the Satanic force

the
dark
tarot



.....

So farewell hope, and with hope farewell fear,
Farewell remorse: all good to me is lost;
Evil be thou my good; by thee at least
Divided empire with heav'n's king I hold
By thee, and more than half perhaps will reign;
As man ere long, and this new world shall know,
– Thus while Satan spake, each passion dimm'd his face
Thrice chang'd with pale, ire, envy and despair,
Which marr'd his borrow'd visage, and betray'd
Him counterfeit, if any eye beheld
For heav'nly minds from such distempers foul
Are ever clear. Whereof he soon aware,
Each perturbation smooth'd with outward calm,
Artificer of fraud; and was the first
That practis'd falsehood under saintly show,
Deep malice to conceal, couch'd with revenge:

.....

Him thus intent Ithuriel with his spear
Touch'd lightly; for no falsehood can endure
Touch of celestial temper, but returns
Of force to its own likeness: up he starts
Discover'd and surpris'd. As when a spark
Lights on a heap of nitrous powder, laid
Fit for the tun some magazine to store
Against a rumour'd war, the smutty grain
With sudden blaze diffus'd, inflames the air:
So started up in his own shape the fiend.

.....

To whom with stern regard thus Gabriel spake,
Why hast thou, Satan, broke the bounds prescrib'd
To thy transgressions, and disturb'd the charge
Of others, who approve not to transgress
By thy example, but have power and right
To question thy bold entrance on this place;

.....

Paradise Lost



the satanic force

the heinous crimes of indian peace keeping

Volume 1

Published by
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Head Quarters Jaffna

First Edition, 1990. Printed in UK

தமிழீழ விடுதலைப் புலிகள்
Liberation
Tigers Of
TAMIL EELAM

தர்மமும் உண்மையும் எமது பக்க

மிருக்கிறது. அதுவே எமது பலம்.

வே. பிரபாகரன்.

COURTESY

DECCAN HERALD

THE STATESMAN

THE INDEPENDENT

The Indian Post

THE TIMES OF INDIA

INDIAN EXPRESS

INDIA WEEK

THE HINDU

The Telegraph

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Current

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The New York Times

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THE AGE

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Peace accord ended lives and hopes

Massacre shatters image of peace-keepers

Murderous minuet's toll of horror

A Nation Disintegrates

Families tell of rapes and killings

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







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SOCIAL JUSTICE

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

M.V. KAMATH

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MOHAN RAM

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BODY-COUNT

S. SIVANAYAGAM

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GEORGE FERNANDEZ

INDIA'S MY-LAI

A.P. VENKATESWARAN

IPKF was a monumental failure

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

Artificer of fraud;
and was the first
That practised falsehood
under saintly show,
Deep malice to conceal,
Couch'd with revenge

. . . As when a spark
Lights on a heap of nitrous powder, laid
Fit for the tun some magazine to store
Against a rumour'd war, the smutty grain
With sudden blaze diffus'd, inflames the air:
So started up in his own shape the fiend.

Why hast thou, Satan, broke the bounds prescrib'd
To thy transgressions, and disturb'd the charge
Of others, who approve not to transgress
By thy example, but have power and right
To question thy bold entrance on this place;

When fate is following in our tracks
Like a madman with a razor in his hand
– Arseniy Tarkovsky

INTRODUCTION

It is now universally acknowledged that the Indian military intervention in the Tamil homeland was a disastrous mistake. The war undertaken by the Indian military establishment against the LTTE was the costliest, the bloodiest and longest protracted armed conflict. It was a humiliating military debacle that severely tarnished the image of India and put at serious stake the 'honour' of the Indian army.

The Indian military intervention served no purpose; it achieved nothing; it was counter-productive. The strategic objectives of the whole military exercise collapsed in face of fierce resistance by the Tiger guerrillas and the brilliant political and diplomatic manoeuvres undertaken by the LTTE leadership. The paradoxical aspect of the Indian military intervention can be best discerned by the end product of the whole exercise. What began as a peace-keeping mission turned out to be a most violent and ruthless war; what began as a disarming process turned out to be a heavily arming programme in the creation of a proxy army called the TNA; what began as a firm commitment and obligation to ensure the physical safety and security of the Tamil speaking people turned out to be a destructive campaign of mass extermination of Tamils and Muslims; what began as a strategic objective of eliminating the LTTE ended up with the emergence of the Tigers as the most powerful politico-military force in the Tamil homeland.

The Indo-LTTE war, which began on the 10th October 1987 as a 72 hour operation, lasted more than 720 days, the longest war ever undertaken by the Indian military establishment. The direct victims of this protracted war were the people of Tamil Eelam. The war brought enormous suffering to the Tamil and Muslim civilian population. The Indian army wanted a quick victory. But it was not forthcoming. Angered, frustrated and demoralized by the heavy toll of casualities, the Indian jawans went wild and ruthless, violating all norms and conventions of warfare. In a desperate attempt to smash through the fierce resistance of the LTTE guerrillas in Jaffna, the Indian armed forces unleashed torrents of artillery and mortar shells indiscriminately against the unguarded civilian targets. The ruthlessness of the attack took a heavy toll of civilian casualties. In the battle of Jaffna which lasted for

more than a fortnight, over two thousand innocent Tamil civilians were killed and nearly five thousand wounded and five hundred thousand people became refugees. The utter callousness by which the civilians were exterminated in cold blood by the advancing Indian columns and untold suffering inflicted on the huge population of helpless refugees made the indian offensive a most barbarous act of inhumanity. The offensive against the LTTE soon became an all-out war against the civilian masses.

The Indian soldiers killed with impunity and the massacres of the innocents became a common feature. The most notorious of the mass killings was the massacre at the Jaffna General hospital during the early days of the Indian campaign. Without any provocation or reason, the Indian military personnel stormed into the hospital senselessly slaughtering over eighty people mostly in-patients and outpatients, doctors and nurses. The monstrous massacre at Pirampaddy Lane, Jaffna, the helicopter borne rocket at the Chavakachcheri market and lately the Valvettiturai massacre amply illustrated the brutality and ruthlessness of the Indian military operations which earned universal condemnation. Unable to cope-up with the increasing resistance of the Tiger guerrillas, the Indian military retaliated on the innocent civilians and adopted repressive methods subjecting our people to merciless persecution. More than six thousand civilians perished during the two year military campaign.

The Indian army became an object of fear and hatred. The people regarded them as an aggressive army occupying their homeland. The myth that the Indian military presence would guarantee the safety and security of the Tamils and Muslims was soon dispelled. Because of this disenchantment the people overwhelmingly supported the armed resistance of the Tamil Tigers. The hostile, irrational behaviour of the Indian army towards the civilian population, the ruthless repressive methods adopted as a collective punishment against the people, the callous disregard to human life and dignity, were the essential factors that led to the estrangement between the people and the Indian army and made the Indian military approach a disastrous failure. The other crucial factor that caused the Indian military debacle was the miscalculation and misconception about the LTTE guerrilla movement – its

Truth has to be lived; not taught. Prepare for battle.

Herman Hesse

manpower, its fire-power and above all its fierce determination to resist. The Indian policy makers, heavily depending on the inaccurate reports provided by RAW miscalculated the strength and motivation of the LTTE and assumed that the Tamil Tigers could be wiped out within days. When the war prolonged indefinitely and when the Indian army faced heavy casualties, Delhi began to realize its folly. The LTTE was not a rag-tag army of sarong clad boys as the Indians assumed. The Indian army was faced with a unique military phenomenon – a well disciplined, highly motivated guerrilla force – one of the best in the world. Delhi was compelled to re-orientate its military strategy. The honour of the Indian army was at stake. Yet, Rajiv rejected the LTTE's pleas for unconditional talks and wanted a quick military victory. India decided to increase its military strength in the occupied areas and to intensify offensive operations against the Tigers. Accordingly, the Indian troops were beefed up to more than one hundred thousand troops and intensified offensive operations under various code names were launched against the LTTE. Jungle trained special commando units were thrown against the LTTE fighters in the northern jungles. Fierce battles raged on several fronts. LTTE fighters withstood the might of the Indian army and were able to inflict heavy casualties on the Indians. The morale of the Indian army began to crumble. After massive military efforts, the Indian army high command realized that the Tiger guerrillas could not be defeated. The price paid in terms of men and money to subdue the Tigers was inconceivably high.

It was at this time, in May 1989, the LTTE leadership responded positively to the call made by President Premadasa and entered into a peace dialogue with the Sri Lanka government. The peace talks in Colombo, between the parties in conflict, severely embarrassed the Indian Government and placed the Indian mediation in serious jeopardy. While the historical enemies talked peace in a cordial atmosphere in Colombo, the war waged by the Indian army against the LTTE on behalf of Sri Lanka became absurd, meaningless and illogical. Confused, humiliated and alienated by the brilliant diplomatic stroke of the LTTE, the Rajiv administration turned hostile towards Sri Lanka and

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

intensified the military offensive against the LTTE, a desperate move which made Indian military intervention ridiculous in the eyes of the international community.

In the Colombo peace talks, the LTTE delegation condemned the atrocities of the Indian army and categorized it as an alien occupation force. The LTTE expressed the view that the Indian troops stationed in the Tamil homeland could not be categorized as a peace keeping force. Taking U.N. conventions of peace keeping models as examples, the LTTE delegates argued: "There are internationally accepted norms and standards of controlling conflicts and promoting peace. A peace-keeping army is a neutral force that stands between two or more conflicting parties or combatants. The main function of a peace keeping exercise is to help to maintain or restore peace in areas of conflict. A peace keeping operation is a conflict control exercise. A peace keeping force in the U.N. tradition is mandated to prevent aggravation of a conflict situation and to create congenial conditions of peace and normalcy which are fundamental pre requisites for settlement of conflicts through peaceful negotiations. A peace-keeping operation involves the deployment of military personnel without enforcement powers. The military personnel are not authorized to use force except in self-defence and they always carry light defensive weapons. An important principle which has been demanded of every peace keeping force is that the peace keeping force should adopt a position of neutrality and non-involvement as far us conflicts are concerned. A peace keeping force should not act in anyway to influence the balance of forces between parties in conflict and that it should not interfere in domestic affairs. The purpose of a peace keeping exercise is to prevent situations from deteriorating and to achieve stabilization of relations between the parties in conflict".

Under the terms and definitions of the U.N. peace keeping tradition, the Indian army could not in anyway be categorized as a peace-keeping force. The Indian forces neither maintained peace nor controlled the conflict. Instead, it waged a violent war, disrupted the peace and aggravated the conflict. It forcefully occupied the Tamil homeland, used enforcement powers and created an authoritarian military regime. The





Indian army never adopted a position of neutrality and non-involvement, instead it was biased and hostile towards the LTTE and fully supported and promoted all the Indian backed quisling groups. It deliberately influenced the balance of forces in the conflict by training and arming certain puppet groups. Instead of peace-keeping, the Indian army assumed entirely a different role and became an active and dominant participant in an armed conflict with one of the combatants of the conflict – the LTTE. The Indian troops therefore violated all accepted norms and practices of peace keeping. The LTTE's contention was that the Indian forces stationed in the Tamil homeland had no essential characteristics of a peace-keeping force, but rather it was an occupation army.

The fierce and determined resistance of the LTTE guerrillas at the battle front and the subtle diplomatic moves during the Colombo talks finally led to a cease-fire between the Indian army and the Tamil Tigers, and eventually secured the total withdrawal of the Indian forces from our homeland. Though the Indian army has completely withdrawn and peace and normalcy have returned, the deep wounds that were inflicted on the soul of the Tamil nation by the occupation army have not been healed. It is our duty and responsibility to expose to the world the despicable war crimes committed by the Indian forces under the pretext of a peace-keeping exercise. *The Satanic force* is a major effort towards this project.

This encyclopaedic documentation illustrates the horrendous story of the heinous crimes committed by the Indian occupation forces in the Tamil homeland. The compilation consists of authentic reports, analyses, reviews, commentaries and critiques of the Indian military intervention and the disastrous consequences that followed. The critics are mostly Indian journalists, authors and columnists whose indepth analyses and objective elucidations expose the hypocritical pretensions of the so-called Indian peace mission and the blunders of the Indian strategic objectives. The entire compilation constitutes itself as a negative critique of India's military mis-adventure and a serious indictment of the war crimes, of the barbaric military atrocities, of the merciless persecutions of the innocent civilian population.

விடுதலைப்
புலிகள்
எங்கள்
காவலர்
இந்திய
PLEASE
OF
INDIA
MOHAN

Hundreds of affidavits detailing extra-judicial executions and inhuman torture and hundreds of photographs vividly depicting the horrors of civilian casualties and monumental damage done to property illustrate the pages of this brilliant documentation.

The diabolical misdeeds of the Indian occupation army is aptly characterized by the biblical concept of SATAN denoting it as an evil force bent on human destruction. The Indian army behaved as a Satanic force, as a devilish destructive force, with a callous and cruel disregard for human life bringing instant death to thousands of innocent lives. The compilation is a bold attempt that documents the monumental tragedy of a small nation of people who have committed no crime other than seeking peace and protection from India against the genocidal onslaughts of the Sinhala armed forces. The Indian forces that invaded our homeland under the pretext of a peace keeping mission left a tragic saga of death and destruction more violent and brutal than the Sinhala army atrocities.

The Indian military authorities in collusion with the Delhi government adopted the most fradulent methods to suppress information of military atrocities leaking to the international community. The Government of India bluntly refused permission to international human rights organizations, i.e., Amnesty International, International Commission of Jurists, International Red Cross to visit Tamil Eelam and to make on the spot investigations. The Indian occupation army sealed off the local media, incarcerated the Tamil journalists and prevented the world media from entering the occupied territory. All the Tamil quisling groups and parties who were installed to power in the Provincial administration and in Parliament with the blessing of the Indian government kept a calculated silence while the Indian army slaughtered our people in thousands. One of the Tamil leaders utilized the Parliament as a platform to defend and praise "the supreme sacrifices" made by the Indian jawans in the "noble cause" of preserving peace and protecting the Tamils. The Government of Sri Lanka under Jayawardane which invited the Indian army to do the dirty job watched the whole episode with callous disinterest as if the Tamils and Muslims were alien people who deserved to be wiped out. Thus, the Indian military had a free hand with unquestionable authority





to kill, rape and plunder. While the Indian military machine went on a mad frenzy of reckless violence breaking every rule of civilized behaviour, the Indian state propaganda machine worked overtime to defend the honour of the Indian army and to praise the glory of Indian democracy.

During the Indian offensive operations, our fighters took extra-ordinary risks to collect information and were able to produce factual accounts of the Indian military barbarities. Whenever our statements were released to the international media, the Indian High Commission in Colombo and the foreign office in Delhi were quick to brand our version as 'malicious terrorist propaganda'. In a diabolical effort to stifle information leaking to the outside world, the Indian army and the Tamil quisling groups, particularly the EPRLF and ENDLF, killed in cold blood several prominent Tamil citizens, human rights workers and Citizens Committee leaders who had been voicing against the Indian military brutalities.

Though the Delhi Government, its diplomatic mission in Colombo and the Indian military authorities in Palaly made every effort to cover-up the war crimes committed by the occupation army, our persevering effort to bring the culprits to book had a positive outcome. Amnesty International, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights as well as the international media ridiculed the Indian peace mission and condemned India for serious human rights violations in the occupied Tamil territory.

The publication of this work, '*The Satanic Force*' will throw more light on the brutalities of the Indian war and heinous crimes committed against our people. The crimes against humanity, wherever they occur, should be brought to book and the perpetrators of such crimes should be exposed to the critical eyes of the world.

We commend our comrades for the diligent and skilled work in compiling this voluminous document to record for history one of the darkest periods in the annals of our liberation struggle.

Politburo
People's Front of Liberation Tigers

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



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

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

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1652. **From peace-keeper to interloper** Ajit Bhattacharjea *The Independent*

1653. **Doomed in Lanka** Editorial *The Statesman*

1653. **Karunanidhi taunts Rajiv on Lanka** *Indian Express*

1654. **An unwanted inheritance** N.J. Nanporia *The Independent*

1655. **Casualties of War**

1656. **Confrontation**

1657. **LTTE Martyrs**

1658. **Lying as a Habit** Ravi Rikhye

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1660. **"The Fear that civil war would follow IPKF pullout was proved wrong"** Balasingham Interview *India Week*



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1678. **Premature Republic** Manik De Silva *FEER*
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1705. **It is a moral issue** Ashok Mitra *Deccan Herald*
1708. **The lessons of Sri Lanka** A.P. Venkateswaran *Indian Express*
1711. **The Tiger country** Mukund Padmanabhan *Sunday*



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

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23 India air-drops relief supplies on Jaffna.

24 Prabhakaran air-lifted from Jaffna to Delhi for discussion.

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28 Prabhakaran meets Rajiv. But does not endorse the Accord. Anti-Accord violence erupts in Colombo.

29 Rajiv signs Accord. Violence continues in South Lanka.

30 Rajiv survives an assault by a Lankan Naval rating. Indian troops begin landing in North-Eastern Lanka.

31 Indian Naval frigates anchor off Colombo. Colombo still under curfew. Arrival of IPKF is officially announced.

The Gandhi Airlift

REPORT

New Delhi's mission to aid the Tamils

The five Soviet-designed An-32 military transports roared across the 22-mile Palk Strait and began their descent over Sri Lanka. Overhead, their swept-back wings glinting in the late afternoon sun, four French-made Mirage jets flew protective cover. At about 1,200 ft., the Indian air force transports opened their giant rear doors and dropped their payload—22.5 tons of food and medicine—over the village of Kokuvil, three miles north of Jaffna. All that was visible below was empty streets and lush greenery as the planes parachuted their cargo to Tamil civilians. Less than an hour later, pilots and crews landed safely at India's Bangalore air force station.

So ended Eagle Mission-4, an operation aimed ostensibly at providing relief for ethnic Tamils caught up in a weeklong offensive by Sri Lankan forces. That the airlift also had a political objective was made clear minutes after the drop as the five An-32s pointedly flew over Palaly, the busiest air base in Sri Lanka. By flaunting its vastly superior air power over its weaker Indian Ocean neighbor, New Delhi gave notice that it no longer considered itself neutral in the four-year-old war between the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government and the separatist guerrilla forces seeking independence for the Tamil minority.

In a note handed to the Sri Lankan High Commissioner in New Delhi, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs called the mission "humanitarian assistance." But to Colombo, it was a "naked violation of Sri Lanka's independence." Colombo's daily *Sun* newspaper called India a "predator of the worst kind." For many, the anger was overshadowed by despair: Sri Lankans know they cannot take on the might of their giant neighbor. Complained a Sinhala shopkeeper bitterly: "They may shout, but when we are in trouble, America and China do nothing to help us." Whatever Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's motives for the drop, its effect was to edge his government perilously close to open conflict—a prospect that neither side wants.



The week began with Sri Lanka's armed forces completing the first phase of Operation Liberation, its long-awaited drive against the Tamil rebel stronghold in the Jaffna Peninsula, which lies opposite India's southern coast. The area's civilians had already endured some hardship from recent fighting and a five-month-long cutoff of fuel supplies and telephone service. Backed by air support and naval gunfire, Sri Lankan troops seized all the territory around Valvaddittural. The town's importance was both strategic and symbolic, since it is an operational center for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the main Tamil separatist group, and the birthplace of its leader, Vilupillai Prabakaran. In the process, government troops sealed off key landing sites for supplies ferried across the straits from Tamil rebel bases in southern India. Colombo claimed that casualties on both sides had been light: 29 soldiers dead and 166 wounded, with 87 guerrillas and 41 Tamil civilians killed.

TIME's Qadri Ismail, who flew aboard a Sri Lankan government plane into newly captured Point Pedro, found little recent battle damage there. But his requests to visit Jaffna and Valvaddittural were denied by Sri Lankan authorities. While many Point Pedro civilians were hungry, the army appeared to be making an effort to bring in supplies. When soldiers in an army truck arrived in the town of Nellandai and began handing out rations, civilians ran to the truck and scuffled with one another over the handouts. A mother with a child in her arms watched helplessly until a journalist noticed her plight and brought her a food packet.

Other army units, meanwhile, were busy mounting a dragnet aimed at depopulating the area of all male Tamils of fighting age. Outside the Pathirakali Amman temple in Nellandai, more than 600 barefoot youths with their hands tied could be seen marching four abreast toward Point Pedro, a mile away. One woman, with tears streaming down her face, cried, "Give me back my son! Why do they take him away?"

"All of them cannot be terrorists," conceded General Cyril Ranatunga, commander of Sri Lankan forces. "But still we will get some of them." At Point Pedro, the youths were lined up against a wall, while rebel defectors, with gunnysacks over their heads to conceal their

O.V. Vijayan, Newstime . 7.6.87



Indian fishing boats embark on a futile attempt to deliver food to civilians

identities, walked down the line pointing out Tiger suspects. The few who were recognized were separated from the group. The rest were put aboard a ship waiting at sea. Their destination: Boosa detention camp, 300 miles from their homes. "To me," said Captain Lal Ariyatilleke, "the most difficult part of the campaign was not the fighting, but separating husbands from wives and sons from their mothers."

Increasingly, all sides in the war have become captives of their own rhetoric. India has long tried to mediate the conflict, even as it was arming and training the Tamil rebels. When the Sri Lankan government launched Operation Liberation, Gandhi began demanding an outright halt to Colombo's offensive. Last Monday, Sri Lankan forces ended their campaign after taking Point Pedro. But Tamil terrorists ambushed a bus in Eastern province on Tuesday, gunning down 32 passengers, including 29 Buddhist monks. Next day a car bomb exploded outside the 300-year-old army fort in Jaffna, followed by a deadly rebel mortar barrage that left three soldiers dead and 42 wounded. The attacks, coming after Sri Lankan President Junius Jayewardene had just been perceived as giving in to



Relief packages being dropped by parachute

Colombo called it a violation of sovereignty.

New Delhi, left him with little room for further concessions.

At midweek Jayewardene faced yet another demand. Indian officials requested that his government permit a fleet of Indian fishing vessels to deliver relief supplies directly to Jaffna, where more than one-third of Sri Lanka's 2 million Tamils reside. Jayewardene's response: No relief was necessary, but if India insisted, its boats could deliver their supplies to Sri Lankan officials for distribution by them. Under no circumstances, he emphasized, would any unauthorized flotilla from India be permitted to violate Sri Lankan territory.

India dispatched the boats anyway, 20 in all, with one of them carrying nearly 100 journalists who had been flown by the government aboard an Indian Airlines jet to the staging area in the port of Rameswaram. Led by the *Vikram*, an unarmed Indian coast guard vessel, the flotilla set out late Wednesday and reached a point eleven miles from Sri Lankan shores just before dark.

To no one's surprise, three Sri Lankan frigates were visible on the horizon, already in position to bar the flotilla's progress. Darkness fell, and rough seas threatened to swamp the small craft. When the frigates radioed the flotilla to halt, the Indian boats turned back to Rameswaram. The fleet's interdiction prompted a stinging rebuke from New Delhi. Colombo's intransigence, said an Indian government spokesman, "makes it clear that the government of Sri Lanka is determined to continue to deny the people of Jaffna their basic human rights."

Seeking to maximize its public relations impact, New Delhi then diverted the journalists returning from Rameswaram to the An-32 transports that were already loaded and poised for takeoff in Bangalore. This time Sri Lanka had no means to resist. Its air force has no jets, and its only antiaircraft guns date to World War II. The government in Colombo was reduced to a verbal riposte, denouncing the violation of its airspace as an "outrage" and an "act of cowardice."

The airdrop dramatized Gandhi's new assertiveness, and his actions were generally lauded in India. One of the few voices of dissent was an editorial in the *Statesman* of New Delhi that called the attempted sea lift "gunboat diplomacy" and warned that "India appears to have become an active participant in the conflict."

That was putting it mildly. Gandhi claimed that India's attempts to mediate a peaceful solution between the Sri Lankan government and the rebels had not succeeded because the government had virtually declared "war" in Jaffna. Combined with an earlier statement that India would no longer remain an "indifferent spectator" to the plight of the Tamils, Gandhi's words seem to convey that further intervention by New Delhi was not only possible but probable. —***By Lloyd Garrison. Reported by Qadri Ismail/Point Pedro and Venkat Narayan/Rameswaram***

JUNE 15, 1987

SUNDAY

14—20 June 1987





O.V. Vijayan, The Statesman

Soon after coming to power, Rajiv Gandhi saw Jayewardene's inner compulsions and mounted pressure on the LTTE, largely through its father-figure, the Tamil Nadu chief minister, M.G. Ramachandran, to settle its differences with Colombo. But Romesh Bhandari, the then foreign secretary, seemed to convince the Prime Minister that there was little substance in the LTTE demand for an autonomous stretch of land covering the northern and the eastern provinces of Sri Lanka because Tamil-majority areas in the state were not contiguous. They are, in fact, contiguous. So, when Bhandari and Hector Jayewardene, the President's lawyer brother, hammered out a draft agreement in August 1985, based on the factually incorrect premise, many Tamils thought it was a sellout and the LTTE boycotted all official-level discussions.

Since then, Rajiv Gandhi's Sri Lanka policy has changed considerably, having come round to the old view that the island's Tamil problem can be solved only in a quasi-federal set-up in which, without undermining the territorial sovereignty of Sri Lanka, its minorities can enjoy limited autonomy. Throughout the second half of last year, Rajiv Gandhi got the union minister of state for internal security, P. Chidambaram, to work out the modalities of a settlement based on this principle. But while the proposals were finally fleshed out on 19 December in Colombo, the Jayewardene government suddenly imposed an embargo on fuel supplies to Jaffna on 30 December.

Someone obviously has to pick up the chord of negotiations from where it has snapped. India will lose all leverage *vis-a-vis* Colombo if it has to repeat its show of strength. Already Sri Lanka's 18,000-strong Buddhist clergy has been spewing venom at "Hindu India" in public rallies. In Colombo's Haltsdorf Court Complex in the beginning of June, a demonstration of lawyers led by Hector Jayewardene held aloft placards which read, "Hands off, India" and "Exit Dixit". The island's *Daily News* published a doggerel in its editorial page, which said: "Rajiv, you should hang your head in shame/Although you bear the great Mahatma's name."

It is unlikely that Colombo will invite India to begin mediation efforts soon. It is also possible that Sri Lanka will now turn more vigorously to its Western allies, and also Pakistan, for increased military assistance, because, as Athulathmudali says, "When threatened by a big neighbour, small countries always try to get even by inviting outside powers." But, drifting into the Sri Lankan skies for just about 15 minutes, India has only casually waved a stick after the carrot failed to work. **Sumit Mitra/**

REPORT

Bitter Mood

AN Indian ship carrying relief supplies finally berthed at Kankesanthurai, the northern-most Sri Lankan port, last fortnight. But New Delhi could have chosen a ship with a less provocative name. *Island Pride* can only add salt to Sri Lankan wounds. Anti-India demonstrations are still held every other day before the Indian High Commission in Colombo while Prime Minister R. Premadasa leads the protracted, propagandist, anti-India war, passionately supported by the media.

The Sinhala middle class, in particular, is seething with anger, more because the manner of intervention has been so bitterly humiliating. Perhaps an invasion by a power a hundred times stronger, would have been preferred. In the case of the Sinhalese opposed to the ruling United National Party (UNP), the question is whether India or their own regime is the main enemy.

The wily opposition leader, Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike, has partially resolved that contradiction. She, her son Anura, who is leader of the Opposition, and their Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) have condemned the Indian violation of sovereignty. But she also blames the Jayewardene Government, its anti-India policy, ineptness and inconsistency. A government that cannot defend the country's sovereignty must resign, she said last week, adding: "My foreign policy of genuine non-alignment and friendship with neighbours was our first line of defence." She then went on to demand a "restoration of democracy" and found all other opposition parties, including the rival three-party left alliance, responding to her slogan.

With the arrival of the *Island Pride* and relief supplies likely to be a two-week operation, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have announced a unilateral ceasefire—an assurance to the Indian Government—and expressed the hope that the army will do the same. Though there have been sporadic clashes, the drop in casualty figures reflects the sharp scaling down of the fighting, which effectively ended with the Indian air-drop. As part of this politico-military struggle, four cabinet ministers also flew to the north to appear on television, distributing food and talking freely to local people.

Recent happenings trouble those Sri Lankans who realise that the alienation of the Tamils in the north may reach a point of no-return, and psychologically, if not physically, a 'separate' state may come into being. Prominent US Congressman Stephen Solarz, said last week that if a political settlement is not reached soon, the Tamil north will become South Asia's Ulster. The current situation suggests that Jaffna has already gone beyond Ulster.

The Tigers in the Jaffna peninsula have gone strictly by the book—on guerrilla warfare. With the exception of Jaffna city, they have withdrawn in the face of the armoured might of the Sri Lankan forces, particularly in the Vadamarachi area on the north-eastern coastal flank, where the army has the advantage of the sea behind its back and naval protection. If the Tigers' reflex was a classic guerrilla response, so was the Sri Lankan Army's. It has established nine new camps, extended the defence perimeters of all camps, dug trenches, fortified forward positions and gone through the predictable exercise of consolidation. The question being asked last week was whether it can hold, patrol and defend the "liberated zone". The Tigers have meanwhile strengthened their positions in Jaffna, the key in this highly complex political-military conflict which not only involves the two combatants but also the politics of this island country and India as also—overtly or covertly—Pakistan, Israel, China, Britain and the US.

Politics in the Sinhala south is the great neglected factor in both India's Sri Lankan policy as well as in foreign media reportage of the island's crisis that has also gone beyond its original boundaries of an ethnic conflict. In July, the UNP will celebrate its tenth anniversary in office, the longest of any regime in an island accustomed to "throwing the rascals out" every five years. Besides electoral exhaustion and impatience, there is the long-suppressed anger of the Sinhala constituency over how this longevity was acquired.

Rajiv Gandhi has said that he had two objectives in mind while making the air-drop: help for the Tamils and a message to Colombo that Delhi cannot be a silent spectator to a military onslaught on the civilians of Jaffna. He might have added a third. The Tamils were being told that in the final analysis, it was not the Tigers or even Tamil Nadu which could be their protector but the Indian state.

Delhi has also urged the Tigers and others to work out some reasonably acceptable regional autonomy formula. If this will lead to a resumption of talks, and the talks pave the way to a settlement, Rajiv's 'benign intervention' will make his assertion of regional paramountcy more meaningful. But it is only after Minister for National Security Lalith Athulathmudali's return to the island from Pakistan and the US that the Government's next move will be known. Pakistan, top favourite in the local media, will obviously have much to do with it.

—MERVYN DE SILVA in Colombo

"Some people understand only one kind of language. . . !"

Sudhir Dar, The Hindustan Times.

LTTE rejects accord
Rajiv Gandhi going to Colombo tomorrow

NEWS

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI, July 27.

The Government of India today formally announced the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's plan for a two-day State visit to Sri Lanka from Wednesday which, it is known, will be utilised for signing an umbrella agreement, enshrining the political solution of the ethnic issue in Sri Lanka. The move for an accord however suffered a setback as LTTE announced its rejection of the new package tonight.

Notable for its boldness, New Delhi's decision obviously took into account not only the provisions of the draft agreement, but also its relevance and importance in the wider political context. In the pursuit of its objective, New Delhi made, for the second consecutive day, determined efforts to dispel the misgivings of some Tamil groups. By a strange coincidence, the draft agreement was opposed by a section of Tamil militants, and by the Sri Lankan Prime Minister, Mr. Premadasa.

An official announcement this evening said: "At the invitation of the President of Sri Lanka, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene and Mrs. Jayewardene, the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, accompanied by Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, will pay a State visit to Sri Lanka on July 29 and 30." The announcement put an end to speculation over the possibility of delay in regard to the visit because of reservations expressed by the Tamil groups, notably the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. It came at the end of the day-long discussions at various levels with the Tamil groups.

That LTTE had taken a tough line was clear since yesterday but its total rejection of the new package tonight gave a new negative dimension to the current efforts to resolve the ethnic problem. They, Mr. Prabakaran said, would not be a party to the signing of the agreement between India and Sri Lanka.

In an earlier development, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Mr. M. G. Ramachandran had a one-hour meeting with the Prime Minister. Mr. Ramachandran presumably acquainted Mr. Gandhi with the outcome of his discussions with Mr. Prabakaran.

An act of betrayal, says LTTE chief

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI, July 27.

Announcing the rejection of the accord, the LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran, described it as an act of betrayal and affirmed his resolve to continue the armed struggle in Sri Lanka.

He based his concern and disappointment on the provision requiring them to surrender their arms. He was opposed to the disarming of the militants until the military camps in their areas were dismantled.

In a strongly-worded statement, he blamed the Prime Minister for having betrayed their trust. They had come to Delhi, he said without any idea of the proposal, but appeared to have "walked into a trap." The LTTE, which so far had to reckon with the Sri Lankan army, might have to face the Indian Army as well, he said.

Govt. disappointed: An official spokesman expressed deep disappointment with the LTTE's stand. He noted that all the other Tamil organisations had agreed to extend support and expressed full confidence that the Government of India's efforts would meet the legitimate aspirations of the Tamils in Sri Lanka.

The spokesman also said the talks were still continuing with the LTTE and hoped that they would understand that the Government of India remained committed to a political solution which would not compromise with the legitimate interests of the Tamils. This had been recognised by all the other Tamil groups.

PTI reports:

'Disappointing': Mr. Prabakaran, told PTI that the accord would remain "only on paper" as it had been drawn up ignoring the Tamils' aspirations.

Describing Mr. Gandhi's decision to sign the accord as "disappointing and shocking" the LTTE chief said it amounted to "a stab in the back of Tamils". He said the LTTE least expected the Government of India to "let down the Tamils" who had suffered immensely and were now totally exposed to the Sri Lankan military offensive.

The LTTE leader said his group would not adhere to the truce which formed the main plank of the 17-point peace plan and added it would not lay down arms until the Sri Lankan Government dismantled the nearly 200 Army

camps established in the last one year in the Tamil areas and Army moved to barracks.

The LTTE delegation, he said, was 'tricked' into coming to Delhi for talks. They were merely told that the Prime Minister wanted to hold talks with them to clear certain misunderstandings. Only on arrival here were they informed that an "unsatisfactory accord" was to be signed by the two Governments, he said.

Mr. Prabakaran wondered why the Government of India had toed the line of the Sri Lankan Government and tried to 'thrust' a 'preconceived' plan on Tamils. He felt piqued that the entire Indian exercise in Delhi was aimed at getting their consent and not for consultations for improvement.

While the other groups chose to give their acceptance and reservations on the proposals

"Let them take away our arms. But the peacekeeping force proposed to be deployed will have to protect the Tamils' lives and properties. When we are disarmed at the instance of India though we are the sole protectors of our people, India will be held responsible for atrocities on Tamils", he said.

Premadasa wants referendum first

COLOMBO, July 27.

The Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, Mr. Ranasinghe Premadasa, has urged the postponement of the visit of the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi to Colombo to sign a peace agreement to end the country's civil war until other proposals are considered, Government sources said.

The President of Sri Lanka, Mr. Junius Jayewardene appeared, however, determined to sign the agreement with Mr. Gandhi on Wednesday.

Mr. Premadasa expressed his reservations during an extraordinary two-and-a-half-hour Cabinet session called by Mr. Jayewardene to discuss the proposal, the sources said.

Mr. Premadasa, who returned here on Sunday from a foreign tour, called for a national referendum on the matter before signing the accord that would merge the Tamil-dominated Northern and Eastern regions of Sri Lanka.

It was not known if the Agriculture Minister, Mr. Gamini Jayesuriya, who had also opposed the proposal, pressed home his reported threat to resign from the Cabinet.

Political observers attached considerable significance to the fact that Mr. Premadasa, a bitter critic of India's involvement in the ethnic tangle, went to the Cabinet meeting in his private car.

These observers felt that Mr. Premadasa's action provided added substance to the speculation that he might quit the Cabinet

The Cabinet met amid mounting opposition to the peace deal with India. The Indian High Commissioner, Mr.J. N. Dixit, who flew back here today, was in a Cabinet ante-room

R.K. Lakshman, Times of India

THE HINDU

PM disappointed at LTTE stand

From Our Special Correspondent

NEWS

NEW DELHI, July 28.

The Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi expressed his disappointment at his meeting with the Opposition leaders here today that the LTTE had reservations on this accord. He added that the LTTE had asked that the safety and security of its personnel be ensured and he had told them that the Sri Lankan Government had given the assurance that this would be done. Mr. Gandhi also noted that the other Tamil groups had welcomed the agreement.

The Prime Minister made it clear in this meeting that attempts to reduce the gap between the LTTE and the Government of India's approach to a settlement were continuing.

PTI reports:

The Prime Minister made it clear that there was no change in his plan to leave for Sri Lanka tomorrow morning, to sign the accord with the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene.

Mr. Gandhi explained how India would be involved in ensuring that peace returned to the island. One of the features of the agreement was that hostilities would cease within 24 hours of the signing. Another important feature was the assurances received on the linking of the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

The accord contained provisions for the sending of Indian observers, induction of a peacekeeping force, the return of Sri Lankan refugees in India and of Indians still awaiting repatriation.

About the reservations expressed by the LTTE, the Prime Minister said its attitude was very disappointing since the LTTE had accepted all the major proposals earlier, though it had reservations regarding the withdrawal of army camps. The issue was taken up with the Sri Lankan Government and even on that "we got the Sri Lankan President to agree"

At a meeting with Mr. M. G. Ramachandran, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister in Madras later, the LTTE had fully accepted the proposals. In Delhi now they had gone back, he said.

Safety assured: The Government was looking into why this had happend. One of the reasons could be apprehensions about safety and security. "We will certainly ensure their safety and security," Mr. Gandhi assured.

The Prime Minister said the LTTE consisted mainly of 2,000 young people. Barring them, all the Sri Lankan Tamil groups had welcomed the agreement.

To a question from Mr. Samar Mukherjee (CPI-M) about the time factor involved, Mr. Gandhi said, the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities would come into effect immediately. The full details of the accord would be published tomorrow.



India, Sri Lanka sign agreement

From K. K. Katyal

COLOMBO, July 29.

India and Sri Lanka today signed an agreement—described big and unusual by the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi—that provides for a set mechanism to safeguard the interest of the Tamil minority, envisages a role for India in its implementation and most important of all, takes into account the security concerns of India in the region.

In all, seven out of 29 Ministers kept away from the functions connected with the agreement.

Delhi provides guarantee

At a simple but elegant ceremony in an amiable atmosphere, Mr. Gandhi and the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, appended their signatures to a six-page document, committing the two countries to a cooperative approach not only in regard to the limited issue of resolving the ethnic problem but also in a much wider concept. The vastness of its sweep and the boldness of its approach did not go unnoticed.

Particularly notable is the provision that the "Government of India will underwrite and guarantee" the accord and cooperate in the implementation of its provisions. India, for instance, could send a peace-keeping contingent at the invitation of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the ceasefire. Then there is the omnibus provision that at Sri Lanka's request India would afford military assistance to enable it to implement the agreement.

As important as the agreement is its annexure and the letters exchanged by the Prime Minister and Mr. Jayewardene. Whether the contents of the letters have the same force and status as the provisions of the agreement remains unclear, despite a specific query on the subject at the press conference by the two leaders. However, there is no doubting the significance and far-reaching implications of the points agreed upon by them. All this shows the complete appreciation of India's security perceptions and takes care of the irritants that have arisen in the past—be that in regard to the use of the strategic Sri Lankan port of Trincomalee, the use of foreign military personnel in Sri Lanka or the use of the Sri Lankan broadcasting services by outside powers.

Boycott by Ministers

From K. K. Katyal

COLOMBO, July 29.

The Sri Lankan Prime Minister, Mr. Ranasinghe Premadasa, and at least two Ministers stayed away from the official reception accorded by their President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, to the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, on his arrival here today. The Ministers, conspicuous by their absence were, Mr. Lalith Athulathmudali, Internal Security, and Mr. Gamini Jayasuriya, Agriculture.

This was the first glimpse of the open manifestation of the strains and differences in the Sri Lankan Government over the signing of the 17-point accord with India — the purpose of Mr. Gandhi's visit — as also the political solution of the ethnic problem enshrined in it. Mr. Premadasa and some of his colleagues had not minced words in decrying the accord in the last few days.



Ramamoorthy, Deccan Herald, 29.6.87

Indo-Sri Lanka Accord

DOCUMENT

FOLLOWING is the text of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement to Establish Peace and Normalcy in Sri Lanka:

The Prime Minister of the Republic of India, His Excellency Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and the President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, His Excellency Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, having met at Colombo on July 29, 1987:

Attaching utmost importance to nurturing, intensifying and strengthening the traditional friendship of India and Sri Lanka, and acknowledging the imperative need of resolving the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka, and the consequent violence, and for the safety, well-being and prosperity of people belonging to all communities in Sri Lanka,

Have this day entered into the following Agreement to fulfil this objective.

In this context,

1.1. *desiring* to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka;

1.2. *acknowledging* that Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and a multi-lingual plural society consisting, *inter alia*, of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors) and Burghers;

1.3. *recognising* that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which has to be carefully nurtured;

1.4. *also recognising* that the Northern and the Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups;

1.5. *conscious* of the necessity of strengthening the forces contributing to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving its character as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious plural society, in which all citizens can live in equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and fulfil their aspirations;

2. *Resolve that:*

2.1. Since the Government of Sri Lanka proposes to permit adjoining provinces to join to form one administrative unit and also by a referendum to separate as may be permitted to the Northern and Eastern Provinces as outlined below:

2.2. During the period, which shall be considered an interim period, i.e. from the date of the elections to the Provincial Council, as specified in para 2.8., to the date of the referendum, as specified in para 2.3., the Northern and Eastern Provinces, as now constituted, will form one administrative unit, having one elected Provincial Council. Such a unit will have one Governor, one Chief Minister and one Board of Ministers.

2.3. There will be a referendum on or before 31st December 1988 to enable the people of the Eastern Province to decide whether:

(a) The Eastern Province should remain linked with the Northern Province as one administrative unit, and continue to be governed together with the Northern Province as specified in para 2.2., or

(b) The Eastern Province should constitute a separate administrative unit having its own distinct Provincial Council with a separate Governor, Chief Minister and Board of Ministers.

The President may, at his discretion, decide to postpone such a referendum.

2.4. All persons who have been displaced due to ethnic violence, or other reasons, will have the right to vote in such a referendum. Necessary conditions to enable them to return to areas from where they were displaced will be created.

2.5. The referendum, when held, will be monitored by a committee headed by the Chief Justice; a member appointed by the President, nominated by the Government of Sri Lanka; and a member appointed by the President, nominated by the representatives of the Tamil speaking people of the Eastern Province.

2.6. A simple majority will be sufficient to determine the result of the referendum.

2.7. Meetings and other forms of propaganda, permissible within the laws of the country, will be allowed before the referendum.

2.8. Elections to Provincial Councils will be held within the next three months, in any event before 31st December 1987. Indian observers will be invited for elections to the Provincial Council of the North and East.

2.9. The Emergency will be lifted in the Eastern and Northern Provinces by August 15, 1987. A cessation of hostilities will come into effect all over the Island within 48 hours of the signing of this Agreement. All arms presently held by militant groups will be surrendered in accordance with an agreed procedure to authorities to be designated by the Government of Sri Lanka.

Consequent to the cessation of hostilities and the surrender of arms by militant groups, the Army and other security personnel will be confined to barracks in camps as on 25th May 1987. The process of surrendering of arms and the confining of security personnel moving back to barracks shall be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities coming into effect.

2.10. The Government of Sri Lanka will utilise for the purpose of law enforcement and maintenance of security in the Northern and Eastern Provinces the same organisations and mechanisms of Government as are used in the rest of the country.

2.11. The President of Sri Lanka will grant a general amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other Emergency laws, and to combatants, as well as to those persons accused, charged and/or convicted under these laws. The Government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate militant youth with a view to bringing them back into the mainstream of national life. India will cooperate in the process.

2.12. The Government of Sri Lanka will accept and abide by the above provisions and expect all others to do likewise.

2.13. If the framework for the resolutions is accepted, the Government of Sri Lanka will implement the relevant proposals forthwith.

2.14. The Government of India will underwrite and guarantee the resolutions, and cooperate in the implementation of these proposals.

2.15. These proposals are conditional to an acceptance of the proposals negotiated from 4-5-1986 to 19-12-1986. Residual matters not finalised during the above negotiations shall be resolved between India and Sri Lanka within a period of *six* weeks of signing this Agreement. These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India cooperating directly with the Government of Sri Lanka in their implementation.

2.16. These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India taking the following actions if any militant groups operating in Sri Lanka do not accept this framework of proposals for a settlement, namely,

(a) India will take all necessary steps to ensure that Indian territory is not used for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka.

(b) The Indian Navy/Coast Guard will cooperate with the Sri Lankan Navy in preventing Tamil militant activities from affecting Sri Lanka.

(c) In the event that the Government of Sri Lanka requests the Government of India to afford military assistance to implement these proposals, the Government of India will cooperate by giving to the Government of Sri Lanka such military assistance as and when requested.

(d) The Government of India will expedite repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian citizens to India who are resident there, concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu.

(e) The Governments of India and Sri Lanka will cooperate in ensuring the physical security and safety of all communities inhabiting the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

2.17. The Government of Sri Lanka shall ensure free, full and fair participation of voters from all communities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in electoral processes envisaged in this Agreement. The Government of India will extend full cooperation to the Government of Sri Lanka in this regard.

2.18. The official language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala. Tamil and English will also be official languages.

3.This Agreement and the Annexure thereto shall come into force upon signature.

In witness whereof we have set our hands and seals hereunto.

Done in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on this the twentyninth day of July of the year one thousand nine hundred and eighty seven, in duplicate, both texts being equally authentic.

Rajiv Gandhi
Prime Minister
of the
Republic of
India

Junius Richard
Jayewardene
President of the
Democratic Socialist
Republic of
Sri Lanka

Annexure to the agreement

1. His Excellency the Prime Minister of India and His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka agree that the referendum mentioned in paragraph 2 and its sub-paragraphs of the Agreement will be observed by a representative of the Election Commission of India to be invited hy His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka.

2. Similarly, both Heads of Government agree that the elections to the Provincial Council mentioned in paragraph 2.8 of the Agreement will be observed by a representative of the Government of India to be invited by the President of Sri Lanka.

3. His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka agrees that the Home Guards would be disbanded and all paramilitary personnel will be withdrawn from the Eastern and Northern Provinces with a view to creating conditions conducive to fair elections to the Council.

The President, in his discretion, shall absorb such paramilitary forces, which came into being due to ethnic violence, into the regular security forces of Sri Lanka.

4. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka agree that the Tamil militants shall surrender their arms to authorities agreed upon to be designated by the President of Sri Lanka. The surrender shall take place in the presence of one senior representative each of the Sri Lanka Red Cross and the Indian Red Cross.

5. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka agree that a joint Indo-Sri Lankan observer group consisting of qualified representatives of the Government of India and the Government of Sri Lanka would monitor the cessation of hostilities from 31st July 1987.

6. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka also agree that in terms of paragraph 2.14 and paragraph 2.16(c) of the Agreement, an Indian peace keeping contingent may be invited by the President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities, if so required. □

The exchange of letters

Following is the text of Sri Lankan President J. R. Jayewardene's reply to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's letter of July 29, 1987:

Excellency,

Please refer to your letter dated the 29th July, 1987, which reads as follows:

Excellency,

Conscious of the friendship between our two countries stretching over two millennia and more, and *recognising* the importance of nurturing this traditional friendship, it is imperative that both Sri Lanka and India reaffirm the decision not to allow our respective territories to be used for activities prejudicial to each other's unity, territorial integrity and security.

2. In this spirit, you had, during the course of our discussions, agreed to meet some of India's concerns as follows:

(i) Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view to ensuring that such presences will not prejudice Indo-Sri Lankan relations.

(ii) Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests.

(iii) The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee oil tank farm will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka.

(iv) Sri Lanka's agreements with foreign broadcasting organisations will be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence purposes.

3. In the same spirit, India will:

(i) Deport all Sri Lankan citizens who are found to be engaging in terrorist activities or advocating separatism or secessionism.

(ii) Provide training facilities and military supplies for Sri Lankan security forces.

4. India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a joint consultative mechanism to continuously review matters of common concern in the light of the objectives stated in para 1 and specifically to monitor the implementation of other matters contained in this letter.

5. Kindly confirm, Excellency, that the above correctly sets out the agreement reached between us.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,
Sd/-
(Rajiv Gandhi)

His Excellency
Mr. J. R. Jayewardene,
President of the Democratic Socialist
Republic of Sri Lanka,
Colombo

This is to confirm that the above correctly sets out the understanding reached between us.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(J. R. Jayewardene)

His Excellency

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi,
Prime Minister of the Republic of India,
New Delhi

THE HINDU

India's help sought

From N. Ram

COLOMBO, July 29.

The Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, is seeking immediate military cooperation and assistance from India to create a conducive atmosphere right at the start for an effective and trouble free implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement, according to well informed sources here.

This means India's peace keeping force might be in place in the northern and eastern regions of the island within the next couple of days, so that the mutual process of demilitarisation of the situation — following the formal cessation of hostilities which is due to take effect within 24 hours of the signing of the agreement — can take place smoothly.

Time frame: The India-Sri Lanka Agreement to Establish Peace and Normalcy in Sri Lanka, signed today by the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, and Mr. Jayewardene, specifically provides that 'in the event that the Government of Sri Lanka requests the Government of India to afford military assistance to implement these proposals, the Government of India will cooperate by giving to the Government of Sri Lanka, such military assistance as and when requested". The text of the agreement also specified a 72-hour time frame after the ceasefire comes into effect within which the process of the militants surrendering arms and security forces returning to barracks and to the pre-Vadamarachi offensive situation (as on May 25, 1987) is to be completed.

Mr. Jayewardene indicated in Wednesday's press conference in Colombo, in response to a question raised by THE HINDU, that he was agreeable to giving more time for the mutual process, that he would also ensure in the meantime that the Sri Lankan Armed Forces strictly observed discipline and restraint.

In response to the LTTE expressing its concern and apprehension about the security or safety question for the Tamils during the initial period of implementation of the bilateral agreement, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi is believed to have made clear to the LTTE leaders, Mr. V. Prabhakaran and Mr. A. Balasingam, that India would provide assurances on this point in cooperation with the Government of Sri Lanka and would come up with a practical safety-assuring proposition right from the start of implementation.

Credible guarantee: The idea of an Indian peace-keeping force representing a credible guarantee and a key safety factor for the implementation of the agreement, which has boldly taken on the challenge of finding a peaceful political solution to the ethnic conflict appears to have ready acceptance from Mr. Jayewardene. His current mood and approach openly stresses friendship with India as a guarantee for Sri Lanka's unity and well-being and even publicly acknowledges that "mistakes" were made in the past. In the current troubled situation in Sri Lanka, this mood and approach must be considered distinctly forward looking.

Indian troops land in Jaffna

NEWS

From K. K. Katyal

COLOMBO, July 30.

Close on the heels of the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement, some 1,500 Indian troops, constituting the 'peace-keeping force', landed today in the Jaffna peninsula at Colombo's request. IAF planes carried the troops to the Palaly camp, the largest in the peninsula.

Indian troops will be at Colombo's disposal: Dixit

THE HINDU, August 1, 1987.



Within 24 hours of the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, Indian peace-keeping force has arrived in Jaffna area.

INTERVIEW

On July 30, Sri Lanka's 82-year-old President, a veteran of many political and ideological battles over many decades, looked cool and relaxed at his desk, in dramatic contrast to the atmosphere outside—at that juncture, there was extensive violence on the streets and curfew outside, several of the civilian faces on view looked glum or burdened with anxiety over the affairs of state, and it was an open secret that there were bitter differences within the Cabinet.

President Jayewardene made it clear to me, in his on-the-record as well as off-the-record conversation, that while he was not underestimating the forces ranged against the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement and the bold attempt to resolve the ethnic conflict politically through this agreement, he was not overestimating them either.

Here is a sample of the responses in an interview that represented vintage JR, at his political, tactical and intellectual best:

N. Ram: Mr. President, could you give us your perspective on Indo-Sri Lanka relations today?

President JR: My attitude to India? That has never changed. I am a lover of India, a friend of its people and a follower of its greatest son.

Q: Are you happy with the results of this visit by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and with the discussions?

A: I am happy so far as the governments of the two countries are concerned. I am very unhappy with the way some of our people have behaved. A set of hooligans and thugs murdering people, causing other harm to individuals, property. That's not the way democratic people behave.

Q: What do you expect to happen in the next few days and weeks?

A: If those whom I call terrorists or separatists disarm, as the accord wishes them to do—genuinely, fully, without having to have recourse to arms or laws—the first steps to true friendship will begin. That is fundamental, essential. The army will go back to barracks.

Q: You can call it a process of de-militarisation of the situation?

A: Yes, if you like. A cessation of hostilities, not a ceasefire.

Q: Do you have a message for the Sri Lankan Tamils?

A: The message is: Forgive. I have forgiven them—if they lay down arms. Join the mainstream of political life and be elected into positions of power.

Q: Do you have any specific thought on what the moderates should do and what Mr. Prabakaran should do?

A: All should do the same thing..... Lay down arms. It is a primitive method. Prabakaran must change his mind. He must become a good democrat.....

Q: Mr. Jayewardene, you have had very long experience in the politics and governance of this nation and also in international and regional relations. And surely you have instincts and certain perceptions that would be a guide to understanding the present..... It is a tangled situation so far as we can make it out. What is your own sense of the situation?

A: Ram (laughs), I am going to use your own words. I have to untangle the Gordion knot and to do that this agreement must be implemented—sincerely, fully, in all its aspects. I intend to do that. I want India, which is also a signatory, to do it—and to get the separatist groups, violent and non-violent, to accept and follow it. I have no touch with them. If they lay down arms, I will be in touch with them. Those (on the Sinhala side) who are doing what they are doing are doing it largely through ignorance. And they are being inflamed by a Sinhalese terrorist group working among the Sinhalese people. They won't be able to do it if they understand the accord and see it implemented.....

Q: And you are determined to see this through?

A: Democratically, yes. Right to the end, I'll go..... There will be no problems if we implement the agreement.....

Q: The general impression is that it is a historic role you are playing now, but it could go either way.....

A: It will go only one way. I'm sure of that. If, as I said, all those who are signatories adhere to the accord, implement it and get others who are necessary to support it. Let me say this to you. I will bring my whole Cabinet to Jaffna if this is implemented..... and if democracy is returned to the Northern and Eastern provinces. They can choose their leaders by vote.

August 8-21, 1987

High grade input

HOW was the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement negotiated and clinched?

Many of the ideas, and certainly the guiding principles for a settlement, were available from the previous "good offices" endeavours of India. But there was one very major point of departure and this had to be cleared politically at the very top — by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. This was a departure from the role of "good offices" which had attempted to bring the two parties to the ethnic dispute together, narrow the understanding and communication gap, and to make *them* negotiate a peaceful, political settlement. This "good offices" role held for most of the period since 1983.

The change of India's role—from *promoter* to *party* to the settlement with a direct involvement in *guaranteeing* and *underwriting* its structure and framework and in *cooperating* in its implementation—cannot possibly be overestimated in a qualitative sense. It made all the difference to what appeared intractable. This reflected a major political decision taken by the Prime Minister, that became a Cabinet decision and very quickly, state policy.

By all accounts and by every test of performance, the professional Foreign Office input into the exercise was high-grade during this sensitive period. High Commissioner J. N. Dixit played a leading role in building on the sound basis identified, in tying up the details, in getting over or round obstacles, and in getting the agreement in place, ready to sign, by July 29. Foreign Secretary K. P. S. Menon and his colleagues, working closely with the Prime Minister's office, provided solid encouragement and support to Dixit's endeavours and also the important element of professional coordination.

This bold but close-to-the-ground professional input, which has hardly been reported in the media in any substantive sense, forms a real contrast to the high-flying, compromising and eventually very negative role played by Romesh Bhandari when he was Foreign Secretary and even thereafter, in shaping India's policy towards the Tamil question in Sri Lanka. □

N.R.

THE HINDU

Sri Lankan sailor hits P.M. with butt of gun

Rajiv ducks, escapes with minor injury

PIB

The attacker collared.

NEWS

From K. K. Katyal

COLOMBO, July 30.

The Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, this morning escaped a determined bid on his life, as a Sri Lankan Navy sailor hit him with the butt of his gun during the inspection of a guard of honour—a part of the official sendoff on the eve of Mr. Gandhi's departure for Delhi.

What was a formal sendoff outside the Sri Lankan President Mr. J. R. Jayewardene's official residence in the heart of the city took an ugly turn at a time and place, least expected for such an attempt. The Prime Minister suffered bruises on his head and shoulder and could have sustained a serious head injury, had he not ducked in a quick reflex action. As a result, the gun got deflected and the force of the blow was absorbed. Members of the Special Protection Group (SPG) on duty at the spot responded to the situation with remarkable alacrity. Some of them threw themselves around the Prime Minister in a protective ring. Others pinned down the assailant.

I'll probe it: JRJ

Reuter, PTI, UNI report:

The white-clad sailor was the third last in the front row of the honour guard that Mr. Gandhi inspected.

As Mr. Gandhi walked past, the man swung his assault rifle up over his shoulder with both hands and slammed it down on the Prime Minister's left shoulder. Mr. Gandhi halted briefly but did not stagger and was immediately grabbed and led away by securitymen.

Mr. Jayewardene smilingly told reporters he thought the sailor was suffering from sunstroke "fainted" and fell on Mr. Gandhi. "I'll investigate it, I'll investigate it," he said.

The sailor looked defiant as he was grabbed by half-a-dozen uniformed police officers and plainclothes security agents and dragged away. He was pinned with his face against an iron railing and his hands were held behind his back before he was hustled away.

The curfew in Colombo, which was to be lifted at 11 a.m. today, was extended till tomorrow





Sri Lanka: the truth according to Jayawardene

IN PARLIAMENT

THE ADDRESS TO THE SRI LANKAN Parliament by President Jayawardene, at the commencement of its new session on 25th February, 1988, has a few intriguing statements which throw new light on the circumstances in which the governments of India and Sri Lanka signed the Agreement in Clolmbo on 29th July, 1987, under which India agreed to send its troops to Sri Lanka to fight Jayawardene's war against the Tamils. Says Mr. Jayawardene:

"On the 29th July, 1987 the Prime Minister of India, Shri Rajiv Ghandhi and I signed in Colombo an Agreement to establish peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka...

"On this day, the 29th July, in some parts of the Island, other than in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, rioting took place. Mobs converged on the city of Colombo from the direction of Kelaniya, Nugegoda and Panadura-Moratuwa. The security forces and the police were able to disperse them at Peliyagoda, Dehiwela Bridge, Kirillapone, Pamankade Bridge and Ayurvedic Hospital Junction, Borella. These mobs had committeed a spate of violence in the outskirts of Colombo, before attempting to enter the city.

"Violence spread to other areas as well The areas most affected were Matara, Galle, Hambantota, Kalutara, Mount Lavinia, Nugegoda, Kandy, Ratnapura and Polonnaruwa."

There are facts that were widely known at the time when these incidents occurred. However, Jayawardene then goes on to give statistics to explain the gravity of the situation that confronted him during this period. He says:

"(a) Total number of incidents in the country between 28.07.1987 and 02.08.1987. — 2,527

(b) Breakdown of incidents —

Murders	—	16
Injured	—	40
Damage to Government/Corporation buildings — (42 Local Govt. and Asst. Government Agent's Offices, 47 Railway Stations/Tracks).		
Culverts damaged	—	529
Damage to Govt./Corporations/Private vehicles (including Ceylon Transport Board buses). (Over 500 Ceylon Transport Board buses damaged)	—	1,005
Damage to telegraph pylons and transformers.	—	189
Robberies	—	561

"The damage caused amounted to over Rs. 200 million."

According to Jayewardene:

"The JVP had clearly designed to unleash violence throughout the country, by exploiting a situation where large numbers from other political groups were to take to the streets, in order to stage demonstrations. They converted such crowds into violent mobs. In fact, the robbery of 311 shotguns by the JVP during this short period, suggests that they had a larger and long-term objective in mind — the eventual capture of state power and destroying the democratic process."

To deal with this situation, Jayawardene says:

"The Government had to withdraw the security forces amounting to about 4500 from the North and East to meet this treat. Over 900 police personnel were also engaged on duty in Kandy on account the Esala Perahera."

And then he goes to make the most significant revelation:

"Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi came to my assistance by sending Indian Forces to the Jaffna Peninsula to relieve Sri Lanka Forces to come down to the South. As a result of this gesture I was able to bring to the troubled areas outside the North and the East sufficient security services to prevent further rioting and causing of damage to persons and property.

"I was advised to permanently strengthen the security services in the South and I did so. This necessitated that they be released from duties in the North and East.

The Rev. Maduluwave Sobitha is a Buddhist monk to be watched. Regarded by many as a future political star of the Khomeini type, he leads the Maubima Surakime Vyaparaya (Protectors of the Motherland). An open enemy of the Rajiv-JR agreement.

THE HINDU

NEWS

LTTE, EROS will not lay down arms

MADRAS, July 31.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam today firmly declared that it would not lay down arms. The Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS) also announced that it would not hand over its weapons at the stipulated places announced by the Sri Lankan Government.

In a statement sent to the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, through Maj. Gen. R. K. Singh by the LTTE's regional commander for Vavuniya, Mr. Ajit Mahatiya, the LTTE said it had taken a pledge to fight to the last breath to protect the freedom of the Tamil people. The LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran and other representatives, who went from their "region of control" to Delhi on the invitation of Mr. Gandhi, had not been able to contact the LTTE. "This action of the Government of India has made us lose faith in it," Mr. Mahatiya said in the statement.

Consultation first: He categorically ruled out any question of the LTTE handing over its weapons to anybody or surrendering until Mr. Prabakaran and other representatives were flown back to Jaffna from Delhi and they consulted the Tamil people to arrive at an acceptable solution.

Mr. Mahatiya said the LTTE would not respect the proposals agreed to by the Government of India and the Sri Lankan Government, for they had been chalked out without consulting the Tamil people and the LTTE, or eliciting their opinion. "We will not accept with folded arms such a genocide that is being imposed on our people today," he said.

"Hence, we will fight till our last breath any armed aggression or launching of any action in our area of control without our permission or consultation. We declare very firmly that if anybody tries to impose any proposal on us or commit aggression, it could happen only over our dead bodies. At the same time, we would welcome unarmed people who come with a spirit of friendship. We are not against the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi or the people of India. The continuation of the friendship with the Tamil people depends on the understanding of the Government of India," the LTTE's regional commander said.

Mr. Prabhakaran, leader of the LTTE was kept incommunicado in a New Delhi hotel. A demonstration in Holland demanding release of the leader.



Blocking the IPKF soldiers enroute, people of the Jaffna clamoured for the release of their leader

Bringing LTTE around

REPORT

The LTTE's announcement on August 4 that it would surrender arms and go along with the agreement was the result of much persuasion. Its initial negative stand had stemmed from worries over the safety and security of its cadres and the people during the implementation phase. MALINI PARTHASARATHY traces the delicate operation in Delhi.



K. Gajendran

At the Madras airport, on his way to New Delhi, Prabakaran talking to reporters. With him is Kittu.

PERHAPS the most vivid indication that the long-awaited breakthrough in the protracted efforts to resolve the Sri Lankan Tamil crisis was in the making, was the arrival in the Indian capital of the leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Velupillai Prabakaran, for talks with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

As leader of the LTTE, which has taken on the major part of the Tamil defence against the offensive of the Sri Lankan security forces, and whose determined resistance, in cooperation with the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS), had ensured that the attempts to impose a military solution on the Tamil people would not succeed, Prabakaran's cooperation was vital to the implementation of the proposed agreement.

On the morning of July 24, three Indian Air Force helicopters flew to Jaffna and brought the LTTE chief and his lieutenants to India. The ground for Prabakaran's visit to New Delhi had already been laid by the talks that Hardip Singh Puri, First Secretary in the Indian High Commission, had with him in Jaffna a few days earlier. However it was clear from the comments of the LTTE leader in Madras en route to New Delhi that while he considered New Delhi's invitation to the LTTE "historically important" and felt that the Tamil struggle had reached a "decisive phase," his substantive assessment of the proposed settlement would have to await the conclusion of his talks in Delhi.

The LTTE leader made one point clear: the Sri Lankan armed forces should pull back to the pre-May 26 position when they launched the offensive on the Vadamarachchi region of the Jaffna peninsula. He indicated to reporters at the Madras airport that he had no clear idea of what was being proposed. Puri had conveyed an "urgent invitation to meet the Prime Minister" and had expressed the keenness of the Government of India on solving the problem. Prabakaran's aide Yogi added that Puri had suggested that the two parties, Colombo and the LTTE, should come together.

The LTTE leader met the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, M. G. Ramachandran, before flying into Delhi that Friday afternoon. MGR had already been briefed by Indian Government officials on the proposed accord. A team of officials headed by the Foreign Secretary, K. P. S. Menon, had visited Madras on July 21 and, in an hour-long meeting with the Chief Minister, explained to him the details of the negotiations between the Governments of India and Sri Lanka. The official team, which included Kuldip Sahdev, Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, Hardip Puri, and Ronen Sen from the Prime Minister's office, met the Tamil groups, the TULF, EROS, EPRLF and PLOT, separately and asked them to study the "emerging suggestions."

The Tamil groups recognised that the latest Colombo proposals represented a conceptual advance in that the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces was on the negotiating agenda, but were worried by the enabling provision of a referendum which, they said, would render the nature of the proposed merger conditional and possibly temporary. But all the groups indicated that the proposals showed definite promise. Said the TULF: "We are hopeful that this may lead to a final settlement."

As the focus shifted to New Delhi after the arrival of the LTTE leader, it became clear that the following days would be crucial in the attempt to clinch a settlement. But New Delhi was making little headway in its bid to con-

vince Prabakaran that the safety and security of the Tamil people would be taken care of under the accord.

The LTTE was clearly worried over the provision that envisaged a simultaneous cessation of hostilities, involving on the one hand the army's move-back to the pre-Vadamarachchi situation and on the other the disarming of the militants within a 72-hour time-frame. The LTTE leader expressed his confidence in the Government of India but said it was difficult to trust the Sri Lankan Government and be sure that the undisciplined Sri Lankan armed forces would not go on the rampage again against the civilian Tamil population. And once disarmed, it would be difficult for the militants, who had all along been the protectors of the Tamil people, to defend them from an onslaught. The substantive questions posed by the LTTE leader were: what would be the safety mechanism in the period of disarming and how would the cadres and the civilian population be protected in the phase when the militants are in the process of disarming and the army has not yet fully moved back? And after disarming, who will bear the responsibility of protecting the Tamil people should the Sri Lankan security forces resume their onslaught?

Like the other Tamil groups, the LTTE expressed its reservations about the provision for a referendum as one likely to render the merger of the two provinces conditional and possibly temporary.

The Government of India recognised sympathetically the LTTE's concerns and intensified its efforts to address the issues that had been raised. The Tamil Nadu Government, which had been playing a significant role in the efforts to resolve the crisis, liaising between New Delhi and the Tamil groups, was roped in. The State Chief Minister and the Food Minister, S. Ramachandran, flew into the capital at the instance of the Prime Minister on Sunday to exercise their influence in the effort to convince the LTTE leader.

But as the Government announced that the Prime Minister would be going to Colombo on Wednesday, July 29, obviously time was running out. And despite the combined efforts of the Government of India and the Tamil Nadu Government to bring Prabakaran around, little headway had been made. In fact the nadir appeared to have been reached on Monday night when the LTTE announced that it was rejecting the proposals.

A clearly angry Prabakaran announced that he had "been tricked." According to the LTTE, it had not been consulted on the agreement. When Puri came to Jaffna he had not made clear that the agreement would be between the two Governments and that the LTTE would not be a party to it. In fact the LTTE had been given the impression that it would be asked to negotiate. Although Prabakaran subsequently retracted some of the sharply critical statements, the LTTE's reservations relating to the safety and security question remained a hard nut to crack.

Meanwhile the Government of India was in close touch with the other Tamil groups. The Prime Minister met the TULF Secretary-General, A. Amirthalingam, and his colleagues separately and the leaders of other groups jointly. While both the TULF and EROS accepted the proposals broadly, expressing reservations on some of the specifics like the referendum provision and the problems involved in disarming, the EPRLF, TELO and PLOT issued a statement extending support to the accord and attacking the LTTE for "not cooperating."

The Tamil Nadu Government was working hard to address the LTTE's problems. S. Ramachandran posed two questions sharply to the Indian Government: first, the safety and security of the cadres and the people in the initial phase of implementation of the accord and second, the precise political role of the Tamil groups in the agreement envisaged between the two Governments.

Ramachandran's mediation was making significant progress. The efforts to narrow the differences between the viewpoints of the LTTE and the Indian Government climaxed at a midnight meeting between the Prime Minister and the LTTE leader, hours before Rajiv was to leave for Colombo. At that 75-minute meeting, Rajiv listened sympathetically to the LTTE's points and assured it that the Government of India would come up with a practical safety-assuring proposition from the start of the implementation.

The Prime Minister asked the LTTE leader to stay on in the capital for further discussions on these issues. Evidently with this midnight meeting much of the tension evaporated as the gap had been significantly narrowed. And New Delhi's response to the LTTE fears was the proposal for an Indian peace-keeping force to supervise the process of cessation of hostilities. Another indication that the LTTE's reservations about the very short time-frame for disarming would be heeded came when President Jayewardene told a press conference on Wednesday that he was agreeable to giving more time for the process of cessation of hostilities.

While the Indian Government, understandably, drew much satisfaction from the fact that an agreement had been signed and a chance for peace wrested from a four-year saga of turmoil and much pain, it did not allow the sense of jubilation to dilute the understanding that the realities of the implementation process lay ahead, and a significant part hinged on the cooperation of the LTTE and its leader who was waiting in Delhi to conclude the discussions.

Appreciating that the LTTE's fears had not been fully allayed, in the two days that followed the signing of the agreement, the Government of India, with the vital cooperation of the Tamil Nadu Government, particularly S. Ramachandran, resumed its efforts to remove them. As the Indian peace-keeping force was on the threshold of the Jaffna peninsula, the LTTE had last-minute doubts. Prabakaran met S. Ramachandran several times and the two went over the list of LTTE concerns, some of which appeared new, as for instance the claim that the LTTE had understood that it would be given charge of the peninsula in the interim period. But this was clearly at odds with the explicit provision in the agreement that the "same organisations and mechanisms of Government as used in the rest of the country would be in operation."

The LTTE leader is understood to have told the Tamil Nadu Food Minister that the regional commanders of his organisation wanted him back in Jaffna and to be present when the implementation process began. The LTTE apprehensions were not dismissed and in response it was pointed out to it that there had occurred a qualitative change in the Jaffna peninsula as a result of the induction of the peace-keeping force. Besides, the LTTE could accept the good faith of the agreement. The process of demilitarisation to which the LTTE fears of safety and security related, would be completed under the aegis of both India and Sri Lanka.

That the Indian Government's assurances were well taken was apparent from the fact that although Prabakaran indicated that he would take a final decision only after reaching Jaffna and consulting his regional commanders, the attitude and approach he displayed in New Delhi was positive. In the early hours of August 2, the LTTE chief was flown by an IAF aircraft back to his island home via Madras, where he met the Chief Minister.

The arrival of Prabakaran in Jaffna a day before the deadline stipulated in the agreement for the voluntary surrender of arms by the militants expired, augured well for the implementation of the agreement as it indicated that the LTTE was showing an inclination to accept the assurances of India and to go along with the process. **August 8-21, 1987**

REPORT

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's speech, in the company of MGR, to a mass audience on the Madras Marina has provided a popular summation of the features of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement and the exchange of letters between the Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka, and also a persuasive analysis of the character of the breakthrough and of the methodology that had been employed:

On the political significance of the agreement in a wider sense: "Every reasonable demand has been met and this is the time to stop fighting, stop the violence and stop the conflict; it is time to start building..... Now we have created a condition for an end to the violence, for an end to the needless suffering and for an end to all discrimination. Now the Tamils in Sri Lanka will continue to live as they lived there for hundreds of years as honoured and respected citizens enjoying all political and civic rights on a footing of equality with all other Sri Lankans."

On the attitude of the two adversarial camps in the ethnic conflict: "The Sri Lankan Government has given us several assurances that it will not take advantage of the disarming of the militants. Before I went to Sri Lanka to sign the agreement, I talked with the militants and the moderate Tamils (from Sri Lanka)..... I had consultations with all the fighters for justice and equality in Sri Lanka. The militants had all understood, and they agreed with the agreement that we have signed."

On the meaning of the devolution of power, and related aspects of the political package for the Sri Lankan Tamils: "This agreement secures everything that the Sri Lankan Tamils have demanded, short of breaking Sri Lanka, and, in fact, it goes well beyond the initial demands of the Sri Lankan Tamils."

On the substance of the autonomy that is to come to the North and East: "Under the agreement, approximately one third of Sri Lanka's territory will be made a single province, where the Tamils will have a clear majority. They will have regional autonomy, comparable to the State Governments in India. This represents an immense advance on what has been asked for by the Tamils in Annexure C in 1983. It represents major concessions made by the Sri Lankan Government."

On the current stage of the peace process: "A stage has been set for a national reconciliation and we must do everything we can to assist in this task, in the process of reconciliation and rebuilding. There is nothing further to be gained by more violence and more killing."

On the possibility of extremists holding out and on Indian assurances: "There should be no sympathy now for anyone who acts against this agreement, because anyone acting against this agreement will be acting against the interests of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Some of the militant groups have been a little apprehensive, perhaps a little worried about their personal security. They were also worried how they will fit into the future set-up. But I have reassured them that the agreement covers both the aspects very effectively and we will see that security and involvement in this rebuilding process is there for everyone" in the North and East of Sri Lanka."

On the wider, security-related features of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement in an extended sense: "This hostility opened up for others an opportunity to fish in troubled waters and cause problems in this part of the world..... Our security and strength lies in non-alignment. Certain outside presences in Sri Lanka were destabilising this commitment to non-alignment. This agreement not only brings to an end the hostilities but also brings peace, gives justice to minority communities in Sri Lanka, and also removes the opportunity for hostile forces to destabilise the region. It strengthens security and non-alignment in our region."

On the content of the Rajiv-JR exchange of letters: ""We have seen the security problem in our region. We will see that such hostile forces are not allowed to come into our region. This exchange of letters ensures that forces prejudicial to India's interest will not be present on Sri Lankan soil. It also ensures that Sri Lankan ports, including Trincomalee, will not be given for military use if it is prejudicial to India's interest. It will also ensure that any broadcasting facility that is set up in Sri Lanka will not be used for military or intelligence purposes."



CHAPTER 2

1987

August

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LTTE starts surrendering arms.

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

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Prabhakaran addresses a mammoth public meeting at Jaffna. "In taking from us our weapons - the one means of protection for Eelam Tamils - the Indian Government takes from us big reponsibility of protecting our people."

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J.R. survives an assasination attempt Premadasa and Lalith escape with injuries.

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Indo Sri Lanka Accord

Prabhakaran's public address at Jaffna (Suthumalai) on 4-8-87

My beloved and esteemed people of Tamil Eelam,

Today there has taken place a tremendous turn in the history of our liberation struggle. This turn has come suddenly, in a way that has stunned us, and as if it were beyond our power to influence events.

Whether the consequences of this turn will be favourable to us, we shall have to wait and see.

You are aware that this Agreement, concluded suddenly and with great speed between India and Sri Lanka, without consulting our people and without consulting us, our people's representatives, is being implemented with expedition and urgency. Until I went to Delhi, I did not know anything about this Agreement. Saying that the Indian Prime Minister desired to see me, they invited me and took me quickly to Delhi. This Agreement was shown to us after I went there. There were several complications and several question marks in it. The doubt arose for us whether, as a result of this Agreement a permanent solution would be available to the problems of our people. Accordingly, we made it emphatically clear to the Indian Government that we were unable to accept this Agreement.

Primary Concern

But the Indian Government stood unbudging on the point that whether we accepted or did not accept the Agreement, it was determined to put it into effect. We were not taken by surprise by this stand of the Indian Government. This Agreement did not concern only the problem of the Tamils. This is primarily concerned with Indo-Sri Lanka relations. It also contains within itself the clauses for binding Sri Lanka within India's super-power orbit. It works out a way for preventing disruptionist and hostile foreign forces from gaining footholds in Sri Lanka. That is why the Indian Government showed such an extraordinary keenness in concluding this Agreement. However, at the same time, it happens to be an Agreement that determines the political future and fate of the people of Tamil Eelam. That is why we firmly objected to the conclusion of this Agreement without consultations with our people and without the seeking of our views. However, there is no point in our objecting to this. When a great power has decided to determine our political fate in a manner that is essentially beyond our control, what are we to do?



Difficult to Digest

This Agreement directly affects our movement and our political goals and objectives. It affects the form and shape of our struggle. It also puts a stop to our armed struggle. If the mode of our struggle, brought to this stage over a fifteen year period through shedding blood through making sacrifices through staking achievements and through offering a great many lives, is to be dissolved or disbanded within a few days, it is naturally something we are unable to digest. This Agreement disarms us suddenly, without giving us time, without getting the consent of our fighters, without working out a guarantee for our people's safety and protection. Therefore we refused to surrender arms.

India's assurances

Under such circumstances, India's Honourable Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, invited me for a discussion, I opened my mind and spoke to him of our concerns and our problems. I pointed out to the Indian Prime Minister the fact that I did not repose the slightest faith in the Sinhala racist government and did not believe that they were going to fulfill the implementation of this Agreement. I spoke to him about the question of our people's safety and protection and about guarantees for this. The Indian Prime Minister offered me certain assurances. He offered a guarantee for the

safety and protection of our people. I do have faith in the straightforwardness of the Indian Prime Minister and I do have faith in his assurances.

We do believe that India will not allow the racist Sri Lankan state to take once again to the road of genocide against the Tamils. It is only out of this faith that we decided to hand over our weapons to the Indian peace keeping force.

What ardent, immeasurable sacrifices we have made for the safety and protection of our people! There is no need here to elaborate on this theme. You, our beloved people, are fully aware of the character of our passion for our cause and our feelings of sacrifice. The weapons that we took up and deployed for your safety and protection, for your liberation, for your emancipation, we now entrust to the Indian Government.

Transfer of responsibility

In taking from us our weapons – the one means of protection for Eelam Tamils – the Indian Government takes over from us the big responsibility of protecting our people. The handing over of arms only signifies the handing over, the transfer of this responsibility.

Were we not to hand over our weapons, we would be put in the calamitous circumstance of clashing with the Indian Army. We do not want this. We love India. We love the people of India. There is no question of our deploying our arms against Indian soldiers. The soldiers of the Indian Army are taking up the responsibility of safeguarding and protecting us against our enemy. I wish very firmly to emphasise here that by virtue of our handing over our weapons to it the Indian Government should assume full responsibility for the life and security of every one of the Eelam Tamils.

We have no way other than to co-operate with this Indian endeavour. Let us ofter them this opportunity. However, I do not think that as a result of this Agreement, there will be a permanent solution to the problem of the Tamils. The time is not very far off when the monster of Sinhala racism will devour this Agreement. I have unrelenting faith in the proposition that only a separate state of Tamil Eelam can offer a permanent solution of the problem of the people of Tamil Eelam. Let me make it clear to you here, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that I will contiue to fight for the objective of attaining Tamil Eelam. The forms of struggle may change, but the objective or goal of our struggle is not going to change. If our cause is to triumph, it is vitally necessary that the wholehearted, the totally unified support of you, our people should always be with us.

The circumstance may arise for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to take part in the interim administration or to contest elections, keeping in view the interests of the people of Tamil Eelam. But I wish firmly to declare here that under no circumstances and at no point of time will I contest elections or accept the office of the Chief Minister.

The Liberation Tigers yearn for the motherland of Tamil Eelam.

Pulling the Tigers' Teeth

For the Tamils, a reluctant surrender of arms

AFP—CUBRAN

AP—SHANKAR

A rebel fighter on guard duty at the temple rally, above;

REPORT

Only two days earlier, India had released the rebel leader from virtual house arrest in New Delhi after he promised to order his Tamil Tigers, Sri Lanka's largest insurgent group, to lay down their arms. Now, the bitterness of defeat visible in his eyes, Velupillai Prabakaran stood before 70,000 Tamils at a temple on Sri Lanka's Jaffna Peninsula to make good on that pledge.

The Tigers would disarm, he told the throng, which was guarded by scores of armed insurgents, and leave the Tamil population in northern and eastern Sri Lanka under the protection of Indian troops. The crowd cheered, and Indian military officers sitting several yards from Prabakaran looked visibly relieved. Then the stocky rebel leader offered a darker observation: "We do not accept this accord, but because India is a powerful country, we are unable to do anything about it. I don't think it will be a lasting solution."

On that pessimistic note, the pact signed two weeks ago by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Junius R. Jayewardene to bring to an end an increasingly bloody four-year insurgency on the island appeared to have taken hold—at least for the time being. New Delhi had delivered on its promise to assure that the Tigers would put down their weapons. It had also deployed 7,000 troops in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, home to most of the country's Tamil minority, to guarantee the truce. Offshore, Indian naval vessels patrolled the Palk Strait to cut off potential new arms shipments from Tigers based in India's Tamil Nadu state. The Sri Lanka government, for its part, withdrew many of its soldiers from the Jaffna area, announced the impending release of an estimated 4,000 Tamil prisoners and began planning for local rule in Tamil-dominated areas.

The end of the shooting, however, did not make for an end to discord. Prabakaran made it clear that he was not about to abandon his dream of Eelam, an independent Tamil state. What action he might take toward that end—and in the process disrupt the local-rule plan—remained a worrisome question in Colombo and New Delhi. Moreover, most Sinhalese, who represent 75% of the island's population, remained less than happy about Jayewardene's deal with India; two weeks ago antipact riots in Colombo left more than 70 people dead. The predominantly Buddhist Sinhalese were as distrustful as ever of India, which helped create the Tigers in the first place by training and arming them. The establishment of a lasting peace, said Neelan Tiruchelvam, a leading Tamil moderate, "will take an extraordinary effort on the part of both communities."

Last week Colombo and New Delhi were intent on proving that the pact—and the truce—was working. The day after Prabakaran's speech the Indian army arranged for a ceremonial turnover of arms at Palali Air Base on the Jaffna Peninsula, the headquarters of the Indian forces on the island. Journalists were flown in from New Delhi, Madras and Colombo to watch the Tigers drop off six truckloads of weapons, a haul that contained everything from ancient single-shot rifles and rusty mortar shells to AK-47 and M-16 assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.

Indian and Sri Lankan officials even staged something of a surrender ceremony. In a dusty, cramped room at the air base terminal, one of Prabakaran's lieutenants, who carries the nom de guerre of Yogi, handed over his pistol to Sri Lankan Defense Secretary Sepala Attygalle. The senior civil servant played his part: "Today," he said, "is a historic day for the future of Sri Lanka." Yogi looked glum and said nothing.

According to Major General Harkirat Singh, the commanding officer of the Indian peacekeeping forces, the weapons surrendered at Palali amounted to a "token" number; his men, he said, expected to collect more in the coming days. Many of the Tigers, however, were expected to hold on to their personal weapons. Indian army officers assumed that the turn-in rate might be as low as 40%. Sri Lankan officials said that if the Tigers held back, the Indian forces would "comb out" hidden arms with raids and checkpoints.

At a press conference near Jaffna the day after his speech, Prabakaran answered questions about the Tigers' future in tones of anger and derision. Said he: "It is obvious that we are doing things we don't want to do. So naturally I feel bitter." He sounded intent on eventually undoing the pact, by one means or another, and announced that he would not accept Colombo's offer of a leading role in the in-

terim administration of a new province incorporating the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka. Prabakaran also declined to participate in elections for a provincial council, a key feature of the local-rule proposal, although he explained that the Tigers' political wing, led by Yogi, would contest elections in the region that will probably be held later this year.

The Tigers' demands, Prabakaran insisted, had not changed: an independent Eelam state incorporating the northern and eastern regions. That goal put him at odds with the pact's provisions as well as Colombo's and New Delhi's desires. Would he renounce violence in pursuit of his aims? Prabakaran was asked. His answer: a clipped no.

One fear among middle-class Tamils is that the Tigers may attempt to dominate the balloting by threatening other Tamil groups to withdraw from the elections. The Tigers have attacked and decimated



REUTER—TSANG

rushed out of their houses to greet patrolling Indian soldiers. Residents everywhere on the peninsula filled in trenches that had been dug as protection against attacks by the Sri Lankan air force.

Life also returned to normal in Colombo, and Jayewardene appeared to be regaining some political ground. Two weeks ago there had been concern that his government might fall; last week there was new confidence. Said Gamini Dissanayake, a senior Cabinet minister: "There is absolutely no doubt that the legislation for the provincial councils will go through Parliament."

Sri Lankan troops were happy to see the fighting end and to depart from Jaffna, even if they did so on Indian air force planes put at their disposal. Said one Sri Lankan officer at Palali: "At least it's up to the Indians now to deal with the Tamils." But the powerful Indian presence, including two navy frigates in Co-

AP—SHANKAR

Prabakaran announces that his men will hand in their weapons; at Palali Air Base, Indian soldiers stand beside a lethal bounty

rival groups in the past, and Prabakaran unabashedly advocates Tiger primacy in a one-party state. If the rebels did gain political control, they could conceivably proclaim an independent state, though India would be unlikely to tolerate such a move. While some of Prabakaran's fighters were prepared to call it quits last week, most sounded determined to follow their chief's orders. Said Ramesh, a 22-year-old: "I know that the leader has some plan for the future, and I will follow it."

In the end, the Tigers, who number only about 3,500 in a population of 1.4 million Tamils in the north and east, may find less support among their brethren than they seem to expect. At the temple rally, Prabakaran's declaration that the rebels would disarm brought wild cheers, while his more bellicose remarks were greeted by silence. When the Tigers tried to organize a shopkeepers' strike to protest against the pact two weeks ago, they succeeded only after ordering store shutters closed at gunpoint. Most of the inhabitants of the Jaffna area, in fact, seemed more than ready for peace—and delighted by the presence of the Indian army. Villagers

lombo's harbor and a steady stream of heavy air force transports rumbling in and out of the Jaffna area, left many Sri Lankans uneasy. "Already they are starting to look like an invading force," said a schoolteacher in Jaffna. To Minister Dissanayake, by contrast, who had helped negotiate the truce agreement, "geopolitical realities" made India's role inevitable. Said he: "It amounts to a recognition that we live next to a very powerful and complex country." —*By Edward W. Desmond. Reported by Qadri Ismail and Ross H. Munro/ Jaffna* AUGUST 17, 1987

INDIA TODAY

Cautious Optimism

REPORT

The post-accord scene offers hope as Jayewardene outfoxes opponents

THE walls of the arrival lounge at Colombo's plush international airport are plastered with alluring advertisements for the myriad casinos that dot the city, symbols of the gambling blood that surges through the capital's social veins. But the one Sinhalese who has taken the biggest gamble of all time is the country's ascetic-looking President Junius Richard Jayewardene. Now 81 and in the dusk of his protracted political life, JR as he is popularly known, has, in the face of daunting odds, staked everything on the one throw of the dice—the historic and unique accord he signed late last month with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

In gaming terms, Jayewardene's move would have been considered suicidal. The three-day riots that erupted in Colombo before the signing of the agreement were a violent expression of the widespread opposition to the accord by the majority Sinhalese population. But not for nothing do the Sinhalese call Jayewardene 'The Old Fox'. In just one week, he has seemingly succeeded in outmanoeuvring the two men who posed the greatest immediate challenge to the accord—his hardline anti-Indian Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa, and the powerful Minister for National Security, Lalith Athulathmudali.

Premadasa, who telegraphed his opposition to the accord by absenting himself from the official receptions during Rajiv's visit, made his first public speech last week where he carefully avoided criticism of the deal and cautioned the people against using violence to voice their objections. Athulathmudali initially tried desperately to sink the accord. At the six-hour emergency Cabinet meeting which Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit was invited to address, Athulathmudali produced what he claimed were transcripts of wireless intercepts between the militants saying they would not surrender their arms. Dixit, convinced the Cabinet that the intercepts were forgeries and that the Indian Government would guarantee the arms surrender.

BHAWAN SINGH

Since then, the minister for national security, usually the one man in the Sri Lankan Cabinet most accessible to the press, has suddenly become unavailable. But significantly, in a televised broadcast after the accord he said that any opposition to the accord "should be through democratic means".

He has also been rattled by Finance Minister Ronnie de Mel's demands for his resignation. By indicating that the post of national security minister has been made redundant by the peace accord, Jayewardene, in an ironic twist of the knife, has hinted that Athulathmudali would be made minister for national reconstruction—a subtle reminder that the Old Fox has the undated resignation letters of all his ministers in his possession.

Obviously, the wily President has managed to neutralise them in a surprisingly short period. At the first Cabinet meeting after the signing of the accord, on August 5, Premadasa, to everybody's surprise, arrived in Jayewardene's car. The meeting itself was, in the words of de Mel, "objective and extremely cordial". Says de Mel: "We were expecting some fireworks. But the only fireworks took place when I demanded the resignation of the national security minister for the total breakdown of national security during the riots. The rest of the meeting passed without any harsh words. There has been a subtle change in dissenting opinion."

HOW Jayewardene achieved that breakthrough, particularly with Premadasa, resides at the moment in the realm of speculation. Knowledgeable circles speak of the incriminating dossiers the leader has on his cabinet ministers. Whatever the reason, a major hurdle in the path to peace appears to have been removed. In a private conversation with a senior Indian official, the President reportedly said: "I am the captain of the ship and I am steering in a certain direction. If anybody wants to go in a different direction, they can take to the lifeboats."

But Jayewardene still has a tougher task ahead—to convince the Sinhalese population, smarting at what they perceive as a betrayal of their country's sovereignty. It is symbolised visibly by the presence of the 6,000 armed Indian troops in the northern province and the two Indian naval frigates—bristling with weapons and radars—anchored opposite Colombo's Galle Face, the social meeting place for many of the capital's citizens. He has to persuade them that the accord will ultimately benefit the war-ravaged country and the Sri Lankan people.

Admits Lands Minister Gamini Dissanayake, one of the key figures in the pre-accord negotiations: "The task now is to get through to the hardcore. There is a national psychosis that cannot be ignored. You can't expect to do that overnight. But already there are signs that the public is starting to realise the benefits." Jayewardene himself has appeared on national television on two successive days to point out that the choice now lies between stability and prosperity on one side and chaos and economic ruin on the other.

Even the threat from Mrs Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), which had come out strongly against the agreement, has suddenly dissipated into Colombo's monsoon air. Bandaranaike has refused to talk to the press or issue any anti-accord statements after her initial

(Anticlockwise from left) Rajiv and Jayewardene after signing the accord; a LTTE mortar; surrendered arms at Jaffna

SHYAM TEKWANI

outbursts, most notably in a strongly-worded letter to Rajiv in which she criticised the accord and the manner in which it was achieved. Says Dissanayake: "The SLFP has been left in the lurch."

Senior Sri Lankan cabinet ministers claim that opposition leaders have withdrawn from the anti-accord movement because of the changing public mood. "The average Sinhalese has accepted that it is now a fait accompli. They have seen that the Tamil militants are surrendering their arms and no killings have taken place. Once they realise that peace means prosperity, they will come around," says a senior official in Colombo. Adds Neelan Tiruchelvam, one of the most respected moderate TULF (Tamil United Liberation Front) MPs: "After the surrender of arms, there has been a definite change in public opinion."

On the surface, it is logical to agree with de Mel when he says that "the worst is over". Jayewardene has clamped extended curfews in areas of potential trouble. Colombo's hyper-active social night life has come to an abrupt halt with a nine to six night curfew when army patrols have the streets to themselves. "The Government is on top of the situation," asserts Dissanayake. The press censorship currently in force is another inevitable step keeping in mind the more rabid Sinhalese newspapers that are capable of whipping up chauvinist sentiments.

Control of the press has also ensured that extensive coverage was given to the arms surrender by the militants—considered a key factor in influencing Sinhalese opinion—and to statements by world leaders and governments in hailing the accord and its long-term benefits. A major element in all this is the positive statements being publicised by solitary members of the Buddhist clergy. This community, because of the high esteem it enjoys among the Sinhalese, poses the greatest non-political threat to the accord.

Map by B K SHARMA

"There is nobody in the armed forces—totally Sinhalese at the moment—who would dare fire at a Buddhist monk. They could certainly pose problems if they decided to mobilise and take to the streets like they did after the air-drop and during the pre-accord riots," says a top Sri Lankan official.

The danger, as a secret CID (Criminal Investigation Department) report on the riots and its origins points out, is of radical elements like the outlawed Janata Vimukti Perumuna (JVP) masquerading as monks. One monk who was arrested and named in the report, was in fact, a JVP activist. Security forces who raided his house in a Colombo suburb unearthed a cache of arms and ammunition.

Though Sri Lankan officials are playing down the threat posed by the JVP, it forms a potentially explosive issue. The success of the JVP-led insurrection in 1971 was precisely because it was able to mobilise Sinhalese youth in protest against "Indian expansionism". Today,

An Indian army APC in Jaffna: delicate task



SHYAM TEKWANI

as the recent riots revealed, the campuses are ideal breeding grounds for a similar show of radical youth power. Most colleges have been closed or have functioned intermittently in the recent past, and the number of jobless youth has shot up because of the ethnic strife of the last four years. And, in campuses last fortnight, there were once again rumbles of protest and posters condemning the "Indianisation of Sri Lanka".

However, till now, the JVP has been confined to a relatively small area in the southern part of the island. Sri Lankan officials point out that with the Indian Army having moved in to the north, Sri Lankan armed forces there have been ferried to the south by Indian Air Force transport aircraft to provide added security. But there is also the widely-acknowledged fact that the JVP has infiltrated certain sections of the armed forces and cannot be ignored as a major threat to the success of the accord.

Thus, it is more realistic to accept Tiruchelvam's post-accord assessment as being one of "cautious optimism". The Sri Lankan Legal Department is currently working on what could be the make-or-break issue for the future of the accord—its ratification in Parliament scheduled for next month. The SLFP is certain to stall proceedings by demanding that the motion be sent to the Supreme Court for examination, as the Constitution allows. The Cabinet, however, can insist that the Supreme Court give its decision within 48 hours, a decision likely to favour the introduction of the vote.

But the key question is whether a majority of the ruling party MPs will actually endorse the accord legislation which requires a two-third majority. Under the current numerical representation, if less than 30 out of the 169 ruling United National Party (UNP) members abstain or even vote against the peace accord, the

PRABHU CHAWLA





PRABHU CHAWLA

Pirabhakaran at his Jaffna meeting (left); and armed Tamil militants: uncertainty

INTERVIEW

J.R. JAYEWARDENE

"I have never mistrusted India"

THE barricades and frequent security checks outside his private residence at Ward Place, Colombo's most exclusive residential area, symbolises the threat to his life. But there is little tension or fear inside the modest house where a confident Junius Richard Jayewardene, 81, the frail-looking President of Sri Lanka receives his guests. While conversing, he monitors the progress of the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord. As time for the TV *news approaches, he ushers guests into the* TV *room so that he can watch the daily surrender of arms by the Tamil groups. The news over, he expresses satisfaction over the developments. For over a month, he has kept away from the media. In an exclusive interview with Senior Editor* PRABHU CHAWLA, *last fortnight, Jayewardene speaks about the role of the Indian Army and his domestic problems. Excerpts:*

Q. *Till recently, you have been pursuing a military option against the Tamil militants. What made you change your strategy and sign an agreement with India?*

A. We were always for a political solution. But the terrorists never agreed to it. We knew we wouldn't be able to solve this problem except through a political dialogue. Now, they have also agreed. On our own part, we never gave up the political option. We had discussions at Thimpu, New Delhi, and Colombo and these discussions were not military discussions. But the terrorists never even looked at our documents.

Q. ***Do you feel that India has played an important role in bringing the Tamil Tigers to the negotiating table?***

A. Till recently, India was playing the role of a mediator. Now, for the first time, India has discussed this problem directly with us. India's role in this whole problem has changed from a mere mediator to that of a participant.

Q. ***Do you think that this pact would have come about if the Tigers had not been part of the dialogue?***

A. I have nothing to do with them. I have never seen Pirabhakaran.

Q. ***Have you gained anything politically?***

A. One major gain is that terrorism is over. If the accord is sincerely implemented by these parties—the Indian Government, the Sri Lankan authorities and the separatist groups—peace will return to the island. The violence is over.

Q. ***Keeping in view the mistrust between the Indian Government and your government, do you think this accord will be implemented seriously?***

A. I never had mistrust in the Indian Government. In fact, I never had mistrust in the separatists. What is there to mistrust? They (the separatists) are for violence, they are for murder—what is the kind of mistrust you are talking about in this kind of situation. On the other hand, I have been accused of trusting everyone too much.

Q. ***If you had trust in India, why didn't you sign a similar accord earlier?***

A. I don't have a reason myself for this. But the only explanation which I can possibly think of is that it is the first time that India is prepared to tackle this terrorism problem as an active partner with me.

Q. ***If the accord has led to the end of violence in the north and east, then why has it not been welcomed by the Sinhalese?***

A. Violence never lasts long. It has now died down. There was some opposition to the accord in certain parts of the island. It was activated by the Sinhalese terrorists. During the opposition to the agreement, voiced by the Buddhist clergy and the SLFP, they found that the JVP was taking active interest in the violent activities. Others have backed out of the anti-accord agitation, but the JVP is still continuing.

Q. ***Don't you think you will find it difficult to sustain this accord if your prime minister and minister for national security are opposed to it?***

A. In a democracy, you have these freedoms. But when I bring legislations for the accord to Parliament, they will have to support them or they have to leave. I have signed a treaty and, under the Constitution, I have the right to make treaties with any country. I needn't to get cabinet support or approval for it. But when I have to go to the Parliament for legislative measures, they will all have to support them.

Q. ***If they don't, what will you do?***

A. I will dissolve Parliament.

Q. ***In the wake of opposition, how are you going to implement the accord?***

A. Most of it has already been implemented. The terrorists have surrendered arms. Laws are almost ready for the devolution of powers to the Provincial Council and subsequent elections. The referendum for the merger of the east with the north will take place. For all these, I need parliamentary approval. We will have interim administration for the north and east.

Q. ***But how are you going to sell this***

RAGHU RAI



accord to your people who consider it a total surrender?

A. I will do it with propaganda in favour of the advantages of the accord. I will use all democratic means to convince the people that this accord is in the best interests of our country. This might be an issue for the next elections but it would have been completed by that time. I am not going to have referendum on this accord.

Q. ***What are the economic gains?***

A. We have nothing to lose. Peace will return to the country which, in turn, will help in reviving economic activity.

Q. ***Are you sure that the Sri Lankan people approve of Indian forces?***

A. That is immaterial. The only way they can question it is by votes. And that will be clear during the elections. There are ways, in the democracy, of seeking the people's support for one's actions as President. If we go to the people for every action, then the Government can't function. Unfortunately, the Opposition is not opposing this government by democratic means. They are resorting to violence and this should be suppressed.

Q. ***What is the specific role given to the Indian peace-keeping forces?***

A. They are acting under my supervision and directions and they will carry out those instructions. They have to supervise the surrender of arms by the terrorists, maintain law and order with our troops. They have to take part in all peaceful operations.

Q. ***Will they be present till the accord is fully implemented?***

A. Well, that will take a long time. Provincial elections will take place at the end of the year. Till normalcy is restored, not only the Indian but also our forces are necessary. But if there is peace, the forces are not necessary. We have enough troops of our own during peaceful times. I would like the Indian forces to remain as long as there is trouble in the north and east.

Q. ***If you have Indian forces here, why are you asking for American military help?***

A. I have asked America, England and Pakistan for help.

Q. ***What kind of help or assistance you have sought from them?***

A. Whatever help they can give. I didn't make any specific reservations. But we have not asked for any military help. They may offer us helicopters, spare parts. I don't need any military assistance but only material assistance from friendly countries. And I have informed India about these as well. One reason for asking those countries for aid is to show the world that I have not only asked India for assistance, but others as well. Mrs Bandaranaike also received assistance from various countries for containing secessionists in 1971. She got MiGs from the USSR, helicopters from the US and aid from the UK and India. I have not done anything beyond that.

Q. ***Since you are dependent on the West, both militarily and economically, don't you expect problems from them in implementing the accord?***

A. Sri Lanka does depend on the West for economic aid, and nothing else. But they can't influence our decisions. I am pro-West even now because there is democracy there. I am for democracy wherever it exists.

Q. ***But why are you seeking help from anti-India countries like Pakistan and Israel? Will it not affect your relations with India as well?***

A. Earlier, I sought help from all of them. I couldn't have trained my people in India. They were training the terrorists.

Q. ***How are you going to deal with*** JVP ***Weren't they crushed by Bandaranaike with foreign support?***

A. It is very difficult to give reasons for the revival of the JVP. Many people blame me for it. When I took over, I released a majority of their cadres and leaders. For over five years, they were quiet. And I was under the impression that they had accepted the democratic norm of behaviour. They contested the municipal and local elections. They contested the referendum, and lost in all these elections. But, in 1983, my security informed me that these people are again militarily active. They were preaching violence. I proscribed them. They had a hand in the 1983 riots in Colombo. Since then, they have been working underground, amassing a lot of support. I don't know how they've done this.

Q. ***With all these problems, don't you feel exhausted at this age?***

A. They say the brain never gets tired, only the muscles get tired. I can switch off my powers of concentration. At the moment, I am thinking of you and nothing else. That is the way I am made. I can compartmentalise my problems

Q. ***Aren't you thinking of retiring from active politics now?***

A. My term will end in 1989. I can't re-contest without a referendum.

Government's motion will be defeated. Says Tiruchelvam: "A legislative reversal would clearly endanger the accord." Jayewardene has threatened to dissolve Parliament if that happens, but under that eventuality, it will be virtually impossible for the UNP to win a general election. Jayewardene, however, remains President till 1989.

But the voting issue is a double-edged sword. Most MPs of the UNP would go along with the accord only because they would prefer to avoid seeking re-election. The UNP last week celebrated its 10th year in power and the mood of the electorate is clearly for change. On the other hand, the main target of the politically-motivated rioters were ruling party MPs. One was killed and six others had their houses burnt. The mobs extracted pledges from the MPs that they would vote against the accord in Parliament.

JAYEWARDENE, though, is confident that he will swing the MPs on his side before the voting takes place (he also has the resignation of all UNP parliamentarians in his possession which he is capable of holding over their heads). Says de Mel: "During the riots, the MPs were without any protection at all. Now, with 2,500 additional troops moved to the south, they are all heavily guarded. Also, once the advantages of the accord become more apparent, they will be more fortified in their decision (to support the accord)."

The Jayewardene Government has to tread delicately in the weeks ahead with the specific objective of implementing the accord rapidly; convincing the Sinhalese public that the Indian armed forces are there at the express command of the Sri Lankan Government; allaying the deep-rooted suspicions of the Tamils and spelling out the concrete advantages of the agreement it has signed. The Government has moved rapidly on all these fronts. Last week, Jayewardene announced the setting up of an interim administration for the northern and eastern provinces. He also announced a general amnesty for the Tamil militants, many of whom have already been released from detention. He also stated that the Indian armed forces are likely to pull out in August, however impossible that may be to achieve.

On the economic front, de Mel has spelt out the advantages of the accord in relation to the cost of the war to Sri Lanka—an estimated Rs 15 billion in damages to property alone apart from its drain on the country's finances (which comes to 25 per cent of the annual domestic budget of Sri Lanka). And the

unemployment rate is around 17 per cent.

Sri Lanka's major donors and the international financial institutions have already announced satisfaction at the accord and pledged an aid increase apart from emergency funds to get the economy back on the road to recovery. "We have already received offers of assistance and countries like the Netherlands that have frozen funds for projects over the last four years are now being asked to unfreeze them," says de Mel.

In fact, one of the key reasons for Jayewardene suddenly switching his stand and gambling on the accord was the lukewarm response from western countries, mainly the US and Britain, to his pleas for military aid and assistance. The US Administration made it clear that it would not do anything that would upset New Delhi and urged him to settle with the Tamils.

The Sri Lankan Government is hoping that once aid starts pouring in and key export-earners like tourism pick up, the boost to the economy—new projects, additional areas of employment, improved telecommunications, power generation, transport services, water supply and health services—will convince the public that the accord is in everybody's interest.

But there is considerable uncertainty and unease in the north and the path to peace is obviously still a rocky one. The initial euphoria over the arrival of the Indian peace-keeping force has died down and the sudden slow-down in the arms-surrender process by the militants could pose some major problems. "We have extended the deadline for the surrender but I don't foresee any problems," says Lt-General Harkirat Singh, general officer commanding of the Indian peace-keeping force.

But problems are already apparent. The tension between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the other militant groups is palpable and has led to some unforeseen snags. Last week, the LTTE announced that it would "be forced to reconsider the decision to lay down arms in view of the atrocities committed against our disarmed cadres by other Tamil militant groups". The LTTE claims that the other groups have not laid down arms on one pretext or another and have started killing and kidnapping LTTE members.

Meanwhile, the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) had earlier suspended the surrender of arms in protest against the abduction of 13 of its members by the LTTE. It was only after the

THE ACCORD

Quiet Moves

IT was a triumph of planning, foresight and secrecy. The first faint ideas for the Colombo accord emerged this May. A crack team of handpicked officials—including Foreign Secretary K.P.S. Menon, Intelligence Bureau Chief M.K. Narayanan and India's High Commissioner in Colombo J.N. Dixit—was set up. Its brief: design a solution within the framework of the Sri Lankan Constitution and bring the Tamil militants to the negotiating table.

All politicians, except Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran, were kept away. The team was organised in two groups: Menon negotiated with the militants while Dixit got in touch with Jayewardene via his trusted minister Gamini Dissanayake. Key officials in the prime minister's office monitored progress.

Menon (left) and Dixit: main architects

The first round failed. Both the militants and the Sri Lankan Government refused to budge from their earlier stand on the merger of the north with the east.

The moves were called off. But when the Sri Lankan Army launched a major offensive killing 1,000 people, pressure was mounted on India to intervene. Air dropping of relief supplies by India buttressed her position. In mid-June Dixit was summoned by Jayewardene to work out a peace formula. It was here that Dixit played a mastercard. He insisted that India be allowed to send relief to the northern and eastern provinces. The purpose: to use it as a cover to contact militants. Thus, when the first relief ship reached Jaffna on June 25, Hardeep Puri, a first secretary in the high commission, used it to meet Pirabhakaran. It was a fruitful meeting. The militants conveyed that they were ready for talks.

A happy Dixit flew to New Delhi on June 27 to brief the foreign secretary and the prime minister. It was then decided to send another high powered emissary to Jayewardene. Dixit himself was picked for the sensitive assignment. On July 1 he met Jayewardene with the draft proposals. The door had been opened. Between July 1 and July 16, Dixit had 12 meetings with Jayewardene, during which all issues including the devolution of powers to the Provincial Council, withdrawal of the army from the north and surrender of arms, were discussed.

On July 16, in an unprecedented move, Dixit briefed the Sri Lankan Cabinet. The meeting was attended by 12 ministers, including Lalith Athulathmudali. For 45 minutes Dixit held forth, clearing mists of any doubts that the ministers might be entertaining. Next morning, Dixit submitted the revised draft to the President. It was cleared, subject to certain modifications and Dixit returned to New Delhi.

Between July 18 and July 20 a series of meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs were convened. Dixit, alongwith Menon, attended most of them. He then returned to Colombo with a final draft. Puri, at the same time, was meeting the seven commanders of the LTTE. And as Pirabhakaran insisted on meeting Rajiv before signing the document, he with his wife and two children were flown out of Jaffna to Trichy on July 24.

Meanwhile, Dixit received Jayewardene's green signal and dashed to New Delhi. But as MGR was also a major factor, Pirabhakaran was first taken to him. Later he was lodged in New Delhi's Ashok Hotel. For two days Dixit and Menon ironed out differences, before MGR and his Food Minister Ramachandran did some plain talking. And the final charming was done by the prime minister himself.

But all was not yet over. Dixit once again returned to Colombo to brief the Cabinet on July 27. Forty-eight hours later, the historic accord was signed.

—PRABHU CHAWLA in Colombo

Indian Army intervened that the abducted men were released. Clearly, the enmity between the other groups and the LTTE is as dangerous and deep-rooted as that between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. Indian Army officials in Jaffna also admit that it is highly unlikely that the militants will surrender all their arms. The Indian Army has been further hampered in its attempts to fan out into the eastern part of the island because of the heavily-mined areas around the army camps they have occupied.

In the face of the mounting tension between the militants, the biggest hurdle to the accord's durability could be the proposed referendum in the eastern province on a merger with the north scheduled, according to the terms of the accord, on or before December 31, 1988. Jayewardene himself has gone on record to say that he will personally campaign in the east against the merger.

The key to the merger issue currently lies with the Muslim population which forms 13 per cent of the population in the eastern province and can tilt the balance either way. The Muslims are being wooed by both sides but are likely to opt against the merger for fear of being swamped by the Tamils and losing their identity. "We are willing to offer them a rotation of the chief minister in the political set-up that emerges. There are other concessions we can make to ensure that they vote for the merger and still feel secure," says S. Soosaithahasan, MP for Mannar, the district closest to Tamil Nadu.

The LTTE's Yogi and General Harkirat Singh at the surrender ceremony: psychological moment

But on current indications, the Muslims will require a lot of wooing before they decide to vote for the merger. The crux of the entire issue is what will happen if they vote against the merger. Jayewardene and the Indian Government claim that the Tamil militant groups will have no choice but to accept the referendum result as being the will of the people. But Velupillai Pirabhakaran, the LTTE supremo, made his feelings clear at his Jaffna meeting last fortnight: "We do not accept this accord but because India is a powerful country we are unable to do anything about it. I don't think it will be a lasting solution."

MORE significantly, he has subsequently stated that the LTTE's demands have not changed: an independent Eelam state incorporating the northern and eastern provinces. Asked if he would renounce violence in pursuit of his goal, his answer was an unqualified no. The fact that the Indian troops cannot overstay their welcome is another sticking point in the context of Pirabhakaran's views. People like Soosaithahasan, however express the hope that once the political process gets going in the north, the militants will change their attitude. "Once they acquire responsibility, they will change," he says.

But for that to happen much will depend on the correct balance of diplomacy and pressure that the Indian Army can bring to bear on the militants. Dixit has been given full authority by South Block to handle the situation and advise the Indian Army as he sees fit. If he is given a free hand without the kind of interference that had aborted earlier Indian mediation efforts, he is capable of pulling it off. Not only is he extremely well-informed about the Sri Lankan scene, he has managed to establish an excellent rapport with Jayewardene over their occasional glasses of cognac together.

For New Delhi, the stake in ensuring the accord works couldn't be higher. The accord itself is a tacit acknowledgement by the Sri Lankan Government that India is the regional superpower and its sphere of influence over the region can no longer be denied. In the regional context, it is a repetition of the Monroe Doctrine, a forcible statement that any external forces prejudicial to India's interests cannot be allowed to swim in regional waters. That message will undoubtedly extend to the other countries in the region as well.

But in the context of the accord itself, much also depends on Jayewardene and how he plays his domestic cards in the crucial weeks ahead leading up to the parliamentary vote. Already Jayewardene and Rajiv have been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. If the accord fails, Sri Lanka is doomed. If it works, it will be the least they deserve.

AUGUST 31, 1987 —DILIP BOBB in Colombo

The Economist



Non-Tiger terror

FROM OUR SOUTH ASIA CORRESPONDENT

HAD President Junius Jayewardene been killed when he was attacked on August 18th in Sri Lanka's parliament building, his ministers would have fought bitterly over who should succeed him; and the peace agreement with the island's Tamil rebels might have been sunk. That did not happen, but what did was bad enough. Shots were fired and two grenades were thrown, a member of parliament was killed and the national security minister, Mr Lalith Athulathmudali, was badly hurt.

The president is left wondering what the word "security" means in his country. The would-be assassin is thought to have had a job inside the building where the attack took place. According to some Sri Lankan and Indian politicians, the security forces themselves may have been infiltrated by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the wild-eyed group from the country's Sinhalese majority which is suspected of planning the assault.

The JVP consists mainly of unemployed young men who follow a particularly passionate form of Sinhalese chauvinism. They see the peace accord with the Tamils, which gives a lot of autonomy to the Northern and Eastern provinces, as a sell-out to the Tamil guerrillas whose ultimate aim is an independent state. The JVP has acquired weapons from friends in the army, and by raiding government armouries. In 1971 the organisation led an unsuccessful anti-government insurgency in which thousands of people were killed. However, a man claiming to belong to another group, the hitherto unknown Patriotic People's Movement, telephoned the BBC to claim responsibility for this week's attack.

Whoever did it, the implications are the same: the men of violence want to frighten Mr Jayewardene's colleagues into voting against the peace pact in September or October, when, the president says, he will put it to parliament. They may be disappointed. The early signs are that the president will be able to rally enough support to get the agreement approved. Many members of parliament are suspicious of the agreement but dislike the idea of violent opposition to it; and they are not keen to face the general election which might follow if they voted against their leader. Others are prepared simply to give the accord a chance, for a few months at least.

Such people might be won over to a yes vote if events in the Tamil north and east run smoothly. The main guerrilla group, the Tamil Tigers, is surrendering weapons in quantity. Other guerrillas have already done so. Nobody is keen to give an accurate count, but mortars, AK-47 rifles, grenades and ammunition have been handed over. That's the lot, say the Tigers. The Indians do not believe them, but the surrender of arms may be more than a gesture.

The Tigers' leaders are beginning to look and act like ordinary politicians. They wear ordinary clothes, earnestly face the press, and are now bargaining hard over an interim council to run the Northern and Eastern provinces until an election can be held. The Tigers are trying to keep a rival group, the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front, off the council. The Front was reduced to around 100 men after the Tigers mauled it last year, but it has support in the Eastern province, where the Tigers are weak.

The Tamils want military protection. The Indian troops who moved into northern Sri Lanka after the agreement was signed are happy to give it to them now, but India says it would like its 9,000 men out of Sri Lanka by December. Mr Rajiv Gandhi will probably have to keep his soldiers there for longer than that. Sinhalese extremists are one reason. Another is next year's referendum, which will give the Eastern province, where the Tamils are less predominant, a chance to opt out of its provisional merger with the north. If the east votes to split away, as many Sri Lankans expect, it will revive many of the Tigers' grievances, and could mean a resumption of fighting. As one Indian commentator puts it, until the referendum is tackled the Sri Lankan peace accord will be plagued by built-in obsolescence.

AUGUST 22 1987

Conberra Times, 10.8.87.

An old fox and a new bag of tricks.

From JOHN ELLIOTT, in London

QUOTE: My own lack of intelligence, lack of foresight and courage were to blame. Thus Mr Junius Jayawardene, the 81-year-old president of Sri Lanka, explained his failure to avoid four years of escalating violence by reaching an earlier settlement with India on his island's Tamil ethnic crisis.

Displaying a bewildering mixture of humility, sharp wit, eccentricity and authority, Mr Jayawardene was sitting beside Mr Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, when he offered this observation. The two men had just signed an historic agreement to end the dispute over Tamil demands for devolution, which has cost 6,000 lives in the past four years.

To achieve this peace deal Mr Jayawardene has conceded to India a controversial say in Sri Lanka's security affairs. He has also taken a major gamble with the political stability and internal security of his country, and reversed his own previous policy of seeking a military victory in advance of a peace settlement.

When asked what had happened in the past few weeks to make him change his mind, he would only say, "The combination of the stars and planets has changed."

A reference to history, rather than astrology, might have been more appropriate. In fact, he has had to come to terms with the fact that he is no Dutugemunu — the legendary Sinhalese prince who marched north 2000 years ago and defeated the Tamil king, Elara, at the holy Buddhist city of Anuradhapura. With India breathing threateningly down his neck, President Jayawardene had no such opportunity for heroics.

He needed a peace settlement so that he could relaunch the island's crumbling economy on to the free market path which he set out on 10 years ago.

This wily old politician is a man of far greater intelligence, acumen and skill than his sometimes bizarre performances at press conferences suggest.

BONA FIDES OF SRI LANKAN LEADERS

A CONCERN SPANNING GENERATIONS



Sudhir Dar, The Hindustan Times, July 83.

Ravishankar, Indian Express 6.6.87







Nehru in 1954 **Rajiv in 1987**

Inspecting a Guard of Honour in Sri Lanka

CRUEZ—AP



AUGUST 10, 1987

REPORT

A Deal in Sri Lanka

The key question: How long can it last?

Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was savoring a diplomatic breakthrough as he emerged from the President's House in the Sri Lankan capital of Colombo last week. The previous day he had joined Sri Lankan President Junius R. Jayewardene in signing an agreement, long sought by India, that held promise of ending a four-year-old insurgency in which more than 6,000 have been killed.

As the Prime Minister strode past the white-uniformed men of a Sri Lankan naval honor guard, one of the sailors suddenly broke ranks and swung at Gandhi with the butt of his rifle. The Prime Minister ducked and received only a glancing blow on the back of his neck and left shoulder. But if he escaped serious injury in the incident, for which the Sri Lankan government quickly apologized, the Prime Minister must have realized how much strife and distrust had been aroused by the pact he had just initialed—and how uncertain were its chances of success.

The agreement was worked out during three weeks of secret talks between New Delhi and Colombo. Its centerpiece was Jayewardene's concession of local rule in two regions heavily populated by Sri Lanka's Tamils, an ethnic minority comprising 12.5% of the country's 16 million people. In exchange, Gandhi, whose government has provided refuge and vital support to Tamil insurgents fighting the Colombo government, promised to ensure that the rebels would lay down their arms.

Gandhi's pledge was backed up the morning after the signing ceremony, when 3,000 Indian troops landed by air and sea on the Tamil-dominated Jaffna Peninsula in the north of the island. Their task: disarm the guerrillas and take up peacekeeping duties.

The Indian military's job will not be easy; indeed, a direct confrontation between the guerrillas and their former protectors may be inevitable. The Indian army's first contact with representatives of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the largest and most militant of the five rebel groups, ended in a standoff. A group of 400 angry Tamils rocked the vehicle of the Indian commander, Major General Harkirat Singh, while yelling that the Tigers would not lay down their arms. A senior Tiger commander told TIME, "The Indians will have to cross our dead bodies to get these weapons." The Tigers' main complaint was that their leader, Velupillai Prabakaran, had been confined to a New Delhi hotel room because of his resistance to the pact, which he called a "stab in the back." But early this week, Prabakaran was permitted to return to Jaffna after pledging that he would ask his commanders to lay down their arms.

As his aircraft descended toward Colombo at midweek, Gandhi could see that Jayewardene had serious problems of his own. Columns of black smoke rose over the capital as angry mobs, overwhelmingly from the Sinhalese majority, battled police and burned buses to protest the settlement. At least 70 people were killed last week as police and soldiers resorted to rifle fire to contain the rioting. In the protesters' eyes, Jayewardene, once their hero, had caved in to rebel demands and Indian pressure. "Let's be truthful," said one government official. "Ninety percent of the Sinhalese people are against us."

For all the controversy it has aroused, the accord offers benefits to both countries—if it holds up. For Sri Lanka, it could mean a return to peace after years of bloodshed and political turmoil; for India, success would promote its coveted image as the regional superpower. Said U.S. State Department Spokesman Charles Redman: "We applaud the statesmanlike efforts and perseverance of these courageous leaders in achieving this accord."

The potential gains are especially attractive to Gandhi, who is facing growing opposition at home. If the accord does not crumble, the Prime Minister will have not only enhanced India's image as a peacemaker but also extracted concessions from Colombo that amount to a compromising of Sri Lankan independence in the areas of defense and foreign affairs. The Indian initiative carries risks as well:

should the Tamil Tigers resist and drag the Indian peacekeeping forces into the insurgency, the enterprise could turn into a political calamity for Gandhi.

Jayewardene is taking an even bigger chance. His Prime Minister, Ranasinghe Premadasa, refused to attend the pact's signing and is actively speaking out against it. The military, 45,000-strong, backs the President, but foreign diplomats in Colombo believe the accord is seriously straining the loyalty of the lower ranks. The main opposition party and Buddhist monks, who form an influential force in Sinhalese society, were in the vanguard of the antigovernment demonstrations. Said Madihe Pannaseeha, chief priest of the Amarapura Chapter of Buddhists: "India's aim is the total subjugation of Sri Lanka. First of all, they will take the north and east. Then they will infiltrate the central provinces. Ultimately they will have the whole country."

Sinhalese distrust of India runs deep. Over two millenniums, Sri Lanka's Buddhist majority has fought back periodic invasions from Hindu India. Sri Lanka's Tamils are Hindus too, and the Sinhalese tend to regard them as India's natural allies. The current round of Tamil-Sinhalese conflict goes back to 1956, when the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, now the leading opposition group, assumed power in Colombo. In a burst of Sinhalese chauvinism, the party made Sinhala the sole official language and restricted job and educational opportunities for ethnic minorities, effectively reducing the Tamils to second-class citizens.

Though Jayewardene's United National Party eased the discrimination in 1977, bitter feelings remained. Tamil resentment erupted into sporadic violence. In July 1983 one of those incidents catapulted the country into war: after Tamil guerrillas ambushed and killed 13 Sri Lankan soldiers, enraged Sinhalese stampeded through Colombo and killed at least 600 Tamils. With that, a full-fledged Tamil insurgency was born.

The rebels' goal was a unified, independent state for Tamils in the island's Northern and Eastern provinces, though it was widely assumed that most would settle for an autonomous homeland. The 3,500-man Tigers, under the charismatic leadership of Prabakaran, emerged as the most powerful insurgent group, dominating the Jaffna Peninsula. The Tigers' nationalist line proved more appealing to Tamils than the doctrinaire Marxism of other organizations; they also showed no reluctance to gun down competitors.

Outnumbered by the Sri Lankan military and poorly armed, the insurgents would not have gone far without assistance from India. Just 22 miles across the Palk Strait from northern Sri Lanka lies India's Tamil Nadu state, home of 55 million Indian Tamils. On an initially covert but increasingly visible basis, New Delhi and the Tamil Nadu state government provided the rebel groups with weapons, training camps and staging areas. Even as it armed the guerrillas, India pressed the Jayewardene government to negotiate a settlement with the Tigers. New Delhi, however, did not endorse the Tigers' demand for independence, insisting instead that Colombo grant local rule.

Jayewardene refused. The Tigers dug in on the Jaffna Peninsula, from where they staged frequent raids and terrorist attacks into the south. During a single week in April, a car bomb in Colombo and a massacre in the Eastern Province claimed the lives of at least 240 civilians, nearly all of them Sinhalese. A month later the Sri Lankan military launched an all-out offensive against the Tigers in the Jaffna area. India demanded that Colombo call off the action, then defied Sri Lankan sovereignty by sending air force cargo planes to parachute 22.5 tons of nonmilitary supplies into the Tamil areas.

At that point, according to Indian diplomats, Jayewardene saw the writing on the wall: he realized that India, with its superior military might, was determined to stop Colombo's efforts to defeat the Tamil rebels. Said a Western diplomat in Sri Lanka: "The military option was no longer viable. Direct talks with the militants, considering their adamancy, were not viable." Jayewardene's only way out was to negotiate with New Delhi.

In June and July, secret talks began through diplomatic intermediaries. Says Neelan Tiruchelvam, a leading Tamil moderate: "The Indian and Sri Lankan governments felt the only way it would work was to present Tamil and Sinhalese extremists with a fait accompli." Colombo agreed to New Delhi's proposal for Tamil local rule, while India acceded to Jayewardene's request that it impose the settlement on the rebels—by force if need be. (Indian troops had helped Colombo once before, when they intervened briefly to put down an insurrection in 1971.) Asked at a news conference last week why he had not come up with such a proposal four years ago, Jayewardene, 80 and noted for his idiosyncratic remarks, drew gasps when he replied, "Lack of courage on my part, lack of intelligence on my part, lack of foresight on my part."

The terms of last week's agreement:

- ▸ Within 48 hours of the signing, a ceasefire to take effect throughout the country.
- ▸ Within 72 hours, rebel units to lay down their arms and Sri Lankan soldiers to return to barracks.
- ▸ Colombo to decree a general amnesty for all Tamil rebels and to free all Tamil political prisoners.
- ▸ Colombo to declare that English and Tamil, in addition to Sinhala, be official languages.
- ▸ New Delhi to expel any Tamil advocating separatism or terrorism in Sri Lanka and to close down rebel camps in Tamil Nadu. Indian and Sri Lankan naval vessels to patrol the Palk Strait to interdict any supply shipments for the rebels.
- ▸ Colombo to create a unified, locally ruled province out of the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka. By the end of the year, residents of the new region would elect a governor, chief minister and a cabinet. Some 92% of the northern area's residents are Tamils; the comparative figure stands at just 40% in the eastern region. As a result, the agreement provides that easterners would decide by referendum next year whether to remain unified with the north. Most observers believe the easterners would opt out. The provision is unacceptable to the Tigers.

India took advantage of its strong position to pull Sri Lanka more closely into

Resistance in the Jayewardene camp: Prime Minister Premadasa giving alms to Buddhist monks, right; Tiger Leader Prabakaran flanked by Tamil guerrillas before his confinement in New Delhi

its orbit. Jayewardene's pro-Western attitudes and laissez-faire economic policies have long irritated New Delhi, which describes itself as a nonaligned, socialist-leaning country and sees itself as the dominant force in South Asia. As part of the accord, Jayewardene agreed to deny military use of the naval base at Trincomalee and other Sri Lankan ports "in a manner prejudicial to India's interests" and promised that foreign broadcasting facilities in Sri Lanka would have no "military or intelligence purposes." The latter concession was prompted by Indian concerns about a Voice of America transmitter under construction near the west coast town of Puttalam, north of Colombo.

Moreover, Colombo said it would consult with India before bringing in "foreign military or intelligence personnel." Since 1984, Sri Lanka has relied on Israeli, Pakistani and other foreign experts to help combat the insurgency. Asked at a press conference whether Sri Lanka had moved closer to India, Jayewardene hesitated, then said softly, "We are free, and we will remain friends of India."

Winning concessions from Jayewardene was only part of Gandhi's task. If the peace plan was to succeed, he needed cooperation from Sri Lanka's Tamils and their supporters in India. Foremost among the backers were M.G. Ramachandran, Tamil Nadu's influential chief minister, and his pro-Tamil party, the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam. Without Ramachandran's acquiescence, it would be difficult to clamp down on rebel activities in the state. To Gandhi's relief, Ramachandran consented, perhaps because the Tamil rebel groups have become something of a threat to law-and-order in Tamil Nadu.

The second, and much more difficult, job of persuasion centered on the Tigers. Gandhi's representatives approached Tiger Chief Prabakaran. With Colombo's permission, an Indian air force helicopter flew to Jaffna a week ago to pick up the Tamil chieftain, who had not been informed of the peace proposal. The first stop was Madras, the Tamil Nadu capital, where Chief Minister Ramachandran tried but failed to cajole Prabakaran into going along. Next, Prabakaran was flown to New Delhi for three days of discussions. The Tiger leader continued to resist, arguing that his fighters would not be safe without their weapons once Indian forces departed. He insisted that the future of the Eastern Province could not be separated from that of the Northern.

As the talks grew heated, Prabakaran described the deal as an "act of betrayal" and charged that he had been "tricked" into coming to New Delhi. "Let them take away our arms," he declared. "But the peacekeeping force proposed to be deployed will have to protect Tamil lives and property. When we are disarmed at the instance of India, India will be held responsible for atrocities against Tamils." Even a meeting with Gandhi failed to soothe the Tiger Chieftain. Placed under military guard, he sat out the pact signing in a room at the government-owned Ashok Hotel in New Delhi. Indian officials hinted that Prabakaran would face exile if he did not have a change of heart.

Countering those pressures with an ultimatum of their own, the Tiger leadership and several smaller rebel groups announced that they would not lay down their arms until Prabakaran returned to Jaffna. "Our friendship with India," said the Tiger statement, "depends on the Indian government's understanding of our basic issues."

Early this week, Prabakaran appeared to give in. After promising that he would ask his fighters to put down their arms, New Delhi arranged for him to fly on an Indian air force plane to Jaffna, where he arrived Sunday afternoon. It appeared that a concession from Colombo was what brought about achange in Prabakaran's attitude. Sri Lankan officials told Prabakaran that he could have a leading role in an interim body administering the Eastern and Northern provinces until elections. He was also reportedly guaranteed the right to appoint a personal security force. Despite the apparent end to the impasse, observers in Colombo and New Delhi were unsure what would actually happen after Prabakaran met with his men.

Jayewardene may have trouble keeping his part of the bargain. The day before he and Gandhi signed the pact, opposition leaders and Buddhist monks sparked violent antigovernment demonstrations. In front of Colombo's central rail station, Madoluwe Sobitha, a well-known monk, told a crowd that Jayewardene was no different from Sri Lankan leaders who had "sold out" the country first to the Portuguese, later to the British. "There are only 24 hours left for us to do something about this," he declared. Before long, protesters were hurling stones at police, and several buses were torched. Outnumbered police killed several demonstrators. Protests spread around the country; Red Cliffs, Jayewardene's vacation home on the southern end of the island, was set on fire.

The next morning, two hours before Gandhi was due to arrive, the government declared a curfew across the island and deployed soldiers to keep demonstrators from approaching the presidential residence. In addition to holding back the angry crowds, senior police and military officers had their hands full trying to keep their own unhappy forces in line. Said one enlisted man: "I have been wearing this uniform nonstop for four days. But what use is it? I am unable to support my own people. This gun I have should be pointed in the other direction." Still, the security forces held, and Gandhi's car drove

ROBIN MORTON

through empty streets to the President's House, where he was welcomed by Jayewardene and Kandyan drummers in brilliant white-and-red uniforms.

Even in his own camp, Jayewardene faced trouble. While the pact was being initialed, Prime Minister Premadasa, who had boycotted the ceremony, was busy giving alms of yellow rice, curd, fruit and cake to Buddhist monks. He claimed he had not been involved in negotiating the deal with India. "I asked them not to sign this, even yesterday," he told the monks. "There is terrorism in Sri Lanka only because India is backing it."

Since many in Jayewardene's ruling United National Party feel no different, the agreement stands a slim chance of winning ratification in Parliament. Mere identification with the document appeared to be dangerous; late in the week a U.N.P. deputy who had attended the signing ceremony was assassinated by a group of Sinhalese men; in response, Jayewardene granted U.N.P. deputies permission to carry weapons. Jayewardene has vowed to dissolve Parliament and call new elections if there is no ratification. That threat may keep his party in line: given the widespread Sinhalese anger at Jayewardene, elections would probably be a disaster for U.N.P. deputies.

At the same time, Opposition Leader Sirimavo Bandaranaike, head of the centrist Sri Lanka Freedom Party and Prime Minister from 1960 to 1965 and from 1970 to 1977, supported last week's demonstrations. "From now on we will have to consult India on everything," she declared. Government censorship kept opposition statements out of the papers.

Jayewardene's best chance to rebuild his political position would be the success of the pact itself. Said Defense and National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali: "The key thing is the disarming of the separatists. A week from now, I want to be able to say India has done *a, b, c* and *d*. Then I can go to the people and make a plea for no more violence."

Keshar, The Hindu, 30.7.87



As Indian forces arrived in the Jaffna area, comments by Jyotindra Nath Dixit, the Indian high commissioner in Colombo, heightened Sinhalese fears that India might be aiming at more than a temporary stay. When the troop deployment was announced, Defense Minister Athulathmudali explained that the units would be under Sri Lankan command. Sounding a bit like a proconsul, Dixit at first told a Colombo news conference that the Indian troops would answer to him; he later allowed, however, that Jayewardene was in ultimate control of the peacekeeping force. Asked how long they would remain, Dixit answered, "Whenever our troops have moved into a foreign territory since independence, they have left when the job was done." Countered Athulathmudali: "Indians have a timeless culture."

Even if the Indians plan to stay only long enough to disarm the Tigers, that may take longer than New Delhi or Colombo ever anticipated. The Indian commander in Sri Lanka, Major General Singh, met late last week with Kumarappa (a nom de guerre), the Tiger commander in Jaffna. Singh eventually persuaded Kumarappa to allow him to talk with local people. A few miles away, in the village of Tellippalai, the mob of 400 Tamils closed in on the general's car and began rocking it back and forth. The protesters chanted slogans declaring they wanted an independent Eelam and would never surrender their arms. "These people are diehards," Singh said later. "But I think we can deal with them."

After three days in Sri Lanka, the Indian peacekeeping brigade had yet to collect a single rifle from the Tamil Tigers. At the air base in Palali, on the Jaffna Peninsula, Indian planes and helicopters were arriving around the clock with crates of ammunition, mortars and heavy equipment. To all appearances, the Indian force had come to stay for a while. ***—By Edward W. Desmond. Reported by Qadri Ismail and Ross H. Munro/Colombo and K.K. Sharma/New Delhi***

At a time when the island of Sri Lanka is violently shaken by the winners' gratitude and the losers' wrath, we reproduce below an article that appeared in the Guardian (21 August 1987) in the wake of the Indo-Sri Lankan peace accord, as it delineates how meticulously its author previsioned and portrayed the true nature of the accord.

THE INFAMOUS CONTRACT

By a special correspondent

COMMENT

INDIA'S PACT with Sri Lanka is the most infamous contract imposed on a small country - short of military occupation - since the Munich Agreement of 1938. The island's ethnic conflict and her relations with India have drawn comparisons with many post-war situations. There are no more striking parallels, however, to the course of events in Sri Lanka than those which preceded the Sudeten-German crisis of the 1930s.

In 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain described the situation in Czechoslovakia as "a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing." Those who did know the country - like Churchill - admired her "virile democracy" and her "will to live unmolested."

Sri Lanka has been in the news the past four years - as Czechoslovakia in the late Thirties - because of an ethnic conflict exacerbated by a larger neighbour.

So it is with Sri Lanka. Those who do know the country recognise that she is the only Third World nation to have exercised universal adult suffrage in free elections for an uninterrupted period of 55 years; that she has the highest literacy rate and the lowest infant mortality rate among the poorer countries, and an average life expectancy among her people (68 years) exceeded by few richer nations. Yet Sri Lanka has been in the news the past four years - as Czechoslovakia in the late Thirties - because of an ethnic conflict exacerbated by a larger neighbour.

There are real minority grievances in Sri Lanka - as there were in Czechoslovakia - but, as Churchill said, on behalf of the Czechs, they were "magnified and exploited" by the bigger power.

The charge of discrimination hangs oddly on a government which has appointed its Chief Justice, Attorney General and Police Chief from a minority numbering less than 13 per cent of the population; or in a country where, as with the Sudeten-Germans, that minority holds a proportionally larger share of jobs in the public and private sectors than the majority or other minorities.

Accusations of "genocide" against the Tamils in the Indian press matched the stridency of Goebbels's charges of "Czech terror in the Sudetenland" and these lies were disseminated - as they were then - by partisan propaganda machines abroad. It passed unnoticed that in a country considered unsafe for the Tamils more of them continued to live in the Sinhalese-speaking south than in their traditional "homelands."

Terrorist atrocities were dismissed as airily as the German press treated the excesses of the Sudeten-German uprising. The Sudetens, at least, had spared civilians; they did not engage in the premeditated butchery of priests, women and children.

By contrast, many Sinhalese households, at great personal risk, sheltered Tamil families who were dispossessed when hooligan mobs went on the rampage in July 1983; a far cry from the German reaction when Jews were attacked in 1938 during the Nazis' bloody "Kristallnacht." Yet the violence of 1983 was compared to that infamous episode in an orchestrated campaign to discredit the Sri Lankan government.

Konrad Henlein and his Sudeten Germans received arms and training from Himmler's SS. Those Tamil terrorists who were not trained in PLO camps ("What does Sri Lanka have against Israel?" asked Menachen Begin when told of their presence in the Shatilla camps) had their training in South India from where flowed the arms and explosives for their operations. India did not turn a blind eye to such training, as is commonly supposed.

The Research Analysis Wing (RAW) of India's Foreign Ministry directed it with the same enthusiasm as the CIA organised the training of Nicaraguan contras.

Indian pressures for major concessions from Sri Lanka were not unlike those which forced the Czechs to go cap in hand to Berlin. In the past three years, Sri Lanka presented proposals for Tamil regional autonomy which the Indian government would scarcely consider for its own Sikh minority. Senior officials would journey to India to be questioned ("grilled" in the words of one veteran Indian correspondent) about them. Not once were they told what the Tamil separatists were prepared to concede.

Then, as it became clear that Sri Lankan forces had begun to make inroads into terrorists strongholds, there began the series of "messages" - the term Premier Gandhi himself used to describe the pressures exerted on Sri Lanka.

It is known that in 1984 - shortly before her assassination - Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had ordered Indian troops to invade Sri Lanka.

The abortive landing of unwanted supplies was followed by the violation of Sri Lanka's air space and a personal warning to President Jayawardene that India's patience was wearing thin. Like Czechoslovakia, Sri Lanka was under no illusions as to what that meant.

Indian military plans for the occupation of Sri Lanka had a much longer shelf life than "Case Green" - Hitler's

plan for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It is known that in 1984 - shortly before her assassination -Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had ordered Indian troops to invade Sri Lanka. The operation was called off at the last moment only because of a resurgence of Sikh militancy.

The speed with which concessions were extracted from Sri Lanka, following Rajiv Gandhi's "messages", matched the rate at which President Benes of Czechoslovakia capitulated to Nazi demands. The domestic-political agreement could have been negotiated much earlier had India disavowed the Tamil militants and insisted on direct negotiations between the elected leader of the Tamils - A. Amirthalingam of the Tamil United Liberation Front - and President Jayawardene.

The Sri Lankan government had made it clear that everything was negotiable - short of a separate Tamil state. The compromise would also have satisfied the Tamil moderates who wanted nothing more than the responsibility for law enforcement, land allocation, and education in the areas where Tamil-speaking people predominate. But it would not have satisfied India.

Rajiv Gandhi's diplomatic coup is even more spectacular than Hitler's at Munich.

India wanted more than a political settlement of Sri Lanka's ethnic problems. Her sponsorship of the Tamil militants was designed, like Hitler's support of Henlein, to advance interests in other areas. What she really wanted was the right to control Sri Lanka's foreign policy so that her regional geopolitical aims could be realised. The Annexe to the Agreement does precisely that.

By insisting on prior consultation in Sri Lanka's future foreign relationships, India has effectively reduced Sri Lanka to the status of Sikkim and Bhutan whose external relations are controlled by New Delhi. By forcing what are, in effect, veto powers on the island's use of Trincomalee harbour, she has secured her long standing aim to safeguard her southern flank from unfriendly penetration.

Rajiv Gandhi's diplomatic coup is even more spectacular than Hitler's at Munich. He told a rally in Madras: "We have gained for the Tamils more than they had ever wanted." He might, justifiably, have added that the world applauds his role as "peacemaker." Hitler never had it that good; it was Chamberlain who was hailed as such at Munich.

Lt. Col. Harkirat Singh in jubliation over the surrender.



We will fight for our political objective

INTERVIEW

—V. Prabakaran

V. Prabakaran, the LTTE leader, is a key player in the dramatic developments represented by the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement and its implementation. He was invited to New Delhi before the agreement was signed, raised apprehensions and objections, met Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi for a frank discussion of the situation and the problems, and returned to Jaffna in early August. On August 4, Prabakaran made a speech that drew wide attention: in it, he analysed the situation from the LTTE's standpoint, expressed his dissatisfaction with the agreement but also his closeness to India and said the LTTE would hand over arms basically because it "loves India" and did not want to clash with the Indian peace-keeping force. A week later, a FRONTLINE team comprising writer **T. S. Subramanian** *and photographer* **D. Krishnan** *met him for this session in Jaffna. Soon after this, fresh Indian assurances led to the LTTE deciding to go ahead with the handing over of arms.*

FOR his first extended interview after returning to Jaffna from Tamil Nadu in January 1987, Velupillai Prabakaran, the Supreme Commander of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, meets representatives of FRONTLINE and THE HINDU in the second week of August in Jaffna. The interview, conducted in Tamil, lasts over an hour.

The LTTE leader looked cool and relaxed. He sets the ball rolling by suggesting that we should go to the Eastern province where the Sri Lankan soldiers, he alleges, are still harassing Tamil civilians.

FRONTLINE: There was a media story that when the Sri Lanka armed forces began their offensive against the Vadamarachchi region of the Jaffna peninsula on May 26, you were trapped in Velvettiturai and you managed to escape. Is this version true?

Prabakaran (smiling): I moved to Jaffna on the night of May 25. They began the offensive the next day morning. They attacked Velvettiturai thinking that I was there.

Q: What is your assessment of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement? What are your apprehensions about it? You say there is a shortfall in relation to your expectations. What are the main areas of dissatisfaction?

A: As far as the agreement is concerned, they say that there will be a referendum in the Eastern Province even on the merger of the North and the East. Moreover, they say the referendum will be decided by a simple majority. It is not a question of the merger of the North and the East. It is our homeland. There is no question of any negotiation on this.

There are some further complications. It is an agreement between the Government of India and the Sri Lankan Government, as far as we are concerned..... In 1983, there were only a few Sri Lankan army camps in the North and the East. But now there are some 200 camps. The Sinhalese settlements could not be removed or dissolved without removing these army camps and, in fact, the camps 'legitimised' the Sinhala settlements. An important aspect (in the agreement) is that there is no room at all for the removal of the camps. To stop such settlements and prevent atrocities, the Indian Army should stay there.

But a strange thing is that there are no Indian Army camps beyond the Elephant Pass or Jaffna peninsula. But today, the Indian Army camps have been established at Kodikamam, Achuveli, Palai, Vannankerni, Yakkachi junction, Thalaiyadi coast, Pandatharippu and Kankesanthurai Light House. There is no need (for Indian Army camps) in these places, because there are no Sinhalese here. But the Indian Army has set up camps there.

We say the 200 (Sri Lankan) Army camps should be removed. But the Indian Army is establishing more camps. This itself has led to doubts and dissatisfaction among the people, at a beginning stage..... There is no atmosphere of safety for the refugees to return. Security and surveillance zones have not been lifted yet. The Indian Army camps have been established. This has led to dissatisfaction among the people. They came to the LTTE's office to give petitions and we told them to give the petitions to them (the Indian peace-keeping forces).

Q: You said the text of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement was not given to you.

A: They took away the copy. Mr. J. R. Jayewardene today says there will be a referendum. The bill has not been moved in the Parliament.

(At this point, Yogi, one of the political organisers of the LTTE, intervenes to say that there are "technical difficulties" in the passing of the bill. The Sri Lankan Government is not sure of getting the two-thirds majority required to pass it. "So, the changes in the constitution cannot take place," Yogi says).

Prabakaran: The question of cut-off points should be settled. The Government Agents say that people who had fled their places after 1983 could return. But people left their places even before 1983. There are two important aspects in this agreement. One is related to our homeland consisting of a unified North and East. The second is our land. Both are complicated problems, major complications. The agreement has not solved these two questions. This is the fundamental problem.

Q: What is your attitude towards the Government of India and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi?

A: Attitude?

Q: I mean your standpoint.....

A: As they took into consideration their own interests and hurriedly arrived at the agreement, they have not looked after the grievances of the people who have been affected for so long.

Q: How?

A: There are refugees in Mullaitivu. People are taking out processions. But before that, we have to lay down our arms. However, the people's problems have not been solved. The problem is that people must return to their land. To

facilitate that, the (Sri Lankan) Army camps should be removed. But the Indian Army is not prepared to remove the (Sri Lankan) Army camps and this will not bring about a solution. If this had been discussed before the agreement was arrived at, we would have laid down certain conditions. We would have said the army camps should be removed. But this has not taken place.

When we say the army camps should go back to the position that obtained on May 25, then why do they establish more Indian Army camps in Kodikamam? People are not able to go back first; the refugees are unable to return.

(At this point, Prabakaran asks his bodyguards to bring the Jaffna Tamil newspapers and says we should know the situation. He reads out the title of a local newspaper's editorial, "Nobel prize is calling.")

Q: Addressing the public meeting on the Sudumalai Amman temple grounds on August 4, you said you had a heart-to-heart discussion with Rajiv Gandhi. You also mentioned that he gave you some assurances and then you relented. What are the assurances?

A: Mr. Rajiv Gandhi gave the assurance that we, the Tamil people, will be protected in the North and East. But people are not able to return to the East.

The Indian Army has gone there but the Tamil people are not able to go there—because there is an increasing opposition from the Sinhalese Home Guards and the Sinhalese people. There are army camps there in individual houses, schools and cooperative stores. But the Indian Army has not been deployed in such places. The Ceylon Army has not been evacuated, the problem has not been solved. Another thing is the people's lack of faith arising out of the non-removal of the Ceylon Army. Even if the Indian Army goes, occupies such places and later vacates, the Sinhala army will come back. Further, we wouldn't have arms.

Q: What did Rajiv Gandhi say about the removal of 200 army camps?

A: We opposed the agreement on this point. Nobody was prepared to consider it.

Q: In Delhi?

A: Yes, in Delhi (firmly).

Q: In the future political set-up of the North and East, what is the role you envisage for the LTTE, once the laying down of arms is completed?

A: When we say political role, we have contacts with people at the organisational level and we are strengthening it. We are strengthening our organisation in the East also. We are already working with the people in Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts. This is not a difficult task.

Q: Is the LTTE strong in the East?

A: In the East our people are active even in areas where there are Sinhalese. When the people hoisted the LTTE flag at Mudur, they were shot dead. The Indian Army and the Government Agent wanted the flag to be removed. To that extent, people are conscious of things.

Q: Will you accept a multi-party, competitive political system? You said earlier that there should be a one-party democracy on the lines of Yugoslavia.

A: This is important and you should know our position. We have not achieved Tamil Eelam. I had expressed my views on a political set-up for Tamil Eelam. But there is no separate country now. This is an agreement imposed on us. In this (set-up) everyone is equal, everyone is the same. We will fight for our political objective. We will take the Eelam political objective in a sustained manner before our people.

What I said then was to be done after the establishment of our own State. But there cannot be any compatibility between one-party rule and what obtains now. What is taking place now is this. Sri Lanka and India have concluded an agreement. The Indian Army is here and is asking for our weapons. If we don't do that, we will have to fight the Indian army. To avert that, we accepted these arrangements, but we have not abandoned our political objective.

Q: There are conflicting or varying reports on what you said during the press conference you held in Jaffna on August 5. While one report said that you would not allow the "anti-social" militant groups to contest the elections, other reports said you would allow other groups to contest. Which is true?

A: Everybody will be allowed to contest elections. We will place our views before the people.

Q: What is the role you see for the TULF as the elected representatives of the people?

A: You are aware of what they did before. What do they know but the job of fighting elections? They will go back to fighting elections. We don't want power to pass into their hands—that is our intention and our stand. Let the people decide. They will contest elections. We will stand against them in the furtherance of our cause. The people will decide on whose side they will stand.

Q: At the Sudumalai public meeting, you said the LTTE would take to different forms of struggle. What are they? Will it be a mass-based struggle, a revolutionary party, a non-violent struggle or will you take to armed struggle again?

A: We will resort to a mass-based struggle.

Q: But isn't LTTE a purely military organisation?

A: Today, the LTTE is a mass-based organisation. You would have noted our May Day rally. There is military rule here during the time of the rally. Military helicopters are firing from above. At the same time, the Sinhalese people in the South are not able to celebrate the May Day. In this kind of dangerous situation, if we are able to mobilise 200,000 people and take out a rally in the burning sun, it does mean we are a mass-based organisation. We have built up such a strength. If ours had been merely a militant organisation, people would not have attended the May Day rally in such a massive way.

Q: What is your attitude towards the Muslims in the East?

A: We don't look upon the Muslims as a separate category; we consider them an integral part of the Tamils. It is a question of people united by language and differentiated by religion.

(At this point, Yogi made a remark to the effect that it was the Sri Lankan Government which separated the Muslims from the other Tamils.)

Q: President Jayewardene has been appealing to the people in the East to vote against the merger in the referendum. What will you do if the Muslims vote against the merger?

A: We have not planned for that situation. It is something that is going to happen in the future. We can respond to the problem only at that stage.

Q: In a system where there are going to be elections—a competitive political structure—what are the problems you foresee?

A: We have already met such political competition. We are no strangers to such competition. Let the people decide ultimately whom they want. Let them choose for themselves a proper leadership to free themselves from this confusion.

Q: What will be the future of your cadres, estimated to number 5,000?

A: We will devise a proper plan for their future life. We will not abandon them. We will find a way out for them to continue their livelihood.

Q: In what way?

A: We will create job opportunities. Those who want to study will be allowed to study. We will arrange for them technical training. All of us will remain disciplined and create opportunities in a collective way.

Q: What was the reaction of your cadres to the agreement and to the proposition of handing over arms? Did they oppose the handing over of arms?

A: As far as the cadres are concerned, they have much faith in me personally. That is why they deferred to my word. But even today there is no protection. Dangers arise for us from the cadres of the other armed organisations and from the Sri Lankan Army.

Q: Was there any opposition?

A: As regards opposition, I myself was not willing. Then, imagine the feelings of the cadres. There is no security. So many cadres have died.

Q: What happens to the cyanide capsules that your men wear round their necks? Are they necessary when there are no arms?

A: I think the capsules are needed most, they are indispensable now. They are the only weapons for the cadres to protect themselves in the Eastern province from hoodlums, the rival groups and the Sinhala army. Not only that; they would continue to wear them in remembrance of those comrades who fought along with them and sacrificed their lives.

(At this point, Prabakaran asks Yogi whether he sports the cyanide capsule. Yogi pulls out the capsule tied to a string around his neck. It is made of white and black plastic. Prabakaran also pulls out his capsule from under the collar of his shirt and shows it to us. When we ask him whether we can photograph him at this moment, he politely declines the proposition.)

"I will fight till the last drop of my blood for the liberation of my motherland"

Q: How do you feel when your fighters are killed? For example, you have named your son Charles Antony in memory of a loyal LTTE fighter who was killed in a clash with the Sri Lankan Army in July 1983.

A: As far as our feelings are concerned, we have been very deeply affected in our hearts. Having fought so much, having sacrificed so many lives and having lost 20,000 people ..... all this has been subordinated to India's strategic interests. Not only that, we the representatives of such martyrs, have not been properly respected.

Hence in this kind of situation ..... during the interim arrangement .... we feel that we want to demonstrate to the Government of India the support we have from the people. India has not given us our due. Without consulting us, they have arrived at an agreement. Hence, we would like to enter politics with the people's support and with the goal of Tamil Eelam. That will be the fitting reply.

Q: Today's Tamil papers in Jaffna quote an LTTE representative as saying the organisation would not fully surrender arms.

A: Yes, we made the statement. It is better to fight and die than surrender the weapons in an insecure environment and die on a mass scale!

Q: What are the shaping influences on your life?

A: Ra. Su. Nallaperumal's serial "Kallukkul Eeram" ("It is wet inside the stone") published in *Kalki* magazine. I have read it five times. It revolves round the Indian freedom struggle. Mr. Nallaperumal balances the ahimsaic struggle and the armed struggle. Generally, I read anything on any freedom movement. I used to read books on Joan of Arc, Napoleon and so on. I was always interested in history. Shivaji was the first guerilla to have fought against the Mughal rule. When I was young, I always had a picutre of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose. I used to keep his picture on my table when I used to study. I had written on my table, "I will fight till the last drop of my blood for the liberation of my motherland".

FRONTLINE: Thank you, Mr. Prabakaran. ☐ **August 22-September 4, 1987**

The Week

INTERVIEW

'Many loose ends'

Interview with A.P. Venkateshwaran

WHEN THE WEEK approached A.P. Venkateswaran, former foreign secretary, for his comments on the Indo-Sri Lankan accord, he said he was reluctant to speak about it because he had yet to study its full implications. Pressed for his reactions about the sudden reversal of the stand by President Jayewardene, he said: "President Jayewardene had opposed even much smaller concessions like those provided in annexure C only four years ago and had gone back on his own words. Agreements reached on one day would be gone back upon the next day." Despite his reluctance Venkateswaran went on to talk about the recent developments. Excerpts:

QUESTION: *What has happened now?*

ANSWER: I cannot imagine that a great change of heart has taken place in this regard and can only assume that some factors have entered into the equation which we are as yet unaware of without any certainty.

Do you think there had been pressure from and arm-twisting by India?

To attribute the change to the air-drop exercise is not convincing to me. The chances are that certain internal factors have been responsible for President Jayewardene's volte-face

What about the provisions of the accord?

Going by what has been published and presuming that there are no confidential clauses to the agreement, I can only remark that there are many loose ends.

Like which ones?

First, we know that the constitutional package for greater autonomy of Sri Lankan Tamils in the accord still has a number of aspects to be decided upon. These gaps would prove very difficult later on to sort out. Secondly the deadline set for surrender of arms by the militants would seem unworkable in practice.

Thirdly, from what President Jayewardene had himself told his party before signing the accord, he does not envisage the Eastern province to remain with the Northern province when the proposed referendum is held by the end of 1988. Are we then going for an accord with a built-in obsolescence? What happens thereafter?

Fourthly, according to the provisions in the accord, the Indian peace-keeping force is entirely dependent on the request of President Jayewardene and would cover only the Eastern and Northern provinces. What would happen if ethnic disturbances break out in other parts of Sri Lanka?

The dead line set for surrender of arms by militants would seem unworkable in practice.

You are referring to the start of the ethnic strife in Colombo four years ago.

Precisely. And last but not the least, what is India's capacity to ensure peace-keeping outside its borders, particularly when India has enough problems within its own borders?

What would happen to the basic question of human rights?

Yes there is the danger that because the accord has been signed, whether it works or not, world attention will no longer be focused on what has been a question of human rights—the struggle of the Sri Lankan Tamils to win equal treatment as citizens of Sri Lanka.

What is your final view of the accord?

Now that the accord has been signed for better or for worse, let us hope that all concerned will do their best to make it work and to restore peace to that troubled island.

What about the violent Sinhala opposition to the accord?

The boycott of the accord by powerful segments within the government of Sri Lanka and the strong opposition by Buddhist groups as evidenced by large-scale disturbances are a cause for concern. Let us only hope that the cure will not be worse than the disease.

Should the accord have the sanction of the Sri Lankan Parliament?

The accord is not yet a formal accord because it has not been ratified by the Sri Lankan Parliament. In our system, such ratification is not necessary. But the accord becomes formal only when the Sri Lankan Parliament ratifies it, as provided in the accord itself.

How can we send troops to Sri Lanka before the Sri Lankan Parliament approves the accord?

Yes, how are we sending the troops? Are we helping the Sri Lankan government to violate established norms?

Would the accord produce more problems?

It can create a serious ethnic crisis if Sinhalese anger is aroused against Tamils elsewhere, in Colombo and other areas.

Would they not recognise the need for peace?

I hope they would and in spite of all inhibitions, peace will return to Sri Lanka.

AUG. 9–15, 1987–T.V. KUNHI KRISHNAN

CHAPTER 3

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29 LTTE is offered 7 places out of 12 member Interim Administrative Council.

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Sydney Morning Herald

An elusive peace in Sri Lanka

REPORT

SRI LANKA today begins in earnest negotiations with the World Bank and the IMF on a reconstruction program after four years of civil war. But it is still torn by dissension. On August 18, three weeks after President Jayewardene and Mr Gandhi signed the agreement which ended the Tamil insurgency, grenades clearly meant for the President were hurled into a Cabinet meeting room in Colombo. The grenades, almost certainly thrown by a disaffected Sinhalese, missed their target but killed one Cabinet minister and injured others.

The Indian-imposed solution to the Tamil problem underlined Sri Lanka's inability to deal with its most serious internal problem without outside assistance or direction. When that imposed solution gave rise to the new problem of a Sinhalese backlash, the sense of Sri Lankan impotence was reinforced. For the immediate task of tracking down those who attempted to kill President Jayewardene, Scotland Yard's help has been sought; for the continued protection of the President, an elite police commando group, British-trained and under the control of the President's son, is said to stand ready to replace the normal security forces if necessary; and to strengthen Sri Lanka's capacity to counter the new terrorist threat, the US has at last sent the much-needed helicopter spare parts it had withheld when the main target was the Tamil insurgency in the north.

Compared with the Tamil threat, now fairly satisfactorily neutralised by the Gandhi-Jayewardene agreement, the threat from "Sinhalese terrorists" is serious indeed. The Tamils, before their surrender, employed terror, to be sure. But they also maintained the serious and difficult objective of controlling territory. They were able to maintain their position only because they also had genuine support from people living in the areas in which their writ ran. The Sinhalese terrorists have a much simpler objective. Resentful of the concessions given to the Tamils and angry with what they see as a surrender of sovereignty to India, they want to destroy the Gandhi-Jayewardene agreement by destroying its architect on the Sri Lanka side.

Assassination of the President would plunge Sri Lanka into chaos. In such a situation, the Sinhalese extremists, whether backed by communists or Buddhist priests, could not expect to take control. But they know that the Opposition, led by Mrs Bandaranaike, is committed to repudiate the Gandhi-Jayewardene agreement. That could sustain the terrorists' murderous determination. However, Mrs Bandaranaike, no matter how warmly she detests the agreement, can hardly be pleased at the prospect of seeing it overturned by terrorism. Apart from anything else, she has powerful personal reasons – her husband's assassination 28 years ago by Buddhist monks – to abhor the politics of violence.

Far from threatening the Gandhi-Jayewardene agreement, then, the tactics of the Sinhalese terrorists should in fact strengthen it. The terrorists must be isolated, not encouraged. However sincerely the Opposition might resist the experiment in power-sharing with the Tamils, it should not be tempted to think that it would easily benefit from every blow against that experiment. Peace in Sri Lanka has so far depended heavily on President Jayewardene. Now it depends as much on his political opponents, and their acceptance that the alternative to reconstruction is anarchy. 2.9.87

Madan, Ananda Vikatan, 9.8.87



SRI LANKA

Coping with Peace

REPORT

A return to normalcy but fears for the future

ARO Hara, Aro Hara. The devotees chanted as the deity of Lord Muruga was taken out of the 170-year-old Nallur Kandaswamy Temple and placed on the intricately carved chariot. The hail to the lord reached a crescendo. It was as if four years of pent up feelings were bursting out in a cathartic sigh of spiritual and emotional exhilaration.

It was August 23, the occasion of the car festival, and the most important day in the 25-day-long festival in the Jaffna peninsula's holiest temple. Never before had such a crowd been witnessed. Almost half the peninsula's population of 700,000 people had shown up—more than double the turnout in the preceding war-torn years.

It was after a long, long time that holy incense and not billowing black clouds of destruction was rising into the air. The people were exuberant, not cowering in terror. Every one was experiencing the delicious thrill of mobility and freedom, instead of tensely pricking a ear to detect the sound of aircraft and run for cover. The massive turnout and *joie de vivre* of the festival was the most touching tribute to the peace and security brought to war-ravaged Jaffna by the accord.

The leash of terror in the peninsula has, at last, snapped. In just two weeks, life is back to what it was before the July 1983 riots. There is no shortage of essential commodities. Refugees are returning home, bringing happy reconciliations. Many households are preparing to send their children to school and college when the term begins on August 31. And, as Jaffna businessman Sankaran Hariharan, whose annual turnover slumped from Sri Lankan Rs 60 lakh to Rs 50,000, said: "Business is picking up."

Yet the people suffer no delusions. "We feel free and easy now, but we feel it's a temporary truce," remarks Varadaraja, a farmer of Allaipatti village who had migrated with his family to Jaffna to run a small shop. He now plans to go back to his 1.5 acre tobacco farm. A government servant expressed a similar sentiment: "This is only the start. We have got only half freedom. We wonder how long it will last." Trapped in a vicious cycle of violence, people are finding it psychologically difficult to believe that peace will last.

With the initial euphoria waning, as is inevitable, two crucial problems have emerged in the post-accord phase. Firstly, as Jaffna Municipal Commissioner C.V.K. Sivagnanam said: "Till now, the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) did the policing of our society. But now with their disarmament, there is a vacuum in discipline enforcement. Antisocial elements are beginning to exploit the situation and crime has gone up."

Trapped in a vicious cycle of violence, people in the northern province are finding it psychologically difficult to believe that peace will last.

Second and most crucial, is the urgent need for reconstruction and rehabilitation. On June 6, two days after the Indian air drop, the Sri Lankan Army based in the Palali camp devastated Valalai village in a brutal retaliatory attack. The house of Alagendra Raja, a small farmer, was attacked and set on fire. Raja's family, along with 15 other families, fled to seek refuge in a school in Chavakacheri. Two months later Raja returned to his village. But he is now penniless and homeless.

Anton Sudhakar, a fisherman of Gurunagar, was detained at the Boosa camp for ferrying TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation) members. The accord enabled his release and a joyous reunion with his family. However, two short weeks later, he faces grinding poverty. His electricity has been cut off for non-payment of bills and his few possessions have been sold already. His boat has been impounded and he sees no way of earning a livelihood.

Rehabilitation is an aspect of the peace accord that demands urgent attention. For if neglected, the goodwill of the public can turn irreversibly. Peace can assuage tense minds, but cannot fill empty stomachs. During the horror-filled days of the carpet-bombing, the sole preoccupation was finding safe shelter. Now, with the chance to pick up the threads of life once again, people lack the means to buy food, to rebuild their homes or start business.

Indian officials in Colombo, aware of the problem, talk in terms of Indo-Sri Lankan joint economic cooperation to set up some large projects to solve the problem of unemployment in the north and east of the island. While this is essential, the most pressing need at present is to provide the basics—food, shelter, clothing and the tools of trade.

Only the LTTE has so far risen to the task of rehabilitation though it is constrained by limited resources. A new party reconstruction and rehabilitation wing has now focused on these activities. LTTE cadres have begun construction work in ghost towns and villages like Velvettithurai, Point Pedro, Valalai, Vasivilan and Urupiddy. Squads go about clearing debris, cutting timber and transporting other essential items in the northern province.

In fact, the LTTE cadres seem to have taken to civilian life quite easily. As Kanagamma Arumugam, a teacher of Hindu College in Chavakacheri, said: "The Tamil Tigers will have no problems adjusting to civilian life. They are used to a life of hardship and, in any case, they have been running a parallel government here for sometime."

Though the group's militant members still carry their cyanide capsules and feel "orphaned without arms", their discipline and fierce loyalty to leader V. Pirabhakaran has ensured their obedience to embrace civilian life. The change from living in secret jungle hideouts to the free bustling town area has been a marked one for most LTTE men. Yet, as Puliendran, the Tamil Tigers area commander in Trincomalee who took part in at least 500 guerrilla operations, explained, he had all through spent time cultivating paddy along with his military duties—thereby driving home the point that normal civic functions were very much a part of guerrilla existence.

There is no doubt that the LTTE holds complete sway in Jaffna. Even in Trinco-

malee, the LTTE is the most popular group as the others have earned opprobrium for indulging in criminal activities and are also suspect as being fronts propped up by the Indian Government. But at the same time, there has developed an interesting shift in public perception when it comes to governance. The public recognises the sacrifices and the consistently disciplined behaviour of the LTTE. But they do not unreservedly accept it as their ruler. N. Manickam, an electrical superintendent of Urumterai, owes his life to a local LTTE leader who advised him on how to construct bunkers outside his house to survive the bombing. Yet, Manickam now says: "The LTTE deserve the top positions but none of their cadre have the education required to go with such posts."

On the other hand, though the more moderate Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) commands less respect, it is recognised as having greater political maturity and experience. Echoing popular sentiment, Varadarajan, the small-time farmer, said: "We would like TULF and LTTE to share power. TULF has experience and LTTE has idealism. A combination would be in our best interests." But as matters stand, Pirabhakaran is more inclined to reward his cadre who have sacrificed so much. At the same time he does recognise the need to field eminent public personalities to counter the general charge of the inexperience and lack of education of his men.

PIRABHAKARAN still firmly believes that with the accord, "the Tamils have become victims of India's geo-political interests". Understandably, the LTTE is resentful of the presence of the Indian Army, whom they see as usurpers of their role. What is worrying India, however, is the anti-Indian propaganda they have begun to indulge in. At regular political meetings organised by the group, they explain the accord as suiting only India's geo-political interests. While most Tamils want the Indian Army to stay on and some, in fact, even talk in terms of India starting a permanent Ceylon regiment, the LTTE has been pointing out the dangers of a prolonged stay of an "outside army". They take the line that "an army is an army" after all—insinuating the possibility of Indian soldiers misbehaving with the local girls among other things. Realising the havoc this can cause, Indian jawans have been sternly warned not to mix with the local people and to keep a low profile.

But that warning could apply to the Tamil militants as well. Barely had the ink dried on the accord when LTTE flags began mushrooming all over Trincomalee, Sri Lanka's once famous and now battered

Rebuilding homes in Jaffna: key issue

port-town. Predictably, the LTTE's red flag with its yellow emblem of a roaring tiger framed in a coat of arms was a red rag to the local Sinhalese. Trouble was sure to follow and it did—first on August 6 and then more dangerously, on August 24.

On August 6, a crowd of jubilant Tamils carrying LTTE flags and bursting crackers ran into an antagonistic Sinhalese crowd on the N.C. National Highway. In the fight that ensued a Tamil was killed. The Indian Army then instructed the Tamils that no flags were to be kept in public places and dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed.

The second incident occurred 18 days later in Madathady junction, on the outskirts of Trincomalee. Some Tamil taxi-drivers were gossiping idly under a huge tree, atop which two LTTE flags were fluttering gaily, when a group of Sinhalese arrived and demanded that the flag be taken down. The Tamil taxi-drivers re-

Accord Adjunct

● One of the unwritten—and unannounced—Indian imperatives behind the Indo-Sri Lanka accord was to break a budding military and commercial relationship between Colombo and Islamabad.

In the last few months, several Pakistani military advisers had been trooping into Colombo and Sri Lankan soldiers were being trained in Pakistani camps.

But the new accord has given Pakistan's Colombo card a rude jolt. The military advisers have been sent back and in future Sri Lankan troops will be trained in India.

South Block has been quick to capitalise on the commercial vacuum created by Islamabad's over-confidence in its relationship with Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan Government had asked Pakistan to supply anti-riot equipment like tear gas cannisters and rubber bullets. But Pakistan had failed to deliver even four months after the order was placed. Soon after the accord, Sri Lanka asked India if it could supply the same equipment. A foreign office request for speedy delivery was honoured within 24 hours.

Similarly, a Sri Lankan requirement for 500 buses to replace those burned during the pre-accord riots may now go to an Indian company, through the Indian Government and not to a Pakistan-based company as would have been the case earlier.

Ramamoorthy, Deccan Herald, 9.8.87

Pirabhakaran with aides: no illusions

fused, saying provocatively, "your time is up, now it is our time". The fight snowballed, and before long there was heavy stone-throwing. At this point, a joint patrol of the Indian Army and Sri Lankan police chanced by. Persuasion and firing in the air did not work and finally the Indian Army had to open fire, injuring two Sinhalese.

The agitated Sinhalese rounded up the 60 home guards of the area and two hours later, at about 8 p.m., returned to Madathady. They ransacked and set ablaze the house of Kanapathi Pillai, a Tamil port worker. Anticipating trouble after the firing incident, the Pillai family had fortunately fled from their house and hidden in the Saraswathy cinema theater, in the Tamil dominated Sivan Koil which is located just behind Madathady. Gazing disconsolately at the charred remains of his house, Pillai said: "We had thought there would be peace after the accord. We are still so scared. We will feel secure only if the Indian Army sets up an outpost in Madathady."

> **"If our people are attacked again, we will return to arms. We are prepared to start again, from scratch."**
> V. PIRABHAKARAN

But that would only be adding fuel to already inflamed Sinhalese passions. There is smouldering resentment to the Indian presence among the Sinhalese, stemming perhaps from a feeling of being threatened by the Indian Army. For, their position is now reversed—until now, the Sinhalese were the ones who had felt secure due to the presence of Sri Lankan home guards and security forces. Said Vimal Hewawithanrana, 33, a home guard of Vijithapura village, menacingly: "Your army fired at our people. Why should your army attack our people only?" And when asked about the burning of Pillai's house, Vimal's response was typical: "The Tamils burnt their houses themselves and simply put the blame on us." What is disturbing is the fact that the police had arrested Pillai's Tamil neighbour, Thanaraja, 27, for suspected arson when in reality, he too had fled to Sivan Koil at the time of the incident.

The situation in Madathady is now very tense, particularly because the Sri Lankan Government has, in the last two years settled several Sinhalese families and home guards in the temple lands which adjoin the five temples nearby.

It was significant that neither the Tamil nor Sinhalese refugees in their camps at Clappenberg and Cod Bay in Trincomalee district felt safe enough to return to their villages. "We are dying to go back. But as long as the Sri Lankan Army camps are around, we do not feel safe to return," said K. Periathamby, a Tamil refugee from Muthur. Added E. Nageswaran, another refugee: "Now that the militants have been disarmed, we feel even more insecure." Visibly frightened and too insecure to even talk freely to an Indian, Sumana Seyana, a Sinhalese refugee from Podokattu village who returned to his camp after a recent trip to his village, says: "I am too scared to go back because when I went to my village a group of Tamil youths came and warned me not to return." Declares another refugee: "I have no faith in the accord because there will still be violence." Even though they have to pay a price for it, the Tamils in Trincomalee are in no mood to bring down their flags. "It is about time our flag went up," says E. Rasalingam. "After all, we are putting it in our territory. All our suffering would have been in vain if we brought down our flag at this point."

In Sivan Koil, and other Tamil-dominated areas, the Tamils are somewhat heady with the breath of confidence and security they now feel due to the presence of the Indian Army. But unlike in the Jaffna Peninsula, which is solely populated by Tamils, any show of exuberance by the Tamils in Trincomalee, which has an equal number of Sinhalese and Muslims, can be gravely counter-productive. Sensing the growing hostility of the Sinhalese, joint patrols have been increased to five per locality daily, and no Indian Army jeep dare ventures out alone. Today, Trincomalee epitomises the tinderbox that Sri Lanka has become. Any event—be it assassination attempts or routine disputes—now have the potential to blow up the fragile accord.

The urgent need for rehabilitation in the battle-scarred areas cannot be overemphasised. One fact that both India and Sri Lanka cannot afford to gloss over is that most Tamils believe the accord is only a truce and that a Tamil Eelam is finally the permanent solution. Father Singharaya, a Catholic priest who was released from the Welikada prison after the accord, is one of them. "After all that the Tamils have gone through, I feel Eelam is the only solution," he says. His view was endorsed by almost every single person spoken to in the peninsula.

Psycologically, it has become impossible for the Tamils to trust the Sri Lankan Government. Gently stroking his leopard cub Sita, Pirabhakaran said: "If our people are attacked again, we will return to arms. We are prepared to start all over again, from scratch." And Ramesh, 21, who is a second lieutenant in the LTTE hierarchy, agrees wholeheartedly: "My whole life is reverted to the recall to arms." The only way this attitude can be kept on a leash is by ensuring that rehabilitation and development quickly follow the newly-found peace on the island.

—ANITA PRATAP in Jaffna

Fragile Frame

THERE is a divine power that is keeping this accord alive," says the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo J.N. Dixit. He is not exaggerating. The accord would have been destroyed had Rajiv Gandhi not ducked in time on July 29 or had the grenades lobbed into the parliamentary hall on August 18 not bounced off President J.R. Jayewardene's table before exploding, killing one minister and injuring 16 others.

The blast revealed the chilling capacity of the anti-accord forces to infiltrate the nerve-centre of government. But miraculously the blast seems to have only strengthened the resolve of the President and his colleagues to push through the accord. M.D. Premaratne, deputy minister for sports, convalescing from back and leg injuries, said: "Of course I will support the accord. This is the last chance we have to solve this problem." Said the MP from Mannar in the deep south, S.K. Piyadasa whose house was attacked on July 29: "We won't be frightened. We cannot allow future generations to suffer for our cowardice."

The Patriotic People's Movement, believed to be a front organisation of the Janata Vimukti Permuna (JVP), claimed responsibility for the blast. Even though the police have arrested four employees of the parliament complex and interrogated 700 persons, they still cannot fathom how the grenades were smuggled into the complex, breaching the concentric rings of security. Frank Silva, DIG(CID) who is in charge of the investigations commented that "one of the grenades was Chinese and the other Singaporean, the kind that is imported into the country for military use". The JVP had conducted three raids in the last five months on military installations and escaped with arms including grenades. But as Neelan Tiruchelvam, ex-TULF MP pointed out "a few more nasty incidents like this and the UNP MPs will be gravely demoralised."

Admitting that it was an "inside job" Silva said "the threat is from within not from outside. That is a matter of real concern to us." There are many who believe that the accord has only shifted violence from the north to the south. In fact, contrary to foreign perceptions, riots in southern Lanka are to be "anti-Jayewardene and not anti-accord" to quote a prominent Buddhist priest, the Rt Rev Madihe Pannasiha Maha Nayaka Thera, 75, head of the Amarapaura sect, because, as he says: "The public feel that the President has trampled upon Sinhalese interests and pushed the accord through without prior intimation."

Luckily the blast did not throw the mechanics of accord implementation out of gear though it did slow it down. The Sri Lankan Government which was expected to lift the Emergency by mid-August could not do so. The Government was also slow in releasing Tamil prisoners—only 1,300 of the 5,700 detenus have been released so far. But the Tamil militants have also been tardy with their arms surrender. It is learnt that while the LTTE has surrendered 85 per cent of their lethal weapons, they have handed over only about 45 per cent of their small arms. It seems the LTTE is hiding a cache of firepower, wrapped in polythene and buried underground, as a kind of safety valve should something happen to the accord.

"The public feel the President has trampled upon Sinhalese interests and pushed the accord without prior intimation."

NAYAKA THERA
Amarapaura sect head

The accord has thrown up two new problems which have to be urgently tackled. Firstly there is evidence of colonisation in Trincomalee by the Sri Lankan Government since the accord was signed. There have been reports of Sinhalese families being resettled in Kantalai, Selaipaiaru, Nilapali, Nilavali, Dehiwate, Sumithra, Allai and Alliolluve in the district. Considering that the eastern province, which includes Trincomalee, is to vote for a merger with the Tamil-dominated northern province, the Tamils will naturally view this as an underhand way of ensuring that the majority vote will be against the merger. This is because the Muslim and Sinhalese population together will far outnumber the Tamils in electoral terms. Secondly, the Indian Government has come to the conclusion that 37 of the 60 Sri Lankan Army camps in the east should be withdrawn to enable the refugees to return to their villages in safety and security.

The demilitarisation, the first phase of the accord, has gone off better than expected as have the moves for the setting up of the interim administrative council. Jayewardene had accepted all three Tamil names for the interim council suggested by Pirabhakaran. The council is expected to come into being very soon.

Simultaneously talks were held by constitutional experts on residual matters of devolution in Colombo and Delhi. It was not entirely smooth-sailing for according to an Indian official "Sri Lanka's understanding of the accord does not quite tally with ours." But at this juncture patience is the name of the game and Lands Minister Gamini Dissanayake said: "Surely the Tamils must have faith in the President who has staked his life for the accord." The drafting of the legislation is expected to be over in September after which it will be put before the Supreme Court to judge its constitutionality. It is then put before the Parliament for vote.

Both Sri Lankan and Indian officials do not expect any cross-voting as the UNP does not have a history of defections. Moreover, the President is comfortably placed—for a two-third majority he requires 113 votes. He has 141 MPs in the House of 168.

The only guarantee required is the physical safety of the President and his MPs. Despite many having received death threats, the UNP MPs are sitting ducks since none of them have been provided with even elementary security. Six weeks after the legislation is passed, the elections can take place for the setting up of the interim provincial council for the north and east.

There are, of course, a number of factors that could eventually dilute the accord, mainly the proposed referendum in the east for a merger with the northern province to which the Muslim population in the east holds the key. The accord provides for the referendum to be held by December 31, 1988, though Jayewardene has been given the option to postpone it if he wishes.

But there are still many stages to go through before that, each fraught with dangers that can sabotage the accord. As Dixit says, the accord could do with all the divine help it can get.

SEPTEMBER 15, 1987 —ANITA PRATAP in Colombo

Tamil Tigers accuse Indian Intelligence

September 21, 1987

JAFFNA – The leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam has accused an Indian intelligence agency, RAW, of stirring up inter-group violence in the north and east of Sri Lanka.

Veluppillai Prabakaran was responding to criticism levelled against the LTTE by a spokesman for the Indian External Affairs Ministry.

Prabakaran said that the Indian Foreign Ministry office was fully aware of 'the sinister role played by RAW in training and arming anti-social elements for use against unarmed cadres of the LTTE'.

Blamed

Prabakaran also blamed the Indian intelligence agency for propping up as political leaders well-known criminals who had committed murders in both the Indian state of Tamil Nadu and Tamil Eelam.

The Tamil leader declared: 'While we lay down our arms, we place the responsibility of protecting our unarmed cadres on the government of India.

'There was peace until the Three Star group and Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front reentered Tamil areas with sophisticated weapons and unleashed violence against the LTTE and the innocent public.'

He alleged that those responsible had been trained and armed by RAW and sent to Tamil Eelam 'at a crucial time when we were co-operating with India in the process of disarmament.

'These groups clashed among themselves and launched repressive killings against the LTTE, causing violence and bloodshed and severely disturbing the peace in the Tamil areas.

'We blame RAW, an instrument of the Indian state, for the recent course of violence.'

Prabakaran said he believed the Indian government had completely misinterpreted the reasons for a hunger strike and civil disobedience campaign launched by the LTTE last week.

A Tamil leader in the Jaffna area, S. Theliban, is in the sixth day of a hunger strike, and two women schoolteachers in the fourth day.

Picketing

Tamils in the north are also picketing and occupying government buildings.

The campaign was launched in protest at the fact that no interim government in the north and east has been constituted, as promised in the Indo-Sri Lankan deal.

The LTTE have said that Sinhala colonisation of Tamil areas is continuing, that Tamil refugees are unable to return home because of a massive presence by the Sinhala Home Guard, police and army, that new police stations are being opened and prisoners not being released.

Prabakaran said: 'We have put forward fair and just demands which should have been implemented according to the terms of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord.

'Our struggle is not a campaign against India or against accord but the struggle to win our freedom, dignity and security.

'The entire Tamil masses are behind us.'



EDITORIAL

India to fight Jayawardene's war

SO R. GANDHI HAS ONE MORE ACCORD to his credit, this one of international dimensions. But like his earlier accords (of the domestic variety) this too will come unstuck before the ink on it has fully dried. Though R. Gandhi has been taking credit along with Jayawardene for producing the framework to end the civil war in Sri Lanka, the chances are that India will end up by fighting the war for Jayawardene's government.

All hush-hush about the accord notwithstanding, there are enough reasons to believe that it is not Gandhi-Jayawardane's baby, but the handiwork of the American-British-Jayawardene axis. The British and the Americans have their own reasons to see India embroiled in military conflict in sri Lanka. They want Jayawardene to win. They want Sirimavo Bandaranaike to be contained. And they want India to bloody its hands in foreign territory and thus end its moralising. And with some luck, they want India to have its own Viet Nam.

Jayawardene wants to see the end of India's involvement on the side of the Sri Lankan Tamils by making her close the guerilla/ military training-camps in Tamil Nadu and the supply of money and weapons to the Tigers. And more importantly he wants India to do what his own ragtag army cannot: destroy the Tigers.

The Americans and British have been indulging in small flattery by dropping hints that Gandhi-Jayawardene are now in the queue for the Nobel Peace prize. A joke over which they laugh in private. But what does one do when you have an R. Gandhi who is willing to be made a sucker! Except that in this case he has landed the country in the worst foreign affairs mess in four decades.

An accord in Sri Lanka to be successful should have included during the negotiations the two most important parties to the dispute in Sri Lanka. The Tigers who are fighting a war, and Sirimavo Bandaranaike who has emerged as the most powerful leader of the Sinhala people. But that is not what the American-British-Jayawardene interests want. And we shall not have to wait for long to have the proof.

BY A FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT

MADRAS — The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have categorically denied reports that they killed members of the Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF).

Leaders of the Tigers said the reports, from an Indian news agency based in Colombo, were 'malicious fabrications to tarnish the image of our organisation'.

The UNI agency has been giving the Sri Lankan authorities ammunition to target the LTTE with lying reports of a power struggle within the Tamil Tigers based on 'caste differentiation'.

It has also alleged that the Tigers have clashed with muslims in the east, that the LTTE runs torture camps and that it is seeking the support of a southern Indian political leader to launch an armed struggle for Tamil Eelam.

A communique in the name of S. Subramanian of the LTTE Political Committee said these reports were 'baseless and far from the truth'.

Yesterday the Tamil Tigers launched a hunger strike in protest at the Sinhala colonisation of Tamil areas and against the introduction of the Sri Lankan police system in the north and east.

The 'fast until death' will be accompanied by mass picketing in front of government offices in the northern and eastern provinces.

A resolution passed by the LTTE high command in Jaffna regrets that the assurances given by the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to the LTTE have not been fulfilled.

It points out that the Jayewardene regime is pressing ahead with Sinhalese colonisation even though the interim administration in the north and east has still to be formed.

While the Tamil refugees are not receiving cash aid, rehabilitation funds are being made freely available for Sinhalese families who are prepared to settle in the Tamil homeland.

The LTTE resolution stresses that many Tamil refugees are unable to return to their homes because of the threats made out to them by the Sinhala army, police and so-called Home Guard.

'More than 1½ months has elapsed since sighing of the agreement between India and Sri Lanka and thousands of detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act have still not been released,' says the LTTE.

The resolution urged the Indian government to ensure an immediate halt to all forms of Sinhala colonisation of the Tamil homeland under the pretext of rehabilitation.

The LTTE wants plans to build a new police station covering the northern and eastern provinces to be shelved.

It is also insisting on 'the surrender of all arms under the proper supervision of the Indian peace-keeping force by so called Home Guards and commencement of the closure of all army and police camps situated in Tamil villages and schools.

'The release of all those still in prison and detention camps under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.'

LTTE leader Velipullai Prabharakan has told the Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka that he will not call a halt to protests in the Jaffna peninsular if the Indian authorities deal with these grievances.

A sinister new threat to the Tigers emerged yesterday when the Indian government said it would consider ordering its troops to use force to recover weapons in the Jaffna peninsular.

Under the terms of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord, all weapons should have been handed in within 72 hours of the cease-fire which came into force seven weeks ago.

Some weapons were handed over, but many more were not. Now the Indian army may resort to force if a final appeal to the Tamils to surrender arms is ignored later this week.

Newsline (London) , 16.9.87.

Sri Lankan Government in contravention of the Accord encouraged Sinhalese to found new colonies in the Trincomalee region, a traditional homeland of Tamils. RAW – the intelligence wing of India schemed and helped anti-social elements and dissidents from other militant groups to liquidate the Tigers. Since the Indian Government failed to keep the promises it made, LTTE's political wing leader for Jaffna Mr. Dhileepan went on fast unto death demanding the rights of the Tamils be safeguarded: People thronged in to support him.

Eight more persons in other regions followed the way of Mr. Dhileepan with the backing of the populace.

Sri Lankan misadventure

EDITORIAL

Another Bangladesh?

SOME TIME AGO, A TAMIL intellectual had said that the intra-Tamil rivalries in Sri Lanka would result in a worse bloodbath than the fight between the Sinhalese and Tamils. Also, he had said that if the Tamil extremists would get power, they would be more despotic and unscrupulous than the Jayewardene Government.

The first prophecy has come true. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the combined forces of the other groups (EPRLF, TELO and PLOTE) have already started a war of mutual annihilation. Gun-wielding youths of rival parties are on a killing spree, spraying bullets on suspected opponents, often innocents including women and children. In Mannar, Batticaloa and other Tamilian towns, the streets were littered with dead bodies as a result of fighting between extremist groups. No one is responsible for law and order, as the Sri Lankan authorities do not wish to interfere in the fratricidal war. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) have no mandate to curb the fighting, because they are there as intermediaries between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamils. to see that the Tamil extremists are unarmed. With that premise they entered Sri Lanka.



Ramamoorthy, Deccan Herald, 25.9.87.

The Tamil militants have surrendered only a part of their arms. Now that fighting has broken out amongst them, there is no hope of surrender of more arms. In fact, they are blaming the Indian army for unarming them without giving them protection. As long as the Tamil extremists do not lay down their arms, the Sri Lankan Government is not obliged to fulfil its part of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord.

Thus the accord that was arrived at with lightning speed by high pressure tactics is fast turning sour. The Sri Lankan authorities are happy that India is now made to hold the baby. The situation is such that the Indian army will have to fight the Tamil militants to discipline them.

India is badly caught in a trap of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's making. The Sri Lankan Tamils, who expected India to save them, have now turned bitter. They feel that India has conspired with Sri Lankan authorities to disarm them and make them powerless.

The Sri Lankan misadventure has turned out to be another Bangladesh for India, in which hundreds of crores of rupees of taxpayer's money was spent to earn another hostile neighbour. Now in Sri Lanka, thousands of our soldiers, whose services are much in need in India, are languishing, unsure of their role. Not many Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka have returned and thousands of them remain as our unwanted government guests. Above all, India has become suspect in the eyes of neighbours who resent our interference in Sri Lanka.

It is funny to see the Rajiv Government showing off the Indo-Sri Lankan accord as a great attainment and using it to refurbish its image tainted by the several defence scandals. In fact, the Accord has caused more economic and political damage to the country than all the scandals put together.

Ponnappa, Deccan Herald, 27.9.87.



Sudhir Dar, The Hindustan Times, 7.9.87.

Indian Ambassador for Sri Lanka Mr. J.N. Dixit rushed to Jaffna to persuade LTTE leadership to prevail upon Mr. Dhileepan to giveup the fast. But his proposed guarantees to safeguard the interests of Tamils were hallow. The fast went on.



The FEDERATION of TAMIL ASSOCIATIONS
of the UNITED KINGDOM

LETTER

His Excellency Rajiv Gandhi,

Your Excellency,

THILEEBAN'S MARTYRDOM AND ESCALATING POLITICAL TENSIONS IN THE TAMIL HOMELANDS OF SRI-LANKA

On Sunday, 20th September 1987, a mini-bus travelling from Jaffna to Colombo was stopped at a road-block in Paranthan and the passengers interrogated by four armed men who claimed themselves to belong to Tristar, a supposedly new militant organisation we, the Tamil people, have never experienced before. They were interrogated in order to identify if there were any LTTE cadre, threatened not to embark on journeys between Jaffna and Colombo, and eventually allowed to pass. About fifty yards from this incident stood four fully-armed Indian army personnel. This is the eye-witness account of a responsible member of our community who arrived in London this week. An earlier mini-bus carrying passengers was similarly stopped and a civilian employee of a bank was stabbed to death by these armed gunmen.

We are sure that your Excellency cannot be aware of this. Our suspicion is that there are some mischievous intermediary forces that stand between Tamil and Indian interest, and are engaged in the process of discrediting both. This confirms the earlier rumours which were reaching us (conveyed to your Excellency by our letter of 6th September 1987). It is clear to our mind that, if the activities of these intermediary forces, whoever they are, are allowed to gain momentum, they will tarnish both India and us alike.

The will of a people, who have taken arms after fourty years of deliberation and struggle, cannot be overcome by the conditions that are being created in Sri-Lanka currently. This is not a struggle of disgruntled youths, but a struggle of a people where all sections of the community, including the intelligentsia, are intermingled with the thrust of militancy and defiance. The Liberation Struggle has a firm ideolgical basis. **THILEEBAN, A YOUTH WHO WOULD HAVE ENTERED THE UNIVERSITY, IS DEAD TODAY. HIS DEATH WAS HIS SUPREME AND SPIRITUAL SACRIFICE; EVOKING THE PRINCIPLE OF AHIMSA, HE HAS DEMONSTRATED THE WILL OF OUR PEOPLE TO STAND STEADFAST, REMINDING OUR PEOPLE OF THE DETERMINATION OF THE SPIRIT OF INDIAN INDEPENDENCE SPEARHEADED BY MAHATMAJI. WE SALUTE HIM.**

Your Excellency, this Federation has always felt its duty to keep you informed, as we have done for the past three years. We have attempted, as far as humanly possible, to reflect the authentic feelings of a vast majority of our community. Reading through all our communications, one feels sad that the current events could not have occurred had our observations been taken seriously. It must not be said, your Excellency, that we as a group of responsible people have not brought to your notice, the realities that prevail among our people. **WE OWE THIS TO OUR COMMUNITY.** We are beginning to be uneasy that these observations are not presented to your Excellency in the proper light.

WE WOULD BE DELIGHTED WITH AN AUDIENCE WITH YOUR EXCELLENCY, and we would be willing to brief your officials of our knowledge of the current thinking of the Tamil expatriates in this country. We seek this as of **Utmost importance** for we feel it must never be said by your Excellency or the great people of India that we, as a responsible group of people, were unwilling to communicate the realities as we saw it for a rational solution that would have benefited our people and the people of India. 27th September 1987.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. N. Satchithananthan,
General Secretary.

Mr. M. Sivasithamparam,
President,
Mr. A. Amirthalingham,
Secretary General,
The T.U.L.F.,

Dear Sir,

THILEEBAN'S MARTYRDOM AND THE CRISIS IN THE TAMIL HOMELANDS OF SRI-LANKA.

The Indo - Sri-Lankan Accord was signed on 29th July 1987, and, as we understood this accord, the following elements should have been operational by now:

1. Colonisation of the Eastern province by Sinhalese settlers should have been terminated.
2. The Home Guards, the Sinhalese thugs and hoodlums, who threatened the Tamil villages with violence and murder causing the Tamils to flee, should have been disarmed and disbanded, for the Tamil villagers to return to their villages.



3. The Special Tasl Force, which augmented these notorious Home Guards are still operational in the Eastern province and their activity has not ceased.
4. Extra-judicial killings continue to occur (as reported by Amnesty Internaitonal on 16th September 1987) in violation of the accord.
5. The release of Tamil detainees whom we all know were detained under very flimsy charges has not still fully occurred.
6. The enforcement of emergency regulaitons continues unabated in the North and Eastern provinces, in violation of this accord.

We expect the T.U.L.F. to do everything in its capacity to force the Indian and Sri-Lankan Governments to implement the accord properly without delay. This Federation feels a public statement on these matters will certainly help to diminish tensions in the North and Eastern provinces, and carry torwarc the aspirations of the Tamils, for which enormous sacrifices have been, and are being made by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The political maturity of the Thileeban, and his supreme spiritual sacrifice, should be augmented by the T.U.L.F. and its leadership.

It is a crucial time in the history of our people. The selflessness and dedication to serve our community is the demand of the time. We, for our part, will do everything in our power to keep the struggle of our people alive, and provide both moral and psychological support to the heroes of our time, who have exceeded all our expectations, and proved beyond doubt that this was not a struggle of disgruntled youths. The L.T.T.E., by its recent actions, has demonstrated enormous versatility in its capacity to act under enormous pressures. They have demonstrated beyond doubt the ability to make mature political decisions. We appeal to you, sir, the senior politicians of our time, to give the necessary support and augment our struggle forward. 27th September 1987.

Yours sincerely,
Dr. N. Satchithananthan,
General Secretary.

some progress amid strains

It was a tricky situation in Sri Lanka. Clashes between Tamil militants, the LTTE's fast-unto-death campaign which resulted in the death of one of its leaders, and other incidents contributed to increasing strains between the LTTE and the Government of India. Amidst all these, there appeared hopes of a return to normality and further progress in the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement.

REPORT

October 3-16, 1987

THE death of 23-year-old Rasaiah Parthipan, alias Thileepan, head of the propaganda wing of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), after 12 days of continuous fasting in Jaffna, may as well turn out to be an irony. A few hours after his death on September 26 "some progress" was reported at the talks at Palaly in the Jaffna Peninsula between the LTTE leader, V. Prabakaran, and the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, J. N. Dixit, on the issue on which he had started his fast-unto-death—the LTTE's five-point charter of demands.

"We hope that the outcome would result in cooperation and return to normalcy, overcoming the present difficult situation," cautiously reacted Dixit at the end of the talks. Later, he returned to Colombo and apprised the Sri Lankan President, J. R. Jayewardene, of the trend of the talks. Prabakaran also conferred with his regional commanders about the response of the Government of India and the Sri Lankan Government to the LTTE's demands.

There was widespread grief in the Tamil areas of the Northern and Eastern Provinces over the death of Thileepan, a gifted orator who had a yen for political propaganda. Thousands of people from the North and the East poured into Jaffna as the news of his death spread; black flags flew everywhere. Crowds of sobbing Tamils followed the body, covered with the red LTTE flag with the yellow Tiger emblem, when it was taken in a decorated van for the people to pay their homage. His last wish was that his body should be donated to the medical faculty of Jaffna University and the LTTE said it would be honoured.

The LTTE cadre moved in decisively to curb any spill-over violence. The Tigers put all State-owned buses in depots and guarded them. They also provided protection to Government institutions after there were attempts to set fire to them. In an appeal to the people, Prabakaran said: "All public properties are the properties of the people of Tamil Eelam, so the people should not destroy or damage them." Thileepan would have been 24 in two months. It was the first time in Sri Lanka's history that a person has fasted till death over a political demand. He did not even drink water during the 12-day fast.

by special arrangement

Thileepan who fasted till death..... widespread grief.

In the preceding fortnight, despite the presence of the Indian peace-keeping force and the return of peace in the Tamil areas after the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement on July 29, violent clashes between the Tamil militant groups had seriously complicated the situation on the ground, posing a threat to peace itself. Clashes had also erupted between the Tamils and the Sinhalese in Trincomalee, and between the Tamils and Muslims in Amparai district. Besides, the Indian peace-keeping force opened fire on a crowd of Tamils which wanted to present a memorandum at one of its camps in Mannar district on September 23. One person died in that incident. The peace-keeping force again opened fire on September 27, a day after Thileepan's death, to disperse a crowd of Tamils at Kiran in Batticaloa district in the East.

The situation looks a little dangerous on the diplomatic turf as well. The relationship between the Government of India and the LTTE, the most powerful Tamil militant organisation, has perceptibly soured with the former taking a "get-tough" posture with the latter. At the core of the controversy is the LTTE's five-point charter of demands which include a halt to the Sinhalese colonisation of the Tamil areas, stopping of the reopening of Sri Lankan police stations till an interim administration is formed and disarming of the Sinhalese homeguards. There has been a big buildup in the Government of India's strong statements against the LTTE and the question is whether the LTTE will relent on its charter.

The five-hour talks that Dixit had with the LTTE leaders, including Prabakaran, Ajit Mathaiya and A. S. Balasingham, at Palaly in the Jaffna Peninsula on September 23 were not very fruitful, with the LTTE refusing to call off its fast-unto-death campaign until its five demands were met. After the incident at Mannar on the same day, the Government of India warned the LTTE that the troops would be "compelled to respond with even stronger measures if violence is deliberately provoked by the LTTE."

Evidence of India's "get-tough" pos-

Agitation off

Agreement was reached on September 28 on the LTTE's demand regarding the composition of the interim council for the North and the East in Sri Lanka following talks between its leader V. Prabakaran and Indian High Commissioner, J. N. Dixit. The LTTE, consequently, announced withdrawal of its agitation.

On September 16, an official of the Ministry told reporters in Madras that the clashes were "a naked power struggle through the use of arms."

But in Jaffna, Prabakaran reiterated his charge that the RAW was behind the inter-group clashes and he accused India of setting in motion "a calculated false propaganda" against the LTTE.

ture with the LTTE surfaced first when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi held discussions with his Cabinet colleagues, officials and Tamil Nadu Food Minister S. Ramachandran separately in Delhi on September 14 after the fratricidal clashes between the LTTE and the Three Star group, comprising the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation and the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front, left about 60 militants dead.

Earlier, there was a mounting feeling among the LTTE leadership that the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Indian intelligence agency, was working against the LTTE and that the agency had armed PLOT, TELO, EPRLF and the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) and despatched these groups to the Tamil areas to liquidate the LTTE. Prabakaran later openly levelled the charge against the RAW. The LTTE's deputy leader, Ajit Mathaiya, also charged that "a certain force" was out to eliminate the LTTE and that "a special group, a special mission" had been set up to liquidate Prabakaran himself.

Other contretemps too have cropped up. The interim advisory council has not been formed; the Tamils have charged that the Sinhalese colonisation in their areas is proceeding briskly; and the Sri Lankan Government has opened a few police stations in the Jaffna Peninsula.

The LTTE considered the last measure a red rag, for it felt it amounted to "bringing back the oppressive Sri Lankan police machinery which had unleashed atrocities against the Tamil people." Thus, the LTTE had a feeling of being let down by the Government of India which, it felt, was hedging on the assurances it gave to the organisation.

On September 13, the LTTE sent a copy of the text of a resolution to Dixit. A letter, signed by Prabakaran, stated that "our organisation has been compelled to adopt" the resolution and threatened that it "would be implemented unless the assurances sought for are given within 24 hours."

The resolution stated: "The LTTE, in defence of the freedoms of the Tamil people and the Tamil homeland, has decided to draw the attention of the people and the Government of India by launching a fast-unto-death (campaign) by its cadre and picketing of Government offices. The LTTE, however, will call off its fast-unto-death and picketing campaigns if the Indian Government would assure: 1. immediate stoppage of all forms of Sinhala colonisation of the Tamil homeland under the pretext of rehabilitation; 2. stoppage of the so-called rehabilitation work until the formation of the proposed interim government; 3. immediate suspension of opening of police stations in the Northern and Eastern Provinces; 4. surrender of all arms under the supervision of the Indian peace-keeping force by the so-called homeguards and commencement of the closure of all army and/or police camps situated in Tamil villages and schools; 5. release of all those still in prisons or detention camps under the Prevention of Terrorism Act."

After the expiry of the 24-hour deadline, Thileepan began his fast-unto-death on September 15 in front of the historic Nallur Murugan temple in Jaffna town, despite the Government of India's advice against it. Thousands of people gathered to watch the fast which three women also joined later. The commencement of the fast on September 15 and the LTTE's drive against PLOT, EPRLF and TELO two days earlier signalled the beginning of India's "get-tough" stance with the LTTE and there has been no let-up in it since then.

The efforts to implement the other provisions of the agreement, however continued. The third round of discussions in Colombo between the officials of the Government of India and the Sri Lankan Government from September 16 has made "considerable progress" on "residual matters" relating to the devolution of power to the provincial councils. In Madras the TULF has reached an agreement with a Muslim delegation from Sri Lanka on adequate safeguards to and sharing of power with the Muslims in the North and the East. The understanding also covers Muslims' entitlement to an adequate share of land in the North and the East and to employment and education. The Muslim delegation was led by Dr. Badiuddin Mohammed, a former Sri Lankan Education Minister.

The LTTE on its part has furnished its list of nominees to the interim advisory council though there may be delay in its formation. The formation of the council still bristles with difficulties as the LTTE has threatened to boycott it if the EPRLF is included. According to the LTTE's political committee member, L. Thilagar, the inclusion of the EPRLF would amount to "legitimising the anti-social elements." The LTTE is also reportedly against the inclusion of a Sinhalese representative in it. The council would consist of 10 members—five from the LTTE and one each from EROS, TULF, EPRLF, Muslims and the Sinhalese. The LTTE has submitted a list of 10 names including those of K. Padmanathan and K. Sivanandasundaram. The two have been suggested for the post of Chief Administrator. According to Thilagar, "We were told that the man proposed by us would be the Chief Administrator."

What exactly led to the standoff between the Government of India and the LTTE and what was the sequence of

By special arrangement

Jaffna demonstration in support of the LTTE's demands..... soured relations.

events behind it? Events began to move fast from September 13 when "fratricidal warfare" broke out between the LTTE and the Three Star group. A confrontation between the two sides was expected after the killing of 18 LTTE members by the other groups in August. But the immediate provocation was an ultimatum by two of PLOT's leaders, P. Manikkam Dasan and S. Castro. They challenged Prabakaran to subscribe to peace or "be prepared to face death". The LTTE threw the hat in the ring. In a drive launched simultaneously in Batticaloa and Amparai districts in the East and Mannar and Mullaitivu in the North, the LTTE killed 60 members of PLOT, EPRLF and TELO, most of them belonging to PLOT. The frontline leaders of PLOT, including R. R. Vasudeva, Jotheeswaran, Mendis and Bhavan, were killed.

The situation was grave enough for Rajiv Gandhi to hold discussions with his Cabinet members and officials on September 14. He also met Tamil Nadu Minister S. Ramachandran in the presence of the Minister of State for External Affairs, K. Natwar Singh.

Earlier, on the same day, an External Affairs Ministry spokesman, while briefing reporters in Delhi, took care not to blame any particular group. The development was not a setback to the agreement; but the clash could have been avoided if the residual arms, held by the militant groups, had been handed over, he remarked.

CHANGE IN TONE

There was, however, a distinct change in the tone of the statements of the spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry from the next day, September 15, when Thileepan of the LTTE began his fast in Jaffna. A new determination was evident in the Government of India to halt the internecine killings. While the IPKF had not exhausted the peaceful methods to handle the situation, it could not look on passively if the killings continued, it was stressed. On September 16, an official of the Ministry told reporters in Madras that the clashes were "a naked power struggle through the use of arms."

Meanwhile, the LTTE's programme of picketing of Government offices was in full swing in the North and the East. Its members and also the public forced the closure of the newly opened police stations at Pannai in Jaffna town and at Puloly and Velvettiturai in the Peninsula. Thileepan's condition was causing concern. Violence also erupted between Sinhalese and Tamils in Trincomalee on September 18 when the Tamils erected a road-block in support of the LTTE's picketing programme. The IPKF and the Sri Lankan police had to intervene and five persons were killed when the Sri Lankan police opened fire to control the clash.

In Madras, an official of the External Affairs Ministry said the LTTE was "apprehensive about facing the people in free and fair elections." The LTTE's fasting campaign was only to divert attention from its killing of "100" Tamil people. Its "manoeuvres" were aimed at creating ill-will between the IPKF and the people in general, the official felt.

Soon Prabakaran himself joined the fray. Responding to the criticism of the spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry, he said the Ministry was "fully aware of the sinister role played by the RAW in training and arming anti-social elements against the unarmed cadres of the LTTE." These groups were sent to "Tamil Eelam at a crucial time when we were cooperating with India in the process of disarmament," Prabakaran added. Even as he was making this accusation, the Indian Deputy High Commissioner in Colombo, Nirupam Sen, met Ajit Mathaiya and Balasingham of the LTTE and requested them to call off the fasting campaign. But the LTTE turned down the suggestion.

STERN WARNING

After this, the Government of India issued a stern warning to the LTTE on September 20 that it would not brook any attempt to sabotage the agreement. "The killings of innocent Tamils which have taken place in Sri Lanka have been unfortunately largely engineered by the LTTE which, after the brutal killings, has now undertaken what it claims is a peaceful movement," said a spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry. The issue of colonisation had been taken up with Sri Lankan President J. R. Jayewardene, who had promised "remedial measures." Jayewardene had agreed to reopen the police stations and staff them with the Tamils. "The LTTE's accusation against the RAW was malicious and false, aimed at diverting attention from the brutal killings perpetrated by the LTTE," he observed.

But in Jaffna, Prabakaran reiterated his charge that the RAW was behind the inter-group clashes and he accused India of setting in motion "a calculated false propaganda" against the LTTE. He said Rajiv Gandhi had assured him that the interim Government would be set up after the handing over of the arms and that the LTTE would have a predominant role in it. "Barring EROS and the TULF, the other groups should not be given places in the interim Government. The police force would be established by the interim Government of the LTTE..... The interim Government has not been constituted as yet in terms of the assurance. We insist that it be constituted in terms of the assurance given to us. It is the Indian Government which is delaying the formation of the interim Government by insisting on giving places to anti-social organisations," Prabakaran said.

To make matters worse, there was a fresh outbreak of clashes between PLOT and the LTTE. Seven PLOT members were killed in an early morning swoop on September 23 by the LTTE on a PLOT camp at Kalnattinakulam in Vavuniya district in the North. An Indian External Affairs Ministry spokesman condemned the attack. "This tragic and deliberate killing of fellow Tamils by the LTTE is contrary to their professions of commitment to the principles of Gandhian non-violence," he said. But the LTTE replied that the seven PLOT members were killed when its two splinter-factions clashed. Meanwhile, a fresh element in the Indian peace-keeping was introduced when 1,200 men of the Central Reserve Police Force arrived in the Jaffna Peninsula.

There was another incident on September 23 which contributed to the worsening of the relationship between the Indian Government and the LTTE. Tension surfaced when about 1,000 Tamils wanted to present a memorandum to the IPKF at Mannar. The IPKF opened fire to disperse the crowd. After the incident, the Government of India, in its strongest reaction to date, warned the LTTE on September 25 that it would be "compelled to respond with even stronger measures if violence is deliberately provoked by the LTTE." An External Affairs Ministry spokesman said the "entire incident was engineered, incited and arranged by the LTTE" using women and children. He accused the LTTE supporters of throwing stones while arrangements were being made to receive the memorandum.

When Dixit briefed Jayewardene on September 24 on his five-hour discussions with the LTTE leaders, the Sri Lankan President agreed to have discussions with the LTTE on its demands provided it publicly announced that it supported the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement.

The general hope is that the parties will sink the differences in the concept as well as the implementation of the agreement, will resile from any rigid position they might have taken and put into effect an interim governance of the North and the East. □

T. S. SUBRAMANIAN

SRI LANKA

Return to Violence

Militant infighting threatens the recent accord

LESS than two months after Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene signed what was hailed as a historic pact in international relations, the Indo-Sri Lankan accord is in grave danger of exploding in their faces. The current drama being played out in the Jaffna peninsula already has all the elements of a Shakespearian tragedy and the denouement could be even more disastrous.

The violent clashes between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and other Tamil militant groups have escalated alarmingly in the past month and threaten to render the accord meaningless and exposed the hollowness of the much-publicised arms surrender by the militants to the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). By all accounts, the militants are still armed to the teeth and weapons are being openly brandished once again. Jaffna's return to peace has been tragically short-lived.

More dangerous has been the inexplicably passive role of the IPKF, not just in ensuring that more arms were surrendered, but in failing to maintain peace between the warring Tamil factions. There are also growing accusations that it is favouring one group against the other. Thus the anti-India feeling among some Tamils now matches that of the Sinhalese and the IPKF could soon find itself trapped in a morass from which it will be hard to extricate itself.

The latest killing spree by the militants was sparked off by the Tigers in the eastern district of Batticoloa, where they allegedly chopped off the heads of Peoples Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) members. The toll: 75. Among the PLOTE members killed were R.R. Vasudeva, head of the political wing, and military head Jotheeswaran. The irony was that they were on their way to a peace meeting with the Tigers.

A day later, a group of armed LTTE men walked into a carpentry workshop in Vavuniya town and gunned down three suspected PLOTE sympathisers. The next evening, a fully-armed 15-member PLOTE gang headed for Vavuniya, apparently to take revenge, but was intercepted by the IPKF, narrowly averting another bloodbath. The day after, however, the LTTE attacked the PLOTE camp at Kalnattiakulam village in Vavuniya district and gunned down an estimated 18 members. PLOTE quickly retaliated by killing two LTTE members and injuring two others.

Both sides naturally deny responsibility for triggering off the tension. Says Velupillai Pirabhakaran, the leader and supreme military commander of the LTTE: "Far from being responsible for the recent violence in Tamil-dominated areas, the Tigers have, in fact, been at the receiving end. The LTTE has been maintaining peace. The atmosphere was vitiated when groups like Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) and Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA) re-entered the scene recently, armed with sophisticated weapons and began to use them against us. We surrendered our arms in the faith that the Indian peace keeping forces and Indian Government would protect the lives of the people of Tamil Eelam, but we have been sadly disillusioned." Pirabha-

Body of ENDLF member (below); and armed militant: increased bloodshed

Photographs by SHYAM TEKWANI

karan also accuses India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of complicity. "RAW has trained and armed these groups and landed them on Eelam soil," he charged.

Other militant groups strongly contest the Tigers' claims. Said EPRLF spokesman L. Ketheeswaran: "Tamil Eelam is not the monopoly of the LTTE. And it is wrong to allege that the Government of India is siding with the anti-LTTE groups. Delhi seems to have recognised the dominant role of the Tigers in the north and the east, which is wrong. The Tigers have only held military power. The people are not with them."

But more than the deep-rooted bitterness between the groups, the infighting reveals that practically all the militant factions are still heavily-armed (a key factor in the accord was the surrender of all arms by the militants). A senior Indian High Commission source in Colombo admitted last fortnight that "the militants still retain substantial quantities of arms". According to Sri Lankan Army sources, none of the groups have surrendered more than 15 per cent to 30 per cent of their weapons. ENDLF chief G. Rajan charged the LTTE with surrendering only around 15 per cent of its arms. The group appealed last fortnight to Rajiv Gandhi to return the arms it had surrendered in order to defend its cadres from the Tigers.

Disarming the militants is the issue that poses the greatest immediate threat.

IPKF and Sri Lankan Police examine seized PLOTE arms: new offensive



The accord clearly specified that the militants would surrender all their arms within 72 hours of its signing. That deadline was subsequently extended to a week, during which all the groups made symbolic surrenders. Then during the clashes in Vavuniya between LTTE and PLOTE, the IPKF intercepted a PLOTE lorry, on the outskirts of Vavuniya town. In the lorry was found a cache of three automatic rifles, three AK-47s, and 11 locally made grenades. In fact, PLOTE's Vavuniya Commander Manikkadasan openly declared last fortnight that they would not give up their arms so long as faced with a military threat from the LTTE.

What is most worrying, however, is the performance of the IPKF in Sri Lanka. The presence of 8,000 (15,000 unofficially) Indian soldiers is rapidly turning counter-productive. Most Tamils in the north accuse the Indian Army of being partial in its dealings with the different militant groups. INDIA TODAY certainly found them unusually friendly with the ENDLF, whose members are openly moving around in Paranthan and Killinochi with their AK-47s, rifles, and grenades while Indian soldiers look on. In the ENDLF camp in Killinochi, an Indian Army officer actually handed over to Rajan a grenade which the soldiers had been publicly forced to seize from an ENDLF cadre. In Killinochi and Paranthan, there were repeated complaints of ENDLF militants inspecting buses passing through for the presence of LTTE members, and extorting money from all the passengers while the Indian Army looked the other way.

The image of the IPKF—hailed as a saviour when it first arrived—has taken a further beating in the face of the LTTE's latest propaganda offensive. The high point of the offensive is the much-publicised fast unto death of its chief political organiser, Amirthalingam Thileepan, 23, at the famous Nallur Kandasamy temple in Jaffna town last fortnight to press a five-point charter of demands:

- release of the estimated 1,500 Tamil prisoners detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act;
- stoppage of Sinhala colonisation allegedly continuing in Trincomalee, Batticoloa, Amparai, and Mullaitivu;
- stoppage of all rehabilitation work until the formation of the interim government for the north and the east;
- withdrawal of the present programme of opening Sinhala police stations in the north and east;
- closure of all the military camps in schools and Tamil villages.

There were sympathetic fasts and

picketing of all government offices in the north and the east by LTTE cadres last fortnight. But the fast is also being used to whip up anti-India propaganda. Speaker after speaker at the fast site lashed out at India and Rajiv Gandhi, with no word about the Sri Lankan Government or the atrocities the Sri Lankan Army had unleashed on the Tamils.

The fact is that India first turned a blind eye to the fast, then sent Deputy High Commissioner Nirupam Sen to talk tough with LTTE leaders Anton Balasingham and Mahitiya Sree. The subsequent statement from Delhi dubbing it a red herring to divert attention from LTTE's attacks on rival militants, only served to accentuate anti-India sentiments.

Popular sympathy for Thileepan has become synonymous with public hatred of India. Said tea-stall owner Thamotharampillai Ramanandan: "The fights here between different militant groups were introduced only by the IPKF. The people of Tamil Eelam have supported India everywhere. But now India has let us down. After the exercise of its good offices for such a long time, India has taken us back to square one." Added K. Mahesan, professor of English at the Jaffna Hindu College: "We really cannot understand why India should encourage Tamil militant groups which had no stake at all in the liberation struggle." Rasiah Ilango, Thileepan's elder brother, was more forthright. Said he: "The Indian Army came in here as a friend and is staying on as unwelcome outsider."

Last week, Thileepan died following the fast, leaving a question mark on the negotiations between the LTTE and the Indians. High commission sources in Colombo, however, were confident. Said one official: "Our finding is that the LTTE is not all that popular. Even if the LTTE's anti-India campaign continues, the IPKF should be able to handle the situation. Our immediate preoccupation is to disarm the militants to the extent possible, and to that end orders have now been issued to our army to even shoot to seize arms."

The image of the Indian Peace Keeping Force—hailed first as a saviour—has suffered by charges that it is taking sides in the battle of the militants.

But that is easier said than done. If the IPKF is a bad name in Jaffna, its reputation is not better in the east, especially Trincomalee. A satyagraha organised by LTTE sympathisers and released Tamil detenus in Trincomalee town last fortnight, turned into a blood-bath with the IPKF and the Sri Lankan Police being idle bystanders. The satyagrahis began to hold up buses carrying mostly Sinhalese passengers who gathered on the road. Soon after, Tamil and Sinhalese crowds began throwing stones. Then, grenades were lobbed at the Tamil side. In retaliation a Tamil militant began firing, killing Wilson Silva. Four Tamils were killed in the grenade attack, and 37 people—34 Tamils and three Sinhalese—injured. Said a Trincomalee Citizens Committee member: "This violence could have been avoided if the IPKF had promptly taken charge."

An Indian Army brigadier in the Tamil areas, who didn't want to be identified said: "If in the process of maintaining peace, we have kept up contacts with certain militant groups which kept in touch with us, we cannot be accused of partiality." But the explanation is facile. It was their responsibility to make sure that all the militants surrendered all

IPKF patrols Paranthan: passive role

their arms. And, with groups like the ENDLF openly flaunting arms, it is obvious that the IPKF is not doing its job. And now New Delhi has sent an additional battalion of the CRPF to aid the Indian Army. The CRPF is nowhere as disciplined as the Indian Army and with hostility between the local Tamil population and the IPKF on the rise, it could react more violently to any provocation.

The Tamils of Trincomalee are also furious about the reported settlement of 600 new Sinhalese families in the Allakantalai area of the district (there are 800 families now in place of the earlier 200), and they suspect the tacit connivance of Delhi in this. And India has also owned up to advising the Sri Lankan Government to open police stations in Tamil areas. Clarified Nirupam Sen: "We advised Colombo to open police stations, not Sinhalese police stations. The police stations are expected to be staffed by both Tamils and Sinhalese, not to speak of Muslims."

But much of the current tension is directly linked to the delays in implementing key clauses of the accord. Complaints about opening of police stations staffed by Sinhalese and fresh Sinhalese colonisation have arisen out of the delay in forming the interim advisory council for the north and east. The LTTE complains that Delhi had first committed itself to the constitution of an interim government, now diluted to a council, and that they would be assigned the dominant role in the interim set-up.

The hold-up here is that the composition of the council is proving to be an intractable problem. The LTTE does not want any other militant group apart from its ally, the Eelam Revolutionary Organisers, to be represented, though it is prepared to suffer the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). But the anti-LTTE Tamil militant groups have sought an equivalent combined strength, and no compromise seems possible.

There are hold-ups on other fronts too. Admits Sri Lankan Education Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe: "We still have to work out the programme of training teachers for the north and the east. We have appointed a special committee to work out a scheme of educational rehabilitation of militants and drop-outs by way of some post-school training in vocational and technical education. The committee is yet to complete its report."

Further, despite the promise of speedy rehabilitation of both Tamils and Sinhalese in the accord, most Tamils are yet to return to their homes. According to Sri Lankan Government sources, in Trincomalee district there were 3,000 displaced Tamils living in refugee camps at the time of signing the accord. Some 2,000 of them still languish in the different camps.

Despite the problems, there are still optimists around. Sri Lanka's Finance Minister Gamini Disanayake, one of the behind-the-scenes architects of the accord, is one. He told INDIA TODAY: "The accord symbolises the best compromise to a very tangled political and human crisis. The implementation is a somewhat slow process but it is happening. There is still enough time for provincial council elections to be held in December."

But the overall impression is that India has put its feet into quicksand. A cartoon in *The Island* newspaper last fortnight expressed the sentiments of the Sri Lankans: "Once upon a time there was a lion. One day a tiger came along and began to growl, demanding his share of the kill. Then the lion and the tiger roared and growled and began to fight. A jackal, watching the situation, stepped in and said: 'Why are you chaps trying to kill each other? I can solve your problem if you want.' (The lion is Sri Lanka, the tiger, the militants and the jackal, India). The jackal, in all his wisdom, solved the problem by dividing the kill and went away happily." Last month's developments in Sri Lanka amply proved that now it is certainly not the day of the jackal.

—S.H. VENKATRAMANI in Sri Lanka

The fasting Thileepan (below); and crowds to see him: emotional issue



CHAPTER 4

1987

the heinous crimes of indian peace keeping

October

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2
Sinhala–Tamil clashes Sinhala mobs attack IPKF at Trincomalee.

3

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5
India fails to avert Lankan attempt to air-lift LTTE Captives for interrogation. All attempt suicide by swollowing cyanide Regional Commanders Pulendran, Kumarappa and 10 others die immediately.

6
LTTE executes 8 Lankan hostages in retaliation.

7
Violence erupts in eastern province. 150 Sinhalese reported killed. J.R. threatens to withdraw IPKF.

8
Curfew in Jaffna. IPKF with shoot-at-sight order. Indian defence minister and army chief rush to Colombo.

10
J.R. recalls amnesty. Wanted – Prabhakaran with a million rupees on his head. IPKF raids media and communication offices and LTTE camps.

11
IPKF launches massive offensive driving LTTE to defend their territory.

12
No–hold–bar attack on Jaffna. Mounting civilian casualties.

13

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Lakhs of people sheltered in temples and schools in dehumanising conditions for two weeks. IPKF enters Jaffna inflicting heavy civilian casualties.

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THE INDEPENDENT

REPORT

Sri Lanka tells Indians to get tough

From Derek Brown in Galle, Sri Lanka

President Junius Jayawardene of Sri Lanka yesterday ordered the Indian peacekeeping troops in the eastern port of Trincomalee to restore law and order — or get out and leave the task to Sri Lankan security forces.

The brusque command was delivered to Lieutenant-General Depinder Singh, head of the force, at a top-level meeting to review the deteriorating situation on the island.

In the past five days, there have been widespread complaints by the Sinhalese minority in Trincomalee that Indian forces had done nothing to prevent a vicious campaign of intimidation by the rebel Tamil Tigers.

At least 15 people have been murdered, 300 homes and other buildings burned down, and up to 3,000 Sinhalese and Muslims have been forced to flee their homes.

India has hit back by claiming that Sri Lankan armed forces, confined to barracks since the arrival of the Indian troops, have been involved in attacks on the Indians, including an incident last week in which a soldier was killed.

The anger and dismay of the country's Sinhalese majority was reflected in the harsh statement issued by President Jayawardene after his meeting with General Singh.

After the meeting, a presidential spokesman said General Singh had been ordered to work with the Sri Lankan security forces to restore order. "The President further said that if the peace force did not do that, he will direct the Indian troops to withdraw from there and the Sri Lankan security services and police will restore law and order."

K. Lakshman, Times of India, 4.10.87

Mr Nirupam Sen, the Indian deputy high commissioner blamed the deteriorating situation in Trincomalee at least partly on "elements of the Sri Lankan armed forces." According to him, it had been agreed to keep Sri Lankan units in barracks, while the Indians and local police continued joint patrols. But he said he did not recall that the withdrawal of the Indian troops was raised.

The President's spokesman said the Tamil Tigers — who should have given up their weapons early in August under the Indo-Sri Lankan peace accord — had killed a Buddhist monk in Trincomalee on Saturday, he also said that the Sinhalese extremist group, the People's Liberation Front, JVP, was operating with the Tigers.

President Jayawardene, he said, had told the security meeting that his Government had fully carried out its part of the peace agreement, but he felt India was not doing so.

The statement added: "In Trincomalee, in particular, law and order has broken down."

Last night, General Singh and the Sri Lankan army chief, General Cyril Ranatunga, arrived in Trincomalee to direct operations. One of their first orders was that armed civilians were to be shot on sight.

The Indian High Commission disclosed details of a 90-minute exchange of fire between an engineers' unit and armed men at a roadblock outside Trincomalee on Saturday in which an Indian sapper was slightly wounded. Later, 15 men were arrested and handed over to the police.

Local security forces reported that two JVP members were killed in a raid on an army post west of Trincomalee. The gang escaped with several guns.

Sri Lankan security officials are convinced that JVP cadres are cooperating with their arch-enemies, the Tamil Tigers, in a joint campaign to undermine the peace accord. But already the dramatic recent events in Trincomalee have shaken the accord to its foundations.

Sinhalese anger is building up about what is seen as a cynical Indian campaign to help the Tigers drive the minorities out of Eastern Province. If that happened, the way would be clear for the Tamils in the east to push through an amalagamation with Northern Province in next year's proposed referendum. That would mean, in Sinhalese eyes, victory for the separatists and the dismemberment of the country.



Ramamoorthy, Deccan Herald, 4.10.87

A chain reaction

REPORT

Even as peace seemed around the corner in Sri Lanka, in a totally unexpected twist to the complex situation, a full-scale military confrontation between the Indian Peace-keeping Force and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam is on. T. S. SUBRAMANIAN traces the chain of developments which has taken the matter to a pass.

October 17-30, 1987

ANY hope that the announcement of the formation of an Interim Administrative Council (IAC) would bring firm peace to the Tamil-majority Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka has been quickly dashed by a chain of messy, bloody and catastrophic incidents since October 1.

In a totally unexpected twist to the situation, after the death of 12 key members of the LTTE (the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) who swallowed cyanide capsules following their detention by the Sri Lankan Navy, and the LTTE's "revenge killing" of about 150 Sinhalese civilians, a full-scale military confrontation erupted between the LTTE and the Indian Peace-keeping Force (IPKF) in the Northern Province, including the Jaffna peninsula. The confrontation has claimed the lives of scores of men of the LTTE and some of the IPKF. The Sri Lankan Radio asked the Tamil civilians in the Jaffna peninsula to gather at the checkposts of the IPKF—a clear sign that the IPKF was determined to flush out and disarm the militants while trying to avoid civilian casualties. Curfew was also imposed on the Jaffna peninsula.

The high-profile visits of Defence Minister K. C. Pant, the Chief of the Army Staff, Gen. K. Sundarji, and the overall-in-charge of the IPKF, Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh, to Colombo and their meetings with Sri Lankan President J. R. Jayewardene were clearly intended to convey the message that the IPKF meant business and that it was going to handle the situation in a no-nonsense fashion to bring back peace. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi also warned that the IPKF will act very firmly" to disarm the Tamil militants and restore normality in the North and the East.

The decision to send Pant to Colombo on October 9 was taken after Rajiv Gandhi's talk with Jayewardene on the hotline two days earlier. The intention was to reaffirm, at the political level, India's commitment under the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement and to reinforce the points made through diplomatic channels earlier.

The LTTE, which was on a strong wicket when the IAC was announced and was riding a sympathy wave when 12 of its members died after consuming cynaide, has already lost out politically, especially after its "revenge killing" of Sinhalese civilians. Jayewardene announced, with Pant seated next to him in Colombo, that the idea of an interim administration "is no more." He has also annulled the general amnesty given to the LTTE men and offered a reward of Rs. (Sri Lankan) 1 million for the capture of the LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabakaran. Besides, he has said, the "LTTE is now a banned party and orders have been issued to close their camps and seize their arms."

Militarily also the chinks in the LTTE's armour have been exposed. The IPKF has easily unearthed a lot of its arms and ammunition in the East. More than 200 militants belonging to the LTTE, TELO (the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation), PLOT (the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam) and ENDLF (the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front) were detained by the IPKF without facing much of a resistance.

But the LTTE is putting up a tough fight in the Jaffna peninsula, its stronghold. A mini-battle erupted between the IPKF and the LTTE after the former destroyed with explosives the offices of two Tamil newspapers in Jaffna—*Eelamurasu* and *Murasoli* — on October 10. It also seized the radio broadcasting equipment of the LTTE and the installation of its television network "Nidharsanam." The LTTE alleged that the IPKF and the Sri Lankan armed forces were conducting "joint" house-to-house search operations in the Jaffna peninsula, a charge denied by the IPKF.

Meanwhile, there was no let-up in the barrage of strong statements by the Government of India against the LTTE. While it publicly blamed the LTTE for the crisis, it withheld the clear evidence it had of elements within the Sri Lankan Government, especially National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali, trying to scuttle the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement.

There are specific indications that it was Athulathmudali who engineered the process of deterioration by insisting that the 17 detained LTTE members be taken to Colombo for "interrogation" for "contravening immigration laws" and that Pulendran, one of them, be arraigned for the killing of Sinhalese in April last. Athulathmudali's contention was that the crime took place in the North-Central Province and that the general amnesty would be applicable only to the incidents in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

Another disturbing development was the announcement by the Sri Lankan Government on October 11 that its troops had been moved to protect Sinhalese villages in the East. The announcement came after a broadcast by Jayewardene that the IPKF would not be allowed to enter these villages.

He said: "Today, the Sinhalese forces, the forces of the Sri Lankan Army, are there (Sinhalese villages in the East), protecting you. They have come there in the last few days. They have their camps near your villages and, as far as possible, you will be protected by the loyal forces of the Sri Lankan Army."

He affirmed that the Sri Lankan Government "will not let the Indian armed forces to come there," and they "can look after the Tamil areas..... so that

the main difficulty you have—that you are not protected by your own forces—will go in the next few hours."

The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) has however said that the decision "is an open violation" of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement. (Under the agreement the Sri Lankan troops should be confined to their barracks in the North and the East). The TULF has pointed out that most of the villages with Sinhalese settlers have many Tamil residents and Muslims as well and their lives would be endangered by the deployment of the Sri Lankan armed forces.

Official sources in New Delhi said they were not aware of any move to send the Sri Lankan Army units to the East.

The entire process of deterioration began when the Sri Lankan Government started colonising parts of the Northern and Eastern Provinces with Sinhalese in a swift and well-organised way after the agreement was signed. It was apparent that Colombo had a major role in this, judging from the building material and finances made available to the Sinhalese settlers. Colonisation is indeed an emotive issue for the Tamils and one of the five demands over which the LTTE's propaganda chief Thileepan started his fast-unto-death on September 15 was a halt to the Sinhalese colonisation in the Tamil areas.

It looked as if Thileepan's death on September 26 after 12 days of fast would turn out to be a terrible irony, for a dramatic agreement was reached two days later on the formation of the IAC for the integrated Northern and Eastern Provinces. The agreement entailed painstaking triangular consultations between Jayewardene, the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, J. N. Dixit, and the LTTE leaders, with Dixit shuttling between Colombo and Jaffna. The breakthrough was achieved on September 28 after three days of marathon discussions on September 23, 26 and 28 between Dixit and LTTE leaders Prabakaran, A. S. Balasingham, Ajit Mathaiya, Yogi and Thilagar.

The LTTE was to be the central player in the IAC with seven of the 12 seats allotted to it, including the post of the Administrator-in-Council. The TULF was to have two seats, Sinhalese two and Muslims one, in addition to the LTTE's Muslim nominee. A television picture showed a smiling Prabakaran,

Maj. Gen. Harkirat Singh, General Officer Commanding of the Indian Peacekeeping Force, with Ajit Mathaiya, LTTE's regional commander for Vavuniya and No.2 in the hierarchy, and (centre) Kumarappa, the Jaffna regional commander who died after consuming cyanide.....



LTTE leader V. Prabakaran..... opting for a grave course.

Balasingham and Mathaiya, after the agreement was initialled at Palaly, indicating that they were happy with the way things went in their favour on the composition and powers of the IAC.

The next day, Jayewardene announced the constitution of the IAC: V. Sivagnanam, one of the LTTE's nominees, was to be the Administrator in-Council, and six others of the LTTE—Ajit Mathaiya, Yogi, Roopan, Sritharan, Ravi and Al Haj Adam Lebbe Syed Mohammed —were to be members. R. Sampanthan and P. S. Soosaithasan would represent the TULF while Lionel Fernando, former Jaffna Government Agent, and Tissa Jayakody, former Sri Lankan Deputy High Commissioner in Madras, would be the Sinhalese representatives. The Muslim member was to be named later.

But an unexpected hitch developed within 24 hours. The LTTE reneged on Sivagnanam and demanded that another of its nominees, the former Assistant Government Agent for Trincomalee, N. Pathmanathan, be named the Administrator-in-Council. Sivagnanam also dropped out, saying he did not want to be the Administrator-in-Council. The LTTE moreover wanted Ravi and Sritharan replaced by Romesh and Sivanandasundaram. While Jayewardene conceded the latter request, he refused to replace Sivagnanam. Dixit then accused the LTTE of going back on the formal and written commitments it had given on joining the IAC and on furthering the process of normality in the North and the East. The deadlock was complete

An External Affairs Ministry spokesman in Delhi characterised the LTTE's stand as "a complete breach of faith" and a deliberate attempt to obstruct the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement. The LTTE's demand ran counter to the accord between the LTTE and Dixit, under which Jayewardene was to make a choice from the list of three names submitted by the LTTE for the post of the Administrator-in-Council, he said.

Why did the LTTE suddenly show a preference for Pathmanathan over Sivagnanam, though both were its nominees? The burden of the LTTE's explanation was that Pathmanathan was a man from the East and it wanted him to head the council because Colombo was trying to drive a wedge between the Tamils in the North and the East. It argued that Pathmanathan's name was first in the list it proposed for the council and when it was asked to suggest two more names for the post of the Administrator-in-Council, it proposed Sivanandasundaram and Sivagnanam as the second and third choices respectively. But Jayewardene "deliberately" picked Sivagnanam, who hails from the North.

About India's accusation of breach of trust, Prabakaran said: "The IAC has not yet been set up as per the assurance given to us by the Government of India. Jayewardene does not want to appoint a man of our choice as the Administrator-in-Council. Our organisation wants to give greater representation to the people in the East. Jayewardene is afraid that this would make the people in the East turn in favour of the LTTE. This is the actual situation.

'The Sinhala racist Government does not want the merger of the Tamils in the North and the East or the integration of Tamil nationalism. Jayewardene is adamant that he would not appoint Pathmanathan as the Administrator-in-Council. We have made clear the ulterior motive of Jayewardene to the Government of India. But India, instead of pressuring Jayewardene, applies pressure on us. It issues warnings (to us). It unleashes false propaganda and charges that we have committed breach of trust," Prabakaran added.

Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh, Overall Force Commander, IPKF..... down to brass tacks.

But the fact remains that the LTTE did give a list of three names and Jayewardene chose only one among the three. The feeling among many Tamils seems to be that whatever misgivings the LTTE might have had with regard to the appointment of the Administrator-in-Council, it could have worked in closer cooperation with the Government of India in view of the strenuous efforts made by Dixit to achieve for the LTTE almost everything it wanted, including a unified administration for the North and the East, a pre-eminent position for it in the IAC (with no representation to the groups inimical to it) and an Administrator-in-Council from its list of names. The assessment is that in the overall context of the IAC having been announced in the manner in which the LTTE wanted it, the prudent thing for the LTTE would have been to participate in it and make it work.

★ ★ ★

If the deadlock over the appointment of the Administrator-in-Council was expected to be resolved by October 6, a bigger crisis was lurking in the background, which led to an entirely different course of events with so much of tragic bloodletting.

It began with the Sri Lankan Navy intercepting an LTTE boat on October 3 off Point Pedro in the Jaffna peninsula and arresting 17 members of the LTTE, some of them representing the top rung of its leadership. They included the Trincomallee regional commander, Pulendran, and the Jaffna regional commander, Kumarappa. Colombo accused them of smuggling arms while Kumarappa claimed that they were merely sailing to Vedaranyam in Tamil Nadu to bring back the LTTE's political documents from its closed office in Madras. He also said they were carrying only two automatic rifles—a G3 and an M16—for personal safety.

The men were handed over to the Sri Lankan Army which detained them at its camp at Palaly and the Sri Lankan Government announced that it would take them to Colombo for interrogation. Pulendran was indeed a "prize catch" for Colombo; it alleged that he had masterminded the killing of more than 100 Sinhalese, including about 70 soldiers on furlough, on April 17, 1987, Good Friday.

The LTTE appealed to the IPKF at Palaly to prevent the Sri Lankan Army from taking them to Colombo. In a message to the IPKF's Civil Liaison Officer, Brig. E. W. Fernandez, Prabakaran strongly objected to the detention of the 17 by the island's army and pointed

out that his men had been given general amnesty. Hence, their detention violated the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement. They had put out to sea like "any other ordinary fishermen" and they had not committed any illegal act. He argued that India and the IPKF were responsible for his men's safety after they had laid down their arms.

The next day, October 5, Prabakaran sent another message to Maj. Gen. Harkirat Singh, General Officer Commanding of the IPKF, through Ajit Mathaiya, demanding that the detained LTTE men should not be taken to Colombo under any circumstances. He said if they were taken to Colombo forcibly, they would destroy themselves by swallowing cyanide. (The LTTE fighters sport cyanide capsules around their neck, to be swallowed in the event of capture by the Sri Lankan armed forces). He warned that if that happened, the IPKF would be responsible for the consequences and the LTTE would not observe the cessation of hostilities and would not cooperate with the IPKF in establishing peace in the Tamil areas.

But the Sri Lankan Government brushed aside pleas from the IPKF not to take the LTTE men to Colombo. Around 5 p.m. on October 5, as they were in the process of being taken to a Sri Lankan Air Force plane going to Colombo, all of them swallowed cyanide capsules.

Twelve of them, including "Lt. Col." Kumarappa, "Lt. Col." Pulendran and "Maj." Abdulla and "Maj." Nalan died. The stockily built, 30-year-old Kumarappa had married a young woman from the East exactly a month earlier. The stylishly dressed Pulendran, who always talked in a rapid-fire manner, was 26 years old. The soft-spoken Nalan, always nattily dressed, was in his early thirties. The rest were in the age group 20-30. After the bodies were handed over to the LTTE, it said they bore "bayonet marks," indicating torture by the Sri Lankan Army. Pulendran's body had 10 bayonet marks on the neck and chest, the LTTE said. The IPKF said there were no torture marks when the bodies were handed over to the militant organisation.

Prabakaran joined thousands of mourners in paying homage to them. Their bodies were draped in the red LTTE flag with the Tiger emblem and were arranged according to their rank in the LTTE's military hierarchy with Pulendran's body placed first followed by Kumarappa's and Abdulla's. Hundreds wept as they were cremated at Velvettiturai on the evening of October 8.

In Madras, the LTTE's former Jaffna commander, Sathasivam Krishnakumar alias Kittu, felt the Government of India could have stopped the Sri Lankan Government from flying the LTTE men to Colombo. "Instead, the Government of India made the mistake of merely watching passively..... This is a painful matter. We did not oppose the agreement. The agreement had been violated by the death of our fighters. We did not commit any illegal act," he said. He added that six weeks earlier the LTTE had sought the IPKF's permission for the sea trip. Since the permission was neither given nor denied, they sailed out.

There was sympathy for the LTTE in Tamil Nadu following the death of the 12 and the tragedy overshadowed the organisation's hedging on the issue of the Administrator in-Council. Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. G. Ramachandran, who was in the United States stressed that there could be no acceptable reason for the arrest of the 17 LTTE members who were carrying only permitted personal arms or for the decision to fly them to Colombo. He pointed out that the Tigers had put down their arms and a general amnesty had been given to them. State Industries Minister K. Rajaram was stronger in his reaction: "It is a shame that the LTTE members, who had all received a general amnesty, could be arrested by the Sri Lankan Army."

The president of the Opposition Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, M. Karunanidhi, said the incident proved that Jayewardene had duped both the Government of India and the Tamil militants.

The Left parties, notably the Communist Party of India (Marxist), have taken a clear stand that backs the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement against extremist intransigence, fixes the primary responsibility for the sharp deterioration in the situation on the LTTE and its vicious killing of innocent Sinhalese civilians, finds fault with the intransigent attitudes within the Sri Lankan Government which have contributed to the process of deterioration, and calls for vigilance against attempts, internal to Sri Lanka and external, to derail the agreement.

Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh has revealed that the IPKF had made serious and persistent efforts to persuade the Sri Lankan security forces and also the Sri Lankan Government not to take the LTTE men to Colombo. While Maj. Gen. Harkirat Singh tried to persuade the Sri Lankan security forces to release the LTTE men, or at least leave them in the custody of the IPKF at Palaly, Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh took it up with the Sri Lankan Government at the highest level. But Colombo would not agree and contended that these LTTE men had "violated" the laws of the land, including immigration laws.

The IPKF clearly anticipated a turn for the worse in the situation if the captured LTTE members were flown to Colombo for interrogation. And so it was: the LTTE launched massive reprisals on the Sinhalese, mostly civilians. On October 6 it executed eight Sri Lankan soldiers captured earlier in two attacks on the police quarters and the Jaffna telecommunication building at Pannai in Jaffna town. Next, it abducted and shot dead four Sinhalese em-

LTTE

Pulendran, LTTE's Trincomalee regional commander, one of the 12 men who died after consuming cyanide.

ployees of the Sri Lankan television "Rupavahini," waylaid as they were driving to their place of stay after dropping a Tamil employee at home. Two Sinhalese employees of the Kankesanturai cement factory were also killed.

Then the LTTE unleashed a splurge of violence in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and slaughtered about 150 Sinhalese civilians, including women and children. LTTE men pounced on the Sinhalese civilians living amongst the Tamil hamlets in Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts. They ambushed a Batticaloa-Colombo train and set it ablaze after forcing the passengers out. They separated the Sinhalese passengers and peppered 40 of them with bullets. Some of the bodies were thrown into the burning compartments. LTTE men also halted a bus at Pahugula in Amparai district in the East and shot or hacked to death 20 Sinhalese. They stormed a farming village at Eravur in Batticaloa and shot 39 people. Seventeen more Sinhalese were raked with gunfire in Batticaloa. They surrounded two fishing villages in Trincomalee district and shot and hacked to death 27.

"It is clearly the work of the Tamil Tigers," Nimal De Silva, the Batticaloa Superintendent of Police said. Government Agent M. Anthonymuthu described the situation in Batticaloa as "explosive" and he feared the Sri Lankan security forces would come out of their barracks, where they were confined after the agreement was signed, and attack the Tamils in retaliation.

The LTTE attacked some prominent Sinhalese civilians in Batticaloa including M. Sripala, a jewellery shop owner and a member of the local citizens' committee. He and another person were killed when the Tigers lobbed a bomb at his house. Sripala's wife was seriously injured. In Vavuniya district in the North, four Sinhalese civilians were shot at Pavatkulam and at Oddusudean in Mullaitivu district an army jeep was fired at.

On the third day, the vehicle in which Anthonymuthu and Nimal De Silva, besides seven soliders, were travelling hit a landmine planted by the Tigers and all of them were killed. Two vehicles of the IPKF, one preceding and the other following the vehicle, had a miraculous escape. Two more mine blasts in Trincomalee and Amparai districts claimed the lives of six soliders.

In Tamil Nadu, the LTTE's killing of Sinhalese civilians seemed to have cancelled out the earlier sympathy. Clearly, public opinion was running against the Tigers. One reading was that the LTTE had walked into the trap engineered by Athulathmudali.

Specific information available with the Government of India has established that Athulathmudali was behind the unexpected arrest of the 17 LTTE men and the decision to take them to Colombo for "interrogation." It was he who remained adamant on this in the face of the persistent attempts by the IPKF and the Indian High Commission in Colombo to get the men released. The recommendation of the Indian military professionals and diplomats was overruled, with tragic and horrifying consequences for the peace process.

The suspicion is that Athulathmudali, who played a major role in the earlier anti-Tamil military campaign by the Sri Lankan armed forces and who is a diehard opponent of the agreement, played a new game under the new circumstances. There is also evidence of backsliding by Colombo in the devolution of powers to the integrated Northern and Eastern Provincial Council. There is believed to be sympathy for Athulathmudali among the Sinhalese and the question is, what kind of comeback has he staged?

Even before the latest insensate orgy of bloodletting started, communal clashes between the Sinhalese and the Tamils had erupted in Trincomalee district. In the very first act of violence against the Tamils after the agreement, three Tamils observing fast in support of Thileepan's fast were killed in September.

On September 29 the Sinhalese also attacked the Tamils who were bursting crackers to celebrate the announcement on the IAC. Later Sinhalese hoodlums attacked Tamils at Mudcove and Madathuadi, just outside Trincomalee.

From October 1 there were four significant attacks on the IPKF in Trincomalee by the Sinhalese home guards, the police and civilians. On October 1, some people travelling in a van fired at an IPKF patrol. When the IPKF team chased and detained the van, it was found that there were seven Sinhalese home guards inside, armed with rifles issued by the China Bay police. There was firing again the next day at the IPKF from another vehicle in which one jawan lost his life. The vehicle was chased and was found parked in the compound of the Military Coordinating Authority in Trincomalee.

The same day a man in civilian clothes fired at an IPKF foot-patrol just outside Fort Frederick. When chased, he ran into the fort, at the entrance of which was a Sri Lankan Army camp.

On October 3, when the IPKF tried to clear a roadblock erected by the Sinhalese at the Fourth Mile post, there was firing from the crowd in which a Buddhist monk was killed and an IPKF sapper injured. Following this, communal violence broke out at Kantalai, 60 km from Trincomalee town, and at Uppuveli, 10 km from Trincomalee.

The attacks by the Sinhalese on the IPKF and the communal clashes between the Tamils and the Sinhalese were serious enough for Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh to fly to Colombo and meet Jayewardene on October 4. Jayewardene "directed" him to work in close cooperation with Gen. Cyril Ranatunge, chief of the Joint Operations Command of the Sri Lankan armed forces, "to restore law and order immediately in Trincomalee town and district." Jayewardene was reported to have said that if the IPKF did not do so, he would "direct" it to withdraw from the area, deputing instead the Sri Lankan armed forces and the police. Though the Government of India denied any such threat, there was no denial from Colombo. The acting High Commissioner in Colombo then, Nirupom Sen, who participated in the high-level discussions, asserted that the situation in Trincomalee had "partially developed" due to elements in the Sinhalese forces firing at the IPKF and "we find it surprising."

According to information with the Government of India, the attacks on the IPKF in the Sinhalese areas suggested the hand of subversive and well-connected elements who were out to complicate the implementation of the peace plan.

One interpretation is that there is a deeper game, guided by some political elements in Colombo, to drive a wedge between the Eastern and Northern Provinces so that the promised merger does not take place. This would involve a more substantive role for the Sri Lankan armed forces in the Eastern Province and getting the IPKF embroiled with the LTTE in the North. It would also involve putting pressure on India to let the Sri Lankan Army come out of the barracks in the name of undertaking "joint" operations with the IPKF to save the agreement. (Along with the surrender of arms by the militants, the agreement provides for the Sri Lankan Army to be confined to the barracks).

It looks that at least part of the strategy has been successful. The IPKF has certainly been embroiled with the LTTE in the North, including the Jaffna peninsula. The IPKF's swift action in the Jaffna peninsula and its strong presence in the crisis area, the Eastern Province, is clearly meant to demonstrate to the LTTE and the subversive elements among the Sinhalese that the IPKF can act decisively and overpoweringly and that it would not put up with any more nonsense from anyone. □

NEWS

Tigers kill hostages in act of revenge

REPORT

From Derek Brown
in Colombo

The Tamil Tiger rebels yesterday signalled the resumption of their all-out campaign for independence by executing eight Sinhalese army hostages.

The soldiers, captured in March, were shot, and their bodies dumped in the bus stand at Jaffna, the rebels' main stronghold.

The brutal killings were ordered by the Tiger leadership in retaliation for the suicide of 12 of their members in Sri Lankan army custody on Monday.

The two sets of deaths have together brought the two-month-old Indo-Sri Lanka peace accord close to collapse.

The Tigers announced that they would no longer cooperate with Indian peacekeeping forces in the north and east of the island. Nor would they abide by any Sri Lankan law.

The dramatic worsening of the situation comes only a week after it seemed that the Tigers were finally prepared to settle for a political role in a semi-autonomous Tamil region. Now both the political and security elements of the accord are in tatters. The proposal for an interim council to run the north and east pending elections has disintegrated.

smuggling arms from India. They swallowed cyanide pills as they were being put on a flight to Colombo for further questioning.

The Tigers said yesterday that they had clearly warned that their men would take their own lives rather than be transferred to Colombo, where, it was claimed, they risked torture and death.

Indian sources yesterday confirmed that they had urged the Colombo Government at the highest level to think again about transferring the 17 suspects. The Indian warning apparently spelled out the risk to the Sri Lanka army hostages.

With the sudden eruption of violence, particularly in the north-east port of Trincomalee, the Tigers have shown that, two months after their supposed surrender of arms, they are still in business as a ruthless fighting force.

The Tigers put all the blame on the Colombo Government. They say that the 12 men who committed suicide, including two regional commanders, should have been covered by the general amnesty implicit in the peace accord.

The men were in a group of 17 Tigers picked up on Saturday from a fishing boat off the northern coast while allegedly

But the renewed Tamil Tigers belligerence also includes the Indians themselves. Yesterday, they released the text of a letter from the leadership to the commander of the Indian peacekeeping force, Major General Harkirat Singh. Written a few hours before the mass suicide, it warned him that all cooperation would be withdrawn if the men came to any harm.

Such cooperation has not been greatly in evidence in recent weeks, with the Tigers apparently set on eliminating rival militant groups, attacking Sinhalese minorities in the east, and generally asserting their right to exclusive power in Tamil territory.

Now they have abandoned all pretence at being a party to the ceasefire, which was an essential feature of the July 29 pact. Three policemen and two Sinhalese businessmen were killed in the north yesterday. A Sri Lanka television crew is also missing, feared abducted or worse.

The fear now — or the hope for many Sinhalese — is that the Tigers are about to become embroiled in an all-out war with the 10,000 or more Indian soldiers and police in the country.

LTTE men on the rampage

Colombo, Oct. 7 (Reuter): Tamil militants shattered Sri Lanka's fragile ethnic ceasefire on Wednesday in an explosion of violence that left nearly 160 civilians and soldiers dead, military and police sources said.

The hardline Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, angered by the suicide of 13 Tigers in Government custody, attacked a train and a bus, and several Sinhalese villages in the North and the East.

It was the worst violence to strike the island since India and Sri Lanka concluded their peace pact on July 29 to end the four-year-old Tamil separatist revolt, and prompted a flight of panicked Sinhalese from the Eastern province.

"The situation is extremely tragic, volatile and dangerous. Tension is building up," Opposition leader Anura Bandaranaike told Parliament on Wednesday.

The Tigers set off a landmine under a military truck on Wednesday killing six soldiers, a military spokesman said. Ten soldiers were also wounded, three critically, in the blast at Vakarai in northern Polonnaruwa district.

The Tigers also attacked a train from Batticaloa to Colombo on Tuesday night, a military spokesman said. He said they forced the passengers out of the train at Valachenai and set 12 carriages ablaze. They then separated the Sinhalese from the rest and shot 40 of them dead. Some of the bodies were thrown into the burning carriages.

Tiger gunmen ambushed a bus at Pahugala in Eastern Amparai on Wednesday, killing 20 passengers, police said.

The militants stormed a farming village in Batticaloa district, killing 38 people while another rebel group attacked several Sinhalese homes in Batticaloa City killing 17 men, women and children, police said.

The Tigers raided two fishing villages in Trincomalee district and shot and hacked to death 27 men, women and children, and killed four people in an attack on a Sinhalese village near the northern city of Vavuniya on Wednesday morning, they said.

SAVING THE ACCORD

Indian forces crack down on marauding LTTE men

REPORT

IT now looks doubtful whether Defence Minister K.C. Pant's frantic trip to Colombo can save the July 23 Indo-Sri Lanka agreement. And by Indian logic only that agreement can save the Sri Lankan nation.

In its anxiety to save both, India has, almost unknowingly, fallen into a trap set by the Sinhala hawks. It is no longer the mediator it was, but a participant in a civil war in a neighbouring country. The Indian peace-keeping forces are now finding themselves fighting a counter-insurgency war under the command of Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene.

Despite the numerous ceasefire violations and LTTE's obstinacy on the matter of surrender of arms, the situation was not so gloomy until late September. But the fast and death of A. Thileepan, head of the propaganda wing of LTTE, on September 26 suddenly brought in the gloom.

New Delhi then realised that it was impossible to reason with LTTE, unlike what it had always hoped. Thileepan's fast had been in support of a few basic demands: stoppage of all forms of Sinhala colonisation of Tamil homeland under the pretext of rehabilitation, stoppage of rehabilitation work until the formation of the interim government, stoppage of opening of new police stations in northern and eastern provinces, India-supervised surrender of arms by home guards, closure of all army and police camps in Tamil villages and schools, and release of all detained under Prevention of Terrorism Act.

All the while, LTTE had also been making a political demand: a larger participation in the proposed interim council. On September 27 Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit claimed to have achieved a breakthrough in his talks with LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran. LTTE agreed to participate in the council and it would have a larger say in it. Subsequently President Jayewardene announced the formation of the interim council. When LTTE demanded the replacement of two of its nominees, Jayewardene agreed to that too.

But when LTTE demanded that the council's Chief Administrator C.V.K. Sivagnanam be replaced by N. Padmanabhan, Jayewardene thought enough was enough and said no. A frustrated Dixit accused LTTE of going back on its words.

Jayewardene could have carried Indian public opinion with him, but for a bizarre incident for which his troops were responsible. On October 3 LTTE Jaffna commander Kumaran alias Kumarappa, Trincomalee leader Pulendiran and 15 others were captured by Lankan navy while they were sailing to Point Pedro coast. Even as LTTE leaders were discussing with Maj-Gen. Harkirat Singh, chief of the Indian peace-keeping forces, for their release, the Lankan army authorities decided to take the men to Colombo.

Provided the spark. *Thileepan*

> Jayewardene wants India to deal with the hard-headed LTTE; he wants India to establish law and order; he wants India to take all the blame for the worsening of the situation.

For the Tamils, being taken to Colombo is equal to death. Twelve of the captured men, including Kumaran and Pulendiran, killed themselves by consuming cyanide. With that India suddenly found itself being accused of not having prevented their deaths.

LTTE promptly carried out a reprisal. Eight Lankan soldiers in LTTE custody were executed. That was also a notice to India that, since India had not been able to protect the LTTE cadre, LTTE would no longer abide by the ceasefire. On October 7, LTTE went on a rampage in the eastern and northern provinces killing nearly 150 Sinhalese.

One should not forget that it was an LTTE ambush of 13 Sri Lankan soldiers on July 23 that had sparked off the massacre of Tamils in the Sinhala-majority areas in 1983 and escalated the strife into a four-year war. The recent execution of Lankan soldiers in custody and the attacks on Sinhalese seem calculated to provoke a Sinhala backlash which would scuttle the agreement. LTTE knows full well that without realising the military component of the agreement (disengagement and disarming of the guerrillas), the political component (the interim council, elections to the council by 1987 end, and a referendum in the eastern province to ratify the merger of the two Tamil provinces by 1988 end) cannot be realised.

Meanwhile, President Jayewardene had directed the Indian forces to aid Lankan joint operations command in restoring law and order in Trincomalee where Tamil and Sinhalese civilians were killing each other. By the first weekend of October, the Indian forces were deeply involved in a counter-insurgency war. LTTE hideouts were

Keshar, The Hindu, 13.10.87

Bogged down? *IPKF personnel at Palalay air base*

raided and several militants were arrested. There were also reports that Prabhakaran had been arrested, but until October 9 no confirmation on this arrived.

India can now squarely blame LTTE for having scuttled the agreement. Indeed, LTTE started all this by clashing with rival Tamil groups and alleging that was Research and Analysis Wing provoking the clashes for some reason. The specific charge was that the peacekeeping force was not really unbiased.

But blaming LTTE will hardly save the situation. Though its forces are theoretically under the command of the Lankan president, India can always exercise the option of withdrawing them. But that would only lead to the Sri Lankan army taking the role of the Indian forces. And that would be going back to the pre-agreement situation.

So far, President Jayewardene has succeeded in giving the impression that his role in implementing the agreement is limited to getting Sinhalese endorsement of it and delivering the political component. Securing the environment for all this is India's responsibility. Jayewardene has tried to underline this point in more than one way. He threatened to withdraw the Indian peacekeeping force from Trincomalee if it failed to maintain law and order there. Later he asked Lt-Gen. Depinder Singh to take charge of the situation in the eastern province.

In other words, Jayewardene wants India to deliver the military component, even when Indian forces cannot act independently. He wants India to deal with the hard-headed LTTE; he wants India to establish law and order; he wants India to take all the blame for the worsening of the situation.

The basic mistake India committed was that it thought it could persuade LTTE to fall in line by presenting before it a fait accompli. It did not realise that it had lost the persuasive power the moment the LTTE leaders left the shores of Tamil Nadu for Jaffna a few months ago.

The Sinhalese public too can shirk responsibility by saying that the agreement was between two dignitaries and that there had been no national debate over it. Yet, so far the Sinhalese opposition to the agreement has been subdued. It could well be that they are waiting to see how it all works out. They do derive a pleasure from the sight of India, with its claims of self-righteousness, trying to reason with LTTE which is deaf to reasoning. Now the Sinhalese have all the more reason to say that the agreement is no solution to the conflict. And Jayewardene has cleverly cleared himself from all this blame.

The Janata Vimukti Perumana graffiti on Colombo walls are a pointer to the grim future: "Death to the agreement and those who support it." LTTE's strategy of driving the Sinhalese out of the east will have its echo in attacks on Tamils in the non-Tamil provinces including the plantation areas. The JVP's strength cannot be underestimated. It has even infiltrated the army.

Three years ago, there were shrill demands in India for a military intervention (like the one in Bangladesh) to solve the island's ethnic problem. Now the demand is for disarming LTTE on behalf of Sri Lanka. All this gives Jayewardene the pleasure of the last laugh.

OCT. 18–24, 1987 —MODEM

The JVP graffiti on Colombo walls are a pointer to the grim future: "Death to the agreement and those who support it." JVP has infiltrated the army.

IPKF will act very firmly, warns PM

NEW DELHI, Oct. 9

The Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, said today that the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) "will act very firmly" to disarm the Tamil militants and bring peace in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.

In an interview to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Mr. Gandhi said if people were not willing to have peace and were indulging in violent acts when democratic and peaceful methods were available, then "we must act much more strongly and we are doing that."

He denied a suggestion that India was getting biased against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). He said India tried to pull the LTTE into the mainstream for a voluntary disarmament and help it, involve in the development process. "But certain things have happened which have not allowed that to happen."

Answering another question, the Prime Minister said it was wrong to think that by taking action against the LTTE, india would lose the confidence of the Tamil people. "I don't think it is right to equate Tamil people with the LTTE. These are two separate agencies," he added.

Winning over was first option: Why did the IPKF took over two months to act? Mr. Gandhi said: "The first attempt in any such situation must be to try and win over the people because we are there at the request of the Sri Lankan Government. We have to see what is best for Sri Lanka in the long-term as all the people had to live together there in Sri Lanka. And if strong methods or measures were used then it makes it difficult for the future. So we try to pull everyone together to bring peace."

BATTLE FOR JAFFNA

IPKF swoops on militants' camps

NEWS

MADRAS, Oct. 9.

Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh, General Officer Commanding, Southern Command, told THE HINDU today that the Indian Peace-Keeping Force conducted raids on various camps of the Tamil militants in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka and seized arms and ammunition. Ninety-eight militants were taken into custody, said Gen. Depender Singh, who is in overall charge of the IPKF in Sri Lanka. (Reports from Colombo put the number of arrests variously at 200 and 100).

Replying to a question on fresh reports from Colombo today that the leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Mr. V. Prabakaran, had been arrested, he said: "Not to my knowledge".

Gen. Depinder Singh visited Trincomalee today and later returned to Madras.

According to Defence Ministry sources here, Trincomalee and Batticaloa are fast becoming normal. There was a mineblast on Friday morning in which a Sri Lanka army jeep was blown up killing two soldiers. Examination of these booby traps, which had claimed a large number of lives during the past three days, revealed a very high degree of technology sophistication and the explosion was electronically controlled. Such equipment were common place with terrorists in the West but had not been seen in this part of the world earlier.

UNI, Reuter, PTI report from Colombo:

The IPKF personnel raided the camps of the LTTE in the northern and eastern parts of the island, and of the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOT) the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) and the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) in Vavuniya, Mannar and Kilinochchi districts respectively.

Sources in Jaffna said the IPKF carried out search operations for hidden arms in the known LTTE strongholds of Achchuveli, Vasavilan, Tellipallay, Karaveddy and Point Pedro in Jaffna peninsula during the curfew hours last night.

Six men believed to be connected with the landmine blast at Vandaramulai, in which 14 people were killed, had been arrested, according to Indian and Sri Lankan military sources in Colombo. These sources said the IPKF used mortar and small arms fire in the raids.

A Sri Lankan military source said the Indian troops fired mortars and small arms at atleast three camps of minor Tamil groups in Vavuniya, Mannar and Kilinochchi districts around dawn on Friday.

Sources in Sri Lanka said most of those arrested in the raids were from PLOT and TELO. Sri Lankan military officials said the troops, ordered to shoot armed militants on sight, encountered resistance in at least 15 camps. Two of the camps, they said, belonged to the LTTE.

Two shot dead: A spokesperson for the Indian High Commission in Colombo said the IPKF shot dead two Tamils and wounded five in separate incidents in the Eastern Province yesterday. The two were shot dead when they attempted to set fire to houses.

Life was normal in Jaffna town today as schools and shops opened and buses were operating. Reports said the LTTE is said to have closed down all its offices in Batticaloa district and its members had gone underground.

Bus set ablaze: Reports said militants waylaid a Batticaloa-Badulla bus at Pullumalai and set it ablaze with the lone Sinhalese passenger inside after ordering the Tamil passengers out.

Number of soldiers: The island Government told its parliament yesterday that the IPKF would be used only in the Northern and Eastern provinces. The Parliamentary Affairs Minister, Mr. Vincent Perera, replying to questions from the Opposition said there were in all 7988 Indian soldiers, including 23 offiers in the island under the terms of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord.

Mr. Perera said the Sri Lankan Government was not meeting the travelling expenses of the IPKF nor providing vehicles and food for them. However, some vehicles had been loaned to them until they got their own, he added.

Ravi Shankar, Indian Express, 8.10.87

THE TIMES OF INDIA

IPKF seizes LTTE radio, TV stations

By SEEMA GUHA

The Times of India News Service

COLOMBO, October 10.

NINE Sinhalese were hacked to death at Kantale in Trincomalee district early this morning by Tamil militants. Six others were injured and have been admitted to the Anuradhapura hospital.

The Indian peace keeping force (IPKF) in Jaffna sealed the offices of "Elamurasu," the LTTE mouth-piece, and took over the presses of the pro-Tiger, "Murosoli" newspaper. The LTTE claimed that its presses were set on fire and all equipment destroyed in the raid. The television and radio transmission stations of the LTTE, which has so far been running its own special services, have also been seized and the personnel arrested.

These transmitters were broadcasting propaganda against India and the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement, and inciting ethnic violence. They were also being used by the LTTE to extol its violence against fellow Tamils in the northern and eastern provinces, the spokesman added.

According to UNI, India today doubled the strength of the IPKF and set up two tactical headquarters in the North and the East in a bid to curb the "violent elements" opposing the peace accord.

(Continuing their crackdown on various Tamil militant groups, the IPKF and the Lankan army arrested over 100 men in a pre-dawn swoop. The raids were conducted at Vadamarachchi, Avarankal, Achchuveli, Valai, Putter and Neerveli.)

In Trincomalee, the IPKF destroyed 400 kg of explosives and grenades, seized from the militants. In the worst-affected Batticaloa district, the IPKF is helping the Sri Lankan police to conduct a house-to-house search for arms.

NEWS

The LTTE has claimed that 10 Tigers have been killed by the IPKF and over a hundred of its men arrested in the Vadamarachi area. There was no official confirmation of the deaths by the Indian high commission or the Sri Lankan army sources.

The earlier soft attitude adopted by India when the accent was on persuasion rather than the use of force has been altered to meet the new situation where the LTTE has openly repudiated its commitment to the Indo-Sri Lankan accord. India while aware of the problems of the Tamils and committed to ensuring a fair deal to them, cannot afford to allow the accord to be destroyed, considering that Indian security interests are closely tied to it.

Public opinion in Colombo, which had been vehemently against the presence of the Indian army on Sri Lankan soil, has since the massacres in the east. become more and more virulent.

The question everyone asks is: "What are the Indians doing here when our people are being massacred?" Said Samantha Desilva a 28-year-old school teacher: "Are the IPKF here to ensure just the safety of the Tamils? Have they been instructed not to pay heed to the Sinhalese who are being killed?"

An editorial in the English newspaper, "The Island", published from Colombo titled, "We are gasping, Mr Pant", reads: "While the Sri Lanka government had met its responsibilities under the agreement, the so-called Indian peace keeping force has not done so. The failure to seize arms in the time stipulated in the accord, its apparent reluctance to do so, the failure to maintain peace in the north and the east and the 'passive resistance' to Tigers, who went on the rampage are clear instances of the failure of the IPKF in carrying out its fundamental responsibilities."

LTTE CLAIMS

Even before 10th of Oct. '87, the IPKF surrounded an LTTE camp at Mullatitivu, took away all the things in the camp and blasted the camp with explosives.

In the early hours of 10.10.87, the IPKF entered the office of 2 Tamil dailies – *Eelamurasu* and *Murasoli*, arrested the employees working there at bayonet points and blasted the printing machines and office buildings with bombs, thus destroying them completely.

On the same day the IPKF entered the T.V. Centre *'NIDHARSANAM'* of the LTTE of Kokkuvil, seized and took away all the tele-casting equipments.

(The excuse that the IPKF gave for their action was that the broad-casting and tele-casting equipments were stealthily possessed by the LTTE and the printing presses were sealed because they were engaged in bringing out anti-Indian posters and pamphlets and inducing violence).

1. The LTTE was running its broad-casting and tele-casting services for many years. In fact many programmes, tele-casted on NIDHARSANAM were asked for, by the officials of the Indian govt. and televised over the Indian T.V. Net work.

   In such a situation, all of a sudden without informing, the IPKF entered the Television centre, plundered and took away the equipments. This act of the IPKF against LTTE, is beyond reasonable limits.
2. Eelamurasu and Murasoli, registered as newspapers with the Srilankan govt. were printed and published for many years. The blasting and destruction carried out by the IPKF in the offices of these newspapers is seriously viewed by the Eelam Tamils as an act to crumple their democratic rights.

At about 2.15 in the afternoon, the IPKF made an attempt, to advance by indiscriminetly firing at the people at fort side, Koppai side, and Muthirai Junction side. Following this, the LTTE were forced to enter into a war of defence, to save the people as well as themselves. In a combined searching operation by the IPKF and the Srilankan army in the entire Jaffna Peninsula more than 100 civilians were arrested.

The IPKF engaged in a 'hunting' (the Tamil Tigers) operation in Vadamaratchi shot dead 10 civilian people.

General's instructions

Before his return to India at the end of his two-day visit, the Chief of the Army Staff, General K. Sundarji, had issued detailed instructions to his field commanders to continue the operations against those indulging in violence or obstructing the implementation of the accord to remove any impression that India was going back on its commitments.

Gen. Sundarji and Lt. Gen. Cyril Ranatunga, General Officer Commanding-In-Chief of Sri Lanka's Joint Operations Command, finalised detailed plans to check the activities of violent elements, the sources said.

The sources said the IPKF had been posted in company strength to provide protection to all Sinhalese and Muslim villages in the east and extensive patrolling and communication facilities had been organised in all vulnerable areas to check violence.

The operations launched against Tamil militants, particularly against the LTTE on Thursday had already helped bring the situation in the north and east under control, the sources said.

The IPKF, braving electrically-charged wire fencing and sniping, had captured militants and weapons from four of the camps they raided in the north yesterday.

The IPKF, which has so far raided militants camps and bases mostly in the north, today went for the militant bases in eastern Trincomalee and Batticaloa. A 24-hour curfew was imposed in the two districts from 0600 hours this morning, as the IPKF continued its operations.

In Trincomalee district, the IPKF raided an LTTE camp this morning and recovered 400 kg of explosives and grenades and destroyed them.

120 militants killed in IPKF operations

NEWS COLOMBO, Oct. 11.

At least 120 men of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and nine Indian personnel were killed as the Indian Peace-Keeping Force intensified operations against the militants in the curfew-bound Jaffna peninsula in north Sri Lanka early today.

The Indian force's biggest operation against the LTTE was launched shortly after the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation made repeated announcements at 0630 hours today, asking Jaffna residents to evacuate their houses and report at the IPKF checkpoints in the town.

Simultaneous attacks

According to Indian military sources here, a fierce battle raged today between the IPKF and the LTTE after the Tamil militants launched a series of attacks on the force's positions in different parts of Jaffna.

They said the LTTE almost simultaneously attacked the IPKF positions at Telliapalai, Jaffna Fort, Navatkuli, Koppai North and Vadamarachchi. The militants used mortars, rocket propelled grenades and small arms in the offensive.

According to Sri Lankan security sources at Palaly in Jaffna peninsula, more than 120 Tamil militants died in the encounters with the Indian force since yesterday. They said their information was based on LTTE radio intercepts.

They said they could hear the sound of gunfire but did not know how the situation was in Jaffna town, about 20 km away, as they were confined to their camp. The IPKF had advised the people of certain areas of Jaffna to move to temples and schools to avoid civilian casualties during the operations.

Operations intensified

According to the Defence Ministry sources in Madras, following the directions of Mr. Prabakaran to the LTTE cadre to attack the personnel, vehicles and installations of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force, the IPKF (North) has intensified its operations to unearth the unsurrendered weapons and flush out the terrorists.

The IPKF personnel entering Jaffna town in search of unsurrendered weapons in suspected localities were fired upon from buildings and rooftops with automatic weapons, mortars and rocket-launchers. Numerous booby-traps and mines with very heavy explosive-content had also been laid by the LTTE to hinder the IPKF progress. The militants fired indiscriminately, unleashing a wave of violence in the town. A large number of residents have left their houses and have taken shelter with the IPKF.

The IPKF is taking stern measures to combat the violence unleashed by the LTTE and over 60 militants have been killed in the last 24 hours. Two CRPF vehicles were also ambushed near Tellipalai and three jawans killed and eight injured. Six IPKF men lost their lives and 33 were injured in the operation.

Intensive patrolling and combing operations were conducted by the IPKF in the Eastern province. Some LTTE men, including David, one of the LTTE military leaders of Batticaloa sector, were apprehended. There was no major incident in Trincomalee and Batticaloa, the Defence Ministry sources added.

Land-mine blast

The Sri Lankan news agency 'Lankapuvath' said two Indian soldiers were killed by a land-mine explosion in Jaffna this morning.

The official sources told Lankapuvath that clandestine radio hook-ups linking Colombo, Madras and Rameswaram had been exposed by the IPKF. A machine, which printed secret messages and operational plans to be distributed to the LTTE cadres, "has also been destroyed by the IPKF."

The IPKF operations are against "violent elements" opposing the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement.

Five bodies, believed to be those of LTTE men, were found between Navatkuli and Koppai North following the attacks on their positions.

Tamil sources, who requested anonymity, said Indian troops had fanned out in the entire Jaffna peninsula and were conducting house-to-house searches. The curfew clamped on the peninsula early yesterday will continue to remain in force.

Arrests in the east

The Indian military sources further said operations were also on in the eastern Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts. In Batticaloa, 39 LTTE men, nine of them hardcore members, had been arrested. Six camps were raided.

In a raid on an LTTE camp at Punnacholai near Eravur, the IPKF arrested four LTTE men, including "Ravi" who was allegedly responsible for the spate of killings of Sinhalese in the area last week. Some arms were also recovered in the raid.

According to a Sri Lanka radio report Indian troops seized arms and ammunition in a massive quantity in Trincomalee district.

Curfew was lifted for four hours in Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts to enable the people to buy provisions.

Attempt on Minister

Meanwhile the District Minister of Trincomalee, Mr. H. G. P. Nelson and two of his personal secretaries were critically wounded, when suspected members of the banned Janata Vimukti Peramuna hurled bombs.

Mr. Nelson, who represents Pollanaruwa in Parliament, was in his office in the morning with his secretaries, when the assailants stormed in and hurled the explosives, authoritative sources said. The three were hospitalised.

The sources said that on police advice Mr. Nelson had earlier cancelled his participation in the funeral three days back of a Sri Lankan soldier who died in LTTE captivity. The police said they had intelligence reports that the Sinhalese extremists could make an attempt on Mr. Nelson during the funeral. — UNI, PTI

Ramamoorthy, Deccan Herald



LTTE CLAIMS

On the morning of 11.10.87, the shell thrown by the IPKF hit and blasted the 'Kailasapillaiyar' Temple. 12 innocent civilians were killed and 20 more got injured.

At Palai, the IPKF chased a van of the LTTE, but it could not be caught. This irritated and enraged the IPKF which on its way back shot down the people indiscriminately. 13 innocent civilians including 2 children were killed in this 'shooting spree' of the IPKF.

In the night, the IPKF started their operations in full swing, to take control of Jaffna. In the mid-night at about 1 'o clock a very large number of IPKF commandos were heli-dropped in the campus of the medical college of Jaffna University. In the fight that ensued between the IPKF and the LTTE, which lasted for more than 8 hours, not less than 40 soldiers of the IPKF were killed. The LTTE captured lots of arms from them including 20 SMG, 6 S.L.R., 3 L.M.G., 2 G.P.M. and one Rocket launcher. This enraged the IPKF which turned its anger upon the civilians and attacked the public. 30 civilians were killed and 250 were injured by this ruthless act.

AFFIDAVIT

ARIYAKUDDY VASANTHAMALAR (24), Chankanai Sri Lanka.

During the Military Liberation Operation on and after 10.10.87 I and my grand father and grand mother sought refugee in the Murugamoorthy Kovil Refugee Camp, Chankanai.

On the morning of 22.10.87 a mortar shell fell in the premises of the temple and exploded.

At that time my grandfather was in the premises and one of the splinter hit my grandfather's backbone and profusely bleeding and some other refugees were also injured.

He was admitted to Chankanai Hospital where he was treated. His injury has not healed in spite of repeated medical attention.

Finally he died on 20.1.88.

My grandmother fell sick after my grandfather's demise. My father died and I was brought up by my grandfather.

Consequent to my grandfather's death and my grandmother's sickness, I have become destitute. Both myself and my grandmother were depending on my deceased grandfather for our sustenance.

A. Vasanth[illegible]

CHRISTURASA RITAMMA (36), 10 Central West Road, Gurunagar, Jaffna.

My late daughter Christurasa Kamalanayaki, aged 14 years was a student.

On the afternoon of 10.10.87 our locality was subjected to heavy firing and shelling. Fearing to remain at home the members of my family and I sought refugee in the Church of our Lady of the Rosary at Columbuthurai.

On 11.10.87 due to fear caused by shells which fell near the church we fled to the Hindu College at Columbuthurai.

As Indian army personnel were advancing towards the area through Maniamthoddam firing shells we fled to St. Patricks College on 14.10.87.

Consequent on the Gurunagar area being fired at from a helicopter we fled to Chundikuli Girls College on 17.10.87.

On the night of 20.10.87 the Chundikuli Girls' College was hit by shells. 5 persons who had sought refuge in the college were killed and about 40 were injured. Fearing to remain there we fled to the Nallur temple on the morning of 21.10.87.

On 22.10.87 seventy persons including our family members proceeded to Araly Jetty by lorry desiring to cross over to Saravanai in Kayts where we thought we would be safer.

The seventy passengers were crossing the Jaffna lagoon in 4 boats when at about 9 a.m. a helicopter attacked the four boats by firing. The attack lasting for about one hour.

My daughter Kamalanayaki and my father Mudiappu Christian, aged 69 were killed. I sustained a fracture above the wrist in my right hand while a bullet pierced through the flesh of my left hand. My right hand has still not healed. Two of my daughters, Sagayanayaki and Meera received injuries in their legs which have since healed.

As the boats reached Saravanai the dead and the injured were removed in vehicles by local residents to the Kayts Hospital.

On 22.10.87 at about 3 p.m. all who were seriously injured including myself were removed to hte Moolai Hospital.

Consequent on the Moolai Hospital being attacked by a helicopter on 1.11.87 and several being killed I went to Sillalai and staying with a relation continued treatment at the Packianathan Private Hospital.

When I returned home on 12.11.87 I was informed by my husband that 18 personsw including my daughter and father had been killed in the helicopter attack and that 13 bodies had been buried in the St. Mary's burial ground at Kayts on 22.10.87 while 5 bodies had been removed by relations and that one of the injured taken to Moolai had also succumbed to his injuries there and that his dead body had been buried in the Moolai Hospital premises.

On the day of the incident women had raised their hands in appeal and had also raised infants in the air inspite of which the helicopter attacks had continued. On the next day the Sri Lanka state radio announced that boats of terrorists had been attacked by a helicopter of Araly and capsized.

DANIEL THEVAMATHURAM (41)
50/2, Poomakal Veethy, Ariyalai, Jaffna.

I am a retired Govt. Servant.

My wife, children and I were living in our own house at the above said addres

My wife Thevamathuram Selvarani age 39 years was the Librarian attached t the Public Library, Chavakachcheri.

Indian Peace Keeping Force was engaged in confrontation with Tamil Militants on 10.10.87 at several points in the Peninsula.

Continuous curfew was imposed in the Peninsula and an announcement was made on the radio to take refugee at prescribed refugee camps.

My family and I sought refuge at the Temple at Kacheri Nallur on 12.10.87 a it was very close to my house.

On 22.10.87 morning my wife, children and I came home to remove some valuables from our house.

At this time a shell lobbed from the IPKF camp at Navatkuli fell on our house and exploded.

Shrapnels from the explosion killed my wife on the spot and injured my son Thevamathuram Sugir Nagendram age 9 years on his left leg.

The dead body of my wife was burnt the same day in our compound itself as tense situation prevailed. It was reported that IPKF was moving into our village.

After cremation I sought refuge at the Kanagaratnam Central College where first aid was given to my injured son.

My house too was damaged in thise shell blast.

V. D. T[illegible]

GUNARATNAM THIRAVIAM (30), Old Post Office Road, Chankani.

My late husband Thambithurai Gunaratnam, aged 29 years was employed as driver of a passenger van.

At 6.30 a.m. on 10.10.87 my late husband left in the van for Mullaitivu.

At about 8.00 p.m. on 11.10.87 I was informed by Peryathamby who was employed as the conductor in the van driven by my late husband.

That at about 4.30 p.m. on 11.10.87 when the van driven by my late husband was proceeding towards Nallur to drop some passengers from Mullaitivu the van had been fired at from a helicopter close to the Kailayapillai Temple in Jaffna.

That my husband was hit and killed instantly.

And that the dead body had been handed over at my father-in-law's house at Navaly North.

I went to my father-in-law's house on the morning of 12.10.87.

The dead body had injuries on the neck and chest.

The dead body of my husband was cremated at Navaly at 1 p.m. the same day.

I have no children.

JESUADIAN SIMION (42), Industrial Estate, Thoppu, Atchuvely.

The deceased person Gnanamani Arulraj, aged 18 years was my sister.

In the absence of our parents who are living in India my sister was living under my care and maintenance.

On 9.10.87 my sister Murugan Sebastiammah was admitted at the Jaffna General Hospital for a birth control operation.

My other sister Gnanamani Arulraj accompanied her.

On 10.10.87 military offensive was launched by the army.

Due to the intense shelling I left Jaffna and went to Kilinochchi as a refugee.

I was informed on 22.11.87 that both my sisters were shot and killed by the army at Inuvil Mission Hospital on 22.10.87.

I learned that they went to the Inuvil Mission Hospital on 10.10.87 from Jaffna General Hospital as the latter hospital was without electricity.

I learned that the body of my sister Gnanamani along with my other sister Sebestiammah was buried inside the Hospital premises.

My sister's husband Arulraj deserted her four years ago.



Mrs. JEYALUXMI SELVARATNAM (58)
39, Vidanes Road, Chudikuli Jaffna.

My husband Thambipillai Selvaratnam age 63 years was a retired Staff Assistant attached to Post and Telecommuncation Department.

My husband my unmarried daughter and I were living along with my married daughter in her house at the above said address.

Indian Peace Keeping Force in the Peninsular started firing shells towards the residential areas from 10.10.87.

On 20.10.87 at midnight shells were fired from the IPKF camps at Navatkuli towards our locality.

A shell fired from the above said camp at 0.15 hours fell in front of our house and exploded.

Shrapnel from this explosion struck my husband who had opened the door at that time injuring him on the hips.

The shrapnel which entered through the left hip found exit through the right hip.

He bled profusely and was removed to a Private Nursing Home. He succumbed to his injuries on the way to the Nursing Home.

Cremation took place on following day at 12 noon.

Mrs. KANDIAH YOGAMMAH (Widow) (44), Adiyapatha Veethy, No. 104, Nallur Jaffna.

Due to the IPKF liberation operation started in our area on 10.10.87 we immediately left our house and went to the refugee camp. While we were going on the road close to our house, there was a shell blast close to us, and my husband got a shell attacka nd he was removed to the Jaffna hospital and died on 13.10.87 in the hospital.

I have two children one is male and the other is female both are attending schools.

My husband Gunasingam Kandiah age 45 years and he was doing farming from the incoem he was maintaining my self and the two children. Other than his income ther eis no other source of income to support us.

Now we are undergoing severe hardships throughout.

Mrs. LEDCHUMIPILLAI KIDNAR (70) Valalai, Atchuvely.

On 10.10.87 at about 11 a.m. when my late husband was standing in the court-yard of the house, a shell fell on the compound and blasted.

Shrapnels darting from the explosion struck him causing injuries on his right leg and right thigh.

He was attended to at the Thangam Dispensary Atchchuvely from where he continued to receive treatment till he succumbed to his injuries on 3.1.88.

The funeral took place on 4.1.88 and the body was cremated at the Arasan Kaladdy crematorium.

My husband was 79 years old at the time of his demise.



NALLAMMAH SATHASIVAM (48)
3, Victoria Road, Jaffna.

My late husband Sinniah Sathasivam aged 49 years was a petty trader and had a stall in the Jaffna Town market.

From 10.10.87 the day confrontation between the IPKF and LTTE commenced there was fear and tension in the Jaffna Town and my late husband did not go to attend to his business from that day.

On 24.10.87 at about 2 p.m. when my husband was in the front section of our house continuous sounds of firing was heard.

When I went to the spot after the sounds of firing had ceased I found my husband fallen in a pool of blood.

Though he was conscious and groaning I could not remove him to the Jaffna hospital due to the presence of large numbers of Indian Servicemen on road.

As my husband was moved into the house he succumbed to his injuries.

He had a bullet injury on the right chest with an exit wound on his back.

Some others were also killed on Victoria Road on this day.

Due to the Violence that continued it was only on 26.10.87 that it was possible to remove his body for cremation at the Thundi cemetery with the approval of the IPKF.

I have two daughters aged 23 and 29 years and a son aged 17 who is a dumb. I have lost my husband our breadwinner.



NALLATHAMBY ARULMURUGANANDHAVADIVEL, (28)
Navaladi, Ponnalai, Tellipalai.

The deceased Moothathamby Nallathamby, aged 62 years was my father.

He was a farmer.

On 10.10.87 morning I went to Kaithady with my father to our relation's house.

On 13.10.87 we left Kaithady and proceeded towards Pannlai Tellipalai.

As we were passing through Chunnakam at about 10 a.m. a shell fell near in and exploded.

My father was injured in the shell blast.

I managed to take him to our house at Ponnalai.

There he remained at home due to the prevailing situation without adequate treatment.

He died on 13.11.87.

His cremation took place on the same day at Chunnakam cemetery

V. Arulmuruganandhavadivel

Mrs. PASUPATHEESWARY KRISHNARAJAH (46)
Arasady Road, Kondavil East, Kondavil.

My husband Kanapathy Krishnarajah age 50 years was a Supervisor at the General Hospital, Jaffna.

My husband, children and I were living in our house at the above said address prior to 10.10.87.

As the confrontation started between the Indian Peace Keeping Force and the militants in the Peninsula at several points on 12.10.87 my husband took me to the General Hospital Jaffna, the place where he was employed.

We were living in a room in this hospital from 12.10.87

On 21.10.87, the IPKF gained entrance to the General Hospital Jaffna and gunned down several hospital staff, patients and visitors.

My husband who was on duty was shot and killed by the IPKF on 21.10.87.

The dead body of my husband was burnt by the IPKF after 3 days in the General Hospital compound along with other dead bodies.

I have a child by him.

Over 100 innocent hospital staff, patients and visitors to hospital were killed in this incident.

PIUS MARIYATHAS (39)
9/3, 4th Cross Street, Near Water Tank, Gurunagar, Jaffna.

I am a Fisherman.

On 10.10.87 there were shell explosions in our area. These shells were fried from the direction of the Indian Peace Keeping Forace Camp at Jaffna Port.

Through fear, I left home at 4 p.m. with my family to St. Patricks College Jaffna and sought refuge.

After 2 days I sought shelter with my family at St. Mary's church Columbuthurai on 12.10.87.

As shells started falling in Columbuthurai area we left St. Mary's church and sought refuge at Columbuthurai Maha Vidyalayam on 13.10.87.

On 16.10.87 mortar shells started falling in the compound of Maniam Garden Columbuthurai which is in the same locality.

In panic I fled with my family to Chundikuli Girl's College and took shelter.

On 20.10.87 at about 8.30 p.m. while we were at Chundikuli Girls College a shell fired by the IPKF fell in the room next to the one occupied by us and exploded killing 3 innocent refugees and injuring about 15 others.

About 70 of us then arranged a lorry to go to Kayts through Araly Jetty and all of us arrived the Araly Jetty at about 8 a.m.

At about 9 a.m. while we were crossing the sea between Araly and Saravanai in 4 boats and approaching Saravanai Jetty a helicopter hovering over the boats kept firing at the boats for one hour.

My daughter Mariadas Sulogini (15) and my mother-in-law Salamaippillai were killed in the helicopter fire and my wife Mariadas Imelda (36) and father-in-Law Sebastie Xavier were seriously injured.

As we were close to the shore I lifted my other children from the boat and put them into the sea.

At this time my sons Surenthiran and Suthakar received gun shot injuries.

I took my 3 children Surenthiran, Suthakar and Sutharsan to the shore.

I then brought the dead bodies of my daughter Sulogini, mother-in-Law and also carried my wife who was in unconscious state to the shore.

At this time two helicopters and a sea-plane were seen in the sky.

Through fear I ran into the Jetty culvert with my 3 son's and hid till the helicopters and sea-plane left the place.

The dead bodies and the injured people including my wife were taken to Kayts in a tractor.

My 3 sons and I then sought shelter at Saravanai.

While I was at Saravanai at about 6.30 p.m. people of the area came and informed me that my wife had succumbed to her injuries at Kayts Govt. Hospital.

I proceeded to Kayts and attended the burial of the dead body of my wife.

Altogether 13 dead bodies including that of my wife were buried together at Kayts cemetery.

Another 5 dead bodies were handed over to the next to kin for burial.

On this date 18 innocent civilians were killed in the aerial attack.

After being refugees at Saravanai for 15 days I returned to my house at Gurunagar with my 3 sons on 11.11.87.

My fishing boat too was damaged by shell fire on 11.10.87.

MR. PONNAMMAH widow of Nadarajah Kurukkal Lane, Kopay North, Kopay.

At the time the worse situation prevailed in Jaffna district on and after the 10th October, 1987.

My husband Kathiravelu Nadarajah aged 65 years, business man by occupation who was the only sole-bread-winner of the family died on 11.10.87 under tragic circumstances when he was caught in the cross firing.

There are three children by our union.

That since the death of my husband, late Kathiravelu Nadarajah the entire family had been driven to utter starvation and I find extreme difficulty to provide atleast a square meal per day to my children.

RAJESWARY SUNTHARALINGAM (43), widow of Manikam Suntharalingam (43), Navindil, Karaveddy .

I am a housewife.

On 1st October 1987, my husband left home at about 4 p.m. in order to visit his mother who was residing at Alvai.

During this period, there was intermittent shelling coming from the direction of the Army Camp, Manthikai.

About 6 p.m. some member of the public brought home in a car my husband with bleeding injuries all over his body.

I was informed that a shell lobbed from the Army Camp, Manthikai fell on the side of the road near my husband and exploded, causing serious injuries. My husband was returning home at the time of the incident.

Before admission to the hospital my husband succubmed to his injuries.

My husband's body was cremated at the Karahavai North, crematorium on the 2nd of October 1987, after all funeral cites were performed.

I have 3 dependent children aged 14 yrs, 9 yrs, and 7 yrs.

I have lost the only bread winner in my family.

I have not yet received my pension.

S. Rajeswary

RASIAH ARULNANTHINI aged (13) Bharathy Lane, Off K.K.S. Road, Kondavil East, Kondavil.

The deceased person Rasiah Parasothy, aged 35 years was my mother.

My father left us and re-married two months ago.

At the moment we are living under the maintenance and care of my grandmother being my father's mother.

On 10.10.87 a shell fell inside the kitchen and exploded.

My mother who was inside the kitchen at that time died on the spot.

Her body was cremated at Karaikal Cemetery on the following day.

I am the eldest child of our family and have three brothers and a sister.

We are undergoing untold hardships.

Our aged grandmother who is looking after us does not have any income and struggling to maintain our large family.

Our father after his re-marriage doesnot contribute any money towards our maintenance.

Mrs. RATNANAYAKI KATHIRAVELU (52), 49/1, Kankesanthurai Road, Jaffna.

I am the widow of the late Nagarajah Kathiravelu who died of starvation and dehydration when he was locked up in a room of the building into which the IPKF suddenly moved in for occupation on or about 10.10.87.

My husband was a watcher attached to the stores housed at Kaithady of SAMACON, an engineering and contracting firm.

As my husband failed to turn up home for a long time I became disturbed. I was under the impression he would have taken refuge somewhere due to the prevailing military activities.

On or about 15.10.87 when the situation eased, my brother in law N. Loganathan visited my husband's work place at Kaithady but he was not found there.

On 22.12.87,Mr. Pavalanathan, an employee of SAMACON informed me that my husband was found lying unconscious in a room which was locked up and was forced open and that he had been admitted at the Teaching Hospital, Jaffna.

He died at the Hospital on 24.12.87.

The funeral took place on 25.12.87 and his body was cremated at the Viloondi Cremetorium.

I and my two children are now left without any support or financial assistance to maintain ourselves and for the up keep of the family.

My 20 year old son, K. Sureshkumar is a polio-victim and he cannot walk. He moves about in a hand operated tri-cycle donated by the Jaffna Rotarians.

My 14 years old daughter is a student.

I do not own a house or land and have no savings or financial resources to fall back upon.

REGNO MARIUS MAGRIS GOMEZ SHIRLEY (22) 61, Our Lady of Miracle, Jaffna

The deceased person Thomas Neil Gomez Regno Marius Magris Gomez aged 26 years was my husband.

He was an employee of the Jaffna Municipal Council.

On 10.10.87 at about 2.00 p.m. a shell launched by the Army fell inside our rented house and exploded.

My husband sustained serious injuries and was rushed to the Jaffna General Hospital.

He succumbed to his injuries at about 11.05 p.m.

His body was entombed at St. Marys Church burial grounds on 12.10.87.

I have an infant son named Radley Charran aged 10 months.

After my husband's death I do not have any income and undergoing untold hardships.

Shirley Gomez

பெருவெள்ளம்

பற்றை வெட்டிப் பண்படுத்தி
வாய்க்கால் வெட்டி
வரம்பு கட்டி
தண்ணீர் பாய்ச்சிச் சேருக்கி
பசியோடு முளையெறிந்து
பக்குவமாய் பயிராக்கி
களையெடுத்துப் பசளையிட்டு
வேலிகட்டிக் காவலிருந்து
விளைவெடுக்கும் வேளையிலே
பாய்ந்து வந்த பெருவெள்ளம்
பாழடித்தது
பசித்திருந்த வயிறுகள்
பற்றியெரிந்தன.
காத்திருந்த கண்கள்
நெருப்புதிர்ந்தன.

— ஜீவன்

AFFIDAVIT

Mrs. ROHINI NITHIYANANTHEESWARAN (21)
Kerniyady Lane, Thirunelvely East, Thirunelvely.

My husband Thambiah Nithiyanantheeswaran age 27 years was a trader.

My husband, children and I were living in our own house at the above said address.

Violence erupted in Jaffna on 10.10.87 Indian Peace Keeping Force confronted with the militants in several places in the Peninsula.

On 16.10.87 I was forced to fled from my house with my husband and children as shells lobbed at random from the IPKF camp at Kondavil Sri-Lanka Transport Board Depot fell in our locality.

We took our valuables worth₅ Rs 30,000/- in a suitcase and loaded in the van Rs 40,000/- cash was in my husband's possession at that time.

As there was very little fuel for our van my husband, the driver and two others left in our van to collect diesel oil.

They failed to return home for 3 days. I could not go out in search of him due to army atrocities in the area.

My cousin S. Ganeswaran who came home on 19.10.87 informed that my husband, the driver and the two others who accompanied them had been shot dead by IPKF personnel at Thirunelvely junction and the dead bodies burnt by them.

Our mini-van 40 Sri 3089 ELF which was badly damaged was removed by me from the IPKF camp at PunnalaiKadduwan on 3.1.88 damage estimated to Rs 25,000/-.

I have two daughters aged 5 and 3 years.

I am a young widow having lost all my savings and my husband the sole bread winner of our family.



SEBASTIRE XAVIER (63)
9/3, 4th Cross Street, Gurunagar

I am a Fisherman.

On 10.10.87 there was heavy shelling from Jaffna Fort Army camp the Indian Peace Keeping Force towards our residential area.

Through fear I left home with my wife and daughter Imelda and 4 p.m. to St.Patricks College Jaffna and sought refuge there.

On 12.10.87 we took refuge in St. Mary's church and on shels falling in the church compound we moved Columbuthurai Central College on 13.10.87.

On getting to know that the Indian Peace Keeping Force was advancing and firing shells we then moved to Chundikuli Girls College on 16.10.87.

On 20.10.87 while we were remaining in the above College a shell fired by the Indian Peace Keeping Force in adjoining room and exploded killing 3 of the refugees on the spot and injuring 15 others.

The same night through fear I fled with my family and on to St. Mary's Cathedral shell falling in the Cathedral camp and we moved to Nallur Kandasamy temple on 21.10.87.

On 22.10.87 about 70 refugees including members of my family decided to go to Saravanai and proceeded in a lorry to Araly Jetty arriving there at about 8. a.m. where we arranged 4 boats.

When the boats were approaching the Saravanai at about 9 a.m. a Helicopter was seen hovering over the Jetty.

Suddenly the helicopter came very low and opened fire on boats which we were travelling and the firing went on for about one hour killing 12 innocent civilians including my wife Xavier Salamai (59) and grand-daughter Sulogini on the spot and injuring me on the chin.

When the helicopter left the area all 12 dead bodies including the dead body of my wife were taken Kayts cemetery buried at 6.30 p.m. the same day.

I was removed to Kayts Civil Hospital in a tractor and after the medical attention I was brought to Moolai Hospital the same day.

After being warded for 7 days and as there was continuous shell firing on the Moolai Hospital area I got myself discharged from the Moolai Hospital on 2.11.87 and came to Sillalai.

After being refugee for 4 days I went to Mandaitivu and from there I returned to my house at Gurunagar on 11.11.87.

The injury on my chin has not healed yet.



SEGU FARID ABDUL LATIFF BISRUL KAREEMA (27), 45 A.P. Lane, Moor Street, Jaffna.

The deceased Segu Farid Abdul Latiff aged 26 years was my husband.

He was working as a Salesman at a shop in Jaffna.

Due to the military offensive which started on 10.10.87 we went to my father place at Chavakachcheri on 20.10.87 with our infant child.

On 27.10.87 at about 12.20 p.m. shell fired from a helicopter fell wide the house where we stayed and exploded injury my husband seriously.

He died three hours later on the same day.

I have a one year old daughter named A.L. Sarvana.

I went to Minuvangoda with my mother and sister as refugees after my husband death to observe "Ithatha" there.

During our stay at Minuvangoda our hosue at Jaffna was looted and as a result I have sustained losses amounting to Rs. 35,000/-

My child and I have been deprived of the maintenance and support we received from my husband.

SELLATHURAI POOMATHEVI (20)
Parathipuram, Kalasalai Road, Thirunelveli, Jaffna.

My late mother Sellathurai Subathirai aged 47 years was a widow having lost her husband 12 years ago.

There were constant sounds of firing and bomb blasts in our vicinity on the night of 10.10.87.

Fearing to remain at home accompanied by my mother and sister I fled to Puttur on 11.10.87 and having stayed there with a relative we went to the Madduvil Pandithalachchi Amman temple as refugees on 20.1.87.

We returned home on 1.11.87.

On 4.11.87 being informed that IPKF were distributing food at the Thirunelveli junction accompanied by my mother I was proceeding towards the Thirunelveli junction.

As we got on to the Adiapatham road my mother was hit by gunfire emanating from the direction of the Thirunelveli junction.

My mother fell on the ground with a gun shot injury on her stomach.

She was rushed to the Abirami Clinic closeby where she was given first aid.

My mother succumbed to her injuries at about 12 noon the same day when being removed by bullock cart the Jaffna General Hospital.

My mothers dead body was cremated at 5 p.m. the same day at the Thirunelveli crematiorium.

I and my sister Selvamalar are orphaned and unmarried.

I have one brother Balakrishnan who is a refugee in Germany.

SELVARATNAM VALLIAMMAI (53), 36 B.A. Thamby Lane, Vannarpannai.

The deceased person Ponniah Selvaratnam, aged 57 years was my husband.

He was employed as a driver.

On 10th October 1987 we sought refuge at the Jaffna Hindu College due to the commencement of the military offensive.

My husband left for Karainagar in his bicycle at about 9.30 a.m.

On 23.10.87 I came to know that my husband was shot and killed by the army at Kakaithievu on 10.10.87 while he was on his way to Karainagar.

His body was cremated at Kakaithevu on 23.10.87

I have a son named Thirusittampalam, aged 20 years and a daughter named Thiruvaradselvi, aged 19 years.

After my husband's death we do not have any income and undergoing untold hardships.



SELVANAYAGAM SUSEELADEVI, (35) Yavil Masiapitty, Sandilipay.

The deceased Rasiah Selvanayagam, aged 43 years was my husband.

He was employed as an electrician.

On 10.10.87, a few house in our neighbourhood at Arukalmadam were damaged by shell explosion.

My husband took us to Alavetty for safety.

On the same day he returned to Arukalmadam to collect some important things from our house.

As he did not return I sent my brother to search for him.

My brother informed me that my husband was killed when shell fell on our house and exploded.

He also informed me there after he found my husband's body at our house be cremated it at a nearby field.

I have three children.

My daughter was also injured at Alavetty during the military offensive 15.10.87.

We are undergoing untold hardships after my husband's demise and do not have any income.



SHANMUGAM LEDCHUMI (46)
Parathipuram Kalasalai Road, Thirunelveli, Jaffna.

My late husband Velan Shanmugam aged 50 years earned a living as a Casual Labourer.

Sounds of firing and bomb blasts were heard close by throughout the night of 10.10.87.

On 11.10.87 due to fear accompanied by my children I fled for refuge to the Nallur Kandasamy Temple while my husband remained at home.

On 6.11.87 I was informed by a Thiagarasa a neighbour who came to Nallur that my husband Shanmugam had been shot dead by IPKF on 20.10.87 in the compound of the Thirunelveli Farm school.

I returned home on 7.1.87.

My relatives who went to the Thirunelveli farm school the same day informed me later that they had found my husband's dead body in a hightly decomposed state and that they had burnt it at the same spot.

I have two daughters aged 20 and 9 years and two sons aged 16 and 15 years.

My daughter aged 20 years in an invalid and is unmarried.

SINNATHURAI SEETHALUXMY (70), 150, Navalar Road, Jaffna.

The deceased Sinnathurai Parameswaran, aged 39 years is my son. He was employed at the Jaffna Manohara Theatre.

After 10.10.87 due to the military operation in Jaffna, for safety reasons my son went and took refuge as Navalar School and I went and took refuge at the Jaffna Hindu Primary School from 15.10.87 onwards.

On 5.11.87 at 8 a.m. one Subramaniam, a neighbour of mine came to the Hindu Primary School and told me as to what happened to my son.

He told me that on 24.10.87 at 4 p.m. the army personnel who came along the K.K.S. Road towards Jaffna entered the Navalar School and fired gunshots and in the melee 15 persons had died.

And that my son was one of the victims and that the dead bodies were all burnt outside the school by the army on 25.10.87 at 7 a.m.

My husband had already died and my son was looking after me, without getting married. Now there is no one to assist me or look after me.

SINNIAH KANAGASABAPATHY (52)
Kondavil North, Kondavil.

I am a Farmer, married and living with my family in our own house.

My father Kanthar Sinniah age 88 years was also living with me.

Indian Peace Keeping Force which commenced its military operations on 10.10.87 kept firing shells and other sophisticated weapons on residential areas.

Through fear my other family members and I sought refuge at Nallur Kandasamy Temple on 16.10.87 morning.

My father K. Sinniah who was old and feeble remained at home as he was unable to walk to Nallur Kandasamy Temple which is about 4 miles from my house.

On 16.10.87 evening a relative of ours who sought refuge at the same Temple informed me that IPKF personnel who came to our locality shot and killed several innocent civilians including my father. There was no possibility to return home as continuous curfew was in force.

I was able to return home only on 21.11.87 when the ceasefire was announced.

On my return I found only a skeleton inside my house. From the clothes I was able to identify the skeleton as that of my father.

The skeleton was removed and burnt in my compound on 21.11.87.



SIVAGNANASUNDERAMPILLAI SIVANESAN (30)
Palali Road, Vasavilan.

I am employed, in an eversilverware factory.

The deceased are my father, Ilagupillai Sivagnanasundarampillai (65) my mother Sivagnanasundarampillai Sivapakiam (59) and my brother Sivagnanasundarampillai Sivaharan (32) a mechanic at Yarl Metal.

From 10.10.87 there were continous IPKF movements along the Palali Road.

On 16.10.87 I left home at about 4 p.m. for Vasavilan South to buy some milk.

On my return, a little distance away from out house, I was informed that IPKF had entered our house at 5 p.m. that day.

That continuous sounds of firing was heard from our house for some time.

Due to fear I did not go to our house that day.

Due to the indefinte curfew which was in force and as there were constant troop movements and firing in the area I could not go to our house till 25.10.87.

When I went to our house on 25.10.87 accompanied by some relatives I found my father Sivagnanasunderampillai, my mother Sivapakkiam and my brother Sivaharan dead.

Their bodies were in a highly decomposed state.

With difficulty we collected the bodies and burnt them in our compound.

On the way we had seen four other dead bodies one of which was that of a woman on the road which were all in a highly decomposed state and beyon identification and being attacked by dogs and crows.

S. Swaminathan

SOOSAIPILLAI ALPHONSUS (45)
51/2 Water Tank Road, Gurunagar, Jaffna.

My deceased daughter Alphonsus Amutha was 18 years of age.

From about 2.00 p.m. on 10.10.87 our locality was subjected to heavy shelling from the Jaffna Fort.

Fearing to remain at home, accompanied by my wife and children I fled to the St. Rock Cathedral situated at Beach Road, Gurunagar for refuge.

At about 8.30 a.m. on 12.10.87 when all of us were at the School adjoining the Cathedral my daughter Amutha standing near the entrance of a class room was hit by a shell which fell and burst closeby causing a gaping injury on her stomach.

She was rushed immediately in a vehicle to the Holy Cross Hospital on Beach Road.

My daughter succumbed to her injuries at 10.30 a.m. the same day.

My daughter's body was buried at the St. Patrick's burial grounds at 2.30 p.m. the same day.

S. அல்போன்சஸ்

SUPPIAH SELLAMMAH (56), Kampanai, Tellipallai.

I am the mother of Suppiah Vishnu Mohan aged 19 years.

My late son Vishnu Mohan was employed in a factory turning out buckets and earned Rs. 600/- per month.

I was living in a rented house situated at the Kankesanthurai Road, Tellipalai.

On the night of 10.10.87 militant had attacked an IPKF truck on the Kankesanthurai Road at the point about half a kilometre away from our house.

At about 3 p.m. on 11.10.87 IPKF personnel moved along the Kankesanthurai Road firing at random.

While we all fled to the rear of our home my son Vishnu Mohan who was behind us was hit by a bullet in the chest and was killed instantaneously.

Due to curfew enforced from that day my son's dead body was buried in the Catholic Burial grounds closeby on 12.10.87.

My husband deserted me in 1980.

I have one unmarried daughter aged 23 years.

Having lost the support and assistance of my son Vishnu Mohan I face grave hardships and appeal for assistance.

S. விஷ்ணுமோகன்

THILAGAVATHY SATHASIVAM (55) 58/2 Palaly Road, Kondavil.

The deceased Ramupillai Kanapathipillai, aged 85 years was my father.

He was residing with us until the death took him away.

Due to the October 1987 military offensive I sought refugee at the Nallur Kandasamy Temple with my husband and children on 10.10.87.

My father who is very old was left behind at our residence as it was found difficult to take him along with us.

We used to take food for him daily.

On 14.10.87 my husband who took food for my father came and informed me that my father was injured on his leg when a shell exploded near our house.

My husband managed to bring my father to the Nallur Temple with the help of my relatives.

With the intention of going to Nainathievu we proceeded to Araly jetty carrying my father along with us.

Due to the attack of passengers at Araly jetty we decided not to proceed further and stayed at Araly itself.

After the military offensive waned and the situation eased we returned to our residence.

My father expired on 10.12.1987.

His cremation took place of Kondavil Cemetery on 12.12.87.

URUTHIRAN LALITHAMANI (18)
Arasady Road, Kondavil East, Kondavil.

My husband Gopalapillai Uruthiran age 24 years was a Labourer attached to the General Hospital, Jaffna.

My husband and I were living in our own house at the above said address prior to 10.10.87.

Shelling and firing from the Indian Peace Keeping Force camps in the Peninsula towards the residential areas started on 10.10.87 and hence through fear, my husband took me subsequently to his working Place-General Hospital, Jaffna and I remained there in a room.

On 21.10.87 the IPKF entered the General Hospital, Jaffna and gunned down the innated including patients and Hospital staff.

My husband too was shot and killed on 21.10.87 by the IPKF when he was signed in official duties.

About 137 innocent people were killed on this date inside the General Hospital, Jaffna.

The dead body of my husband along with other dead bodies were burnt after 3 days by the IPKF in the Hospital compound.



VELICHORE SEBAMALAI (75)
20, Water Tank, Veethy Gurunagar, Jaffna.

I am a Painter.

My wife Sebamalai Arulammah aged 60 years, son Soosainathan and I are living with my married daughter Mrs. P. Mariyakorathy at the above said address.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force launched its military operations from 10.10.87 in and around our area.

Through fear my wife. children and I fled to St. Patrick's College, Jaffna and took shelter on 10.10.87.

While we were remaining in the above school premises along with a good number of refugees sound of explosions and gun-shots were heard closeby.

At about 3 p.m suddenly one such shell fired by the IPKF personnel fell into the school compound, near by wife Arulammah and exploded.

Shrapnel from the exploding shell struck my wife on the back of her head.

She bled profusely and fell down.

When the shell fire ceased she was removed to a private Practitioner Sellathurai who attended to her immediately.

I could not take her to the Jaffna General Hospital due to the continuous shelling in our area.

When my wife was under treatment in the above Privat Medical Home she succumbed to her injury at midnight 1.30 a.m on 22.10.87.

Burial took place at St. Mary's Burial Ground on 22.10.87 at 12.00 noon.

Mrs. VIMALARAJAH POOMATHEVY (27)
Campus Lane, Kokuvil.

My husband, children, my unmarried sister Sellar Chandrakili age 34 years and I were living in our own house.

On 10.10.87 night Indian Peace Keeping Force Personnel were air dropped in the Jaffna campus premises.

People living around the campus fled to safer places.

My other family members and I too fled to Saratha Mahavidyalaya situated close by.

My sister Chandrakili refused to join us and remained at home.

On 2.11.87 when the situation improved, I returned home with my wife and children and found the burnt remains of a person inside the house. The National Identity Card and clothes of my sister were found close to this spot

We were informed by our neighbours who called at home on their return on 2.11.87 that my sister Chandrakili had been shot and killed by the IPKF and that her dead body had been burnt by them with assistance of some people taken into custody in the area.

My sister Chandrakili who had returned from London had a lot of savings-jewelleries and other items.

All her belongings were robbed.

Mrs. YOGESWARY LIGUORY (35)
5, First Cross Street,
Gurunagar, Jaffna.

I am a Widow, having lost my husband Aloysius Liguory a Fisherman on 10.6.86 when the Sri-Lankan Army opened fire killing 30 fishermen including my husband engaged in fishing at Manaitivu.

My only son Liguory Rons aged 15 years two daughters aged 11 and 3 and I were living at the above said address.

On 10.10.87 the Indian Peace Keeping Force in occupation of the Jaffna Fort Army camp were engaged firing shells and gun-shots towards our area.

In panic my children and I fled to Colombuthurai at 4.30 p.m. and sought refuge.

On 13.10.87 at Colombuthurai shells started falling and through fear immediately I left to Pallikudah with my children by boat and found shelter there.

As my son Liguory Rons fell ill, I sent him with my sister.Theresammah and brother-in-law in a fishing boat to Gurunagar on 15.10.87 to consult a Physician. They were accompanied by other relations of this trip.

On 17.10.87 to my surprise I received the shocking news that my son Liguory Rons, sister Theresammah and two other relations had been killed by helicopter fire on 15.10.87 when they were approaching the Gurunagar Jetty.

On receipt of this message I proceeded to Gurunagar cemetery on 16.10.87 at 2 p.m.

I was informed that my deceased son Rons had received gun shot injuries on the back of his head and abdomen.

AFFIDAVIT

ANNAPILLAI widow of Rajasingham Chelliah (77), Kalaimahal Veethy, Thyiddy, Kankesanthurai.

The deceased are my daughter and grandson; (i) Daughter : Padmini Kanthakumaran (40). (ii) Grandson : Kanthakumaran Jeevith (6).

We were living at No 8 Clock Tower Road, Jaffna. On 11.11.87 there was shelling and shooting in our area. We took refuge at Nallur Temple.

On 21.10.87 my deceased daughter and grandson went to clock Tower road house from Nallur to cook food.

While they were there, they received gunshot injuries and died there.

I was worried as they did not return to the temple in the evening. I was told that a number of people around clock tower road died.

I could not go there immediately. I went there when the curfew was relaxed.

I found the decomposed bodies of my daughter and grandson. The bodies were burnt on 11.11.87.

A. Chelliah

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ARIYARATNAM THANGAMMAH (62), Hospital Road, Chankanai East, Chankanai.

The deceased Ariyaratnam Thavarajah, aged 21 years was my son.

He was a Farm Labourer.

During October 1987 I was warded at the Jaffna General Hospital for an eye operation.

On 11.10.87 I was informed that my son was killed during a shell blast while working in a farm on 10.10.87.

I was also informed that his cremation took place at Vilavelli Cemetery on 10.10.87.

My husband is affected by paralysis and bedridden.

I have three daughters.

It was my late son who maintained and supported our family with the income.

After his demise we do not have any income and undergoing untold hardships.

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KARTHIGESU THAVAKUMARAN (37), Thurgai Amman Kovilady, Tellipalai.

The deceased Thavakumaran Prabaharan aged, 12 years was my son.

He was student of Saivapragasa Vidyalaya.

My son used to sleep in a madam near the Thurgai Amman Temple, as he was a member of the Hindu Youth Sangham run by the Temple authorities.

On 11.10.87 at about 7.00 p.m. he went as usual to the madam to spend the night.

At about 1.00 p.m. I was informed that my son was seriously injured when the madam was damaged by shell blast.

I also learned that he was taken to the Co-operative Hospital, Tellipalai immediately.

I rushed to the hospital and found my son in an unconscious state with a serious injury on the head.

He died without regaining his conciousness.

His cremation took place at Tellipalai cemetery on 12.10.87.

I have two surviving children.

KATHIRAVELU SELVARASA (25), Kopay.

My son the late Selvarasa Selvaruban died on the 11th day of October 1987 due to shelling by the army.

I had to meet his funeral rites having obtained loans from others.

I am not in a position to settle the debt as I am out of billet at present.

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MARKANDU NESAM (45), Market Lane, Tellipalai.

The deceased Nagamuthu Markandu, aged 48 years was my husband.

He was a casual labourer.

My husband was affected by paralysis and was bedridden for the last two and a half years.

On 11.10.87 the army was pounding our area with artillery and mortar shells.

At about 7.00 p.m. I fled from our house carrying my invalid husband with the help of my daughter and another woman.

Before we could proceed any further a shell fell near us and exploded spraying deadly shrapnels in all directions.

My husband was struck by shrapnel on his right leg and was bleeding profusely.

I was also injured during the blast.

We managed to take my injured husband to a house little distance from ours.

We could not get proper medical assistance immediately for my husband due to the situation prevailed during that period.

He expired on 20.12.87 dispite the treatment given to him.

The cremation took place at Tellipalai cemetery on 20.12.87.

I have three children.

We do not have any income after my husband's death.

Mrs M Nesam

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RASATHURAI RASAPOOPATHY (33), Sabapathypillay Veethy, Chunakam South, Chunakam.

The deceased Sinnatti Rasathurai, aged 43 years was my husband.

He was employed as a driver.

On 11.10.87 at about 6 a.m. a shell fell ad exploded in our backyard spraying deadly shrapnels in all direction.

My husband was struck by the shrapnels and sustained injuries on his abdomen.

Immediately removed him to Manipay where he was treated by a private practitioner.

On 17.10.87 he was admitted at the Co-operative hospital Moolai.

He was discharged on 19.10.87 due to the tense situation at Moolai area.

He died on 21.2.88 despite the treatments given to him.

His cremation took place at Poovadai cemetery on 22.08.88.

I have four children.

My children and I have been deprived of the maintenance and support we received from my husband.

We do not have any income and undergoing untold hardships.

SANGARAPILLAI THILLIAMPALAM, a widower, aged 67 years, 392 Navalar road, Kailasapillaiyare Kovilady, Jaffna.

I am a Government pensioner.

I was residing at the above address with my son T. Kathirgamadas, aged 32 years, daughter Mrs. Bavani Yoganathan, aged 29 years, son in law S.P. Yogananthan, aged 35 years, 2 grand sons aged 3 1/2 and 2 years and uncle N. Pasupathy a bachelor, aged 79 years.

On 11.10.87 the IPKF personnel stationed Jaffna Fort Army Camp launched an attack by firing shells and sophisticated guns in Jaffna and its suburbs.

On 11.10.87 at about 5.00 p.m. due to the heavy shell fire in our area all of us including my cousin Mrs. S. Sinnammah, nephew S. Maheswarakumar, and niece Miss. S. Nirmaladevi who took refugee in my house took shelter by lying flat on the floor of our house.

At this time three shells fired by the IPKF fell on our house and exploded with a terrible sound.

As a result of the shell explosion my son in law Yogananthan, uncle Pasupathi, cousin Mrs. Sinnammah and niece Nirmaladevi were killed instantaneously.

My son Kathirgamadas, daughter Mrs. Bavani Yogananthan and nephew Maheswarakumar received serious injuries.

My 2 little grand sons Ramanan and Ratheepan were also badly injured.

All the bodies of the dead and injured persons were removed by me to the General Hospital, Jaffna, with the assistance of some neighbours in a van at 7.00 p.m. when the shell attack ceased.

All injured were admitted to ward No.5 and 12 and subjected to surgery and the dead bodies were removed to the above hospital mortuary.

My son Kathirkamadas, daughter Bavani and nephew Maheswarakumar succumbed to their injuries the same day (11.10.87).

All the seven dead bodies were released and brought home on 12.10.87 after Post-Mortem and inquest.

Mass cremation of all the 7 bodies of the dead was held at Thundi cemetery on 13.10.87 at 11.00 a.m. In this incident my house too had been badly damaged.

The cruel and brutal acts of IPKF and unmerciful murder committed of my son, daughter and son in law has made my two grandsons orphans and this has forced me to carry the burden of looking after grandsons at this old age.

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MRS. SATHIYAWATHY NALLIAH (51) Kalaimani Lane, Kaddaipirai, Kopay South, Kopay.

The deceased Thambiah Nalliah (70) is my husband. He was a Farmer.

On 11.10.87 at about 9 a.m. when my husband was seated on the front verandah of the house having his breakfast a mortar shell fired by the IPKF struck a coconut plant in the fornt compound and exploded.

Fragments from the exploding shell struck my husband on the neck just below the ear and he fell dead on the spot.

As there was continuous shelling on the area the dead body of my husband was cremated in a vacant piece of land close to my house.

My husband leaves behind myself and 3 sons aged 26 years, 23 years, 21 years of whom none are employed. We were entirely dependent on him.

My 3 sons are unable to engage in farming or any form of occupation as they run the risk of being arrested and held in detention by the IPKF.

SATHIYANANEE
Thirunelveli South, Campus 3rd Lane.

Molder of N.I.C. No. 3678222 Ov

My husband died in 1976.

After the death of my husband, I was living with my father Murugesu Sellappathurai (78) at the address given above.

On 11.10.87 there was shelling in our area, my children and I left our house and took refuge at Nallur temple.

My father did not want to leave the house saying that somebody must remain in the house.

On 22.10.87, my father received a gunshot injury while he was in the compound.

I could not go there immediately as the army was around the place.

When the situation eased, I went there and the found decomposed body in the compound.

I cremated the body in the same spot.

I attach a copy of the death certificate No. 411.

Cause of death is given as Death due to profuse bleeding from injury caused by gun shot.

I am a widow with two children.

I was depending on my father after the death of my husband.

I have no means of living. Funeral expenses and other religious expenses were met by me. No one will oppose me to taking the money from the Government for the funeral expenses as my father was living with me.

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SELVARATNAM POORANAM (45) Theatre Lane, Inuvil East, Inuvil.

The deceased Thamboo Vairamuthu, (65) years was my father.

He was living with me until he met his tragic end.

On 11.10.87 we left our house and took refugee at the Sivagamiamman temple Inuvil due to the intermittent shelling by the army.

My father refused to accompany us and opted to stay at home.

After hearing that our house was shelled my husband went there.

He came and informed me that my father was found dead at our house with shell injuries.

His body was cremated at the Poovodai cemetery Inuvil on the same day.



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SELLAR ELIYATHAMBY, born 1916-06-04, 1244 V, Variapulam, Chunakam.

I am the father of Eliyathamby Chandrakumar (24) who died on 11.10.87.

On 11.10.87 at about 5.00 p.m. my son went to the house of one Kumarasamy a neighbour to meet and speak to him about some business.

While my son was talking to Kumarasamy in the front compound of his house, a shell fell and exploded near the two of them.

Both my son and Kumarasamy were mutilated by the exploding shell.

My son's body was cremated the same night.

My wife and I were dependent on this son.

I have two other children a boy and a girl, both married.

My late son, a bachelor, was a Technician engaged in repairing Video decks etc.

He used to earn about Rs.1,000/- a month and support me and my wife.



SINNAPODIAN KANTHAN (65), Koilakandi, Kalthadi.

The deceased Kanthan Markandu, aged 39 years.

He was employed as a painter at the Jaffna General Hospital being a attached to the buildings department.

My son left home on 11.10.87 at about 6 a.m. to his worksite at the hospital premises.

He did not return home afterwards.

As it was his practice for many days to stay continuously at his worksite I did not launch a search for him.

Only after the 21.10.87 incident at the Jaffna General Hospital which resulted in a carnage I started to worry about his fate.

Later I was informed that he was killed caught in the exchange of cross fire during the battle between the IPKF and the militants.

I also came to know that his body was cremated inside the hospital compound immediately after his death.

I have two daughters at home, one of them is unmarried and the other married but deserted by her husband ten years ago and is a mother of three children.

It was my late son who maintained and supported our family.

After his death we do not have any income.

SUPPIAH SIVARAJAH (49) Manjathadi, Kondavil West, Kondavil.

The deceased person Kanthar Suppiah, aged 80 years was my father.

He was a Farmer.

Due to the intensive shelling we fled from our house and went to Chavakachcheri on 9.10.87.
As my father was old and weak he opted to stay at home.

About fifteen days later I was informed that my father was shot and killed by the army while he was inside our house on 16.10.87.

I learned that his body was cremated by my uncle who discovered the body.

My father was living under my care and maintenance until his death.

My mother is living with me.

My mother who is living with me is old and partially blind.



VAIRAVAPILLAI THIRUNAVUKARASU (55), Karuhampanai, Keerimalai.

The deceased Thirunavukarasu Sureshkumar, aged 16 years was my son.

He was a student.

On 11.10.87 at about 8 a.m. my son left home to attend a tution class at Ambanai Tellippallai.

At about 10 a.m. I was informed that my son was shot and killed by the army at Ambanai.

His body was brought home immediately.

His cremation took place at Kopilavadai Cemetery at Tellippallai West on the same day itself.

I have 5 surviving children.

Mrs. ALAGAMMAH SIVATHARMAM (47)
Urumpirai West, Urumpirai.

On 12.10.87 my husband Kandiah Sivatharmam (45) and son Sivatharmam Nirmalan (12) left home to attend to some work in our farm situated along Manipay Road.

At about 1.30 p.m when it was rumoured that the Indian Peace Keeping Force was approaching Urumpirai and gun fire was heard, I sought shelter with my other children at the Kandasamy temple.

While at the temple I came to know from refugees who sought shelter subsequently that my son S. Nirmalan had been shot by the IPKF and injured.

A little later I was informed that my husband had been taken away by IPKF when they left the area.

When I returned home around 4 p.m. when tension subsided I was informed that my son Nirmalan had succumbed to his injuries and that my husband had been shot dead.

Eye witnesses to this incident reported that my son was first shot at by IPKF personnel and injured and that he had succumbed to his injuries in a short while.

They also reported that IPKF who had taken into custody my husband Kathiran Apputhurai and Sinnathamby a labourer who was working under Apputhurai took away with them all three persons with the hands behind their backs.

When a search was made for the 3 persons after the IPKF had left the area K. Apputhurai was found injured with gun shot injuries and my husband and Sinnathamby dead about a quarter of a mile away.

The dead body of my husband bore gun shot injuries and it was evident that he had been shot dead by IPKF.

The dead bodies of my son Nirmalan and husband were brought home the same evening and cremated on 13.10.87 at Vemban cemetery.

My husband leaves behind myself and 7 other children of whom 6 are daughters and a son.

My husband was a farmer and to supplement his meagre earnings he did a retail trade in vegetables at the Urumpirai Market.

My children and I were entirely dependent on my husband's earnings.



APPIAH RATNASINGHAN (44), 161/8 3rd Lane, Arasady Road, Nallur, Jaffna.

I am an employee at the Cement Corporation, Kankesanthurai.

On 12.10.87 at about 2.30 a.m. a shell crashed through our roof and exploded inside.

My daughter Sathiyabama aged 14 years was killed instantaneously after being struck by shrapnels.

I sustained multiple injuries and lost consciousness.

Only after 4 days I regained my consciousness and found myself at the General Hospital, Jaffna.

I sustained injuries on my scalp, compound fracture of my left upper arm and fracture of my right leg below the knee.

Skin grafting was done for my leg on 15.11.87.

I suffer from wrist drop of my left hand and also radial nerve palsy.

I am unable to do any work with my left hand as a result of the injury.

I suffer from loss of sight on my left eye as a result of my head injury.

I am unable to walk properly and find it difficult to walk any considerable distance.

I was initally warded at the Hospital from 12.10.87 to 15.11.87.

I was admitted at the Hospital several times after my initial discharge for complication.

I am unable to work as before due to the injuries I sustained during the shell blast.

A. Rathnasingam

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GANESHAN PARAMESWARY (44) 19, Malarmagal Veethy, Ariyalai, Jaffna.

The deceased Ganeshan Mahendran, aged 21 years was my son.

On 12.10.87 at about 7 a.m. my son left home saying that he is going to Thirunelvely.

At about 9 a.m. I was informed that my son was shot and killed by the army at Thirunelvely.

His body was brought home amidst great difficulty at about 3 p.m. on the same day.

His body was cremated at the Thundi Cemetery on 13.10.87.

I have two daughters and a son.

My husband is an invalid and unemployed.

[illegible]

● ● ●

JAMALDEEN MUBEEN No. 54/21, Aththisoody Lane, Kandarmadam, Jaffna.

Myself and my cousin brother Shahul Hameed Musathic aged 20 came from Vidathaltheevu to Jaffna for the purpose of studying in the University of Jaffna. I joined the University on 6th August 1986 and my cousin-brother the said Musathic joined the University on 12th September 1987.

On 12.10.87 during the IPKF Operation took place at Kokuvil area while shooting and shelling, a gun shot attacked the said Musathic and he died at the spot and his body was buried according to Muslim Religion at the Sinnappalivasalady burial ground, Jaffna.

As his parents are at Vidathaltheevu and unable to come due to their old age I am affirming this declaration on his behalf and request the authority concerned to have sympathy on the dead person and to grant relief and redress to his parents who are residing at Ward No. 10. Vidathaltheevu, Mannar.

J. [illegible]

● ● ●

KUNDIAH SATCHITHANANTHAN (36) Station Road, Kondavil.

My father-in-law Sellappa Veerasingum (70) and was residing with me at the above address. My mother-in-law Mrs. Sivagnanam Veerasingam too is residing. She is under my care and protection.

On 12.10.87 at about 5 p.m on the Indian Peace Keeping Force approaching our residential firing mortar shells and sophisticated weapons I was forced to flee from home with my wife, children and mother-in-law.

My father-in-law S. Veerasingam however preferred to remain behind to look after our property.

My wife, children, mother-in-law and I stayed for the night with relations in their house situated 2 mile away.

As it was found that the IPKF had moved out of the area the following morning, I returned home at about 7 a.m and found my father-in-law's dead body lying close to the gate.

The dead body of my father-in-law bore entry and exit bullet wounds on either side of the waist. It also had also cut injury on the left upper arm.

The cremation took place at about 12 noon on 13.10.87.

3 others too had been shot dead similarly in this area on 12.10.87.

[illegible]

● ● ●

Mrs. LALITHA EDWARD SYLVESTER (35), Pechi Amman Kovilady, Point Pedro.

I am the widow of the deceased Michael Edward Sylvester who was shot dead by the Indian Forces on 12.10.87.

My husband Michael Edward Sylvester left home on 11.10.87 to visit his elder brother at Kankesanthurai.

On 12.10.87 at about 10.00 a.m. when he was in his brothers house Indian Army personnel came into the house and took him out on the road.

He was made to stand on the road opposite the house and was fired at from point blank range.

He received severe gun shot injuries on his chest and fell dead on the spot.

His body was buried at the Oorani Cemetery Kankesanthurai on 15.11.87.

My husband was 35 years old and was a businessman who earned an average monthly income of Rs. 1,500/-

Sicne my husband's death I and my child have been left with no financial assistance or support for our maintenance and existence.

எ. லலிதா

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MAILVAGANAM SINNAPILLAI, (70), AGA Office Lane, Chunnakam.

The deceased person Mailvaganam Thanabalasingham, aged 43 years a bachelor was my son.

He was a casual labourer and was living with me in the house of my daughter Sivapragasam Thavamany.

On 12.10.87 at about 6 a.m. a shell fell on our house and exploded.

My son was killed instantaneously after being struck by the shrapnels.

Fearing further shelling we left the house and sought refuge at various temple.

My daugher's son-in-law returned to our house after seven days and cremated his body in a nearby field.

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THE ILLUSTRATED WEEKLY OF INDIA



P K BHATLEKAR

THE OLD FOX

K P Sunil profiles Sri Lanka's wily President J R Jayewardene

On July 29, 1987 the prime minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka signed a historic accord. An accord which envisaged an end to hostilities between the Sri Lankan government and the local Tamil guerilla groups. An accord which sought to establish an interim government in the strife-torn Tamil provinces of the north and east, allowing these regions a degree of autonomy within the unitary Sri Lankan state. An accord which provided for a return to normalcy under the "benign" supervision of an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). An accord which promised much but, in verity, achieved little.

For, today, the accord is in a shambles. The IPKF, far from maintaining peace, is at war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), desperately trying to subjugate the Frankenstein monster run out of control.

And through all this, one individual has come out unscathed—Junius Richard Jayewardene, President of Sri Lanka.

At 82, Jayewardene is probably the oldest statesman in the world today after China's Deng Xiaoping. He entered active politics in 1944 as a United National Party (UNP) candidate for a by-election. Close family ties with Don Stephen Senanayake, the first prime minister of independent Sri Lanka, ensured Jayewardene a cabinet posting in the first UNP government in Sri Lanka in 1947.

Jayewardene held cabinet postings whenever the UNP was in power. And he was a prominent Opposition leader when the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) held the reins. During his long innings as a parliamentarian he proved an adept at manipulative politics. Until finally, in 1977, launching his campaign from a virulent anti-Tamil platform, he stormed to power, succeeding Sirimavo Bandaranaike as prime minister.

One of his first acts on assuming power was to neutralise Bandaranaike, whose SLFP had been reduced to a meagre eight seats compared to the UNP's 140 in Parliament.

Using his steam-roller majority to the fullest advantage, he levelled charges of corruption and misuse of power against Bandaranaike until she was finally stripped of her civic rights for a period of six years starting from 1980.

Even as Sirimavo Bandaranaike was being silenced effectively, Jayewardene took on his favourite whipping horse, the Tamils. He proved he was a master strategist when he won over his old friend and lone Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) member of Parliament, Thondaman, to cross over to the UNP. Thondaman, who represented the plantation Tamils, was made minister in charge of rural industries in 1978.

The move was designed to isolate the Tamils of the north from the plantation workers of the east though it underlined a paradoxical situation—the plantation Tamils of the east, who were only second class citizens of the island without even the right of franchise, could boast of a full-fledged cabinet minister to represent them!

Jayewardene's next task was to bridle the Tamils of the northern districts. Within a month of his assuming power on July 22, 1977 anti-Tamil riots had broken out in Sri Lanka, in which hundreds of Tamils died, with over a lakh rendered homeless refugees—an occurrence which gave a fillip to nascent Tamil militancy to assume the dimensions of a mass movement.

In July 1978, a new Constitution was enacted which ushered in the presidential system of government to the island republic. Under the new Constitution, Jayewardene the prime minister became Jayewardene the President, armed with virtually dictatorial powers.

Only a little earlier, on May 22, 1978, he had passed an act proscribing the newly emerging Tamil militant force, the LTTE, founded by Velupillai Pirabhakaran. On May 21, 1979 this was replaced by the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), which was passed as a "temporary measure" to quell the increasing activities of the Tamil guerilla forces.

The noose was further tightened around the Tamils by declaring a state of emergency in Tamil areas. The Sri Lankan army occupied Jaffna and other northern districts.

At this stage, Jayewardene's political career was approaching a crucial crossroads. Sirimavo Bandaranaike and her SLFP had been effectively neutralised. But with two years of his presidential term still to go, Jayewardene went to the people for a referendum. The issue placed before them was whether the people wanted a change of government and whether he could continue as President. The move was diabolical in its brilliance. Before Opposition politicians could realise what was happening, Jayewardene had ensured himself a further six years of uninterrupted power!

His triumph was followed by a fresh spell of violence. In December 1984 an all-party conference was convened in Colombo to go into the problems of the Tamils. A conference which turned out to be a fiasco in which all attempts at dialogue by the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) were frustrated.

This year saw Jayewardene in a precarious position. The stalemate over the Tamil issue continued. Violence in the country had not abated. Prolonged war had ruined the State economy with the defence budget going up by leaps and bounds. The prospect of economic disaster and the continuing spectre of civil war was alienating Jayewardene from his vote bank—the Sinhalese. Some of his own cabinet colleagues were nursing ambitions of replacing him at the helm. Jayewardene had to do something and do it fast, to prevent power from slipping from his hands and at the same time assuaging the feelings of the Sinhalese. Again, Jayewardene's instincts for survival came to the fore.

In what can only be termed a desperate bid, he entered into an agreement with the Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, under which a sizable contingent of the Indian army under the nomenclature of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), was stationed in Sri Lanka to supervise the establishment of peace and the surrender of arms at his invitation.

The decision to bring in the Indian army caused initial resentment amongst the Sinhalese. But the shrewdness of Jayewardene in requesting Indian help was brought home when the fight against the Tamils was taken over by the Indian army—albeit on different grounds—to bring about peace! India, which entered the Sri Lankan tangle as mediator has actually become an active participant in a desperate bid to uphold the accord.

In all this Jayewardene has lived up to his reputation. A reputation he has himself built—that of a boxer who aims for the face and punches the belly of the opponent! A reputation that spells for him success. W

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

JAFFNA PENINSULA	ALLAVEDDY
Mangayrkarasy	T. Uruthirarajan
Ravichandra	K. Kugathasan
Y. Cyril	N. Navaratnam
R.S. Rasu	A. Sivarajah
Elilvathany	**ATCHUVELY**
Selvaratnam	**K. Thangammah**
S. Nadarajah	**B. Pathmaranee**
K. Kugathas	G.P. Balasingam
Darmini	T. Paikianathan
Ponni	**Atputhamalar**
S. Viji	Thambu Navarajah
S. Murugupillai	Pongalan Kalistus
S. Anthonipillai	**P. Ritammah**
P. Muthuthamby	K. Collin
Thirunavukkarasu	P. Mahesan
Sellathurai	S. Sivanesan
Joseph Jesuthasan	M. Sathialingam
S. Sellammah	K. Thrumakulasingam
Subramaniam	**ARIALAI**
N. Daniel	**B. Krishnaveeny**
J.C. Stephen	**T. Kanogammah**
Sinnathamby	**T. Jeyarani**
Thavaneswaran	**A. Ajantha**
Kamaldas	K. Kethiswaran
G. Gunachandran	**V. Thavamalar**
Charles Mathews	S. Ambihaibalan
S. Sivarajah	V. Yoganathan
R. Muthulingam	**T. Selvarani**
K. Krishnan	**T. Peralatha**
P. Perinpanathan	S. Shanmuganathan
J. Shanmugalingam	K. Sinnathamby
S. Sivaguru	**P. Sinnamah**
Ravichandra	S. Sivanesan

These pictures are taken from homage ads in Jafina dailies

CIVILIANS □ KILLED (Operation Pawan)

V. Thavarasa 10.10.87

A. Damodaran Pillai 11.10.87

T. Manivannan 11.10.87

S. Padmanathan 11.10.87

S. Sivasithambaram 11.10.87

S. Vishnu Mohan 11.10.87

D. Dayan 12.10.87

Dhamika 12.10.87

M. Dhanabalasingam 12.10.87

Gandhi Amma 12.10.87

S. Ganeshnathan 12.10.87

N. Inbaraja 12.10.87

S. Jegatheewaran 12.10.87

Kanagamalar 12.10.87

I. Kribhakaran 12.10.87

S. Lioneldasan 12.10.87

M.R. Mahendra 12.10.87

Padhmavathi 12.10.87

THE HINDU

IPKF, LTTE locked in fierce battles

BATTLE □ FOR □ JAFFNA

NEWS

COLOMBO, Oct. 12.

Fierce fighting raged today in the northern Jaffna peninsula of Sri Lanka as the Indian forces armed with mortars and machineguns prepared to smash the last stronghold of Tamil militants, Indian military sources said.

The sources said the Indian Peace-Keeping Force had surrounded Jaffna, 300 km. north of here, and parachuted commandos in for a final assault on the town controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Militants' claim

The LTTE claimed that its men had surrounded about 200 IPKF men air-dropped on the Jaffna University campus last night and that the besieged troops had called for reinforcements from their Navatkuli and Karainagar camps.

LTTE sources in Vavuniya, quoting reports received from Jaffna, said while 300 IPKF vehicles were proceeding from Karainagar to Jaffna town to "save" the para-dropped armymen who had sought additional help, a large column of IPKF men were advancing on the town from the Navatkuli camp. A number of para-dropped men had been killed, the sources claimed.

Accusing the IPKF of behaving like an "occupation" army, the sources said the LTTE would continue its fight till they won their land.

About 2,000 militants were defending the town of about 150,000 people, firing AK-47 assault rifles and mortars from behind houses and using civilians as shields, said the Indian military sources, who were in Colombo and spoke on condition of anonymity.

The militants were reportedly laying mines in the streets of Jaffna to keep Indian soldiers bottled up in the old Dutch fort on the town's outskirts. The Indian soldiers were also coming under sniper fire.

Sri Lankan radio said the Indian troops were cordoning off and closing in on the militants. Heavy battles took place throughout last night especially around the fort which is near the LTTE's main base.

The radio said the militants attacked Jaffna Fort on Sunday night but were beaten off. "The Indian are going all out to smash the terrorist networks," it said.

Stiff resistance

Sri Lankan military sources said the Indian troops were using heavy artillery and tanks against stiff resistance from the LTTE. Heavy house-to-house fighting was going on in Jaffna.

The sources said the LTTE men were using rocket-propelled grenades and heavy weapons to slow down the Indian advance. They said Indian officers were confident they would have Jaffna town under control within the next two days.

Jaffna has been under shoot-at-sight orders since Saturday. Restrictions were relaxed briefly to let the residents seek shelter at Indian-protected refugee centres.

Difficult situation

"It is a very difficult situation. We are not fighting on a battlefield but among houses and civilians," said one Indian official.

"The crux of this thing is that the whole lot will be bottled up", he said. "We don't know how many days it will last. We have surrounded Jaffna on all sides".

The Indians are said to be facing logistic difficulties in defeating the Tigers, who have "resisted" implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement to end the ethnic strife in the island. A radio message that was overheard indicated that the Indian troops were running low on fuel and 30 barrels of petrol were being flown from here to the embattled north.

According to unconfirmed reports reaching here, 18 men of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force were injured in a land-mine explosion at Kodikamam, about 15 km from Jaffna town either last night or early this morning. It is said that following the blast the IPKF used helicopter-gunships to strafe militants' concentrations.

Sri Lankan military sources, who also demanded anonymity, reported today that 250 militants died in the three-day fighting. They said the figure was based on intercepted militants' radio messages. Sri Lankan radio also said 250 militants were killed.

But Indian sources said they could not confirm the toll. "We are in the middle of a war situation. We don't know how many people have been killed," one Indian official said.

The death figures could not be verified because reporters have been blocked from reaching the battlefront. But travellers from the region yesterday said heavy fighting was under way.

A spokesperson for the Indian High Commission, Mrs. Lakshmi Puri, told newsmen this evening that 163 LTTE men had been killed in the fighting. She said 18 IPKF personnel lost their lives and 79 were injured.

She said the estimate of loss suffered by the LTTE was based on radio intercepts. The IPKF had recovered only 13 bodies, she said.

With the arrest of four LTTE men in operations today, the total number of those held in the Northern and Eastern provinces stood at about 260. However other reports quoting military sources said 400 militants had been captured in the past three days.

Attacks in the East

An Indian official reached by telephone in eastern Sri Lanka said six Indian soldiers were wounded near the coastal city of Batticaloa as militants kept up sporadic attacks. But the officials, who insisted on anonymity, said the region was "completely under our control".

Curfew is still in force in the northern and eastern districts including Jaffna, Trincomalee, Mannar and Vavuniya.

A number of militants' bases in all these districts have been smashed with a large haul of arms, ammunition and explosives.

Naval surveillance along the coast in the north and east has been strengthened to prevent the militants from escaping —AP, PTI

LTTE CLAIMS

In the fight that took place on 12.10.87 also, a large number of IPKF men were killed and in the IPKF's mortar and canon attack many civilians were killed. The IPKF stopped on the streets, many innocent civilians and ran over them the armoured tanks and jeeps, crushing their bodies to pulp. This inhuman and barbaric act of the Indian army has no parallel in the war history of the whole world. About 40 bodies thus crushed were lying on the streets; they could not be identified and the bodies could not even be removed from the streets for cremation or burial.

The Indian commandos, para-chute dropped in Jaffna University, to rescue the IPKF men captured by the LTTE, acted in the most atrocious manner. On their return, they were carrying only 12 dead-bodies.

The LTTE made arrangements with the Red Cross to hand over the dead-bodies of 29 Indian army men to the IPKF. But the officer of the Indian army, informed the LTTE, through the Jaffna govt. agent that under the prevailing situation it was not possible for him to take the responsibility of receiving the dead-bodies of the Indian soldiers. Therefore the bodies were cremated there itself.

The parachute dropped Indian commandos ran back with a very bad defeat. At Urumbirai, in the civilian areas, the Indian army attacked indiscriminately, killing many innocent public, including 2 children and 2 elderely women.

On 12.10.87 alone, 104 civilians, wounded by shell attacks were admitted in the Jaffna Hospital. The IPKF men raped women in the most cruel manner and then killed them. Children were done to death in the most horrifying manner, in the very presence of their parents. Various parts of their bodies were damaged.

In Sudumalai, Urumbirai and Kokkuvil a large number of young women were abducted, raped and killed by the Indian army. 13 of the raped women, who escaped death were admitted in the hospitals.

The IPKF invited for TALKS the LTTE representative of Ambarai District to a temple in Poduvil in the Eastern Provinces. But when he arrived, the IPKF arrested and took him away.

R.K. Lakshman, The Times of India, 11.10.87

THE HINDU

87 October

IPKF smashes LTTE bastion in Jaffna

NEWS

BATTLE FOR JAFFNA

COLOMBO, Oct 13

The Indian Peace Keeping Force today smashed the strongholds of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Jaffna peninsula after three days of fierce fighting and together with the Sri Lankan forces stepped up Naval patrols to block Tamil militants from escaping or bringing weapons to their embattled bases.

Indian military sources said the IPKF met fierce resistance at many places but with the reinforcements airdropped yesterday overran the bases.

At least 26 Indian soldiers have been killed and more than 100 wounded, an Indian official said.

The military sources put the number of militants killed in the operations so far between 200 and 250.

A spokesperson for the Indian High Commission, Mrs. Lakshmi Puri, said the IPKF was advancing on the LTTE bastion from at least four directions today. The IPKF advanced towards the town along the Kankesanthurai-Chunnakam, Palay-Urumpirai, Koppai North-Navatkuli and the seaside axis, she told a press briefing.

The spokesperson said the IPKF had lost 27 of their men in the operations since Saturday while 141 others had been injured. She said the high casualty rate was due to the "conscious decision" taken by the Government of India not to undertake offensive air operations to provide cover to the advancing troops out of concern for civilian lives and properties.

An estimated 200 LTTE men had also been killed, she added.

'Vital difference'

When a western correspondent suggested that there was no difference between the Sri Lankan security operations in May last and the current operations by the IPKF, she said that there was a "vital difference".

"We are not using any offensive air power," she said. Besides the IPKF operations were only aimed at militant positions and strongholds and all precautions were being taken to ensure civilians were not harmed.

Mrs. Lakshmi Puri said the civilians were also aware of this and that was why a large number of them had collected at designated points in response to the IPKF appeal. She said more such centres had been declared open today.

"A number of civilians have been forced to participate in the LTTE campaign—she said. Civilians were being used for "carrying grenades, ammunition boxes and the dead" she added.

The Indian Military sources said that reinforcements sought by the IPKF had joined the IPKF men air-dropped at Urumpirai, north of Jaffna, on Sunday night and the LTTE resistance in the area was overcome. The air-dropped IPKF men had come under concerted attacks by the LTTE and three soldiers were killed before the arrival of the reinforcements.

They said the LTTE was, by a "three-tier defence", using children, women and old people as "human shields" at gun-point while their men attacked the IPKF from behind. The IPKF had to move from building to building to clear some areas in Jaffna town.

Naval patrolling in the Palk Strait was intensified and orders issued to sink any "contact" moving in a suspicious manner or not responding when challenged, the sources said.

The reports said the IPKF shot dead 15 LTTE men near Vantharamulai in the Eastern Batticaloa district and recovered their weapons. They spoke of fierce fighting near Trincomalle district, but quoted security officials as saying that the LTTE men were "on the run" there. They added that the LTTE set fire to a State-owned bus.

The LTTE leader Mr. V. Prabhakaran, they said, had sent messages to his regional leaders outside the Jaffna peninsula to send more trained cadres to the North to resist the IPKF onslaught.

LTTE sources in the northern town claimed today that the bodies of 29 IPKF men were piled up near the demolished Buddhist temple of Naga Vinhara in the town. They claimed that only eight men of the LTTE had been killed in the fighting.

The sources alleged that the IPKF was resorting to continous shelling and that shells had fallen at Mallakam, Kokkuvil, Koppai, Chunnakam Tellipalali and Jaffna town. One shell fell on a ward of the General Hospital, next to the Dental Institute.

The Tamil-language newspaper *Verakesari* said today that Mr. Prabhakaran had escaped from the peninsula and was in hiding in Madras. There was no official confirmation of it.

The Sri Lankan news agency, Lankapuvath, quoting official sources said three members of the Central Reserve Police Force were killed today in a land-mine explosion in Eastern Batticaloa town. It quoted the sources as having said that it was a "LTTE terrorist landmine".

According to the sources the vehicle in which the CRPF personnel were travelling was blown up and the dead included two jawans and one officer. Nearly 800 CRPF men were now inducted in the Eastern Sri Lanka to increase the offensive against the LTTE militants.—PTI, UNI and AFP.

IPKF exercising restraint

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI, Oct 13.

Jaffna town witnessed the fiercest fighting last night and today since the Indian Peace Keeping Force launched its operations against the LTTE on October 9. The External Affairs Ministry spokesman said 17 IPKF jawans had been killed in last night's operations and 97 wounded. Five paracommandos who were dropped yesterday near Jaffna are reported missing.

The spokesman said the advance of the IPKF forces, which have already overrun several LTTE strongholds, was being thwarted by a 'wall of human beings, mainly women and children' behind whom were LTTE snipers. The IPKF has had to exercise extreme caution in using its fire-power and in the bargain has had to suffer heavy casualties.

The spokesman said LTTE casualties were not known.

IPKF vehicle blown-up: In the Eastern Province, the IPKF has taken seven militants into custody after conducting cordon and search operations. One IPKF vehicle was blown up by a mine. According to the spokesman, the situation in the Trincomalee and Batticaloa areas is 'by and large under control but somewhat tense.'

Asked for his reaction to the DMK leader, Mr. Karunanidhi's reported statement that LTTE Chief, Mr. V. Prabhakaran, had offered to resume negotiations with the Government of India, the spokesman said nothing had been received from the LTTE or its leader. There was therefore no need for comment.

Meanwhile, there was subdued reaction in official circles to the Sri Lankan Prime Minister, Mr. Premadasa's allegations against India in his speech to the U.N. Assembly yesterday. It is well known that the Sri Lankan leader is anti-India and is bent upon wrecking the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement. Though the Indian representative at the UN, Mr. K. S. Rao has already countered the allegations suitably, it is beleived that the matter would be taken up with the Sri Lankan Government at the highest level.

LTTE CLAIMS

On 13.10.87, the Indian army from the Jaffna Fort Camp attacked the Jaffna medical college hospital with mortar shells. The building was damaged to a very great extent. Roofs were broken and blown off; medicines stored were damaged and destroyed. In the shell-attack, the residental house of the Catholic Bishop, in the campus of the St. Mary's Church in the hospital street, was also damaged.

Since the shells fell and blasted in many parts of Jaffna town, a very large number of civilian population got killed. There were absolutely no movement of people on the streets.

In the small hours of 13.10.87, on the pretext of 'searching' for the 'militants', the IPKF have killed 60 innocent public, including babies in arms, children, elderly people and women. Every where, streets or houses, only dead bodies were strewn around. The bodies that were lying on the streets were all crushed to skins and bones by the military vehicles.

AFFIDAVIT

NAGALINGAM NAGESWARI (21)
Ward - 7, Nainativu.

I lost my father 12 years ago. My mother died an year ago.

I moved out from my Nainativu Island home in December 1986 because I wanted to continue my advanced level education at Ramanathan College, Chunnakam.

My elder brother Nagalingam Jeevaratnam, 25 years was already a student at the Jaffna University and residing at No 24, Perampaddy Lane, Kokuvil.

I therefore took up residence with him from December 1986.

My brother was in the final year of the Bachelor of Commerce Degree Course.

From about 1 a.m. on 12.10.87 I and the rest of the household- My brother, Jeevaratnam, sister Anandagowri, Sarathathevi and the brother's children Kausala (7) and Manoharan (6) were kept awake owing to the sound of gun fire.

At about 5.30 a.m. the soldiers of the Indian Army entered the compound of our house.

The soldiers asked us to come out of the house with raised hands and sit in the compound of our house.

While the soldiers waited there we heard shells exploding nearby.

The soldiers perhaps frightened by the exploding turned their guns on us.

One of them shot dead my brother Jeevaratnam and my Nephew Manoharan (6).

My sisters Anandagowrie, Sarathathevy and niece Kausala (7) were injured by gun shots.

My sisters and niece were admitted to the Jaffna General Hospital.

My sisters were discharged from hospital after one month whereas my niece was discharged on 31.1.88.

N. Nageswary

PUVENENTHIRAN YOGAMMAH (68)
Pokanai, Urelu west, Urelu

My husband, I and five children of our family resided at the above address on 12.10.87 at about 4 P.M. Indian soldiers came in trucks to the area where we lived and asked us to raise our hands and come out of the house.

All the members of our family raised our hands and went out of our house.

We were asked to go and sit in the forage factory close to our house

While we were going towards the forage factory the IPKF soldiers fired at us.

My house and the house of a neighbour Thirunvukarasu were burnt down by the IPKF soldiers.

I had to leave my daughter when she fell and proceeded to the factory to which we were ordered to go.

At about 6 P.M. I returned to the spot where my daughter fell and found her dead.

My house and the house of a neighbour Thirunavukarasu were burnt down by the IPKF solidiers.

I have a death certificate No. 5240 in respect of my daughters death.

The cause of death of my daughter Miss Puvenenthiran Vanitha (12) as stated in the death certificate is fatal gun shot injuries.

Y. Gunapalan

RAJALINGAM VIJAYA (22), Urelu West, Urelu, Urmpirai.

My husband Sellar Rajalingam, age 32 years was a Toddy Tapper.

My husband, only child and I were living in our own house at the above said address.

From 10.10.87 shells were being fired on the residential areas by the IPKF at Palaly Camp.

On 12.10.87 at about 10.00 a.m. IPKF personnel walked into our home and searched for militants and left our home.

While leaving our house they informed that they will not harm and they wanted us to stay in our house.

We came to know later that they have visited other houses in our locality and advised them also to stay in their houses.

At about 3.00 p.m. the same day another batch of IPKF personnel came to our house and called for the inmates.

My husband who was with me inside the house took the child and opened the door.

While opening the door, IPKF personnel opened fire and my husband received a gun shot in his chest and child sustained an injury in her right hand.

Both bled profusely and were removed to the General Hospital, Jaffna in a car with the assistance of our relatives.

On our way to the General Hospitals, Jaffna, my husband succumbed to his injuries.

The dead body was removed home and cremated the following day.

The right hand below the elbow of my child had been amputated.

I have lost my husband the sole breadwinner and thereby made destitute with my incapacitated daughter.

RASAMALAR RAJENDRAN (38), Potpathy Road, Kokuvil East, Kokuvil.

The deceased person Philip Rajendram, aged 40 years was my husband.

He was a Mason.

On 12.10.87 due to the intensive military activity in our area my husband took us to the Nallur Kandasamy Temple.

Then on the same day he left for Chavakachcheri regarding some construction work.

He did not return afterwards.

Only after the situation eased and the military offensive waned I came to know that my husband was killed when the Chavakachcheri market came under rocket attack from a helicopter gunship on 27.10.87.

I learned that his body was buried by the army itself at the scene of incident.

I have five children.

After my husbands death who was our sole breadwinner we do not have any income and undergoing untold hardships.

S. Rasamalar

RASAPPU KANDIAH (52)
Urumpirai West, Urumpirai.

My mother Rasappu Saraswathy age 67 years was living with me.

Indian Peace Keeping Force stationed at Punnalaikadduvan started firing shells towards the residential areas on 12.10.87.

Through fear my other family members and I fled to Kodikamam on 16.10.87 whereas my mother R. Saraswathy remained at home.

On 8.12.87 I returned home with my family and found a heap of ash in front of our house, I also found the National Identity Card close to this spot.

I was informed by K. Ponnan my neighbour that my mother was shot and killed by the IPKF personnel who had entered our house on 20.10.87.

RASARATHINAM SENTHILKUMARAN (20)
Kamalasany Vidyalayady, Madduvil North, Chavakachcheri.

The deceased Rasarathinam Maheswary age 43 years is my mother.

On 12.10.87 at 5.30 a.m. as the shells fired by the army from Kanahan Puliyady Junction camp, which is 1/2 km. away, started falling in our area myself, my mother and my sister left out house and went to Madduvil Amman Kovil, which is 1/2 km. away.

At 6.30 a.m. we reached the Putthur - Chavakachcheri Road and at that time the army personnel started firing and my mother received a gunshot injury on her right thigh and she fell down.

I immediately brought my mother to our house with the help of my neighbours and removed her to a private Nursing Home about 1 1/4 km. away. As there were no medical facilities available there and as at the Chavakachcheri General Hospital area army personnel were stationed I could not take my mother to the General Hospital and brought her back home.

When we reached home I heard that army personnel had already come to our area and at 10 a.m. we went to Vairavar Temple which is closeby.

On that day at 10 O'clock my mother died. At 1 p.m. we cremated her body in a land close to the temple.

My father had died long ago.

After my mother's death my brother 15 years and my sister 12 years and I are destitutes.

RASIAH SEGARAN (16), Power House Lane, Chunnakam.

My late father Kanapathi Rasiah, aged 45 years and my late mother Rasiah Manomani, aged 37 years both earned a living as casual labourers.

At about 5 p.m. on 12.10.87 we were informed that IPKF were marching towards our village with several gun carriers.

28 persons in our village had collected together due to fear.

IPKF who came to our village a little while later ordered all the 28 of us to move to an open space closely and were ordered to remain on our knees.

About half an hour later we were all fired at by IPKF from gun carriers.

8 persons were killed and 8 were injured in the firing.

IPKF left the place at 6.30 p.m. that day.

While the injured were removed to the hospital the others fled from the place.

It was only on 16.10.87 that I returned to our village along with others and found my father, mother and 6 others dead. We had not returned earlier due to fear.

The dead bodies were in a highly decomposed state and were all collected and burnt there itself.

Along witn my father Rasiah and mother Manonmani the others killed are: Nannithamby Ranjinithevi aged 14 years: Muthan Kathiri aged 33 years; Muthusingam Pooranam, aged 33 years; Kanagan Selli aged, 60 years; Katyhirgamanathan Sarojinidevi, aged 20 years; and Kathigamanathan Vimalanathan, aged 89 years.

Along with me, my two sisters Rasiah Kumudini, aged 13 years, Rasiah Amuthini, aged 6 years and my brother Rasiah Ingkaran, aged 4 years the four of us are orphaned and are destitute.

I and my two sisters are students.

RATNAM RAJESWARAN (28)
Kokila Veethy, Kondavil North, Kondavil.

I am a Cigar Roller.

Indian Peace Keeping Force started firing shells and gun shots at a random from their camps towards the residential areas.

My brother, two sisters and I left home on 12.10.87 to the refugee camp at Nallur Kandasamy temple as announced over the radio.

My mother Ratnam Sivapakiam a widow aged 49 years remained at home to look after our property.

On 20.10.87 people from our village who arrived at the Nallur Kandasamy temple informed me that my mother had been killed in shell blast in our house on 18.10.87 and her dead body had been burnt by our relations at home as it could not be removed to the cemetery due to the continuous curfew.

I collected the remains of my mother on my relation home after the curfew was lifted for short periods and performed the necessary religious rites.

Miss. SANMUGANNATHAN SANMUGESWARI (25)
Urelu West, old Post Office, Chunnakam.

That during the military operation by the Army the Army personnel entered compromises on 12.10.1987 and killed by shooting my mother, Paramaswamy, and two sisters named, Kamaleswary and Sinthujn.

I sustained bullet injuries on my right arm wrist and on my right back.

I was admitted at the Jaffna Teaching Hospital, on 13.10.1987 at Ward No. 8 and was looked after by my father in the hospital.

On 21.10.1987 shell fell on this Ward No. 8 of the Teaching Hospital, Jaffna and my father's left leg bone has been cracked by the explosion of the shell.

My father, Mylavaganam Sanmugannathan was admitted to Ward No. 14 for treatment and now he is sent to Ward No. 25 of the Jaffna Teaching Hospital.

The deaths of my mother and two sisters have been duly registered I am now discharged from the hospital, but 3 fingers on my right hand cannot be used. I am anything under the care of my uncle, V.S. Kanagalingam of 22, New Road, Athiady, Jaffna.

I make this affidavait as my father above named is still in hospital and cannot sign.

I pray for relief and assistance.

Mrs. SELLATHAMBY PACKIYAM (39), Gandhiji Road, Kokuvil West, Kokuvil.

The deceased my aunt Mrs. Parameswary Nadesu, aged 51 years is a widow. She was living under my care at the above said address.

As there were a military operation in our area by the IPKF I rook refuge at the Kokuvil Hindu College Refugee Camp along with my family and aunt on 12.10.87.

While remaining there on 25.10.87 shells fired by the IPKF fell on the school premises and exploded.

Shrapnel from the exploding shell killed my aunt Parameswary along with many others on the spot. She was seated on the school verandah at that time.

All dead bodies including that of my aunt were buried on 26.10.87 morning at the above school compound.

SIVALINGAM VANAJA (32), Selvapuram South, Urumpirai.

The deceased person Sundaram Pari aged 60 years, widow was my mother.

She was living under my care and custody until her death.

On 12.10.87 I went to Madduvil with my husband and children for safety.

My mother went to a relations house at Raja Veethy, Kopay.

On 20.11.87 when we returned to Urumpirai.

I learned that my mother was killed when the house of our relative was shelled on 20.10.87.

I also learned that my mother's body was buried on the spot where she died.

SUPPIAH MUTTIAH (51), Kovil Thoddam, Kernidady, Kokuvil West, Kokuvil.

I am a casual labourer.

My wife, four children and I were living in our own house at the above address.

On 12.10.87 at about 2.00 p.m. shells were being fired towards our area.

Through fear, my family and I too fled to Murugamoorthy Temple which is close to our house.

There were about three thousand refugees in this Temple.

On 25.10.87 IPKF advanced to our village and started firing gun shots and lobbed shells.

One of the shot fired by the IPKF struck on the head of my son Muttiah Ravikumar aged 25 years and he died on the spot.

The dead body was removed and burnt by me with the help of the refugees on the same day in the land by the side of the Temple.

My deceased son was a casual labourer and he was helping me to maintain my family from his earnings.

THAVAMANY VAIKUTHAVASAN (35), 3, Kailasapilliyar Temple Veethy, Nallur.

The deceased Kanthasamy Selvamalar, aged 51 years, a widow was my mother.

On 12.10.87 at around 5.30 p.m. our locality was subjected to an avalanche of shells.

To escape the shells we ran into the nearby Kailasapillayar Temple.

A shell crashed through the roof of the temple and exploded.

My mother was seriously injured in the balst.

My child and I also received injuries during the incident.

We were taken to the Jaffna Teaching Hospital immediately by some good Samaritans.

There my mother passed away at around 7.30 p.m. on the same day.

Her body was taken to Uduvil and was cremated there on 13.10.87.

I am the only child of my mother having lost my father ten year ago.

THEDCHANAMOORTHY SIVARAJALINGAM (41)
87, Potpathy Road, Kokuvil East, Kokuvil.

I am an Investigating Officer in the Local Government Department.

My brother Thedchanamoorthy Thavarjalingam age 44 years a Health Supervisor, his wife Thavarajalingam Kanagamalar age 39 years, his sons Thavarajalingam Haran age 10, Thavarajalingam Gajendran 6 and his daughter Thavarajalingam Dharmika age 1 1/2 years were living in their own house at 24, Pirampadi Lane, Kokuvil.

On 12.10.87 morning heavy firing was heard in the direction of my brother's residential area.

I came to know that the Indian Peace Keeping Force personnel were in the area surrounding Pirampady lane.

I was able to go to my brother's house only at about 7 a.m. on 13.10.87 where I found 5 dead bodies including that of my brother Thavarajalingam his wife Kanagamalar and their daughter Dharmika inside their house and 2 other dead bodies in the compound.

I also found my brother's two sons Haran and Gajendran and a Nephew Harshan (11) who was living with my brother's family hiding under the bed in a room.

My brother's son T. Gajendran and my nephew J. Harsan were found to be injured and bleeding.

I removed the dead bodies of my brother, wife, his daughter and the injured Rajendran and Dharshan to the General Hospital, Jaffna the same day in a van.

The injured were admitted to the hospital and the dead bodies were removed after inquest, the same day and cremated at Kombayanmunel cemetery.

At present both my brother's sons Haran and Gajendran are in my care.

My brothers house also was subsequently damaged badly by shell firing.

VAIRAVAN NEELAN (40) Kaithadi Junction, Kaithadi.

The deceased Vairavan Sigappi, aged 60 years was my mother.

On 12.10.87. the army was approaching our area.

We fled from our house in fear and went to Nunavil leaving my mother at home.

After 3 months we returned to our hosue and found my mother was buried in a nearby field.

I came to know she was shot and killed by the army after our departure.

APPUDURAI THAVALINGAM (47) Urelu South Chunnakam.

The deceased Appudurai Lechumi aged 72 years, widow, was my mother.

On 13.10.87 the army camped near our house and started shelling towards our direction and as a result we remained indoors.

On 18.10.87 at about 2 p.m. some soldiers came and knocked our door.

My mother went and opened the door.

She was shot immediately.

Then the soldiers stormed inside and fired at random killing three other and injuring one person.

We escaped through the back entrance.

Only after 16 days I managed to return to our house.

There I found my mother's skeleton.

Her remain were cremated at the Urelu cemetery on 4.11.87.



EMMANUEL JOSEPH ANTONY, born 1910-01-18, 10 John Rajah Road, Atchuvely.

I am the husband of Mary Rita Atputhamalar Antony who died on 13.10.87.

On 13.10.87 at about 6.15 a.m. my said wife left home on the pillion of a motor cycle ridden by a relation of mine, Thambo Navarasa.

The said Thambo Navarasa had agreed to take my wife to Jaffna on his motor cycle as there was no other form of transport available due to the tension prevailing at that time.

My wife's purpose in coming to Jaffna was to search for our daughter Mrs Esmie R. Philips who was supposed to have fled Jaffna town in order to seek shelter at our house at Atchuvely.

On 14.10.87 my said daughter arrived home but my wife failed to turn up

The relation who took my wife on his motor cycle too did not return.

I and my relations started searching for my wife and made inquiries at hospitals.

On 21.10.87 we managed to trace the body of my wife among some dead bodies opposite the A.G.A's Office Kopay.

could not remove the body. It was subsequently burnt by the Indian Army.

I believe that my wife was shot by the IPKF while she was passing Kopay on the motor-cycle



KANTHIAH LUXUMY (36) Punalai Kattuvan South, Punalai Kattuvan.

The deceased Murugan Mairasi, aged 55 a widow was my mother

My mother used to sleep in a cottage at our small farm about half mile from our house.

On 13.10.87 at about 9 a.m. I came to know that my mother was shot and killed by the army while she was at her cottage on the night of 12.10.87.

I went to the scene of incident with the permission of the army and found her body.

The army brought her body to our house in their jeep.

She was cremated on 13.10.87 at Kupilan cemetery.



MRS. KATPAGAMANY THAMOTHARAMPILLAI (61) at 'Siva Kudil', K.K.S. Road, Kokuvil.

I with my husband and deceased daughter Miss. Shuseela Thamotharampillai, left our home on 12.10.87 due to constant shell attack on our area and stayed with a relative in Kokuvil East.

At about 6 a.m. on 13.10.87 Indian Army light tanks moving on the road kept on firing when my daughter was struck by bullets causing severe injuries on her chest and right shoulder.

She was immediately taken and admitted at the Jaffna Teaching Hospital, where she succumbed to her injuries at about 8.30 a.m.



KOTTACHI SINNATHAMBY (54) Selvapuram, Urumpirai South, Urumpirai.

The deceased Pandari Sinnathamby (54) was my husband.

He was a Casual Labourer.

On 13.10.87 we left our house at Urumpirai and went to Puttur due to the escalating military offensive at Urumpirai.

My husband opted to stay in our house at Urumpirai.

On 2.11.87 I was informed by our neighbours that my husband was shot and killed by the army at Kopay North while he was on his way to see us.

I could not go to the scene of incident to recover his body due to the prevailing tension.

I do not know what happened to his body afterwards.

My eldest son Kunarasa is an invalid and unemployed.

After my husband's death we do not have any income and undergoing tremendous hardships.

KUMARASAMY THARUMALINGAM (50)
66/3, Palam Road, Jaffna.

I am a Retired Postmaster.

My wife, children and I were living in our own house at the above said address.

Indian Peace Keeping Force in the Jaffna Fort Army Camp fired shells around the Town at random and through fear, on 13.10.87 my family and I left Kalapoomy to Karainagar to stay with my brother-in-law.

On 5.11.87 at about 3.20 p.m. a helicopter gun ship and four bomber planes appeared over Kalapoomy.

Bomber planes, started bombing our area and one bomb fell on the house in .n which we were in occupation.

My eldest daughter T. Navaranjini (18) and 3 children and wife of my brother-in-law were killed in this bomb blast inside the house.

My wife T. Packiam aged 48 years too was injured in this incident.

All the five dead bodies were cremated the same day at 12.00 midnight at Karainagar.

My daughter T. Navaranjini was a student in G.C.E Advance Level class at Hindu Ladies College, Jaffna.

LTTE seeks help to end fighting

NEWS

MADRAS, Oct. 13.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam has appealed to the DMK and other political parties in Tamil Nadu to help bring about a halt to the fighting in Jaffna and evolve a peaceful solution to the problem.

Three representatives of the LTTE—Mr. Sathasivam Krishnakumar alias Kittu, Mr. S. Subramaniam and Capt. Raheem—met the DMK President, Mr. M. Karunanidhi, at his residence this morning and handed over a letter to him from the LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran, seeking his cooperation to end the conflict.

The LTTE had been keeping away from the DMK for a long time and no love was lost between the leaders of these two organisations. In fact, at one time, Mr. Prabakaran had rejected a cash relief of Rs. 50,000 offered by the DMK while the other militant organisations had accepted a similar offer. That being so, the LTTE representatives meeting the DMK leader in the present context of the developments in Jaffna is significant.

DMK plans rallies: Mr. Karunanidhi, later, announced that the DMK would hold rallies in Madras and other parts of the State on October 15 to press for a halt to the fighting in Jaffna and resumption of negotiations to end the problem.

The LTTE representatives also met the Dravida Kazhagam leader, Mr. K. Veeramani and the Tamil Nadu Kamaraj Congress President, Mr. P. Nedumaran today.

According to Mr. Kittu, they tried to meet the Tamil Nadu Food Minister, Mr. S. Ramachandran, last night and this morning but did not succeed. They, however, handed over a copy of Mr. Prabakaran's letter to the security office at Mr. Ramachandran's residence with a request that it be delivered to him.

Mr. Karunanidhi told reporters that Mr. Prabakaran, in his letter, had explained the emerging situation in Jaffna and sought the support of the DMK and the people of Tamil Nadu for his cause. Mr. Karunanidhi, however, declined to make the letter public.

The DMK leader said, "I asked the emissaries whether the LTTE would be prepared to get back to negotiations if the Indian Army stopped the fighting, and they replied that the LTTE would be ready to extend its cooperation to bring about amity."

Mr. Karunanidhi said in addition to the protest rallies on October 15, the DMK would hold meetings in the State on October 17 and 18 to condemn what he called, "the partisan attitude of the Government of India." He would be participating at a meeting in Madurai on October 18 while the party general secretary, Mr. K. Anbazhagan, would do so at a meeting at Coimbatore on the same day.

The DMK President was outspoken in his criticism of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord, the role of the Government of India and the Indian Peace Keeping Force.

In his view the agreement had flopped and the results were "disastrous", because in its implementation, the Government of India acted more in accordance with the wishes of the Sri Lankan Government.

Centre blamed: It was wrong on the part of the Sri Lankan Army to have arrested the LTTE men and the blame should be shared by the Indian Army also as it had "allowed" it, he said. As the Indian Peace Keeping Force "did not show interest" in preventing the attempts of the Sri Lankan Army to take the arrested men to Colombo, 13 LTTE men including Commanders Kumarappa and Pulendran committed suicide. "For the situation to develop like this, the Government of India is also responsible", he said.

If the Indian Peace Keeping Force had taken advance action to prevent the LTTE men being taken to Colombo, the subsequent clashes between the Tamils and Sinhalese which resulted in many deaths could have been averted, Mr. Karunanidhi said and charged the IPKF with not acting in a responsible manner.

"It is an unbearable cruelty that the Indian Army which went to Sri Lanka in the name of restoring peace should attack and kill not only the LTTE fighters but also the Tamil population including children", Mr. Karunanidhi said. It was a matter of deep anguish for the people of Tamil Nadu that the Indian Army was "hand in glove with the Sri Lankan Army in destroying the Tamil Eelam race", he said.

'Misunderstandings': Talking to THE HINDU, Mr. Kittu appealed for an immediate halt to the fighting between the Indian Peace Keeping Force and the LTTE. He said the "misunderstandings" between the IPKF and the LTTE should be resolved through a dialogue.

Mr. Kittu said the fighting had erupted in Jaffna after the arrest of 17 LTTE members by the Sri Lankan Government and the death of 12 of them (who swallowed cyanide capsules). "There should be an immediate ceasefire and the problem should be solved amicably. India is a big power with military might and it cannot be defeated. Now we have been forced to fight in self-defence".

Replying to a question on whether the LTTE was interested in a peaceful settlement of the problem, Mr. Kittu said, "Definitely." As to what the LTTE's next course of action would be, Mr. Kittu said there was no communication between Jaffna and Madras as the LTTE's communication sets in Madras had been seized and so he was not in a position to answer the question.

Tamil Eelam team meets DMK chief: A delegation of Tamil Eelam leaders, including Mr. M. K. Eelaventhan, TELF general secretary, Mr. S. C. Chandrahasan, Coordinator, PROTEG, met Mr. Karunanidhi and other DMK leaders at the party office here in Teynampet today and sought their help in arresting the "deteriorating situation" in Jaffna.

PM hopes Tamil militants will abide by peace accord

VANCOUVER, Oct. 13.

The Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, has expressed the hope that 'even now' the Sri Lankan Tamil militants would come around and abide by the peace accord and lay down arms.

Otherwise, "hard solutions leave scars", Mr Gandhi warned in an interview published today in the century-old Canadian newspaper *Globe and Mail*.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka were shooting only to save themselves and to protect innocent civilian life, Mr. Gandhi said.

However, violators of curfew, imposed in troubled areas of Sri Lanka, "may be in trouble," Mr. Gandhi warned in the interview taken on the eve of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). — PTI

THE HINDU

87 October

LTTE defence lines broken in Jaffna

NEWS

BATTLE □ FOR □ JAFFNA

COLOMBO, Oct. 14.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) tonight broke through the defence lines of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ((LTTE) in Jaffna town, according to Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation.

Immediately after breaking the LTTE siege, the IPKF personnel appealed to the militants to surrender, the Radio said. However, it is not immediately known whether the militants would heed the IPKF call, made through loudspeakers.

The IPKF achieved the breakthrough following a four-pronged attack. An infantry column broke through the LTTE siege, braving heavy rain and stiff resistance.

According to Indian military sources, the IPKF soldiers crossed the Navatkuli lagoon, east of Jaffna, last night and established a position one kilometre away from the heart of the town. They had also established complete control of the Koppai area after heavy fighting with the Tigers, the sources said.

Travellers from Jaffna, 300 km north of Colombo, said the militants had blown up two bridges outside the town, hindering the Indian advance. However Indian and Sri Lankan officials could not confirm the report. Indian authorities have refused to let reporters visit the battlefront.

Battle toll

Sri Lanka's national news agency Lankapuvath quoted official sources to say that 280 LTTE men had been killed in the fighting since October 10, while the IPKF had lost 57 soldiers, including two officers, one of them a colonel.

A spokesman for the Indian High Commission told newsmen this evening that 30 IPKF personnel, who had been reported missing since yesterday, had now been categorised as killed, raising the total number of the men killed in the operation since Saturday to 57.

An LTTE spokesman in Batticaloa, quoting reports claimed to have been received from Jaffna, said that 17 IPKF men in three trucks and two jeeps were captured by the group at Chittankeni in Jaffna peninsula yesterday.

Lankapuvath reported that a major attack on the IPKF, the Sri Lanka Army and the police was repulsed in the northern district of Vavuniya late last night. There was no casualty among the security forces and the number of militants killed was not known.

Lankapuvath also said that the IPKF repulsed an attack on their Manressa camp, near the eastern Batticaloa town, last night. A curfew was imposed on the town this morning and search operations were being carried out, reports reaching here said.

A spokesman of the Jaffna Citizens Committee told local newspapers over telephone that the International Red Cross had been invited to visit Jaffna peninsula to study the plight of the civilians. Some had been killed and several injured in the fighting between the IPKF and the LTTE. There was no power supply to the town and the General Hospital had been closed. Food shortages were reported in the north and east due to the fighting and prolonged curfew.

Temples and hospitals had been damaged in shelling by the IPKF which also resorted to helicopter strafing for two hours this morning, the spokesman alleged.

However, the Indian High Commission spokesperson in Colombo said food despatches by India to Jaffna peninsula earlier were being given to the refugees. The IPKF was also arranging food and relief for them, but there was some distribution problem as some 375,000 people have moved into temples and schools as advised by the IPKF earlier.

Denying that IPKF helicopter gunships had straffed Jaffna town, the spokesperson said the whole operation could have been completed within 72 hours if the IPKF had used its full fire power. "In our anxiety to avoid civilian casualties we have had to take more than the normal amount of casualties."

The spokesperson said the joint patrolling of the Palk Strait and the island's north-eastern and north-western coasts had been intensified, and the number of Indian ships doubled to discourage movement of armed men between the peninsula and south India. The IPKF destroyed one of the three boats which fired at their Valachenai camp in Batticaloa district. The occupants of the other two boats were believed injured and they retreated.

Appeal for arms

Meanwhile, the State-owned *Daily Observer* reported today that the LTTE leadership was making desperate appeals for military hardware from across the Palk Strait. A Tiger radio message from Jaffna to Madras, intercepted around 11 p.m. last night called on the former Jaffna commander, Mr. Sathasivam Krishnakumar, to send arms to the LTTE, the daily said quoting reliable sources.

Lankapuvath said naval gunboats began patrolling the sea between Jaffna and Batticaloa to prevent ferrying of arms between these two points. This followed information that 'Karuna' and 'Dilip', two LTTE military leaders, planned to take a boat-load of arms to the coast of Batticaloa to strengthen the LTTE cadres there and to commence a series of attacks. According to information obtained from a radio intercept, the LTTE military leaders were scheduled to leave Jaffna late last night.

Alert in Colombo

Security arrangements all over Colombo and its neighbourhood were strengthened in view of possible joint attacks by the LTTE and the Janata Vimukti Peramuna to create disturbances across the island. The Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, in his nation-wide broadcast on Monday, said that the Tamil and Sinhala extremist groups were in league to overthrow the Government, and to set up their own government.

The State-owned *Daily News* reported today the information that the Central Telecommunication Office in the heart of Colombo in Fort area might be a target of attack.—UNI, Reuter, AP, PTI

LTTE □ CLAIMS

On 14.10.87, 15 IPKF men were killed in the land-mines attack of the LTTE, near Sambaltivu bridge in Thirumalai District.

At Uduvil, 15 women were raped and killed by the IPKF. Various parts of their bodies were bitten and marks are there. Blood-wounds were seen all over their bodies. Then the bodies were laid down and crushed under the wheels of the armoured vehicles, as a result the bodies got pressed like chappathis. The above accounts were given by those who happened to see them directly.

When after committing such dastardly crimes, the IPKF were returning in their armoured vehicles to their camps, the Liberation Tigers attacked them with land-mines. Their armoured vehicle was blown to pieces and all those who were in it got killed.

At Kiran in Baticoloa District, the LTTE intercepted the Indian army and attacked in which 3 men of the Indian army died and 4 were injuired.

To assist the Indian military, bomber planes helicopters, and tanks were pressed into service. A very large number of Indian army men are involved in Jaffna besiege and attack. On 14.10.87 alone, 70 mortar-shells were thrown at Jaffna town by the Indian army. From the bomber planes and helicopters, attacks are made with 90 calibre and 50 calibre heavy machine guns. Bombs were also dropped from the planes.

Till 14.10.87, 21 soldierrs of the IPKF were arrested by the LTTE. 40 S.L.R, more than 20 S.M.G. 2 rocket launchers, 1 car and 3 armoured vehicles were seized by the LTTE from them.

On 14.10.87, Hindu Ladies College, Jaffna was attacked by machine gunfire and rockets from helicopter gunships. One refugee, Mrs. Thandeswamy Gnanambal died. Two civilians injured.

AFFIDAVIT

KUNCHAN KANDIAH, a widower (73)
Urumpirai West, Urumpirai.

My son Kandiah Eswaranathan aged 35 years a bachelor was residing with me. He was a farmer and I was solely dependent on him.

On 13.10.87 on the Indian Peace Keeping Force commencing its operations in Urumpirai my son K. Eswaranathan took me to Puttur and leaving me behind there returned to Urumpirai.

On 18.10.87 I came to know from people in my neighbourhood who arrived Puttur subsequently that my son K. Eswaranathan had been shot dead by IPKF personnel on 16.10.87 when he was on his way home from his uncle's house.

It was also reported that my son Eswaranathan's dead body could not be recovered as IPKF personnel had come into occupation of the area.

I was able to return to Urumpirai only in the early part of December 87 when conditions improved and curfew which was on for a continuous period was lifted for short periods.

A search for my son's dead body proved futile as I learnt that the IPKF had disposed of the dead bodies in the area.

KUNDUMANI SELLAMMAH (46) Karanthan Road, Urelu East, Urelu.

The deceased Aundumani Puvanendran, aged 17 years was my eldest son...

He was a casual labourer.

On 13.10.87 the army was advancing through our village in the director of Jaffna Town.

As they approached our area firing their guns we fled from our home in fear.

My son ran in another direction.

Later I came to know that my son was seriously wounded in a shell blast.

I was also informed that he was taken to the Jaffna General Hospital and was admitted.

Due to the disturbances I went to stay at Matuvil.

Only after one month I was able to visit my son at the hospital.

He underwent an operation and was discharged after 40 days.

He was readmitted at the hospital within three days of his discharge for complications.

He died on 1.11.88 despite treatments given to him.

His body was cremated at Urelu cemetery on the same day.

I have four surviving children.

One of my daughters named Rohini committed suicide after my son's death unable to withstand the mental agony.

My husband left us and is living with his sisters.

It was my son who bore the burden of looking after our family in absence of my irresponsible husband.

LOGAMBIKAI MANICKAVASAGAR (38), Ward No. 6,Nainathievu.

The deceased Manickavasagar Sutharsan, aged 12 years was my son.

My late son was a year 7 student of Kokuvil Hindu College

He was boarded at No. 49, Station Road, Kokuvil.

On 13.10.87 at about 4 a.m. I was shocked to see my son's dead body which was brought from Jaffna to Nainathievu.

I came to know that he died on 12.10.87 following a shell blast injury sustained while he was at the house where he was boarded on 11.10.87 during the military offensive at Kokuvil.

I also came to know that he was rushed with serious injuries to the Green Hospital, Manipay where he died on 12.10.87.

I have three surviving children.

My husband left for France recently where he is living as a refugee.

The loss of my son at this age is a heavy loss for us.

M. Logambigai

NAGAMMAH NAGAMUTHU (72) Kopay South, Kopay.

My husband Sinnathamby Nagamuthu, aged 75 years was a farmer. He was living with me at the above said address.

I was forced to flee with my daughter's grand children to Puttur on 13.10.87 as IPKF started lobbing shells from their camps towards the residential areas at Kopay.

My husband however remained at home to look after our house and property.

Mr. S. Yogalingam a relative of mine who came to Puttur on 19.10.87 as a refugee informed me that my husband had been pulled out of the house by IPKF personnel that morning and shot dead by the roadside.

I could not return to Kopay to remove the dead body of my husband as there was continuous curfew for almost a month.

On 21.11.87 on returning to Kopay founda heap of ash on the roadside where, it was alleged, my husband had been shot.

On my return home I found that my house and all my belongings burnt.

I am now widow who lost all my belongings along with my husband, the sole bread-winner.

I have come to know that almost all persons who remained in their house when the IPKF entered Kopay were shot dead.

MISS. NALLATHAMBY BAVANI (24) New Chemmany Road, Ananthapuram, Kopay.

Due to the IPKF started liberation operation in our area on 13th October 1987 there was shelling in our area and my father got attacked by the shell blast and immediately brought to Jaffna General Hospital and died on the same day.

My Father's name is Perumal Nallathamby age 53 years and doing farm work and from the income he was maintaining our family of three. Out of them one of my sister got married and gone abroad. My brother is in India as refugee. I have lost my mother about 5 years back.

I am the only dependent of my deceased father.

I am unmarried and staying with a relation of mine and undergoing severe hardships throughout after my father's death.

N. Bavany

NALLIAH SARATHADEVI (56) No. 2, Vairavar Kovilady, Thirunelvely Colony.

The deceased Sinnathamby Nalliah, aged 65 years was my husband.

On 13.10.87 our area was pounded by mrtar shells by the army.


YOU TOO INDIA?







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வயல் வெளிகளிலும்
சந்தித் திருப்பங்களிலும்
உறைந்து போன குருதி,
உறைந்து போன விழிகள்.....

காலமும் நேரமும் காற்றும்
பெருமழையும்
கடலோரப் பெரு மணல் விரிப்பும்
இல்லாத ஓர் வெளியில்
மனித இருப்பை மறுத்துவிட்டுக்
குருதி படர்ந்து வருகிறது....

.....

தெருவில் பிணங்கள்
தூக்கி வீசப்பட்டிருந்தன....

அலைகளின் உதிரத் தொடர்புகள்
துடித்துக் கதறி
ஓர் இனத்தின் கோலத்தை
தம் ஓலத்தில்
உரித்தாக்கிக் கொண்டன.

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As we were preparing to vacate our house a shell fell within our compound and exploded.

My husband was killed instantaneously after being struck by the shrapnel.

His cremation took place at the Thirunelvely cemetery on the same day itself.

I have two children.

After my husband's death we are undergoing untold hardships.



Mrs. SARVESWARY PULENDRAN (36)
'Selvapavanam' Kokuvil West, Kokuvil.

My son Pulendran Janakan (8) was residing with my sister at Pirampady Lane, Kokuvil for the last 2 1/2years.

On 13.10.87 at about 7.00 a.m. I came to know that my son P. Janakan had been shot dead along with my sister and children by the IPKF during their operations at Pirampady lane on 12.10.87 night.

I then left for Pirampady lane where I identified the dead body of my son amongst 9 bodies of my sister 2 children and those of tenants residing in the same premises.

I was informed by the people of that locality IPKF personnel had surrounded the area and fired at random. They had then entered the houses in the area and shot the occupants.

The dead body of my son P. Janakan was cremated along with the 8 other dead bodies at the Kokuvil cemetry on 13.10.87 itself.

SEENIAR. SANTHIRAKUMARAN (34) Soorwatha, Chunnakam.

My wife Santhirakumaran, Easwary, aged 32, my children Santhirakumaran, Sureshkumar, aged 12, Santhirakumaran Rajakumari aged 8, Santhirakumaran Vijayakumaran aged 3 had been shot dead by the Armed forces near Chunnakam Power Station on 13.10.1987.

The untimely death of four members of my family caused me rude shock and now I am mentally and physically affected. After the death of my wife and children I am unable to do any hard work than before. My whole family has been eradicated and, I am left behind.

SINNAMMAH W/o Sellar Sinnathurai 25, Periyathambiran Kovilady, Van-North West, Jaffna

I am the widow of late Sellar Sinnathurai who died under tragic circumstances having been attacked by an artillery shell on 13.10.87 and died subsequently owing to the injuries sustained by him on 8.2.88.

On 13.10.87, he was on his way home after work and was struck by an artillery shell.

My beloved husband was earning his livelihood by working as a labourer and providing for the family.

Owing to my beloved husband's death, I, his widow is faced with much distress for my daily living as I do not have any other source of living.

SIVAPAKIYAM SIVASUBRAMANIYAKURRUKAL, (widow) of N. Sivasubramaniam (42) Veeramakaliamman Temple, Thevasthanam, Jaffna.

The deceased Sivalingam Inbamalar, aged 20 years was my daughter

On 13.10.87 due to the escalating military activity in Jaffna we decided to go to Kilinochi and boarded a van at Nallur.

As the van was passing the Muthirichanthi a helicopter circling overhead opened fire at us.

My daughter was hit by a bullet on her neck.

She died immediately.

After my daughter's death her husband who is unemployed left the children with me and went to live with his parents.

My husband the former chief priest of Veeramagaliamman Temple also passed away last year.



THAVAMALAR MANMATHARAJAH (32)
Urumpirai West, Urumpirai.

On 13.10.87, my husband Velautham Manmatharajah (34) my son M. Dinesh and I were forced to flee from our home when the Indian Peace Keeping Force commenced operations in Urumpirai.

We travelled to Sirupiddy, Madduvil and Neervely when these areas too were affected moved on.

On 29.10.87 on finding that the conditions were improving we decided to return home.

On 29.10.87 accompanied by my husband, son and several other relation we were on our way back.

I crossed the Palaly Road, close to Urumpirai Hindu College and as my husband and few others were attempting to cross the road IPKF stationed some distance away opened fire injuring my husband on the leg and also injuring Ponnar Balsingam and V. Annapooram two relatives of mine.

My husband was removed to Puttur Govt. Dispensary but had to be taken to Sirupiddy as no treatment was possible there under the condtions at that time.

My husband succumbed to his injuries the same evening and his dead body was cremated that day itself.

By the death of my husband, the sole bread winner of the family my child and I have become destitute.



Mrs THAVAMANI MARIMUTHU (55)
Manipay North East, Manipay.

My husband Kuddiyar Marimuthu aged 69 years was a Retired Teacher.

My husband, my daughter Thayani her two children and I were residing at the above mentioned address.

On 13.10.87 the Indian Peace Keeping Force commencing its operations I was forced to leave my home with my family and take refuge at Navaly Kurukkal Temple.

We then moved to the house of relations at Anaicoddai and subsequently arrived at the Hindu Ladies College Refugee Camp on 20.10.87.

On 30.10.87 at about 8 a.m. my husband K. Marimuthu left the Refugee Camp saying that he wanted to worship at the Nallur Kandasamy Temple and failed to return to the camp.

THE HINDU

U.S. supports Indian action in Sri Lanka

WASHINGTON, Oct. 14.

The U.S. State Department has said it backed the firm action taken by the Indian and Sri Lankan Governments to enforce the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement.

The Department said the peace accord offered "the best hope for lasting peace" in Sri Lanka.

"Unfortunately some Tamil militants have rejected the possibility for peace and reconciliation offered by this accord and resorted to continued violence which resulted in the deaths of more than 150 persons last week", a State Department spokesman told reporters.

"We commend the decision of the Governments of India and Sri Lanka to take firm and effective action against these militant groups", the spokesman added.

Meanwhile the House of Representatives' Asia-Pacific Sub-Committee endorsed without dissent and sent to the full House Foreign Affairs Committee the resolution declaring that the July 29 accord signed by the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene and the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, "represents the best hope of achieving a just and lasting solution to the ethnic conflict which has troubled Sri Lanka."

The Sub-Committee Chairman, Mr. Stephen Solarz, said the island's fate hung on the success of the July accord.

"If this agreement falls apart", Mr. Solarz said, "in a few years Sri Lanka may make Northern Ireland look like an oasis" of tranquility.

'Two major setbacks for IPKF'

NEWS

From D.B.S. Jeyaraj JAFFNA, Oct. 14.

The Indian Peace-Keeping Force, in a bid to cut off Jaffna town from the control of the LTTE, has suffered two setbacks at the hands of the Tigers.

A little after midnight on Monday, the Indian commandos were ferried by helicopters to an abandoned crematorium adjacent to the medical faculty complex of the Jaffna University. They were attacked by the Tigers from two directions. In the fighting, 29 Indian commandos and three Tigers died. One Indian soldier was captured alive.

This correspondent saw personally the dismembered Indian soldiers laid out in a row at Buddhist Naga Vihara in Jaffna. Twentynine bodies were also displayed. The bodies were later cremated by the Tigers themselves.

An LTTE spokesman told this correspondent that all efforts to establish contact with the IPKF headquarters at Palaly to hand over the bodies had failed. "Since the bodies were decaying, we had to cremate them," the spokesman said. Meanwhile, 22 other Indian commandos had escaped on foot to the neighbouring village of Kokkuvil.

According to militant sources the LTTE surrounded the areas to capture them alive. But, the IPKF brought armoured personnel carriers on the railway track and rescued them. The details of the IPKF men who escaped or were killed are not available. One unconfirmed report said nine commandos were killed.

In a separate incident at Thumbankerni, three km from Jaffna, the Indian forces proceeding from Karainagar naval base and the LTTE clashed. Seven persons were killed while another 17 Indian security personnel were captured alive.

The LTTE spokesman claimed that the Tigers had captured three trucks, more than 100 weapons and 22,000 rounds of ammunition from the Indian forces. More than 15 vehicles were also destroyed.

The Government Agent of Jaffna, Mr. V. M. Panchalingam, and members of the Citizens' Committee of the area reported to have made official representation about the situation.

Preliminary reports suggest some damage to buildings and property including some sections of the Jaffna University, in the fighting.

Prabakaran writes to Rajiv

MADRAS, Oct. 14.

The LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran, has appealed to the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, "to call off the military offensive operation and resume negotiation with the LTTE to bring about peace, normalcy and ethnic harmony."

In a message to Mr. Gandhi from Jaffna and made available to the press at the LTTE office in Madras, the LTTE leader has charged that the military operation undertaken by the IPKF had escalated with a heavy toll of civilian casualties in the Jaffna peninsula.

The following is the text of the message dated October 14 from Mr. Prabakaran to the Prime Minister:

"Honourable Sir,—I wish to communicate with you once again because of the fast deteriorating situation in the Tamil areas with increased violence and destruction. The military offensive operation undertaken by the IPKF has escalated the conflict with a heavy toll of Tamil civilian casualties in the Jaffna peninsula. The indiscriminate mortar and artillery shelling and heavy aerial bombardment have resulted in the killing of more than 150 innocent civilians with nearly 500 injured. A large number of LTTE cadres have also been killed. The IPKF has also suffered heavy casualties. We have in our custody 18 men of the IPKF as prisoners of war.

Heavy fighting is continuing, rendering thousands of Tamil people refugees. The suffering of our people has further increased with an acute shortage of essential food supply and continuous round-the-clock curfew. It is a paradox of the great tragedy that the IPKF, which came to our homeland to ensure protection, peace and harmony, is engaged in a total war, committing inhuman atrocities against our people.

On the morning of October 13, the IPKF commandos raided the residential area of Pirambadi in the suburb of Jaffna city and massacred 14 innocent Tamils including university students, women and children. What was more disturbing was the calculated attack on public institutions which provide vital service to the people. The IPKF members raided the office of two popular Tamil daily newspapers, *Eezhamurasu* and *Murasoli* on the same morning and blasted the printing machineries with explosives. On (October) 12th, Jaffna General Hospital, the only functioning hospital in the North, was heavily shelled by the IPKF from the Jaffna Fort.

Yesterday, the Jaffna University building was heavily damaged by aerial bombardment. The Indian Government's propaganda that it is not utilising heavy weapons and that there was no aerial attack is far from the truth. Our people are shocked and disturbed to note that the Sri Lankan Air Force planes and helicopters are operating only with Indian aircraft and helicopters in bombing and strafing the civilian targets. This constitutes a serious violation of the cease-fire accord.

We, therefore, request you to send a team of independent observers comprising representatives from international reporters, Amnesty International and Indian Opposition parties to impartially investigate our allegations. We also request you to allow members of the international press stationed in Colombo to visit the Jaffna peninsula. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord gives the IPKF the mandate to maintain peace and protect civilian life. The IPKF has no legal or moral authority to unleash an all all-out war against a political movement, which has the solid backing of the Tamil people.

We wish to point out here that both the Governments of India and Sri Lanka recognised the pre-eminent position of the LTTE when it was asked to form an interim government. We also pledged to hand over the remaining weapons once an interim government was set up, with an adequate recruitive system of our people. But it was unfortunate that the Government of India has decided to take tragic military action against our political organisation, simply because of the incidence of violence in the Eastern Province. It was not master-minded by us. But there was a spontaneous fall-out from the killing of our Trincomalee regional commander, Mr. Pulendran and former Batticaloa commander, Mr. Kumarappa. We also warned of the consequences to Mr. Dixit and the Indian High Commissioner himself warned President J. R. Jayewardene of the possible repercussions.

Furthermore, it is uncharacteristic of a democratic country like India to superimpose its will at the point of gun on a people who have the democratic liberty to choose their political destiny. We have serious reservations about the accord. Yet, we pledged to cooperate with India to implement the agreement insofar as it is in the interest of the Tamils. Therefore, the offensive operation to liquidate the Tamil Tigers, who are none other than the true representatives of the people, is unfair and illegitimate. Therefore, I appeal to you once again to call off the military offensive operation and resume negotiations with the LTTE to bring about peace, normalcy and ethnic harmony.

V. Prabakaran, Leader, LTTE"

More troops for assault on Jaffna

BATTLE □ FOR □ JAFFNA NEWS

COLOMBO, Oct. 15.

The Indian Peace-Keeping Force today awaited reinforcements for a final assault on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's stronghold in Jaffna town. Additional troops are being flown in from India.

Sources said that about 1,000 troops were being brought in to strengthen the rear of the advancing troops so that they were not left thin and vulnerable to attacks. About 6,000 IPKF men are engaged in the current operations.

The IPKF men who have advanced along the Navatkuli-Koppai axis and are at the eastern "doorsteps" of the town are also awaiting troops closing in from the other directions.

A senior Sri Lankan military official said Indian troops shelled Jaffna from the outskirts on Thursday to prepare for the assault. "The Indians are pounding the town with mortars and artillery. They're on the warpath", he said. However the Indian High Commission said it could not immediately confirm or deny the report. "We are not using heavy artillery if we can avoid it", a diplomat said.

"They are in"

The official said the Indian troops late on Wednesday had punched through LTTE lines and entered the militants' stronghold.

"They are in, they have made it through", the high-ranking official said and added that an Indian armoured vehicle unit hammered through the well-fortified positions of the LTTE after approaching Jaffna from the east through the town of Navatkuli.

The official had no information on the progress of the other three armed units, one of which he had earlier said was held up about five kilometres north of Jaffna.

An Indian diplomat in Colombo said battles raged through the night and the Indians were making slow advances against the besieged militants who were fighting house-to-house

Sources said the IPKF had consolidated its position at Urumpirai, north of the Jaffna University campus where the LTTE headquarters is located, after overcoming stiff resistance. It had lost two men in encounters last night.

The LTTE resistance in the town is expected to be overcome by Sunday, according to the sources. An estimated 2,500 armed LTTE men assisted by an equal number of "helpers", were resisting the IPKF advance.

The Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation said the LTTE was reinforcing its cadres in Jaffna for a "last ditch" fight. It said the LTTE had asked its cadres to converge in Jaffna for a "last fight". The militants were entrenched in civilian areas.

In Colombo, an Indian military official said heavy rain in Jaffna had hampered the Indians' advance "to some extent". He said sanitation facilities had broken down in the town and water and electricity services had failed.

The Sri Lankan news agency Lankapuvath said the IPKF was mopping up the LTTE elements elsewhere in the northern Jaffna peninsula, as it consolidated its position around Jaffna town.

According to the news agency, there was fighting last night at Palaly, where "terrorists" fired at the IPKF positions from houses in the vicinity. The terrorists also fired at a cement factory in the peninsula wounding a soldier.

Mine blast

Meanwhile 20 members of the IPKF were killed and five wounded when the LTTE set off a landmine under the truck in which the Indians were travelling at Thannamunai, near the eastern Batticaloa town this morning.

Official sources said the IPKF men were going to bring provisions to their camp when they were blown up by the land-mine. The bodies of eight of the victims were ripped to pieces.

This has raised the total number of IPKF men dead in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka since October 10 to 77. An official spokesman said 380 militants had been killed so far.

Following the land-mine blast, the IPKF men traced an electric wire leading from the site to a spot from where cycle-tyre marks led them to a house about three kilometres away. A man suspected to have set off the mine was arrested from the house, but immediately some other houses in the vicinity were set on fire by unidentified men.

The arrested man took advantage of the confusion and escaped, but before he could get far he was shot dead along with an accomplice, the scurces said.

However, sources close to the LTTE in Batticaloa alleged that the IPKF soldiers went on a rampage after the landmine blast, assaulting people and setting fire to houses, including the parish house. The priest was among those injured in the assault, they said.

"Burnt alive"

According to Lankapuvath, in another incident in the Jaffna peninsula, five Indian soldiers were burnt alive. The agency did not specify when the incident took place. Official sources said they had intercepted a radio message from the LTTE which said "we are frying the Indians". It said blazing car-tyres were placed round the necks of the soldiers. The reports, however, could not be confirmed by the Indian High Commission.

Reports received here said two members of the Sri Lankan National Auxiliary Force and three civilians were killed in another land-mine blast at Kittuluttuwa in Trincomalee district.

At least 10 Sinhalese were killed, when armed "terrorists" today raided a farming village at Kantale in the eastern Trincomalee district, the national news agency Lankapuvath, reported quoting official sources.

The terrorists attacked two trucks carrying Sinhalese villagers and hacked to death 10 of them, Sri Lankan military sources said.—UNI, Reuter, PTI, UPI.



Ranga, India Abroad, 16.10.87

AFFIDAVIT

GUNABALASINGHAM LEELAVATHY (30), 106, Manipuri 3rd Cross, Colombuthurai.

The deceased person velupillai Guanbalasingham, aged 30 years was my husband.

He was a casual labourer.

On 15.10.87 my husband left home saying that he is going to Chavakachcheri to work in a construction site.

It is his usual practice to stay at the worksite for many days without returning home.

While he was at Chavakachcheri military offensive was launched in our area.

Fearing shells we sought refuge at the St. Patrick's College.

For more than a month I did not receive any message about my husband.

Later, I came to know that he was killed when the Chavakachceri market came under rocket attack from a helicopter gunship on 27.10.87.

I learned that his body was cremated by the army itself.

My son Balendran is partilaly blind and remains at home.

I do not have any income and undergoing untold hardships.

கு - லீலாவதி

KASIPILLAI RASADURAI (50)
170, Rural Development Scheme, Thirunelveli, Jaffna.

I earn a living as a casual labourer.

My late daughter Rasadurai Rasasri aged 19 years supplemented my income by doing farm work on a casual basis.

On 15.10.87 as our village was subjected to heavy shelling we all fled to the St. Xaviers church at Thirunelveli East and sought refuge there.

When on 21.10.87 the surroundings of the church were also subjected to shell attacks we all fled to the Saddanathar temple at Nallur.

We returned home on 1.11.87.

On 28.11.87 when my daughter Rasasri was in the rear of our compound sounds of firing were heard and my daughter said IPKF were advancing.

Before she could enter the house more sounds of firing were heard and my daughter was hit an fell down with a gaping injury in her stomach.

I too received minor injuries on my hip and legs.

Due to the curfew that was inforce till 8 a.m. and as motor vehicles were forbidden I was able to admit my daughter at the Jaffna General Hospital taking her by bullock cart only at 9.30 a.m. that day.

My daughter Rasasri succumbed to her injuries at 12.45 a.m. on 3.12.87.

Her dead body was brought home in a bullock cart and cremated at the Thirunelveli Hindu Crematorium the same day.

MANONMANY
62/7, Chemmany Road, Nayyannarkaddy, Jaffna.

On or about the 15th of October 87 on the IPKF commencing its military operations my daughters and I took refuge in the house of relatives at Karainagar.

My husband Vinasithamby Sinnah (65) however remained behind, to look after our house and property.

On our return home on 24.11.87 I was informed by my brother Arulampalam that my husband Sinniah had been shot dead by the IPKF on 17.11.87 when he was going along Adiyapatham Road and that his dead body had been disposed by the IPKF.

My husband was a Casual Labourer able to earn about Rs. 60/- per day which has been denied to us now.

My two daughters aged 26 years, 24 years and I were entirely dependent in the earnings of my husband I have no sons.

Both my daughters have a good knowledge in sewing and will be able to take orders if they are provided with the necessary equipments.

I have no other source of income to maintain the family.

தி. மலரன்மணி

PANIRAS SINNAMMA 16, Small Bazaar Road, Jaffna.

On the 15th of October 1987 I was travelling by boat to bring my sister Theresammah, who was sick, to Jaffna from Palikudah for treatment.

When a helicopter attacked the boat with mortar shells and four of the immates of the boat were killed.

I was severely injured on the back and chest, my daughter Poovah on the face.

ப. சின்னம்மா

Mrs. PONNAMMAH PATHTHAN VEERAN (51)
Narayan Veethy, Kondavil East, Kondavil.

My husband Paththan Veeran aged 58 years is a Casual Labourer.

My two unmarried children and I were living together with my husband at the above said address.

On 15.10.87 there was heavy shelling by the Indian Peace Keeping Force stationed at C.T.B. Depot Kondavil towards our area.

On 16.10.87 when the shelling subsided at about 7 a.m. my husband went towards the cattle shed.

Suddenly shells fired by the IPKF started falling again and one such shell fell close to my husband and exploded.

Shrapnel from the explosion struck my husband on back and killing on the spot. spot.

In panic leaving the dead body of my husband on the verandah and I fled to Nallur Temple with my two children.

At about 3.30 p.m. the dead body of my husband was brought to Nallur in a car by my relations and cremated at Columbuthurai Thundil Cemetry at about 6 p.m.

My late husband was the sole bread-winner of the family.

வீ - பொன்மணி

RATNA THANGARAJAH (48)
nearby Sri-Lanka Transport Board Depot, Kondavil East, Kondavil.

I am a Government School Teacher.

My wife, children and I were living in our own house at the above said address.

Indian Peace Keeping Force personnel who moved from Palaly to Kondavil along Palaly road came into occupation of the Sri-Lanka Transport Depot at Kondavil on 15.10.87 mid-night.

On 16.10.87 at about 1 a.m. a few IPKF personnel came to my house and ordered all of us to leave the house.

As we were leaving the house, the same IPKF personnel took us to the Palaly Road and kept us in detention at gun point till the following morning.

On 16.10.87 morning we were ordered to go to the Nallur Kandasamy temple refugee camp and we then left for Nallur.

At this juncture I noticed that my daughter T. Kethakumari age 17 years and my brother-in-law Kamalanathan aged 23 years missing.

None of our family members could go back home to find out the fate of the missing family members as the IPKF personnel were on the road pointing their guns towards us.

We were able to return home from the Nallur Temple Refugee camp only on 28.10.87 and found only the skeletons of my daughter Kethakumari and my brother-in-law Kamalanathan. Both were identified from the clothes worn by them.

I also noticed that my house and household goods had been damaged badly.

Cash Rs. 37,000/- and the jewellries worth Rs 1,00,000/- were found missing.

MRS. SARASWATHY GANESU (38), Pattawattai, Karanthan, Neervely.

The deceased Muttan Ganesu (40) was my husband.

On 15.10.87 at about 1.00 p.m. when I was at home with my husband and children a mortar shell fired by the IPKF fell in the rear compound and exploded.

My husband who was in the compound at the time was hit by fragments from the exploding shell and succumbed to his injuries almost immediately thereafter.

The dead body of my husband was cremated the same day evening.

My husband was a farmer.

My husband leaves behind myself and 5 children aged 9,8,6,4 and 2 years. years.

My husband was the sole breadwinner of the family and by his untimely demise we have lost the maintenance and support given by him.

SINNAPPODI KIDNAR (52)
residing opposite Mascons Farm, Urelu West, Urelu.

I am a casual labourer.

The deceased daughter Miss. Vasantha Kidnar aged 24 years is the third child in our family of 7 children.

On 15.10.87 at about 2.00 p.m. when it was raining heavily, the Indian Peace Keeping Force personnel from Palaly suddenly moved into our area and engaged in search operations.

After the IPKF group left the area at 4.00 p.m. another group of Indian troops entered our lane and started firing.

My daughter Vasantha who was seated on the Varandah received a severe bullet injury on her stomach and hip and died on the spot.

The dead body of my daughter was taken to the Urelu cemetery on 16.10.87 and cremated at about 10.00 a.m.

SINNATHURAI SATHASIVAM (55)
Koiyathoddam, Irupalai, Kopay

I am an Attendant attached to the General Hospital, Jaffna.

I am married and have 4 daughters and 4 sons.

There was heavy mortar shell fire in our area from 11.10.87 onwards as such the villagers were living under fear.

On 15.10.87 at 8.00 A.M. when my second son S. Sivakumar aged 27 years a bachelor employed as a vehicle driver left home to visit a former class teacher residing at Point Pedro road, Kopay which is situated about one mile away from my house.

At 8.30 a.m. I was informed by a relation who is also a neighbour of the above mentioned teacher that my son Sivakumar and the lady teacher were killed when a shell fired by the Indian Peace Keeping Force from Kopay Army Camp exploded.

I rushed to the spot in a Van and found that the dead body of my son Sivakumar was lying on the road near to the dead body of the Teacher.

I brought my son Sivakumar's dead body home in the van and cremated same in the evening at 4 p.m. at Kopay cemetery.

The daughter of the above deceased lady teacher who sustained fatal injuries succumbed to her injuries while she was being transported in a van to the hospital by her father.

I also came to know that two shells fired by the IPKF fell close to my son Sivakumar and exploded killing my son on the spot.

The dead body of my son Sivakumar bore grievous injuries on his stomach and right hip and thigh.

Mrs. THURAISINGAM SAROJA (40), Talachchan Thoppu, Kaithady.

Due to the IPKF started liberation operation in Vannar Ponnai area my husband's name Namasivayam Thuraisingam was shot and died on the spot. This happened on 15.10.1987.

My husband is a goldsmith and having four children out of them two boys and two girls. They are 18 years, 17 years, 16 years and 14 years respectively. All of them are school going.

Other than my husband's income there is no other income to maintain my family and I am undergoing severe hardships throughout.

ANNAMMA, widow of the late Subramaniam Kailayanathan (55), Navaly Road, Anaicottai.

I am the mother of Kailayanathan Ganeshavel killed in shell-blast on 16.10.87.

On 16.10.87 while my son was standing in the Court-yard of the house, a shell fell in the compound and blasted at about 9 a.m.

I was inside the house and rushed out on hearing him groaning and went up to him.

I saw him fallen on the ground with severe bleeding injuries caused by shrapnels from the blast on his chest. He was unconscious and died within a few minutes.

His body was cremated on the road-side opposite my house at about 1 p.m. on the day.

My son was 25 years of age and was casual labourer who earned an average monthly income of Rs. 1000/-.

I lived and maintained myself solely on the earnings of my deceased son.

Sicne my son's death, I am struggling for existence without any financial assistance or support.

CHELLIAH NAVARATNAM (48), Kalaivani Road, Kondavil North, Kondavil.

The deceased person Sinnathurai Sivasubramaniam, aged 59 years was my brother-in-law.

He was retired Director of Irrigation.

During the October 1987 military offensive I left our Kondavil residence and went to Inuvil.

On 16.10.87 I was informed that my brother-in-law was shot and killed by the army along with my sister and son at Kondavil.

Only on 21.11.87 I managed to visit my sister's house.

I found my brother-in-law's highly decomposed body lying in the compound.

I also found the bodies of my sister and her son lying there.

I cremated their bodies inside the home compound itself on 21.11.87.

My brother-in-law's parents died few years ago.



CHELLIAH THURAIRAJAH (61)
Thiruchelvam lane, Palaly Road, Kondavil East, Kondavil.

My wife, my un-married daughter and I were living in our own house at the above said address.

My family and I sought refuge at Nallur Kandasamy Temple on 16.10.87 as Indian Peace Keeping Force lobbed shells continuously towards our locality from 12.10.87.

My married daughter who had given birth to a child on 13.10.87 too sought refuge at Nallur Kandasamy temple on 17.10.87.

Due to lack of facilities at the said temple, my family, married daughter, her baby and I sought refuge at the Chundikuly Girls School on 20.10.87 morning.

On 20.10.87 night at 7 p.m. IPKF in Navatkuli camp started firing shells towards the Jaffna Town.

One of such shell fell on the school building and exploded.

Shrapnels from this explosion killed my un-married daughter T. Pathmaranee age 19 years on the spot.

About 10 innocent tamils were killed in this incident and several had been injured.

My daughter had injuries all over the body.

The dead body of my daughter was buried in a land close to the said school on the 21st morning as curfew was on.

On 10.11.87, we returned home and found our house was damaged in shell ell firing and our belongings were badly damaged.



KANDIAH NAGARATNAM, (58), No. 24, Rasavinthodam.

I am father of the late Nagaratnam Navaratnarajah killed in shell blast on 16.10.87.

Due to constant shell fire and military activities in the area, my son Navaratnarajah left home at about 7.00 a.m. on 16.10.87 and was on his way to the Nallur Refugee Camp.

While going on Hospital Road, a shell fell in proximity on the road and exploded.

Shrapnels darting from the blast struck my son causing severe head injuries when he fell dead on the spot.

On receipt of information I arrived at the scene to find my son lying dead in a pool of blood.

His body was cremated at the Thundy Crematorium on the same day at about 2.30 p.m.

My son was 19 years old and was a student reading in the G.C.E. (O/L) class.



LAWRENCE MARIAROSA, Koolavadi Lane, Anaicoddai.

My husband, I and five Children – 3 daughters and 2 sons – between the ages of 15 and 6 years lived at the above address along with my mother.

My husband was a businessman engaged in small trading.

On 16.10.87 I and the rest of our family members had to leave our house due to heavy shell fire in that area.

We moved on to Moothu Vinayagar Hindu Temple at Anaicoddai and took refugee there along with several other refugees.

On 18.10.87 my husband Murugesu Lawrence (53) left the temple, spent the night at home in order to see the house was secure from thieves.

Early in the morning on Monday 19.10.87 while I and the children were in the temple we heard the sound of continued gun fire around the temple.

Shortly after the firing ceased the temple door was opened and some of the refugees went out and saw some civilians from the neighbourhood lying dead around the temple, and the IPKF personnel were about the place.

My husband did not turn up on the morning on Monday 19.10.87. I thought he was prevented from visiting us due to the presence of IPKF personnel near the temple.

On Tuesday 21.10.87 morning the refugees in the temple were able to go out as the IPKF had withdrawn.

That morning only I discovered that my husband was dead and that his body was lying about 15 yards away from the temple.

I was informed by Thalayasingam of Aniaicoddai that my husband was shot dead by the IPKF on Monday 19.11.87 morning near where his body was lying.

A mother and son were also shot dead about the same time. The dead mother and son were Thalayasingam's wife Aachipillai and son Siri, a postman.

While Thalayasingam went to the rescue of his wife and son he saw my husband being shot by the IPKF.

MAHESAN MEENACHI (56), widow, Maattu Clunkai, Moothavinayagar Kovilady, Anaikoddai.

The deceased Nagalingam Mahesan, aged 60 years was my husband.

He was a casual labourer.

On 16.10.87 about 5 p.m. shell launched by the army fell over the roof of our house and exploded.

My husband who was struck by a huge shrapnel on his stomach, died instantaneously.

His cremation took place at Navaly cemetery on 17.10.87.

After his death I do not have any income.

My only son was also injured in the blast.

Mrs. NAGESWARY RAJASINGAM (39)
Kalaivani Road, Annunkai, Kondavil North, Kondavil.

My mother-in-law Chelliah Archchipillai age 78 years, husband, my child and I were living in our own house at the above said address.

Indian Peace Keeping Force who advanced to Sri-Lanka Transport Board Depot on 16.10.87 early morning entered into our house and shot and killed my mother-in-law and my husband.

My child and I managed to escape without any injury.

Through fear both of us took refuge at the Pootharayar temple which is close to my house.

I was able to return home only on 21.11.87 the day on which ceasefire was announced and found the skeletons of my mother-in-law and husband.

Both skeletons were burnt by me in our compound on 21.11.87.

RAJARATNAM RASAMANY (52) years, widow of Rajaratnam,
Urelu East, Chunnakam.

The deceased Rajaratnam Lalinthi, aged 20 years was my daughter.

She was a 1st year medical student.

On 16.10.87 our area was subjected to intensive military operation.

At about 3 p.m. the army approached our house firing at random.

We ran out from our house fear.

The soldiers fired at us and my daughter was struck by a hail of bullets.

She died instantaneoulsy.

We fled to our safety leaving her body where she was shot.

Only after eight days we were able to return to our house.

There we found her decomposed body.

We cremated her body at the Pokanai cemetery on the same day.

I have three unmarried daughters.

Mrs. REASU KASUPATHY (55)
Palam Road, Vannarpannai North West, Anaicoddai.

I was living with my husband Ramu Erasu (60) and children at the above address.

On 16.10.87 I was forced to seek shelter at the Kokuvil Hindu College due to the Indian Peace Keeping Force operation in our area.

On 25.10.87 evening the IPKF moved into the area surrounding the Kokuvil Hindu College and resorted to cannon fire and gun fire on the school premises. This continued till the next morning.

My husband Ramu Erasu (60) was hit by a bullet at about 5 a.m. on 26.10.87 and died on the spot.

The dead body of my husband was burnt by IPKF personnel in the school compound itself subsequently.

My eldest son E. Nagarasa (31) remains a bachelor as he is a heart patient. He is unemployed due to the illness.

I have three other children a son and two daughters aged 20 and 16 all four children are unemployed. My children and I were solely dependent on my husband.

The untimely death of my husband is a big blow to me and my children.

THAMAR CHELVAM (75), Chulipuram Millady Sorkavalavu Pillayar Kovilady Kuppilan, Erlalai.

The deceased person Arumugam Thamar, aged 75 years was my husband.

On 16.10.87 my husband left home saying that he is going to Chunnakam.

At about 4 p.m. I was informed that my husband was shot and killed by the army while he was on his way to Chunnakam.

His body was cremated on the following day at Kupilan.

AROKIYAMMAH widow of the late Joseph Fernandez (56),
Thikkampurai, Vasavilan.

I am the mother of the late Fernandez Nobert Jerome Sebamalai who was killed in Indian army firing on 17.10.87.

At about 10.00 a.m. on 17.10.87 my son left home to a shop in proximity to purchase provisions.

I heard the reports of gun firing after my son left home as there was delay in his return when I became nervous and went out in search of him.

I saw my son lying dead on the road with severe head injuries. I was told he was shot dead by the Indian army.

With the assistance of the people around, his body was brought home at about 12.30 p.m. on the day.

His body was buried in the Vasavilan Catholic Cemetery at about 10.00 a.m. in the morning on 18.10.87.

My late son Sebamalai was 27 years of age and was a trader earning a monthly income of Rs. 2,000/-. He was not married.

He was the family bread-winner who maintained me and my family of 5 members.

I and my family lived earlier in Colombo at Mutwal and had to flee our home during the July 1983 race riots. I lost all my belongings as the entire house was looted and were threatened of our lives and hence took refuge in Vasavilan.

Mrs. DONAS PHILOMENA, 23/2, Central East Road, Jaffna.

My son Thavachelvam (alias) Anton Luke, aged 24 years was hit by a shell blast on the 17th of October 1987.

He sustained a compound fracture of the left thigh bone. He was admitted to the General Hospital on the same day and discharged on the 2nd of December 1987 and is still under treatment and bed ridden. This son was sole breadwinner of the family being the eldest.

His father is sickly unable to work. I have eight (8) children to maintain. I am of very poor circumstances and need assistance.

The Daily Telegraph

Cong(S) doubts over Indo-Sri Lanka accord

NEW DELHI, Oct. 14.

The Congress(S) working committee is sceptic about the usefulness of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord in laying the basis for a permanent solution of the ethnic conflict in the island. It is of the view that some provisions of the accord are loaded against India and certainly not satisfactory to Sri Lankan Tamils.

At a meeting here the CWC(S) adopted a resolution criticising the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, for signing 'an extra-ordinary agreement' with the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, overlooking all the sensitive parameters involved in the situation and imposing it on the Tamils.

Giving a resume of the CWC(S) meeting at a news conference here, the Congress(S) general secretary, Mr. K. P. Unnikrishnan, MP, said it was tragic that the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) should find itself pitted against the Sri Lankan Tamils. For 40 years India had tried to defend their interests but had now placed itself in a hostile position.

He expressed the hope that a deadline would be fixed for the earliest possible withdrawal of the IPKF so that the world would know that India "has no ambition or aspiration to play the role of a gendarme in the region". Any other course would mean the reversal of India's traditional foreign policy.

REPORT

Jaffna holds out as Indian troops' death toll rises

By David Wigg in Colombo

INDIAN forces were held up a mile outside Jaffna yesterday by stiff resistance from the Tamil Tigers and large numbers of civilians an Indian Government spokesman said. A landmine killed 20 soldiers.

She said 79 Indians had been killed in the fighting so far with another 17 missing after an ambush during a search operation. Some 260 Indians had been wounded.

The Tigers set off a remotely controlled landmine, killing 20 Indian soldiers in a lorry north of Batticaloa. Three Sri Lankan soldiers were killed and seven were wounded in another landmine explosion at Trincomalee Sri Lankan sources said.

Red Cross appeal

Sri Lankan State radio claimed that five Indians captured by the Tigers were burned alive. The radio said that messages had been intercepted between Velupillai Prabakaran the Tigers leaders and his area commanders which boasted that they were "frying" the Indians Indian official sources said they had no such reports.

The Indian spokesman said that 380 Tigers had been killed and she quoted an intercepted Tiger radio message which admitted that "a large number of cadres have been killed."

She described the fighting around Jaffna as "intermittent" with the Indians using mortar fire. Some Tiger positions were destroyed. There were plans to bring in more reinforcements, she added. Sri Lankan sources called the fighting "heavy".

The Red Cross has appealed for the safety of the vast civilian population. The Indians say they have flown in food medicines and tents, but admit that those actually inside Jaffna town are "having difficulties."

The halt in the Indian advance may have been because they under estimated the Tigers. Western diplomats said. If the Tigers decided to fight to the death then Jaffna might have to be flattened.

The Indians wee not skilled in counter guerrilla warfare they said and seemed to be using conventional advances without any flanking movements apparently prepared for heavy losses.

The Tigers had had four years to prepare their defences and in some areas, had built rrenches that ran for about 3,000 yards. They estimated that only about 10 percent of their weapons had been surrendered.

The Tamil people are industrious envoys said and this was reflected in the Tigers' discipline. They were well turned out and had clean weapons. One source reported how they rested their weapons on their feet, rather than on the dirty ground.

The dislocation of thousands of Tamils may result in some of them trying to flee to Britain and other countries. A British High Commission spokesman said that there had been no increase in visa applications; in (act, there was a seasonal) decrease.

Police airlift

Our New Delhi Correspondent writes : The Indian Government yesterday airlifted hundreds of heavily armed paramilitary Central Reserve Police from New Delhi and other northern states to reinforce the army contigents in Sri Lanka.

More than five Boeing 737 and Airbus jets belonging to Indian airlines were commandeered by the Government, disrupting timetables and leaving civilian passengers waiting. 16.10.87,

Mickey Patel, 15.10.87

Jaffna Takes a Pounding REPORT

15.10.87

The battle for Jaffna had entered its second week, and Nallur Kandaswamy Temple was packed. More than 50,000 men, women and children in Jaffna City were crowded within its walls. It was Deepavali, the most auspicious day for Hindus in Sri Lanka. But none of the Hindu Tamils huddled in the temple were celebrating; all were fleeing pitched battles between Tamil guerillas and the advancing soldiers of the Indian Army. Rani Sivanayagam, 24, spent three days and nights in the shrine before she escaped the peninsula, reaching Colombo after a nightmarish journey over little-used jungle tracks, dodging army patrols and aerial strafing by helicopters. "There is no room to stand, let alone sleep," she reported. "Diarrhoea is widespread and there aren't any sanitation facilities. Only those with money or a relative nearby can have something to eat. That, too, is limited to a bowl of rice gruel a day." Like Sivanayagam, many of the 830,000 Tamils in Jaffna peninsula have taken refuge in similar designated centres or fled south to escape the cross-fire.

The battle began on Oct. 9, when Indian peacekeeping forces, in Sri Lanka to enforce the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement of July 29, mounted an offensive against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the largest and most powerful among several groups fighting for a Tamil homeland. The Tigers had earlier massacred more than 250 Sinhalese civilians in Eastern Province, and attacked an Indian convoy, in retaliation for the capture and suicide-deaths of more than a dozen Tiger guerillas. Since then, there has been no quarter given, and none asked.

India has vowed to continue until the Tigers surrender or are conquered. More than 20,000 of its soldiers are now on the island, about 8,000 of them in Jaffna peninsula. Many are crack border patrol troops, paratroopers or Gurkhas. The Indian High Commission in Colombo said at mid-week that more than 600 guerillas had been killed. On the Indian side, 127 soldiers were reported dead and 27 missing and presumed dead. Other sources said at least 40 Indian soldiers have succumbed to their injuries in hospitals in Madras.

Some sources suspect that more civilians have been killed than guerillas or soldiers. India has not supplied details of civilian casualties, and journalists are barred from the area. But a Tamil refugee from a village near Jaffna who reached Colombo last week said that the city was being shelled "24 hours a day." According to him, "the whole area looks as if a heavy cyclone has struck. Not many buildings are left." An independent group of twelve Sri Lankans, including Jaffna Hospital director P.S. Nacchinakkiniyar and the city municipal commissioner C.V.K. Sivayanam, claimed about 700 civilians have died and more than 300 were wounded. "Even drinking water is scarce, and starvation deaths are imminent," they reported. Roman Catholic clergy in Jaffna reported that many died from indiscriminate shelling and strafing, although India denied using air cover in its assault.

Both sides have been accused of atrocities. Refugees who escaped to Vavuniya, 120 km south of Jaffna city, spoke of rape and murder. They claimed the Indians went on an orgy of violence after 30 soldiers were killed at Jaffna University. The Tigers had massacred the captured paratroopers and set their bodies afire. Another five captured Indian soldiers were burnt alive in Nallur temple.

The Indians claimed last week that they controlled three-quarters of the city centre, including the main bus stand and the general hospital. However, others on the scene reported that by Oct. 21 the advancing units were still half a kilometre away from the municipal limits, while soldiers camped at historic Jaffna fort had not broken out of the one kilometre security zone around the fort. "Their battle tanks are not made to withstand the 250 kg drum mines used by the LTTE," said a refugee. Three reporters who slipped into Jaffna last week said the Tigers were still in control there. "Their supply lines seem intact, and they move about freely," said one journalist.

AP

Indian tank: In for the long haul

The Indians admitted encountering "very heavy resistance" when they tried to capture the Tigers' main base in Urumparai village near Jaffna. After a final four-hour assault on the morning of Oct. 16, the Indians said they counted 110 dead guerillas. At least 50 Indians were said to have died. These included 30 who rappelled down from a helicopter into the grounds of Jaffna University, 400 metres away. Their Russian M18 helicopter returned to Palalai airport on the northern coast riddled with bullets. Two accompanying choppers with 60 soldiers aboard veered off after seeing the intense ground fire.

The Tigers have asked for a ceasefire through various emissaries, including Tamil Nadu politician M. Karunanidhi. But India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has insisted that nothing short of "an unconditional surrender of all weapons, and total acceptance of the Indo-Lankan accord" will do. Tamil mediators have vainly tried to see Indian High Commissioner Jyotindra Nath Dixit, who is ill with malarial fever. "Without his approval, Delhi will not even hear of a ceasefire," one Tamil source told Asiaweek.

The Tigers seem divided over what course to take. "One [group] wants to surrender, while the other, led by [Tiger deputy Mahendraraja], wants to withdraw out of Jaffna while they can," an intelligence source privy to intercepted Tiger radio communication told Asiaweek. The Indians were exploiting the apparent dissent. On Oct. 21 they offered an amnesty, which did not include Tiger leaders, over the radio, loud hailers and through leaflets. "The Indians are encouraging a split within the LTTE," said a Sri Lankan military official. "The question is whether the cadres will take the bait." The Tigers were apparently awaiting orders from their commander, Velupillai Prabhakaran, who had been missing since the day after the Urumparai assault. He was said to have been directing the resistance from Nallur temple.

Even if the Indians wrest control of Jaffna, several thousand Tigers remain at large in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. New Delhi was apparently worried about a protracted struggle. Last week Maj.-Gen. Harkirat Singh, commander of the Indian troops, was relieved of his duties and recalled to Delhi. The Indian High Commission announced that the chief of Indian Military Intelligence had arrived in Jaffna on Thursday to take over command of the Indian forces. Lt.-Gen. Depinder Singh of the Indian Southern Command, who visited Jaffna and Colombo last Monday, was said to have revamped the command structure and issued orders to "speed up" the offensive. Promised Gandhi at a news conference in Washington last week: "The problem in Jaffna should not last more than a week, perhaps two weeks." Others were less optimistic. Given the breakdown of order in Jaffna, India may be in for a long haul. ■

THE HINDU

IPKF not going all out

NEWS

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI, Oct 15.

Some more personnel of the Indian Peacekeeping Force were reported killed today as fighting continued to rage in the Jaffna peninsula of Sri Lanka. Delhi airport was closed to air traffic and commercial flights were cancelled or postponed during the day because more troops were rushed to Sri Lanka in civilian planes.

According to the External Affairs Ministry spokesman, three IPKF jawans lost their lives and six were wounded in the operations near Jaffna town. In a separate incident this morning in the Eastern Province 20 jawans were killed instantly when their transport was blown up in a land mine laid by the Liberation Tigres of Tamil Eelam. Four soldiers were badly injured.

The spokesman said it was difficult to give an accurate figure of LTTE casualties. However, an estimate of the LTTE losses since the operations began on October 9 has put the total at 380 militants killed.

Reports from Jaffna indicate that the LTTE is not conducting guerilla warfare as initially believed but attacking the IPKF from well prepared hideouts in heavily populated areas. The IPKF is under strict orders not to use heavy artillery and in the absence of air strikes, it is fighting with one hand tied behind its back. This has generated considerable frustration among IPKF ranks especially when casualties mounted. Western media reports that the LTTE was putting up a 'hard fight' and that the IPKF was finding it difficult to make progress towards Jaffna have been dismissed as 'ill informed.' It has been pointed out that if the IPKF was allowed to conduct the operations in the conventional sense the LTTE would have been neutralised in the first 48 hours.

The spokesman disclosed that some important LTTE leaders have either been captured or killed in the past few days of fighting. Mr. Devadasan and Mr. Karan Antony, the LTTE's military wing leaders, were killed on October 11 near the Jaffna lagoon area. Mr. Subramanyam, the LTTE's officer-in-charge of operations, was also killed on October 13. Mr. David, the LTTE's political leader in Batticaloa district, was apprehended on October 11.

Return of refugees: Meanwhile at the diplomatic level the Government of India has urged the Sri Lankan Government to take up urgently the question of the early return of refugees to Sri Lanka. There are some 25,000 Sri Lankan refugees in camps and about a lakh outside. It has been pointed out that since Sinhala refugees who fled from their homes in the North and East have returned after the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, conditions must be created for the return of the Sri Lankan Tamils also.

The spokesman declined to comment on the letter written by the LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran, to the Prime Minister and distributed by the LTTE office in Madras yesterday. He said there was no information on whether the letter had been received by the Indian Government.

PTI reports:

Defence sources here said the IPKF personnel now engaged in flushing out LTTE men from their strongholds in Jaffna town are only using light arms and have been debarred from mounting any airborne operation

They said the LTTE had built fortifications on rooftops and groundfloors (akin to pill boxes) on the houses having a wide sweep of the main thoroughfares of the town. "It is extremely difficult to spot these defences unless you come under their hail of gunfire", the sources said.

The LTTE men were using heavy mortars and rockets and forcing people at gunpoint to form a "human shield" in front of them in utter disregard to the safety of innocent human beings.

The sources discounted as "exaggerated" the claims by the LTTE that 28 commandos had been killed after they were airdropped near the Jaffna Fort area before dawn on Monday.

DMK president M. Karunanidhi *(in jeep, left)* **led his partymen who marched from Royapuram to Periyar Statue on Mount Road on Thursday, seeking a ceasefire by the IPKF in Sri Lanka.** *Express*.

LTTE CLAIMS

On 15.10.87 shells fell and blasted even in places, where the Sinhala army could not have moved. In the most indiscriminate shell attack by the Indian army, a very large number of civilian people were killed and many were injured. Many of them are taking shelter on street sides and under the trees. The Indian army men have raped many women and the dead bodies of 11 women were found in a room. There were no dress on these dead bodies; some parts of these bodies were also cut off. Many of these dead bodies have the marks of human teeth (the raped and killed include elderly women too). The Indian army abducted 40 women, took them to their camps, raped them and then crushed them beyond identification under the wheels of their armoured vehicles.

A truck of the IPKF was proceeding from Thondamanaru camp in Vadamaratchi to Yakkarai. From Yakkarai pillaiyar temple which is at a distance of 500 metres from the camp, the LTTE attacked them with land-mines, all those in the truck (8 in number) got killed.

At Sandiveli in Batticoloa District, in the land-mine attack on the Indian army by the LTTE, 3 men of the IPKF IPKF were killed; 5 were injured and the truck by which they were going was thoroughly damaged.

The Indian army burnt-down 300 houses of the Tamil in Mayilamveli of Batticoloa District and they raped 25 innocent Tamil women who were in Sarvodaya. At the very same place, the LTTE attacked them with land-mines 24 men of the Indian army died on the spot; their truct and van was completely destroyed.

At Kiran, Valaichenai, Sandhiveli, Murakkottanchenai and Vadammoolai, the Indian army raped a large number of young girls. It also made them raked by undressing them and made them stand and walk nude thus disgracing and humiliating them in the most barbaric manner.

At Kokkatticholai in its 'search' for militants, the Indian army had killed two innocent civilian.

The Indian army has plundered the residential houses of a large number of Tamils, including the house of Subramaniyam, Railway Station master of Murakkottanchenai and the proprietor of Sandhiveli Bakery, Ram and have taken away their jewels, currency and other valuable properties. From the house of the bakery proprietor they have taken Rs. 28,000 and 2 gold chains.

At about 2 p.m. the LTTE attacked the chained armoured vehicle of the IPKF, at a place between Thellipalai and Mallagam. The vehicle was blown-out beyond use. The LTTE took away parts of the armoured vehicle.

At about 5.30. p.m., in the land-mines attack at Murikandy, 6 soldiers of the Indian army were killed. At Chavakachcheri Pudukkatusandhy also, 6 Indian army men were killed.

On 14th and 15th when the IPKF men came out from the Navatkuzhi camp, the LTTE attacked them 6 times with claymore land-mines. The IPKF met with heavy losses and returned to the camp.

In the attack of 15.10.87, two members of the LTTE, James and Peris were killed.

REPORT

Tigers use common sense to go on fighting

COLOMBO – Four years ago, one of the most sought-after books in the now destroyed Jaffna public library was a illustrated history of weapons, a work which proved invaluable for the Tamil Tigers. who went on to produce mortar bombs and even an 85mm gun, writes Bruce Palling.

It is this sort of resourcefulness that is worrying the Indian army as they close in on the Tigers in Jaffna.

The Indian objective is to crush the Tigers completely, so they cannot pose a threat to the Indo-Lanka accord. But despite their youth and lack of training, the Tigers are a formidable force, as even their Sri Lankan army oponents will admit.

According to the latest Indian estimates. 380 Tigers have been killed in the past five days. – nearly a Quarter of their fighting force. Fatalities such as there would finish off most guerrilla armies, but there is no sign of the Tigers flagging.

In the past year they have tonight three set piece battles and on each occasion, when the situation turned aganist them, they disengaged in classic guerrilla style to fight another day. This time, they seem determined to resist to the last man.

"The Sri Lankan army always knew Jaffna town would be a difficult nut to crack. The Tigers are very capable of setting up their own defences after all they had four years to work out and improve them tacties," said one Western diplomat

The Tigers' weaponry illustrates their supply problems but also their initiative. The preferred weapon is the Chinese made AK 47 but they also use British. Belgian and US rifles. Apart from their mortars, their most feared home made weapon is a rifle grenade they call Stick – essentially a Molotov cocktail fired from a shotgun. They are also expert at setting booby traps and remote controlled mines. In was these that caused the most casualties to the Sri Lankan army in their May offensive.

The Tigers, who gained pre-eminence in the Tamil guerrilla movement through their rughlessness, enforce rigid self-discipline within their ranks and adopt a puritanical morality, eschewing smoking, drinking and drugs. Their military ranking system is unique and promotions are useally based on personal bravery rather than military ability. Their willingness to take cyanide capsules rather than face capture is the result of the knowledge of strategy shared between officers and men.

Although they usually deny participation in massacres of Sinhalese civilians, there is no doubt they have practised terrorism.

By comparison, there Indian opponents are convention itself, with the main forces comprised of the Punjab, Maharatta and Madras regiments. These are mechanised, with some tanks and spotter aircraft, but no combat plane support because of a reluctance to use such firepower in the heavily populated peninsula.

Indian tactics are also conventional – the "advance to contact" approach. Western sources believe it could be a liability for the Indians, and certainly the latest briefings show the Indians are not advancing as quickly as they expected. They say they are awaiting reinforcements.

The next week should tell whether they can wipe the Tigers out or whether they will face a festering guerrilla war with weekly casualties for months to come.

16.10.87 Bruce Pallang

Bhatlekar, Illustrated Weekly of India

BATTLE □ FOR □ JAFFNA

OLD SCENARIOS

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

ANAI KODDAI	
M.M. Lawrance	S. Sureskumar
S. Mary Pathmarajini	S. Vijayakumar
I. Santhirasekaram	S. Uthayakumar
N. Vicnarajah	U. Choromily
M. Lawrance	U. Theepa
M. Vimalarajah	Rasathurai
N. Subramaniam	T. Anathakumar
M. Kanagaratnam	I. Rasarathinam
S. Poorany	S. Kumarasamy
I. Sinnammah	K. Sanmugam
S. Kuganantharajah	K. Balakrishna
S. Nagarasa	Nadesu
S. Rajakumar	Sarasingam
P. Ratnam	N. Sathunan
N. Raseepan	Kanagarayar
V. Venkadachalam	T. Thuraiyappah
C. Viyajarajah	T. Thanabalasingam
Nacar Rathinam	S. Jeyakantham
CHUNNAKAM	S. Prabahharan
N. Ranjinitheen	S. Suthaharan
K. Selvi	T. Suthaharan
K. Rasiah	T. Santhalingam
R. Manonmany	S. Rajakulasooriyar
K. Sarojadevi	R. Kulamany
K. Vimalanathan	Sithihay Gayathary
Kugarasa	T. Parpamma
I. Letchumy	S. Kanapathy
P. Sivalingam	P. Muthulingam
M. Kanapathipillai	Ponnammah Mathar
A. Sivagurunatnan	M. Nadarasa
N. Sinathurai	V. Elumalainathan
S. Easwary	A. Sundaramah
S. Rajakumary	M. Pathmavathy

On Friday (9th October) Indian Defence Minister Pant met President Jayewardene in Colombo and assured him India would keep its part of the bargain and help to stamp out militant violence in the North and East President Jayewardene announced the LTTE was banned and the amensty offered to its members revoked.

On Saturday the Indian Peace Keeping Force. (IPKF) launched, Operation. Flush Out.

As a prelude, the IPKF raided the offices of two Tamil dailies – Eelamurasu and Murosoli – in the early hours of Saturday, a little before the curfew ended, arrested the employees and took them away. A few minutes later there were big blasts which damaged the equipment and offices of the two dailies. Around the same time the IPKF seized TV equipment belonging to the Tigers.

On Saturday, around noon, the IPKF moved out of the Jaffna Fort and up to 2nd Cross St Junction.

Then began the direct confrontation between the IPKF and the Tigers.

The exchange of gunfire was followed by intense shelling – the likes of which Jaffna has never heard before – from the Jaffna Fort. This continued throughout the night.

This was a replay of an old scenario familiar to Jaffna over the last few years.

A curfew was clamped down from 2 p.m. on Saturday till 6 a.m. on Tuesday (13th October).

The intense shelling continued on Sunday peaking, around 5 p.m. when several shells – including eardrum shattering artillery shells – fell near and around Kallosapillayar Kovil. One shell fell on a passenger van parked opposite the Kovil killing a man on the spot. A private medical clinic near the Kovil itself too was damaged. One shell fell near the office and printing establishment of the Tamil daily Uthayan.

On Monday morning (12th October) round about 10.15 a.m. helicopters which carried out a preliminary strafing dropped para-troops in a cremtorium near the Medical Faculty of the Jaffna University.

They were encircled and a fierce battle broke out Twenty nine Indian commandos were killed as they tried to enter the Medical Faculty Building.

Some commandos escaped and holed up in Pirambaddy Lane, Kokuvil, near the Jaffna Technical College.

On Monday evening, round about 5 p.m. Marchetti bombers circled the sky, but did not drop any bombs.

On Tuesday morning: a helicopter strafed several areas in the Jaffna Town at random; one person was killed at Mulhirasanthi Junction.

A while later, Marchetti bombers screamed overhead, dropping at least 20 bombs.

The result?

The Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics Blocks of the University of Jaffna were badly damaged.

The micro-computer complex housed in the Maths Block of the Jaffna University was given a severe shaking - up.

The Library, especially the South Asia Section, which has valuable books on India, was turned upside down, with all the books hurled to the floor.

A rescue operation was mounted to rescue the Indian para-troops.

Armoured vehicles came along rall tracks and the para-troopers were rescued

But at what cost?

At least forty people (including women and children) living down Pirambaddy Lane were killed.

Some of the bodies were literally pasted to the ground, heavy vehicles have been driven over them.

On Wednesday, militant sentry. points were bombed. Shells fired from the Jaffna Fort severely damaged some premier business establishments down Mala Street, Jaffna.

The irony is that these establishments had carried out repair work at considerable expense after the IPKF landed here.

On Thursday morning, a helicopter shelled Jaffna Hindu Ladies College – killing a lady who had taken shelter there.

Jaffna Hindu Ladies College was one of the officially named places of refuge.

At 6.p.m. on Thursday, hell strafing killed 4 members of a family who had come from Pallikudah (near Mandaltivu, Jaffna) to seek medical treatment. They were killed at sea near Passaiyoor Jaffna. Five others were injured.

Their names : Trons (15), Mrs. Ilenricus Mellda (45), Henricus Maryln (17), Mrs. Benedict Theresammah (50).

Early on Friday morning, there was a tremendous explosion it seemed as if the refugees at Nallur Kandaswamy Temple had been bombed.

Fortunately no such thing happened.

Apprantly, shells had been fired : they had hit a Vairavar Kovil in Thionevely.

As we go to press today (Friday) bombers fly menucingly overhead.

To (sum up) :

- Jaffna has so far never experienced such continuous, intense shelling
- The people of Jaffna have never felt such an Intense sense of betrayal
- If the Tigers aren't here, we will be completely at the mercy of the enemy is a commonly expressed, sentiment

• The IPKF came to save us, why are they doing all this to us? Another common question.

These are some of the questions being fiercely discussed and wrangled over in Jaffna at the moment.

While these acrimonious discussions go on, the battle rages on.

Even as we write, bombers – Indian or Sri Lankan, who knows? – circle overhead, though they haven't dropped any bombs so far. The Tigers claim that they have knocked out 19 vehicles and have commandecred 5 IPKF vehicles.

They also claim that they have twenty (20) Indian Peace Keeping Force personnel (IPKF) in their custody.

One of them is reportedly from Tamil Nadu.

Today (Friday 16th October) the seventh day of the war, the people of Jaffna are more daned than ever before.

They don't Know, whether they are coming or going.

Or in which crematorium or graveyard they'll end up – anonymously.

As we go to press the SATURDAY REVIEW learns that over 130 weapons (assorted) and nearly 35,000 rounds of ammunition have been seized.

The militants casualties are not known : about 30 - 50 of them may have been killed, with about the same number injured.

The official figures of IPKF casualties (as at Friday morning), are 59 dead and 117 injured.

According to information available to the SATURDAY REVIEW, moret than 100. civilians have been killed in Operation Flush - Out and at least 150 civilian injured.

At this point of time, for understandable reasons, we are not in a position to give exact facts and figures.

We hope to publish them in the forthcoming. Issues of SR, provided we can do so.

D.B.S. Jayaraj

COMMENT

Many Myths Destroyed

Let us begin with a grand mother's tale. There lived a wicked man, a crul tyrant. The people hatec and cursed him.

Lying on his death - bed, he repented and called his son, "I have behaved badly, caused much hardship to the people and incurred their hatred: Promise me that through your actins, you will make amends thereby earning me a good name".

The son promised. After the father's death, the son started behaving atrociously. The cruelty and tyranny soon, exceeded the father's the father's sins paled into insignificance when compared to the son's. The people of the village began to mutter "what a good man the father was, and what a bad man the son is". So the dutiful son fulfilled his promise and the father's name was cleared.

Ever since the Indian Peace Keeping Force shattered the short-lived Peace in Jaffna many myths are being destroyed. Starting with the media, there was a myth that only the state owned and controlled media. In the South distorted and blacked out news about the North. Now we find the Indian media's "See, here and speak no evil" campaign about the IPKF role here equally and perhaps more reprehensible.

The Sri Lanka Government silenced the independent media through methods like censorship, or a publication ban under the Emergency etc. The Indians have not only arrested journalists and employees of the "Ei lamarasu" and "Murasoli" but have also destroyed machinery thereby rendering them ineffective.

Earlier we thought that civilian killing was a unique feature of the Sri Lankan Armed forces. The brutality displayed in the civilian massacre, at Thalayali and Pirambadi in Kokuvil by the Indian Forces has exploded that myth.

Shelling from military camps into heavily-populated civilian areas was done by Sinhala forces. There were appreciable intervals during the sporadic firing from various points in the Peninsula including the Fort is so intense that the people have no respite at all. Power has been disrupted. 'The hospital is malfunctioning. No official arrangements have been made for the refugees. The low-key activity that went on in earlier days is absent, wish even small mercies being denied; more illusions are disintegrating.

Aerial bombardment and strafing we thought was the prerogative of the Sri Lankan Forces. Today we find it continuing. A hair-splitting argument could be made that it is the Sri Lankan forces who are operating the aricraft and artillery and therefore the Indian

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

M. Sivanatharajah	Thuraiappah
K. Krishnapillai	Makinthan
S. Seenukuddy	Katheramalai
S. Sivakumaran	Sellar Sivapothan
K. Gnanaratnam	S. Ponnupillai
S. Tharmavathy	**N. Sivapakiam**
M. Ambalavanar	Mudisingarajah
S. Rasa	Gunaratnam
K. Krishnapillai	*CHAVAKACHCHERI*
P. Vijayarajah	K. Kaneshamoorthy
T. Sithamparam	S. Paranthaman
Sinnathurai	*COLAMBAGAM*
M. Mormuthu	S. Kanthasamy
Ratnam	**P. Vasanthy**
S. Rosa	*CHANKANAI*
K. Thambirajah	Santhirathevy
S. Sellapah	Kanagasoory
M. Kathiramalai	V. Appiah
V. Vallipillai	N. Navaratnam
S. Kumarasamy	*CHUNDIKULI*
S. Navaratnam	K. Shanmugam
K. Sathasivam	**S. Ratnambal**
K. Saravanai	*EARLALAI*
Sinnachchi	N. Paneerselvam
Selvarajah	S. Jegatheeswaran
Parathyrajah	**Pathmawathy**
R. Arasaratnam	Karthigesu
Appathurai	**Gunalakshmi**
A. Kanthsamy	T. Mathavar
S. Kanthasamy	*GURU NAGAR*
M. Satheswaran	Manuel
S. Satheswaran	**M. Christy**
Nagan Mari Andu	X. Sanayaruban
Seeniyar	M. Rathnasabapathy

forces are not culpable. The morai and legal obligations placed on the IPKF to ensure the protection of the Tamils is a sacred trust tantamount to a Social Contract.

Whatever the antipathy New Delhi may have towards the Tigers, India's primary responsibility of safeguarding civilian life, limb and property cannot be discarded lightly. Also in the popular Tamil perception all violence being unleashed right now is attributed to the Indian and not the Sri Lankan forces.

The current situation is best described by the Tamil Proverb "Veliye payirai meyuthu". (The fence is eating the crop) and the emotions of the people is illustrated by the saying "Ventha Punnile vel" (Pieroing the unhealed wound), The Tamil feeling of betrayal by India is very high.

Other myths being shattered are those like seeing India as a Saviour and a Protector of the Tamils, as a Power dedicated to ensure a just and honourable settlement for the Tamils. What is now clear to most Tamils is that India has secured her geo-political interests through the annexures of letters and not thorugh the Accord.

The Peace Accord was expedited because of the domestic political compulsions on Rajiv Gandhi beleagured by the Bofors Scandal and internal Congress dissensions.

It is now in the Indian interest to prop up a tottering J.R. regime to consolidate what it has achieved in terms of Indian Interests. Thus the Tamils will be short-changed once again with an imposed settlement that will fall far short of their legitimate aspirations. The LTTE which would be the most effective deterrent to this type of settlement and has manifested in the past virulent nationalism that has rocked the corridors of power in Delhi has to be destroyed.

This would appease racist
elements in the South and strengthen J.R's hand. So the witch hunt for the Tigers is on.

The irony is that India which admonished Colombo time and again on the folly of waging war against a guerilla movement fighting for a national goal with a strong element of popular support is now committing the same error.

The political naivete of Rajiv Gandhi is saying that only "2000 Tigers are against the Accord" and foolish boast that the North and East have been joined together have been undermined by current events like the interim provisions in the draft Provincial Councils Act and the on-going hostilities in Jaffna.

The longer India prolongs this conflict situation in a bid to conflict situation in a bid to decimate the Tigers, the greater the sufferings of the people. People will be more alienated from India and the whole exercise will be counter roductive like winning a battle and losing a war.

The analogy between the Sri Lankan forces and Indian forces does not mean the former is better than the later. If one is tweedledum, the other is tweedledee.

The crucial difference is that the average Tamil could understand the motivation and repression of the Sri Lankan forces who were from their point of view, fighting to preserve the territorial integrity of their country. That perception was understood but not condoned or accepted. But in the case of the Indian forces, it is a case of external power considered as a benign Protector and Saviour a power which nourished and nurtured the Tamil struggle, a power which came to salvage the 'Tamils after the ravages of Vadamarachchy. When a Peace Keeping Force transform itself into an army of aggression and indulges in savagery, then the psychological impact cannot but be tremendous.

The shattering of myths was referred to earlier.

There is one myth that will never be shattered. It is the myth created in Colombo, now shared by New Delhi, that the Tamil people could be forced into accepting any settlement through force of arms.

The dogged determination displayed by the Tamils in the past for achieving equasistency of a 31 year old struggle, both non-violent and violent, bear testimony to this.

This is not idle rhetorle but a recently proved by the "blood, sweat, toil and tears" of our people. The sooner the reality is accepted, the greater are the chances of a lasting, honourable peace and end to the anguish and suffering.

O.V. Vijayan, Statesman.

Does Rajiv realise he's riding a tiger?

COMMENT

Nikhil Chakravartty

An event that generated extraordinary euphoria, sweeping over the country, has in less than 70 days, turned into a subject matter of acute concern for the government and the nation. The fall-out of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement has become a rather frightening item in our foreign policy which will ultimately have its inevitable repercussions upon the political situation within the country as well.

When the agreement was signed in curfew-bound Colombo on the afternoon of July 29 by the President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India, there was a sense of relief that the bitter and bloody encounters between the Sri Lankan security forces and the Tamil militants in the north and east of the island would soon end, and with peace would open up the new road to orderly progress towards a set-up ensuring friendly coexistence between the ethnic groups. In that settlement, many in this country wondered if it was proper for the government of India to be a party to the accord which was meant to iron out differences and animosities between the confronting forces within Sri Lanka itself; but this misgiving was smothered by the belief that the ensuring of peace and projection of a possibility of settlement must be to the good of all concerned. For one thing, President Jayewardene, assailed from all sides for the fiasco of his administration's resort to military means coupled with the ruinous economic drain incurred in the Emergency, got a fresh lease of his political life. The accord itself was followed by the spontaneous visits to Jaffna by numerous groups and organisations, from practically all parts of Sri Lanka, as a token of solidarity between the Sinhalas and the Tamil-speaking people of the island. Hope that was shattered by violence seemed to return all over.

Why, in just about two months, has this relation evaporated, and in its place has come the resumption of bloody conflict and confrontation? One's immediate impression is that while the July 29 accord was well-meant, it did not adequately take into account the strength of the forces ranged against it. Any realistic assessment of the balance of forces prevailing on July 29 would have brought out how fragile was the accord itself. The basic assumption was that the Indian side would be responsible for the good behaviour of the Tamil groups while at the same time prevent any Tamil-Sinhala clashes. The other assumption — more implicit than explicit — was that President Jayewardene, having had to face serious challenges from his political opponents as well as JVP extremists, would have the option of calling Indian armed forces if he felt necessary, for his personal protection and also of his regime.

As it has turned out, the hold of the Indian authorities on the Tamil militant groups, particularly the LTTE, was obviously inadequate and undependable — a far cry from the position in 1971 vis-a-vis the Mukti Bahini groups engaged in Bangladesh liberation war. This inadequacy was not overcome in the two months following the July 29 accord: even the laying down of arms by the Tamil militants could not be effected. Rather the LTTE leaders went their own way and the Indian diplomacy and administrative and peace-keeping activities were for sometime subsumed to the authoritarian postures of the LTTE leadership. This became evident during the negotiations for the formation of the proposed interim arrangements when to placate the LTTE, as many as seven out of 12 ministerial posts were offered to it, keeping out all the other militant groups, despite the fact that the LTTE was relatively weaker in the eastern provinces. Perhaps this mollycodding of the LTTE leadership by the Indian authorities in the weeks following the accord led to its having an inflated idea of its own strength and importance.

On the other side, president Jayewardene from the beginning presented a picture of a helpess chief who had no control over his own ministers on this crucial issue. Not only his Internal Security minister Lalith Athulathmudali but his Prime Minister, Premadasa, were quite conspicuously criticising the July 29 accord. Such divisions within the Cabinet naturally had its repercussions on the officialdom. Outside, Jayewardene' spolitical adversary, Sirimavo Bandaranike and her party, SLFP made no bones about their opposition to the accord, while the JVP extremists threatened large-scale terrorist action as marking their protest at this sell-out to Indian hegemonism. The large-scale disturbances at the times of the signing of the accord, the attempt on Rajiv Gandhi's life by a naval rating at the farewell guard of honour, as also the bomb blast in Parliament with the object of bumping off Jayewardene and his entire Cabinet — which fortunately did not go off as was planned — all these showed how untenable had become his own position. **Thus the bringing in of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) at Jayewardene's specific request was a clever move to underwrite his own presidential tenure while at the same time, let India control and contain the Tamil militants and thereby get discredited in the eyes of the Tamil population both in Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu.**

The position that has emerged is that the Indian armed forces are being sucked into Sri Lanka to do Jayewardene's jobs and to protect him from his own extremist groups, while ensuring that India must control the Tamil militants. The question that arises is: should India with her own load of internal problems, send out her army to help pull Jayewardene's chestnuts out of the fire? If this state of things gets protracted, then one

INDIA TODAY

might have to face strong local resentment in the Tamil circles for India having let loose repression on the Tamils, which is bound to have chain reaction in Tamil Nadu itself.

The balance of forces on the Sinhala side changed rapidly. While many among tne Sinhalas welcomed the agreement as a cease-fire relief, their morale was low as the general impression was that the accord was a surrender to India which would now boss over Sri Lanka, Although political elements friendly to India have been trying to counter such a feeling the battle has not yet been won by them. Apart from JVP's terrorist violence, many within Jayewardene's camps itself took strong objection to the July 29 accord. Of these Lalith Atulathmudali is believed to be behind sending out agent provocateurs to the disturbed eastern province, where they helped to spread large-scale violence. At the same time the attempt to whisk off some captured LTTE leading personnel to Colombo from Jaffna led to their committing cyanide suicide. The orgy of violence against Sinhalas that followed nearly killed the accord. And the prompt Indian response necessary to save the accord, would in the long run involve the Indian army personnel on a scale in Sri Lanka which might have a negative impact on all the neighbouring countries.

Even within India, these might well up strong reactions which need not be confined to Tamil Nadu alone. If, for instance, IPKF has to go in for large scale use of force to put down the Tamil militants, it is bound to be resented by Tamils not only in Sri Lanka but in India as well. Besides, if the IPKF in trying to convince Jayewardene gets more and more involved in the quicksand morass of Sri Lanka politics, then one would not be surprised if the government of India is faced with the outcry in India for the withdrawal of Indian armed forces from Sri Lanka. One only would keep one's fingers crossed so that such a contingency may not have to be faced.

Does Rajiv Gandhi realise that in Sri Lanka he is actually riding a tiger?

LAST WORD/RAJINDER PURI

SATIRE

Accord Concord

AFTER India had signed the accord with Sri Lanka, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi described it as the most important agreement of the century. I was rather sceptical about that description. Now, however, I have changed my mind. Because everybody I have met is praising Rajiv Gandhi's policy in Sri Lanka. This is what people are saying.

Soviet diplomat: "We believe that Rajiv Gandhi's policy in Sri Lanka is simply wonderful. We believe that in the years to come it will prove to be the greatest boon to the Soviet Union because it will make us look good in Afghanistan... "

American diplomat: "I think that what is happening in Sri Lanka right now is absolutely great. It is indeed a great morale booster for the American people, who had earlier believed that American leaders were the only ones who were dumb enough to make a mistake like Vietnam...."

Sinhalese soldier: "The new arrangement is a great relief to us. Earlier, we had to shoot only the Tamils. But now we can shoot both the Tamils and the Indian troops and, better still, watch as they also shoot at each other...."

Tamil militant: "We are much better off than we were before, thanks to the accord. Earlier, we were shot by the brutal Sinhalese soldiers, now we are shot by the considerate Indian soldiers...."

Chinese diplomat: "We welcome the Indo-Sri Lankan accord as the start of a great new chapter in the affairs of Asia. We are therefore watching keenly the developments in Sri Lanka, and when the time is ripe we will certainly make our own contribution to the movement that has been started by Rajiv Gandhi—by striving for a similar accord in Arunachal...."

Pakistani diplomat: "Rajiv Gandhi has shown the way by his policy in Sri Lanka. As soon as President Zia-ul-Haq feels strong enough, we hope he will follow Rajiv Gandhi's footsteps by acting in Kashmir and Punjab...."

Sri Lankan diplomat: "Sri Lanka will be eternally grateful to Rajiv Gandhi for bailing President Jayewardene out what had become an impossible situation. Thank God, the people in our country have stopped abusing the Sri Lankan President. They now only abuse the Indian prime minister...."



Sikh militant: "Long live the Indo-Sri Lankan accord! Now at last our brothers in the south will appreciate why the Punjab accord had to fail...."

RSS leader: "Long live the accord—it is the first step towards Akhand Bharat...."

DMK leader: "Long live the accord—it is the first step towards Akhand Dravidistan...."

Eelam leader: "Long live the accord—it is the first step towards Akhand Eelam...."

Congress(I) leader: "The Indo-Sri Lankan accord was a fantastic piece of good work. Already, its benefits are visible—people have stopped talking about the mess on Bofors, they talk only of the mess in Sri Lanka...."

Tamils world over staged demonstrations as protest against the killings of IPKF.

AFFIDAVIT

Mrs KALYANI SURIYA KUMAR (33)
N.I.C. No. 548652855 V. Kadduvan Tellipalai.

My father Veravagu Subramaniam (64) and my mother and sister were residing in my house at Kadduvan.

I am residing at the Chundickuly Girls College and visit my parents during the week end.

On the 17th of October 1987 I was at home with my parents.

At about 10.30 a.m. on this day IPKF personnel passing along the main road shot at my father V. Subramaniam who was drawing water from the well in our compound.

My father received a gun shot injury on the hip and the bullet pierced through leaving a gaping exit injury in the front.

My father who was taken to the Tellipalai Government Hospital was brought back, as the hospital was lacking all facilities due to the power cut.

There was no possibility of transferring him to Moolai Base hospital and no transport whatsoever was available due to the IPKF military operations.

My father succumbed to his injuries on 18.10.87 morning and his dead body was cremated the same day at the Tellipalai Cemetery.

An unmarried sister is living with me while my two brothers have gone abroad.

K. Sooriyakumar

KANAPATHIPILLAI VAIRAMUTHU THALAYASINGAM (66)
Anaicoddai north, Anaicoddai.

I am a retired Forest Officer.

My family consisting of my wife, a daughter, 2 sons and I were living in the above said address.

From 17.10.87 onwards explosions and gun shots were heard intermittently in our area.

On 19.10.87 at about 6.00 a.m. my son Thalayasingam Sritharan aged 30 years a casual Postal employee left home to go to Mooththa Vinayakar Temple situated in our village as done every day for his morning prayer.

The same day at about 6.45 a.m. when I was at home I was informed by the neighbours that my son Sritharan was shot dead by the Indian Peace Keeping Force who moved into our village from Kalundai and the dead body was lying in a lane close to the above Temple.

My wife, daughter and I then rushed to the spot and found the dead body of my son Sritharan lying down face downwards on the ground with the gun shot injury on his back.

When we were attempting to remove the dead body of my son Sritharan suddenly my wife received gun shot injuries on her back and right lower leg. She died on the spot.

I too sustained a gun shot injury on my right foot whereas my daughter escaped unhurt.

Through fear I asked my daughter to run away from the scene and she did so.

Few minutes later I returned home dragging my injured leg.

My neighbours were able to remove the dead bodies of my wife and son T. Sritharan only on 20.10.87 morning after the IPKF had left the area.

The cremation of the dead bodies of my wife and son took place at 12.00 noon at Anaicoddai cemetery the same day.

க.வ.தரையசிங்கம்

Mrs. LEDCHUMY SINNARASA (42)
Mulli Lane, Anaicoddai, Jaffna.

On 17.10.87 on shells being lobbed on residential areas by the Indian Peace Keeping Force during its operations, my son Sinnarasa Nagarasa (21) took me and my other children to Jaffna Hindu College refugee camp.

Leaving us there my son S. Nagarasa left saying that he was going home to collect some food items.

At about 2.00 p.m. the same day Nagamuthu Chandiran a neighbour came to the Refugee Camp and informed me that my son S. Nagarasa had been shot dead by IPKF personnel and that his dead body was lying close to the old Police Station, Anaicoddai.

I could not get out of the Refugee Camp for several days due to the curfew and when I returned home I was informed that my relatives had attended to the burial of my son's dead body.

My husband deserted me 11 years back.

My son S. Nagarasa was a mason and his earnings went a long way to maintain our family.

சி-லட்சுமி

MRS. MAILVAGANAYAGAM SINNATHANGAM (50) Tellipalai East, Tellipalai.

I am a widow.

The deceased Mailvaganam Chandrasekar is my son.

He was 21 years old at the time of his death and was a bachelor.

On 17.10.87 there was heavy shell firing around our area.

At about 12.00 noon there was volley of shells near Thurkaiamman Kovil. Some shrapnels fell on him and caused injuries in his abdomen.

He was bleeding and was rushed to Co-operative Hospital but he died on the way because of bleeding.

My late son was a Mason by occupation.

I was depending on him for my living.

மசின்னத்தங்கம்

Mrs. SEETHALUXMY THANGARAJAH (67), Palaly Road, Kantharmadam, Jaffna.

Mr Appathurai Thangarajah, aged 60 years was my husband.

During the military operation by the IPKF in our area on 17.10.87 a shell fell on our house and blasted and my said late husband sustained severe injuries and started bleeding profusely. He was taken to the Govt. Hospital Jaffna. There he was given an injection and asked us to take him back home as the hospital was not functioning properly at that time.

My said late husband was given medical treatment at home as he was unable to move about until his death on 09.02.88.

I have lost my husband due to the military operation by the IPKF in our area and now I have lost my breadwinner.

Mrs. S. Thangarajah

SIVARAJAH PARAMESWARY (42) Malaivembadi, Suthumalai North, Suthumalai.

The deceased Sivarajah Vigneswaran, aged 14 years was my son.

He was employed as a Cigar Roller.

On 17.10.87 we fled from our house due to shell fire and sought refuge at the Murugamoorthy Temple, Thavadi.

My son left us at about 5.00 p.m. saying that he is going back to our house to bring some necessary things.

He did not return afterwards.

On 18.10.87 at about 7.00 a.m. we went in search of him and found his dead body at Aladi Junction.

It bore gun-shot wounds.

We cremated his body on the spot on the same day.

I have seven surviving children.

My husband is an invalid.

It was my late son who bore the burden of supporting and maintaining our large family.



SORNALINGAM MANINARAN (34) Annai Illam, Urumpirai South, Urumpirai.

The deceased Thambipillai Sornalingam, aged 67 and Lechumipillai Sornalingam aged 57 were my parents.

On 17.10.87 IPKF was advancing through Manipay road from Urumpirai junction. As they were firing from the road in the direction of our house both my parents ran for shelter to a house situated behind ours.

Some soldiers who came from behind the house shot both my parents. They both died on the spot.



THAMBIRAJAH (45), Ananda Veethy, Manipay North, Manipay.

The deceased person Thambirajah Thabonithy, aged 24 years was my daughter.

Due to the military offensive we left our house and sought refuge at the Manipay Hindu College on 17.10.87.

On 18.11.87 at about 11.00 p.m. a shell fell inside the school building and exploded.

My daughter sustained an injury on her right hip region.

She was taken to the Co-operative Hospital, Moolai and later received treatment at various private dispensaries.

She succumbed to her injuries on 27.12.87.

The cremation took place at Pipili Cemetery on 28.12.87

I have six surviving children including five daughters.

My husband is a farmer remains at home due to Rheumatisdm and was recently treated for Hepatitits.



ARUCHUNAN NALLAMMAH (37) Vidyasalaiady, Black Road, Chankanai.

The deceased Sinnapody Aruchunan, aged 45 is my husband. He was a farmer.

On 18.10.87 at about 5.30 p.m. my husband left the house and went out. At 6.30 p.m. there were sounds of bomb blast, and gun fire. Being afraid to stay at home my children and I left the house and took shelter at Vigneswara Vidyalaya.

Next day on 19.10.87 at 6 a.m. my husbands elder brother's son Rasathurai came to the school and informed me that on 18.10.87 at 6 p.m. when my husband was near the Catholic Church IPKF personnel came that way on armoured carriers and started shooting. My husband received gun shot injuries and died on the spot.

Immediately my children and I with the help of Rasathurai and other neighbours cremated the dead body at the Hindu cemetery at 10 a.m. The body had 21 gun shot injuries.

I have 5 children, 3 males and 2 females. Females aged 17 and 14, males aged 16, 12 and 10.

My 17 year old daughter and I are compelled to cooly work and support our family other children are school going.

Mrs. ARUMUGAM RASAMMAH (63) Gnanavairavar Veethy, Kondavil East, Kondavil.

I am a widow.

The deceased Arumugam Thavarajah, aged 22 years was my only child. He was a casual labourer and was earning about Rs 50/- per day.

On 18.10.87 there was an Army operation in our area.

In view of the Army Operations the people of the area were advised to take shelter in Nallur Kandasamy Kovil, Hindu College and other schools and the announcement went out from the IPKF authorities.

I along with my neighbours and the deceased son left our home on 18.10.87 to take refuge in Nallur Kandasamy Temple at Jaffna

Around 9.00 a.m. while fleeing to the above temple between Kondavil and Irupalai junction a shell fired by the IPKF close to my son and exploded.

Shrapnel from the explosion struck him in the stomach killing him on the spot.

The dead body of my son Thavarajah was cremated at 3.00 p.m. at Karaikkal cemetery Kondavil the same day.

My deceased son being the only bread winner of my family, his death is a big blow to me.

KANAGAR SELLATHURAI (72) 84, Stanley Road, Jaffna.

The deceased person Sellathurai Balachandran, aged 27 years was my son.

He was a student at the Madras University.

We received a message from my son that he is returning to Jaffna on a holiday.

The message arrived just before the October 87 military offensive commenced.

We could not send him a message in time asking him not to visit Jaffna.

On 18.10.87 afternoon I was informed that my son was killed in a shell blast at Muthirachanthy, Nallur.

I came to know that after ariving from India he travelled to Palai from where he rode to Jaffna in a bicycle.

I learned that after leaving his bicycle at Kalviankadu he was walking along Point Pedro Road when the shell blast took his life away.

His mutilated remains were cremated at the spot where he died on the same day.

I have an unmarried daughter named Anushya aged 22 years.



MARCELIN JOHNMARY (30)
"Kalvary" near St. Annes Church, Manipay.

My father Theo Marcelin age 63 years was the owner of the shop "St Annes Stores" at Anaicoddai.

I have a sister, married and living separately and a brother who sought refuge in India still living in India.

I have lost my mother long ago.

My father was living with me with my family at the above said address.

My father used to sleep in his shop during night for security purpose.

After he left to his shop at 7.40 p.m. on 18.10.87.

I was informed that the Indian Peace Keeping Force stationed at the Alady junction Uduvil firing shells towards thr residential areas and moving out of the camp.

Through fear my family and I were in closed doors at home.

On 19.10.87 when firing of shells ceased, I went out in search of my father.

I reached the shop at 7 a.m. on 19.10.87 and found that the shop damaged and my father was killed on his bed inside the shop in shell firing.

The dead body of my father was shattered and I removed same and buried in the adjoining compound due to army actions.

After the burial, I with my family sought refuge at Myliddy.

I returned to Annaikoddai on 10.1.88 and found that the shop of my father was looted.

RAJALINGAM SELVI (20) widow of Madathadi, Irubalai, Kopay South.

The deceased Kanthiah Rajalingam aged 24 years was my husband.

He was a causal labourer.

On 18.10.87 due to the military offensive my husband took us to Eluthu Madduval.

On 20.10.87 at about 6 a.m. my husband left us saying that he is going back to our house at Irubalai promising to return as early as possible.

He did not return afterwards.

We launched a thorough search for him which proved futile.

We made inquiries at all army camps without success.

After one month of his disappearance I came to know that he was shot and killed by the army at Kopay and that his body was disposed by the army itself.

I have two small children both infants.

After my husband's death who was our sole bread-winner we do not have any income or support and struggling with untold hardships.

RAMANATHAN JEYASINGAM (42) of 36, St. Annes Road, Jaffna.

There was continuous shelling and firing of gunshots from IPKF army camps towards our area and our house, where 34 people stayed, too was severely damaged on 18.10.87.

While we were travelling through Irupalai-Rajaviithy junction at 10.30 a.m. a shell fired from the IPKF army camp, Konuavil fell in front of our tractor and exploded with a terrible noise

Immediately the tractor was stopped, all of us jumped off the tractor trailer and ran towards Nallur as there was continuous shelling and firing in that area.

A shell fell close to us killing 4 persons including my eldest daughter Shobana aged 16 years.

All our belongings were destroyed by shell bombardment and burning.

After the random shelling ceased we were able to remove all four, bodies with the greatest difficulty to my relations house at Grausault road, Chundikuli.

The burial of the body of my daughter Shobana took place on 20.10.87 at St. Mary's burial ground, Jaffna.

RAVEENDRAKUMAR VIGNESWARY (24), C/o K. Nadarajah Church Lane, Thavadi, Kokuvil.

The deceased Sellathurai Raveendrakumar, aged 27 years was my husband.

He was employed as a Cigar Roller.

On 18.10.87 at about 7.00 a.m. my husband left home saying that he is going to his mother's house at Urumpirai.

He did not return home afterwards.

Our search for him proved futile.

Only after 3 months of his disappearance I came to know he died on 18.10.87 due to shock and blood loss following a shell blast.

I have a 3 year old son named Rajeevan.

I do not have any income after my husband's tragic death.

SUPPAN RATNAM (58), 32, Muthamil Veethy, Koddadi.

The deceased person Iyan Suppan, aged 65 years was my husband.

He was a casual labourer.

On 18.10.87 at about 6.00 a.m. my husband left for work.

At about 11.00 a.m. we fled from our residence as the army advanced into our locality.

On my way I saw my husband lifeless body lying on the roadside with gun-shot wounds.

I later learned that the army itself caremated his body at Vilundi Cemetery.

Mrs. THAMBIPILLAI SINNAMMAH (67) 416, Navalar Road, Jaffna.

The deceased Kandiah Thambipillai (80) was my husband.

My husband was admitted to General Hospital Jaffna on 18.10.87 with shell blast injuries he sustained on 16.10.87 when a mortar shell fell on our house and exploded injuring my husband and damaging the house.

My husband succumbed to his injuries on 1.12.87 while being a patient at the General Hospital Jaffna.

Mrs. THAVAMANY RAJARATNAM (47)
Kalikovilady, Alaveddy North, Alaveddy.

My husband Ariyakuddy Rajaratnam age 53 years was a driver.

My husband was admitted to the General Hospital, Jaffna on 18.10.87 for an operation on his knee.

I was informed on 23.10.87 that the Indian Peace Keeping Force had entered the General Hospital, Jaffna on 21.10.87 gunned down over 137 innocent Tamils including Hospital staff, patients and visitors.

On hearing this news we were worried but I or any of our relatives could not go to the General Hospital, Jaffna as IPKF personnel were in occupation.

Only on 15.11.87, my brother in law could visit the General Hospital Jaffna. He was informed by the Hospital authorities that my husband was one of the victims in the Hospital incident where IPKF killed 137 innocent Tamils and the dead bodies were burnt by the IPKF in the Hospital compound.

I have 5 children by him all under 23 years.

VAIRAVAR SIVAKOLUNTHU (71), 206, 5th Cross, Manipuri, (Maniam Thottam).

The deceased Sivakolunthu Krishnamoorthy, aged 18 years was my son.

He was employed as a Mason.

On 18.10.87 the army entered our village and arrested all the residents including us.

After we were released we sought refuge at the Kanagaratnam Madhya Maha Vidyalaya refugee camp Jaffna.

On 21.10.87 at about 12.00 noon my son left the refugee camp saying that he is going to Jaffna Town to purchase some provisions to prepare food.

He did not return afterwards.

We became highly worried about his non return.

We could not go out in search of him due to the prevailing tension and the curfew.

Only after many days I came to know that my son was shot and killed by the army at the Hospital Road on 21.10.87.

I learned that his body was burnt by the army itself.

My wife died few years ago and I have five children.

My son Balakanesh has become an invalid after being assaulted by the army in 1984.

YOVAMPILLAI THEVASAHAYAM (65)
No. 311. Tenth Cross Street, Maniyamthoddam, Columbuthurai, Jaffna.

Anton Rajkumar is my third son, aged twenty one years. On 18.10.87 my said son left for the Christ Church at Maniyanthoddam. On the same day, the Indian Peace Keeping Force had started its operations in the area. **On his way to church, my son, Anton Rajkumar was shot down by the IPKF soldiers. Subsequently, the curfew was in force for 21 days. Thereafter four days of the death of my beloved son, his body was removed from the spot where it was and buried on the sea beach, near-by.** This is the only son who provides for my living and that of my aged sickly wife. My elder son is married. Owing to the fatal death of my beloved son, Anton Rajkumar I and my wife (his mother) are under-going immense distress ever since his death. Therefore, I most humbly beg the Police to do the needful to enable me to get adequate compensation for the loss of my beloved son. Further, owing to the death of my beloved son, his two younger brothers and an elder un-married sister are also under-going immensedistress for a living.

ARUMUGAM NAGALINGAM (55)
Vannar Kovilady, Vasavilan.

My wife Nagalingam Rasamany (45) my children and I were residing at the above mentioned address.

On 19.10.87 when my wife was in the house of a neighbour, Indian Peace Keeping Force personnel who approached that house opened fire injuring one of the male occupants of that house.

The other occupants and my wife then sought shelter in the kitchen.

IPKF personnel then kicked open the kitchen door and on entering the kitchen opened fire killing one person and injuring 3 others including my wife.

My wife received gun shot injuries on the abdomen and waist.

As my wife could not be taken to a hospital due to the continued curfew and activities of the IPKF. She received treatment at home from a Private Medical Practitioner.

My wife succumbed to her injuries on 22.10.87.

The dead body of my wife was cremated at the Pillayan Kadu cemetery on 23.10.87.

FARID MOHAMED HANIFFA (33), 43, Shabi Nagar Araly Road, Jaffna.

The deceased Mohamed Haniffa Rahila aged 29 years was my wife.

During the November 1987 military offensive I sought refuge at the Osmania College refuge camp, Jaffna along with my family.

On 19.10.1987 at about 3.10 p.m. I was standing outside the college compound when a shell crashed through the college roof.

I rushed in and found my wife's mutilated body which was thrown outside the building due to the explosion.

My son also lost his right hand during the blast.

My wife's remains were buried at the Sinnapalli burial grounds on 20.10.87.

I have five children.

GNANESWARY THARMARAJAH (64), widow, 3rd Mile Post Lane, Kalviankadu, Jaffna.

The deceased Tharmarajah Sivakumar, aged 28 years was my son

He was working as a Labourer.

During the October 1987 military offensive I went to Vaddukoddai as our area was subjected to intense shelling by the army.

On son-in-law and my son refused to accompany us and opted to stay at our house at Kalviankadu.

On 19.10.87 I was informed that my son was killed when a shell fell within our house compound and exploded.

I came to know that my son-in-law managed to cremated his body in a nearby field with great difficulty.

I have two unmarried daughters at home.

THE HINDU

LTTE bastion falls as IPKF forges ahead

NEWS COLOMBO, Oct. 16.

In an overnight offensive, the Indian Peace-Keeping Force wrested a major stronghold of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam at Urumpirai and continued its advance on Jaffna town in north Sri Lanka today.

There was heavy fighting in the Urumpirai area north of the Jaffna University campus where the LTTE attacked the IPKF from houses and entrenched positions.

Urumpirai is one of the strongest fortifications of the militants. An Indian High Commission spokesman said Urumpirai on the Palaly-Urumpirai axis fell shortly after 0100 hours today.

On the Navatkuli sector also, the IPKF have now reached the municipal limits of Jaffna town and have taken control of the road and railway junction at Chemmaikulam. At least 16 LTTE militants were killed in the operation, the spokesman said.

The Chemmaikulam road and railway junction is the only exit point for the retreating LTTE men.

The High Commission spokesman said 111 militants were killed and 14 IPKF men injured in the battle for the LTTE stronghold.

(An AFP report quoting the spokesman said 127 militants were killed in fierce fighting for the control of Jaffna today. One Indian soldier was killed and 32 injured).

With this, 507 LTTE militants have been killec since the Indian army action began on October 10. Sources said the IPKF lost seven men in different engagements around the town last night taking to 86 the number of personnel killed so far.

Desperate bid

The sources said the LTTE carried out a wave of attacks on the IPKF in a desperate bid to break out of encircled Jaffna town. It launched repeated attacks to re-take the Koppai area north east of the town which had been overrun by the IPKF on Wednesday night. The attacks were repulsed with heavy casualties on the LTTE side.

Meanwhile civilians were reported to be fleeing Jaffna on Friday as the Indian troops sought to tighten their stranglehold around the town.

Sri Lankan radio said people were streaming into refugee camps, clearing the way for an Indian assault against the militants who have dug in for a last-ditch stand.

Indian terms for truce

From Our Special correspondent

NEW DELHI, Oct. 16.

As troops of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force tightened their noose around Jaffna town, the last stronghhold of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, there has been a flurry of appeals for a ceasefire from the besieged militant leaders. The most significant clarification of the Indian position outlining the minimum terms for the cessation of hostilities was made available in Jaffna by the IPKF's Overall Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh today.

It has been made clear to the LTTE that—(A) it must immediately surrender all its arms, and (B) it must undertake to fully cooperate in the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. These would be the minimum terms to bring about a halt to the IPKF's current operations. If these terms were accepted by the LTTE there could be negotiations on other matters.

Responding to this clarification of the Indian position, the LTTE Deputy Leader, Mr Ajit Mathaiya said in a letter addressed "To whomsoever it may concern" that the LTTE would agree to a ceasefire and was ready to negotiate on all other matters. Gen. Depinder Singh made it clear that Mr. Mathaiya's letter does not meet the minimum Indian requirements. He has insisted on immediate surrender of all arms and an undertaking to abide fully by the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. Once this was accomplished negotiations could take place in New Delhi.

The tough, no nonsense stand taken by the IPKF is a result of a series of broken promises by the LTTE and the going back on asssurances given both orally and in writing. It may be recalled that the detailed agreed minutes of discussions signed on September 28 by Mr. H. S. Puri, First Secretary (Political) and Mr. Ajit Mathaiya referred, inter alia, to the surrender of 'the remaining arms' excluding personal arms meant for the security of LTTE's leaders. What the Indian Army has faced and paid heavily for in terms of men and material since the beginning of operations on October 9 is now amply clear. There is little chance now that India will agree to a ceasefire or negotiations before the LTTE physically gives up all the arms in its possession. And this time the IPKF will insist on the surrender of personal arms as well.

Major breakthroughs: Meanwhile, an External Affairs Ministry spokesman gave details of two major breakthroughs in the fighting overnight. Military sources have described last night's advance as vital for the capture of Jaffna town. The LTTE stronghold in Urumpirai, on the northern outskirts of Jaffna, has been devastated with LTTE losses estimated to be upwards of 110 dead. One LTTE 'captain' and 22 militants have been captured. IPKF losses have been put at one killed and 32 wounded.

The other advance has been in Koppai North where the IPKF has finally repulsed attacks on its positions by LTTE militants for the past three days. The spokesman said that radio intercepts have indicated that the LTTE is in 'disarray and their units have been immobilised in a number of places.'

Answering questions, the spokesman said the LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran's letter appealing for a ceasefire has been received by the Prime Minister's office in the form of a telegram. He said the letter was no different from earlier communications which were circulated through some Tamil Nadu political leaders. He restated the Government's position, which is much the same as outlined by Gen. Depinder Singh to Mr Mathaiya today in Jaffna.

LTTE CLAIMS

On 16th, 10 young girls in Batticolao were raped by the IPKF men. Seven of them died; the condition of the other three is serious. Many wounds were there on the bodies of these raped women; some more women are missing. The IPKF set on fire and burnt down 200 houses of the Tamils, in this area. Following this, in the LTTE's severe attack on the IPKF, heavy losses were inflicted on the IPKF. In the encounter on the 16th, on LTTE's side captain Ashok of Velvettithurai met with a heroic death.

Kittu told not to stir out of LTTE office

MADRAS, Oct. 16.

The LTTE's former Jaffna regional commander, Mr. Sathasivam Krishnakumar alias Kittu, has been told not to step out of the LTTE office in Indira Nagar here even though the police did not call it a "house-arrest".

The police informed Mr. Kittu this morning that he cannot go out of the office.

MP arrested: Meanwhile, a DMK M.P., Mr. V. Gopalaswamy, who went to the LTTE office and tried to meet Mr. Kittu in the afternoon, was arrested by the police.

The DMK President, Mr. M. Karunanidhi, strongly condemned the arrest of Mr. Gopalaswamy and the "house-arrest" of Mr. Kittu. He said that when Tamil Nadu was "agitated" over the Indian Peace-Keeping Force "attacking" the LTTE in Jaffna, the detention of Mr. Kittu and the arrest of Mr. Gopalaswamy showed the "vindictive attitude" of the Government of India and the Tamil Nadu Government.

PTI reports:

Meanwhile, Mr. Kittu told PTI that he had met the Tamil Nadu Food Minister, Mr. S. Ramachandran, twice to appeal to him to use his good offices to persuade the Centre to bring about a cessation of the IPKF operations.

He said the LTTE was aware that it could not fight a "war" against the IPKF and it had offered to negotiate on the full implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka peace agreement.

Asked if the LTTE would comply with India's condition that the group should surrender all its arms if the IPKF was to end its operations, Mr. Kittu said he had not received any "official word" on this so far. He, however, hastened to add that the LTTE could not accede to the demand for a "total surrender" of arms, for some might have to be kept for "personal security and protection of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka".

Denying reports that the LTTE men had burnt alive five Indian soldiers in the Jaffna peninsula, Mr. Kittu said 29 bodies of IPKF men found by the LTTE had been cremated, and none had been burnt to death.

Mr. Kittu said 21 IPKF men were under the LTTE's custody and it was willing to allow Indian mediamen to meet them. The injured among them were receiving medical aid, he added.

STATEMENT

Statement Made to the I. P. K. F. on the Morning of 16th of October 1987 after the Bomb Blast at Thalayadi off Thannamunai on the 16th Morning of October 1987 by Mr. S. M. Leena, President, Citizens Committee, Eravur Pattu, Chenkaladi in the Presence of His Lordship The Bishop of Trincomalee.

I was at mass when I heared a bomb blast at about 6.40 a.m. It was the 16th of October 1987. After mass I went home. About one and a half hour later two IPKF Jawans entered my daughter's house and I heard cries. I found my son-in-law who is a surveyer and my daughter in night dress being dragged out and assaulted. My other daughter and her children ran there and they were beaten. My wife was beaten and I was beaten and slapped on my face. We were ordered to go to the road. On the road there were rows of Jawans. They started beating us as we went to the place, where the people of the village were ordered together. I saw men, women and children being beaten and brought to the spot. Many had serious bleeding injuries. Many fainted. Petrol was poured on my wife's cloths. We were all ordered to squat on the middle of the road in the hot rising sun. I saw a dead body at the place where we were kept.

There was a doctor whom I requested to attend to the people who have fainted and who had bleeding injuries. He was very human and did a highly commendable first aid job. I tried to speak to a Jawan who appeared to be an officer to me in specks. He shoted me down and he told me that fourteen of their men have been killed and that they would kill fourteen of us and rape all the women. I can identify the officer. Later I tried to speak to another officer who told me that we were all tigers and the women of the area are the people who harboured and helped the tigers and wanted me to speak to the people to give the names of the tigers and to give details of their whereabouts.

I told the people that I was ordered to say. They all were wailing and one women came forward and said that she saw a person at the area of this place where the bomb blast had taken place. She also said that this person was not from our village but the next village.

Then, Suresh, the tiger leader was brought to the spot blindfolded. His eyes were unfolded and he was ordered to point out the tigers from among the people huddled up their. He went round the crowd and after carefully looking at each one of them said that there was not even a single person among us who belong to the tiger group.

When the officer whom I later was informed as Major Madan called me and wanted me to tell the crowd to seperate themselves into groups of men on one side and women on the other side. I got up and passed this information to the people huddled up there. At this time I saw the Parish Priest of our village also being in the crowd. I called him to come up to Major Madan and introduced the Priest to him as our Parish Priest. Then Major Madan apologised to him and asked me to tell the people to go back to their houses.

While we were squating on the road I saw smoke. The village was burning, it appeared. I knew then that our houses were being set fire to. I saw some Jawans when I was being driven out of my house carrying cans. There was petrol inside because they poured petrol on my wife's cloths.

When we returned to our houses we saw many houses burning including the Mission House of the Parish Priest next to the Catholic church. People came crying to me and told me that glass windows, TV sets, Radios, Cabinets, Refrigiraters, Furniture and many other valuables were broken into pieces. Some complained of thefts of cash and Jewellery. Two people were burned to death inside two houses. Their charred bodies were there. They were the bodies of two old and infirm persons.

One of the severely wounded named Ramanan died as a result of this and his body was handed over to relatives, however those who attended the funeral were assaulted. Another victim similarly died is confirmed. Eye witnesses will be produced if we are satisfied that a fair inquiry of the standing is assured.

LETTER

Bishop House,

The Rev. Dr. Emilio Castro,
General Secretary,
World Council of Churches,
P.O. Box. 66,
150 Route De Ferney,
1211 Geneva 20.
SWITZERLAND.

Dear Dr. Castro,

First let me thank the W.C.C for taking note of the present plight of the Tamils on Sri Lanka and for releasing a statement a few days ago. We heard it over the B.B.C. you had rightly urged the Indian government to pursue a negotiated Political Settlement and not adopt the military approach. We are all very troubled and disturbed about the plight of our people and are afraid. The facts about the present Indian army operations are not getting through. A few days ago some leading citizens from the citizens' committee met here at Vaddukoddai and sent a memorandum to the Indian Prime Minister. I am listing some facts below based on that memorandum and other facts which I have been able to verify to the best of my ability.

1. The whole of Jaffna Peninsula is with out electricity for more than three weeks with all the consequences that follow from it.
2. There has been a perpetual 24 hours curfew in the peninsula from the 15th of October. It has been relaxed only for few hours a day during the last few days within the Jaffna municipal limits. This has meant serious problems for the wounded. The dead cannot be given a decent burial or cremation. People are unable to obtain their provisions. There is a standstill of all transport, all communications have been paralysed.
3. The Indian Force contrary to all public statements put out by the official media have engaged in indiscriminate shelling and aerial attacks. Atleast 500 civilians have been killed so far and about 2000 injured.

To mention a few instances :

a). The Government Teaching Hospital in Jaffna was attacked by Indian army and one of the victims who escaped with serious injuries told us that atleast 200 were killed in the hospital. This included a few nurses and a few doctors.

b). A refugee camp in Kokkuvil Hindu College was attacked and about 30 refugees were killed.

c). Passengers at a Jetty in Araly trying to cross over to the Island, on the other side for safety were attacked by air and about 30 of them were killed.

d). Hospitals including other govt. hospitals at Tellipalai and private hospitals have been shelled and forced to close down. Our own mission hospital at Manipay was shelled and one staff member was killed. There were more than 300 refugees at that time, in addition to the patients and the staff. The hospital remains closed for the last few weeks.

4. The indiscriminate shelling has led to nearly 400 thousand refugees within the peninsula. The homes they fled from have been damaged by shellings and often looted. Because of the curfew the N.G.Os including the churches which are trying to help are unable to get provisions for the refugee camp.
5. Since banks and post offices are closed there is an acute problem of money transaction.

All these will convince you that the innocent civilians are the victims of these operations. We do not believe justice and peace can be achieved through this. We trust international organisations can bring to bear their good influence to bring about a ceasefire immediately and urge the parties to work for a political solution.

I don't know I could have this posted since we have no postal services to Jaffna for the last few weeks. We continue to pray for peace with justice for all our people. Please share this letter with others on the W.C.C. staff, particularly Ninanp, Wesley and Preman.

I hope you can use your discretion in giving the publicity that can influence the Indian govt. to go for ceasefire and a political solution.

This letter will provide the explanation for my inability to attend the E.S.R, consultation. I am sorry I had to miss it. My presence here was essential. Please do mention this to Hurbert.

Yours very sincerely
Sd.....
D.J. AMBALAVANAR

Bishop House
P.O. Box. No. 2
Jaffna
16.10.1987

To His Excellency
The Prime Minister of India

To His Excellency
The President of Srilanka

Your Excellencies,

We, the catholic clergy of Jaffna are puzzled and dismayed at the recent turn of events. The last week has seen the worst of the suffering of all our people. The indiscriminate shelling of entire area has caused the death of more than hundred civilians in their own home and rendered an unprecedented number injured. The hopes of the people have been damaged forcing them to flee with panic, seeking refuge in Churches, Temples and Schools. Though civilians were instructed to seek shelter in 3 specified places these very same places have been the target of shelling and injuring some of them. The hospitals and private Medical Centres are now crowded with the injured. A section of the Teaching Hospital of Jaffna has also been shelled. The supply of electricity has been cut off for the last one week in the entire peninsula and the supply of drinking water has therefore been disrupted. No fuel is available and the transport is at a stand still, thus causing a complete break down of the supply of essential food and medicines. The sanitory conditions in the city has deteriorated and there is an imminent danger of the spreading of infectious diseases. The complete ban on seafare has not only deprived the fishermen of their liveli-hood but has also isolated the dweller of the neighbouring tiny island from the rest of the peninsula. Even patients travelling by boat from one of the islands for emergency treatment have been strafed and killed. In this hour of utter desparation of our people we humbly appeal to you as the Signatories of Peace-Accord to seek immediate steps to stop the random shelling, assure the free flow of essential supplies and make all possible efforts to bring immediate ceasefire.

Thanking you,

Yours faithfully
1. Rev. Fr. Illavi Jebanesan
Dean, Jaffna District
2. Rev. Fr. S.A. Michael Samy
Administrator, Jaffna Diocese

"We can't endanger Tamils' interests" NEWS

From Our Staff Reporter

PONDICHERRY, Oct. 16.

The Government of India "has the interests of Tamils at heart", the Defence Minister, Mr. K. C. Pant, said here today.

Referring to the developments in Sri Lanka, he said if the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam took action jeopardising the interests of the Tamils, "we have to see the larger interests of Tamils and cannot allow them to be endangered."

Permanent guarantee: Maintaining that civilians should never be casualties in Sri Lanka, the Defence Minister said it was the responsibility of everyone concerned to respond to the situation and see that the accord was given effect to so that a permanent guarantee could be given to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. For this purpose "our troops are in the island and some of these troops are shedding blood.'

Mr. Pant said he would only appeal to all the parties in Tamil Nadu to look at the issue with clarity. He said that till recently some parties which were criticising the LTTE had now started agitations in its favour. He wondered if these parties were making political capital out of the "unfortunate" situation or whether they were interested in the welfare of the Tamils.

Our Madras Staff Reporter writes:

In Madras, Mr. Pant made a forceful plea to the LTTE to "consider the present situation and cooperate with the Indian Government to help implement fully the recently concluded Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement.

"I feel sad that the LTTE is not able to see the problem in its correct perspective as it should, and we still hope that the LTTE would lend its whole-hearted support to implement the agreement.

Mr. Pant, who was on his way to Delhi from Pondicherry, told reporters at the Madras airport that the Government was committed to implementing the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement.

"We have to see that the legitimate interests of all the Tamils in Sri Lanka and not of a single group alone are safeguarded". The Minister said the Indian Government had tried to restore peace after signing the historic agreement in strife-torn Sri Lanka.

Mr. Pant expressed his unhappiness over the LTTE's move to go back after agreeing to the details of the composition of the interim administration and the committee chosen for the purpose. The Indian Government had even agreed to change the name of the member suggested by the LTTE, he said.

The Minister was sad to note that innocent civilians were being used as "human shields" against the Indian Peace-Keeping Force. He said that "the responsibility for any civilian casualties will be the LTTE's" he added. "The Government of India and the IPKF do not bear any ill will against anyone or to particular Tamil groups. We are only trying to implement the agreement in full, and all Tamil groups, particularly the LTTE, should help in this direction."

CIVILIANS □ KILLED (Operation Pawan)

S. Prabhakaran 12.10.87

R. Raja Rajan 12.10.87

P. Sachidanandam 12.10.87

N. Suresh Kumar 12.10.87

Thavarasalingam 12.10.87

P. Muthulhambi 13.10.87

Miss. Susila 13.10.87

Miss. Annette 15.10.87

D. Navarathnam 16.10.87

R. Sivapakyam 16.10.87

S. Sivasankar 16.10.87

Sabapathy 17.10.87

I. Sahadevan 17.10.87

K.S. Sundaram 17.10.87

Kadirkamanathan 18.10.87

P. Sriskandaraja 18.10.87

D. Balachandran 19.10.87


C. Chokkalingam 19.10.87

THE AGE



Red Cross calls for end to slaughter of civilians

Colombo, Thursday

The Red Cross today appealed for an end to the killing of civilians as Indian troops pressed deeper into the Tamil Tiger stronghold of Jaffna, in northern Sri Lanka.

Speaking by telephone from the beleaguered city, the president of the Jaffna branch of the Red Cross, Mr Balasubramanian, said the killing of civilians, mainly by heavy shelling, must end. "We're not criticising anyone," he said, "we just want to save the community from perishing. The situation in Jaffna is worse than it's ever been. It's a slow process of death."

Another Jaffna source said by telephone that 76 bodies had been brought to the hospital since Saturday, when Indian troops launched an all-out campaign against Tamil separatist guerillas.

More than 320 wounded had also arrived, including 91 females and 18 children under the age of 10. About 70 per cent of the men were more than 40 years old, suggesting a high proportion of non-combatant casualties.

Jaffna, with 6000 Indian troops closing in, is without power, sanitation or effective medical care. The hospital has run out of oxygen, fuel for its generator, and bandages. Surgeons, who did 166 operations on Monday alone, have been forced to stop work.

Food is running low in other parts of the Jaffna Peninsula, and unless supplies are sent in within the next few days the estimated 400,000 people who have taken refuge in designated schools, churches and Hindu temples will be in dire straits.

Mr Balasubramanian said he had appealed to the Sri Lankan Red Cross in Colombo to send food and medicine. He said food was running very short because no one could leave: traders could not get to the wholesalers, and shops in the bazaar had no food for sale.

The grim picture was confirmed by a contact who managed to make a brief telephone call yesterday to the capital. "The situation is worse than anyone can imagine," he said. "The impression that has been created among the people here is that the fighting is directed against the civilian population."

The Jaffna contact insisted that there had been steady shelling from the Old Dutch Fort to the west of the town centre, from where Indian forces have been making limited sorties against heavily defended Tiger positions.

The Indian Army has been battling Tamil guerillas since last week, when Tamil militants went on the rampage after 13 Tigers committed suicide in police custody. The Indian troops, whose numbers have been boosted to about 15,000 in the past week, are in the country to enforce a peace accord signed by the Indian and Sri Lankan governments in July.

The Tamil Tigers today showed that they are still a force in other parts of the country. They exploded two land-mines within eight kilometres of Batticaloa, on the east coast. The first killed 20 Indian soldiers, taking the Indian death toll to 77. No details were available of casualties after the second land-mine explosion, but two members of the Tamil Tigers were shot after the first incident.

Farther north, in the Trincomalee district, a third land-mine killed three members of Sri Lanka's paramilitary home guards. To the east, 10 Sinhalese villagers were killed when two lorries were ambushed. Like the gruesome massacres a fortnight ago, this is also thought to have been the work of the Tamil Tigers.

— John Rettie, Guardian

16.10.87

Mangaiarkarasi & Family 12.10.87

Sivagurunathan & Family 17.10.87

'Hoodwinked', say Tamils

By TONY WRIGHT

The Indian Government had hoodwinked the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil population with its so-called peace-keeping force, according to Tamils who demonstrated in Canberra yesterday.

Tamil spokesmen said India's real reason in sending troops to Sri Lanka was to gain effective control of the Sri Lankan strategic deep-sea harbour of Trincomallee Port, and instead of protecting the interests of Tamils, the Indian troops were waging war on them.

More than 150 Tamils held a quiet demonstration outside Parliament House yesterday before marching to the Indian High Commission, where two of their representatives presented a petition calling on the Indian Government to allow the Red Cross access to Jaffna, where heavy fighting has been reported during the past few days, and to resume peace negotiations with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

The representatives of the Australasian Federation of Tamil Organisations also presented a letter to the office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Hayden, asking him to persuade the Indian Government to halt the offensive against the Tamil Tigers and to negotiate with them; to permit immediate access by the Red Cross to the areas of conflict; and to grant access to foreign media correspondents "to secure complete and accurate information on developments in Sri Lanka". The letter to Mr Hayden alleged that "never in the history of human conflict have tanks and heavy artillery been used against so defenceless and battered a people as the Tamils of Jaffna".

A spokesman for the federation of Tamil associations, Mr K. Ravichandra, said reports he had received from Jaffna indicated that about 200 Tamils had been killed and 375,000 out of a population of 800,000 on the Jaffna Peninsula had been made homeless during recent attacks by the Indian force. "We have heard that 45,000 people are taking sanctuary in one temple alone," he said.

The secretary of the Eelam Tamil Association of Australasia, Mr Sureshan, said the international media had abandoned Jaffna after the Indian forces had arrived, in the belief that peace was being restored. The international media was getting a distorted picture from Indian sources, he said.

OCTOBER 16.



Picture: RICHARD BRIGGS

A Tamil protester wearing a black headband holds a placard aloft during yesterday's demonstration by more than 150 Tamils outside Parliament House and the Indian High Commission. The demonstrators presented a petition at the commission.

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

Kathiravelu Sinnamma 24.10.87

S. Srivaradaraja, Neelambigai 24.10.87

INDIA TODAY

SRI LANKA

Tiger by the Tail

REPORT

The Indian Army's offensive has dangerous overtones

IT is a sight familiar enough to India's border population. The skies awash with waves of lumbering troop carriers, the heavily-fortified camps below unloading tanks and armoured personnel carriers, troops in full battle dress on patrol, the distant thunder of gun-fire. But this time, there was one vital difference—the border was one that India's military strategists had never even considered in their operational plans, and the enemy happened to be people of the same ethnic blood.

Barely 10 weeks after Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Junius Jayewardene put their signatures to an accord designed to bring peace to the troubled island, India's role in that process has acquired alarming overtones. The 8,000-strong Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), originally sent in to police the peace between the Tamils and the Sinhalese, at first found itself a helpless spectator to a bloody internecine war between the Tamil groups that left over 150 dead. And by last fortnight, in what is the ultimate irony, the IPKF was sucked into a full-scale battle against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the most dominant militant Tamil group in the island.

That could be an overture to a diplomatic and even military disaster. The fact that the Indian Army is now engaged in an open war with the LTTE—who they originally intended to protect—has all but destroyed the accord's legitimacy. More dangerous is the fact that the Indian Army could get bogged down in a Vietnam or Afghanistan-type misadventure.

The LTTE is the most heavily-armed, the most fiercely motivated and the most battle conditioned of the Tamil militant groups. It has fought a similar guerrilla war for the last four years against the Sri Lankan security forces and inflicted heavy casualties. It has a near-total support of the local population, amongst whom it can mix without detection. And, it is fighting on a familiar battlefield though, admittedly, against a superior and better-trained force.

The official death count after New Delhi gave the green signal for the IPKF to launch an offensive against the Tigers, is an estimated 250 Tamil militants, mostly LTTE men, killed and 500 injured. On the other hand, 18 IPKF personnel lost their lives and 79 have been injured. But the fact that 300 people have died in three days of fighting is an alarming indicator.

In Jaffna, the Tigers used women citizens of the town to form a human shield in an effort to keep out the approaching Indian army. As the military action intensified, whole buildings were razed to the ground, window panes of houses and shops were smashed, doors broken and ajar, shops closed. There was indefinite curfew. Gunshots and the deafening sounds of intermittent explosions rent the air. Some 40,000 trembling residents huddled into schools, colleges, temples and public buildings.

The IPKF objective was to capture the LTTE leaders, seize their arms and demolish opposition to the accord. And the army tried to enter Jaffna town from three axes: the southwest, northwest and the west of the town. However, the initial assessment that the action would be over in five days was later revised to 10 days. The very fact that the IPKF strength in northern and eastern Sri Lanka was doubled to an official 16,000 (unofficial sources put it closer to 30,000) and supplemented with squadrons of tanks, APCs and even a battalion of para-commandos who were

Captured LTTE leaders killed themselves with cyanide, precipitating a crisis that resulted in the IPKF taking on the LTTE.

Indian troops in Jaffna (left) and Tamil Tigers with cyanide capsules

Bodies of Sinhalese killed by LTTE militants in the eastern province



The IPKF allowed the war between the militant factions to get out of control and failed to stop the mass killings.

air-dropped over Jaffna, indicates that the IPKF has literally caught a tiger by the tail.

This unenviable situation is largely of its own making. It did nothing to ensure that the Tigers surrendered all their arms. The IPKF allowed the internecine war between the militant factions to get out of control and failed to stop the ensuing mass killing of Sinhalese and Tamil civilians. And now, it is faced with an invisible enemy who has heavily mined key areas in Jaffna district.

The situation was serious enough for Defence Minister K.C. Pant and Chief of Army Staff K. Sundarji to rush to Colombo last fortnight in a last-ditch effort to salvage the endangered accord. Sundarji issued detailed written instructions to his field commanders to disarm the militants, rout them out of their hide-outs and shoot at sight, if they resisted. Said Jyotindra Nath Dixit, India's high commissioner in Colombo: "Our troops have fanned out to seize all arms in the possession of the Tamil militants."

Within three days of "full-fledged operations", some 500 suspected LTTE members have been taken into custody. Two ordnance factories of the Tigers were destroyed and arms as well as ammunition recovered. Over 400 kg of explosives that were unearthed in the eastern province have been destroyed. Moreover, the printing presses of two newspapers—*Eelamurasu* and *Murasoli*—which the Tamil Tigers were running in Jaffna, were also blown up by the IPKF.

Photographs by SHYAM TEKWANI

The Indian action was not confined to Sri Lankan soil. In search and raid operations on LTTE offices launched simultaneously in Tamil Nadu, six powerful radio transmitters were seized in an attempt to break their communications network. The IPKF is now engaged in a concentrated manhunt for senior LTTE leaders: military commander Velupillai Pirabhakaran, seen by India as the arch villain endangering the accord and on whose head Jayewardene has put a price of Rs 1 million, T. Yogi of the group's political wing, A.S. Balasingham, ideologue and spokesman, and five other hardcore leaders. But that will not be easily accomplished. The LTTE leaders have many hide-outs in the peninsula which they switch and can count on the

locals to give them sanctuary.

The onerous nature of that objective is already in evidence. At Pooneryn, south of the Elephant Pass which connects the Jaffna peninsula with the rest of the island, a land-mine explosion critically injured three Indian soldiers. Three Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel and two soldiers were killed in LTTE attacks on Indian patrols, in the first two days of the Indian Army's 'operation arms seizure'. Seven CRPF personnel and 10 soldiers were also injured in the pitched battle where heavy Indian artillery was deployed. And three paratroopers were shot dead during the para-drop over Jaffna Fort. A Sri Lankan government source said the Tigers also managed to take five Indian soldiers into custody and hacked them to death. Dead Indian paratroopers' bodies were publicly displayed in the town.

Meanwhile, Pirabhakaran has remained elusive. From his Jaffna hide-out, he sent a message to Rajiv Gandhi via his Madras office, asking him to stop the Indian Army offensive. "The offensive of your army directed against us violates the peace agreement and can cause grave consequences," the message stated. Separate messages went out also to the Tamil Nadu chief minister M.G. Ramachandran and DMK President M. Karunanidhi. Fumed an Indian High Commission official: "Pirabhakaran is now trying to dabble in Tamil Nadu's politics for his nefarious ends."

Having taken a stand in the face of mounting criticism from the Jayewardene Government, it is unlikely the offensive will be called off. But it is a battle that will be difficult to win since it now involves virtually the entire Tamil population in Sri Lanka. Says Vettivelu Yogeswaran, former Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) MP from Jaffna: "How can the Indian Army be sure that everybody it has killed is a militant? It will be difficult for the Indian security forces to prove that." Added Dr Neelan Tiruchelvam, a leading Colombo lawyer and also a former TULF MP: "The action of the IPKF in launching its military offensive against the LTTE is a set-back to the whole peace process. It is alienating significant sections of the Tamil population, because a large section of the Tamil population had emotionally identified itself with the Tigers."

The danger of alienating the Tamils in the northern and eastern provinces is already evident in their sullen mood and the hatred with which they now view the IPKF. Lamented Father Chandra Fernando, vice-president of the Batticaloa Citizens Committee: "The Indian Army seems to have started going the way of the Sri Lankan Army. We plan to seriously complain to Indian authorities about the activities of the IPKF."

The current operation, however, has been quickly put under wraps. Communications between Colombo and Jaffna have been cut and all transport heading north is being stopped and turned back.

The IPKF is obviously worried about civilian casualties. But in their current operations, that will be virtually impossible to avoid. Sri Lankan Tamils, who have managed to reach Colombo from central Vavuniya and surrounding areas, are narrating stories of acute civilian suffering in the north. Said a 50-year-old Jaffna Tamil businessman, who managed to escape from the peninsula to Colombo after the battle outbreak: "Fourteen innocent Tamil people were killed outside the Kailasa Pilliar Koil near Nallur in Jaffna, in an exchange of fire between IPKF personnel and the Tigers. Only eight Tigers were killed in the shoot-out. This should give an idea about the increased proportion of civilian killings."

Indian Army sources vehemently denied allegations of civilian killings in their search operations or retaliation against LTTE attacks. Said a top IPKF army officer: "We always remember that we are fighting insurgents in a foreign country, so we take the utmost care not to harm a single civilian." Argued an Indian High Commission official: "People in Sri Lanka who criticise us for not achieving total arms surrender by the militants within the deadline stipulated in the accord, should remember that the Sri Lankan Army has unsuccessfully fought the militants for four years. How can the IPKF seize all their arms within a specific time frame?"

The Indian reaction came in the wake of charges by Jayewardene and others in his Government that while Colombo had fulfilled its commitments under the accord (phased release of Tamil detenus, introduction of the Provincial Council Bill and its reference to the Supreme Court), Indian soldiers had not satisfied the prerequisite of achieving total arms surrender by the militants. Jayewardene has, in fact, warned that if the Indian soldiers did not do so,

In Jaffna, Sundarji issued instructions to disarm the militants, rout them out of their hide-outs, and shoot at sight if they resisted.

Sundarji and IPKF commanders discuss strategy in Jaffna

they will be asked to quit—a move within his powers under the accord.

But if much of Jayewardene's recent statements are populist-aimed, there is now no denying that New Delhi had miscalculated badly by becoming signatory to an accord which the Tigers had always denounced and then, by not ensuring the surrender of all Tamil militant arms within 72 hours of the signing of the accord, as enjoined under the agreement. The current situation offers tailor-made fodder for the opponents of the accord who are becoming more vocal in their criticism. Says Anura Bandaranaike, leader of the Opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party in Parliament: "The Indian Army is like the Trojan horse. We accepted them and expected them to bring peace, and they then started watching as our people were butchered. President Jayewardene has appealed to the Indians to do their duty or quit. But they won't quit. They have come here to stay. They won't take the President's orders."

Dinesh Gunawardene, MP and leader of the Mahajana Ekasath Peramuna, which opposed the accord, protests: "The so-called peace accord has failed to bring about cessation of hostilities. Only some arms were surrendered and the so-called peace-keeping force failed miserably to protect the Sinhalese, Muslims, and Tamils." Further, Jayewardene now says that he will not allow the crucial merger of the northern and eastern provinces till the militants are totally disarmed.

But that is obviously going to be an onerous task. The Tigers have made a mockery of the IPKF in the eastern province by massacring an estimated 200 civilians, mostly Sinhalese, under the very nose of the soldiers. The Tigers have also reportedly terrorised and chased out entire Sinhalese colonies, and an estimated 10,000 Sinhalese have been rendered homeless in the eastern provinces, many of whom have started arriving in Colombo. They have also killed prominent Tamils like the Batticaloa government agent M. Anthonimuthu. Said Father Fernando: "The IPKF cannot escape the blame for allowing large-scale civilian massacre by the Tigers." Said Sri Lanka's Education Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe: "Sinhalese people have genuine misgivings about the IPKF having been an idle bystander when Tamil terrorists attacked Sinhalese civilians in a series of incidents in Trincomalee."

The large-scale civilian massacre by the LTTE was a sequel to the IPKF bungle in allowing the Sri Lankan Government to try and transport 17 LTTE members—intercepted by the Sri Lankan Navy off Point Pedro, in a boat reportedly stacked with arms and ammunition—to Colombo for trial. The 17 Tigers, who included Jaffna regional commander Kumarappa and Trincomalee commander Pulendran, were being detained by the Sri Lankan forces in Palaly.

THE Tigers, however, had threatened grave consequences if the men were taken to Colombo, where they feared they would be tortured or killed. The Indian authorities could have stopped the transfer and Dixit apparently tried to convince Jayewardene but failed. The result was tragic—all 17 detenus consumed cyanide. Twelve, including Kumarappa and Pulendran died, while the other five were in intensive care at the IPKF hospital in Palaly.

In fact, New Delhi's dealing with the Tigers has been a series of grievous blunders, specially in the last month. It underestimated the exponential propaganda effect of Amrithalingam Thileepan's fast in September, in Jaffna. And neither was it aware that the LTTE command structure was being weighted in favour of military commanders, with the political leadership being sidelined. Kadavul, Naresh and Tommy, all politically conscious leaders of the Tigers in Batticaloa, have left the LTTE in the last one year, and recently, Francis, the politically mature LTTE leader from the district, was replaced by Suresh. Karuna, who was till recently a personal bodyguard of Pirabhakaran, has become LTTE's military commander for Batticaloa. In fact, Karuna's appointment was made after the signing of the accord, clearly implying that the Tigers had not given up their military ambitions.

That the Tigers hadn't changed their stripes was equally evident from the breakdown of negotiations between them and Dixit on the composition of the interim administrative council (IAC) for the north and the east. Jayewardene, under Dixit's persuasion, went out of the way to accommodate the LTTE in the composition of the 12-member IAC. He selected the chairman of the council, C.V.K. Sivagnanam, from the panel of three names (two from the north and one from the east) submitted by the LTTE. He gave the LTTE six more seats in the IAC. The six members were selected from a panel of nine names (seven from the north, two from the east) given by the Tigers. And he conceded the Tigers' demand that no other Tamil militant group would find a place in the council. He also agreed that one of the two Muslim representatives would be an LTTE nominee.

But still the Tigers reneged, under the pretext that the President had created the impression that they represented only the north, in the names he had selected. But the panel of names submitted for consideration by the Tigers had itself spoken of the group's northern bias. So when Sivagnanam backed out of the chairmanship, the Tigers insisted only N. Pathmanabhan, former assistant government agent in the east, should replace him.

Faced with this intransigence, the decision was taken to launch the offensive against the Tigers, first between Rajiv Gandhi and Jayewardene on the telephone, and later during Pant's visit. Jayewardene announced that the LTTE had been outlawed and there is now a suggestion from the Sri Lankan side to announce another interim council that will exclude the Tigers and give more representation to the other militant groups which have supported the accord.

But substantial sections of the Sri Lankan Tamil population are of the opinion that no settlement that excludes the Tigers would work. Said a Jaffna Tamil citizen, who left for Colombo after the outbreak of hostilities: "The Tigers perhaps wouldn't be able to hold out for long against the Indian Army. But defeating them militarily wouldn't be the solution. You will have to talk them into agreeing."

Kittu told INDIA TODAY last fortnight: "We hoped a situation wouldn't arise in which we would have to clash with the Indian Army. But the blame should be on the IPKF that such a situation has arisen now. We are for the accord, although we doubt the Sri Lankan Government's sincerity in implementing it. We, however, certainly want an understanding with the IPKF."

But the voice of the moderates is being drowned in the gun-fire that echoed through Jaffna last fortnight. Added to that is the ominous rumble of Indian tanks—with reinforced treads to counter the effect of the land-mines strewn all over the area—that have been brought in to augment the already awesome arsenal of firepower in the peninsula.

IPKF sources say that their orders are to go all out, at least for the next week or two, to ensure that the militants are disarmed and key leaders of the LTTE apprehended. But India's decision to go in for a military short-cut rather than a mixture of the carrot and the stick, could yet prove to be its biggest bungle in a situation where there have already been too many.

—S.H. VENKATRAMANI in Colombo

THE STATESMAN

INDIA'S NEW ROLE IN LANKA

Visions Of Cyprus And Vietnam

SUNANDA K. DATTA-RAY

OCTOBER 18, 1987

COMMENT

AS Jaffna's defences crumble and an obliging Commonwealth prepares to bestow respectability on a peace pact that needs a war to keep just its memory alive, Sri Lanka's plight evokes the tragedy of two other countries: Cyprus and Vietnam.

Tiny Cyprus, not more than 3,600 square miles· is formally a single republic whose independence, territorial integrity and security are assured by a treaty of guarantee signed by Britain, Greece and Turkey. But Nicosia's writ does not run in the breakaway fragment that calls itself the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". And if India takes its responsibility "to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka" more seriously than the signatories to the Cypriot treaty· we might be presented right on our doorstep with the running sore of another Vietnam, probably to run for much longer than the original's 12 years, and with the renewed danger of a fall-out of hostilities in this country.

But for all that India's Defence Minister and Chief of the Army Staff flew out to Colombo as they might have to Kohima at the height of the Naga insurrection, the problem is not our's. Belying the true purpose of India's exercise in mediatory diplomacy, as set out in Rajiv Gandhi's letter attached to the July 29 agreement· Sri Lanka is not yet the 26th State of the Union. In spite of the Prime Minister's defensive reiteration of Colombo's explicit invitation to send troops, and notwithstanding the fulsome praise that a hard-pressed Junius Jayewardene feels obliged to shower on the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement, the challenge of a secessionist Eelam is no more this country's responsibility than the Khalistan revolt is Pakistan's.

PROTEGES

What does concern us is the extraordinary volte face that our Government has performed, as a result of which it is bogged down today in a foreign civil war, defending a President whom it accused of vacillation and bad faith until only the other day and attacking a people whom it regarded as friendly proteges until just as recently. While Tamils charge India with betrayal and the Sinhalese gloat over the IPKF's grim predicament· Mr Gandhi stands accused of himself pursuing the precise military solution that he was so quick to condemn when attempted by Mr Jayewardene.

The official explanation that New Delhi could not refuse to send troops when demanded by Colombo will not wash for clause 2.16 (c) of the agreement would never have been included if such military intervention had not been contemplated right from the start. It is also specious to plead that the LTTE invited military reprisal by prevaricating over nominations to the Interim Council since Mr Jayewardene's conduct in this respect has been almost as devious.

In any case, all the allegations of terrorism, adventurism, dishonesty and whatever that New Delhi's propaganda machine has suddenly started to churn out against the LTTE would have been just as valid four years ago at the start of the conflict. They could also justifiably have been voiced later when India looked on passively while the LTTE butchered its political rivals, and· more recently, when Colombo was sharply warned not to think of bombing the guerrilla strongholds.

Not only has India always condoned Velupillai Pirabhakaran's many outrages but the Indian forces turned a blind eye when the LTTE made a mockery of the arms surrender ritual. Even as India claimed that "70 per cent" of arms· including all heavy weapons, had been given up, and only small arms retained for personal use· there were reports of the LTTE using "mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, rocket launchers, mines with very heavy explosive content" etc. At the same time, the foreign Press more plausibly pointed out that only about 20 per cent of the cache had been handed over· even this consisting mainly of easily replaced home-made mortars. Nor could the Indian authorities in Sri Lanka have been unaware of the reported brisk sale of polythene and vaseline as the Tamil guerrillas wrapped and buried the bulk of their more deadly weapons.

The only explanation for ignoring all this seems to be that up to a point it suited New Delhi's strategy to encourage the Eelam rebels and exert additional pressure through them, on the Government in Colombo. Tamil Nadu's internal politics may have been a further complication, but the haste with which the Chief Minister followed New Delhi in dropping the LTTE suggests that M. G. Ramachandran's line may not have been so defiantly independent after all. Indeed, the political exploitation of cross border terrorism—of which Sri Lanka complained bitterly at Saarc's inaugural summit in Dhaka—is borne out by the favours shown to the Tamil terrorists until Colombo's capitulation to India's

regional demands made them redundant.

The precedent for the strategy was set on the small stage of Sikkim way back in 1949 when New Delhi's local representative pressured a most reluctant ruler, Sir Tashi Namgyal, to appoint as his Prime Minister an Indian protege called Tashi Tsering who had launched an agitation for popular Government. Two weeks later Dr B. V. Keskar, then Deputy Minister for External Affairs, appeared in Gangtok and agreed to Tsering's dismissal on condition Sir Tashi accepted an Indian Dewan and a draft treaty.

The tactic was repeated a few years later in another Himalayan kingdom when the Nepali Congress was allowed to take up arms against the recalcitrant Ranas but forced to abjure violence as soon as King Tribhuvan was won over. By the time he died, B. P. Koirala was among New Delhi's most severe critics, bitter with the realization that India's espousal of democracy in Nepal was strictly determined by its relations with the reigning king.

Many years later, Morarji Desai was quite prepared to bundle Kader Siddiqui, the Tiger of Tangail, back to Bangladesh and certain death as a feature of his rapprochement with Ziaur Rahman.

Such fluctuations hold a sombre lesson for the region's embattled minorities, Tamil, Chakma, Sindhi and Pakhtoon. They can expect sympathy but not support until New Delhi is moved by its own reasons to discipline the Government against which they are engaged. Indeed, the Shanti Bahini already complains of having been abandoned because of Mr Gandhi's improved relations with General Ershad. It follows that when neighbouring rulers feel threatened by domestic pressures they have the option of enlisting India's help, and that no question of principle will inhibt the latter, providing the price is right. The military assistance given to Mrs Bandaranaike in 1971 to put down the JVP rebellion made sense, therefore, in the light of her democratic socialist republic's alignment with India on most global issues.

Not that all our neighbours are equally inclined to take advantage of this standing offer. Mrs Bandaranaike's successor certainly did not until it was made clear to him that flirting with Pakistan, China, Israel and the West would only further antagonize India without solving his problem at home. Faced with not dissimilar difficulties, Pakistan has tried to remove itself from India's orbit, creating a role that makes it indispensable to the USA's global calculations and ensures American assistance in coping with domestic or regional challenges.

But it may be inferred from three subcontinental wars that when it comes to the crunch, neither the USA nor China will intervene in South Asia, a supposition that has been strengthened by American benevolence towards India's assumption of the role of primus interpares, if not more. Finally, Nepal's peace zone theory may be seen as another, if more modest, means of trying to evade the implications of India's regional supremacy.

The question is now of only academic interest to Mr Jayewardene for having fully endorsed the first four points of Mr Gandhi's letter of July 29, he can claim to have bought the Indian Army's protection against the Eelam insurrection. It may be suggested at the same time that since India has obtained de facto control over Sri Lanka's defence and the substance of its foreign policy, it has no qualms about turning its back on yesterday's protege, shelling the town over which it so recently dropped food supplies in a dramatic gesture of compassion, liquidating Tamil terrorist organizations and forcing Tamil civilians back into the straitjacket of a unitary State with only the symbols of regional autonomy.

ACCORD

But though a nation's permanent interests justify much, the moot question is whether the accord in whose defence India is fighting a bloody war in Jaffna will ever be implemented. The eastern province's Tamil minority—only 46 per cent—does not augur well for merger, the referendum can be postponed and the extent of devolution of power and scope of administrative arrangements have not been worked out. It is by no means certain either that the Sri Lankan Parliament will ratify the necessary legislative measures, or that Mr Jayewardene, harried by the JVP, betrayed by the armed forces rank and file, denounced by the Buddhist clergy and sabotaged by his UNP colleagues, will survive in office long enough to carry out his part of the compact with India.

Fighting with its back to the wall, the LTTE has given notice that the fall of Jaffna will not be the end of the struggle for Eelam. The conflict has again underlined that the island holds two notions, as distinct from each other as when Dutthagamani vanquished Elara in the epic battle between Sinhalese and Tamil, and communal reconciliation may be as impossible as in Cyprus. The rejection of Mr Pirabhakaran's last overture confirms that Mr Gandhi meant business when he spoke of a "more aggressive role" for Indian troops, which reinforces the nightmare vision of Vietnam.

The implications of the letters exchanged when the peace pact was signed were discussed in these columns on August 2-3 with the caution that India had in effect, succeeded in imposing a variant of the Monroe doctrine on Sri Lanka to start with, but probably extending to all South Asia. But there was nothing to suggest then that India would so soon be called upon to take up a military challenge that would have provoked an immediate international outcry, if both powers had not been Asian. The entanglement in Jaffna is the price of regional hegemony: playing the superpower is not an easy role, not even in a subcontinental fish-bowl, and the rewards are by no means assured.

THE ILLUSTRATED WEEKLY OF INDIA

The Sri Lankan accord was supposed to usher tranquillity to the battle-scarred island republic.

What it has done instead is bog down the Indian army in a savage no-win situation. Over one hundred soldiers have already perished in this war of attrition.

Jaswant Singh, MP, criticises the Gandhi government's perceptions and policies on Sri Lanka.

COMMENT

JASWANT SINGH

TRAGIC HASTE

NOVEMBER 1, 1987

At the time of writing this piece, October 19, the 'military' situation in Sri Lanka, particularly Jaffna, is clear only upto a point. We have already committed about two divisions of troops in that country, blocked Jaffna harbour, enhanced our naval presence in the Palk straits and arranged for all the necessary IAF transport in addition to that provided by Indian Airlines. This situation is as near to 'war' as any since 1971.

For the first time in our history, we are engaged in combat on a foreign soil without any open declaration of hostilities. Our troops, *for the first time ever* are under the political directions of a foreign government. Even though the conditions are military, our troops are being employed in almost a policing role, for reimposing law and order. Against local forces of incipient secession, whom we had ourselves, until recently, sheltered, armed, trained and encouraged.

Our armed forces are yet again engaged in finding a military answer to gross political failures. It is ironic that those very elements of Sri Lankan society (the Tamils), whose aspirations and welfare we had made our cause are the ones that we are now fighting: that similar efforts made by the Sri Lankan forces had drawn our impotent ire earlier, is doubly ironic.

In all this is contained a most profound statement on the failures of our statecraft, of our handling of the situation, of our government's conceptualisation and conduct of foreign policy, of its ability to conceive, define and protect India's national interests.

The most unforgivable aspect then is the casual manner in which our government has committed our soldiers to battle in a foreign land.

For what have they laid down their lives and are still dying in Sri Lanka? For which overriding national interest? Are we in the process of resolving any issues? Or have we compounded them? Have we, by this action, furthered the nation's good? Or harmed it, ensured tranquillity at home, in the neighbourhood or created conditions for a 'Lebanonisation' of the region?

To date, we have already suffered about 400 casualties. More than a hundred soldiers are dead, an undisclosed number missing. The domestic polity of Tamil Nadu has been thrown into a new and unpredictable ferment.

For the second time in the recent past, political elements from within the country are turning in parochial criticism against our own army. And all this when Jaffna, the stronghold of the LTTE, has only just been militarily invested.

Our forces have only now moved in for that most exacting and ugliest bit of combat; fighting in built up areas. That these street battles would take a murderous toll, not just of us, but also of the 'captive' civilian population and property, is obvious. What is not is why our government has chosen this precise moment to talk of 'cease-fires'. Such talk is politically, militarily, psychologically and morally damaging, especially when time is not on our side.

What our army is now doing ought to have been completed in the first 72 hours of the signing of the agreement, in July itself. What conditional cease-fire is our prime minister now talking about?

Let us briefly and quickly recollect what we had set out to do on July 29. The preamble to the agreement (and intervening in Parliament, on a debate on the subject I had even then remarked upon our government's superstitious jettisoning of the debased word 'accord') speaks of the 'utmost importance (of) nurturing, intensifying and strengthening the traditional friendship of India and Sri Lanka'.

A schedule was announced for this purpose: hostilities to end within 48 hours, surrender of arms by Tamil militants, withdrawal of Sri Lankan forces to pre-May 1987 positions within 72 hours, amnesty, release of prisoners etc by August 15—and so much else which now has the taste of sawdust.

When our government was asked in Parliament to elaborate on the progress of 'surrender of arms'

we were then casually informed, '70 per cent of it is complete'. 'Delays,' languidly explained the minister, 'do after all, take place'. It is that casual approach which has already taken over a hundred Indian soldiers' lives. And all those arms, where are those 70 per cent 'surrendered' arms now?

Yet, in early August, all this was described by our prime minister with characteristic immodesty, as 'the agreement of the century'. Either that statement was total public deception or it was complete self-deception, and on a prodigious scale. Little wonder, therefore, that our reactions ought now to be so stunned and so incoherent.

The mess that we find ourselves in in Sri Lanka, is a classic example of thought following action instead of preceding it.

Did our prime minister really believe what he said then? If he did, then he must be an uncommonly unthinking, man. If he did not and yet said what he did, then that is unforgivable. Not only because it demonstrates, yet again, that our prime minister has no understanding of where he is leading the nation. More so because the words that he uttered then exemplify how he has become a hostage to self-bewitching persuasions.

The question that all policy makers must routinely address themselves to is not merely 'what needs to be done' but 'how is it to be done'. This holds as more particularly true in the field of foreign affairs.

Mistakes by a government in the conduct of its domestic policy, though exacting a price, are remediable from within. Not so the errors of diplomacy and international relations. They invariably take a more grievous toll.

That is precisely why in the field of international relations it is not good policy to take decisions without thought or merely on the basis of what needs to be done: not, at least, until it is quite clear as to how that is going to be done, and successfully. Individuals might fail or might not. Nations cannot. They must always, eventually, only succeed; or a whole people perish.

And what the President of Sri Lanka did, our prime minister did as well. He formulated a policy in respect of Sri Lanka, presumably entirely in his own head or within a closed coterie and launched our nation on the parlous path of 'peace-keeping' in a conflict of ancient origins. An accord, not between the Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan government; an agreement between the governments of India and Sri Lanka, as if they were the real disputants.

Our prime minister decided on a major new foreign policy and security commitment, the viability of which had never even had a chance for consideration by those responsible for its execution, leave alone a detailed examination of its various implications. What its costs were likely to be, how long all this might take and most vital, what would be the minimum requirements of governmental policy directions before we committed our armed forces to this bog of ethnic and social divides. All this, presumably, was treated as nagging detail in that heady moment of 'history'.

Yet another horrible apprehension haunts me: have we been lured into a trap, partly set, but largely of our own making? It is especially important to establish whether, when our government decided to undertake this assignment, it did so for itself; for a cause, or because others had put up a bait for us to snap at.

Let us take the unworthy fears first: was there (or was there not) a ruse, on the part of Sri Lanka or anybody else? All those overstated and repeatedly announced fears about the presence of Mossad; that anxiety over an improbable-sounding firm of British mercenaries, Keeni-Meeni; darkly hinted suggestions about presence of Pak interests etc. Were they all real?

Even if they were, did they amount to as much a threat to our national interests as is the present bogging down of the Indian army in that island? Are we not, therefore, to conclude that our prime minister's precipitate bid at resolving an intractable ethnic divide is but a ludicrous example of rising thoughtlessly to the bait.

Then, apprehensions that our government acted for itself, not the cause. There has always existed comment, now, as earlier, that the prime minister acted with the kind of haste that he did because he desperately wanted relief from the constant hammering on the Bofors issue. That he wanted to demonstrate 'success', somewhere, anyhow. And that is precisely why he commissioned a major public relations exercise in early August, following the accord: the 'agreement of the century'; 'an unexcelled example of diplomatic wisdom' etc.

As Congress president he instituted special publicity cells within the party to propagate the virtues of the agreement. He remained curiously unwarned even when a Sri Lankan rating assaulted him during a guard of honour. Parliament was thereafter promptly adjourned to enable congressmen to welcome him home, where at Palam he attributed his welcome escape not to providence, but to his hitherto undemonstrated natural 'agility'. Whereafter, in pique, he refused to meet Opposition leaders because, as he said, 'If they had no time to share in national glory,' then he had 'no time for them.'

But if, while working for the national good, there was even the slightest element of personal political interest, then the whole was bound to get sullied: as it has demonstrably done now.

Sri Lanka is not an Indian colony. It is unlikely to willingly become our protectorate, whatever paper any Sri Lankan government might sign, as an agreement or otherwise. Here is what the Sri Lankan President had to say on the subject in August, after signing the agreement:

> There are charges that these (letters) are tantamount to surrender of sovereignty.
>
> Whatever needs legislation will have to be within our Constitution. The courts interpret it. If they reject anything, we can't go ahead with it. The letters have nothing to do with constitutional procedure in Parliament. You can only, if I may say so, take away from our independence by laws, not by words....

The essence of the above is that agreements will always be as binding as the people's subscription to them. If the Sinhala do not accept what has been signed, or if the Tamils question the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement; or if it has the inherent fragility of an individual's life-span, then it is not an agreement. It is a trick. And surely, no one can ask Indian soldiers to die for the sake of perpetuating trickery.

The cause, then, of Sri Lanka is more easily stated than attained: a united, peaceful and friendly Sri Lanka that recognises India's primacy in the region and does not act in a manner that would affect our security interests. How much of this has been attained, is indeed, attainable, or is likely to be attained through the present means employed? Of course, what we need is a flowering southern neighbour, not one that is in torment.

Are we, therefore, resolving Sri Lanka's torment by our presence or are we, in fact, compounding not just our own difficulties, but also theirs? Without any authorisation of Parliament (admittedly, not a constitutional requirement), we have placed our armed forces in the unenviable position of being the targets (real and metaphorical) of everyone in Sri Lanka (and partly in India as well).

Theoretically, we went there as saviours, applauded initially at least by the Tamils. Now, we are questioned by all segments of Sri Lankan society, Sinhala and Tamil alike. Are we to count this too as an achievement? What great national purpose has been served by this astute conduct of diplomacy? If it were security interests that propelled us to take the action that we did, then how has our nation's security environment improved by creating a potential Lebanon on our peripheries; by our southern frontiers being activated for the first time since the advent of imperial Portuguese in these waters?

Of course, execution of policy will always be attended by risks, and such risks as follow intelligible and well-constructed policy must always be accepted by any nation. But what of risks without following any policy at all? ■

"Don't you Dare, That's my bird."

Sudhir Dar, Hindustan Times

Bodies of Gandhi's troops on display: with the casualty count the highest since the 1971 war against Pakistan, the Prime Minister faced political risks

LETTER

Jaffna
17-10-87

His Excellency **J.R. Jayawardene**
President of the Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.

Your Excellency,

We, the senior public servants of Jaffna being heads of the government departments wish to bring to your kind notice that the situation in Jaffna has tremendously deteriorated from Saturday 10th October 1987, the date on which the IPKF commenced its operations and activities with the blasting of the two independent newspapers *"Eelamurasu"* and *"Murasoli"* botl registered newspapers. It has resulted in the collapse of all activities in Jaffna and the normal life has totally failed.

We would like to state below some of the main subjects which we consider as absolutely urgent.

1. BOMBING AND KILLING :

There is an intermittant and continuous shelling from the permanant army camps at Fort and Navatkuli and the temporary camps established by the IPKF at Kopay, Urumbirai, Maruthanamadam and Manipay etc. Other than this there has been aerial bombardment for two or three days and strafing from helicopters.

2. CIVILIAN DEATHS AND INJURIES :

As the result of indiscriminate bombing, shelling and aerial strafing almost 700 innocent civilians are believed to have died and death in the Jaffna Hospital alone is 76. In many instances people have carried out cremations at the respective positions due to non-availability of transport. Many people have been admitted to the Jaffna Hospital and surgical operations have been carried out for more than 300 injured persons.

3. REFUGEE CAMPS :

With the commencement of operations, the places where refugees have been asked to stay are mainly Jaffna Hindu College, Nallur Kandasamy Temple and Jaffna Hindu Ladies College for a population of 350,000 people in the entire area. These 3 places can only accommodate 3% of the population referred to. The refugees who have taken shelter in these camps have suffered deaths by aerial bombardment and artillery shelling. It appears that IPKF is expecting the people of Jaffna to face death at their houses or to go to camps and face death or to move out of the entire area. It is impossible to expect the people of Jaffna to find accomodation elsewhere. Several people have collected themselves in Temples and Churches and their lives are in danger due to the shellings and bombings. Apart from that several people have suffered injuries inflicted mainly by the IPKF and murders committed by IPKF.

4. ELECTRICITY :

The entire Jaffna district has no electricity supply from 11.10.1987. Even though the Ceylon Electricity Board personnel can restore the supply, they are unable to do so as the IPKF is not permitting the movement of them to attend to the defect. The effect of non availability of electricity to the society can well be imagined and need not be stated.

5. WATER SUPPLY :

Drinking water supply to the municipal area and the domestic water supply system have also failed.

6. FOOD SUPPLY :

The food supply situation is very grave. The people are on the verge of starvation due to non-availability of essential food items. Eventhough rice is available it cannot be transported to the areas where it is needed due to the total road block of the IPKF. As the result of bombing and shelling the traders have been forced to close the shops and flee for security reasons. Flour is not available but if transport arrangements are available this can be brought, if these are done there would be no necessity to bring the food from outside or even to airdrop food parcels.

7. FUEL :

There is an acute shortage of fuel and the situation can well be imagined. Even mobility is totally affected due to the fuel shortages.

8. DRUG (MEDICINE) SUPPLY :

Inspite of the fact that there are heavy admissions in the Jaffna district, especially the Teaching Hospital Jaffna, the drug supply has almost failed and there is a possibility of death figure increasing for want of drugs and other treatment materials. It may also be mentioned that there is the risk of the operation theatre failing due to the stand by generators failing for want of fuel and Oxygen cylinders non-availablity.

9. EDUCATION :

The total education system in the area has come to stand still and all the educational institutions from the Jaffna University down to the primary school remain closed. The biggest tragedy and grave injury inflicted on education tremendous and heavy damages have been caused to the buildings of the University of Jaffna due to the shelling and bombing. It is needless to say that the closures would have very considerable effect on the present younger generation.

10. CURFEW :

Great difficulties are caused due to the continued curfew and even the time out information being not available to the public due to the failure of TV and Radio network, due to the electricity failure. This has denied the essential services to all of us.

11. HEALTH HAZARD :

The scavenging and drainage services has come to a stand still. And the maintenance of sanitary conditions of the refugee camps have developed into a major problem for want of electricity and water supply. It is strongly feared that there will be an outbreak of epidemic diseases. We as responsible public servants ae compelled tc appeal to your Excellency to intervene in this matter and enable us, as public servants to perform our duties for the people of Jafina. We would like to emphasise the fact that any failure can lead to several adverse effects for which as head of state your Excellency and the government would not like to be party to it.

Thanking you,

Yours respectively,
Sd.....

Dr. P.S. Natchinarkiniyar
Director, General Hospital, Jaffna.

Mr. S. Kanagaratnam
Chairman NRIB

Dr. M.S Arasanathan
Registrar, Health Department

Mr. M. Manikavasagar
AGA., Jaffna

Mr. R. Jeganathan
ACCD. Jaffna.

Mr. C.V.K. Sivagnanam
Municipal Commissioner

Mr. M.N. Manzoor
Regional Director of Education

Mr. C. Panchalingam
G.A. Jaffna

Mr. S.M. Setukavalar
D.S. Postal Department, Jaffna

Mr. Ganeshanathan
D.P.S. Municipality, Jaffna

Mr. Sarkunam
ASP. Jaffna

Dr. Sivagnanasundram
Dean of Medical Faculty, Jaffna

The Daily Telegraph

The Indian Empire meets its Waterloo

Anthony Hartley on how history has caught up with Mr. Gandhi

REPORT

'India is no longer in a position to rebuke racism in Pretoria'

The Sunday Telegraph, 18.10.87

AS INDIAN TROOPS fought their way into Jaffna, the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, was pitching into South Africa and Colonel Rabuka at the Commonwealth Conference. Events in Sri Lanka were not allowed to disturb his high moral tone. There was nothing to show that here was the leader of a country over - extended abroad and riven by dissension at home.

In the good old days of Nehru things were different. The moralising was there, but it was accompanied by more efficiently conducted power politics designed to assure continued power to the Congress party and expand India's influence in Asia. Kashmir was secured, Goa invaded, Pakistan split into two States - all with the very best of motives. Indian supremacy in the sub-continent seemed to have come about by sleight of hand with none of the disagreeable episodes that usually attend imperial expansion. Nehru left his successors an Indian Raj modelled on its British predecessor and liberally anointed with cant.

Now the moment of reckoning has arrived. Mr. Gandhi has been taken for what promises, to be a dangerous ride on a Tamil Tiger. After conniving for years at the build-up of Tamil guerillas in the north of Sri Lanka, India finds itself pledged to suppress them. Jaffna, which the Sri Lankan security forces were unable to take, is now being stormed by the Indian Army with heavy losses on both sides. History produces these uncomfortable ironies, but the outcome is one which New Delhi should have foreseen.

Yet it must all have looked so easy to Mr. Gandhi. Intervention in Sri Lanka to protect the Tamils seemed likely to raise his prestige at home and abroad. The agreement with President Junius Jayawardene and the dispatch of Indian troops to Sri Lanka looked like a diplomatic triumph which would ensure the extention of Indian influence. It also had the effect of diverting attention from the deadly Sikh dissidence in the Punjab.

But this was to reckon without the Tamil Tigers.The djinni of linguistic nationalism once released is not so easily put back in the bottle. Men who believe that power comes out of the barrel of a gun are reluctant to surrender it. Oddly enough, they come to enjoy killing people. The Tigers do not merely want independence for the Tamil areas in north and east Sri Lanka. They also aim to roll back Sinhalese settlement through terror and massacre.

The result is that India, honourably carrying out its agreement with President Jayawardene, find itself landed with the responsibility for maintaining law and order in a large part of Sri Lanka for an indefinite period. Moreover, President Jayawardene is only just managing to contain Sinhalese anger at the killings carried out by the Tigers Were the agreement to collapse, then Indian would be faced with the alternative either of fighting both sides or of withdrawing from Sri Lanka in humiliating circumstances. No doubt the corpses of Jaffna have already lost Mr. Gandhi the vote in Tamil Nadu.

At the same time Indian security forces are trying to stifle the terrorist movement in Punjab which cost Indira Gandhi her life. Mr. Gandhi's agreement with the moderate Sikh party Akali Dal, whose leader was assassinated shortly afterwards, has not satisfied those who demand a Sikh State (Khalistan). Nor is the Punjab the only part of India where religious or linguistic disturbances have taken place. The latest such incident was in the area around Darjeeling where Gorkhali nationalists are demanding their own autonomous State.

As if these internal tensions were not enough. Mr. Gandhi has inherited from his gradfather the enmity of India's two most powerful neighbours. Indians now claim that Pakistan has been encouraging Sikh extremists, and there has been renewed fighting between Indian and Pakistani troops on the glaciers north of Kashmir. With China there is still a frontier dispute which led to clashes during 1986.

This number of foreign commitments and internal upheavals are too great a burden for a country whose economic policies area failure and where poverty has actually worsened over the last 20 years. The fact is that history has caught up with India. Determined to dominate its own region, while stoutly preaching the gospel of antiimperialism to others, it has been arrogant with its neighbours and often oppressive with its own minorities. The rancours and suspicions of neighbouring States are an inheritance from a period when India dictate its own solution to any dispute.

At home the cracks which have begun to appear in the Indian union are the result of years of inefficient Congress rule, which has imposed on the country a smothering bureaucracy, whose policies were based on the precepts of Kingsley Martins's New Statesman. The new nationalism which India has encouraged at the expense of Western States, is a contagious disease. No wonder that regional and ethnic groups in India should be bitten by the bug. Against the centrifugal forces that are pulling India apart stand the Indian Army and the heirs to the old Indian Civil Service. Will they be enough to hold the country together?

It is an irony that Mr. Gandhi should have to pay the price for Congress's mistakes. For he has been more conciliatory than his predecessors and perhaps deserves his annual bursts of rhetoric at Commonwealth Conferences more than they did. His plunge into Sri Lanka was probably taken with excellent intentions. But he has involved himself in an expensive and dangerous adventure, and it is hard to see how he can get out of it
without a disastrous loss of political prestige. Reading the riot act to South Africa and Fiji will not do much to improve matters. India, over-extended to rebuke reform in Pretoria or offer its protection to the Indians of Fiji.

For years India preached international morality, while reaching out to impose its will upon its neighbours. Indian influence loomed large; Indian self-righteousness even larger. Now its imperlum is dickety, and the moralising that camouflaged its expansion sounds empty indeed. Pecksniff is at the end of its tether and of his cant. Whether Mr. Gandhi likes it or not, he will have to recognise that he can no longer play the lead part in a theatre foreign policy. There is nothing like a Tamil Tiger to concentrate the mind.


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

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














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THE HINDU

87 October

Jaffna blacked out as IPKF closes in...

NEWS

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI, Oct. 17

The Indian Peace-Keeping Force has positioned itself around Jaffna town and is poised for a final assault on the last stronghold of the LTTE militants in Sri Lanka. An External Affairs Ministry spokesman said a column of the IPKF was barely two km of the town from the north and west, while another was already on the eastern fringes.

Giving details of the military action in the past 24 hours, the spokesman said that on the Navatakuli axis in the east, the IPKF captured Arialai in a heliborne raid. Twenty LTTE militants were reported killed and the IPKF seized control of a huge arms and ammunition dump in the area.

However, the LTTE launched another attack on Kopai North which was captured yesterday by the IPKF. The spokesman said the attack was repulsed, without giving details of the casualties. The LTTE had attacked this position thrice earlier, before the IPKF wrested control. This and Urumparai (also captured yesterday) are vital approaches to Jaffna from the north-east.

From the west, the IPKF's pincer advanced further south of Manipai and was close to Milestone 3, the spokesman said.

No response yet

Although reports from Jaffna indicate that conditions in the town are desperate - there is an acute food shortage and the electricity supply has been cut off -the LTTE has not yet responded positively to the minimum terms for the cessation of hostilities spelt out by Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh in Jaffna and the spokesman in Delhi yesterday. They had made it clear that an unconditional surrender of arms by the militants and an unreserved undertaking that the LTTE would cooperate in the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord were necessary before the current operations of the IPKF could be called off.

But a mood of increasing desperation among the militants was evident. Reports reaching here from Jaffna have said that the LTTE militants have been going to the outskirts of the town in the past few days and explaining the situation to the populace thus. They said the LTTE never wanted to take on a powerful army like India's, but they were committed to defending the interests of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. What would they (the people) like them to do, the LTTE cadres asked. This has been interpreted as seeking a way out of the present predicament, but nothing is known of the peoples' reaction to the rhetorical appeal. However, going by the military situation and the IPKF's total control of all approaches to Jaffna town, the LTTE leaders may not have much choice in the matter soon.

Reuter, UNI, PTI report from Colombo:

The IPKF has advanced further towards the heart of Jaffna town from four different directions, leaving at least 515 Tamil militants dead so far and capturing more areas from the LTTE.

Jaffna was blacked out as the Indian troops closed in on the town, Sri Lanka radio said.

The radio said power supplies to the town had been cut to neutralise electrical booby traps and bombs designed to explode at the press of a switch.

All exit points were under Indian control and the militants were trapped, with their firepower fast diminishing, military analysts said.

A spokesman for the Indian High Commission said as many as 101 Indian personnel have been killed so far. Most of the IPKF casualties were from landmine explosions and booby traps laid by the LTTE in Jaffna peninsula and in the Eastern Province. As many as 25 Indian soldiers are missing.

The spokesman said the IPKF which had already captured some 500 to 1000 metres of the Jaffna fort, were now strengthening their positions by putting up road blocks and sending out probing operations to locate the LTTE positions, especially on the eastern part of the town. House-to-house clearing operations are also on.

On the Kankesanthurai-Jaffna sector, the Indian troops have moved further down Manipai, about one kilometre at a place called Uvarakulam, and are now about half kilometre away from Jaffna town on this sector.

On the Palaly-Jaffna axis, the spokesman said in Urumparai, which the IPKF captured early yesterday in one of the toughest battles killing at least 111 LTTE men, the consolidation process was going on despite sniping fire by the retreating militants. Six more LTTE elements were killed in the vicinity of Urumparai during the past 24 hours, as the IPKF repulsed intermittent attacks by the fleeing militants.

On the Navatkuli flank where the IPKF has already reached the municipal limits of Jaffna town, the Indian soldiers are maintaining their forward movement and pushing into the town. Heavy fighting is raging inside the municipal limits. The LTTE, according to the spokesman, was directing its fire heavily from built-up areas, houses, tree-tops, where it had set up "machans".

The militants have positioned themselves in rocket launching pits, and long bunkers, fortified with bricks and sand bags. Some of these bunkers are as long as 40 feet. The bunkers are set up in front of houses most of which are encircled with barbed wires. This is done to have the houses with people inside as protective shields, the spokesman added.

The Sri Lankan radio said a secret LTTE document detailing sabotage attacks and raids against targets in Batticaloa was found on a militant leader captured on Friday.

The spokesman said that of the five militants arrested in Batticaloa yesterday, two were believed to be hardcore members. One LTTE member, Sashi Kumar, committed suicide by swallowing a cyanide capsule after the landmine blast on Wednesday, he said quoting delayed reports.

A 32-member Indian Red Cross team, flown to the Palaly headquarters of the IPKF would fan out in the peninsula under IPKF escort and oversee the distribution of relief supplies to displaced people, he said. A Sri Lankan Red Cross team is already in Palaly.

Civilians began streaming out of Jaffna yesterday, telling of serious shortages of food, water and medicine and alleging indiscriminate shelling of the city by Indian troops.

Ponnappa, Deccan Herald.

THE HINDU

IPKF enters Jaffna, takes parts of town..

NEWS

BATTLE □ FOR □ JAFFNA

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI, Oct 18.

Although the Indian Peace Keeping Force has entered and captured some points in Jaffna town, the LTTE militants seem to be re-grouping and attacking positions they had lost earlier.

The External Affairs Ministry spokesman said today that the Jaffna bus stand was under the control of the IPKF. But the siege of Jaffna Fort by the LTTE had not been broken. The spokesman said two columns of IPKF troops were making rapid progress from the eastern and western approaches to the town and were 'now poised to link up with the besieged Jaffna Fort.'

Once that happened, the spokesman said, the LTTE would have 'no option but to surrender' and to give in their caches of arms, ammunition and explosives. Currently, the LTTE was engaged in a 'desperate' bid to move more arms and ammunition into Jaffna by boat from hidden caches in the Jaffna lagoon. However, Indian naval boats were 'hindering' their clandestine moves, the spokesman said.

Counter-attacks

Fierce fighting continues in the northern and eastern approaches. The LTTE has launched counter-attacks in Urumparai and Kopai North, two positions captured by the IPKF in the last two days. Along the Navatkuli axis in the east, the IPKF is engaged in heavy fighting in built-up areas of Jaffna town.

The spokesman said that over 1,000 civilians had approached the IPKF to rescue them from what they described the jaws of death. The IPKF was making arrangements for their evacuation.

In the past 24 hours, the IPKF has suffered 13 killed, 39 injured and one soldier was missing. No details of LTTE casualties were given. In the Urumparai area one Infantry Combat Vehicle (ICV) of the IPKF was blown up by a mine. There was no report of violence from the Trincomalee and Batticaloa sectors where the situation was under control, the spokesman said.

Another appeal for a ceasefire was made by the LTTE deputy leader, Mr Ajit Mathaiya today. It was conveyed to the IPKF by the Jaffna chapter of the Sri Lankan Red Cross. The IPKF has repeated its earlier position, namely, that an unconditional surrender of arms by the militants and an unreserved undertaking that the LTTE would cooperate in the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement were necessary before the current operations could be called off.

As the IPKF operations entered the second week with the complete ground encirclement of Jaffna, observers here are intrigued by the persistent and desperate attempts by the LTTE to recapture Kopai North. Over 100 militants were killed in fighting two days ago when the IPKF wrested control of the area from the LTTE. Ever since, it has continued its attack on IPKF positions with more casualties.

Not so bad

Not much importance is being attached to the continuing siege of Jaffna Fort where some IPKF units have been isolated since the beginning of operations. Apart from regular helicopter supply drops, the fort is linked by causeway to positions in the rear which are under IPKF control. The fort is heavily mined by the LTTE in front and once the IPKF pincers from the east and west link up, the Indians are expected to use tracked vehicles like tanks and BMPs to get past the mines.

Travellers who have managed to leave Jaffna in the past three days give a less desperate picture of conditions in the town than generally believed. Though there are food shortages, it is nowhere near depletion. Also most of the buildings have not been damaged, a clear proof of the IPKF's restraint in using heavy artillery and air power.

Meanwhile, it is said that over 100 personnel of the Indian Red Cross are being sent to Jaffna tomorrow to supervise the distribution of medical and food supplies. These supplies are currently being loaded on to the ship Island Glory at Madras port which will sail for Kankesanthurai tomorrow.

PTI, UNI, report:

During the briefing, while referring to the capture of the bus stand, the spokesman did not clarify whether it was the old or the new bus stand. While the old one is on the outskirts of the town, the new one is well inside it. He said an ammunition dump had also been captured. The pressure along the northern approaches astride Urumparai and Kopai North was being maintained.

A Defence Ministry spokesman said that in a major breakthrough the IPKF today captured a headquarters of the LTTE at Kopai North. It also captured an ammunition dump and recovered over a tonne of explosives.

On the main Kankesanthurai-Jaffna axis, Indian troops were consolidating positions at Inuvil. The IPKF had also launched patrolling of LTTE strongholds in the eastern Trincomalee district where a dusk-to-dawn curfew was in force.

The spokesman said the troops had smashed through heavily fortified bunkers on the eastern perimeter and were locked in heavy fighting along narrow roads and alleys in Jaffna's congested western outskirts. The IPKF advanced on fiercely-defended bunkers, rocket and mortar emplacements under sniper fire from LTTE fighters hidden in surrounding trees.

"Progress is slow because the troops are meeting heavy resistance and also because they are not using all the firepower at their command out of consideration for the civilians".

Using only one hand

The IPKF was fighting with "one hand tied behind its back", he added. "This is being done at a great cost to us and at the cost of prolonging the whole operation".

"The militants have built bunkers in front of houses. When the bunkers are attacked, they retreat into the houses and attack the troops from inside." The LTTE was using hit-and-run tactics, at the same time attacking from built-up positions and from behind human shields.

The official declined to say what kind of armour was used. He said earlier that on certain operations armoured cars had been used against selected targets. The official said that the offensive would not be halted until the LTTE surrendered all its weapons.

He said that during the past two days, between 1,500 and 2,000 additional troops had been flown into the peninsula, increasing the strength of the IPKF in Jaffna alone to 8,000.

LTTE CLAIMS

On the 17th, in the encounters at Kallimadai Veli 36 men of the IPKF were killed. The Liberation Tigers captured many rifles, including one G.P.M.G and more than 10,000 bullets. In the fierce fight at Koppai one mortar and 6 shells were captured by the LTTE.

In Urumbirai region, the IPKF's indiscriminate attack has completely destroyed the plantain-fields and other crops. The IPKF drove its chained armoured vehicles through these fields and destroyed them. They also abducted 14 young girls. The LTTE which is fighting fiercely against the IPKF, is fighting only with the weapons they have caputured from the IPKF.

The IPKF attacked the Tamils in Kiran Kommandurai, Sambalveli, and Chithadi villages of the Eastern Province and burnt-down more than 50 houses of the Tamils. The LTTE engaged itself in fierce battle against the IPKF. At Kallumunai in the counter-attack of the LTTE, 24 soldiers of the Indian army were killed. The LTTE captured 3 L.M.G. magazine full of bullets.

On 17th night, at Urumbirai, 16 young girls were abducted by the IPKF.

IPKF moving in on five axes NEWS

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI Oct. 19

The Indian Peace-Keeping Force further tightened its hold over Jaffna city today when at 2.20 p.m., a linkup was effected between an Indian brigade group from the Manippal side advancing 15 km. from their positions and a group of para-commandos and Mahar Regiment soldiers advancing out of the Jaffna Fort. With this linkup, the coastal zone from Navanturai to the Fort, past the Infectious Diseases Hospital has come under the control of the IPKF.

The IPKF control of the area cuts off the LTTE inside the city from its supply bases on the islands of the Jaffna Lagoon. Tonight another IPKF column is expected to move from the eastern side of Jaffna to link up with the forces in the Jaffna Fort. With these actions, the town hall, the bus stand in front of the fort, the post office and the microwave tower have been wrested from LTTE control. Sources said that the post office building was heavily booby trapped and it would be some time before it could be cleared.

Next objective: In the actions planned for the next 24 hours, the IPKF will attempt to establish control over the Jaffna General Hospital and preparations are already under way to bring in oxygen cylinders, portable electric generators and other equipment and medicines to assist the Jaffna citizens. The IPKF will also attempt to establish contact with large groups of civilians who are attempting to reach secure areas. Last night, one attempt by a group of 1,000 civilians was foiled by firing from LTTE positions.

The IPKF is moving in on the heart of Jaffna city on five axes, the Kankesanturai-Jaffna road, through the Palali-Chunnakam-Urumparai road, via Manippal and the west coast road, via Kopai and lastly along the western coastal approaches. Though more than four brigades have been committed for the operation, the actual fighting is carried out by some 2,000 Indian soldiers fighting approximately 2,500 LTTE cadres who are entrenched in well sited and established positions. The rest of the Indian force is committed to the task of logistics and ensuring the security of the roads already opened up.

Formidable defences: In the terrain which consists of an almost continuous rows of houses along the roads leading to the city proper, the LTTE over the years has built up a formidable three or four-tiered defence system facing the approaches from Palali, Kankesanturai and Chavakacheri. The houses, mostly one or two storeyed, stand in small compounds. The LTTE has constructed an elaborate defensive line which involves deep bunkers in compounds linked with tunnels/trenches with the houses which have sandbagged and loopholed strongpoints on their upper floors.

The IPKF has so far been fighting with virtually no heavy weapon. They have used some 105mm field guns but only in a direct fire role, i.e., on targets visible to the gunners and therefore clearly identified strongpoints. The IPKF has now a huge mosaic aerial photo of Jaffna with a resolution sufficient to identify each house and it shows that little damage has been caused by the IPKF action. It is to be noted that Jaffna suffered considerable damage in May this year through the aerial action of the Sri Lankan Air Force. Sources say the photo reveals that there are not too many refugees in the Nallur Kandaswamy temple or in the General Hospital area.

More bitter action likely: The IPKF is quite confident that its assessment of the damage will be borne out by independent observers. They are ready to fly the media to the area as soon as the situation stabilises. However, given the self-imposed constraints on the IPKF it may still be a few days before this happens. In fact, the heart of the city, which is more heavily built up, will see more bitter actions unless the LTTE accepts the offer made by India to lay down arms.

Details of yesterday's battle to open the eastern coastal road are now available. A company of Mahars moved up to Milestone 2 on the road on the night of the 17th and a linkup was planned with a brigade swinging down from Manippal. The company had to face over 24 hours of attacks by LTTE fighters and lost two young officers in a gallant action. The company held out, supplied by an air-drop of ammunition till the brigade linked up at 5.30 a.m. today to push forward to meet a force emerging from the fort. This action cuts off the LTTE from their caches and supply centres in the lagoon islands. The draught in parts of the lagoon is just a little over 1 ft. And there is an acute shortage of craft to patrol it. In fact, just over five craft are currently available of which four belong to the Sri Lankan Navy.

Details are also available of the action fought around Kopai North where the LTTE launched as many as six attacks on Indian positions and lost over 100 fighters. The IPKF was somewhat puzzled by the ferocity of the attacks and the reasons for the action were realised only after an IPKF attack led by a few tanks captured the positions. Kopai North was not only a training ground for the LTTE but had a big ammunition and explosives dump.

Yesterday, near Kopai South, the IPKF also discovered three garages equipped with machine tools and found that they had captured a major LTTE facility for manufacturing mines, mortar shells and mortar barrels. In this action, the IPKF lost its seniormost officer so far, a colonel who was killed in a mine explosion while conducting a reconnaisance. So far the IPKF has lost 120-130 men including a Colonel, two Lt. Colonels and 13 other officers.

No word on Prabakaran: No details are available on the whereabouts of the LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran. IPKF radio intercepts have not been able to ascertain his whereabouts. However, it is known that following the first attack on the university campus where the IPKF had its biggest losses so far, the LTTE leader had indicated that he was sending his last message and responsibility for actions were being given over to the various regional commanders.

LTTE CLAIMS

On 18th at about 3 'o clock in the evening, the IPKF attacked the civilian residences at Koppai with chained armoured vehicles. The LTTE faced them with R.P.G. and land mines. One chained armoured vehicle was completely destroyed. At a place called Chandinipai, a chained armoured car of the IPKF was destroyed by the LTTE. The IPKF could not face the attack of the LTTE and therefore withdrew. The LTTE took one G.P.M.G. and large cache of arms from the IPKF.

In the fight that took place on 18.10.87 Alan, Jana and Viji of the LTTE died. At Anaikottai region of Manipoy, in a three hours fight, Indian army has used more than 125 L.M. artillery shells. 9 civilians were killed in this, and nearly a hundred people were injured. The houses and properties of many people were damaged to a very great extent. The shell thrown by the IPKF near the Pillaiyar Temple at Manipoy, hit the temple and blasted, damaging it thoroughly. Many people who had taken shelter in the temple were seriously wounded.

In the fierce battle at Koppai the LTTE destroyed with rocket launchers 5 A.P.C. armoured vehicles of the IPKF. The LTTE spoiled the attempt of the IPKF to advance from Navanthurai to Jaffna. The IPKF's attempts to move out from the Jaffna Fort was also spoiled by the LTTE.

We prefer cyanide to surrender: LTTE

NEWS COLOMBO, Oct. 19.

Indian troops battled inside the Sri Lankan City of Jaffna on Monday but the ferocious Tamil Tigers' opposition in bullet-pitted alleys slowed their advance.

Refugees fleeing Jaffna spoke of bullets spattering around the city's mud and wattle houses as the Indian troops sought to tighten an arc of steel around the outnumbered Tamil militants opposing the Indo-Sri Lankan peace pact.

"We'd rather kill ourselves by taking cyanide than surrender. But we will take some of them with us first", a sarong-clad commander of the Tigers said in central Sri Lanka.

He spoke as 20 militants shouldering gleaming automatic rifles loaded a supply truck bound for fellow LTTE men in Jaffna, where non-combatants are short of food and water after 10 days of fighting.

Electricity has been cut off for three days and the Indian and Sri Lankan Red Cross teams are visiting areas of the city to assess the damage.

An Indian official reported fierce mortar and machine gun duels just inside the city"s perimeter as two groups of Indian soldiers who fought their way inside the municipal zone on Sunday for the first time tried to reach the city centre.

Another column was advancing from a shell-scarred Sri Lankan army-held fort in the port. A fourth and fifth group outside the city to the north were advancing against strong opposition from the LTTE fighters.

India flew in 2,000 more troops on Sunday to join the 6,000 police and troops seeking to disarm the Tigers and implement the pact.

Independent confirmation of the fighting is not available as reporters are barred from visiting the Jaffna peninsula.

"It's human nature to exaggerate your side's advances, but I think the Indian account of movements on the ground, as far as it goes, is accurate," the diplomat said.

"I think the fighting will go on for at least another week."

Refugees have spoken of sporadic artillery shelling and some air attacks by the Indian Peace Keeping Force. The Indian High Commission has denied that air offensive power is being used and said artillery is being fired "very sparingly."

"Our hands are being tied behind our backs", a commission spokeswoman said on Sunday. The Indian troops could not use their full firepower for fear of harming the estimated 1,30,000 civilians remaining in the port.

Manhunt for Prabhakaran: Meanwhile, the troops launched a manhunt to capture the LTTE supreme commander, Mr. V. Prabhakaran, in a bid to crush the fierce resistance to India's offensive aimed at disarming Tamil rebels, Indian sources said.

The troops had smashed a rebel headquarters on the outskirts of Jaffna on Sunday and destroyed an estimated one tonne of high explosives as they pursued their search for the LTTE leader.

It was not immediately clear whether Mr. Prabhakaran, widely believed to be holed up in Jaffna and directing the resistance, was wanted dead or alive.

The 33-year-old LTTE supremo, with a price of Rs. 1 million (Sri Lanka) on his head, leads an estimated 2,500 armed militants and has said that he will never be captured alive.

"The LTTE keeps shifting its headquarters and important leaders. We know of at least six such places. Part of the Indian offensive is to capture Prabhakaran," said an Indian source.

Mr. Prabhakaran "is directly responsible for rejecting the peace accord and the attacks on rival militants and Sinhalese civilians," the Indian source said. — Reuter & AFP

LTTE letter to P.M.: The following is the text of the letter (issued by the U.K. branch of the LTTE) from Mr. G. Mahendrarajah, Deputy Leader of the LTTE, to the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi.

Dear Prime Minister,

"I, Mr. G. Mahendrarajah, Deputy Leader of the LTTE, agree on behalf of the LTTE (1) to handing over of arms and working out of the accord in accordance with the decision arrived between the LTTE and the Government of India on the 28th September 1987 at Palaly; (2) an immediate ceasefire; (3) negotiate on all other matters"

Thanking You,
Yours faithfully and sincerely,
(signed)
G. Mahendrarajah.



Kalki 25.10.87

Commandos break out of Jaffna Fort

BATTLE □ FOR □ JAFFNA

NEWS

MADRAS, Oct. 19.

A commando group of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force today broke out of the Jaffna Fort and linked up with columns advancing along the coastal road.

A spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry told reporters that in a major development, the force, after clearing the mine fields laid by the LTTE outside Jaffna Fort, established control on the south-western outskirts of Jaffna. But during this movement forward, it met heavy resistance from the LTTE, including small arms, machinegun and mortar fire.

The IPKF advance, he said, continued on various fronts. On the Navatkuli-Jaffna axis, there was a two-pronged movement forward. Troops had established positions on a railroad junction on the outskirts of Jaffna.

The IPKF continued to move forward, consolidating its position in the Kopai North sector where it broke through yesterday. It recovered one tonne of ammunition and also captured a factory where mines and booby traps were being manufactured. The entire area around Kopai North had been cleared. The existence of the factory explained the LTTE's attack with booby traps.

The peace-keeping force was also moving towards Jaffna on the Kankesanturai-Jaffna and Palaly-Jaffna axis. The spokesman said that in certain sectors the IPKF had used mechanised infantry formations. Replying to a question, he said that this involved the use of armoured personnel carriers. However, he clarified that a conscious decision had been taken by the Government of India not to use air power. "We have not used air power thus far."

In many areas the IPKF had suffered heavy casualties because of its decision not to use air power. "We are very particular not to cause any damage to property or cause injury to civilians," he said.

The significance of today's operation was that the IPKF had secured one particular portion of Jaffna town.

The spokesman said the IPKF today provided assistance to refugees fleeing from the LTTE's hold in the Navatkuli and Urumpirai areas. "This assistance has been provided in the midst of fire and personal risk..."

Meanwhile, the engineering units of the IPKF were engaged in the reconstruction of roads and bridges damaged by the LTTE in the face of the IPKF's advance.

Answering a question on the LTTE's reported rejection of the precondition to surrender all its arms, for a cease-fire, the spokesman said "we are going through an on-going process," but he reiterated that the LTTE should lay down all its arms, as required under the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement. "We would also like to have from them an unequivocal commitment to the implementation of the agreement."

He explained that the basic political objective was to disarm the militant groups holding arms in violation of the agreement, so that peace could be restored and the Tamils could live in safety and security in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The IPKF would ensure that.

The peace-keeping force, he asserted, was not running a military operation against the LTTE but was only trying to implement the agreement. To achieve this basic objective, peace and tranquility were essential. This could not be obtained as long as the LTTE was in possession of arms in violation of the agreement. "While the LTTE was piously negotiating with the Government of India, it was also engaged in the manufacture of booby traps." The Government of India remained firmly committed to securing what was provided under the agreement, including devolution of power.

Narrating the sequence of events since the signing of the accord to the present confrontation, the spokesman said the Government of India had met all the demands of the LTTE. But at every stage it seemed to suffer from fear of the electoral process. "They got psychologically adjusted to the bullet rather than the ballot.... We want them to change from the use of bullet to the acceptance of the ballot."

Even in the formation of the Interim Administrative Council, for which there was no provision in the agreement, every conceivable LTTE demand was met. It wanted a majority of seats in the proposed council. It said one of the Muslims from among their list should be selected. It urged that one of its nominees should be the Administrator-in-Council. It also wanted the rehabilitation of its cadres in the special police force and clearly defined powers for the Council. All these were met. He said under the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement the militant groups should lay down their arms within a period of 72 hours. Unfortunately, this did not happen.

The LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran told Maj. Gen. Harkirat Singh, GOC, IPKF that he was unable to hand over personal arms held by the LTTE leaders because of threats from rival groups. From 1986 till the beginning of this year, the LTTE had killed over 340 fellow Tamil militants. The demand of the LTTE to keep personal arms for the security of its leaders was conceded, but it was asked to hand over heavy arms and equipment, to which Mr. Prabakaran agreed.

Subsequently, the Government of India held detailed negotiations with the LTTE to persuade it to refrain from violence and to make it a part of the democratic process. There was, however, no positive response. And clashes erupted between the LTTE and the other groups.

One of the LTTE leaders, Thileepan, went on a fast unto death to press the group's five-point charter of demands. Then came the announcement on the Interim Administrative Council. This was followed by the Sri Lankan Navy's capture of the LTTE boat with 17 members on board.

He admitted that it was not a wise move on Colombo's part to insist on taking the captured men to Colombo. As a sequel to 12 of its men committing suicide by swallowing cyanide, the LTTE went on a rampage, killing 300 Sinhalese civilians. The Sri Lankan Army was under tremendous pressure to come out of barracks to protect the Sinhalese. There was also a move to get the Sri Lanka's Special Task Force into action again. The Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, was under great pressure to act in that direction as 20,000 Sinhalese refugees had fled to Colombo. It was then that the Government of India decidied to go into the root cause of all this violence. It was found out that the possession of arms by individual groups in violation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was responsible for this.

"We had come to the conclusion that Mr. Prabakaran while ostensibly claiming that the arms with them were for personal protection of the LTTE leaders was in fact determined to use them for purposes other than personal protection..... We decided then that if anything is done in violation of law by Tamil militant groups, we will act."

Asked about the messages received so far from the LTTE, the spokesman said that they did not meet the basic requirement of laying down of arms so that the Agreement could be implemented.

AFFIDAVIT

KANAGASABAI SELLAKANDU (36) 129, Colombogam Road, Colombogam East, Colombogam.

The deceased Murugar Kanagasabai aged 56 years was my husband.

He was a businessman.

Due to the Ocotber 1987 disturbances I took refuge at the Illanthaikulam Pillayar Temple, Colombogam with my children.

On 19.10.87 at about 9.00 a.m. I was informed that my husband was killed in the shell blast while he was on his way to the Temple to see us.

I rushed to the place where the incident took place and saw his mutilated body.

His body was cremated at the Thundi Cemetery on the same day.

I have three small children, all daughters.

My children and I have been deprived of the maintenance and support we received from my husband.

After his demise we do not have any income.

க. செல்வக்கண்டு

MANIKKAM CHETTIAR MUNEESWARAN (43) 15/11, First Lane, Power Hosue Road, Jaffna.

The deceased is my Cousin Sivananthan Sivalingam, aged 26 years.

My deceased cousin lost his parents when he was young and was living with me for the last 12 years.

I was living at Dutch road Kopay up to October 1987, and moved to the address given above in November 1987.

On 19.10.87 we moved to the Nallur temple as refugees as there was intense shelling in our area.

On 21.10.87 my cousin went to Kopay and was returning to Nallur temple when a shell fell close to him and exploded. He died at the spot.

A person known to me came to the temple and informed me that my cousin died of injuries caused by explosion of shell.

I removed the body and cremated it on 21.10.87.

Muneeswaran

LEGGE'S FLOWERPECKER



MATHIAPARNAM BALAMBIKAI (42) Gnanavairavar Temple, Vasavilan South, Vasavilan.

My late husband Velupillai Mathiaparnam, aged 49 years was a farmer.

On the morning of 19.10.87 my late husband left home to work on his plot of land of Oorsaadi also in Vasavilan South.

At about 11.30 a.m. the same day about a thousand IPKF were moving past our plot of land firing at random.

After a few hours when the Indian Forces had left the vicinity, I, accompanied by neighbours went and searched for my husband but we could not find him

As a curfew was in force through fear we returned home.

When a search was again made on 20.10.87 the dead body of my husband Mathiabarnam was found lying in a channel on the edge of our plot of land.

As a curfew was in force on that day too the body of my husband was cremated there itself.

I have lost my husband and bread winner and am destitute.

ம. பாலாம்பிகை

MRS. MILDRED RATNARANI ALEXANDER (62), 118, 4th. Cross Street Jaffna.

My husband George Wilfred Alexander, aged 72 years was a retired Co-Operative Inspector.

My husband, unmarried son and I were living with my married daughter in their house.

As there was continuous shelling from the Jaffna fort IPKF army camp towards our area my husband and other family members left to Mirusuvil in a tractor on 19.10.87.

While passing Irupalai junction at 10.30 a.m. a shell fired from the IPKF camp at Kokuvil fell in front of our tractor and burst with loud noise.

Tractor was stopped and all of us got down from the tractor and ran towards Nallur as there was continuous shelling in that area.

Another shell fired from the same IPKF camp fell on our tractor and burst and all our belongings worth Rs. 10,000/- destroyed along with the belonging of other family who travelled with us in the same tractor.

All of us reached Nallur at 11.30 a.m. except my husband who was old and feeble.

When my son-in-law went to see my husband at 4.30 p.m. he found the dead body of my husband along with 3 other dead bodies of those who travelled in the tractor were lying of the road.

The dead body of my husband was brought to a house of my relation at Jaffna at about 6 p.m. on the same day.

MOHAMED SHERIFF ANEESA (49) 98 Navalar Road, Jaffna.

The deceased Mohamed Sheriff Mohamed, age 16 years was my son.

He was a student at Central College, Jaffna.

On 19.10.87 our area was subjected to severe shell attack from a helicopter gunship.

A shell fell within our compound and exploded spraying sharpnels in all directions.

My son was hit by a sharpnel and fell down bleeding profusely.

He died few hours later due to the excessive bleeding without giving any medical help due to the prevailing tension

He was buried the Sinnapallivasal burial grounds on 20.10.87

I have five surviving children.

Sheriff

NADARAJAH JEYARAJAH (42) 5B Milk Board Road, Thirunelvely.

The deceased person Vairavapillai Nadarajah, aged 65 years was my father.

He was a cigar roller.

Due to the October 1987 military offensive we left our residence and went to Naranthanai, Kayts for safety.

My father refused to accompany us and sought refuge at the Thalakaval Pillayar Temple.

After few days of our departure we came to know that my father was shot and killed by the army on 19.10.87 when he returned to our house to inspect its condition.

We learned that his body was cremated by our neighbours who came across it.

ந. ஜெயராசா

NAGALINGAM MUTHULINGAM (50) Urumpirai North, Urumpirai.

The deceased Nagalingam Ponnammah, age 65 years was my wife.

On 19.10.87 at around 11 a.m. advancing soldiers entered our house and opened fire killing my wife and injuring three others.

We cremated her body on 20.10.87.

I have two unmarried daughters.

NAGALINGAM SATHANANDHAN, 40 Swamiar Road, Columbuthurai.

I am the son of the late Ledchumypillai Nagalingam, 78 who died on 19.10.87 as a result of a shell attack.

My aged mother preferred to stay at home in Kondavil.

Almost every day thereafter I went to look after the needs of my aged mother.

On one such visit on 19.10.87 when I went home at about 9.30 a.m. I found my mother dead.

A shell had fallen in the compound of my house breaking three coconuts trees. Shells fragments were strewn about the house.

My mother was lying on bed, dead without any injury, obviously died of shock from the shell blast.

My mother's body was cremated the same day at the crematorium nearby.

My mother was living with me for the last 16 years and was supported by me.

I have three married sisters and no brothers.

NALLIAH NALLAPILLAI (52), Puthur East, Puthur.

The deceased person Thinaharpillai Nalliah, aged 65 years was my husband.

He was employed as a tea maker in a tea shop.

On 19.10.87 at about 5 p.m. my husband left home saying that he is going to the tea shop in Jaffna.

He used to stay at the teashop for many days at a stretch without taking leave.

On 21.10.87 at about 8.30 a.m. I left for Matuvil with my two children as our village was subjected to heavy shelling.

We stayed at a relation's home at Matuvil for three months.

From Matuvil I sent many messages to my husband requesting money through people who were going to Jaffna town and Matuvil.

I did not receive any reply from my husband.

Then I personally visited Jaffna town and inquired at the shop where he was employed.

I was informed that my husband was killed when a shell fell and exploded in the tea shop on 21.0.87.

I learned that his body was cremated by the employer on the same day itself.

I have an unmarried daughter, named Vasanthamalar aged 22 years.

After my husband's death we do not have any income or support.

NAVASOTHY, daughter of Sinnappu Sokkalingam (26), unmarried. Somasundaram Road, Anaikottai.

I am the elder of two children both daughters of the late Sinnappu Sokkalingam and late Rasamma Sokkalingam.

I am an orphan.

My mother, the deceased Rasamma Sokkalingam left home at about 10.00 a.m. on 19.10.87 to fetch water from a well in a paddyfield about 150 yards away.

On the day (19.10.87) there was troop movement and gun firing in the area of Anaicottai.

My mother did not return home. Although we feared something untoward had happened to our mother, we could not go out in search of her through fear of the forces who were moving about. However, my father went in search of her at about 3.00 p.m. and he too failed to return home.

On 20.10.87 when the IPKF had moved away and when we realised it was safe to go out, we went in search of our parents at about 6.00 a.m. in the morning. I found my mother Rasamma lying dead near the well with severe head injuries and her skull having been shattered.

Her dead body was taken to my cousin's house as troops had already taken position near my house.

The dead body of my mother Rasamma Sokkalingam was removed in a motor van along with the corpse of my deceased father and was cremated in the Pippili Crematorium at Manipay at about 1.00 p.m. on 20.10.87.

RAJADURAI CHANDRA (38), Virali Amman Kovilady, Kokuvil West, Kokuvil.

The deceased Vellayan Nagalingam, aged 65 years was my father.

He was a casual Labourer.

During the October 1987 military offensive we sought refuge at the Virali Amman Temple, Kokuvil.

On 19.10.87 at about 3.00 p.m. my father went back to our house to have his meals.

At about 4.00 p.m. I also returned to our house.

There I found our house damaged by shell explosion.

Inside I found my father's dead body which bore shell wounds. .

We cremated his body on the same day at Kompayan Manel cemetry.

I have seven children.

It was my father who maintained and supported us after my husband's desertion.

After his death we do not have any income and undergoing severe hardship.

RATNAM PRABHA (18), Ist Lane, Pillayar Koviladi, Anaikoddai.

The deceased Nagamuthu Ratnam, aged 50 years was my father.

I lost my mother 8 years ago and since living with my father along with my brother and two sisters.

During the October military offensive we took refuge at Hindu Ladies College refugee camp Jaffna.

My father left us on 19.10.87 saying that he wanted to buy provisions.

He did not return afterwards.

On the third day of his disappearance I was informed that he was shot and killed by the army near Anaikoddai junction.

His body was buried the public near hte spot where it was found.

I have two younger sisters and one brother.

We are rendered orphans after our loving father's tragic death.

We have been deprived of the support we received from our father.

We do not have any help or income after our father's death.

As a result we are undergoing tremendous hardships.



SELVARAJAH PERINETHAMMAH (55) Suryaveli, Navanthurai.

The deceased Selvarajah Ranjan, aged 32 years was my son.

He was a businessman.

On 19.10.87 at about 6.30 a.m. my son left home in his bicycle.

After he left there was intensive shelling by the army directed at our area.

We left our residence and sought refuge at the Hindu Ladies College, refugee camp.

I was informed on 21.10.87 that my son was shot and killed at Ottumadam junction.

I came to know that his body was burnt by the army after he was shot.

I have a daughter and two sons.

One of my daughter's daughter named Niranjini aged 6 months is also staying with me.

My husband deserted me long ago.

It was my late son who maintained and supported us.

After his death we do not have any income.

I am an invalid and due to a defect I am unable to talk.

SHAKUNTHALADEVI THURAIRAJAH (44))
Somasunderam Road, Moothanar Kovilady.

My late husband Thurairajah, aged 55 years was a Mechanic who worked at a motor servicing garage at Koolarady.

On 19.10.87 my husband, as usual, left home at 9 a.m. for work at the garage.

He was shot dead by the force near the garage.

He received a severe head-injury and other injuries on his legs.

His dead-body was cremated on the following day (20.10.87) at about 2 p.m

The death of my husband was reported to the registrar of Deaths Manipay who registered the death under No. 6187.

My husband earned an average monthly income of Rs. 1500/-.

I have no income or support to maintain my family including my aged parents - one is bed-ridden and other is blind who are dependent on me. I have one child a girl of 14 years.

SINNAPPU SIVALINGAM (46), 687/24, Manipay Road, Oddumadam, Jaffna.

The deceased person Sinnappu Annaluxumy, aged 26 yearswas my sister.

She was a deaf-mute and was living under my care and maintenance until her death, as I was her eldest brother.

On 19.10.87 due to the heavy shelling we sought refuge at the Navalar School refugee camp.

On 24.10.87 the army entered the refugee camp and opened fire at random.

My sister was struck by a hail of bullets and died on the spot along with my mother who was also gunned down.

Several other refugees were killed and injured during the shooting spree.

My sisters body was cremated by the army on the same day itself inside the school premises.



THAMBIAH SATKUNAM (40)
Palaivalavu, A.V. Road, Ariyalai Jaffna.

I am working in the Multi-Purpose co-operative Society in my village.

My wife, children and I were living in a rented house at Ariyalai.

On 19.10.87 Indian Peace Keeping Force advanced from the Navatkuli camp lobbing shells towards our village.

Through fear we decided to take refuge at the Kanagaratnam central college.

At about 7.30 a.m my family and I moved out of our house. when moving towards the gate a shell fired from the IPKF fell close to us in our compound and exploded.

Shrpanel from the explosion struck my son Satkunam Sathiyapperiyan age 4 years on the nock and he died on the spot.

I too was injured in this incident.

The dead body of my son was buried on 20.10.87.

THAMBIMUTHU SARASWATHY (57) Urumpirai South, Urumpirai.

I am the wife of Karthigesu Thambimuthu aged 70 years who was arrested by the IPKF on 19.10.87 and whose whereabouts since then is not known inspite of efforts made to ascertain same.

Due to the military offensive I left home with members of my family on 12.10.87 and sought refuge at the Nallur Kandasamy Temple.

My aged husband was left behind as he was too weak to move.

I came to know through the neighbour, one Sellathurai that my husband was arrested by the IPKF along with about 15 others of the locality and kept confined in a house in the neighbourhood belonging to one Sabaratnam since 19.10.87.

I learned that my husband and the others were continued to be detained by the IPKF at the said house although some of them were released on the second day.

Only on 5.11.87 I was able to return to our house which was partially burnt with most of the movables.

I do not know what happened to my husband.

My son went to the Jaffna secretariat and handed over a written appeal to the Rehabilitation ministry official regarding my missing father.

My son informed me that my husband's named was not among the 34 names read out at the secretariat.

I came to know that the inquiries made by my son at the Kondavil army camp about my husband failed to yield any positive result.



VELAUTHAM THAYANANTHAN (21) Sivan Veethy, Urumpirai East, Urumpirai.

My father deserted my mother seven years back.

Our family consists of my mother 2 brothers and 6 sisters and myself. We were residing at the above address.

After my father deserted our family our relations were assisting our family in a great way for our upkeep.

On 19.10.87 there was heavy shelling and firing of sophisticated guns in and around our village by the IPKF.

We remained behind in the house through fear unable to move out.

On 20.10.87 at 6.30 a.m. to our surprise about 15 armed IPKF personnel entered our compound.

No sooner they entered our compound they started cutting the fence and engaged in damaging the house.

Through fear I ran into the shrine room and my mother and sisters with my younger brother got excited but were getting ready to run away.

Within a few seconds my mother along with my sisters and brothers started running through the back door of my house.

At this time one of the IPKF personnel threw a hand grenade on the rear verandah and it exploded.

Following this explosion IPKF personnel were engaged in firing at random.

When the firing ceased and the IPKF left the house I came out from the shrine room at about 8 a.m. and found that my mother V. Maheswary age 45 and sister V. Manoranjitham aged 14 dead.

My other sisters and brothers escaped death and they were found in the neighbouring house.

The dead body of my mother and sister had severe injuries on their chest and stomach and minor injuries all over body.

On 21.10.87 we removed the dead body of my mother and sister to Atchuvely in a tractor. A tense situation prevailed in Urumpirai.

Cremation took place the same day at 4 p.m. at Atchuvely cemetery.

In this incident a neighbour was also killed by the IPKF.

VELAYUTHAM RATHINAM (49) Suthumalai North, Manipay.

The deceased person Arumugam Rasammah, aged 67 years, a widow was my mother.

She was living under my care and maintenance until her death.

During the October 1987 miitary offensive we sought refuge at Suthumalai Enjadi Vairavar Temple.

My mother refused to leave the house and preferred to stay back.

On 19.10.87 at about 10.00 a.m. I was informed that my aged mother was shot and killed by the army while she was seated in the verandah of our house on 18.10.87.

On hearing the news I rushed to our house where I found her lifeless body lying in the verandah.

Her body was cremated in a nearby empty field on 20.10.87.

IYANKAN THILLACHCHI (54)
Selvapuram, Urumpirai South, Urumpirai.

The deceased Kathiran Iyankan age 71 years (Labourer) was my husband.

On 20.10.87 morning at 8.00 a.m. my husband left home for work.

On 20.10.87 at about 9.30 a.m. a friend of my husband came home and informed me that my husband was found dead in a field at Urumpirai South about 150 yards from our house.

On 20.10.87 at about 10.00 a.m. the people of the area brought the dead body to home. The body had two gun shot injuries on the stomach side.

On 20.10.87 the body was cremated at Vempan cemetery.

I have one daughter Selvamalar (17) Cooly, not married. When my husband was alive I got an income of Rs. 700/- per month; Now I get only Rs 200/- per month. Now I am unemployed.

The death certificate No. 5237 in respect of my husband's death is attached.

KATHIRAVELU ARUNTHAVAMALAR (42), widow, "Thavagiri", Kopay South, Kopay.

The deceased child Kathiravelu Rosaiya, aged 17 years was my daughter.

She was a G.C.E. (O/L) student at the Hindu Ladies College.

Due to the October 1987 military offensive we sought refugee at the Kopay Veerapathirar Temple.

On 20.10.87. army approached our Temple and fired at random through the Temple window.

My daughter who was struck by fusilade of bullets died on the spot.

Three other refugees also perished in the incident.

My daughter's body was cremated on the third day of her deat'

I have five surviving children.

Mrs. KAMALAMBIKAI KARUPPIAH (42)
70, Kannathiddy Road, Jaffna.

My four children, my husband and I were residing at the above address.

Due to the military operations of the IPKF my husband children and I were forced to seek shelter at Navalar School on 20.10.87. This school is situated 200 yards from our house.

On 24.10.87 the IPKF which was approaching Jaffna along K.K.S. road suddenly entered the Navalar School refugee camp and opened fire at random.

17 innocent refugees including my husband Sivalingam Karuppiah (58) were shot dead in this instance.

Several others were also injured by the gunfire of the IPKF.

The dead bodies of the 17 victims were burnt by IPKF in the school compound itself on 25.10.87.

On 27.11.87 the refugees were permitted to leave the refugee camp.

My children and I then took refuge in the Jaffna Hindu College refugee camp where we remained for about 10 days.

I have 4 children, 3 sons aged 26 years, 19 years and 4 years and a daughter 13 years. The last three children are attending school.

My eldest son Ravindran (26) has a speech defect and thereby unemployed.

My husband was a carpenter and was able to earn about Rs. 60/- or more per day.

My children and I have now lost the maintenance and support of my husband the sole bread winner of the family.

A ruthless leader

He would rather die than give up

PROFILE



What will he do next? *Prabhakaran*

WHATEVER be the ultimate fate of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, its stocky, ruthless but brilliant leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, will definitely find a place in the history of Sri Lanka, more so, in that of its Tamils. None would have even dreamt that the 16-year-old student, who joined the Tamil Students Organisation (TSO) in 1970 would one day be seen as 'the protector of the Tamils' and 'a self-confessed murderer with a million rupee prize on his head, as JRJ recently dubbed him.

In early 1982, when he first surfaced in Madras following a shoot-out with rival Tamil group leaders, he was a quiet, hungry-looking, observant man, heading the Tamil New Tigers, an outfit he formed on breaking away from the TSO. Then, he lad only few hundred youth and had a paltry cache of arms. Today, LTTE is said to be about 4,000-strong, and is a tough, highly-motivated fighting force.

Born on November 26, 1954, in Velvettithurai a smugglers' haunt in northern Sri Lanka, and claiming to have been inspired by Subhas Chandra Bose and Bhagat Singh, Prabhakaran's was a calculating and ruthless climb to the top. He had quit his Tamil Tigers over differences with its leader, went back to TSO, which had then become TELO, crossed over to Madras and then regrouped his colleagues to start LTTE. He came to be known as *Thambi* (younger brother), since he was the youngest Tamil militant leader.

In Madras, he was seldom seen in public. But he built up LTTE, which to be among the frontline groups in a short span of time. Said to be a self-taught fighter, Prabhakaran's top cadres got expert guerrilla training abroad. He also motivated Tamils living abroad to fund his movement. Such was its financial strength that LTTE came to

have some of the best weapons for guerrilla warfare.

However, other groups like TELO and EPRLF, while growing in strength, seemed to have incensed him. Prabhakaran, who neither sought advice nor liked his authority challenged, antagonised some of his own seniors, who quit LTTE. Stories abound that he had passed death sentences on his opponents; of youth bumped off. Such were his murderous intentions that, in 1986, on his initiative, LTTE destroyed TELO and its promising leader Sri Sabaratnam on the island. With that bloody action LTTE came to be considered the sole militant voice.

With, sophisticated weaponry and organised cadre—so highly motivated that they are prepared to swallow cyanide capsules hung around every Tiger's neck, when captured—Prabhakaran had ensured that even at the peace talks by India, LTTE was given prime importance. And he has till date refused to give up his call for Eelam, a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka. Though he owed a great deal to India for the growth of LTTE, and proclaimed "we love India" after the Indo-Sri Lanka accord was signed and the Tigers agreed to lay down their arms, Prabhakaran distanced himself from the accord and backed out suddenly from the interim council after agreeing to it. It seemed that a man who commanded power with a gun was just not prepared to take on the political role. A fascist who spouted patriotism.

Deciding to fight India must be his biggest mistake, though an unconditional surrender is unlikely by Prabhakaran. He may rather die fighting. Ironically, the Tamils still need LTTE and Prabhakaran in their midst. But if history is any guide, the Prabhakarans have rarely stayed on till the end.

OCT. 25—31. —VINCENT D'SOUZA

An amateurish approach

Indian policy has been lacking in coherence

COMMENT



Cracking strategy. *High Commissioner Dixit and Defence Minister Pant (right) with Jayewardene (left)*

IT was June 4. The Indian Relief Flotilla flying the Red Cross flag destined for Jaffna with relief supplies was turned back the day before by Sri Lanka. Five AN-32s laden with 25 tonnes of food and medicines took off from Bangalore. The commander of the lead AN-32 told the control tower at the Colombo airport. "This is Operation Eagle...escorted by four Mirage-2000s,...entering your air space in a few minutes."

There was no response. Headlines next morning hailed it as a great act of solidarity with the Tamil people of battle-ravaged Jaffna peninsula. But there was a message for Sri Lanka President J.R. Jayewardene. If India could violate Sri Lanka's air space, albeit on a mission of mercy, it would well drop bombs on the island, with impunity. And in four months, early in October, India was paradropping commandos, not in support of the Tamil guerrillas but to combat them. It was a full circle.

India's official approach to Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict has been ad hoc, discontinuous and disjointed. The responses have lacked consistency and coherence.

In the wake of the July 1983 Sinhala backlash against the Tamils followed by heightened Tamil guerrilla activity, when President Jayewardene appealed to countries in south Asia and outside for help fearing an invasion, India propounded its own Monroe doctrine. Where its interests were involved, India had to be consulted on any outside help in the event of a threat to the regime and any outside help should be with India's consent and participation.

On August 1, 1983 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told the south Asian regional cooperation meeting of foreign ministers: "Ours is a troubled region. Most of our countries are multi-racial and multi-religious. It would be idle to pretend that we are not affected by what happens elsewhere," and adding for good measure: "India is not just another country."

Mrs Gandhi followed up this message by organising help to the Madras-based Tamil militant groups. True she did not support the demand for Tamil Eelam but she did not denounce it either. The ambiguity aimed at heightening the uncertainty for Sri Lanka so that the Tamils could wrest some concessions through India's political mediation. India's own Tamil opinion and the leverage the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran had in New Delhi were crucial factors here.

But after the failure of India's political initiatives guerrilla activity was moving into a higher gear. The uncertainties caused by the assassination of Mrs Gandhi until Rajiv Gandhi legitimised his succession, winning the December 1984 elections, and the absence of M.G. Ramachandran from the immediate scene (he was undergoing treatment in the United States) emboldened Colombo into a strident stance. The Tamil groups thought India would intervene militarily to check the drift to disaster.

What followed was something else. India began soft-pedalling its Tamil cause. Foreign Secretary Romesh Bhandari was most acceptable to Colombo while Indira Gandhi's special envoy G. Parthasarathy was anathema. Bhandari rushed to Colombo in March 1985 to reassure Jayewardene that with Indira Gandhi ended India's old Sri Lanka policy. India had begun equating Sri Lankan state terror against the Tamils with the defensive violence of the

guerrillas and would not admit that it was a genocide of the Tamils.

The screw began tightening on the Tamil groups in Madras. Their camps were ordered shut. Ferrying of men and material across the Palk Strait became difficult for them. The groups were bludgeoned into attending the talks at Thimpu to seek a negotiated settlement. Following that Tamil leaders were deported from India. All this helped Sri Lanka to build up its military muscle for a final assault on the Tamil strongholds.

Rajiv Gandhi had clearly spoken out against Tamil Eelam but more galling to the Tamils was the marginal support he extended to Colombo even as his government was playing off moderate Tamil groups against the militants and at times one militant group against the other. M.G. Ramachandran's commitment to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam balanced New Delhi's ill-concealed hostility to it.

By the end of 1986, Jayewardene was desperate and wanted India to bail him out through a political solution. And the crackdown on LTTE and other groups in Madras was in response to his appeals. Velupillai Prabhakaran,

India is fighting the war against the Tamils where Jayewardene had left it off. But what if he reneges on the accord?

flown to Bangalore during the SAARC summit in November 1986, was told to come to terms. If he did not, the US seventh fleet might intervene in Sri Lanka, he was warned but LTTE did not succumb to the bogy.

The crackdown on his organisation, seizure of its arms and wireless equipment convinced him that India could not be relied upon. Prabhakaran quietly slipped into Jaffna to direct a new phase of the military campaign. LTTE's announcement about proclaiming Eelam state from January 1 made Jayewardene order a fuel embargo on and economic blockade of Jaffna and a similar operation, on a lower scale, in the eastern province.

When LTTE lost out in Vadamarachi and the Sri Lankan forces had closed in on Jaffna city and all that remained was the final, decisive assault to take it, the high political cost seemed to inhibit Jayewardene. The June 4 air drop mission was largely to dispel Indian Tamil feeling that India was not doing anything to save Jaffna from the assault which would have meant thousands of civilian casualties.

Bhandari had retired and it was A.P. Venkateswaran in the foreign office but India's deliberate equivocation had already damaged the Sri Lankan Tamil cause. Weeks before the July 29 agreement, result of quiet negotiations, New Delhi was buzzing with reports that Colombo had been told that India did not mind the military liquidation of LTTE. Bhandari, now the convener of the Congress party's foreign policy planning cell, is known to have conveyed this message to National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali.

The agreement did not take the Tamil groups into confidence. Not LTTE at least. While orchestrated Indian media reports suggested that Prabhakaran, brought to New Delhi for discussions, had accepted the agreement to be signed and only a few details regarding surrender of arms were to be settled, he went to Jaffna and told a huge meeting on August 4 that Indian leaders told him that they would go ahead with the agreement whether he supported it or not. And LTTE's token gesture of laying down arms on August 5 (which it refused to call surrender) followed because it was reluctant to clash with the Indian peace-keeping force.

The tenuous ceasefire ended on October 6 and India is fighting the war against Tamils where Jayewardene had left it off. South Block in New Delhi maintains that India was trying a political solution in Sri Lanka and that LTTE's violence overtook the political discussions. India does not contemplate any new political initiative. It is determined to implement the accord (its commitment limited to securing a disengagement and a corollary to it, disarming LTTE) even if the new political set-up to emerge excludes LTTE.

Rajiv Gandhi has been saying that India has plans for all contingencies. LTTE's frustration and intransigence in its anxiety to scuttle the accord is a part of the reality. It was never a party to this in the first place. But what if Jayewardene, under Sinhalese opposition now snowballing, reneges on the agreement? LTTE would then have been militarily liquidated. The other groups would have been disarmed. If India is asked to pack up, and if Sinhala forces in Tamil areas, now confined to the barracks, resume their role, it would be back to square one.

Sri Lankan Tamil opinion may not forgive India for that. And Indian Tamil opinion might not quite endorse it. All due to South Block's rudderless policy shaped by enthusiastic amateurs ostensibly to secure India's strategic interests in the region. But the agreement cannot survive in parts. It stands or collapses as a whole.

OCT. 25–31, 1987 —MODEM

Will it be honoured? *The signing of the accord*

LETTER

LTTE are not 'terrorists'

Sir, — Indian military power is superior to LTTE's in Jaffna. But one shouldn't forget that the LTTE took up arms only to protect its people from total annihilation. They are not terrorists. They are patriotic young men raised in good families and who took up arms only as a last resort. They are not mercenaries; they are fighting for their people and their soil.

Remember the long struggle of non-violence by Chelvanayakam and the TULF. Were they given any consideration by the racist Sinhalese government? Given the record of the Sinhalese government, only the militants can protect the people of Eelam.

If the IPKF accomplishes what it wants to accomplish, what awaits the Eelam Tamils? Surely, when all is over and when Jayewardene wants, the IPKF will have to leave Sri Lanka. Who then stands guarantee for the safety of these poor people? The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka appears to be a deep one; it cannot be papered over by forced peace-keeping measures.

It would be good for the IPKF to immediately cease fire and think of finding a lasting and a permanent solution for all the troubles of the hapless people of Eelam.

G.V. SANKAR
No.3, Periyalwar St.
East Tambaram, Madras-600 059

Indian Express

Sir — It is now clear that it was the Sri Lankan Government which was the first to violate the accord, by its arrest and taking away of the 17 LTTE men — instead of handing them over to the IPKF — and all the rest that followed.

The Tamils have given their sweat and blood for the economic development of Sri Lanka. In return they have received discrimination and neglect from successive Governments. Prolonged deprivation has turned some of the ordinary civilians into militants. That the militants and citizens are not two separate groups can be seen from the fact that IPKF had to carry its search and seizure operations against LTTE right into the households of the civilians in Jaffna.

An inter-Governmental Accord to solve what the Indian Government itself until recently called an "internal matter of Sri Lanka" is a contradiction of sorts. All the problems can be traced to lack of adequate consultation and convincing of the LTTE on the one hand and Mr. Jayewardene's inability to carry with him his Prime Minister and National Security Minister on the other.

V. Ranganathan, Bangalore

Sir — It is unfortunate that most of your readers replying to your editorial comments on the Sri Lankan issue have tended to blame either mildly or strongly the LTTE for fighting against the IPKF.

The LTTE has been clearly provoked and trapped in furtherance of a sinister scheme politically to discredit it and physically eliminate it so that it would not hereafter be reckoned with as an important group which had indeed made a supreme sacrifice. One wonders whether the Indian Government was a willing party to the scheme of discrediting and decimating the LTTE.

The Tamils all over the world feel sorry that the Indian Government has played into the snare laid to it by the shrewd Lankan President. The Tigers' escape route to Tamil Nadu is almost closed now. This time Mr. Jayewardene is likely to win in his plan to defeat the LTTE.

India too does have the excuse of obligation arising from the agreement signed with the Sri Lankan Government. But India should stop killing the Tigers. The Tigers were well within their right to request the Sri Lankan President to change the choice of Chief of interim administration sought to be set up. There again the President wanted to gain some political advantage by choosing the person from North instead of from East which the LTTE thought would take place.

P. Padmanabhan, Somanur (Coimbatore Dist.)

Sir,—While no one would dispute the fact that the present accord is the best the Sri Lankan Tamils would have ever thought of, one cannot also deny that the Indian Government has miserably failed in its role. Will the Government of India ponder over what actually went wrong with the accord, now in a mess?

When 17 of the LTTE members were captured by the Sri Lankan Navy and they were about to be taken to Colombo for further interrogation and trial, the Indian Government did not take effective steps to prevent that disastrous course the Sri Lankan Government was taking. The Indian Government's version that it tried its best and still could not succeed in its efforts would convince nobody.

If the IPKF can now effectively function against the erring militants, would it not have exerted some such political pressure on the Sri Lankan Government? Had they done it the present situation could have been completely avoided.

S. Sugenendiran, Srirangam

Sir,—India's military action against the Sri Lankan Tamils is deplorable. It is unprecedented.

Looking at our policy on Sri Lanka one remembers sadly the words in "Alice in wonderland".

"I am mad, everybody is mad,
What a topsy turvy world!"

B. Gomathi, New Delhi

The Hindu

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

GURU NAGAR	IRUPALAI
A. Theresama	J. Kriston
P. Jesurajan	S. Sivakumar
S. Antonipillai	Rasaratnam
P. Jeyatheswaran	Velappan
M. Bastiampillai	M. Thuraisingam
M. Bastiampillai	**S. Sasirega**
Caatherine	A. Rathinam
A. Gregory	T. Nalliah
S. Monicamma	INUVIL
Concy	Ramupillai
Robina	M. Ganesh
Cousala	K. Kandasamy
Augustine	R. Panchanathan
Emelda	Tharmalingam
P.M. Sulogini	T. Vijayan
Salomipillai	K. Alagaratnam
J. Virgini	S. Mangalarajah
S. Alponsus	K. Paramanathan
P.M. Theresammah	V. Kumarasamy
E. Jeyarajah	S. Selvaratnam
K. Victor	R. Annammah
S. Chandran	V. Jesupalan
M.M. Millis Gilta	R. Krupiah
B. Theresammah	Kaligar Rasiah
Ligori	S. Satkunam
E. Morin	S. Balasubramaniam
Christy	N. Sellathurai
Amalanayaki	T. Sivapatham
Anthony Croos	JAFFNA
B. Jeya Margaret	S.K. Ponniah
Emelda Mariathas	R. Marories Goms
Mariathas Sulogini	T. Maniannan
Salomaipillai Xavier	Edwin Camilus
S. Chandran	

COMMENT

Indian People Killing Force

LTFA, Trichy

Current Status of Eelam Tamils and Indian Factor

The Tamil people of Sri Lanka who were hitherto subjected to state sponsored terrorist activities by the Sinhala chauvinistic government are now at the receiving end of much graver forms of ruthless atrocities meted out by the Government of India. Even the Sinhala Government is ashamed at the cold blooded murders of civilians, raping of women and large scale devastation of life and property committed by the Indian Forces.

Peace Accord and Compulsions

At the incept, the people hoped that this much publicized peace and accord would bring them peace & harmony. At that instant apparently they failed to realize that the ulterior objective was to satisfy Indiann interests of Regional Supremacy. This accord was constituted without consulting the Tamils or their accredited representatives namely the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Therefore it does not comply with natural law of justice to force the Tamils to accept this accord. Infact the accord should have been made by both Sri Lankan government. Even then as a mark of goodwill and respect to India, the LTTE agreed to co-operate in the implementation of the accord. They agreed to entrust the very weapons which were collected in the battlefields after expending blood and sweat and much valued lives of their cadres and even handed over the weapons in two batches in great numbers. It must be emphasized that this handing over took place only after a guarantee offered by the government of India for the life of the leaders and cadres of LTTE.

Who Breached the Accord?

There have been a number of instances, which goes to prove that the Sri Lankan government, ironically the co-signatory of the accord was hell-bent to breach the accord since the day the State sponsored colonisation of traditional Tamil homeland, opening up the Sinhala dominant police stations in the Tamil areas, and despite the 12 day fast unto death by Thileepan to highlight the breaching of the accord by the Sri Lankan government and lethargy of Indian diplomats and agents over it and arresting of 17 LTTE men by Sri Lankan navy, who are supposed to keep away from patrolling, open declaration of withdrawal of general amnesty, the situation which forced the 12 LTTE men including the leaders Pulendran and Kumarappa to consume cyanide are clear instances of the breach of the accord by Sri Lankan government. International community at large got no doubt that the J.R. Jeyawardene government is engaged in cunning manoeuvres to twist the accord. Nevertheless the Indian government, which sponsored the accord and guaranteed the safety and security of Tamil people chose to be a silent spectator of the events.

Indian Intervention

The events that followed the death of leaders Pulendran and Kumarappa were spontaneous and not different from the kid of events that happened in Delhi and other parts of India on the murder of Indira Gandhi. However India capitalised on these events and launched a full scale war against the Tamils was heralded by the bombing of the two Tamil dailies by the names *Murasoli* & *Eelamurasu* published from Jaffna. This action to silence the voice of Tamils and throttle the freedom of speech & expression by the greatest democracy of the world cherishing Gandhian ideals shook the civilised world.

Peace Keeping Force assumes the role of Occupation Army

The Indian forces which came into SriLanka to implement a so called unique accord with no historic parallel, assumed a new role of military oppresistoric parallel to Peace keeping forces becoming a party in the conflict, that even launching an offensive against the grieved lot to protect whose interest they first came in.

Indian troops unleashed heavy artillery, and caused large scale destruction of life and property and captured Jaffna, which by then appeared a ghost city with none bothered to clear the streets littered with decomposing corpses.

In this brutal war over 2000 civilians lost their lives and double that number got injured, hundreds of women were raped and done to death. Over 50,000 people were compelled to desert their homes and seek safer places. Crores of rupee worth of property was destroyed. Continuous and indiscriminate launching of mortars and shells destroyed among other things temples, churches, mosques, schools, hospitals, libraries, commercial centres, factories and even officially recognised refugee camps. There were also instances of air attack and helicopter strafing by the Indian troops. Even the building of Jaffna University and certain sections of the Jaffna hospital which was spared in the onslaught by the SriLankan soldiers were damaged by the Indian attack.

Jaffna in the grip of Indian Peace Keeping Force

In effect a Military regime was set up in Jaffna. Whatever is uttered by the Indian Commanders becomes the rule of law. Curfew enforcements and relaxations were made as to suit the whims and fancies of the soldiers and never as proclaimed in the radio and mass media. Starvation and epidemics have gripped the Tamils. Large extents of farms and paddy lands have been already destroyed by the Sri Lankan forces. Today thousands of Jaffna Tamils live in make-shift camps and survive on a starvation diet of forage and yams. The Jaffna peninsula has never suffered as this by famine in the recorded history.

The injured are unable to seek medical treatment because most of the hospital and medical institutions are rendered inaction by the military offensive by the Indian forces. Number of deaths have occurred for want of medicines, medical equipment or doctors and para medical staff. The day Indian army moved into Jaffna hospital they shot and murdered in cold blood 3 doctors, 3 nurses and over 100 patients receiving treatment. All norms of civilised behaviour was forgotten in this mission by the Indian soldiers.

Indian March to the East.

Indian troops march to the east was recorded as a blood stained chapter in the history of Sri Lanka. Indian army marched into Palathady mosque in Valaichenai, a town 30 km from Batticaloa and opened a barrage of fire on the muslim devotees gathered there which included women and children. 13 Islamic Community at large went on to prove that in comparison to Indian army the Sri Lankan trigger happy soldiers were only moderates.

Our point of view

Inspite of these extreme situations of brutality and ruthless murder, rape and acts of intimidation by the Indian army, the LTTE is ready and willing to start peaceful negotiations with the Indian government and settle the impending issues.

LTTE activists are not murder hungry extremists but are freedom fighters who took to arms in order to safeguard the freedom of the people and to assure them dignified living with safety and security in their traditional homelands. They are highly motivated and are committed to sacrifice their lives and all earthly belongings towards this noble cause.

Indian army seems to be keen on taking over the arms LTTE is holding, rather than guarantying the safety of the Tamil people, despite the fact the LTTE is clinging on to the arms merely to safeguard the Tamil people and not for any other purposes.

Even at this juncture, if the Indian army is ready to return to the barracks, where they were before launching of the offensive on the 10th October 87, if they assure to do so, on condition that India is responsible for the safety and security of LTTE leaders and cadres and the Tamil people at large, the LTTE has informed the Government of India their willingness and readyness to surrender all the arms. It is deplorable that Indian Government has not accepted this and continue on the war path, with scant respect of the life and freedom of the Tamil people.

Crucial message to all Tamilians

Our dear brothren in Tamil Nadu! Blood is thicker than water. You are here in great numbers, to the tune of 60 millions. How long are you going to peacefully watch your own brothers and sisters getting butchered 30 kilometers across the Palk Straight. The time has come for you all to raise up in the name of solidarity of our race and protect the lives of innocent Tamilians.

Indian Union government is definitely watching the mood and reaction of Tamilians in Tamil Nadu. You cannot afford to be lethargic any longer. Raise your voice in the name of race solidarity, human civilisation and freedom of peaceful existence. Help to stop the annihilation of your race.

TIME IS UP FOR ALL TAMILIANS TO RISE UP.

LETTER

Lanka Quagmire

19.10.87

Sir, — The article by Mr Praful Bidwai, "Way Out of Lanka Quagmire" (October 5), does not make sense to anyone who has been following the events in Sri Lanka.

If Mr V Prabhakaran, the LTTE chief is as bad as made out by Mr Bidwai, one wonders why our Prime Minister had him brought to Delhi and gave him enough assurances in person to satisfy him. One would like to think that our Prime Minister would have nothing to do with the associate of a "notorious criminal" and the like of a Pol Pot.

At the time the rebels surrendered their arms in Sri Lanka, the LTTE slogan was, "We Love India". If now their feelings are different, sufficiently good reasons must exist, not the least being the death of Mr Thileepan. The LTTE leadership probably innocently believed that the inheritors of the Mahatma's doctrine would respond correctly. One wonders whether the IPKF could have done it at the time, without inviting greater complications. It would have been wise to concede the LTTE's demands in time to save Thileepan. They were conceded anyway.

Mr Bidwai speaks of democracy, little realising that in the whole episode, neither Sri Lanka nor India has given a thought to this ideal. They have been governed only by their self-interest. Why should there be so much opposition to meeting the demands of the LTTE, after they have been assured of a "predominant" role? The LTTE can fulfil its role only if given a free hand. We refuse to concede the same thing to the Sri Lankan Tamils. Neither the Sinhala people nor Indians have the right to be in the homeland of the Tamils in Sri Lanka as masters, dictating terms.

Mr Bidwai's attempt to depict the LTTE as murderers and smugglers may serve certain vested interests, but is at variance with the spirit shown by our own government, beginning with the airdropping of essential supplies to a besieged population. Our own freedom was earned not by non-violent satyagraha alone, but also by the contributions made by our revolutionaries, the Indian National Army and the mutineers of the RIN.

The LTTE deserve nothing but admiration. They have waged a war of independence, dwarfing even the leadership and resistance of the people of Bangladesh, and demonstrated to the world the mettle of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as second to none. Mr Bidwai has no right to blame them for their ruthlessness, for they had, and have, to face ruthless situations. Acts on India's part which will make it more difficult for the Tamils to gain self-government can only bring discredit to India.

E. R. PANIKKAR

Bombay.

The Times of India

Protesting against IPKF - Tamil Nadu

THE TIMES

INDIA'S REGIONAL ROLE

EDITORIAL

OCT 19

The Indian army is fighting in Sri Lanka. Its objective is to flush out units of the Tamil guerrilla group, the Tigers, capture their arms stores and enforce compliance with the terms of the July peace accord fashioned by Prime Minister Gandhi and President Jayewardene to end the island's communal conflict. So far the battle has raged for nine days, and looks set to continue. Indeed, the Indians have said they will "overcome all the elements obstructing the agreement using all the force at our command".

This represents an important shift in India's response to the Sri Lankan crisis. Traditionally, the Indian government, with its 50 million Tamils in the South, has in effect supported the Sri Lankan Tamils. However, although the presence of the Indian peace keeping force was intended to reassure the Tamils of Indian protection and the Sri Lankan army's compliance with the accord, its mandate included the disarming of Tamil guerrilla groups. In this more neutral role the Indians have identified the Tigers as the principal obstruction to peace. Now, in undertaking the task of neutralizing them, they have – both in Tamil and Sinhalese eyes – moved away from their earlier position of protector and are taking the role of honest broker in Sri Lanka's conflict.

This change in India's attitude, has significant implications, both military and political. Militarily, the Indian army is now committed to a policy of destroying the Tigers' power. This means that the Indians are fighting an anti-guerrilla war, in a foreign country, and are determined to win it. It also means that there will be further casualties, possibly several hundred more, and many will be Indian.

Many people will question this strategy. After all civilian lives are involved and there will be a measure of wanton destruction. But for how long could the Tigers have been allowed to sabotage the July peace treaty? How many more Sinhalese massacres could have been condoned? And how much longer could the Indians have stood by as the Sri Lankan feud tore the island apart?

The political messages from northern Sri Lanka are, if anything, most important of all. For President Jayewardene there is a warning behind the military action. If the Indians will no longer tolerate the Tigers' obstructionist policies, it can be safely assumed that neither will they be patient with Sinhalese opposition. Now that he has taken to arms to enforce Tamil compliance Mr Gandhi cannot simply sit back if the Sri Lankan cabinet or parliament fails to ratify the accord or to fulfil its role under its terms. To that extent the Indian army has limited President Jayewardene's room for manoeuvre.

There are also lessons for India's other neighbours. By taking decisive action against the Tigers the Indian government has made clear that its sympathy and support for neighbouring secessionist movements is limited. Mr Gandhi will not countenance a second Bangladesh in South Asia. By the same token India is also prepared to exert itself to solve the region's ethnic problems.

Yet there is also a need for caution. In Sri Lanka a more assertive Indian foreign policy appears to have been born. If this simply restricts itself to obtaining recognition of the country's pre-eminent role in the region it will be acceptable. But if it becomes a cloak for Indian intervention in other countries' affairs it could disguise a form of sub-continental imperialism which must be checked. Sri Lanka could be the testing ground for such wider Indian ambitions.





RAPED

12.10.87	Pirambady lane/Jaffna	15 women
14.10.87	Kokuvil/Jaffna	9 girls (then killed)
14.10.87	Uduvil/Jaffna	15 girls (then killed)
15.10.87	Batticoloa	Miss. S. Vanajambal (18)
15.10.87	Batticoloa	Miss S. Rajasuloshna (16)



10.30 AM
17/x/87.

Rajasuloshana. 16 y.

H/o. being raped by IPKF Soldr at 7.30 AM. 15/x/87.

O/F:- No abration. or Laceration or condusion on face, trunk

M.H.: Menache at 5 month back.

Cs:- DR. NO (M)
BP - 110/70.

Inform Police

Rs:- No bite marks in the chest or over the breast

Ab:- Flat abd.
S. Rajasuloshana



10.15 AM
17/x/87

Vanajamlal. 18 y.

H/o being raped by IPKF Sol at 7.30 AM on 15/x/87.

O/F:- No abdration / Laceration / Condusion. Over the face breast limbs

Inform Police

Cs:- DR. NO (M)
S. Vanajambal.

THE HINDU

'Jaffna capture may not end battle'

NEWS

COLOMBO, Oct. 20.

The military operation by the Indian Peace-Keeping Force in northeastern Sri Lanka has now reached its final stages with only a tightening of the noose around Jaffna required for bringing about the fall of the last bastion of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

However, political observers here are sceptical if the capture of Jaffna will signal the end of India's battle against the LTTE. They say it might mark the beginning of India's lingering involvement in Sri Lanka's blood-letting ethnic tangle.

"Guerillas, with their commitment, rightly or wrongly, are never obliterated, they spawn and proliferate", the analysts said.

The Tigers, following their reversal in the straight battle against the mighty Indian army, might take recourse to classical guerilla warfare providing nagging trouble to the Indian Army, as they earlier did to the Sri Lankan armed forces, the analysts said.

Asked if the captured areas in the Jaffna peninsula had been "pacified", an Indian diplomat said, "In a guerilla situation it is difficult to say that areas taken in are pacified."

The LTTE, still rigid, not surrendering arms and reluctant to accept the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement in full, might spread out in the jungles and in difficult areas of lagoons and creeks to carry on their protracted struggle, inviting more and more of the Indian army to be engaged in hit-and-run battles.

Already the IPKF has been strengthened in the past few days by over 2,000 and there have been reports of further reinforcements.

JVP active: The southern extremist elements, spearheaded by the proscribed, pro-Sinhala Janatha Vimukti Peramuna, which led the insurgency in 1971, have been active again since the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement.

The JVP, apart from killing or injuring ruling United National Party members in the southern districts, has raided Sri Lankan Army camps in the deep south and is engaged in a drive to collect weapons by various means.

The Sri Lankan President Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, himself has said the JVP and Tamil extremists have established links and that both are determined to overthrow the Government and set up one of their own.

The fact remains that various forces in Sri Lanka both national and international, are at work and there are wheels within wheels in this confusingly volatile ethnic situation.

The "strait-jacket" solution to the Tamil problem provided by the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement will be put to a severe test while dealing with the emerging scenario that has new dimensions of formidable proportions.

Political observers say international forces, which appear to be applauding the agreement, are not too happy with India's emergence as a regional superpower, which the agreement accepts. These countries too have a stake in seeking its failure.

Forces inside the country, spearheaded by the main opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party of the former Prime Minister, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, certain influential sections of the Buddhist clergy, and a cross section of the Sinhalese population, including some members of the ruling UNP, have never accepted the agreement gracefully.

Anti-India sentiment: An anti-India scenario is being created by constantly criticising the presence of the IPKF and the fact of its being "armed to the teeth". Such criticism will gain momentum in the coming days, observers say.

The "injured" self-respect and national honour of the Sinhalese, allegations that the IPKF first "sided" with the militants and that they were taking too much time to finish off their job in Jaffna are being bandied about freely, to fan the flames of the anti-India sentiment, they said.

In an interview to the English daily *Island* on Sunday, Mrs. Bandaranaike said ".....reports do not indicate any overwhelming success by the IPKF. I did not think that one of the biggest armies in the world would run into so much difficulties against terrorists, who in the estimation of Mr. Dixit (Indian High Commissioner) himself had only 30 per cent of their weapons."

The former Prime Minister also expressed strong doubts about the Indian Army leaving the country soon. "Now that the Indians have launched an offensive in the north and many Indians have died, they will not leave without getting what they came here for", she said.

She said: "Almost three months have gone by since the agreement was signed and Indian soldiers are still here. That does not augur too well for the country. What is most intriguing and dangerous about their presence is the equipment they have brought down. They have brought with them armoured cars, anti-aircrafts guns, field guns and powerful tanks, according to information we have."

All this propaganda is "literally swallowed" by large cross sections of the Sinhala population, the observers say. — PTI.

DMK threatens rail roko stir

MADRAS, Oct. 20.

The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam will launch a 24-hour "rail roko" agitation on October 24 "if the Indian Government does not pay heed to the appeal of the people of Tamil Nadu and stop army action in Jaffna", in Sri Lanka.

A decision to this effect was taken by the administrative committee of the DMK, which met here today, the party president, Mr. M. Karunanidhi, presiding.

A resolution condemned the Indian army's attack on Sri Lankan Tamils and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, "despite the LTTE expressing its willingness for talks several times" and said it was aimed at "annihilating the Tamil race".

An appeal from the IPKF

Dear Brothers and Sisters in Jaffna,

1. We are here to bring peace and normalcy for you which the ill motivated LTTE are causing impediments in the way, as they are power hungry. The posture of ruthless violence adopted by the LTTE top leaders is only designed to suit their own vested interests. The Peace Keeping Force has tried all means to make the LTTE see reason but in turn the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was attacked.

2. Men, women and children are being used as shield by the LTTE leaders to minimise their own casualties at the cost of peace loving and innocent Tamil citizens. Young boys and girls are treacherously being coerced by the LTTE for laying mines as also indulging in sneak attacks on the IPKF. This is in utter disregard for their lives.

3. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), in order to avoid casualties to civil population, has been launching their operations with utmost care. Despite our best endeavour the Tamil population is still suffering avoidable casualties which are entirely due to the intransigent attitude of the LTTE leadership.

4. We know the hardship you are facing due to lack of basic necessities of life. We request you to make the LTTE stop their violence and back the accord which will bring peace to Jaffna and elsewhere in Sri Lanka. You can easily do this as we know that you all want peace and you want to live in tranquillity with your near and dear ones. You also want your children to go to schools and grow up as dignified and honourable citizens. Therefore, there is no reason for you to ruin your life and your children's future for the LTTE leaders who have so far brought nothing but agony and misery to you all.

5. The IPKF appeals to the Tamil population to break off with the LTTE leadership and come over to the check points and camps indicated by the IPKF to avoid any further casualties and also to enable us to provide the basic necessities which you have been denied by the intransigence of the LTTE. The IPKF's presence in Jaffna is solely for the benefit of the Tamil population and sacrifices are being made by the IPKF to ensure an honourable and dignified life for your tomorrow.

LTTE escape routes to lagoon sealed

BATTLE □ FOR □ JAFFNA

NEWS

MADRAS, Oct. 20.

The Indian Peace-Keeping Force has sealed the escape routes of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to the Jaffna lagoon after its units moved out of the Jaffna Fort yesterday and firmly established its control on the coastal road of the town.

A spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry told reporters here that the IPKF had also advanced along the Navatkuli-Jaffna axis and established firm positions astride the railway line. This move also effectively sealed all exits from Jaffna on the Navatkuli-Jaffna axis.

Meanwhile, Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh, Overall Force Commander, IPKF, flew into Jaffna this morning in the wake of advances made by the IPKF towards the heart of Jaffna.

The spokesman also said the IPKF had consolidated its positions along three axes, viz Kankesanturai-Jaffna, Palaly-Jaffna and Velvettiturai-Koppai North, and was poised for further advances towards the centre of Jaffna. All illegal movement across the Palk Strait had also been effectively sealed by the Indian Navy.

In these operations, the Peace-Keeping Force had taken all possible care and precaution to avoid civilian casualties including its use of fire-power. "For this reason, the advances have been made in a measured and careful manner," the spokesman said. The IPKF had also helped more civilians to move out to safer locations and it was arranging for medical assistance and food supply to those who sought its assistance.

Vague 'offer'

He termed "vague" the LTTE deputy leader, Mr. Mathaiya's conditional offer to Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh to surrender its arms.

"Mr. Mathaiya's message is vague," the spokesman said. "For the Tamils to live in peace and security, all arms in the possession of all groups should be handed over. Mr. Mathaiya's message does not meet this."

Asked whether India had then rejected Mr. Mathaiya's offer, he said, "From what I said, it must be self-evident". He stressed that the political objective of the current exercise was to disarm the militants.

"The fact remains that as of today, all the militant groups other than the LTTE have welcomed and agreed to abide by the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. All these militant groups have laid down their arms. These militant groups and the TULF have called upon the LTTE to lay down its arms. This conclusively proves that the LTTE, by its actions, stands politically isolated in the Northern and Eastern provinces", he said.

The External Affairs Ministry spokesman dismissed as "totally false and baseless" the allegations that there had been heavy civilian casualties in the clashes between the LTTE and IPKF. Civilians were not killed even in the crossfire. He pointed out that the IPKF had been calling upon the people to come out of Jaffna and that it would give them assistance.

On reports that there was starvation in Jaffna, he said it was the LTTE which had bottled up people inside Jaffna, and not the IPKF. The LTTE was using the civilians as human-shields. "I have never known a Tiger taking cover behind a lamb", he said.

Replying to allegations that the IPKF had raped women in Jaffna, the spokesman said, "This allegation is false, preposterous and mischievous. It is an absolute case of disinformation. Otherwise, people will not come out to be fed by the IPKF."

Answering a question on the observation (about a month ago) of Mr. J. N. Dixit, Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, that the LTTE had laid down 70 per cent of its arms, the spokesman said the LTTE obviously possessed more arms than was assessed in that context.

'Bid to kill social worker'

He regretted that the LTTE attempted yesterday to kill Mr. Sam Thambimuthu, a prominent social worker in Batticaloa district, "who played a stellar role in protecting the rights of the Tamils in the Eastern province." He said this was the second attempt of the LTTE on Mr. Thambimuthu. "We strongly condemn this action of the LTTE and regard it as yet another manifestation of its attempt to establish its political hegemony through force, coercion and terrorism."

The spokesman also referred to the incident yesterday in Batticaloa when a 'remote-controlled landmine set off by the LTTE blew up a bus, killing 41 Tamil civilians and one Indian soldier. "This is an instance of the LTTE's total disregard for the lives of innocent Tamil civilians," he added.

Answering a query on why reporters were not being allowed to go to Jaffna to report the situation firsthand, the spokesman said, "First, this is not a war situation. We are not at war with anybody. We have mounted an operation with the objective of implementing the agreement. Given the indiscriminate way in which the LTTE fires and lays mines, it (going to Jaffna) is at your risk. We don't want unnecessary casualties."

Bunkers destroyed

Our Special Correspondent reports from New Delhi

In the Navatkuli-Kolumpurai-Jaffna Fort axis, the IPKF has destroyed 30 concrete bunkers, one explosive dump and a workshop of the LTTE, according to the External Affairs Ministry spokesman. Demolition charges that had been laid by the LTTE on 10 culverts had been defused and 42 claymore mines along with 65 bombs have been recovered by the IPKF.

Reacting to some media reports that an official of the LTTE organisation had sent a note to Indian and Sri Lankan officials, offering to meet the Indian demand for an unconditional surrender but India had not responded, the spokesman characterised such reports as 'misleading' and said that they appeared to be 'deliberate disinformation spread by the LTTE.'

LTTE CLAIMS

On 20.10.87, at Kondavil, 3 A.P.C. armoured vehicles of the Indian army were destroyed by the rocket attacks of the LTTE.

In the fight at Arali, all the weapons including A.P.C. armoured vehicle, one jeep and a cannon artillery of the IPKF were captured by the LTTE. Besides 2 soldiers of the IPKF were also arrested. At Koppai, in LTTE's Pasuka rocket launcher attack, 2 tanks of the IPKF were completely destroyed. Two Indian made 50 caliber rifles and 3000 bullets were also seized by the LTTE.

On their way from Palali to Urumbirai the IPKF shot dead 10 innocent civilians. The Indian army on its way from Anaithurai to Kallundaiveli shot dead more than 20 civilians.

In the evening at about 3 'o clock, in the Pannai region, near the fort camp, 3 Sri Lankan Bomber planes dropped bombs and attacked the public. Many of them died and a very large number got injured.

At Anaikottai 19 civilians killed.

The conditions of the Jaffna town are deteriorating, day after day, in the most cruelest shell attack on the Indian army, which is worse than that of the Sri Lankan army. As a result innocent public are undergoing untold sufferings. Even those who had originally taken refuge at Nallur Kandaswamy Temple, have started moveing out. More than 500 shells are thrown at, every day.. In such an attack people are wounded to a large extent. Many people suffer for want of food and shelter.

AT 'Karaithivu' firings from helicopter, killed 2 public besides wounding 2 of them.

AFFIDAVIT

MURUGAN ARULNAYAGI (22), Kappanpulam, Punnalaikattuwan North.

The deceased person Kanapathy Murugan, aged 62 years was my father.

He was a casual labourer.

On 20.10.87, at about 8 a.m. my father left for work.

At about 9 a.m. I was informed that my father was shot and killed by the army when he tried to run away after seeing them.

I came to know that there was a confrontation took place between the army and the militants in the area at the time of my father's death.

His body was brought home only on the third day and cremated at the Vilankan Cemetery.

My mother was shot and killed by the Sri Lankan security forces in 1987 early part.

I have two brothers who are younger to me.

After my father's death we are undergoing untold hardship.

My brother Singarasan (12) was forced to abandon his studies after his father's death and now working as a labourer to maintain our family.

MUTHUKUMAR PAVALAMALAR (38) "Thavagiri", Kopay South, Kopay.

The deceased child Muthukumaru Illankeeran, aged 10 years was my son.

Due to the October 1987 military offensive we sought refugee at the Kopay Veerapathirar Temple.

On 20.10.87 at about 1.30 p.m. army fired through the Temple window.

My son was struck down by a bullet and died on the spot.

Three other persons were also killed in the incident.

Only on the third day we managed to cremate his body in an empty field.

NAGALINGAM SINNAPPU (58) Asari Lane, Kopay North, Kopay.

My father named Vattan Nagalingam, aged 75, Worker was staying withme at the above address.

Due to the spate of violence in October 1987, my father the above-named fell a victim to shell blast and succumbed to the injuries sustained by the same on 20.10.87 at Kopay.

I have 5 children and my late father has been maintaining me and my children prior to his death.

POOMANI KRISHNAPILLAI (55), Pilliyar Koviladi, Kavanthan Road, Urelu East, Urelu.

The deceased Krishnapillai Chandrakumar, aged 22 years was my son.

He was a casual labourer.

Due to the October 1987 military offensive we left our house at Urelu and took refuge at Matuvil.

On 20.10.87 my son left us saying that he was going to Urelu to inspect our house.

At about 4 p.m. I was informed by a person who accompanied my son to Urelu that my son was shot and injured by the army at Urelu.

I also came to know that he was admitted at the Pointpedro Base Hospital Manthiki.

I rushed to the hospital immediately.

He died on 21.10.87.

I have two unmarried daughters at home.

My husband is unemployed and an invalid.

It was my son who maintained our family through his hard work.

After his death we do not have any income.

RAMALINGAM PUVENESWARAN (46) Kaithady North, Kaithady.

The deceased Suppar Sinnathamby, aged 80 years was my paternal grandfather.

My grandfather was employed as a watcher in a house at Navatkuli.

On 20.10.87 I was informed that my grandfather was shot and killed by the army while he was at the house where he was working as a watcher on 16.10.87.

I also came to know that the body was disposed by the army itself.

Mrs. RASAMMAH PONNAMPALAM (78) Urumpirai South, Urumpirai.

The deceased Mrs. Pancharatnam Pushparani (51) is my daughter.

My daughter Pancharatnam Puhparani was one of the several persons shot dead at Urumpirai on 20.10.87 during the IPKF operations.

Her husband too was shot dead on this day.

I am watching the interests of my daughter's family in Jaffna as her 3 children are married and the youngest son P. Manorathan the only unmarried child has since left the Island.

SINNAMMAH POOTHAPILLAI (54), Karanthan Road, Urelu East, Chunakam.

The deceased Elayavan Ramu, aged 65 years was my father.

He was a casual Labourer.

On 20.10.87 as the army approached our house firing their rifles we fled from our house through fear.

While he was accompanying us my father was shot and killed by athe army about quarter mile from our house.

We fled from the scene of incident leaving my dead father at the spot where he was killed.

After about one month I returned to our village to find only my fathers skeleton remains lying at the same place where he was shot.

As my husband is an invalid and unemployed it was my father who supported my family.

I have six children at home.

THAIYALNAYAKI PONNUTHURAI (35), Suthumalai South, Manipay.

My father and I were living with my married sister at the above address.

My father Velauthar Ponnuthurai, was maintaining a cigar industry at the above address.

Due to the IPKF operation in our locality the family of my sister and I sought refuge in Madduvil Chavakachcheri on 20.10.87.

My father remained at home to look after the house and property.

We returned home on 10.12.87 when situation improved and found the skeleton of my father in our compound.

Same was burnt in our compound on 10.12.87 evening.

I am a spinster and I was fully dependent on the earnings of my deceased father.

I have no savings, no house of my own and no other source of income.

P. Thaiyalnaki

VEERAGATHIPILLAI THANKARASA
Point Pedre Road, Kankesanturai.

That on 11.10.87 when the Indian army started firing at our area, I was alarmed and sent my son, Babisingam, to fetch my daughter, Pusparani, who was a student of the Ramanathan College at Maruthanamadam, as a boarder.

That my son did not return home for nearly a week and I began searching for him. I heard from a person in Point Pedre that he was warded at the Manthikai Government Hospital, with injuries on his legs, caused by gun-fire.

That I went to the Manthikai Hospital on 20.10.87, cycling through lanes and by-ways and saw my son warded there. My son told me that when he was approaching Maruthanamadam to meet his sister, the Indian Army fired at him and that he was injured on his legs.

That my son, Babisingam, told me that he was helped by a friend from Atchuvely who carried him on his pedal-cycle, gave him First-Aid treatment at his house and took him to the Manthikai Government Hospital. He could not be taken to the Jaffna General Hospital or to the District Hospital at Tellippalai, as they were not functioning due to military operations.

That my son, Babisingam, died at the Manthikai Government Hospital on 17.11.87 due to wounds turning gangreneus, as there were no medical staff to dress the wounds owing to military operations in the area.

That on 11.10.87, I along with my family, fled away from my house which is situated near the sea-beach, close to the Yarl Cinema theatre.

my mechanised fishing boat had been destroyed and they were in smithereens. The outboard motor and the fishing nets and allied accessories, too, were found missing. The damage and loss suffered by me is roughly Rs One hundred thousand (Rs. 100,000/-) I think that my boat had been destroyed by the Indian Army. I also think that the outboard motor, nets and other allied accessories, have been destroyed by the Indian soldiers, as no one else could have gone there without their knowledge.

CHELLIAH THIRUNAVUKKARASU (41), 8, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Jaffna.

The deceased is my sister, Chelliah Kamala Ambikai age 52 years.

On 21.10.87 my sister was living in the address given above.

We heard about the shelling and shooting around the house where my sister was living on 21.10.87.

We were worried about her safety; but we could not go there as the curfew was on.

When the curfew was lifted, we visited the house and found the decomposed body of my sister. The body was burnt there on 11.11.87.

I may be given some assistence.

C. Thirunavukkarasu.

EMMANUEL MARIAROSE THAVARANI (39), C/O. Gunaratnam 5/1, Press Road, Chundickuly, Jaffna.

The deceased person Chelliah Ceciliya Thangammah, aged 77 years was my mother.

During the night of 21.10.87 our locality was subjected to intense shell fire.

We fled from our house in fear.

As my mother was running from our house she was injured on a shell blast.

She was admitted at the Holy Cross Health Centre, Jaffna.

She succumbed to her injuries on 12.11.87.

Her body was buried at St. Mary's burial ground, Jaffna.

She was living under my care and maintenance until her death.

E mariarosi Thavarani

JACOB MARIACHI (60) 82, Manipuri 3rd Cross Colombuthurai.

The deceased person Neekilan Jacob, aged 67 years was my husband.

He was a Fisherman.

On 21.10.87 at about 6.30 a.m. my husband left home for fishing.

At about 2.00 p.m. I was informed that my husband was shot and killed by the army while he was engaged in fishing.

I later learned that his body was buried at the Navatkuli Catholic burial ground.

I have an unmarried daughter named Mary Meninje, aged 29 years.

After my husband's death I do not have any income.

Mrs. JOSEPH CYRIL BRIDGETTE (60)
138/1, Kondady Road, Gurunagar, Jaffna.

There was shelling and firing of sophisticated weapons in and around our area on 20.10.87.

Through fear my husband, children and I sought refuge at St. Patrick's College Jaffna.

On 21.10.87 while we were at the above school shells fired by the Indian Peace Keeping Force from all directions started falling in the St. Patricks College school compound.

One such shell fell close to us and exploded.

Shrapnel from the shell explosion struck my husband on both his legs causing severe injuries and he bled profusely.

When the shelling ceased my husband was removed to Jaffna Holy Cross Private Hospital in a car where he was admitted at about 5 p.m.

While under treatment he succumbed to his injuries the same night.

The dead body of my husband was brought to St Patricks College refuge camp from the hospital on 22.10.87 and burial took place at St. Mary's Cathedral Cemetery at 10.00 a.m.

On this date 4 people were killed and several others including my grand-daughter Maristella, aged 14 years injured in this incident.

The untimely death of my husband is a great loss to me and I have become a destitute.

Mrs. KANMANY, widow of the late Sivalai Gunaratnam (45) 188/2, Kasturiar Road, Jaffna.

I am the widow of the late Sivalai Gunaratnam killed in army firing on 21.10.87.

My husband left home at about 2 p.m. on 21.10.87 to the Jaffna Teaching hospital for medical attention on a cycle with a friend of his.

While he was on the road opposite the out-patients Dept. of the hospital there was heavy firing from the hospital buildings and premises.

My husband was hit by bullets when he fell dead on the spot.

The dead body of my husband along with several other dead bodies of persons killed were heaped up on the road opposite the O.P.D. and given a mass cremation.

My husband was a Govt pensioner.

I and my five children were dependent on him.

LOPPU SAVERIMUTHU (73), 172 (368), Main Street, Jaffna.

The deceased Patrick Saverimuthu, aged 18 years was my son.

He was an advanced level student of St. Patrick's College, Jaffna.

On 21.10.87 our area was subjected to intense shelling by the army.

At about 3.00 p.m. I left my home and sought refuge at the St. Mary's Cathedral.

It was my late son who took me to the Cathedral.

After leaving me at the Cathedral he left promising to return without delay.

At about 6.30 p.m. I was informed that my son seriously injured when a shell like object fell near him and exploded while he was on his way to the Cathedral.

The incident took place at the Press Road.

I also came to know that he died while he was being taken to the Anaipanthy Dispensary.

His remains were buried at the St. Mary's Cathedral burial grounds.

I have an unmarried daughter Gnanamani aged 35 years.



MANUEL DONAS (45), No. 15/2, Fifth Cross Street, (near water tank) Gurunagar, Jaffna.

On 10.10.87 as our locality was subjected to heavy shelling from the Jaffna Fort, accompanied by my wife and children, I fled to the St. Patricks College for safety.

On 21.10.87 when shells fell on the College premises causing injuries to several, we fled to the Nallur Kandasamy Temple.

On 22.10.87 about 70 refugees of Nallur left at 7 a.m. in a lorry for the Araly Jetty.

At about 9 a.m. 70 in boats in which we were crossing the lagoon Saravanai were fired at by a helicopter, the attack lasting for about one hour.

The right arm of my son Donas Hamilton aged 5 years was shattered by a bullet. Several others including my wife were also injured. 13 persons were killed instantaneously.

My son was rushed to the Kayts Hospital was transferred along with other injured persons to the Moolai Hospital at 2.30 p.m. the same day.

On 24..10.87 my son's right leg was amputated above the knee.

On 1..11.87 after the Moolai Hospital was started by a helicopter I removed my son to Sillalai and continued the treatment at private hospital there and returned home with my son on 8.11.87.

Mrs. MARIAMMA KURUSUMUTHU (56), Uyarapulam Anaicoddai.

The deceased Kurusumuthu John Peter is my son.

My son K. John Peter (24) was a monthly paid casual labourer attached to the General Hospital Jaffna.

My son K. John Peter who was on duty at the General Hospital Jaffna on 21.10.87 was shot dead when the hospital was stormed by the IPKF.

Over a hundred employees, patients and visitors were shot dead in this incident.

The dead bodies were burnt by the hospital authorities on the instructions of the IPKF.

My husband who is now 67 years has poor vision and cannot work.

My husband, my son Darwin (18) a student, unmarried daughter Rajeswary (25) and I entirely depended on the earnings of my son K. John Peter.

By the death of my son K. John Peter the sole bread winner of the family we have been put into good inconvenience.

S. MICHELLE (70)
15, St Patrick's Road, Jaffna.

I am (a) the wife of the late Sinnathurai Sellarasa (52) and (b) the mother of Rosaline (21) both died on 21.10.87 opposite the Jaffna General Hospital.

On 21.10.87 at about 3.30 p.m. my husband went to St Patrick's College, Jaffna to prepare for the rest of the family to go and stay there as refugees.

While my husband was there a shell fell in the backyard of our premises at St Patrick's Road.

I immediately got hold of my 18 year old son who was born disabled and rushed to St Patricks to join my husband and my other son who were already there.

When I went to St Patrick's my husband inquired as to where our daughter Rosaline was.

I said I did not know where she was.

My husband went home at once and found my daughter lying injured in the back compound of our house.

As I learnt later my husband removed my injured daughter in a car belonging to one Nadarajah to the Jaffna General Hospital.

My husband did not return. I or any of my relations could not go towards the Jaffna Hospital to search for my husband and daughter due to a state of tension in that area.

On or about 26.10.87 I and my husband's brother, Arumaithurai went to look for my husband and daughter.

We found the car in which my husband removed my daughter in a burnt state.

The burnt car was lying on Hospital Road opposite the Hospital and near the burnt down Jaffna Cooperative Store building.

We found skulls and bones and remnants of the clothing worn by my husband and daughter.

I and my surviving two minor children have lost the maintenance and support we received from my late husband.

NADARAJAH RAVINDRAKUMAR
Sinnakoviltheru, Kopay South, Kopay.

That my mother Pushparanee Widow of Nadarajah was shot dead on the 21st Day of October 1987 by IPKF at my home at Sinnakoviltheru, Kopay South, Kopay and her death was registered in certificate of death bearing No: 5115.

That I have suffered mentally and financially by the death of my mother.

That I have no source of income to maintain me and my two sisters.

I pray that I be paid reasonable compensation for the death of my mother.

NADESAPILLAI POOMANY (51), widow, C/o Dilka Bakery, Irupalai, Kopay South, Kopay.

The deceased person Nadesapillai Arulchandradas, aged 17 years was my son.

He was an employee of the Dilka Bakery, Irupalai.

On 21.10.87 at about 10.00 a.m. we fled from our residence as the army advanced towards our locality.

My son was left behind at the Bakery.

Only on the fourth day we learned that he was shot and killed by the army while he was in the Bakery on 21.10.87.

We only recovered his skeletal remains which we cremated at the Irupalai Cemetery.

I have a daughter named Jeyanthi aged 16 years.



PONNAMPALAM NADARAJAH (69)
NIC No. 47 231 2065 V. 111/4, Convent Road, Jaffna.

I am a Chauffeur. I have been employed as such by Markandu Thiagarajah of Stanley Road, Ariyakulam, Jaffna.

I used to drive the motor car bearing registration number 4SRI 1989 an Austin A 40 Farina model.

On 21.10.87 at about 2 p.m. I drove the said car for my employer, Mr Thiagarajah who wanted to go to St Patrick's Road on some business.

The occupants of the car besides me as driven were Mr Markandu Thiagarajah and his son Mathiarasan, about 14 years of age.

When we were driving past the main gate of St Patrick's playground at St Patrick's Road we were stopped by some people who appealed to us to take some injured people to hospital.

The injured persons were three girls who were struck by shell fragments.

The three injured girls were carried into the car. Two men, one of whose name was Selvarasa and who were close relatives of the girls too got into the car.

I drove the car with the said 7 occupants towards the Jaffna General Hospital.

As the car was about to cross the junction of Hospital Road, Clock Tower Road, Junction, IPKF soldiers who were standing on Clock Tower Road turn off started shooting at the car driven by me.

I stopped the car immediately at a point where it was about to cross the said junction. I was also hit by the bullets fired by the IPKF soldiers.

I was hit on my head, face on my shoulder and legs.

I managed to open the door and sit on the ground near the foot of a tree standing in the middle of the Hospital Road.

After a while I crossed the other half of the carriage-way of Hospital Road and left over the Hospital parapet wall and entered the Hospital premises.

When I was hit, I also noticed that bullets were striking the other 7 occupants of the car. The time would have been 2.30 p.m.

I was attended to at the hospital and I was lying as an in-patient at ward No. 25.

I was got readied to be taken to the operating theatre at about 3.30 p.m. when there was further shooting by the IPKF inside the hospital premises.

I was told by a young doctor to remain in the hospital overnight and to leave the hospital during the early hours as it was not safe for patients to remain in the hospital as the IPKF was shooting and killing even hospital staff.

Early the next morning, that is on 22.10.87 I looked towards the car I had left on Hospital Road.

It was smouldering at that time.

I left the hospital premises and went to Moolai Hospital for further treatment.

I am yet not fully cured though I was discharged on 31.10.87.



RAMALINGAM KESAVAN, Maravanpulo, Chavakachcheri.

That my elder brother Ramalingam Suhumar who was working as a labourer at General Hospital, Jaffna was shot dead on 21.10.87 at General Hospital premises and his body was cremated in the Jaffna Gen. Hospital premises.

I pray that the monthly salary due to my deceased brother for the month of October 1987 be paid to me.

RAMASAMY MUNIANDY KANTHAN (47),Troup Estate, Talawakele. vakele.

I am the brother of the deceased Ramaswamy Rajaratnam alias Ramiah (37).

My brother R. Rajaratnam alias Ramiah was a bachelor and was employed in Dinesh Bake House, Manipay for the last 7 years.

My brother R. Rajaratnam alias Ramiah who was a patient in ward 16 of General Hospital, Jaffna was one of the several persons killed when the Hospital was stormed by the IPKF on 21.10.87 during its operations.

Our father died several years ago.

Our mother who is alive is residing with me at Troup Estate, Talawakele.

My mother and unmarried sister Kamalam (35) were dependent on my brother R. Rajaratnam alias Ramiah.

RASAMMAH SORNALINGAM (60), Arasady, Kopay North, Kopay.

I am the mother of Sornalingam Nithiananthan aged 34 years who died on 21.10.87.

He was a Farmer.

On 21.10.87 a shell fell inside our hosue and exploded.

My son was killed on the spot.

His bodyw as cremated at the spot after three days.

I have six sons.



THE HINDU

NEWS Next phase of IPKF operations very arduous

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI Oct. 20.

The IPKF today consolidated its positions around the Jaffna city without any significant action being reported last night. Sources indicate that Indian casualties in the last 24 hours have been eight soldiers wounded.

In the western waterfront area, the brigade which had effected the linkup with the forces from the Fort yesterday moved over a kilometre inland. Similarly there was movement in the other four axes as well. By tomorrow morning, the IPKF hopes to advance its ring further south from the north and north-east roughly along the east-west roads linking Manipai, Chitumalai, Kondavil and South Kopai. This will leave an area roughly seven square km under the control of the LTTE in the Jaffna city proper.

The eastern waterfront area, from the Jaffna Fort to Kalumputurai West is still not under the IPKF control and is the one area that affords the LTTE access to the lagoon and its bases and arms caches on the lagoon islands, as well as to the rest of the northern province. The IPKF will also move to seal this by a movement similar to the one carried out yesterday on the Navanturai side.

Meanwhile, the Chief of the Army Staff, Gen. K. Sundarji, who has been closely monitoring the operations, visited Jaffna today to check on the arrangements for the next phase of operations which are likely to be extremely arduous and are likely to result in a complex situation which would involve the IPKF in isolating the LTTE cadre from the 350,000 civilians in Jaffna city proper.

Lack of personnel: The IPKF is now moving in a slow and deliberate pace so as to avoid taking needless casualties as well as inflicting them on civilians who are trapped in the crossfire. The biggest problem being faced by the IPKF is the lack of adequate personnel to police the areas it has already wrested from LTTE control, as well as logistical problems in maintaining the 2 Division force in Sri Lanka. The Indian Army has a northern orientation with major deployments, bases and supply depots over 3,000 km from the area they are currently fighting in. The continuously built-up area cannot be completely secured from small groups of LTTE personnel infiltrating to plant mines and booby traps even after the lead IPKF forces have passed through and then detonating them when supplies and ammunition are being ferried. In fact, the bulk of the IPKF losses have been attributed to mine blasts.

Radio detonation: The mines are proving devastatingly effective though in terms of technology they may be simple. The LTTE, however, is using radio detonation techniques which enable remote control detonation. Simply put, a barrel of liquid explosive or 30-40 kg. of plastic explosive is buried underground and a 100-metre fuse connects it to a radio switch which in turn can be detonated by an observer who may be watching the IPKF vehicle 500 metres away from a roof-top or some such place. This technique allows the LTTE to allow five, six or even ten trucks to pass by before setting off the explosion under a truck carrying the maximum men.

The radio switches are an expensive item of ordnance and there is some speculation as to the source of the supply. Intelligence sources say the LTTE received a major shipment of arms about a month ago which included AK-47 assault rifles, RPG-7 anti-tank rockets, explosives and detonators.

Oct. 12 action: Details are now available of the action on the night of October 12 when 29 Indian soldiers were killed and one was taken prisoner in a commando raid in the Jaffna University area. The raid was carried out by a group of para-commandos ferried to a landing ground by helicopter. The paras were accompanied by a company of Sikh Light Infantry jawans who were to hold the landing ground while the commandos completed their task which was the destruction of an LTTE communications centre in the university. Unfortunately, in the darkness, the Sikh LI jawans were put down on a clear ground some two km. away from their intended landing zone. The commandos came under fire even while landing and lost eight men while they were still to disembark. However, they did land and complete their task. But, the Sikh LI jawans were trapped in a heavily built-up area and though surrounded they fought valiantly for almost 24 hours before being overwhelmed by superior forces. The fact that 29 of them died and only one was taken prisoner indicates the tenacity of their action. The para-commandos managed to fight their way to the Kokkuvil village area from where they were rescued.

IPKF sources denied reports that LTTE personnel had burnt Indian soldiers alive. They said that the reports were baseless and designed to create a sense of hatred between the IPKF and the LTTE. They said the IPKF would as per its traditions carry out its role in a professional and dispassionate fashion.

40 LTTE men held in Batticaloa

COLOMBO, Oct. 20.

Forty liberation Tiger militants were captured in eastern Batticaloa last night and in the early hours of this morning during the current round-the-clock intensive cordoning and search operations by the Indian Peace Keeping Force and the Sri Lankan police in the whole of Batticaloa district.

Search for woman fighter: At the seaside resort Kalkudah, the police said the Indian and Sri Lankan security forces were today hunting for a woman Tamil militant suspected of planting the landmine. The hunt was centred on Kalla, a fighter in the LTTE.

The LTTE fields dozens of trained woman combatants known in Tamil as "freedom birds."

The police said residents told them that shortly before the blast, Kalla had been seen in the area where the landmine went off.

A Sri Lankan military spokesman in Colombo said the toll had risen to 42. Twentyfour of the bus passengers and two IPKF members were wounded the police said.

A second landmine blast killed three Indian soldiers near Kiran, just outside Batticaloa, on Monday, residents said, but this could not be confirmed by officials. — PTI, & AFP

The New York Times

87 October

India Reports a Troop Breakthrough Into Tamils' Main City in Sri Lanka

REPORT

25.10.87

By Barbara Crossette
New York Times Service

COLOMBO, Sri Lanka — India said Monday night that its troops had broken into the center of the northern Sri Lankan city of Jaffna after a 10-day military campaign against an ethnic Tamil guerrilla army it had pledged to disarm.

There was no independent confirmation of the report, which was issued in New Delhi. An official Indian government spokesman in Tamil Nadu said Indian troops were continuing to advance on Jaffna, but he said nothing about their being in the center of the city.

Another Indian official in Tamil Nadu, elaborating on the report from New Delhi, said Indian commandos based in Jaffna Fort had linked up with a column of troops advancing from the northwest of the city along a coastal road. The campaign, which began on Oct. 9, may have already cost 700 civilian lives, local government administrators said in a message Monday.

At the same time, Indian forces have stepped up operations around the eastern ports of Trincomalee and Batticaloa. Some 300 to 400 Indian troops came ashore Sunday night on Kallaidy Beach at Batticaloa, residents of the area said Monday in telephone interviews.

Police officers in the area told Reuters that Tamil militants, trying to blow up an Indian convoy at Kalkudah, north of Batticaloa, had instead destroyed a civilian bus, killing 40 people.

Fighting is still apparently going on in the city of Jaffna, the historical center of Sri Lanka's Tamils. An Indian government spokesman called it a "mopping up" operation, but Jaffna residents said the town was in a state of near collapse, with casualties high and damage severe.

None of the reports could be verified because Indian troops have prohibited journalists from visiting their areas of operation. On Monday, the daily news briefing at the Indian High Commission in Colombo was canceled without explanation

Fourteen prominent civil servants in Jaffna sent a message to the Sri Lankan president, Junius R. Jayawardene, on Monday saying that the situation was worsening and asking him to intervene with the Indians on behalf of Jaffna's residents.

The letter, a copy of which was sent to Virakesari, the Colombo-based independent Tamil-language newspaper, said there had been "indescribable bombing and shelling and aerial strafing" in which "almost 700 innocent civilians have died."

Some of these local administrators had been tacit supporters of the guerrillas of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; most had been critical of the Sri Lankan government when it was trying to subdue the militants, earlier this year.

Relations between local Tamil people and the Indian force appear to be rapidly worsening throughout Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka, where the soldiers are deployed. India says it has 14,000 troops in Sri Lanka, but unofficial estimates in Colombo and in New Delhi put the figure at 20,000 to 25,000.

The Tamils are far outnumbered on the island as a whole by ethnic Sinhalese, who also dominate the government and the armed forces, but they are most numerous in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The Tamils are mostly Hindu and the Sinhalese are primarily Buddhist, but there are Christians in both groups.

The Indians, once public advocates of the Tamil cause and critics of the Sri Lankan government, were at first welcomed as peacekeepers who would underwrite a July 29 accord designed to end a four-year-old guerrilla war and bring Tamil militants into the political process in newly created autonomous areas in the north and east.

Now, Tamil neighborhoods are daily reporting acts of violence against civilians by Indian troops searching for guerrillas' or their sympathizers.

Troops from the Indian Army and commandos of the Central Police Reserve Force have refused to estimate civilian casualties in Jaffna, the base of the Tigers.

But residents fleeing the city all speak of the killing of men, women and children as the Indians advanced on the town with armored personnel carriers and tanks, razing buildings along the route.

Jaffna's telephones are cut off, and there is no electricity and little food. Many residents have fled to temples or schools, or are trying to escape the peninsula altogether.

There were persistent rumors on Monday that the leader of the Liberation Tigers, Velupillai Prabakaran, was hiding among 25,000 to 40,000 Jaffna residents who are said to be crowded into the historic Nallur temple.

Tamils in Colombo, who besiege new arrivals from the north, have heard that Mr. Prabakaran, still a hero to many, has sent a message to the Indians warning that if they come for him, thousands of Tamil civilians around him would die.

There were also reports Monday that the Tigers had made another appeal for a cease-fire, but that the Indians had not found their terms acceptable.

People flee out for life.

In the Eastern Province, independent information is easier to obtain because telephone links are still good, and there are active citizens committees looking after local interests.

In Batticaloa, reports are emerging daily about Indian revenge attacks on the Tamil village of Saturagunda after an Indian Army convoy hit a land mine, killing 20 to 25 troops.

Separately, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said Monday that India would not withdraw soldiers from Sri Lanka as long as its government permitted the troops to remain.

DAVID LEVINE/*New York Review of Books*

TIN SANG/*South Vietnam*



Madan, Anandavikatan, 18.10.87

A friend in need sets the Sri Lankans wondering

REPORT

From **Bruce Palling** in Colombo

The day after the Indian army lost nearly 30 paratroopers in the fighting against Tamil Tiger guerrillias in the Jaffna peninsula, the "thought for the day" in the government-controlled *Ceylon Daily News* was : "Those who in quarrels interpose, must often wipe a bloody nose."

Among many Sri Lankans — both minority Tamil and majority Sinhalese — there was a sense of grim satisfaction that at last the Indians had been forced to realise that the Tigers would not listen to them any more than they heeded the Sri Lankan government.

Although the full-scale war in northern Sri Lanka between India and the Tamil Tigers is proof that the Indian mean business in their dealings with the separatists, there is nevertheless a profound mistrust of India's motives for sending nearly 20,000 soldiers here.

No Sri Lanka believes that India is here simply to make good neighbourly gestures; indeed, life fine print in July's peace accord makes it clear that Sri Lanka had to sacrifice some of its independence for the Indians to come at all. The government had to agree not to allow foreing countries to establish radio transmitters here, let alone military bases.

The view most widely held by many Sinhalese is that India is after the magnificent Trinconmalee harbour in the east. They speculate that as Trincomalee is in the eastern province of the proposed autonomous Tamil homeland, India will demand it in return for past help to the separatists.

To rub in their power, the Indian Navy rather tactlessly stationed two frigates almost within hailing distance of Colombo — ostensibly to protect Indians living here, but more likely as a show of strength to any dissidents thinking of overthrowing President Junius Jayewardene. This led to the only sign of humorous graffiti from the extremist Sinhalese JVP movement — "Jayewardene Go Home".

There are good historical reasons for the unease, since tiny Sri Lanka, with its 16 million people, is smaller than most of India's states. In the past 2,000 years there have been several attempts at invasion from India and the crack regiment in the Sri Lankan army, the Gemenu Watch, was named after the Second Century Sinhalese king who repelled a Tamil invasion from southern India.

The Sri Lankan Prime Minister, Ranasinghe Premadasa, has been the most hostile member of the government towards the accord and is particularly critical of the presence of Indian forces. Earlier this month, when he addressed the UN General Assembly, he accused the Indians of turning a blind eye to the Tiger training camps and bases in India's southern Tamil Nadu state.

Fears of being swallowed up by India even permeate the newspapers' astrology columns and have led to a bizarre situation where some Sinhalese feel proud of the Tigers' ability to hold the vastly superior Indian force at bay for so long. One of the most anti Tiger cabinet ministers told me that the Indians should realise they were not fighting tribesmen in the northeast jungles of India — but Sri Lankans!

While the fighting prowess of the Tigers may have impressed some Sri Lankans, the extent of the military action by the Indians has led to Tamil disquiet. "We gave the Indians a good welcome into the peninsula; everyone was friendly we thought they were our saviours," a Tamil businessman said. "Now they are being ostracised... they are killing a lot of innocent people.

The government controlled newspapers are trying to assuage hostility towards the Indians. Newspapers whose cartoons until recently portrayed the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, wearing a tiger's tail, are now trying to calm down the disquiet felt by the Sinhalese towards their neighbour.

Yesterday's editorial in the *Daily News* pointed out that "enlightened self-interest demands that the Sri Lankan people do what they can to ensure that the Indian action in Jaffna succeeds. One thing that can be done is refrain from beating the anti-Indian drum that is too often audible in the country today."

The Indian ban on correspondents - both local and foreign - from going to Jaffna rankles with Sri Lankans who see it as a foreign power dictating to them where they can go in their own country. The *Island* newspaper commented sarcastically that "great powers, especially democracies, permit journalists to cover the operations of their armies. Those aspiring to such status are also expected to follow similar procedures."

President Jayewardene is fully aware of the local reaction to the Indian forces, but whether he can get them out depends on the Indian's success in eliminating the Tigers. If the guerrillas decide to melt away in Jaffna, it is possible that the Indians will stay well beyond their allotted 15 months.

Perhaps the most ominous comment was made by a Tamil businessman who fled from the peninsula last week. "It is becoming something like Northern Ireland; the Tigers will go underground and then pop up all over the place." If events unfold in this manner, the Indians may be here a great deal longer than either the Sinhalese or the Tamils bargained for — with unpredictable results for both communities.

21.10.87

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

JAFFNA

Nagappan Pasupathy	**M. Slogini**
P. Joganandan	P. Sambapillai
T. Bhavani	M. Xavier
T. Kathirkamadas	Cyril
Maheswarakumar	**Lugesammah**
Selvamalar	**A. Roxini Prasilda**
S. Kamalam	S. Rajadurai
P. Thamirasa	**R. Queen**
D. Thayan	S. Thamiah
A. Kandiyah	**Renuga Selvaraja**
A. Vijayasingam	**Markandu**
P. Maheswary	P. Navaratnam
P. Thangarany	S. Patrick
S. Saraswathy	C. Thayan
Puvirajasingam	C.P. Mahalingam
K. Balasingam	**E.I. Jeyamala**
Rathinam	**E. Chaitra**
K. Thirunavukkarasu	**S. Nalini**
M. Thanaludchumy	S.P. Alfred
A. Thangeswary	M. Christian
P.J. Marium	E.S. Emmanuel
P.J. Therasa	**Pastiampillai**
P.J. Jeyakumari	S. SEnathirajah
S. Selvarajah	M.J. Quinton
A. Victor	**T. Saraswathy**
R. Selvaratnam	S. Sellathurai
P. Navaratnam	T. Uthayasooriyan
A. Noielkine	P. Nageswaran
Xavier Naepolian	E. Benedict Mathews
K. Jesuratnam	K. Narayan
G. Mariyanayagam	V. Soosaipillai
Jeyarasa	V. Sinnathurai
E. Thamba	J. Antonypillai
M. Mandhari	Solastine

As the Tigers put up fierce resistance, Indian infantry was unable to advance towards Jaffna. The Indian Air Force was brought in to the help of the infantry. With the result the innocent civilians were bombarded.



Casualties mount as Tamils put up fierce resistance

REPORT

From Bruce Palling
in Colombo
22.10.87

THE INDIAN army was meeting stiff resistance from Tamil Tigers guerrillas in fierce house-to-house fighting yesterday, as reports circulated in Colombo that the Indian commander leading the assault on Jaffna had been replaced because of incompetence.

Both sides were said to be taking heavy casualties. The Indian high commission said only one Indian soldier had died in the past 24 hours but military sources say the figure is considerably higher and that both sides are taking heavy casualties.

Sri Lankan military sources reported that the Indian Chief of Army Staff, General Sunderji, along with the head of Southern Command, Lieutenant General Depinder Singh, flew into Jaffna Peninsula yesterday for urgent consultations.

There are unconfirmed reports that Major General Harikirat Singh, the Indian commanding the Indian force in the peninsula, has been removed from operational command because of his unsatisfactory performance. Diplomats said his position as commander was "in a state of suspended animation".

The Indian high commission denied the reports but added that the General was no longer in the country. A spokeswoman said: "operations have reached a certain stage of finality in Jaffna, so he has been called back to India for consultations."

Reports from New Delhi say Lieutenant General K. S. Hajuria, from the Directorate of Military Intelligence, went to Jaffna last week and reorganised the military command. He brought in additional units from the 22nd and 36th army divisions. India says it has fewer than 15,000 troops in Sri Lanka, but Sri Lankan military officials say the figure tops 25,000.

The spokeswoman in Colombo said the Indian peace-keeping force had moved forward overall and that most main public buildings around the Jaffna Fort area had been captured and combed for mines and booby traps. However, from yesterday's briefing, it was unclear exactly where the main Indian columns were. Every indication suggested they were still mostly on the outskirts of the town.

The spokeswoman said the Indian forces had not entered nor touched Jaffna Hospital. But a report from a local correspondent, who recently returned from the Jaffna Peninsula, said it was hit at least seven times earlier this week.

Meanwhile, pamphlets have been distributed in Jaffna signed by the Tamil Tiger leader, V. Prabhakaran, saying that the guerrillas would never surrender and would fight to the last man. The leaflets claim that only 34 Tigers have been killed in the 12 days of fighting in the peninsula. Official Indian figures, based on "body counts", say that 607 Tigers have been killed.

Reports from refugees arriving in Colombo suggest that the majority of the deaths are in fact civilians and that total Tiger deaths are no more than 50. India refuses to give civilian casualties but admits they are inevitable because of the nature of the fighting.

Jaffna residents are still leaving the besieged city, which is dangerously low on food and other essential supplies. The Indians say the Tigers are trying to keep the civilians in Jaffna but refugee reports do not confirm this. There is some speculation that many Tigers may have slipped through the Indian military cordon with the civilians. The Indian spokeswoman conceded that this was possible, as guards were checking only for weapons and were not worried about identity.

The Indian forces were broadcasting amnesty appeals to any Tiger cadres who surrendered their weapons and agreed to abide by the peace accord signed with Sri Lanaka in July.

These followed radio intercepts which the Indians said showed a split in the movement, with some Tigers preferring to surrender rather than fight to the death. The amnesty does not apply to the Tigers' leaders.

Ronnie de Mel, Sri Lanka's Finance Minister and a leading supporter of the July agreement, said yesterday that he would not rule out the Tigers coming back into the political process if they gave up their weapons and agreed to the conditions of the peace accord. He said: " I would support anything that ensures a lasting peace."

He told *The Independent*: "I would always negotiate with the real representatives of the Tamil people — my difficulty is that it is not easy to identify who they are in the present conditions. If it is the Tigers, it would be useful to talk with them as it is useless to talk with stooges or puppets. That type of set-up never lasts."

He emphasised that these were his own views but added: "I don't think they are very far from the government." Other cabinet ministers, notably the Minister for National Security, Lalith Athulamadulai, have said privately that they want to exclude the Tigers totally from the interim provincial councils to be established under the terms of the peace agreement.

Mr de Mel said he did not think that President Junius Jayewardene really meant it when he said at a recent press conference that the Tigers were now outlaws and a proscribed organisation.

"You must never judge a situation by what people say in the heat of the moment," he said.

AFFIDAVIT

Mrs. RAJALEDCHUMY JESUTHASAN (33), 36/3A New Road, Koiyathoddam, Jaffna.

My husband Christopher Jesuthasan alias Christopher Ariyaratnam (45) was a salesman attached to Marketing Department, Jaffna.

My husband, 3 sons and I were living in our own house at the above said address.

IPKF stationed at Navatkuli advanced up to Kachcheri Jaffna on 21.10.87 firing shells towards the residential areas.

Through fear my family and I sought refuge at my sister's house which is next to our compound.

On 21.10.87 one of the shells fired by the IPKF in occupation of the Kachcheri at 4.30 p.m. fell on my sister's house and exploded.

Shrapnels from this explosion killed my husband, my son Jesuthasan Jeyakumar, age 15 years my sister Mrs. Nadesan Vijayaluxmy who was in an advanced stage of pregnancy.

My sons Jesuthasan Rajkumar, age 12 years and Jesuthasan Vijakumar, age 6 years, my sister's husband K. Nadesan, my sister's daughter N. Vanmathy and I were injured in this blast.

The injured including myself were removed to the Holy cross medical centre, a private nursing home and admitted for treatment.

I came to know that the dead bodies were removed by my brother the following morning and burnt at Thundi cemetery.

On 28.10.87, my injured son J. Rajkumar and I were transferred to the General Hospital, Jaffna for surgery.

The 3rd toe of the right leg of my son was amputasted at the General Hospital, Jaffna.

My left leg below the knee bady shattered and I am still hospitalized.

RASAMMA SHANMUGANATHAN (43), Nallur Cross Road, Jaffna.

I am the widow of the late Gunaratnam Shanmuganathan who was killed in shell-blast on 21.10.87.

My late husband who was a vegetable vendor at the Kalviyankadu market left home at about 7 a.m. on 21.10.87 for his usual business at the market.

At about 11 a.m. on the day a shell fell in the market square and exploded.

A shrapnel darting from the explosion struck my husband's neck causing a grievous injury.

On hearing of the mishap I rushed to the market to find my husband lying dead in a pool of blood.

His body was brought home and the funeral took place on 22.10.87. The body was cremated at the Chemmany crematorium.

My husband earned an average monthly income of Rs. 1500/-

Since my husband's death I and my children are left with no support or financial assistance for our existence and maintenance.

I have no financial resources or savings to fall back upon and in the circumstances I look forward for financial or other forms of assistances for the maintenance and up-keep of the family.

I have four children and all four are school-going. The eldest is 17 years of age and the youngest is 10.

RASU THIYAGARAJAH (43), No. 35, Kanagaratnam Road, Ariyalai.

My son by the name of Thiyagarajah Piragalathan, aged 18 years (eighteeen years) was an employee of a private firm. **On the 21st day of October 1987 at about 5 p.m. a shell bomb suddenly came and fell on the road and my son T. Piragalathan became a victim of the shell bomb. He died on the spot.**

His body was burned at the Thundy cemetery, Colombo.



SANTHANAM SELVARAJAH (22)
Ward No. 1, Nilaveli, presently of Selva Refugee camp 322 Temple Road, Nallur, Jaffna.

My parents, brothers, sisters and I were forced to leave Trincomalee in 1985 due to the atrocities committed by the Sri Lankan army and take refuge in Jaffna.

My mother is presently staying with one of my brothers in Colombo.

My father Sebastian Santhanam (80) brother S. Saverinayagam, sister Theresa Mary and I were living at the Selva Refugee camp.

On 21.10.87 when my father S. Santhanam was bathing at the well in the compound of the house occupied by us, a gun shot struck him on the back and he fell down unconscious. At this moment IPKF personnel were firing at random from the direction of Kaliankadu.

My father was immediately removed to Nallai Atheenam First Aid Centre where his wounds were dressed. He could not be removed to General Hospital Jaffna as curfew was in force and IPKF personnel were all over the area.

On my father's condition deteriorating he was admitted to General Hospital, Jaffna on 16.12.87 where he succumbed to his injuries at 6 a.m on 19.12.87.

The dead body of my father was released the same day at 10 a.m and buried the same evening at St. Mary's burial Grounds, Jaffna.

Mrs. SARASWATHY RASU
23/3, Martyn Road, Jaffna.

N.I.C. 306840894V

I am the widow of the deceased Kandiah Rasu, age 65 years. Watcher.

My husband was working as a watcher in a firewood depot at Martyn Road.

As there was shelling from the Jaffna Fort, I took shelter at the Jaffna Convent.

My husband was at the firewood depot.

On the 21st of October, there was heavy shelling and a shell had fallen in the Firewood depot.

The shell blast was so great that the body was in pieces.

On the 22nd morning, he did not come to the convent.

I went to the Firewood depot to seem him.

The hut in which he usually sleeps had fallen down. I pulled the roof and saw my husband's body in pieces.

The body was burnt in the same compound as it could not be taken as whole body.

SARAH RAJINI DHARMARAJ (36), "Malar Vasam", Ponnalai, Chulipuram.

I am the deponent above named.

The deceased person Leslie Joshua Dharmaraj, aged 50 years was my husband.

He was Lecturer at the Jaffna College.

During the October 1987 military offensive our area was pounded by mortar and artillery shells.

As shells fell and exploded near our house at Kokuvil where we were residing at the time.

I pleaded with my husband to leave the house but he blatantly refused saying that we will be shot if we leave our house.

As the shelling and cross fire grew intense on 21.10.87 I got excited and fled from the house leaving my husband who refused to accompany me.

I reached Jaffna Town and stayed with an uncle of mine.

As Jaffna town was subjected to intense military offensive I went to Ponnalai.

Due to the curfew and the tension prevailed during that period I could not go to Kokuvil to find out what happened to my husband.

Only on 7.11.87 I returned back to Kokuvil alone.

When I reached my house I found it damaged by shelling and all the things looted.

There was no sign of my husband inside the house or in the vicinity.

I got permission from an army office and searched all the camps in the area without success.

Later, I came to know that my husband was killed on 26.10.87 caught in a shell blast at Kokuvil.

His body was not recovered and in all possibility burnt by the army itself.

I do not have any children.

I am residing with my parents after my husband's death.

S. R. Dharmaraj

SELLADURAI POOPALASINGAM
Kulukandy Road, Kopay South, Kopay.

My mother Packiam aged 55 years was under my care, custody and maintenance.

During the military operations of the Indian Peace Keeping Force my mother was shot dead on the 21st day of October, 1987.

The funeral expenses of my mother and other religious ceremonies were conducted by me out of my own expenses and yet to be done.

I am the only son to my parents and my sisters are married.

I am the sole heir of the deceased Packiam and I am entitled to receive the compensation.

I indemnify the authorities concerned from all liabilities.

My mother's death was duly registered under No. 5322.

My mother's full sister Kanmany too was in my care and custody and she too died by shelling on 17.10.87 and her funeral too was done by me and I am entitled to claim compensation. I indemnify the authorities in this matter also.

SELVARAJAH NAGESWARY (52)
168, Kasturiar Road, Jaffna.

My husband Kandiah Selvarajah was a Hospital Overseer attached to the Government Teaching Hospital, Jaffna.

On 21.10.87 he left home for work at about 6.30 p.m.

The same day about noon I myself went to the same hospital to get an insulin injection as I am diabetic.

As I entered the hospital premises I found the hospital staff and patients in a state of fright.

Mortar fire was being directed towards the hospital.

Outdoor patients, hospital employees and visitors were among people who were advised to take shelter in the hall of the ground floor of the administration section.

My husband and I and my son, Udayakumar who brought me from home to the hospital were in the said hall together with several people taking refuge there.

Even around 4 p.m. the people who sought shelter there were still there with us.

About the same time Indian Armed soldiers in Uniform came to the road side entrance of the said hall and started firing at the crowd seeking shelter in the hall.

All the people immediately lay down on the ground. But I saw that my husband and some others were hit by gun fire.

My husband fell down bleeding. I receded backwards but I was hit by a grenade thrown from the direction where the Indian soldiers stood.

Shortly afterwards I managed to crawl where my husband fell and found him lifeless.

The dead, wounded and others who were not injured were still in the hall the next day till about 10 or 11 a.m.

The hospital authorities called out the people about 11 a.m. on 22.10.87 to come out.

As I was injured I was admitted to ward No. 4 and remained there till 5.11.87.

The dead bodies including that of my husband were still there in the hall.

My husband's body was shown to me and my son Udayakumar on 23.10.87 for the purpose of identification before the corpses were burnt en masse on the rubbish heap of the hospital premises on the same day as told by my son Udayakumar.

I have only one child a son Udayakumar aged 22 years.

SHANMUGALINGAM LOGANAYAGI (37), Murugan Veethy, Urumpirai East, Urumpirai.

The deceased Vaithilingam Shanmugalingam aged 49 years was my husband.

He was employed as an Ambulance Driver at the Jaffna General Hospital.

During the October 1987 military offensive our house was subjected to shelling and caught fire.

I fled to the Jaffna town along with my children and stayed with my husband in his quarters at the Jaffna General Hospital.

On 21.10.87 my husband remained inside the Overseers office with my two children.

I stayed inside the X-Ray room with my other two children.

All around the hospital I heard gunfire and shell fire.

As the army entered the hospital premises and started to fire at random at everyone in sight I remained inside the X-Ray room.

Then the army entered the X-Ray room and started the firing and hurling grenades inside.

We miraculously escaped the shooting.

Only on the second day at about 5 p.m. I went to the overseers office room when I found my husband's lifeless body.

His body was cremated inside the hospital premises on the 23.10.87.

Later I came to know that my second and fourth sons who were with my husband when the shooting started left the hospital immediately after the shooting.

My fourth son Satishkumar was also injured in the shooting and was carried by his brother to the Anaipanthy Hospital

I have four sons

L. Shanmugalingo

SINNATHAMBY RITAMMA (39)
NIC NO 48 570 5023X, 36/2, St Patrick's Road, Jaffna.

I am the widow of the late Gnanapragasam Mariyanayagam who died on 21.10.87.

From about the first week of October, 1987 the area in which we lived was subject to heavy shell attack.

All the people in the area used to spend the nights at St Patrick's College and return to their homes briefly during the day to prepare meals and to attend to other needs.

On 21.10.87 around 2.30 p.m. a shell fell and burst in the neighbourhood injuring several persons.

About 3 p.m. a van was arranged to take the injured persons to hospital. Some helpers were required. My husband volunteered to go with the injured.

In the said van there were in all 14 persons consisting of injured persons, driver and helpers.

My husband did not return that day nor was there any news about the others.

I learnt later that it was dangerous to go towards the Jaffna General Hospital.

Nine days later, my husband's brother, Ravindran went in search of my husband. He came and told me that the particular van in which my husband went was found burnt on Hospital Road, opposite the main gate of the Jaffna General Hospital.

He further said that only bones and parts of skeletons were found in the shell of the particular van.

Death certificate NO 1177 was issued in respect of my husband, Gnanapragasam Mariyanayagam's death giving place of death as opposite the Jaffna Teaching Hospital and cause of death - gun shout wounds - body not recovered.

I have four minor children - Vasanthi (f) (17), Gnanasekaram (m) (13), Chandramohan (m) (16) and an infant of 4 months.

I and my four children have lost the maintenance and support which we received from my late husband who worked as a labourer.

Mrs. SULOSANADEVI MAHALINGAM (41)
Sivakula Veethy, Urumpirai South,
Urumpirai.

The deceased Mahalingam Lingeswaran (13) is my eldest son.

My son M. Lingeswaran was a student in Grade 6 of the Jaffna Hindu College.

I fled from home with my children on the Indian Peace Keeping Force commencing its operations in Urumpirai.

On 21.10.87 my son M. Lingeswaran who returned home to collect come essential items was shot dead by the IPKF when he was crossing the Palaly Road at Urumpirai South.

The dead body of my son was burnt by the people in the locality.

THANGAVELU INDRANI (37)
Kadaichchami Kovil Street, Jaffna.

The deceased is my son Thangavelu Soundararajan aged 6 years.

At about 10.20 a.m. on 21.10.87 when our locality was subjected to heavy cannon fire, accompanied by my children and neighbours I fled to the Kadaichchamy Temple close by for refuge.

Suddenly the Temple was hit by several bombs, smoke and dust enveloped the whole place.

When the dust subsided I observed my son Soundararajan and several others injured.

The injured were rushed to the Jaffna General Hospital.

My son Soundararajan succumbed to his injuries at the hospital the same day and his body was also buried in the Hospital premises.

When bombs fell on the temple my brother and sister Kumarasamy Purusoththaman and Kumarasamy Mahaledchumy were killed instantaneously.

VAIRAMUTHU PONNIAH (64), 77/5, Ananthan Vadali Road, Colombothurai.

The deceased person Ponniah Navarathasingham, aged 31 years a bachelor was my son.

He was employed as a mason.

On 21.10.87 at 1 p.m. my son left our house saying that he is going to draw drinking water from the Temple well.

He did not reutrn home afterwards.

Due to the shelling I could not go out in search of him.

Only on the following day I went out and saw my son's lifeless body.

It bore shell inflicted wounds.

On 22.10.87 his body was cremated at Thundu cemetery.

I have three unmarried daughters.

My son was our sole bread winner and after his death we do not have any income.

VARIRAVANATHAN RATHINAM (52), 23, B.A. Thamby Lane, Jaffna.

The deceased Vairawanathan Nageswary, aged 18 years was my only daughter.

On 21.10.87 we decided to go to Punguduthievu due to the intense military offensive in Jaffna.

We set out from our house and were proceeding along the K.K.S. Road.

At about 10 a.m. a shell fell near my daughter and exploded.

My daughter died instantaneously in the blast.

Her body was mutilated beyond recognition and we left it in the spot where it happened.

We later learned that her remain were cremated by the army.

Inquest into death did not take place due to the tension prevailed during those days.

The loss of my daughter at her prime affected me so much that I was bedridden for the last four months and not still to recover completely.



VELUPILLAI KANDIAH (65)
Antonia Street, Thirunagar, Kilinochchi.

My son Kandiah Vetharaniam (27) was a Casual Labourer attached to General Hospital Jaffna.

On or about the 10th of November 87, I was informed by another employee of the General Hospital, Jaffna that my son had been shot dead by the IPKF on 21.10.87 in an incident that had taken place there.

On my enquiries at the G.H. at Jaffna his death was confirmed.

It was reported that the dead bodies of all the persons killed in that incident had been burnt in the hospital premises on 23.10.87.

My wife, his aunt a widow and I were entirely dependent on my son K. Vethnaraniam who was bachelor.

BASTIAMPILLAI SURENTHIRAN (27)
645/7 Beach Road, Jaffna.

On mortar shells being fired on our residential areas all members of my family moved to St. Patricks College for shleter on 21.10.87.

At 2.45 p.m. the same day a mortar shell which fell in the ST. Patricks College compound injuring 10 people including my sisters Neele Vijayanthi and Mala Bastiampillai who were removed to General Hospital Jaffna, in a van.

On 22.10.87 at 6.30 a.m. my father T.P. Bastiampillai (64) my mother Mrs. A Bastiampillai (60) and cousin Satheus Yogenthiran left for the General Hospital to look into the requirements of my sisters who were hospitalised.

My mother, father and cousin Sathees Yogenthiran failed to return home.

The blood spottered bicycle of my father with bullet marks was found by me on 30.10.87 at the near entrance of the hospital.

I have made a thorough search for my father, mother and cousin to find out whether they had been arrested or had fled elsewhere but my search proved futile.

It was reported that the Indian Peace Keeping Force had shot dead over 100 persons including Hospital staff, patients and visitors in the General Hospital, Jaffna on 22.10.87 and that the dead bodies had been burnt three days later in the hospital compound.

I believe that my mother, father and cousin too were amongst those shot dead by the IPKF on this date.

EHAMPARAM GNANAMMAH (62) Courts Lane, Kodikamam

The deceased person Appapillai Ehamparam, aged 56 years was my husband.

He was employed as a Production Foreman at Sugar Factory, Kantalai.

On 22.10.87 at about 6.00 a.m. my husband left for his mother's house at Eluthumadduval.

As he did not return home that day we went in search of him to Eluthumadduval.

There we were informed that he was shot and killed during a crossfire which took place between the army and the militants on the previous day.

His body was found buried at Eluthumadduval.

I identified the body as of my husband.

His body was exhumed and cremated on 24.10.87.

I have two unmarried daughters.

After my husband's death we are undergoing untold harships.



Mrs. KAMALATHEVY (41)
21/5, Wymann Road, Jaffna.

I ame the holder of National Identity Card No. 475511557v.

Late Sinniah Pararajasingam is my husband and he was an employee of the Jaffna Municipal Council. While the deceased my husband was looking after the house, my four children and myself went to Karainagar for safty of our lives fearing the shelling and bombing all over the places. At Karainagar we heard that my husband was struck by a Shell Fire and died on 22.10.87 at the Navalar Cultural Hall in Navalar Road, Jaffna.

When I was able to return, I came with my children and heard that the body of my dead husband had been burnt - cremated - on the road side the next day.

I brought this to the notice of the Grama sevaka and have also obtained a Death Certificate.

My late husband was the only bread-winner of the family of 5 of us and we are now struggling to live, without him and due to his untimely death we are all driven to utter poverty.

I submit this affidavit to vouch the death my husband and also seek relief and assistance from the authorities for my four children and I to live.

KANAGAR SELLATHURAI (72) 84, Stanly Road, Jaffna.

The deceased person Sellathurai Rasammah, aged 62 years was my wife.

On 22.10.87 at about 9.30 a.m. and avalanche of shells fell in rapid succession all around our house and exploded.

A large shell shrapnel darting from a nearby explosion crashed through the roof and struck my wife on her back.

She died on the spot after sustaining a grievous injury.

Her body was taken immediately after her death by my son in a bullock cart to Thundi Cemetery amid great difficulties and cremated there.

I have a daughter named Anusuya, aged 22 years.



Mrs. KANDIAH NAGAMMAH, widow (56), Tirunelvely East, Tirunelvely.

On 22.10.87 when the IPKF started the liberation operation in our area at Tirunelvely there was a shell blast and my husband got a severe attack and taken immediatley to the General Hospital and died immediately on 22.10.87. Later we removed my husband's dead body and cremated in our place.

My husband's name in Sinnavy Kandiah, age 60 years doing farm work and maintain my 2 children and myelf.


WE LIKE PEACE
BY TALKS
NOT BY INDIAN
TANKS AND
ARMOUD CARS
TAMIL WOMEN

Battle tanks on their way to Meenambakkam on Wednesday for being airlifted to Jaffna. *Photo by George Francis, Scorp News.*

NEWS

Tamil refugees observe fast, demand IPKF withdrawal

MADRAS, Oct. 20.

About 1,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees, including 350 women from Chingleput and Thanjavur refugee camps today observed a 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. fast in front of the Madras University on Kamarajar Salai demanding immediate stoppage of IPKF offensive against the LTTE in Jaffna.

Before dispersing they adopted a resolution urging the Government of India not to send back the Tamil refugees to Sri Lanka until the proposed interim administrative council was entrusted in the hands of Tamils and complete normality was restored that would ensure safety to their lives and property.

Mr. T. R. P. Nathan, president, Eelam Tamil Refugees Manram, who led the fasting refugees, said if the Government of India did not direct the IPKF to ceasefire within two days, all the refugees stationed in various camps in Tamil Nadu would commence a fast unto death.

A group of students from various city colleges participated in a day long fast near Kuralagam protesting against the IPKF offensive and its withdrawal from Sri Lanka.

IPKF control of Jaffna imminent

BATTLE □ FOR □ JAFFNA

NEWS

MADRAS, Oct 22.

The Indian Peace-Keeping Force in Jaffna has taken control of the town's market, bus stand and the General Hospital.

An External Affairs Ministry spokesman told reporters here today that while an IPKF column from the east had taken control of the Jaffna Government Agent's Residency, the Secretariat and the railway station, the column from the west had further advanced and taken control of the market, bus stand and the hospital. Both these columns were very close to meeting each other and their taking control of the entire nerve-centre of Jaffna was imminent.

The spokesman conceded that the IPKF did encounter resistance from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam near the Government Agent's Residency and the hospital. The LTTE men, from inside the hospital, fired on the IPKF column but the control of the hospital passed into the IPKF's hands.

The IPKF had also made significant advances on the Velvettiturai-Koppai axis towards Jaffna and the Palaly-Jaffna axis and was reaching the northern entrances to Jaffna on both these fronts. But it had not reached the Jaffna University yet. The IPKF's advance had been measured so that civilian casualties and damage to buildings were minimal, he said.

Appeal to lay down arms

Meanwhile, the air units of the IPKF dropped leaflets today over Jaffna, containing an appeal from the Government of India to the LTTE cadres to lay down arms. The appeal said: "We appeal to all cadres of the LTTE to hand over their arms to the IPKF in the interests of the Tamil people of Sri Lanka. Those militants who hand over their arms will be provided full security and protection by the IPKF. They will also be granted full amnesty in terms of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, which will enable them to participate freely in the democratic political process in Sri Lanka and live with honour and dignity on the island."

The spokesman said the appeal had been made following clear indications from wireless intercepts that the LTTE cadres wanted to hand over their arms. "The term 'surrender' (of arms) is not in keeping with the dignity of the situation," he said.

Answering a question whether such an appeal would be made to the LTTE leaders, the External Affairs Ministry spokesman said if the Government of India received an offer from the LTTE leaders to lay down their arms, express their willingness to participate in the democratic political process and also support the agreement, the Government of India would take it up with the Sri Lankan Government.

He said there were indications that the LTTE cadres would like to lay down their arms but were uncertain of doing so because of their apprehension about the future. The appeal was primarily to assure them that they would be offered amnesty. The offer had been agreed to by the Sri Lankan Government. "It is our sincere, hope that the cadres of the LTTE will respond positively to our appeal so that peace can be restored, he said.

The IPKF today intercepted two wireless messages from the LTTE. While the first message ordered its cadres to open fire with mortar-shells between Karan and Regal cinema, the second intercept said families should be used for carrying ammunition and also that women and children should be used as human-shields.

On reports that the civilian casualties in Jaffna were high, the spokesman pointed to conflicting reports. The LTTE had said in London that 200 civilians had been killed. The church leaders in Jaffna put the toll at 100. But other organisations estimated that 60 people were killed.

The spokesman said India would help the citizens of Jaffna rebuild their houses. Answering a question, he said this was independent of the World Bank aid. "This is bilateral."

Food supply despite firing

Our Special Correspondent reports from New Delhi:

The spokesman said the LTTE militants today fired at IPKF helicopters dropping food supplies to people sheltering in the Nallur Kandasamy temple, the Hindu Women's College and some other areas of Jaffna town. The firing, however, did not 'deter' the helicopters which successfully dropped 2000 food packets in two sorties.

Giving details of the operations in the past 24 hours, the spokesman said two IPKF soldiers were killed and four wounded.

The spokesman said that the IPKF had sent Army medical teams along with medical supplies to attend to the sick and wounded in the Jaffna hospital. Efforts were also being made to restore electricty to the town.

According to LTTE radio intercepts, the LTTE seemed to be 'in utter disarray and also continues to show utter diregard for the loss of innocent Tamil civilian lives'.

The spokesman said intelligence reports indicated that there was a division in the ranks of the LTTE. 'Some groups have come to realise that senseless violence will achieve little,' the spokesman said. He cited a radio intercept which said they (an LTTE group) should not bank on a particular sector anymore as 'they are now concerned more about their future'.

Navy joins operation

UNI & PTI report from Colombo:

The Indian Navy for the first time took part in the operations today as the IPKF flushed out Tamil militants from more buildings in Jaffna town after a fierce fighting.

An Indian High Commission spokesman said the navy attacked the jetty in the LTTE stronghold of Gurunagar, west of the town, and destroyed a number of LTTE supply boats after landing "special groups" on the edge of the jetty.

The supply boats, according to Sri Lankan radio, numbering 14, were kept ready to ferry out LTTE leaders. The Indian High Commission spokesman said the IPKF was now in full command of the areas south of the railway line in Jaffna town and the offensive thrust was going up from the Jaffna fort sector as columns of the advancing Indian troops were moving down on the town from various flanks.

Many important landmarks and buildings in and around the hospital area, apart from the town hall, clock tower, Veerashigham hall and Regal theatre, taken over yesterday were now under control of the IPKF.

The Indian troops, according to the spokesman, finally linked up the forces in the Jaffna fort this morning and the cordon was completed. Although the LTTE continued to engage the IPKF at all stages and offered fierce resistance, the IPKF was moving forward.

The spokesman described the link-up between the IPKF columns from Navatkuli and the Jaffna fort as a "major advance" and said it was 'critical' to the overall operational strategy. As the IPKF advanced along the Navatkuli axis, the LTTE had resorted to using women and children as shields to attack them from behind.

The IPKF troops which secured Kopay south yesterday had moved very close to the Nallur temple, on the outskirts of the town where about 40,000 people had reportedly taken refuge. An aerial reconnaissance showed that many of the refugees were taking shelter elsewhere. They were leaving the temple despite the LTTE's attempts to prevent them in order to use them as a cover for their attacks, he said.

Quoting official sources, the official national news agency, Lankapuvath, said the IPKF took control of the LTTE's office behind the Government Hospital.

The agency quoted sources as having said the Kankesanthurai-Palay road was opened up by the IPKF after they had cleared the route through Kottadi.

According to the sources, street fighting was going on the Kandy road in eastern Jaffna, concentrating point of the IPKF offensive.

Meanwhile, a Tamil was murdered by "terrorists" for being an informer at Akkaraipattu in the eastern province. His mutilated body was found by the security forces, the news agency said.

Plea for resumption of talks with LTTE

NEWS

MADRAS, Oct. 22.

A public meeting convened by the DMK in support of the Sri Lanka Tamils today adopted a resolution demanding immediate cessation of hostilities between the Indian Peace Keeping Force and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Jaffna and other areas of the island and the resumption of negotiations with the LTTE to arrive at a solution "acceptable to the Tamils".

The resolution said the solution should bring an end to the ethnic problem and safeguard the interests of the Sri Lanka Tamils. It expressed the view that the Rajiv-Jayewardene agreement, "which was signed against the wishes of the major Tamil groups of Sri Lanka, should not be used to annihilate and humiliate the valiant Tamil fighters, whom the Jayewardene Government itself could not suppress all these years through its own army, supported by mercenaries from abroad".

It said the large-scale military operations launched by the IPKF had resulted in extensive loss of life of not only Tamil militants, but also the civilian population and IPKF personnel.

'Tragic drama': Moving the resolution, the Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister, Mr. N. T. Rama Rao, called for an immediate ceasefire in Jaffna and wanted India to involve the LTTE also in a round table discussion to sort out the problem and implement the agreement.

"The drama that is being played out in the Jaffna peninsula has assumed tragic intensity and may produce disastrous consequences", he said, adding that it was an unbelievable spectacle of the IPKF mounting a violent offensive against the LTTE. "A task that could not be accomplished by the Sri Lankan armed forces has been achieved by the IPKF".

Punctuating his emotional speech with illustrations from the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, Mr. Rama Rao said what was happening in Sri Lanka was unfortunate and preventable. The orgy of violence and bloodshed, the spate of mass suicides and homicides witnessed in Sri Lanka are both a terrific challenge and an inescapable responsibility of the Government of India. He pledged the full support of his Telugu Desam party to the cause of the Sri Lanka Tamils.

'All India protest': Speaking on the resolution, the DMK president, Mr. M. Karunanidhi, cautioned the Government of India that the patience of the Tamils was running out and it was high time a ceasefire was ordered in Jaffna and the annihilation of the Tamils stopped.

"Since all our appeals during the past 15

days have gone unheeded, it is time to warn the Prime Minister that unless he cried halt tc the attack on the militants and civilians in the island, we will have to launch an all-India protest and struggle to save the Sri Lanka Tamils" he said.

Condemning what he called a "mischievous campaign" against the LTTE over All India Radio and Doordarshan, Mr. Karunanidhi demanded the democratic right of voicing his protest through the same medium. "If they enlist people to support the military offensive in Jaffna, we must be allowed to condemn it", he said. Otherwise, the DMK would be constrained to symbolically destroy a radio and a television set in public to register its protest, he added.

Mr. Upendra, leader of the Telugu Desam Parliamentary Party, criticised the Government of India for signing an "impractical" agreement without letting the Sri Lankan Tamils sign it themselves and be just a witness. "If the IPKF cannot implement the agreement, let it withdraw and let them solve the internal matter"

Mr. Upendra said there was no point in blaming the Indian Army because it was only doing a task assigned to it. "We have always condemned the use of the army for such embarrassing jobs as in the Golen Temple and now in Sri Lanka, because it affects the popularity and image of the armed forces".

The Lok Dal (A) president, Mr. Ajit Singh, said he had come to demonstrate that the north was behind Tamil Nadu in support of the suffering Sri Lanka Tamils. "It is a shame that India should keep quiet when Mr. Jayewardene and his Government do not implement the agreement at all, but launch an offensive against the LTTE for voicing its fears and reservations".

'Eelam only answer': Mr. Subramaniam Swami, Lok Dal general secretary, urged the DMK to unify all the forces in the country to fight for the rights of the Sri Lanka Tamils and said Eelam would be the only answer to their problems and suffering.

Welcoming the gathering, the DMK general secretary, Mr. K. Anbazhagan, wondered what would happen if Sri Lanka asked the IPKF to leave the island after wiping out the LTTE. "Whom will you talk to or hand over the administration if the true representatives are killed?", he asked, and appealed to India to show the same humane approach to the Sri Lanka Tamils as it did to the ethnic sufferers in South Africa or the PLO.

LTTE wants security guaranteed

MADRAS, Oct. 22.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam has appealed to the international community to plead with the Government of India to stop the hostilities in Jaffna, which resulted in a large number of civilian casualties.

In an appeal from Jaffna routed through its U.K. branch and received here by telex, the LTTE said it would give up arms and support the Indian Government's effort to implement the peace accord "if the security of our people and ourselves are guaranteed by the Indian Government."

The Jaffna peninsula, the LTTE alleged, was at present the target of a combined military attack by the Indian Peace Keeping Force and the Sri Lankan armed forces. The attack started on October 10, was continuing unabated. It was evident, the LTTE claimed, from the operation in the last few days that the Indian army, under the name of the IPKF, was killing innocent civilians in large numbers and was carrying out a war of destruction.

More than 3,50,000 people had been rendered homeless and taken refuge in various places. The continuous curfew had brought all human activities to a standstil, and because of non-availability of food, the people were on the brink of starvation. The electricity cut had not only brought darkness but even water supply had been affected.

The LTTE claimed it had captured alive 20 soldiers of the Indian army and they were being treated "very well". It would release them if India stopped the hostilities.

"We have always been for a ceasefire and talks; however India is adamant that it will go on with the war", the appeal signed by Mr. G. Mahendraraja, deputy leader of the LTTE, alleged.

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

JAFFNA	
Jacob Thevathas	Jeyalaxmy
Y. Philomina	Arunasalam
P. John Mary	Santhasegaram
S. Siva	Rajaratnam
S. Jeyakumar	Thiruchelvam
S. Ramachandran	Rasarathinam
S. Antom	K. Tharmalingam
Pakialedchumy	K. Kopalakrishnan
S. Koruthan Vallai	R. Prabaharan
S. Velupillai	K. Manoharan
Olevich Anton	T. Thavarasalingam
Mathimalar	T. Kanagampikai
Saraswathy	T. Tharshini
Gladys Masriasingam	N. Jeevaratnam
K. Valli	T. Susheela
S. Jeyaseelan	Nagar Veerasingam
N. Sathivelu	Soosaipillai Mathew
Arokiyanathan	N. Ponnar
S. Joseph	Samuel Navarasa
Mohamed	M. Uthayakumar
F. Asaithurai	S. Manikam
M. Duncan	N. Veerasingam
KOKUVIL	S. Muthu
Velayuthapillai	N. Ponnar
Rasathurai	N. Nadarasa
Nadarajah	M. Uthayakumar
Kantha	T. Selvanandini
V. Kumarasamy	T. Navaneetharan
Pavalarathinam	Santhirasegram
Rajarathinam	Selliah Nageswary
Alagaratnam	S. Velayuthapillai
Thamotharampillai	A. Thangeswari
Kanapathipillai	A. Satkunarajah
Sachithananthan	A. Sathiyarajah

Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh, GOC-in-C Southern Command, talking to IPKF jawans at a location in Jaffna area in northern Sri Lanka.

Endless tragedy. The fate of a cyclist! The decomposed body of a civilian victim on the ground.



LTTE CLAIMS

On the morning of 21.10.87, when the IPKF, tried to come out of the Jaffna fort camp, the LTTE attacked them and killed atleast 10 members of the IPKF. L.M.G. and S.M.G. weapons were also seized from them. In the shell attacks of the Indian army, from Jaffna Fort camp, some shells fell and bursted at Sundikuli Women's College, killing 7 people who had taken refuge there. 40 people were injured. Five more persons, living in the houses adjoining the college were also killed in the shell attack.

In IPKF's shell attack, 10 people who took refuge inside Inuvil Amman temple were killed. 28 of them were badly injured.

In Jaffna town, 3 bomber planes were engaged in dropping the bombs and in this more than 100 innocent civilians were killed.

Since the IPKF has surrounded the Jaffna hospital, people are unable to take the injured persons for treatment into the hospital. Those who are inside already with wounds and injuries are dying without medical facilities. Most of the doctors, nurses and other employees of the hospital are leaving the hospital, out of fear and panic: dead bodies are all strewn around inside as well as outside the hospital, with no one to care. It is a pathetic and horrible sight to see these dead bodies being eaten away by stray dogs and crows. The once, beautiful city of Jaffna now stinks death. Every where, it is only dilapidation and destruction. In the shell attack on the 21st alone 100 civilians were injured.

The Jaffna peninsula has been atfected very badly, in an unprecendented manner. On 21-10-87 alone, more than 700 mortar shells were used by the IPKF. Because of this, the people of Jaffna were seriously affected. It is simply impossible for them even to carry and remove the injured and the dead. Dead bodies are all strewn on the street. Those who were wounded are also slowly dying for want of medical attention. Since a fierce fight is going on near Jaffna Hospital doctors and nurses are not able to get into the hospital. Lakhs of public in Jaffna peninsula have been rendered homeless and have become refugees.

Liberation Tigers are engaged in a fierce fight, stalling or following the advancements of the IPKF. The suicidal squad (black-tigers) of the Tigers are engaged in a fierce battle against the special commandos of the Indian army thus stalling them from leaving their fort-camp.

In the night 5 doctors were shot dead by the Indian army, that entered the Jaffna hospital from fort camp; they have raped nine nurses. 150 patients and 200 civilians who had taken refuge in the hospital were also killed in a cruel manner by the IPKF. A doctor who escaped with injuries in the gun fire, gave this informations and it was confirmed by the mother of a 2 year old boy. She had admitted her son in the hospital, but when both of them incurred gunfire injuries, she left the hospital with her child and is now staying in a refugee camp, without any medical assistance. Jaffna hospital has now turned into a vast-grave yard. Many of them died because of continuous bleeding from their wound and many more are slowly dying.

In Kiran of Batticolao District, one person was shot dead by the IPKF.

More than half the population (the total population is 8,30,000) of Jaffna has been rendered homeless, following the fierce fight between the IPKF and LTTE. They have taken shelter in the refugee camps and these informations were given by the govt. officials. There is a very bad scarcity of 'food-stuff'. People are suffering for want of food and there is the imminent danger of people dying of hunger and starvation. Since the fight is going-on on a large-scale, distribution of food has become a great problem. The Indian officials have also accepted this. There are complaints about the non-supply of food in the refugees camps. No steps have been taken so far to redress the grievances of the people who have lost their heerth and home.

On the night of 21.10.87, the central part of Jaffna was attacked with more than 300 bombs that were thrown continuously. The dead and the injured were not removed; the bodies are still lying there. More than 22 injured persons have been admitted in a private hospital. But neither doctors nor medicines were available to save them. Many of them die for want of medical assistance, to stop over-bleeding. In the attack on the 21st alone, more than 250 innocent people including children, women and the aged were killed.

30 men of the IPKF entered Nalamkattai in Mannar district. These men entered the house of an aged woman and raped her two daughters. They tied many others to posts and have whipped them. Those who escaped narrated these horrifying incidents. Nothing is known about the people captured by the Indian army.

The Indian army entered the Jaffna hospital on Wednesday (21st) night and killed many people including doctors, nurses and patients. The hospital's ambulance driver, his wife, his two sons aged 9 and 14 years and a daughter were there in the hospital at the time of attack. And the following is the gist of the account given by the 14 years old boy who escaped death by jumping over the compound wall of the hospital, with his brother. (He narrated these things to a doctor).

'Many patients were shot dead. My father was also shot-down and killed in front of my eyes. My mother and sister were dragged away by the Indian army men and I do not know what has happened of them. My younger brother got injured in the bullet fire. I was lying down like dead with the dead bodies and so could see what all things were taking place within my vicinity. The doctors and nurses of the hospital were made to stand in line and were asked to raise-up their hands. They were taken to the X-ray room. From there, gun-shots and loud-cries were heard. When these sounds stopped, I could see many patients lying dead in heaps, on the way to the X-ray rooms. Their eyes were blind-folded. At another place, heaps of dead bodies, in white uniform were seen by me. These were the bodies of the doctors and nurses. I carried my wounded brother and escapd by jumping over the compound wall.'

The refugees took shelter in Navalar cultural building in Navalar street. A shell fell on the building on 22.10.87 at about 6 p.m. six refugees were killed by the shell blasting. At 4 p.m. the same day, a shell hit a residential houses at Rsavin Thottam, killing 4 members of the same family.

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

JAFFNA

Mariathas	Lottie Peteson
Asheervatham	Amalathas
Aseervatham	**Ritammah**
Stephen	**Christie**
Sivagnanavadivel	A. Gnanapragasam
Navin Quintus	P. Sinnathamby
Thurairajah	**Mathimalar**
Esthaky	Uthayasooriyan
Antonypillai	**T. Mathuraseela**
Rakummah Ummah	R. Paikianathan
Gino Charles	K. Rajah
Suventhiran	C. Thurairajah
Innasian	P. Suthaharan
Michel Cecilia	M. Annaratnam
Mohanathas	A. Frothoran
V. Vijayakumar	S. Sinnathurai
A. Michael	K. Kandiah
Selvam Vincent	K. Rass
J. S. Nicholas	J. Nadarajah
Philomena	S. Ranjitkumar
M. Thiyagarajah	G.L. Alexander
P. Nadarajah	G. Sanmuganathan
Moshon Ilayan	Abraham Thomas
Jesuthas Lucia	S. Pradeep
Benedict	**S. Siyamala**
Gnanithas	**S. Vijaya**
Marimuthu	Sivarajah
Genoa	**S. Sayikobillai**
Sebastiampillai	S. Tharsan
Sivarasa	**V. Annammah**
Karunan	**M. Kamalam**
Gregory	P. Sellathurai
Anandarajah	S. Sinnathurai
Sydney William	R. Packianathan

AFFIDAVIT

KANTHIAH KULASINGHAM (48), Illankai Nayagi Amman Koviladi, Kalviankadu.

The deceased Kanthiah Asaipillai, aged 85 years widow, was my mother.

During the October 1987 military offensive we left our house and sought refuge at the Nallur Kandasamy Temple and thereafter we proceed of Kayts.

My aged mother defiantly refused to accompany us and opted to stay at our house at Kalviankadu.

While we were at Velanai I was informed that mother was killed in a shell blast while she was on her way to the Nallur Temple on 22.10.87.

I came to know that her body was cremated at the spot where it was found by the same persons who took pain to inform me about her demise.

LOURTHAMMA wife of Thevasagayam Annaratnam (39), 60/2, Soloman Lane, Koyathodam, Jaffna.

I am the sister of the late Joseph Antonypillai Rajaratnam killed in gun-fire on 22.10.87.

My late brother was unmarried and lived with me and was looked after by me.

On 20.10.87 due to the belligerent situation prevailing in the area, I and my family including my late brother left out home and took refuge in St. Antony's Church Pasyoor.

On 22.10.87 there was shell fire directed on to the church area and some shells fell on the church and exploded.

My late brother Rajaratnam through fear ran from the church premises towards Maniar Thoddam and on the way he was shot dead by the Forces.

His dead body was recovered from the drain on the road-side near the spot on 27.10.87.

My late brother Rajaratnam was 60 years old and was unmarried and lived with me. He was looked after by me.

My brother was a casual labourer who earned an average monthly income of Rs. 1000/-.

My husband is sickly and is not a regular wage-earner.

NADARAJAH PONNAMMAH (54), 82, Rural Development Scheme (Colony), Kopay South, Kopay.

The deceased person Ariyacutty Nadarajah, aged 64 years was my husaband.

He was a Cigar roller.

During the October 1987 military offensive we sought refuge at the Nallur Kandasamy Temple.

My husband refused to accompany us and opted to stay back to guard the house.

On 22.10.87 I returned home to prepare some meals.

I was chocked to find my husband's lifeless body lying in the backyard.

His body bore shell blast injuries.

I learned that he was killed by a shell on 21.10.87.

His body was cremated on 22.10.87 at Thirunelvely Cemetery.

I have two unmarried daughters and three sons and three sons.

POOPATHY PULENDRARAJAH (43), 54, New Chemmany Street, Jaffna.

I am the Nephew of the late Miss. Ganeshamudaliyar Pravapathy killed in Indian army firing.

My late aunt Miss. G. Pravapathy was a spinister aged 75 years and she was looked after and maintained by me.

On 22.10.87 when my aunt was alone at home sea!ed in an out-hut while I and my family were away, Indian troops who were on our road, entered the premises.

She was gunned down and the hut was set ablaze by the Forces.

Her partially charred body was found with gun shot injuries.

Her body was cremated in the open land within the premises of the house on 23.10.87.

RAVEENDRAN THILAGAWATHY (34), Vanniasingham Lane, Thavady North, Thavady.

The deceased person Rasiah Raveendran, aged 34years was my husband.

He was a businessman.

Due to the October 1987 military offensive we sought refuge at the Hindu Ladies College, Jaffna.

On 22.10.87 at about 10.00 a.m. my husband left us saying that he is going to our house at Anaicodai to inspect its condition.

At about 5.00 p.m. I was informed that my husband was killed in a shell explosion at Manipay Road while he was on his way to Anaicoddai.

His body was cremated by the army itself.

I have four chidlren.

My children and I have been deprived of the maintenance and support we received from my husband.

SEMPOTSOTHY KARUNAILINGAM (55), Atchuvely North, Atchuvely.

I was residing at the above mentioned address with my wife Karunailingam Seethalakshmy (45) daughter Karunailingam Sumathy (23) and son Karunailingam Sumanan (17).

On 22.10.87 where it was found unsafe to remain in our house due to mortar shell fired by IPKF fallng in our residential area I decided to leave for the Atchuvely Pillayar temple at about 6 p.m.

When I was proceeding to the temple with my wife and children accompanied by my tenants who were occupying an annex and had walked about 100 yards from my house several shells fell in the area of which one very close to us.

My wife K. Seethalakshmy and daughter Sumathy and Ratnam Nagaswamy (13) a tenant were killed on the spot and my son K. Sumanan and I were injured.

I sustained a compound fracture on the right elbow.

With the help of people fromt hat locality I got the dead bodies of my wife and daughter removed to a vacant house and there sent my son K. Sumanan for help.

On 23.10.87 morning the dead bodies of my wife and daughter and R. Nageswary were taken home with the help of relatives and cremated the same afternoon.

I was taken to Chavachcheri Govt. Hospital on 23.10.87. As facilities were lacking at this hospital for proper treatment. I was transferred of Manthikai Government Hospital on 24.10.87 morning.

I have lost my wife and only daughter in this unfortunate incident where the IPKF has acted savagely by firing shells on residential areas indiscriminately.

My wife sustained gaping injuries on her chest and abdomen while my daughter was hit by shrapnel on the back of her head.

SIVARAJAH MANJULA (26), C/O V.S. Nadarajha, Velathoppu Kalviankadu, Jaffna.

The deceased Govindapillai Sivarajah aged 30 years was my husband.

He was a casual labourer.

During the October 87 military offensive I along with my daughter and mother left our house and sought refuge at the Nallur Kandasamy Temple.

My husband opted to stay at home and used to visit us often at the temple.

On 22.10.87 I was informed that my husband was killed in a shell blast at Kalviankadu market while he was on his way to the Nallur temple on the same day.

Due to the prevailing situation I could not go to the place where he died, to recover his body.

I do not know what happened to his body afterwards.

I have a daughter Girija aged 5 years.

We do not have any income or support after my husband's death and undergoing severe hardships.

THIRUNAVUKARASU NAGULESWARY (44), 17, Navalady Vannarpannai, Jaffna.

The deceased Saravanamuthu Thirunavukarasu, aged 54 years was my husband.

He was farmer.

On 22.10.87 our area was the target of intense shell fire.

At about 12 noon a shell fell inside our backyard and exploded.

A large shrapnel broke through the roof tiles and struck my husband on his leg.

The injury was severe and my husband died immediately due to excessive bleeding.

His body was cremated at the Kombayan Manal cemetery on the same day itself.

I have four unmarried daughters and a son.

My children and I have been deprived of the maintenance and support we received from my husband.

We do not have any income and undergoing untold hardships.

THIVIYARATNAVEL VIMALA (46), 75, Martin Road, Jaffna.

The deceased person Thiviyaratnavel Mathivathani, aged 17 years was my daughter.

She was a student at the Holy Family Convent Jaffna.

On 22.10.87 our area was the target of intense shelling.

At about 10 a.m. a shell fell and exploded near our house.

Through fear we fled from the house.

As we were running from our house a shell fell on the road side and exploded.

My daughter died instantaneously after being struck by a shrapnel darting from the explosion.

We cremated her body on the following day at Kombayan Manal cemetery.

I have two daughters.

UTHAYARANI widow of Rasiah Mohanadas, Moothavinayagar Lane, Nallur, Jaffna.

My husband Rasiah Mohanadas died on the 22nd day of October 1987, during the military operation by the IPKF at Kachcheri Nallur Road, Jaffna and his death was due to injuries caused by shell blast.

My husband the abovesaid Mohanadas was working a labourer and he was the sole bread winner of my family.

I have no source of income to maintain me and my children.

KANDIAH SIVAKOLUNTHU (75), widow, Variapulam, Chunakam.

The deceased person Ramu Kandiah, aged 85 years was my husband.

He was a Farmer.

On 23.10.1987 at about 12.00 midnight my husband went out to answer a call of nature.

Then we heard a report of a gun.

As our house was without any compound and situated by the road side, soldiers who were moving about outside on seeing my husband fired at him killing him instantaneously.

After the army left the place my daughter who went outside found his dead body.

His body was cremated at Chunakam Kothialady cemetery on the following day.

KANDIAH SIVALINGAMOORTHY
231, Saddanathar Road, Nallur.

NIC No. 423232595 V.

The deceased Sundaram Navaratnam is my father-in-law 52 years and was living with me.

On the 23rd of October as there was shelling towards our area, we left our house and took refuge at the Nallur temple.

After 10 days, my family went to a house at Eachchamoddai road and stayed with our relations.

The deceased went to Nallur to see our house.

He was living at Nallur as the tension eased.

On 11.11.87 while he was going to a shop to buy some provisions he received a gun shot injury and died on the spot.

A neighbour of ours at Nallur came to Eachchamoddai and informed us that my father in law received a gun shot and he died.

The body bore injuries on the chest and thigh.

The body was cremated by me on the same day 11.11.87.

I attach a copy of the death certificate No. 464 of 30.1.88.

Cause of death; Death due to profuse bleeding from injury caused by gun shot.

5/2/88

NANNITHAMBY RATNAM (44), Power Station Road, Chunakam South, Chunakam.

The deceased Ranjinidevi Nannithamby, aged 14 years was my daughter.

She was a student at Ramanathan College, Marathanamadam.

On 23.10.87 the army was advancing through Palaly Road, towards Jaffna.

At around 3.00 p.m. the army came to our residence.

The opened fire killing eight people on the spot and causing injuries to a few including me.

My daughter also died in the incident.

Her body was cremated at a nearby field on 26.10.87.

I have two sons at home.

My husband was also injured in the incident and is unable to walk.

SEENION MUTHULINGAM (38), Power House Road, Chunakam South, Chunakam.

The deceased Muthulingam Pooranam age 38 years was my wife.

On 23.10.87 the army came to our residence.

On seeing us they opened fire killing eight person on the spot.

My wife was also shot and killed during the incident.

She was buried in a nearby field on 27.10.87.

I am undergoing severe mental pain due to my loving wife's untimely death.

SELVARANI SATHANANTHAN (27) years, Vettilaikerniady, Kokuvil West, Kokuvil.

The deceased Muthulingam Sathananthan (28) is my husband.

My husband, 2 children and I were residing at the above address.

At about 12.00 noon on 23.10.87, when shells started falling in our residential area, my husband requested me and my children to leave the house and run towards a coconut plantation for safety saying that he would follow.

As he failed to arrive and the helicopter which was dropping explosives had left I went in search of my husband at about 1.00 p.m.

I found my husband fallen dead in a pool of blood close to the rear entrance.

Our house too had been damaged by shell blasts.

It was evident that my husband had been killed when he was hit by fragments from the exploding shells as he was leaving the house.

My husband, the sole bread winner, was a retail dealer in vegetables.

My husband leaves behind myself and 2 children aged 9 years and 6 years.

SITHAN NANNIAN (50), Power Station Road, Chunakam South, Chunakam.

The deceased Selvi Kanaki, widow, aged 65 years was my sister-in-law.

After her husband who died few years ago she became one of my dependents.

On 23.10.87 while we were in our house the army came there.

On seeing us they opened fire killing eight persons on the spot.

My sister-in-law was also shot and killed during the incident.

Her body was also buried in a nearby field on 26.10.87.

VALLIPURAM SELVARANEE (52), Arasady, Kopay North, Kopay.

The deceased person Sabapathipillai Vallipuram, aged 62 years was my husband.

He was a Blacksmith.

On 23.10.87 at about 10.00 a.m. my husband left for Anaicoddai on a private matter.

As he did not return home that day we became highly worried and mounted a search for him.

For many days we did not receive any information about him.

A week later I was informed that he was killed in a shell explosion at Anaicoddai.

His body was not recovered.

I have four children.

My children and I have been deprived of the maintenance and support we received from my husband.

AARUPILLAI SANGARALINGAM, (46)
Kumarakoddam, Kondavil.

I am a farmer.

My wife, three daughters and I were living in our house at the above said address.

Indian Peace Keeping Force who came into occupation of the Sri-Lanka Transport Board Depot in Kondavil started lobbing shells towards our locality in random on 24.10.87.

All residents in our locality fled to the closest temples. My wife, children and I too run to Neddilippai Pillayar Temple.

On our way to temple, a shell fired from the above camp fell close to us and exploded.

I was thrown off and when I got up I found my wife Sangaralingam Saraswathy 44 and daughter Sangaraliagam Kayenthini 24 in pools of blood.

When I went close to my wife and daughter, I noticed that both my wife and daughter were dead. They had injuries all over their bodies.

My other two daughters escaped injury.

Dead bodies of my wife and daughter Kayenthini were removed and burnt in a land close by on the same day, as there was heavy shelling towards our area on this date.

More than 6 persons were killed and several injured in this incident.

Indian Peace Keeping Forces who came to our locality on 13.11.87 after an incident in which two IPKF personnel were killed set fire to my house and tobacco in my house worth Rs. 75,000/-

ARASARATNAM SELVAVATHY (43), Kalikovilady, Thirunelvely.

The deceased Sivaguru Annammah aged, 78 years was my grand mother being my father's mother.

During the October 1987 military offensive we sought refuge at the Pathirakali Kovil which is situated across the road from our house.

My grandmother stayed at home due to old age.

On 24.10.87 at about 9 a.m. army arrived at the Temple and Cannon charged.

After they left I went back to our house where I found my grand mother suffering from an injury on her neck which was caused by the shell shrapnel.

I came to know she received the injury during the army cannon fire.

She succumbed to her injuries on 6.11.87.

Her body was cremated on Chembatu cemetery on 7.11.87.

She was living under my care and maintenance till her death.

ARULAPPU THOMAS (23) 36, St. Mary's Road, off 1st Cross Street, Navanthurai.

One to the October, 1987 military offensive I sought refuge at the Navalar School.

On 24.10.87 as we thought it is safe to leave the camp and returned home.

At about 1.00 p.m. I returned to the Navalar School to remove some of our possession which we left there.

As I approached the school I was fired upon by some soldiers who were lying down on the road side away from my view.

I sustained an injury on my right upper thigh.

I left the scene bleeding heavily from the wound.

On the following day I was admitted at the Co-operative Hospital, Moolai.

On 10.11.87 I was admitted at the Jaffna General Hospital.

I was discharged on 7.12.87.

I am a fisherman and after the incident remain at home unable to do any work.

I feel frequent numbness and unable to walk far or lift any heavy objects as it gives excruciating pain.

I have four unmarried sisters of marriageable age.

My father is an unvalid.

We do not have any income after the incident.

GURUSAMY RASAMMAH (50), 54/16, Oadai Lane, Jaffna.

The deceased persons Kulasegarampillai Thanaluxumy, aged 58 years a widow was my elder sister.

She was living with me until she met her tragic end.

During the October 1987 military offensive we sought refuge at the Navalar School refugee camp Vannarpannai.

On 24.10.87 at about 2.00 p.m. the army fired at the refugees in the school killing and injuring many persons which resulted in a carnage.

My sister was also among the persons shot and killed by the army.

Her body was cremated by the army itself inside the school premises.

She was living under my care and maintenance after her husband's death two years ago.

KULASINGHAM SELVARANEE (42), Vanniasingham Veethy, Thavady North, Kokuvil.

The deceased person Rasanayagam Kulasingham, age 47 years was my husband.

He was a cigar-roller.

Due to the October 1987 military offensive we sought refugee at the Jaffna Hindu College refuge camp.

On 24.10.87 at about 10 a.m. my husband left us saying that he is going to our house to inspect its condition.

He did not return afterwards.

On the following day at about 10 a.m. I was informed that my husband was killed in a shell blast at Arukalmadam.

His body was not recovered by us but cremated by the army itself.

I have five children.

PONNUTHURAI RANI, (36) Kerniyady, Kokuvil West, Kokuvil.

Late Mr. Appathurai Ponnuthurai was my legal husband.

We have five children namely Miss. P. Thanaluxmy (13), Miss. P. Pushpamalar (12), Mas. P. Kirupakaran (8), Miss. P. Gowri (6), and Mas. P. Jayaruban (2).

My husband above named was an employee of a bakery named 'Sutha' situated at Kerniyady.

On 24.10.87 while my husband was carrying bread for delivery, he was shot dead by the IPKF. He died instantaneously. His body could not be removed and we came to understand that his body was burnt at the roadside by the IPKF.

I am widowed with five children without any source of income for sustenance. I, therefore, pray that I am paid reasonable compensation to bring up my poor, fatherless children.

MUTHUKUMARU PARASAKTHY (63), Kerniadi, Kokuvil West, Kokuvil.

The deceased person Sinnathamby Muthucumaru, aged 60 years was my husband.

He was a Cigar roller.

During the October 1987 military offensive we sought refuge at the Hindu Ladies College refugee camp.

On 24.10.87 my husband left the camp saying that he is going back to our house to bring some coconuts.

He did not return afterwards.

We could not go on search of him due to the tense situation prevailed during the period.

Later I came to know that he was shot and killed by the army at Alady Arukal Madam on 24.10.87.

His body was cremated by the army itself.

I have two unmarried daughters.

South Jaffna out of LTTE grip NEWS

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI, Oct. 23

The Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) operating on the Navatkuli axis met up with a force moving out of the Fort and established complete control over the Jaffna Railway Station at 11 a.m. today. With this action, the IPKF's eastern and western axes have linked up liberating the southern Jaffna city from the LTTE control. Though the IPKF reached positions near the station two days ago, the last 500 metres was bitterly contested. Now just one area, Gurunagar, between Jaffna jetty No. 1 and Kalumputurai West, remains under militant control in this southern waterfront area.

A wireless intercept of the LTTE indicated that the militants had been asked to 'pack up' and move to the jetty for possible transhipment across the lagoon. Two days ago, the Indian Navy personnel began dragging operations on the lagoon to locate possible caches of arms.

Militants in temple: The LTTE resistance was continuing in a roughly 10 to 12 sq. km. area which includes the Tirunelveli area, the University, the Nallur temple and Kokkuvil. The IPKF sources say that some semblance of 'law and order' has now been restored in Clock Tower, Regal and the Townhall areas. While pressure was being maintained on the LTTE on the Kondavil axis, another column operating from South Kopai moved south-westwards down the road to a multiple road-junction, one kilometre west of the Nallur Kandaswamy temple. The IPKF sources feel that the militants have mingled with the refugees in the temple and intend to offer resistance using the temple as a hideout. This belief stems from the fact that the IPKF helicopters dropping food packets in the temple area yesterday and today were fired upon by the LTTE militants from the area. Similar fire was drawn by helicopters dropping food packets in the Men's Hindu College and the Women's Hindu College the second day running today.

Hospital made functional: The IPKF has got the Jaffna General Hospital fully functional today by sending in two surgical teams. They also provided two tons of medical supplies and diesel to get the electricity generators functioning to restart electric supply to the hospital. The medical team which entered the hospital first yesterday, unaccompanied by combat personnel, met a horrifying sight. Some 360 patients were being looked after by just two doctors and three nurses. Bodies of patients who had died due to lack of care were decomposing. Having helped cremate the bodies, the medical team swung into action providing relief to the patients who are also being supplied with food.

However, the medical team was told by patients that some LTTE personnel were masquerading as patients. As a result, an infantry company was sent to guard the hospital.

Engineering help: The IPKF engineers have restored the distribution and transmission system of the Chunnakam power house destroyed by the LTTE while retreating from there. In addition, construction and engineering personnel have also been inducted into the IPKF to repair the damage done by the LTTE firing and to help people repair their destroyed or damaged houses.

In another action today, the IPKF seized a big arms cache in the Batticaloa area. The cache included assault rifles, heavy machine guns, anti-tank rockets some 29 in number and quantities of explosives and mines. The IPKF personnel have also moved to seal of the routes leading out of the city to prevent the escape of the trapped militants. Yesterday and today, some LTTE cadres attempting to escape were detained at Achchaveli area and at the ferry linking Arali South with Velanai island in the lagoon. There are no clear estimates of the LTTE personnel still inside the IPKF encirclement, but the IPKF sources emphasised that they were still confronting stiff LTTE fire in the encircled area.

Arms ready for shipment: Intelligence sources say that militant representatives in Singapore have secured another supply of arms and explosives for shipment to Sri Lanka. They are, however, unable to charter a ship to carry the shipment. Earlier, a bogus shipping line run by the LTTE out of Singapore possessing two ships was used for the task, but the two ships have since been sold off for as yet unknown reasons. Three weeks before the final confrontation with the IPKF, the LTTE had received a shipment of arms including AK-47 assault rifles, RPG-7 anti-tank rockets and explosives for making mines. According to sources, this points to the fact that the LTTE had decided sometime in September or even earlier to scuttle the accord.

IPKF toll 133: The most recent casualty figures available indicate that so far 133 IPKF personnel have laid down their lives including 16 officers. The IPKF estimates that 659 LTTE personnel have been killed. These figures have been compiled from LTTE radio intercepts and in fact just about 20 per cent of this figure have been checked out physically by the IPKF.

Radio intercepts are providing the IPKF a considerable amount of information on the LTTE. However, the problem of locating high frequency transmission makes it difficult to pinpoint the 12 to 15 sets still operating. Some intercepts reveal a sense of desperation such as asking for militants to use shield of women and children to avoid IPKF retaliation.

Another intercept made when Indian medical personnel entered the Jaffna Hospital unaccompanied by combat troops said, "Let's have some fun and fire some mortars to scare away the Indian troops.' Yet another intercept pointed to the fact that there was some dissension in the militant ranks. It said: "Tell all members to sign (possibly some document enjoining them to fight on). All those not signing will be punished."

IPKF personnel showing the damaged church built in 1706 and portions of Jaffna Fort shelled by the LTTE during earlier hostilities.

LTTE CLAIMS

On the 21st October 87, at noon, the IPKF stormed into the Jaffna Teaching Hospital and shot dead three doctors and nearly hundred indoor patients who were receiving treatment. Ten nurses were brutally raped and gunned to death. Some of the medical internees were arrested and killed.

On the 22nd October 87, thirtyfive passengers were killed and many injured when a helicopter gunship unleashed rocket mortar on a group of passengers assembled at Aralithurai Jetty used for travelling to the nearby islands.

On the 24th October 87, two young women were raped and killed by 13 men of the IPKF in the presence of their mothers at Sangupitty. When IPKF opened cannon fire at a refugee camp established at Kokuvil Hindu College, 40 innocent people were killed and 80 injured. The other refugees were commandered to cut trenches and the corpses buried there unceremoniously.

IPKF operations will continue

BATTLE □ FOR □ JAFFNA

NEWS

From V. Jayanth

JAFFNA, Oct. 23.

Even as the battering of mortars, the exchange of fire between the LTTE and the IPKF and the blasting of booby traps continued today, a press party from Madras was taken to Jaffna to see for themselves the *modus operandi* of the IPKF and the restraint with which they conducted the operations.

Pressure stepped up

The press party spent six hours in the town, in the Fort, in the surrounding areas and at the Palaly headquarters of the IPKF. Just as we left the town, the IPKF stepped up pressure on the militants to "neutralise" another of their strongholds just behind the battered Town Hall.

From the Fort, we saw what remains of the Central Telegraph Office and the adjoining Rupavahini establishment, the Veerasingam multi-storeyed hall, the Regal cinema, the main post office, the shattered library and the Town Hall — which have all been heavily shelled and damaged by the LTTE in the past. The significance of the IPKF taking control of these landmarks in the town stems from their strategic location and from the effective military use to which the LTTE put it.

It was from these points that the LTTE had reportedly launched the offensive against the IPKF, positioned at the Fort.

Today, the LTTE, whose presence in the town was still reckoned as "sizeable", has been pushed to the north and east and was engaged in snipping operations from Gurunagar, behind the Town Hall area.

As Brig. Manjit Singh explained the "linking operations" to the presspersons, the boom of shells and snipping guns was heard distinctly. "That's the LTTE's AK 47 rifle. The finishing noise is peculiar," he noted.

Characteristically, the militants had set a maze of land mines and booby traps on the road from the Fort to their positions. With curfew in force, there was no semblance of human activity in this part of the town.

Different kind of war

As Brig. Kulwant Singh, the officiating GOC of the IPKF now, put it: "It is a different kind of a war, with fighters in civil dress mixing up with the people."

All commanders of the IPKF were categorical in asserting that the loss of innocent civilian lives was "minimal." "If we have taken so much time and care in this operation, it is because of the restraint and a conscious decision not to kill civilians or damage buildings" was the point emphasised.

Restraint

Brig. Kulwant Singh explained that the casualties of the IPKF were rather high because of this restraint. "You will also see that the ratio of officers and other ranks killed is also high, because we have asked the officers to lead and ensure that no civilians are killed and no property damaged."

We landed at the Palaly airfield around 11 a.m. and after a detailed briefing by the officiating GOC, went to the field hospital of the IPKF. Three wounded soldiers were being transhipped and two others lay in bed, unable to speak—both suffering from a blast of a landmine. Sukumaran, one of the injured, had a blast on his face, left hand and left leg.

We then took off in an IAF helicopter for an aerial survey. The IPKF officers made it clear that there could be no low-flying because the operations were still going on and no risk could be taken.

The intention of the officers was to show what had happened and what could have in such an operation. We were flown over the Vadamarachi area to see the extensive damage inflicted by the Sri Lankan armed forces during their offensive, but flying at an altitude of 800 metres only specs of the gaping holes in roofs could be seen.

There was not much we could see in Jaffna and the damage to the buildings had been inflicted even earlier. The Jaffna University area was still not within IPKF control and the hospital was declared "risky" to reach because of the road mines. "The LTTE has shelled the hospital and left only a day or two before we reached there. It is now under our control and functioning normally," the IPKF officers said.

The Jaffna operations have not ended, but the "mopping up operations" are nearing completion. "It is by no means the end, when we have full control of Jaffna, because many LTTE groups have gone out of the town," we were told.

How do the Indian soldiers, particularly the Tamils, feel about fighting the Tamil militants and killing them? "We see it as another assignment. After all, the police and other authorities in Tamil Nadu have to act and punish offenders or criminals. If the LTTE opposes India, we have to deal with them too," a couple of Tamil soldiers positioned at the Jaffna Fort responded.

LTTE shells hospital

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI, Oct. 23.

The LTTE has begun firing at the Jaffna General Hospital after it was taken by the IPKF yesterday. According to an External Affairs Ministry spokesperson, the LTTE is continuing to direct its fire towards the hospital 'unmindful of the safety of the patients and the medical staff'.

The spokesperson said the LTTE was firing from the hospital at the IPKF when the hospital was under its control. The IPKF did not return the fire as it wanted to avoid damage and casualties. After the hospital was captured, the LTTE sent radio messages calling for heavy mortar fire around the boundary wall of the hospital. The spokesperson did not give casualty figures but said the IPKF doctors were attending to the sick and wounded in the hospital.

Consolidating position

The IPKF was now in the process of consolidating its 'commanding position' which it had established in Jaffna city following the link-up of the IPKF's eastern and western columns. Last night it secured the area around the Vambadi Girls School. This morning a heavily booby-trapped and large LTTE ammunition dump measuring 100 sq.ft. was captured.

The remaining LTTE positions in Jaffna city were being subjected to 'pressure from all directions'. All escape routes had been sealed, it was stated.

Heavy rain today prevented the airdropping of food packets around the Nallur temple and other areas of Jaffna city. Yesterday the IPKF had airdropped 2000 food packets despite encountering LTTE ground fire.

In the Batticaloa area, a mine explosion killed three IPKF soldiers. A large cache of arms and ammunition has been captured by the IPKF. It included 22 rifles, three heavy machine guns, two rocket launchers, and two mortars.

Rs. 30 million a day being spent on IPKF

COLOMBO, Oct. 23.

India spends Rs. 30 million a day to maintain its Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka, a Cabinet Minister told the Sri Lankan Parliament yesterday.

Winding up the debate on a motion (which was passed by 106 to four votes) for the extension of Emergency by another month, the Minister of State, Mr. Anandatissa de Alwis, said the IPKF came here on the invitation of the President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, to "disarm the terrorists and hand over the arms to the Sri Lankan Army".

The Minister said the current situation in Jaffna was the result of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam going back on its word. If the IPKF was not there, it was the Sri Lankan soldiers who would have got killed.

He said he would discuss with the Indian High Commissioner the question of allowing Sri Lankan and foreign media personnel to visit Jaffna to cover the developments.—UNI

THE HINDU

Prelude to the ongoing war

REPORT

D. B. S. Jeyaraj, THE HINDU's Correspondentin Sri Lanka, who was in Jaffna for ten days during the thick of the fighting between the IPKF and the LTTE, provides his account of a traumatic experience. Jeyaraj left Jaffna on October 20 and arrived in Colombo the next day.

COLOMBO, Oct. 23.

The uneasy peace that Jaffna had been enjoying since the signing of the Indo-Lanka accord on July 29 was shattered on Saturday, October 10, in the early hours of the morning. Two Tamil newspapers published from Jaffna were "sealed" by the Indian Peace-Keeping Force. The employees, including journalists, were arrested after which the printing equipment and office premises were blasted by explosives. This was the prelude to the ongoing war that broke out between the Indian forces and the Tamil militant group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, that afternoon. The brief respite the people of Jaffna enjoyed was over.

I was staying at a friend's residence in Nallur, once the ancient capital of the Jaffna kingdom and now within the municipal limits. The Jaffna and Nallur divisions have a population of 159,469 out of the overall Jaffna district figure of 831,112 (1981 census figures). With the outbreak of hostilities, the IPKF launched a multi-pronged offensive. The Indian Forces were approaching Jaffna from five directions. At the outset, a common feeling prevalent was that the Indian forces would not harm the civilians. It was felt that the Indians would isolate and alienate the Tigers from the Tamil community at large. Soon those hopes evaporated. Intermittent shelling from camps and sporadic aerial attacks were experienced.

Using a bicycle——the popular mode of conveyance in Jaffna—I was able to travel within urban Jaffna and several rural areas. At times, when the exchange of fire between both sides intensified, movement was curtailed. Yet I was able to visit areas after the firing ceased. On a few occasions, I was in the combat zone and was able to see at first-hand certain aspects of the fighting.

The Tigers soon reverted to their familiar style of placing landmines on the approach roads and commencing attacks on Indian convoys. A substantial portion of the Indian losses was due to this. Another Tiger strategy was to allow the Indian forces to advance to a point after offering token resistance and then use by-lanes, footpaths and so on—thereby getting to the rear of the Indian troops. The LTTE used familiarity with the terrain to its advantage and attacked the Indians in pincer-like movements.

On the Indian side, the initial attempts seemed to be a series of sorties from different directions, aimed at wearing down the Tigers and above all exhausting the limited LTTE firepower. Also, Indian movements seemed restrained by some reluctance to get involved in thick fighting. I was able to see this phenomenon on two occasions at Kallundai on the outskirts of Jaffna and Kopay, 8 km from Jaffna.

During ten days of fighting, during which period I was in Jaffna, the civilian casualty figures compiled independently by me were 192 killed, 485 injured (of whom 326 were hospi-talised).

Jaffna is literally in the dark as the power supply has been cut off. An indefinite curfew, extending to several days at a stretch, has been imposed. Road and rail transport to and from the peninsula has been severely curtailed. Food-stocks are rather scarce as a result. No mail or newspapers are delivered. The only channel of information is the radio. Ironically, the All-India Radio broadcasts—the most popular in Jaffna in the past—have suffered in credibility.

The Jaffna teaching hospital was severely hampered by the power cut and operated under considerable hardship.

Over 3 lakh displaced

Over 300,000 people are totally or partially displaced. Most residents in the advance line of the IPKF troops have vacated their homes and moved into areas relatively safe from violence. Most of them have put up with friends and relatives or schools and places of worship. There is also heavy migration to the south of the peninsula from where many people trickle out to the mainland via the ferry.

One consequence of the whole conflict has been the psychological impact caused in the minds of the Tamil people. India was seen as the protector and saviour of the Tamil people and "Mother India" was seen to have nourished and nurtured the Tamil struggle. Although most Tamils realised that India was acting only in its self-interest, few thought that Indian troops would be involved in fighting with the LTTE. This emotional trauma is something which can be gauged only qualitatively.

One disturbing episode was reported from Kokuvil, a village 3 km away from Jaffna. Earlier Indian commandoes were heli-dropped at night at an abadoned crematorium behind the Jaffna University complex. The objective was to secure the LTTE base camp in front of the university. The Tigers were lying in ambush and the elite troops were attacked in three directions. Twenty-nine Indians were killed and one was captured. Some commandoes escaped into Kokuvil. While the Tigers were trying to surround and capture the troops, a rescue mission was undertaken by the Indian forces. Track-armoured cars were mounted on the rail-tracks and brought to Kokuvil. The allegation was that while escaping, the Indian troops caused the death of 40 civilians along a lane named "pirambadi" and that seven bodies were run over by heavy vehicles.

I was able to interview several residents and also visit the area. All of them—from grown-ups to children—alleged that Indian troops had killed the civilians. With this incident, the popular Tamil perception became hostile in my observation.

The LTTE's deputy leader, Mahendrarajah alias "Mahattaya," is directing the field military operations. When I asked him about ceasing hostilities, he said the LTTE had no objection to an immediate cease-fire. The Tigers were not prepared to surrender their arms unconditionally. A phased out surrender of weapons was possible subject to negotiations and a communication to this effect had been conveyed to India. If New Delhi was willing to act on this, the abating of violence was possible, he indicated.

THE INDEPENDENT
(London) titling thus to the same story

Massacre shatters image of peace-keepers

D.B.S. Jeyaraj

23 October 1987

"The war is still going on"

REPORT

From T. S. Subramanian

JAFFNA, Oct. 23.

"The war is still going on. We are in Jaffna town. We still have to wrap it up. Sniping goes on. Along with the war, we are also carrying out civic action. The first place we went to was the Jaffna General Hospital. It was still under fire. Our men walked through ambushes and booby-traps and reached the Jaffna General Hospital to give medicines to the sick... Their (the LTTE's) presence is sizable but some of them have gone out of Jaffna."

These words from Brig. Kulwant Singh, Officiating GOC, IPKF, sum up the situation in Jaffna town. A team of reporters who were taken to Jaffna Fort today saw for themselves the constant sniper fire from the LTTE, the booby-traps exploding at a distance and the hazards under which the Indian Peace-Keeping Force had to toil to avoid civilian casualties.

Briefing reporters at Palaly airfield in the Jaffna peninsula, Brig. Kulwant Singh said, "Today, we (IPKF) are in Jaffna town and we have surrounded it. As far as Jaffna town is concerned, we are holding the railway station, the General Hospital, the Town Hall and all that matters. As far as the outskirts are concerned, we are blocking all ways out. We are surrounding Jaffna on every axis." The IPKF's eastern and western columns linked up at the Jaffna railway station last night, thus providing it the key to the nerve-centre of the city.

"Sophisticated arms": But during its thrust towards Jaffna, the IPKF came across "very sophisticated weapons" from the LTTE including electronically operated mines and communication equipment. "Their technology of using explosives is very advanced and very akin to the western countries. We have not seen such acquisition in the eastern countries," he said. The IPKF's progress itself had been constrained because of the built-up areas, the LTTE's tactic of using civilians as human-shields etc. Besides, the IPKF was not using heavy weapons or air-power.

He pointed out that the IPKF had so far lost 12 officers, nine junior commissioned officers and 132 men belonging to other ranks. There were 23 wounded officers, 44 JCOs and 471 other ranks. Four JCOs and 43 other ranks were missing. "This type of casualties do not occur in a war in such a short span of time." the IPKF had lost so many men because of the stiff resistance from the LTTE and the bold action of the IPKF.

Neutral zone: A sharp drizzle greeted the reporters as they landed at the Palaly airfield. Replying to a question on whether the rain in the Jaffna peninsula in the last few days had hindered the operations of the IPKF, Brig. Kulwant Singh said the rain posed a hindrance only to the vehicular movement. The IPKF had declared the General Hospital a neutral-zone and the troops had been told not to go inside. But the LTTE had shelled the hospital causing a hole in its roof, he said.

On when he expected the operation to be over, the Officiating GOC, replied that it was difficult to give a date at this stage. He could not estimate the civilian casualties because they were used as human-shields.

Answering a question on the IPKF firing a number of mortar-shells from the Jaffna Fort into the town on Wednesday, he said the IPKF had fired small-calibre mortar-shells from the Jaffna Fort but it did not do so unnecessarily.

Prabakaran's movements: Asked whether the IPKF knew about the movements of the LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran, he said that Mr. Prabakaran kept moving and did not stay in one place. The IPKF was trying to find out his whereabouts.

The reporters were also taken to the 17th century Dutch-built Jaffna Fort. The stillness pervading this ancient fort was constantly fractured by reports of sniper-fire, hardly 300 metres away from where the reporters stood. From the ramparts of the fort, the reporters could see the burnt-out Veerasingham Memorial Hall, the clock tower, the Town Hall, the Library Hall and a stadium overgrown with weeds. All these had come under the control of the IPKF. But the LTTE men were still holding out on the First Cross and Second Cross Streets.

Link-up operations: At the Fort, Brig. Manjit Singh, who commanded the western column that linked up with the eastern column to bring the nerve-centre of Jaffna under the IPKF's control, said the IPKF lost 10 men in the link-up operations. His column, originating from Chunnagam and Udduvil, had linked up with the Jaffna Fort garrison on October 19. Thereafter, the garrison was "harassed" by the LTTE. Then, his brigade broke out of the Jaffna Fort, proceeded on the coastal road and established a link with the eastern column last night at the Jaffna railway station.

Answering a question, he said there was a mixed reaction from the people in Jaffna to the IPKF because "the LTTE has achieved a certain amount of success in maligning the IPKF." He had visited two markets in the town and all the shops were intact. There had been no plundering or looting.

Lt. Col. U. V. S. Dahiya exhibited to presspersons various types of mines used by the LTTE to counter the advance of the IPKF. They included improvised Claymore mines with iron filings, pipes filled with gelatine, buckets filled with explosives and "Bangalore-torpedos." He said the LTTE connected explosives to the power-mains in the houses and the IPKF had removed a number of such explosives. When the main electricity supply was switched off, PVC pipes loaded with batteries were used to ignite the charges, he said.

Helicopters hit: Group Captain Dhillon spoke about the logistics support given by the Indian Air Force to the IPKF in ferrying food supplies, medicines and evacuation of the injured. He said that six IAF helicopters had been hit by ground-fire from the LTTE. Four of them suffered extensive damage. One helicopter was hit in the Koppai North. But no crew was injured.

At the end of the visit, an External Affairs Ministry official said the IPKF was using minimal force with maximum care to avoid endangering civilians' lives or damaging property. If the IPKF were to use full force with battle tanks and air-power, the operation would have been over quite some time earlier. The objective of the operation was the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement by disarming the militants.

The official said the Government of India believed that the Tamils in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka should live in safety and dignity and that they should take part in the democratic political process once the task of disarming the militants was completed. He added that the "LTTE has been in contact with us through various channels." He was confident that once the LTTE handed over its arms, peace would be restored.

It is expected that the IPKF's mopping up operations in Jaffna town will take another week.

Madan, Anandavikatan, 25.10.87



TIME

SRI LANKA

The Battle for Jaffna

REPORT

Indian troops step up their assault on the Tigers' stronghold

OCTOBER 26, 1987

Slogging their way through heavy rains, 6,000 Indian troops surrounded Jaffna town in northern Sri Lanka last week and launched a four-pronged assault backed by artillery, tanks and helicopter gunships. Resisting them every step of the way were about 2,000 guerrillas from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the rebel group that has led a four-year struggle to gain an independent homeland for the West Virginia–size island's Tamil minority. Tens of thousands of terrified civilians were caught in the middle of the fighting. Most of them abandoned their homes and huddled in temples and schools as food supplies grew scarce and shells continued to explode around them. By week's end Indian officials acknowledged that 86 of their troops had died and 260 had been injured. The Indians claimed to have killed some 500 Tigers, but the guerrillas charged that most of the dead were Tamil civilians.

Many innocent victims were caught in the cross fire at Jaffna. With journalists and other independent observers barred from the town, the exact number of noncombatant deaths was impossible to verify. A doctor at Jaffna Hospital claimed there were 76 bodies in that facility and at least 100 more scattered in the streets outside, but it was not clear whether they were civilians or rebels. Tiger spokesmen charged that the Indians had killed more than 250 civilians and accused Gandhi's troops of wholesale rape and murder. The Tigers' own ruthlessness meanwhile, was demonstrated in the eastern province, where they murdered a total of 21 Sinhalese civilians in two separate attacks and killed 20 Indian soldiers in a land-mine explosion.

Indian diplomats did not deny that civilian casualties had taken place in Jaffna, but blamed them mostly on the rebels' tactic of using the local Tamil population as human "shields." That charge was confirmed by a 19-year-old from Jaffna town who had taken refuge in the Nallur Hindu temple on the eastern edge of the town. He told TIME that the Tigers were seizing young men, arming them and forcing them to advance against the Indians. "These people don't know anything about a gun," said the youth. "They are just being killed." He added, however, that the Indian mortar fire was causing "much damage" in the town and was "killing more civilians than Tigers."

The Indians found themselves in an ironic situation. Last spring Gandhi had bitterly criticized a Sri Lankan army offensive against the Jaffna-based rebels and even parachuted food supplies into the area to demonstrate his concern for the suffering civilians. Now his own troops were shelling the city. Scoffed a Sri Lankan army colonel: "When we did that, the Indians called it genocide."

That was not the only irony. The Indians were fighting against a group that had long enjoyed Indian support. Since 1983, the Tigers and other separatist organizations had been allowed to set up bases and receive supplies in Tamil Nadu, the southern Indian state that has a large population of ethnic Tamils. But Prabakaran's refusal to cooperate with the peace process—and the Tigers' latest burst of violence—has eroded his support even among Indian Tamils.

From a tactical point of view, Prabakaran's actions were baffling. The peace plan had promised the Tamils local rule in the regions where they predominate. The rebel leader had extracted a further concession that would have allowed his group to control the interim administration. Why had he sacrificed such tangible political gains and provoked a military confrontation that could only lead to his destruction?

A widely held view was that Prabakaran had "lost control" of himself, as one Sri Lankan official put it, following his comrades' group suicide. Others speculated that, on the contrary, he had told his men to take cyanide in order to make martyrs of them and spark a general revolt among the Tamil population. According to this scenario, he had hoped the resulting unrest would topple the Jayewardene government and perhaps pave the way for full Tamil independence.

In any case, Prabakaran apparently had not expected his former Indian benefactors to move against him. That was a serious miscalculation. "He thought he could push us around and get away with anything," said an Indian diplomat. "He made the mistake of not realizing that what is at stake now is nothing less than the credibility of the Indian state."

The Indian offensive in Sri Lanka also poses substantial political risks for Gandhi, whose administration is faced with serious regional unrest and opposition charges of corruption at home. Already, Indian army casualties have reached their highest level since the 1971 war with Pakistan. Should Gandhi become involved in a protracted guerrilla war in Sri Lanka, his own hold on power could be threatened.

The current course is similarly fraught with political danger for Jayewardene. The 81-year-old leader, who survived an August assassination attempt, has been sharply criticized by some Sinhalese leaders for allowing India such a substantial role in Sri Lanka's affairs. "This is the first time in the history of our country that our civilians are being killed by outsiders," said Lakshman Jayakody, an opposition member of Parliament. "The repercussions will be grave. After this, Indians will have greater and greater control over Sri Lanka, and this will result in a never-ending animosity between the two countries."

Others, however, see India's action against the hated Tigers as a military necessity that could ultimately help stabilize the country. Observed Sinhalese Journalist Gyrika Perusinghe: "If the Indians can finish Prabakaran and then resettle all the Sinhala refugees who were chased out, Jayewardene may just be able to pull things through."

As the Indians tightened their grip on Jaffna last week, Prabakaran appealed to Gandhi for a cease-fire to "negotiate matters." Gandhi, however, had apparently stopped listening. Instead, he sent some 1,000 Indian reinforcements to the island in preparation for a final assault. Prabakaran showed every sign of resisting to the end. But as a Sri Lankan intelligence officer observed with satisfaction, it will be "only a matter of time before the Indians smash him."

—By Thomas A. Sancton. Reported by Qadri Ismail/Colombo and Ross H. Munro/New Delhi

Jawans of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force combing areas for LTTE militants.

Tamils on hunger strike in London yesterday. Left to right: E Pulendran, T. Seelan and N. Mohan

AFFIDAVIT

RAJASEKERAM SELVAMALAR, born 1943-02-03, 267, Navalai Road, Jaffna.

I am the widow of the late Sinnathambo Rajasekeram (68) who die on 24.10.87.

My husband left home on 24.10.87 and joined the fmaily of the late Senathirajah Sirivaratharajah to go by car to Kilinochchi.

The said car was fired on by the IPKF near Thirunelveli Junction at about 10.30 a.m. on 24.10.87.

All the occupants of the car save a child died as a result of the shooting my husband too died.

My late husband was a farmer, in receipt of an income of Rs. 700/- P.M.

I was dependant on my late husband.

I have no children.

RAKKAN SELVARATNAM (26) Urumpirai South, Selvapuram.

The deceased Selvaratnam Dalini, aged one and half year.

On 24.10.87 at about 9.a.m the army was advancing through our village firing and cannon charging from the tanks.

We become highly excited and decided to go to Mattuvil.

As we were getting ready my infant daughter along with my mother who was carrying here were struck down by bullet.

My daughter and mother died on the spot.

We buried my daughter's body at Vemban cemetery at Urumpirai.

R. Sevaratnam



SENATHIRAJAH VIGNESWARAN, born 25.07.51, 267, Navalar Road, Jaffna.

I am the brother of the late Senathirajah Sirivaratharajah (38) who died on 24.10.87 along with his wife Mrs. Neelambikai Sirivaratharajah, his son Tharson (6) and daughter Tharmalla (3).

My late brother and his family were permanent residents in England and came to Sri Lanka on 5.10.87 to see Kandiah Senathirajah (69), my father who was a patient at a private hospital in Jaffna.

After visiting his father at Jaffna, my late brother with his family wanted to set back to Kilinochchi 40 miles to the south of Jaffna.

My late brother and his family members travelled by a hiring car and were passed at the Nallur Hindu Temple check point by the IPKF on 24.10.87.

The car and its occupants were further checked at Adiapatham road, Temple road junction at about 10.30 a.m. by the IPKF soldiers manning the check point.

When the car had gone 100 yards on Rajaveethi (road) that is the off road connecting Temple road, it was shot at repeatedly by the soldiers who had allowed it to pass a little while earlier.

The occupants in the said car besides my brother, his wife and Mrs. Kathiravelu and my sister Mrs. Rajani Ravindran (30) and my uncle Sinnathambi Rajasekaram (68), master Sirivaratharajah Krishan 1 year 6 months and the driver of the car whose name I do not know.

Of this driver and other occupants, only the driver and the last mentioned child escaped with injuries, the rest died.

The IPKF soldiers had later examined the car and found the driver had escaped, all others were dead except for the small child which was crying.

The injured child was taken by the IPKF soldiers and handed over to the Refugee Camp at Sattanathar Hindu Temple at Nallur.

The child was later claimed by me when I heard about the incident and the recovery of the child from the ill fated car.

The refugees at the said Temple from where I claimed the child a week later told me that the IPKF soldiers had admitted that they had inadvertently shot and killed the rest of the members of the family of the child.

Further that the child be given to any next of kin who might claim it.

The same refugees told me that the car together with the dead occupants was burnt by the IPKF.

On or about 1.11.87 with the permission of the IPKF I went and viewed the burnt out shell of the car.

Some people who lived in the area told me that partially burnt bodies were found inside the car and that they had them properly disposed of.

I am the only brother of the late Mr. Sirivaratharajah living in Sri Lanka.

I am bringing up the sole surviving child of my late brother.

SINNATHAMBY PERAMPALAM KANDASAMY (60), at No. 58, Milk Board Road, Thirunelvely.

The deceased person Perampalam Ponnammah, aged 76 years a widow was my mother.

She was living under my care and maintenance until her death.

During the October 1987 military offensive I along with my wife and children sought refugee at the pathirakali Kovil which is actually situated in the next compound of our house.

My aged mother opted to stay in the house due to her old age.

On 24.10.87 at about 3.00 p.m. a shell fell on the Temple Kopuram (tower) and exploded damaging it badly.

Our house was also damaged in the blast.

My mother who was inside the house sustained injuries on her right leg and right hip caused by the shrapnels darting from the explosion.

Due to the extreme tension prevailed during that period as well as due to the curfew we could not take her to the Hospital.

She expired on 26.10.87.

Her body was cremated at the Chempattu Cemetery, Thirunelveli on 27.10.87.

S. P. Kandasamy

SINNAN THAMBIPILLAI, 41, of Tirunelvely East, Thirunelvily.

The deceased person Thambipillai Seetha, aged 40 years was my wife.

On 24.10.87 we left our residence due to military offensive and were going towards jaffna Ladies College refguee camp.

Near the Ayanar Temple, Vannarpannai at about 3.00 p.m. we were fired upon by the army who were about 200 yards away from the road.

My wife who sustained injuries died instantaneously.

In fear we fled from the place.

Only on the third day I managed to return to the scene of incident.

I found that her body was already cremated at the spot where she was shot.

I have an adopted son named Sashikumar, aged 13 years.



SINNATHURAI PAKIAM, a widow (72), 165, Navalar Road, Jaffna.

The deceased is my husband, age 76 years. He was a C.T.B. driver.

After 10.10.87 due to the military operation in Jaffna, fearing to stay at home on 18.10.87 we went and took refuge at Navalar School. About 800 people took refuge there.

On 24.10.87 in the morning several shell fired continuously from Kokuvil started falling and bursting in our area. At 3 O' clock army personnel who came along the K.K.S. Road towards Jaffna all of a sudden entered the school where we were staying for safety.

Having entered there they fired gunshots and my husband died at the spot 14 others also died at the spot.

About 500 army personnel surrounded the school building and they did not allow us to cremate the dead bodies.

On the following day i.e. on 25.10.87 at 7 a.m. those army personnel burnt the dead bodies outside the school building.

About 15 persons sustained injuries in that incident and they too were not allowed to take treatment for three days.

I was solely depending on my husband, and now after his death there is no one to look after me.

SINNATHURAI SEEVARATNAM (36)
Kumarakoddam, Kondavil.

I am a Farmer.

My wife, children and I were living in our own house at the above said address.

Indian Peace Keeping Force which came into occupation of the Sri Lanka Transport Board Depot in Kondavil started lobbing shells towards our locality at indiscriminately on 24.10.87.

All residents in our locality fled to the closest temples. My wife, children and I too ran to Neddilippai Pillayar Temple.

On our way to temple, a shell fired from the above said camp fell close to us and exploded when we were running through a lane.

All of us were thrown off and when I got up, I found my son Seevaratnam Aruran age 7 years fallen in a pool of blood along with five others.

When I went to lift my son, I observed that my son was dead.

Besides my son my wife Seevaratnam Sarojinidevi age 33 years and daughte Seevaratnam Mathanika age 12 years were injured in their arm and leg respestively.

The dead body of my son was removed and burnt in a land close by the same day as there was heavy shelling in our areas.

About six innocent persons were killed and several injured in this incident.

SIVAKOLUNTHU RASAMMAH (70), Rajaveethy, Kopay South, Kopay.

The deceased Thambipillai Sivakolunthu, aged 85 years was my husband.

During the October 1987 military offensive we took refugee at the Nallur Murugan temple.

My husband refused to accompany us and preferred to stay at home.

On 24.10.87 a relative who came to the temple informed me that my husband was killed in a shell blast while he was at our house on 20.10.87.

He also informed in that he cremated my husband's body within our house compound itself due to prevailing tension.

I am totaly blind and unable to move around without assistance.

MISS. SUGANTHIE GANGADHARAN (22), 51/1, Kannathiddy Street, Jaffna.

I am the sister of the late Gangadharan Rajeswaran killed in gun fire on 24.10.87.

As there was constant shell fire on the area, my brother G. Rajeswaran, left home and took refuge at the Navalar High School, Jaffna on 18.10.87.

On 24.10.87 the advancing Indian Forces surrounded the Navalar High School at about 1.00 p.m. and opened random fire.

Later, troops entered the School premises when my late brother waited with raised hands.

However, a soldier fired at him despite his entreaties with folded arms, when he received fatal gunshot injuries on his chest. He fell dead on the spot.

The dead body of my brother along with several others killed in firing was cremated within the School premises on the same day (24.10.87) at about 4.00 p.m. by the Indian Forces.

My brother was employed at a photographic studio in Jaffna and was in receipt of a salary of Rs. 1200/- per mensum.

I am orphan having lost both my parents while young and I was maintained and looked after by my late brother.

I have no other brother or sister.

Since the death of my brother I am left with no support or maintenance for my living and existence.

I have given up my studies and am on the look out for a job to earn a living.



MRS. VASUKI KADIRGAMANATHAN (31) at 36, Sivan - Pannai Road, Koddady, Jaffna.

I am the widow of the late Arulampalam Kadirgamanathan, who was killed in Army firing on 24.10. 87.

I was away in India at the time.

As there was constant shell fire on Koddady from 10.10.87 and as advised over the Radio, my husband for his safety and security left the house and took refuge at Navalar High School and opened fire.

On 24.10.87 while he was in the school premises, the advancing Indian Forces surrounded the school and opened fire.

He was struck by bullets in the random firing opened by the Forces. He received fatal head injuries and fell on the spot and died without any medical attention.

The dead body of my husband was cremated within the school premises along with several other dead bodies in a masscremation on 25.10.87.

My late husband was in textile business earning and average monthly income of Rs. 2000/-

Subsequent to the death of my husband, I and my five dependent children who are all school going are left with no financial assistance or support for our maintenance. Besides, I have no financial resources or reserves to fallback upon.

VELLAYAN SINNAMMAH (55) Parayam Pulam, Karaveddy East, Karaveddy.

The deceased person Vellayan Sothithas aged 29 years was my son.

He was a Farmer.

On 24.10.87 at about 9.00 a.m. my son left home to buy some onions at Puloly.

At about 3.00 p.m. I was informed that my son was shot and killed by the army at Puloly.

His body was brought home and cremated at Verkali Cemetery on the same day itself.

I have three children.

ABRAHAM YOGAMMAH (74), Bharathy Lane, Nayanmarkadu.

The deceased John Abraham, aged 70 years was my husband.

During the October 1987 military offensive we took refuge at the St. John's Church, Nallur.

On 25.10.87 at about 8.00 a.m. my husband left the Church saying that he is going to Urumpirai in search of our son and his family.

I came to know that he was shot and killed at Raja Veethy at Kopay South.

His body was not recovered.

Mrs. AMIRTHALINGAN THAVARANEE, Kokuvil East, Kokuvil.

I have been living at the above address along with my husband and three children.

Due to the eruption of violence in our area in October 1987, we all got displaced from my home and sought shelter at the Kokuvil Temple.

My husband, Kanapathipillai Amirthalingam, aged 33 fell a victim to gun shots by the forces on 25.10.1987 and succumbed to the injuries.

His body was cremated at Kokuvil East Crematorium.

I am now left with 3 children as a destitute.

ARASARATNAM SELVAVATHY (43), Kalikovilady, Thirunelvely.

The deceased Sivaguru Annammah, aged 78 years was my grandmother being my father's mother.

During the October 1987 military offensive we sought refuge at the Pathirakali Kovil which is situated across the road from our house.

My grand mother stayed at home due to old age.

on 24.10.87 at about 9.00 a.m. army arrived at the Temple and Cannon charged.

After they left I went back to our house where I found my grandmother suffering from an injury on her neck which was caused by the shell shrapnel.

I came to know she received the injury during the army cannon fire.

She succumbed to her injuries on 6.11.87.

Her body was cremated on Chembatu Cemetery on 7.11.87.

She was living under my care and maintenance until her death.

Mrs. KAMALATHEVI MUTHU KUNABALASINGAM Erlalai East, Erlalai.

I am the affirmant above named, holder of N.I.C. No. 505802560 V.

The deceased is my daughter Pathmasiri 9 years.

The deceased daughter and another daughter of mine went to my sister's house at Kokuvil and was there.

They were at Kokuvil and because of heavy shelling, they took refuge at Kokuvil Hindu College.

On 25.10.87 while my children were at the college, there was shooting and shelling around the area.

One shell fell close to my children and exploded.

My two daughters received severe injuries and one died at the spot (name Pathmasiri).

The other daughter who was injured was removed to the Hospital at Chankan and was treated.

She was treated for the injury on her neck.

The deceased daughter's body was buried at Kokuvil Hindu College grounds.

KANTHIAH RAJARATNAM (50) Iveni Punnalaikattuvan North, Punnalaikattuvan.

The deceased Kanthiah Nallammah, aged 74 years widow was my mother.

She was residing with me until she met her tragic end.

On 25.10.87 at about 4.p.m. soldiers who came to our house arrested me along with my brother and sisters and took on to their camp.

My aged mother was left alone in the home.

At about 6.p.m when I returned home after being released by the army.

I found my mothers lifeless body lying inside our housem

She bore gunshot wounds on her stomach.

She was cremated on the same day within our compound.

MURUGAN SINNAMMAH (43) Inuvil Theatre Lane, Inuvil East, Inuvil

The deceased Kathiran Sinnakutty, widow, aged 75 years was my mother-in-law.

On 25.10.87, Inuvil was subjected to severe shell attack.

As shells started falling near our residence we fled from our house.

As we ran, a shell fell near my mother-in-law and exploded killing her on the spot.

She was cremated on the same day at Inuvil Poorodai cemetery.

She was living with us before her death.

NANNY THAMBIMUTHU (56) Urumpirai West, Urumpirai.

During the month of October 1987, there was heavy shelling and firing in our area due to the intensive military operations by the IPKF.

On 25.10.87, my wife named Thambimuthu Rasammah sustained shell blast injuries, during the abovesaid operation, and was immediately admitted to the Government General Hospital, Jaffna where she was pronounced dead.

I am sickly person and cannot do any work. I am suffering from Asthma I have no income whatsoever.

It was my late wife who did house to house work and earned sufficient income to maintain me, my two children and herself.

At present we are in great difficulties financially.

PACKIYAM SELLATHAMBY (39) Kokuvil West.

The deceased Mrs. Thiraviam Sellar, aged 53 years is my mother.

She was a widow and was living with me at the above said address.

Due to the IPKF severe military operation in our area my family and I along with my mother and aunt sought refuge at Kokuvil Hindu College Refugee Camp on 12.10.87.

At about 10.00 a.m. on 25.10.87 shells fired by the IPKF fell into the above school premise and exploded killing my mother Thiraviam along with several others on the spot.

Her dead body was buried along with other dead bodies the following day morning in the above school compound by the refugees who were remaining there.

PARAMESWARAN INDRADEVI (37) 24/3, Sivapragasam Road, Jaffna.

The deceased Ganesh Parameswaran, aged 45 years is my husband. He was a Cigar Roller.

On 25.10.87. at 10 a.m. my husband left for work to Kokuvil distance of 9 kilometres in a bicycle, didnot return back.

Next day on 26.10.87 at about 8.00 a.m. my uncle K. Sellathurai informed me that he saw my husband's dead body near Kokuvil Hindu College and he had buried the body at Kokuvil Hindu College grounds.

I was also informed that my husband had been killed in a shell explosion.

I have 2 children to support.

RUKMANIDEVY, widow of Kandiah Shanmugaratnam (41) "Shanti Vasa" Kopay South, Kopay.

I am the daughter of Thillayar Arumugam who was killed in army firing on 25.10.87.

On 25.10.87 at about 3 p.m. my father Thillayar Arumugam Nachchimar Kovil Road was hit by bullets when IPKF opened fire on some youths going on the road.

He dropped dead on the spot having received a severe chest injury.

His body was cremated on the roadside near the spot where he lay dead without being taken home due to the tense situation that prevented.

My father was a cigar maker who carred an average monthly income of Rs. 1000/-.

I am a widow with three children two of whom are school going and we were all maintained and looked after by my late father.

Since my father's death I have been denied ther maintenance and support I received from him.



SARASWATHY, widow of Suntharabalan (30), 29, Aseervathappar-Veedhi, Nallur, Jaffna.

I am the legal wife of my late husband, Arumugam Suntharabalan.

My late husband Arumugam Suntharabalan died on shell-attack on the 25th day of October 1987 at Kachcheri Nallur Road.

He was doing business and supported us - 5 members in the family.

His death is a great blow to us, as he was the sole bread-winner in the family.

I do sewing work to maintain the family to some extent, to prevent them from starvation.

SEENIVASAGAM DEVARAJAH (55), Pathirakali Kovil Lane, Thavady South, Kokuvil.

I am the son-in-law of the late Mrs. Thangammah Ponnudurai, killed in the shell blast.

The late Mrs. P. Thangammah lived with me and was maintained and looked after by me.

She was 70 years and her husband predeceased her.

On 25.10.87 at about 8.00 a.m. in the morning when my mother-in-law was seated at the entrance to the kitchen a shell fell on the house and exploded.

Shrapnels darting from the blast struck her causing severe injuries. She bled profusely and due to the curfew in force and the prevailing tense situation no medical attention was provided.

She succumbed to her injuries in the evening on 25.10.87

Her dead body was buried in the compound of my house on the same day at about 6.00 p.m.



'Civilian casualties during such operations are unavoidable" says Depinkar Singh, Commander-in-chief, IPKF.



..tamil corpse becomes meat for dog.

Nallur temple under IPKF

NEWS

MADRAS, Oct. 24.

The advancing units of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) from the north have reached and established control in the area around Nallur Kandaswami Temple in Jaffna.

One column of the IPKF entered the University campus this afternoon. It is now engaged in clearing the area of LTTE resistance.

A spokesperson of the External Affairs Ministry told reporters here that the head priest of the Nallur temple was contacted this morning and he had been assured of food supplies and medical assistance to about 20,000 people camping in and around the temple.

No major resistance

There was no major resistance from the LTTE there, but the approach roads were all heavily mined. This had created problems in moving the supplies. The IPKF was clearing these mines. "The food supplies and medical assistance have since been moved by road from Palaly. The supplies flown from Madras are being airdropped," the spokesperson said. There were a few instances of sniper fire. One reason why the supplies from helicopters were airdropped from certain heights was the sniper fire.

Leaflets airdropped

The spokesperson said that the IPKF had also airdropped leaflets to the people in the entire Jaffna area to assure and advise them that they could come to the nearest IPKF post for any urgent medical assistance. The leaflets made it clear that such assistance would also be provided to LTTE cadres who might have been wounded. Three tonnes of medical equipment and supplies had been moved into the Jaffna General Hospital yesterday and today.

The relief ship Island Glory, which left Madras port yesterday, was expected to reach Jaffna later this evening. Arrangements had been made for unloading the supplies. A six-member Indian Red Cross team had also been flown in to assist the relief operations.

The spokesperson could not say whether the advancing columns of the IPKF had reached the base camp of the LTTE opposite the University campus. But "they have entered the University campus."

The IPKF had established control over Gurunagar area, west of the fort, some spots in the east like St. Mary's Church, St. Patrick's College and also Subash Hotel. A major portion of northern Jaffna was still under the control of the LTTE and southern Jaffna with the IPKF. "We have entered the northern approaches to Jaffna."

Asked whether it could be claimed that the back of the LTTE resistance had now been broken, the spokesperson said that any such claim would be propaganda. "I would like to be factual."

TV programmes

Answering a question, the spokesperson stated that the Government of India had plans to relay TV programmes for Indian troops in Jaffna. For this purpose, the Sri Lanka Government's permission had been obtained.

An LTTE message intercepted had claimed that the "Jaffna hospital had been attacked, 1000 people killed and all the nurses raped. Please tell the press." The External Ministry spokesperson dismissed the contents of the LTTE message quite contemptuously.

LTTE commander killed

Our Delhi Special Correspondent reports:

Citing an LTTE radio intercept, the External Affairs Ministry spokesperson said that Mr. Santosham, the LTTE's regional commander of Jaffna, has been killed along with 60 LTTE cadres. The IPKF's losses in the last 24 hours has been three killed and five wounded.

A brigade group of the IPKF advancing down the road from Kopai South surrounded the Nallur Kandaswamy temple today. The force established contact with the head priest of the temple and ascertained that 20,000 refugees are present in the premises of this most famous shrine in Jaffna. The people have been staying there under conditions of great privation and steps have been taken to provide food and medical assistance to them over land instead of airdrops as before. It may be recalled that in the past two days the IPKF carried out airdrops of food packets to refugees gathered in the temple and came under small arms fire from the LTTE militants.

A large cache of ammunition and explosives was discovered in the Residency area. The cache comprising nearly three truck-loads of Claymore mines, 81mm and 3' mortar shells, gelignite, gunpowder and fuses and electrical cable were booby-trapped and a single detonation would have blown up the Residency and the Kutcheri complex had it not been defused.

Last night, the Gurunagar area was also wrested from the LTTE control though the latter did not offer any resistance. It is believed that the LTTE had planned to evacuate some of their forces from the jetty there but raids by para commandos on the nights of 22nd and 23rd had resulted in the destruction of some 18 LTTE boats and the plan had to be abandoned. The forces operating along the eastern waterfront therefore have now effected a link-up with a column from Esplanade and 4th Cross Road side. Now the entire waterfront is under the IPKF control.

The IPKF sources said that militants when captured were not taking recourse to the cyanide capsules carried by them. On October 22, for example, two militants were captured with their capsules intact after they attempted to down on IPKF helicopter in the Achaveli area with an RPG-7 rocket.

PTI reports from Colombo:

The entire Jaffna town, except for a 0.5-km area, has come under the control of the IPKF after 16 days of fierce fighting with the LTTE, reports here tonight said.

This half-a-kilometre are had not fallen into the IPKF hands "because this small strip is thickly populated," the Sri Lankan National News Agency, Lankapuvath, reported, quoting the Indian Army top brass as having said.

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS KILLED

KOKUVIL	
A. Sivalingam	
A. Frank	M. Subramaniam
B. Shanrany	M. Sellappathurai
C. Nageswari	M. Rasaratnam
K. Kavitha	M. Annaiah
K. Iynkaran	N. Bavani
K. Balasubramaniam	N. Sarasu
K. Selvaratnam	N. Jeevaratnam
K. Sinnathurai	N. Nadarajan
K. Shanmugam	N. Sivalingam
K. Ariyaratnam	N. Rathinam
K. Muthuthurai	N. Sothini
K. Sathithanandam	N. Sellappah
K. Sinnarasa	N. Sinniah
K. Chellan	N. Veerasingam
K. Poomani	N. Vijeratnam
K. Parameswaran	N. Pakiyam
K. Annamah	N. Sellammah
K. Saravanai	N. Krishna
K. Mandharan	N. Nalini
K. Ponnan	N. Thuraisamy
K. Kobalakrishnan	N. Mangaleswaran
K. Sukumar	P. Rathinam
K. Thambirajah	P. Rajeswari
K. Thangarathinam	P. Punithavathy
K. Ramalingam	P. Nanthakumar
K. Kandiah	P. Selvaratnam
K. Maheskumar	P. Nagalingam
L. Thasan	P. Balasingam
M. Neelakanthan	Nadarajah
M. Kanesan	P. Kumarasamy
M. Uthayakumar	P. Kandiah
M. Satkumaran	R. Mahendra
M. Seethai	R. Subathira


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

15.10.87	Batticoloa	1 girl
15.10.87	Thanthamunai	Nagamma and 24 women
15.10.87	Mayilanveli	25 girls
15.10.87		51 women
16.10.87	Batticoloa	10 girls
17.10.87	Urumpiray	30 girls were abducted
20.10.87	Manipay	- a girl, another girl and her mother.
21.10.87	Jaffna Hospital	6 Nurses
22.10.87	Mannar	2 girls
24.10.87	Sangupitti	2 girls (then killed)

OBSERVER

Murderous minuet's toll of horror

Families tell of rapes and killings

REPORT
25 OCTOBER 1987

PETER HILLMORE,
first British newspaperman into Jaffna, reports on the Tamil Tigers' desperate bid to halt the Indian onslaught.

THE WOMAN lay on the filthy hospital bed covered in grey, soiled bandages. She was shaking uncontrollably and seemed incapable of lifting her hands to brush away the flies that settled on her face.

But her shaking and the dry tears did not come from physical pain. The doctor explained that Indian troops had stormed into her house and shot dead her husband and her three children. The children were aged 10, five and two.

Her neighbour in the hospital was also her neighbour in Jaffna. This woman had a bullet wound in her leg: she told me that the troops had kicked her door down, shouting 'Why haven't you all left?' and then shot dead her mother and father.

There had been no man in the house who could have been a Tamil Tiger, she insisted. Further down the crowded hospital ward, two little boys were lying on the same bed, both with shrapnel wounds. The nine-year-old seemed too shocked and bewildered to explain what had happened to him. The four-year-old was too young.

However tempting, it is always difficult to take atrocity stories at face value, as entirely believable. The Tigers are as prone to fanciful propaganda claims as the Indian High Commission in Colombo. The Tigers have said that Indian troops shot doctors and patients as well as raping nurses when they entered Jaffna hospital last week; the Indians have said the Tigers shot the doctors.

But I know personally that Indian claims that there is no indiscriminate shelling on the peninsula are untrue. The village where photographer John Reardon and myself spent our first night was shelled as we slept and six houses were destroyed. The route we had used to cross into the Peninsula, a route normally used by farmers, was strafed by a helicopter gunship. I saw some of the casualties.

A government agent from Jaffna, appointed by the Sri Lankan Government, told me that last Monday he had counted about 600 shells falling on the town. One hit a coconut palm, which fell onto a girls college and crushed six refugees to death. He said that his superior had told the Indian commander that he was writing a letter accusing the Indians of killing him. There was then a lull in the shelling.

I met a badly beaten-up 14-year-old boy who haltingly told of an alleged massacre he had seen. He said he had been rounded up with other people and had seen Gurkha soldiers attempting to rape three Tamil girls. They were stopped, but later he saw about 10 dead bodies, including those of naked girls.

He was brought to see us by the Tigers and there is by its very nature, no way of verifying his horrible story.

But there is some independent evidence of another alleged rape incident in the battle for the Eastern province of Sri Lanka, where a doctor has said that three girls were attacked. After 'vehemently denying that the incident could have taken place', the Indian High Commission has now started an inquiry.

I visited one of the refugee camps on the peninsula and spoke at random to some of the 10,000 refugees who were sheltering there. Although it is only about 15 miles from Jaffna, many had taken three or four days to get there as the overloaded lorries, tractors and even bullock carts had avoided the troops.

It is the accretion of facts, the accumulation of details, that gave the overall picture disturbing credibility.

They talked of random shelling, even in areas away from the actual fighting there were frequent stories of helicopters firing on people in the streets below.

A bewildered 74-year-old man produced a crumpled piece of paper showing he was officially released from Indian custody.

'The Indians arrested me when I was working in the fields,' he said through an interpreter, 'and beat me up, demanding to know where the Tigers were. I told them I was just a farmer, but they wouldn't believe me.'

None of the refugees said they had received any of the food parcels the Indians claimed to be dropping. 'They are not dropping food parcels,' a man said, grabbing me as I walked past and insisting that I wrote it down. 'They are dropping bombs.'

The world's fourth largest army, which now has 15,000 troops in Sri Lanka, is being resisted by a guerrilla force that never amounted to more than 2,500. Even the most fanatical Tiger admits they will eventually be defeated or wiped out if some acceptable ceasefire is not worked out ('We are fighting for our dignity,' said the Tigers' political chief . but they are causing innumerable problems to the Indian juggernaut.

The Indians at Elephant Pass have taken two weeks to advance a mere 30 miles westwards. The Tigers know the terrain and have the support of the local population.

The West may sometimes think of the Tigers as a murderous bunch of terrorists who murder innocent Sinhalese, but the Tamils see them as a bulwark against a Sinhalese majority who have attacked them for years, and against the Indians who have been attacking them for weeks.

'Who will protect us from the Indians when the Tiger boys are killed?' one old woman asked me. The Indian peace-keeping force may have thought it was acting as a policeman, but it is regarded as an invader.

Given the disparity between the two sides, it is a curiously leisurely-looking war. When we travelled to the 'front,' it had the formality of a murderous minuet. A day earlier, the Indians had captured a village in the morning, but the Tigers had won it back in the evening. This morning it was the Indians' turn to try again.

I travelled on the back of a motorbike and the driver would constantly ask locals the exact way, as if to a village fête.

At precisely nine o'clock the Indians started things with some salvoes of mortars. Some landed dangerously close, so we lay in a rice field. I gave the driver a cigarette and he asked me about London. Only the body of a dead Indian, from the previous day's battles, looked out of place.

After a few minutes the Tigers opened up with assorted machine guns and grenades and then everything went quiet again. As if it were a tea break the 12 young Tigers who were fighting the Indian army gave us coconuts to eat, while villagers then took the opportunity to return to check on what damage the earlier Indian victory had inflicted.

The dozen Tigers, in spite of the cyanide capsules they wore round the neck, reverted to being 12 shy teenagers. They looked at the array of photographic equipment hanging from John Reardon's neck with the same mixture of awe and incomprehension as we looked at the weaponry hanging from theirs.

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

KOKUVIL

R. Rajasuri	S. Sivanathan
R. Kailasapillai	S. Kulendran
R. Sivamani	S. Veerasingam
R. Seevarathinam	T. Kumarasamy
R. Thayabarasundary	T. Kanagamalr
R. Sathyabama	T. Tharmika
S. Inthiran	T. Malichumy
S. Sellathurai	T. Mohan
S. Mahalingam	T. Kunabalasingam
S. Sathiyarajah	T. Thavarasalingam
S. Subarathinam	V. Nagamani
S. Manikaratnam	V. Shanmugalingam
S. Jeyakumar	V. Muththiah
S. Nandakumaran	V. Sinnapillai
S. Kandasamy	V. Kasipillai
S. Arumugam	V. Shanmugam
S. Muththan	V. Krishnasamy
S. Nagendrarajah	V. Lingaratnam
S. Annammah	V. Geetha
S. Saravathiyammah	V. Suhanya
S. Sithamparam	V. Navartnam
S. Subramaniam	V. Mangayatkarasi
S. Ratnam	V. Paramanathan
S. parasakthi	V. Somasundaram
S. Sundaresan	V. Kandiah
S. Maheswaran	S. Naguleswary
S. Kanapathipillai	K.M. Avarayamudali
S. Nageswari	P. Shanmuganathan
S. Santhirakumar	A. Subramaniam
S. Sachchithanandam	B. Achchimuthu
S. Somasundaram	Ushananthan
S. Nadarasu	Sathiakumar
S. Kaththy	G. Jeyarajah
S. Sivabalasingam	K. Kasilingam

CIVILIANS □ KILLED (Operation Pawan)

S. Jothilingam 19.10.87

V. Mathiabaranam 19.10.87

S. Nataraja 19.10.87

S. Navaratnam 19.10.87

C. Rajamma 19.10.87

K. Rajendran 19.10.87

S. Sakthivel 19.10.87

K. Sathyaseelan 19.10.87

S. Chelliah 20.10.87

N.K. Dharmalingam 20.10.87

S. Elango 20.10.87

B. Jagananda Raja 20.10.87

Mrs. Jayalakshmi 20.10.87

S.N. Kandiah 20.10.87

Mrs. V. Maheswari 20.10.87

K. Namachivayam 20.10.87

T. Nataraja 20.10.87

V. Navaratnam 20.10.87

THE SUNDAY TIMES

It will take Indians years..

REPORT

By Ben Barber
in the Jaffna Peninsula

Anton Balasingham said the Tigers would not use their cyanide capsules to commit sucide - although over 200 have already done so since 1975 to avoid interrogation after capture - but would slip away to fight a guerrilla war if they lose the Jaffna city fight.

"We can still hold on - we have the weapons," said the former information officer for the British High Commission in Colombo.

"If they are bent on crushing or physically liquidating the movement then we will fight a guerrilla war in the north and east, our tentacles are spread out.

"It wil take years and years for the Indian government to round us all up."

Although Indian diplomats, who have barred reporters from visits to the peninsula, claim they have killed 640 fighters of LTTEs since Oct. 10, and lost 130 Indian troops, Balasingham said LTTE lost only 43 and killed over 400 Indian soldiers. They said over 400 civilians have been killed.

At Mandikal hospital the staff said over 50 wounded Tigers have been admitted. Ten lay on beds in one ward, their dark torsos naked in the heat and wearing the checkerd sarong cloths all Tamil men wear. Two touched their hands across the space between their beds, singing a quiet song. Another, code named "Radha", said he was shot a few days earlier in Jaffna fighting house to house.

"There are so many Indians," he said in a semi-delerious state.

Wednesday a tour bus, driven in the narrow, winding streets with a white flag like hundred of civilian buses defying the 24 hours curfew since Oct. 10 stoped near reporters and their Tiger guides.

Inside were abot 20 young men, all smilling and sweaty, holding a variety of automatic assault rifles. They had come from heavy fighting around Kopay north junction.

At first glance they seemed to be civilians. Their morale seemed extraordinarily high.

During 24 hours on the peninsula, driving to Chavakachcheri, Atchaveli, Puttur and other towns on the fringes of the Indian battle lines, not a single Indian soldier was seen. The entire area is under Tiger control.

"We have every street landmined," said Jastia, 23 a senior Tiger fighter with a bandage covering a neck wound. He was shot in the Jaffna University battle last week in which 29 Gurkhas were gunned down after a helicopter deployment into ambush.

Remote controled mines are used so Tigers and civilians can move at will but Indians will be attacked.

"Although the cutoff of electricity had curtailed Medical services, food preservation and other civilians uses, Tigers say they have gnerators to power their weapons workshop producing rocket propelled grenades and mines.

But since the range of their rockets is short they cannot reach inside Palaly air base.

At Neeraveli reporters were pushed under trees and inside houses as helicopters circled overhead, probably radioing targeting information for the shuddering mortar blasts heard moments later. One and a half miles away at Kopay, 100 Tigers have been fighting for 10 days, killing 90 Indians and destroying nine vehicles with landmines said Jastia.

As the mortar explosions seem to come closer the Tigers rush the journalists into a van and cruise the labyrinth of narrow lanes, framed by walls of palm leaf fencing.

After several attempts to enter the city Jastia said Indian troops had cut off the last open roadway into the center. Reporters were taken to a supporters's house for the night which was extremely dark with no electricity, no moon and an overcast sky.

Next morning reporters wandered in the lanes there and other areas where local people obviously are aware of Tamil bases and voice support for the Boys. Some fighters are 15 to 16 especially newly trained Tigers.

"Close to 1,000 girls" are fighters say the Tigers, one is 'Dharsha', (all Tigers have code names), 22, who wears the double braids and cyanide capsule proudly.

"We want to be free citizens of a Tamil Eelam" she said.

The increasing reports of Indian violence against civilians - especially those of fighting age, may increase Tiger recruits.

Arunanthi Kamaleswaran, 14 told reporters he was beaten with sticks on his arms and legs by Indians after he tried to prevent the rape of three Tamil girls Tuesday at Urumpirai.

"The soldiers stopped us and said you smile when (Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran calls you but you cry when we call you."

After herding several civilians together the soldiers - said to be Nepali Gurkhas - striped the three girls and tried to rape them said the boy.

Three other Tamil boys who tried to stop the rape were shot and killed, he said. "We said they are our sisters," he said.

"Kamaleswaran, speaking convincingly and without hesitation repeated several times his description of the events. He said there were six other bodies at the site, four of them women around 18 who were naked. The Indians placed tyres on top of the bodies and set fire to them he said.

"Even your Tamil women have taken up arms against us - already we have shot five of them", the Indians were reported to have said. 25.10.87

LTTE leader terms India aggressor

NEWS

COLOMBO, OCT. 25.

A top leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has dubbed India the aggressor and alleged that the present conflict was thrust on Tamil militants by Indians.

In a lengthy interview published in the English daily, *The Island* here today, the LTTE deputy leader, Mr. G. Mahendrarajah, alias Mahathiya, said "We are very small when compared to India. But this is our country, we know every inch of our land, we fought the Sinhalese because we wanted to be free."

"After all, Sinhalese and we, belong to this island. But who are the Indians to come and dictate terms to us? They are aggressors," Mr. Mahathiya said asked whether a small organisation like the Tigers or the Tamil people can withstand India.

The LTTE deputy leader, who is now understood to be directing the militants' fight with the Indian army in the peninsula, said "after all, even the Sri Lankan forces were stronger than us. But that did not stop us from fighting."

Not opposed to talks: When asked how long can they go and what about negotiations, Mr. Mahendrarajah said "we will continue our struggle as long as we can. We are not opposed to negotiations. But it must be with a new set of negotiators."

Following are excerpts from the interview: Do you hope to continue? India will not allow any more fresh arms supply to the LTTE. When your fire power diminishes what will you do?

"We have a strategy. Now we are fighting face to face like two armies. We will fight hard to hold every inch of our land. The next step will be to allow the Indians to advance a certain distance.

Suicide missions: "Then we will use footpaths and by-lanes and get beyond them and attack them. The third step will be to start the suicide missions. Hundreds of our members have voluntarily taken the 'Black Tiger Oath' (suicide oath squad). We will not take cyanide and die simply. We will take some of the enemies with us.

"At a given point — cannot say when — we will all go underground and continue to wage a guerilla campaign. There will never be normalcy in our areas. You asked about our arms supply."

"We are confident that despite all the blockades imposed by India, we can get enough arms to continue a guerilla campaign. There will never be a civilian administration in our areas," Mr. Mahathiya said. — PTI

Pet cub is killed, 'Tiger' elusive

MADRAS, Oct. 25.

The pet leopard cub of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) chief, Mr. Velupillai Prabakaran, was shot dead by soldiers of the Indian Peace-keeping Force (IPKF) two days ago, when their offensive over the Jaffna city was stepped up, according to official sources here.

But Mr. Prabakaran himself remained elusive despite the search mounted for him by the Indian commanders.

The sources said the cub was shot dead when it came out of a children's park near the Nallur Kandaswamy Temple. —UNI

LTTE CLAIMS

On 25.10.87 the IPKF's bomber planes attacked Sangupitti, in the early hours of the day, and dropped innumerable bombs. A "Teleka" van and a lorry caught fire and were completely destroyed. In this 3 men, Maruthapillai, Anthoni pillai of Poonagari, and Thavarasa of Vadiyadi were killed. Vedanandam of Poonagari, Sudha, Mahadeva of Neerveli South, Sivaprakasam of Urumbirai South and Sivalingam of Poonagari Durga were all injured seriously.

Shells fell in Kokuvil Technical College. 25 refugees killed. 60 injured.

In the morning at about 9 'o clock, when the Indian army set on its mission, the Liberation Tigers attacked them with claymore. Four soldiers of the Indian army were killed on the spot.

At 10.30 in the morning, the LTTE's camp at Manalaru in Trincomalee, was besieged by the Indian army. They burnt down a house of the LTTE and some other houses nearby. No loss was incurred by the LTTE in this incident.

At Thavadi and Kokkuvil, in the attack of the LTTE on Indian War Tanks, two tanks were completely destroyed. One L.M.G. and some automatic rifles were captured by the Indian army. Fierce battle took place at Kulappitti, Kokkuvil and Jaffna University.

At 3.30 in the evening, Indian army started moving from Marudanamadam towards Jaffna and fired with cannons at peoples' crowd and refugees camps. In the attack of the Indian army at Kokkuvil technical institute, more than 25 persons, who were staying there as refugees were killed. More than 60 people were injured.

Blast in Indian chancery

COLOMBO, Oct. 25.

A big explosion in the office of the Assistant High Commissioner of India in the heart of the hill district town, Kandy, in the early hours of this morning, caused extensive damage to the chancery building, located on Rajapihilla Mawath (Road).

The explosion which caused vibrations in Kandy, 115 km. north-east of Colombo, occurred around 2.35 a.m.

"Fortunately, there were no casualties," the Assistant High Commissioner", Mr. R. P. Dua told PTI over trunk telephone from Kandy.

The High Commissioner, Mr. J. N. Dixit, rushed to Kandy on receiving news of the blast. He told Indian reporters, after returning from Kandy, that the blast was caused by a plastic device containing some 20-kg. of explosives. The Sri Lankan President had expressed concern over the incident.

The bomb was either triggered off by a remote-controlled radio device or a pre-timed contraption, Mr. Dixit said.

Police suspect that members of the proscribed Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) are involved in the attack. A suspected JVP supporter, who used to reside near the chancery building, was missing since this morning, they said. Extensive hunt is on for those behind the blast.
—PTI, UNI

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

KOKUVIL

S. Mahadevan	S. Pararajasingam
S. Sivagurunathan	**J. Ponnammah**
S. Visaladchumi	T. Tharmalingam
K. Somasundaram	**T. Kanagamalar**
S. Suppah	**T. Kanagampihai**
K. Nadarasingam	T. Thurairajah
K. Markandu	A. Mahatheva
L. Padmavathy	Amirthalingam
M. Sudarasan	A. Gopalakrishnan
Manobalasingam	**B. Aachimuthu**
M. Ratnam	**B. Kethanjeli**
M. Arunachalam	G. Jeyaraj
N. Ponniah	G. Satkunanandan
N. Navaneethakrishnan	K. Rajaratnam
P. Suhunadevi	K. Sivanathan
R. Krrubaharan	K. Sokkalingam
R. Sinnathurai	K. Somasundaram
R. Kengatharan	K. Thangarajah
R. Pathunarajah	Kanapathy Suppar
R. Leelavathy	Kandaiya Kasilngam
S. Sraswathy	Kandaiya Mahadevan
S. Sarveswara Ruby	**K. Sinnathankachi**
S. Kumar	K. Sivagurunathan
S. Sellammah	K. Sivalingam
S. Ramasamy	**K. Ponnachi**
S. Velauthampillai	**K. Visalachy**
S. Hudson	K. Kandasamy
S. Suppiah	**K. Maheswary**
S. Thiyagarasa	K. Iyathurai
S. Shanmugalingam	K. Nagarajah
S. Pradeep	K. Narasingam
S. Shyamala	K. Thiyagarajah
S. Vijitha	**Nageswary**
S. Selvanayagam	Markandu

தமிழா! வீழ்த்தெழு!

பஞ்சாவின் பயங்கரத்தையும்
வன்முறையையும் ஒழித்திட
திறனில்லா மத்திய அரசே!

ஈழங்கேட்டு போராடும் விரப்புலிகளை
ஒடுக்கிடும் பயங்கரவாதம் ஏன்?
சண்டை போடுவதுதான்
சமாதானப் படையின் இலக்கா?
சிறுபான்மை விரர் இனத்தை
அழிப்பதுதான் அமைதிப் படையின்
அர்த்தமா?
நம்மினத்திற்கே கேடு விளைவிக்கும்
மத்திய அரசிற்கு நம்எதிர்ப்புக்கரங்கள்
குமுறும் எரிமலையென
வெடித்தெழட்டும்!
எதிர்ப்புக்கள் இடிஒலியாய் எழுந்து -
தமிழர் இன உணர்வு பேரொளியாய்
சுடர் விட்டும்!

இவன்: 13வதுவட்ட தி.மு.க. இளைஞரணி.

People of Tamil Nadu spontaneously held massive demonstrations against the killing of their brethren in Tamil Eelam by the IPKF. The political parties joined together and conducted a general strike in condemnation, which was a great success. Life in Tamil Nadu came to a standstill during the strike. Posters everywhere condemned the army reprisals. D.K. leader Mr. Veeramani was beaten up by the police during a demonstration.



LETTER

Citizens' Committee
Vaddukkoddai

25th October 1987.

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi
Prime Minister of India.

Respected Sir,

We, the citizens of Jaffna now displaced from our houses and have taken temporary abode at Vaddukkoddai along with the citizens of Vaddukkoddai. wish to bring before you the following for your kind consideration and immediate action. The military offensive launched by the IPKF on 10th October 1987 to apprehend the LTTE has caused much damage and hardship to the civilian population of Jaffna peninsula.

The curfew imposed on 15th October 1987 has not yet, to our knowledge, been lifted. This we consider the most intense in any country where the curfew has continued without any interruption for such a long spell. The power supply to the peninsula was terminated on the 10th October 1987 and has so far not been restored. This too we consider unprecedented. This has resulted in untold hardships to the community in the form of paralysing work in hospitals, acute shortage of energy, light and storage facilities etc. The offensive itself has taken a heavy toll of civilian life and destruction to public and private property. The All India Radio and Sri Lankan Broad casting are spreading false propaganda saying that civilian targets were not hit by shelling or bombing. But even hospitals, schools, temples and churches were not spared for which we are eye witnesses and victims in consequence to indiscriminate shelling and also in response to IPKF request to leave the houses, several lakhs of people (about 4 lakhs) have vacated their houses and have taken refuge in various schools, temples and churches. Conditions in all refugee camps are far from satisfactory. Sufficient food is not available and contribution from both government and voluntary organisations has been very negligible. Sanitary conditions are very poor and are made worse by the prevailing weather and powercut.

Total absense of medical facilities, easpecially to the old, expectant mothers lead to great risks. Due to the stoppage of transport to and from Colombo some of the commodities including essentials have come to dangerously low levels. Even local production of food items has not been possible due to the prevailing conditions and displacements of persons. As banks and other monetary institutions remain closed, people are faced with an acute problem. There is a severe hardship arising out of the situation with the complete lack of any adminstrative authority. The IPKF originally advised the people of Jaffna to go into the Nallur Temple and to other leading schools in the vicinity of Jaffna. But subsequently those who sought asylum in the Nallur Temple were asked to leave for safer places. But no indication was given as to where they should go, leaving the refugees in a state of confusion. People living in other areas have been asked to go to the IPKF camps. But again no indication has been given where these camps are located. All in all normal civilian life in the Jaffna peninsula has during past two weeks come to a grinding halt. Transport, banks etc. have all ceased to function and the degree of uncertainty is high. It would not be far too correct to say that we are on the edge of destruction, an experience Jaffna has been never subjected to before. We appeal to you Sir, very humbly to halt the operation and call for an immediate ceasefire - a precondition to bring back any sort of normalcy.

We remain sir,

Yours faithfully,
Citizens of Vaddukkoddai and
Citizens of Jaffna now residing at Vaddukkoddai

Annexure:

We give below definite instances where either civilian institutions or where civilian themselves have been target to IPKF operations.

1. a) The Green Memorial Hospital of the American mission was subjected to heavy Shelling.
   b) which led not only to the killing of a woman employee but also to the complete closure of the Hospital.
2. At the General Teaching Hospital, Jaffna, the director has testified that the IPKF personnel led two doctors and a few nurses out of the hospitals. Later they were found dead with gun shot injuries. An ambulance driver was also shot dead.
3. The government hospital at Tellipallai was a target of indiscriminate shelling which has forced the hospital to close down.
4. The experience at the MCLEOD Hospital, Inuvil, another leading American Mission Hospital has been the same. The hospital at present is occupied by the IPKF.
5. Hindu Ladies College, Jaffna, one of the schools assigned by IPKF for refugees was hit by shells. One woman was killed and several others injured.
6. Osmania College, Jaffna, a leading Muslim School was also subjected to the same treatment, killing atleast 4 school boys, among the refugees there.
7. Chundikkuli Girls High School, another prominent girls school in Jaffna was also a target of shelling resulting in atleast four deaths.
8. A boat load of civilians crossing a small water stretch leaving to the Island situated in the western side of the peninsula was shot at from a helicopter and atleast 35 people perished. Several others were seriously wounded. It should be mentioned here that these people embarked on this journey to take shelter on the Island, on the official advice given by certain IPKF officials. We would like to reiterate that these are incidents which have verified from these relatively remote corner of Jaffna. We are quite certain that any more incidents of this nature that occurs throughout the peninsula which we hope that it will, will come to light in due course.

Signed: 1) N. Sivagnanam
President, Citizens' Committee Vaddukkoddai.
and 27 other citizens.



Tigers pledge to fight on

JAFFNA – The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have pledged to continue to resist the Indian army and wage the armed struggle for national liberation.

'You are aware of the fact that the Indian and Sri Lankan governments have joined together against the Liberation Tigers,' the liberation movement said in a statement at the weekend.

The statement, addressed to the Tamil masses, said: 'The radio stations of both countries have been broadcasting false propaganda to tarnish our image and to confuse our people while the Tamil people's media has been destroyed by the Indian Peace-Keeping Force and silenced.

'In this situation we have a duty to explain the true position to our people.'

The statement poses a number of questions and then sets out to answer them in detail.

Why did the government of India persuade the Sri Lankan government 'to recognise our movement, only to turn around and wage war against us?

'What is the current situation in the war? What is the casualty level suffered by our peoples? Will the Indian government continue its war against us? What view do the people of Tamil Nadu and the rest of India take on this war?

'What are the international implications of this war?'

The statement says the deaths of Tamil martyrs – one leader during a hunger strike, two commanders who took cyanide after their boat was captured by the Sri Lankan army, and 12 others who took cyanide after being captured must be avenged.

'We can never forgive those responsible for murdering our comrades as a part of the conspiracy to weaken our leadership.

Crime

'We hold both the Jayewardene regime and the Indian government responsible for this crime as respectively the instigators and co-conspirators.

'India never had the genuine aspirations of the Tamil people at heart.'

It was after these deaths that the LTTE had started to lose faith in the Indian government.

'We are not involved in any of these killings.

'This foolish war against the liberation Tigers is being conducted to appease Jayewardene and his Sinhala racist regime.'

The statement says India's motivation was to protect its regional and global interests.

'The Indo-Sri Lanka accord served to bolster India's international position and so it is determined to tenaciously cling on to it.

'If this accord is to survive, India must ensure the political survival of Jayewardene. It must bow to his demands.

'Because of their one-sided position, the interests of the Tamil Eelam people were thrown to the wind.'

It was in this context that the war against the LTTE was waged, says the statement. Unlike the Gandhi regime in India, the Tigers have no ulterior motives 'separate from or above those of our people'.

Warn

The Tigers warn that the Indians are trying to destroy their organisation in order to then impose the puppet Tamil United Liberation Front on the Tamil masses. This bourgeois parliamentary group has collaborated with the Jayewardene regime all along.

But the Indians' attempts to crush the liberation struggle have come to nothing.

'Rather than giving up our arms and dying as slaves, we decided to fight for truth and justice.

'Our leader Prabhakaran declared that we would rather die on our feet than live on our knees.

'If necessary, we will fall as martyrs in our people's struggle, but we will never go as lambs to the slaughter.

'With this belief we took a firm decision to resist. India tried to encircle Jaffna and massacre our people but our fighters bravely confronted them.

'From numerous battlefields came reports of our fighters' heroism.'

Faced with the LTTE's determination, Indian soldiers had turned and fled, said the statement.

'The defeat inflicted on an army comparable to that of a superpower surprised the entire world. Fierce battles raged for many days.

'India wanted to capture Jaffna quickly but we frustrated and foiled their plans.

'The Indian forces used various kinds of weapons gunships and fighter bombers. They even called in the Sri Lankan air force.'

The Indian-inspired war is directed not only at the Tigers but the whole Tamil nation and people, the statement explained. It is aimed at destroying the 'Tamil right to self-determination' by crushing 'the organisation that our people see as embodying their rights and aspirations'.

In the ten days of war preceding the statement, 200 innocent civilians had been killed. More than 950 had been injured. Many girls had been raped, hundreds of homes destroyed, thousands of people made into refugees. Hospitals, schools, places of culture and learning had all suffered extensive damage.

Shelled

Newspaper offices, the Jaffna General Hospital and Jaffna University had all been shelled from the ground and bombed from the air.

'You are aware of the atrocities committed against our people by the Sri Lankan government in the past. But the Indian atrocities are even more shocking.

'More than 100 Indian soldiers have already fallen victim to their own war. We are currently holding 20 Indian prisoners of war.

'In the last ten days of war, 40 of our comrades are prepared to lay down their lives.

'Our leader Veluppillai Prabhakaran has sincerely explained this to the Indian leaders and it is our hope that they will come to their senses and call off their unjust war.'

The statement says that there have been strong protests against the war in the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu, including from the leader of the opposition DMK party.

'We are also receiving increasing reports of protest mounted by other opposition parties in India.

'Justice and truth are sure to come, in the end, whilst India will have to bow its head in shame before the world.'

The LTTE leadership urge the Tamil people: 'At this critical moment in the history of our struggle, do not be afraid or confused.

Forward

'We confidently look forward to your continued support as our freedom fighters give their lives to defend the self-respect of our people and to win our freedom.

'Your continued support is a rock that can never be shattered and no force on earth can crush us. Long Live Tamil Eelam.'

The voice of Tamils against IPKF atrocities continues to protest.

AFFIDAVIT

Mrs. SELVARANJITHAM BALAKUMAR (34), 89, Poompuhar, Ariyalai, Jaffna.

On 25.10.87 my husband Nadarasa Balakumar (30) was killed in a shell explosion close to the Jaffna Kachcheri where he was on his way to collect money due to him.

The dead body of my husband was removed by us on 26.10.87 and cremated at Thundi Cemetry, Colombuthurai at about 4.00 p.m.

My husband a building Mason was the sole bread winner of the family.

He leaves behind myself and 3 children aged 9 years, 7 years, and 1½ years.

We have no other source of income and by the loss of my husband my children and I have lost the maintenance and support given by him.



SENTHIL RATNAM (29), Nayanmar Veethy, Nallur, Jaffna.

My wife Kamalawathy wife of Ratnam died on the 25th day of October 1987 at Jaffna and her death was due to injuries caused by shell blast during the military operation by the IPKF in the Jaffna peninsula.

My late wife the above said Kamalawathy was working as a Tailor and she was the sole bread winner of my family.

My wife died when she went to purchase things for her tailoring work.

I am doing petty business and I have no other source of income to maintain my family.



THANABALASINGHAM RAJESWARI (23) Anna veethy off Palaly Road, Vasavilan.

The deceased person Kanthan Thanabalasingham, aged 30 years was my husband.

He was engaged in farming at Udayarkattu in Mullaithievu district.

On 25.10.87 my husband left our farm house at Udayar Kattu saying that he is going to Kaithady to his sister's house.

On 1.11.87 I was informed that my husband was shot and killed by the army 27.10.87 at Kaithadi.

His sister Selvarajah Sivamany informed me that my husband visited her residence at Kaithady on 25.10.87 and left for Palaly on 27.10.87 at about 7 a.m. promising to return on the following day.

I learned from his sister that after his failure to return as promised she mounted a search for him.

I came to know that his body was found at the Kopay bridge with gunshot wounds and identified as that of my husband through his identify card.

It was found in half buried state.

It was left in the same state.

I have a daughter named Bharshiga aged 3 years

After my husband's death we are undergoing untold hardships and do not have any income or support.



VEERAGATHY LETCHUMY (30), Pechchi Ammal Kovilady Navaladi Lane, Vannarpannai.

The deceased Sinnatti Veeragathy, age 35 years was my husband.

He was a casual Labourer.

On 25.10.87 our area was subjected to heavy shelling by the army.

My husband was talking to my cousin at his house which is adjoining to our house.

At about 10.00 a.m. a shell fell within the compound and exploded spraying shrapnels in all directions.

My husband died on the spot after being struck by the flying shrapnels.

I was with him when the shell exploded.

My cousin was also killed in the above incident.

I have four children.

My children and I have been deprived of the maintenance and support received from my husband.



CHANDRARASA BABY (Widow) (42) Inkaran Veethy, Suthumalai South.

Due to the IPKF started liberation operation in our area on 26.10.1987 while my husband was coming by bicycle on the road at Suthumalai Junction there was a shell came closer to my husband and got blasted and my husband got the attack of the shell pieces and immediately brought to Jaffna General Hospital and died after admission.

My husband's name is Ratnam Chandrarasa, age 46 was doing business and maintaining myself and two daughters aged 16 years and 13 years. Both are attending schools.

I was fully depending from my husband's income now after his death I and my two daughters are undergoing severe hardships throughout. Even to the funeral expenses I have borrowed money from my neighbours and spent it. Other than my deceased husband's income there is no other income.



Mrs EASWARY VALLI (48), Kanpola Veethy, Karaveddy.

My daughter named Miss. Atputhamalar Valli, aged 20 years was attacked by shell blast at Jaffna on 26.10.87 and immediately taken to Jaffna hospital and died on 26.10.87.

She visited one of her relations in Tirunelvely by that time she came to take the bus from Jaffna, on her way she got the attack of the shell blast on 26.10.87. This happened during the Liberation operation by the IPKF.

She was doing labour work and helping me to maintain my 5 children. We belong to a very poor family.

After my daughter's death we are undergoing untold hardships throughout.

KASIPILLAI RUDRA (59), 115/1 Arasady Road, Kandermadam, Jaffna.

The deceased Rudra Dinendra, aged 17 years was my son.

He was a G.C.E. (O/L) student at Jaffna Hindu College.

During the October 87 military offensive we left home and took refuge at the Nallur Murugan Temple.

On 26.10.87 at about 12.00 noon I was informed that my son was shot and killed by the army near the Nallur Temple where we were taking shelter at that time.

His body was cremated at an empty field near the Temple on the same day itself.

Mrs. KUDDIYAN KANAGAMMAH (widow) (68), Near Milking Centre, Tirunelvely East, Tirunelvely.

Due to the IPKF started liberation operation in our area on 26.10.87 we immediately left our house and while going to the temple, there was a shell blast close to us, and my husband Kanthan Kuddiyan got the attack and I immediately brought to the Jaffna General Hospital, he died immediately inside the hospital and we removed the dead body.

My late husband's age is 70 years, doing labour work and I have one daughter who is not married. My husband is the bread winner of my family of two.

Other than my husband there is no other source of income to maintain me and my aged daughter and suffering a lot for the last one year.



KANDIAH RASAMMAH (59) Thalayadi West, Thirunelvely.

The deceased person Kannapathy Suppar, aged 75 years was my father.

He was living with us until fate took him away.

Due to the October 1987 military offensive I fled to Vaddukoddai with my two daughters.

My father and my husband refused to accompany us and opted to stay behind to look after our house and property.

On 2.11.87 I was informed that my father and my husband were both killed on 26.10.87 in a shell blast while they were going towards the Thirunelvely Sivan Temple with the intention of taking refuge.

I came to know that their bodies were cremated by some person who discovered their bodies in a barren field on 27.10.87.



KASIPILLAI RUDRA (59), 115/i, Arasady Road, Kandermadam, Jaffna.

The deceased Rudra Dinendra, aged 17 years was my son.

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His body was cremated at an empty field near the Temple on the same day itself.

MURUGESU MEENACHI (55) 36, Arasady Road, Jaffna.

The deceased person Sadaiyar Murugesu aged 60 years was my husband.

He was a vegetable vendor and was our only bread winner.

On 26.10.87 at about 6.00 a.m. my husband left for Chavakachcheri market where he was engaged in selling vegetables.

For the next few weeks we did not receive any news from him.

After he left we were driven out from our house and sought refuge at Jaffna Hindu College refugee camp.

After 15 days I was informed that my husband was killed when the Chavakachcheri Town was subjected to rocket attack from a helicopter gunship on 27.10.87.

I learned that his body was cremated on the spot where he perished.

I have three children at home.

I am an invalid as a result of a malaria fever.



Mrs MUTHULINGAM PONNAMMAH (widow) (57), Ariyalai West, Jaffna.

My husband's name, Muthiyah Muthulingam aged 60 years being a business man. I have three children.

While my husband was at home with us due to the IPKF. Liberation operation in our area there was a shell came and blast in our compound and my husband got severely injured and immediately brought to Jaffna hospital. This happened on 26.10.87 and died in the hospital on the same day.

Later we brought the dead and cremated in our place.

I have borrowed money from my neighbours and spent for the funeral and other incidental expenses. Now they are worrying me to repay their loan.

Now we are undergoing severe hardships throughout after my husband died. Other than my husband's income there is not other income to support my family.



NADARAJAH INTHIRANEE, Pathirakali Lane, Vannarponnai West, Jaffna.

I have been living at the above address along with my mother.

My father died a few years back.

Due to the eruption of violence in our area in October 1987, I got displaced from my home and sought refuge at Pathiraly Temple for fear of our lives.

While we were inmates of the said refugee camp, my mother named Nadarajah Manonmany, aged 60 years fell a victim to a shell blast and succumbed to the injuries caused by the same on 26.10.87.

My deceased mother was engaged in handicraft and maintained me out of her earnings.

After her demise, I am left a destitute with no one to look after me.



NAMASIVAYAGAM ARUNASALAM (67), Kondavil West, Kondavil.

The deceased person Arunasalam Tharmarajah, aged 37 years, bachelor was my son.

He was a Cigar roller.

On 26.10.87 we left the Nallur Murugan Temple where we sought refuge and were proceeding towards a relations house near the Iyanar Temple.

At about 4.00 p.m. as we were going along Sivapragasam Road, Vannarpannai some soldiers fired at us.

My son was cut down by a fusilade of bullets.

He died on the spot.

His body was cremated at the road side.

I have an unmarried daughter named Thavamany aged 23 years.

I met with an accident few years ago and sustained injury on my hand and leg as a result I remain at home.

It was my late son who maintained and supported our family with his income.



SABARATNAM NAGARATNAM (55), 32/7, Mariammarl Lane, Thirunelvely, Jaffna.

Late Mrs. Angusapalan Ketheeswary, aged 39 years, was my daughter-in-law. She was married to my son Mr. Sabaratnam Angusapalan, who is in abroad.

On 1987.10.26 since there was a dangerous situation prevailing at Thirumelvely area consequent to continuous shelling, ariel bombardments and shooting, my daughter-in-law was forced to leave her home at the above address with her three children. She wanted to go to Nainativu for safety and with this intension, she was passing through Kokuvil area.

At the Puthu Road, Kokuvil West while she was passing that way, she received fatal injuries by gun shot and died on the spot due to profuse bleeding.

The poor motherless and helpless three, children are in my custody since the death of their mother.



SINNATHURAI PANCHALINGAM (40), Nanthavil West Lane, Thavady, Kokuvil.

The deceased Annalingam Kamaladevi, age 33 years, is my sister.

There was shell firing in our area on 13.10.87 so we decided to go to Kokuvil Hindu College for safety which is about 500 meters from our house.

On 26.10.87 when we were at Kokuvil Hindu Primary School, the army started firing from Kokuvil Junction and my sister Kamaladevi was injured on her neck and died at the spot, 3 others refugees were also killed in this incident.

We left the dead body of my sister and took refuge at the Kokuvil Hindu College.

Already 30 person were killed at the Kokuvil Hindu College and the dead bodies were cremated on 1-11-87 by the army personnel.

We stayed at the Kokuvil Hindu College for 25 days and then stayed at Nallur Temple for 20 days and then returned home. When we were at Kokuvil for 25 days from 1.11.87.

My sister had 1 daughter named Nanthakumari (13) a student.

My sister's husband Annalingam died due to illness.

Now Nandakumari is being looked after by me.

Mrs. SINNIAH SELVARAJAH NAVARATNAM (Widow) (44), Suthumalai South, Manipay.

My husband late Mr. Sinniah Selvarajah was attacked by shell when the IPKF started liberation and operation took place at Suthumalai on 26.10.87. Immediately we took him to Jaffna Hospital, where he died on the same day.

I have only one son who is about 16 years old and studying. After my husband's death we are undergoing severe hardships throughout.

Also I wish to inform you that we both were depending on the deceased husband income. He was doing business. He is 45 years old. Other than my husband's income there is no other income to maintain my son and myself.



SOOSAIPILLAI THRESAMMAH (60), 5, Navalar Road, Navanthurai Jaffna.

The deceased Anthonymuthu Soosaipillai, aged 65 years was my husband.

He was a fisherman.

During the October 1987 military offensive we left our home at Navanthurai and sought refuge at Navali.

On 26.10.87. at about 8 a.m. my husband left us saying that he is going to Navanthurai to look for our grandson who was arrested by the army few days ago.

He did not return afterwards.

Due to the prevailing tension I could not mount a search for my husband.

On the fifth day of his disappearance I came to know that he was killed at Ottumadam due to shell blast on 26.10.87.

I also came to know that his body was disposed by the army.

After my husband's death I do not have any income or support.



AGINUS SUBRAMANIAM (40), 2, Vellantheru, Koddady, Jaffna.

The deceased person KuttySubramaniam, aged 45 yearswas my husband.

He was a casual labourer.

On 27.10.87 at about 9.00 a.m. my husband left for work in his bicycle.

As he did not return home at that day I became highly worried.

On the following day I came to know that he was shot and killed by the army at Manipay Road on the previous day.

His body was cremated at the Vellantheru off Manipay Road itself.

I have three children

My children and I have been deprived of the maintenance and support we received from my husband and undergoing untold hardships.



KANAGU SORUBARANI (31), "Sri Vel Bhavanam" Puthur East, Puthur.

The deceased Kanagu Ponnu, aged 57 years was my mother.

On 27.10.87 at about 9.30 a.m. my mother left home saying that she is going to the Chavakachcheri Market to buy a sewing machine.

At about 5.30 p.m. I was informed that my mother was killed when the Chavakachcheri market was attacked by helicopter few hours earlier that day.

I came to know that she was rushed to Chavakachcheri Hospital with serious injuries where she died.

Her body was brought home on 28.10.87.

The cremation took place at Puthur East cemetery on the same day.

I have one brother K. Sritharan aged 26 years a student.

My mother's brother's two children are also living with us after being deserted by their father.

My father also died 16 days after my mother's death.

I do not have any income after my parent's death.

K. Saruparam

MURUGESU RAJANAYAGAM (57), Vedantha Madam, Madduvil.

The deceased child Rajanayagam Arunthavarajah, aged 13 years was my son.

He was a student at Paranthan Maha Vidyalaya.

On 27.10.87 fearing military reprisals I decided to go to Paranthan along with my son.

At about 11.00 p.m. we were going through the Kandy Road in a bicycle.

Suddenly I heard shots and my son was hit by bullets and fell down.

He died on the spot.

I left his body where he fell and fled from the scene.

I came to know later that he was buried by the army itself.

I have a son named Pathmarajah aged 16 years.

MUTHU PONNUTHURAI. (62)
Anbuvalipuram, Trincomalee. presently 65, Sivan Street, Trincomalee.

My wife, children and I came to Jaffna as refugees in 1986, and we were at the Neervely M.P.C.S Union Refugee camp.

After a six months stay in Neervely leaving my wife Mrs. Maheswary Ponnuthurai (49) daughters P. Manjuladevi (28) P. Kamaleswary (10) behind I returned to Trincomalee.

In mid November I came to know that about 16 passengers of a van bound for Trincomalee including all family members of a Brahmin Priest were shot dead by India Peace Keeping Force Personnel on 27.10.87.

It is only in the latter part of December 87, that I came to know that my wife and daughters Manjuladevi and Maheswary too had been killed in the incident mentioned.

I then came to Nunavil, Chavakachcheri and made inquiries from people known to me, who informed me that my wife and 2 daughters had left with several others in a van bound for Trincomalee on 27.10.87 night.

And that the van had been fired upon when passing the market by IPKF personnel killing 16 passengers including my wife and 2 daughters and injuring several others.

I was also informed that the dead bodies had been buried on the orders of the IPKF opposite Dee-bergs College.

NAGAMUTHU LUXUMY (71), Kalthiddy Lane, Kokuvil.

The deceased person Varavi Nagamuthu, aged 81 years was my husband.

On 15.10.87 we sought refuge at the Nallur Kandasamy Temple due to the intermittent shelling in our area.

On 27.10.87 at about 9.00 a.m. my husband left the Temple saying that he is going to Kokuvil to inspect our house.

He did not return afterwards.

On the following day one Nadarajah came and informed me that my husband was shot and killed by the army at Aladi junction, Oddumadam while he was on his way to Kokuvil.

His body was not recovered.

I have an unmarried daughter Vimaladevy, aged 29 years.

PONNAN PARI (60), Selvapuram, Urumpirai South, Urumpirai.

The deceased Ponnan Tharmalingam, aged 22 years a bachelor was my son.

He was a Casual Labourer.

During the October 1987 military offensive we left our house at Urumpirai and sought refuge at the Bethol Sabai at Nallur.

On 27.10.87 at about 9 a.m. my son left us saying that he is going to Urumpirai to inspect our house.

At about 12 noon I was informed that my son was shot and killed by the army at Urumpirai.

At about 5.30 p.m. on the same day I went to the scene of incident and recovered the body and buried it with the help of my relatives.

Due to the tension prevailed during the period inquest did not take place.

My husband is and invalid and suffering from paralysis.

It was my late son who looked after us.

After his death we do not have any income or support.

THANGAVADIVAL ANANTHASAMY (54), Matuvil South, Chavakachcheri.

The deceased Ananthasamy Arunthavasivanesan, aged 25 years, a bachelor was my son.

He was employed as a mini-bus driver.

On 27.10.87 at about 6 a.m. my son left home as usual for his job.

At about 6 p.m. I came to know that my son was critically injured when the Chavakachcheri market and bus stand came under helicopter shell attack which resulted in carnage.

I was also informed that my son was admitted at the Pointpedro base Hospital at Mantiki where he died on the same day at about 8 p.m.

Due to the prevailing situation I could not go to the hospital immediately.

Only on 29.10.87 I managed to bring his body home.

His body was cremated at Kuchapitty cemetery on 29.10.87.

It was my late son who supported my family with the income.

His death is a great loss to us.

THURAIAMMAH wife of Sellathurai, Kellavil Lane, Suthumalai South, Manipay.

Due to fear of shelling we sought shelter at Thavady Pathirakali Kovil Refugees camp on 20th October, 1987.

On the 27th October 1987 my daughter Sellathurai Latha died due to bleeding as a result of shell attack in the camp.

My daughter's body recovered and identified by me and Vaithi Krishnar of Kellavil Lane, Suthumalai South, Manipay on the same day.

My daughter's body was buried near refugees camp at Thavady.

Consequent to my daughter's irrepairable loss, I was shocked and have not recovered from the above shock. Since her death, I am ill and under treatment.

A view from the Tigers

INTERVIEW

THE LTTE's 31-year-old deputy leader, G. Mahendraraja alias Mahatiya, is currently directing field operations in the battle with the Indian Peacs-Keeping Force. He gave a formal interview to D. B. S. Jeyaraj THE HINDU's Colombo Correspondent, at Jaffna before the outbreak of hostilities. Mahatiya was associated with the LTTE's political wing leader Dilip Yogi, and political adviser, A. S. Balasingham, during the interview. The interview was subsequently updated in separate meetings with Mahatiya.

The picture has changed in some essential respects after these interviews, but the text provides insights into the LTTE leadership's thinking, mode of presentation and attitudes. D. B. S. Jeyaraj was taken into custody by the Sri Lankan police authorities in Colombo after the publication of his interview with Mahatiya in a Colombo-based daily.

THE HINDU: What is your opinion and assessment of the current conflict with the Indian forces? Can the LTTE afford to take on the military might of a power like India?

Mahatiya: This was not a fight we wanted. Our leader told high Indian officials in New Delhi that we did not want to fight India, but that we would do so if necessary. Prabakaran also announced to our people in Suthumalai that India was now responsible for the security of our people and that we were laying down arms because we love India and did not want to fight India. Now we are fighting India because we have no choice. The conflict was thrust upon us.

Q: How? Why did you not have a choice?

A: Ever since the accord was signed, India was, in a subtle manner, encouraging forces hostile to us. Eighteen of our members were killed by groups like PLOT, TELO, ENDLF, etc. The Indians brought these fellows here and they were operating in close proximity to Indian camps. Despite repeated representations, the IPKF did not act. Finally, we took some action. In the same way India did not act properly with us in implementing provisions of the accord. All our objections were not taken notice of. India was acting like J. R. Jayewardene's agent! They tried to destroy us by taking our arms by force. Before that, they let us down very badly on issues like the interim administration and the release of our arrested leaders like Pulendran and Kumaran. When we realised that they were trying to destroy us, we resisted. We had to fight in self-defence.

Q: But India is a big country. It is considered the fourth largest power. Can a small organisation like the Tigers or the Tamil people withstand India?

Aggressors

A: Certainly we are very small when compared with India. But this is our country. We know every inch of our land. We fought the Sinhalese because we wanted to be free. After all, the Sinhalese and we belong to this island. But who are the Indians to come and dictate terms to us? They are aggressors. Do you expect the Tigers to accept this situation meekly? After all, even the Sri Lankan forces were stronger than us, but that did not stop us from fighting! Let the Indians also learn the lesson from us. We are prepared to die. But we will do so with honour. Like America in Vietnam, Russia in Afghanistan, India will learn its lesson from us. Even if we all die, the Indians will lose a big number.

Q: But the Indians, with their large population, can afford to lose men. Can your organisation do so? Also are you not being defeatist by saying your are prepared to die?

A: I said we are prepared to die only as an indication of our sincerity to our cause. You see the cyanide capsules we carry. From an ordinary member, even leaders like Pulendiran and Kumaran will swallow them if necessary. But we will not commit suicide like fools. We will continue our struggle. As you said, India can lose a lot of people and not feel the impact. But we will create a situation where India will have to bring more and more men and arms and equipment to suppress the Tamil people. The true nature of the Indian armed forces will be exposed. Many civilian massacres will take place. India's hypocrisy about Mahatma Gandhi's principles will be exposed. India, a great nation, is struggling to kill the aspirations of a small people like us! The whole world will laugh at India. You are talking about the impossibility of fighting India. At the moment, it is a question of self-respect, honour and national dignity. We cannot give in or surrender like that to anyone—even the Indians. Look at the Sandinistas of Nicaragua. They are followers of a person who died so many years ago. Like that, our struggle will continue generation after generation even if we all die. But our future generations will not be able to accuse our generation of having betrayed them by accepting Indian aggression.

Q: But how do you hope to continue? India will not allow any fresh arms supply to the LTTE. When your firepower diminishes, what will you do?

A: We have a strategy. Now we are fighting face to face like two armies. We will fight hard to hold every inch of our land. The next step will be to allow the Indians to advance a certain distance. Then we will use footpaths and by-lanes and get behind them and attack them. The third step will be to start suicide missions. Hundreds of our members have voluntarily taken the Black Tiger oath (suicide squad oath). We will not take cyanide and die simply. We will take some of the enemy with us. At a given point, I can't say when, we will all go underground and continue to wage a guerilla campaign. There will never be normalcy in our areas. You asked about our arms supply. We are confident that despite all the blockades imposed by India, we can get enough arms to continue a guerilla campaign. There will never be a civilian administration in our areas!

Q: But how long can the people take it? How long can they suffer? Is there no way to achieve a peaceful settlement? Is your position intransigent?

A: We are not intransigent. We care for the people. That is why we are fighting. The people know this. Otherwise, we could have accepted the interim administration on JR's terms, found jobs for our boys, and led an easy life. Or we could have accepted Indian authority, as the TULF and some other groups have done shamelessly. But we have self-respect. We have genuine concern for the people. If, at any stage, the people genuinely want us to stop, we will end everything. It is the people who matter. it is they who sustain us, support us. But I must show you something. (He shows the text of the correspondence between the IPKF and the LTTE). Now you can understand that despite our stand the Indians are determined to crush us. They do not want a compromise. So we have to go on. We have no choice.

Q: In your estimate, what is the exact military position?

A: Up to now (October 18), the Indian forces have over 300 casualties. Of these, more than half are dead. We have captured 23 Indian soldiers alive. We have destroyed 21 vehicles including armoured personnel carriers. We have seized five Indian vehicles. We have also captured more than 150 weapons from the Indians including bazookas, mortars, bren guns, LMG's, SMG's, SLR's, etc. And over 35,000 rounds of ammunition. On our side, we have lost 43 persons so far. This includes five women fighters. Also seven of these died when our own landmine exploded accidentaly. Three of our girls were captured by the Indians at Kopay. A little more than 50 of our members are injured. But mostly civilians have been affected in the shelling and bombing

Q: What do you expect to do with the Indians you have captured?

A: We will treat them as prisoners of war. We have not taken any decision about them.

Q: Are there Gurkhas fighting?

A: We have not seen them so far. But there is a feeling that they are here. The Sikhs are fighting here. So are Maharattas, Rajputs and Tamils. So let the Gurkhas also come! Isn't it funny the Sikhs are fighting for a separate State in India, here they are trying to kill us. The Gurkhas want a separate

homeland in India, but they will kill us here in our homeland.

Tamils fighting Tamils

Q: Don't you think it is ironical that Tamils are fighting Tamils?

A: Most of the Tamils fighting here are not from Tamil Nadu. They are from other States. They have no Tamil feeling. But the fight going on now is not a Tamil versus Tamil fight. It is the Indian army against the people of Eelam.

Q: Don't you think that Mr. J. R. Jayewardene has succeeded in driving a wedge between you all and the Indians?

A: At the moment, yes.

Q: Have you not played into his hands and precipitated matters?

A: We were forced into this position. Instead of being systematically undermined by India, we decided to confront them. We have now exposed the true nature of India Our people thought that India was genuinely helping the Tamils. They thought the Indian army was here to protect them and welcomed them at first. Now they see the true picture. They understand that they have been betrayed by India. Even if we are destroyed, we will die honourably with the pride that we fought the second largest army in the world. But J.R. may think he has succeeded now. Actually he has committed a blunder by inviting the Indian army. They will not go away. After they finish with the Tamils, they will turn against the Sinhalese. Indian public opinion, particularly Tamil Nadu, will demand this.

Q: Many people are amazed at how the LTTE has stood up to the Indian army so far. How was this possible?

A: Well, the Indians underestimated our strength and capacity. They were overconfident at the start. Then we know the terrain. They are aliens. They are an army trained for some other type of fighting. Even though we are fighting directly, we are using a lot of guerilla tactics which they can't cope with. In some cases, they are just trying to get us to waste ammunition by advancing and retreating. Then, again, we are the cyanide capsule guerillas. How can those people who were buying electrical goods and TV decks in Jaffna have the same courage we have? They have never tasted urban guerilla warfare before.

Q: Some people say that the Indians are reaping what they sowed by training you?

A: (Acts angry) How can you of all people, say this? You know the history of our movement . It was these other groups who are shamelessly licking India's feet who are trained by India. We only got the help of some Indian Tamil army officers at the start on a private basis. Afterwards we trained here in our own areas. That is why, with all the backing of India, these groups can't dislodge us there!

Puzzling aspect

Q: Another aspect puzzling people is how the LTTE lost in Vadamarachchi compared with the fight you are putting up now?

A: We never lost in Vadamarachchi. We tactically withdrew and resumed guerilla tactics like the Neliady attack.

Q: The killing of Sinhala civilians in the North and East by the Tigers after the taking of cyanide by Pulendiran and others has created a bad impression about your movement. Today, the whole world may think that India is justified in destroying you all because of your activities. What do you think?

A: The world must realise that India is killing Tamil people and not the Tigers. The LTTE did not kill the Sinhala civilians.

Q: Who killed them?

A: We do not know. It may be the other groups.

Q: But you are the dominant group.

A: We deny killing them.

Q: What about the eight soldiers in your custody? Who killed them?

A: That we did. We accept it.

Q: But did you not have a moral responsibility to safeguard prisoners in your custody?

A: When the Indians and Sri Lankans deliberately created conditions that led to the suicide of our cadres, that moral responsibility came to an end. When the amnesty given to us was not honoured, we also do not have to follow these formalities.

Q: What was the background to the incident?

A: Well, the Indians promised to get the 17 people released. For two days J.R. did not take any action. We were allowed to supply meals and talk to them. On Monday we were told that after Dixit meets J.R. our boys would be released. They promised us that they would never be taken to Colombo. Suddenly they told us that J.R. was not listening to Dixit and they could not do anything in the matter. They withdrew the IPKF guards. Our boys took cyanide. They had warned the forces earlier that they would do so if taken to Colombo. The Indians were supposed to protect us. We were supposed to have got an amnesty. But they could not do anything to help us. Tomorrow, my leader Prabakaran and I may be arrested as "poultry thieves". The Indians will say they are helpless. What angers us most is that the Indians tried to bargain with us. They said our boys will be released if we accepted the accord and interim council.

Q: The positive image built up by the fast-unto-death of Thileepan boosted the LTTE. Have you not lost it now by the violence? Why did you drop the Gandhian way of struggle?

A: Thileepan's fast was a different strategy adopted under different conditions. If Dixit had taken prompt action, Thileepan's death could have been avoided. But India has shown us that non-violent protests do not work. Mahatma Gandhi will have no success with Rajiv Gandhi! The LTTE is not worried about image building.

Q: You are accused of going back on guarantees given by you on the interim administration. Could you explain your side of the picture?

A: Some months ago, when Mr. Pathmanathan was in jail, we gave three names—Messrs Sivagnanasunderam, Thillainathan and Sivagnanam to be chief administrator. This was given to Mr. S. Ramachandran, the (Tamil Nadu) Minister. Later when Mr. Pathmanathan was released, we gave a second list substituting Mr. Pathmanathan for Mr. Thillainatham. This was given to Kuldip Sahadev on 18-9-87. We indicated that our preference was for Pathmanathan. In talks with Dixit, we were told to submit 15 names for the council. We did so but we told him clearly that we wanted the first six on the list. The six persons were myself, Yogi, Ruban, Kasi Anandan, Romesh and Kamaldeen. Now the first two, Yogi and I, are from Jaffna. The other four are from the East. Ruban is from Trinco, Kasi Anandan and Romesh are from Batticaloa, Kamaldeen is from the Amparai district. The LTTE has a clear policy of giving weightage to the East to avoid charges of Jaffna domination. Also Dixit said Mr. Jayewardene cannot appoint Mr. Pathmanathan and suggested that Mr. Sivagnanam was more acceptable. We agreed at that stage.

But when the council was appointed, we found that both Batticaloa names were dropped. We were very angry and felt that this was deliberately done to divide the North and East. We protested. At the same time, Mr. Sivagnanam declined for personal reasons.

At this point of time we felt that Mr. Pathmanathan who is from Batticaloa should be made administrator to dispel the hurt feelings of Batticaloa. We also wanted both Kasi Anandan and Romesh. Later Dixit told us that Mr. Jayewardene would not accept Pathmanathan. India did not want Kasi Anandan because he had made anti-Indian speeches in Jaffna, said Dixit. This angered us. If we could not appoint our nominees to the interim council because India did not like one of them, then what kind of administration is that? So we took up a rigid position and refused to compromise.

Publishing tapes

Q: But now India puts the blame on you and threatens to publish the transcripts of tapes?

A: What can we do? We are fighters. Politicians and diplomats are clever in saying untruths. India will threaten to publish the tapes but they will never do it. We have also got tapes. It is 15 hours long. Now the time is not suitable. Later on, we will give them to you. Listen to them and judge for yourself.

Q: Whom do you blame, Mr. Dixit or Mr. Jayewardene?

A: We have no direct dealings with Mr. Jayewardene. We trusted the Indian guarantees. So we blame Mr. Dixit.

Q: Are you prepared to face elections? Some say you are afraid that you will lose and that is why you are sabotaging the provincial councils.

A: We have just set up a people's front. We had no time for political work. The people are with us. They know about us. When elections become necessary, the people will support us.

Q: Finally what do you think of the future? How long can you go on? What about negotiations?

A: We will continue our struggle as long as we can. We are not opposed to negotiations. But it must be with a new set of negotiators. Mr. Dixit and Mr. Puri are unacceptable.

Q: How can you demand that from India? It is their official matter.

A: Yes. But then why did Mr. Rajiv Gandhi replace Mr. G. Parthasarathy with Mr. Bhandari? Because of Sri Lanka's objections. So it can be done here too if New Delhi is genuine.

Jaffna taken: LTTE leaders flee city

BATTLE □ FOR □ JAFFNA

NEWS

MADRAS, Oct. 25.

The Indian Peace-Keeping Force has virtually taken control of Jaffna town and the LTTE leaders and cadres have fled their strongholds. The IPKF has cleared Jaffna town, except for a small area of one sq. km. around the Hindu College.

"There is no organised resistance left ... Organised resistance has crumbled, "an External Affairs Ministry spokesman told reporters here today. Last night, the IPKF took control of the LTTE headquarters opposite the Jaffna University. According to information received from people gathered round the Nallur Kandaswamy temple and elsewhere, the LTTE leaders and cadres had fled Jaffna. "All efforts to free Jaffna from the LTTE's armed control has been virtually completed," the spokesman said.

"We have to carefully assess how many LTTE cadres have left their arms and run away. There might be LTTE cadres hiding within the city", he added. "When you are being sniped at, you cannot go into every house. It will be dealt with. It will be a routine matter."

Relief being moved in

The attention had now shifted to moving relief supplies for the people. "We are moving the relief supplies as fast as we can," the spokesman stressed.

Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh, Overall Commander, IPKF, flew into Jaffna this morning, accompanied by Maj. Gen. C. A. Barretto, Chief Engineer, Southern Command. The objective of the visit was quickly to clear the roads of mines laid by the LTTE to restore free movement. The roads had been extensively mined and an IPKF truck carrying relief supplies to the people around the Nallur temple was damaged in a landmine blast this morning.

IPKF units distributing food to people around the temple were also fired at last night. Despite the problem of moving relief supplies because of landmines, the IPKF was ferrying food both by air and by road, the External Affairs Ministry spokesman said. "There are 80,000 people in various camps to whom we are reaching out."

The LTTE had damaged the high tension wires and the IPKF had established contact with the Sri Lankan Government through the Indian High Commission in Colombo and urged that engineers be sent to restore the power lines. The Jaffna General Hospital was now functioning and a Lieutenant Colonel belonging to the IPKF was looking after the hospital. Three tonnes of medical supplies had been sent to the hospital. The assistance of the Red Cross would also be enlisted.

Replying to a question whether he expected any diplomatic initiative to get under way since the IPKF had virtuallly taken control of Jaffna town, the spokesman replied, "It is up to them (LTTE). The amnesty offer is absolutely on for the (LTTE) cadres."

He added that the Sikh Regiment had carried out the operations around the Jaffna University area. The Gorkha Regiment, who are "devout people" had been posted around the Nallur Kandaswamy temple. There was the Madras Regiment around the Navatkuli area.

UNI reports:

The spokesman said that in the last 24 hours the IPKF suffered four killed and three wounded.

UNI reports from Colombo:

Indian military sources said at least 18 IPKF personnel, taken captive by the LTTE, were also believed to have been taken to the Nallur temple, apparently to deter the IPKF from storming it. There were still about 12,000 refugees in the temple compound and a majority of them were being held against their will by the LTTE. There were reports that a large number of militants have taken shelter in the temple behind the refugees for a last ditch battle.

An Indian High Commission spokesman said that in the eastern Navatkuli sector, the IPKF had captured an estimated five tonnes of ammunition and explosives from a single LTTE dump.

Prabakaran may be in Point Pedro

From Manoj Joshi

JAFFNA, Oct. 25.

With the IPKF gaining effective control over the whole of Jaffna city, the Commander of the Brigade conducting the operations in the area to the west of the railway line announced here to a group of visiting presspersons from New Delhi that the entire Municipal city limits had come under the effective control of the IPKF.

However, the visiting presspersons heard sounds of explosions and small arms fire in the city and smoke billowing on the horizon. Senior IPKF officers told presspersons that the bulk of the explosions were in fact mines being detonated by the IPKF engineers, since all the areas so far taken over had been heavily mined and booby trapped. Some small arms fire was of course to be heard.

Touched off by obduracy: Speaking to the presspersons this morning at Palaly, Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh, Overall Commander of the IPKF and GOC in Chief of the Southern Command said that the entire action was touched off by the obduracy of the LTTE visible in the first week of October.

On October 9, the LTTE commenced its hostilities by attacking the patrol of the First Maratta Light Infantry near the fort area and another of the IPKF camps. Up till then the possibility of their attack was not considered in a military sense. The IPKF had never really thought that they would ever enter into hostilities with the LTTE. At that time, the force level of the IPKF in Jaffna was just one Brigade and the requirement was to proceed to Jaffna city quickly and not allow it to become an LTTE bastion. This one Brigade was far too small for the requirement of the IPKF since it was still on the ground.

The LTTE had an armed cadre which had taken strong defensive measures in the interim period, like laying mines and setting up booby traps. Therefore the progress of the IPKF was initially very slow and limited till the reinforcements came in from the Trincomalee, Batticaloa areas and also from India.

"Clearing will take time": Gen. Depinder Singh said that the process of "clearing up" would take a little time. "I cannot be specific. All I can say is it will take time." Despite closing all escape routes this process had been done slowly as per the advance of the IPKF. In the last few days, before the closure some infiltration had taken place and this was indicated through radio intercepts, Gen. Depinder Singh said.

He said in response to a question that never in his life had he encountered mines and booby traps with such high explosive contents as here. He said the major weaponry used by the LTTE, besides homemade mortars, comprised AK-47 rifles and G-3 automatic rifles along with mines and booby traps which in fact were lethal.

In response to a question, Gen. Depinder Singh said that there was no reliable information on the whereabouts of Mr. V. Prabakaran. "I think he probably left few days after the operations and that he may be in the Point Pedro area."

"I cannot see him being inside the city. After five or six days of fighting", General Depinder Singh said, "it would have been clear to the LTTE that they had to either stay and fight to the last man or the last cyanide pill or leave a certain minimum number to stay inside and the rest exfiltrate out. I suspect that the bulk would be exfiltrated by now. It is my wild guess that 1,000 to 1,200 of LTTE cadres would have got out."

He told the correspondents that the total fire power options were not even considered. It would have been much quicker and there would have been far fewer casualties for the IPKF and many more civilians casualties. He explained that the IPKF's task there was not to fight any enemy. "We are here taking certain actions against occupancy", he added.

Civilian casualties: In response to a question, the General said so far the IPKF had not taken up any accounting of the civilian casualties. However, he said he had put certain people on the task to gather the information from refugees and other people. Since the IPKF had, however, taken extreme precautions to ensure no civilian casualties resulted, one of these was to send officers and the JCO to be upfront in any action. He said that "I cannot deny that there would be no casualties."

In response to a question as to whether he could say that Jaffna had fallen, the General said "if you mean when you could drive through all parts of the city safely that would mean a lot of time since it would take time to defuse the mines and the booby traps and to take care of sniper fire."



These kids have a unhindered ride on the desolate platform of Madras Egmore station as train services were suspended for 24 hours in view of DMK's "rail roko" plan to protest against IPKF action in Sri Lanka. *An EXPRESS photo by V. Ramaswamy*
25.10.87



IPKF drive into gain control over Jaffna. ---- the armed .....the armless.

Escaped rebel leaders may regroup to launch fresh guerrilla offensive

India poised for victory

REPORT

From Derek Brown in Colombo Oct 26

Indian forces are poised for victory over the Tamil Tiger defenders of Jaffna in the northern peninsula of Sri Lanka as rebel forces slipped past advancing troops and escaped.

"The bulk, left, no question," the commander of the Indian forces said yesterday to foreign journalists allowed into the city that had been the Tigers' stronghold for two years.

Lieutenant-General Depinder Singh's rough estimate of the number who escaped north of Colombo was 1,000 to 1,200.

But the Indians have taken heavy casualties in the 15-day battle. The latest official figure is 159 killed, with 555 wounded and 38 missing.

None of the leading Tigers have been killed or captured. There is every indication that the remaining rebels will regroup and reopen an offensive.

Meanwhile, horror stories from refugees and others trapped in the fighting zone have multiplied. The few reporters who have managed to breach the tight Indian controls on access to the Jaffna peninsula have brought back detailed accounts of indiscriminate artillery fire, strafing from Sri Lankan helicopter gunships, and other atrocities committed by the advancing troops.

The Indians stoutly deny all such allegations. They are now sufficiently confident of ultimate victory to have allowed two parties of reporters to visit Jaffna at the weekend.

The reporters were taken to the old Dutch fort, where they heard the evidence of continuing fighting: sniper fire, sporadic shelling, and mortar exchanges.

But the new Indian commander in the peninsula, Major General A.S. Kalkat, told them: "We control the metropolitan part of the city. The final battle is over." The "final battle" apparently referred to the Tigers' ferocious response to the initial Indian attacks, when the rebels stood their ground and defended carefully prepared bunkers and trenches.

The fighting has since entered a new phase, with the Tigers reverting to ambushes, sniping, and landmines; techniques in which they have proved a deadly efficiency.

Reporters and refugees from the north agree that the rebels, far from defeated or even demoralised, remain highly organised and determined to resist the Indian occupying forces.

On both sides, it is now tacitly accepted that Jaffna is a prestige, rather than practical, prize. The Tigers have said they will defend it to the last man, and the Indians seem about to prove the emptiness of that boast.

But there is ample evidence that the rebels are capable of a psychological as well as tactical shift to guerrilla warfare in other Tamil areas, including a huge swathe of northern Sri Lanka beyond the Jaffna peninsula.

On Thursday, one of the key escape and supply routes of the Tamil Tigers, the ferry over the lagoon separating Jaffna from the rest of Northern Province, was abruptly cut by Indian troops backed by Sri Lankan helicopters. Refugees spoke of indiscriminate firing from the air, which killed one person and wounded several more.

But by Saturday, the Indian troops had pulled out of the southern shore of the lagoon. The road leading to the ferry was almost deserted.

One young Tiger volunteer cradling an assault rifle, with a companion carrying a walkie talkie radio, provided the only evidence of a war that has already claimed hundreds of lives and looks increasingly to be developing into a bloody stalemate.

Siege over, focus on succour to Jaffna

BATTLE □ FOR □ JAFFNA

NEWS

MADRAS, Oct. 26

With the collapse of the organised resistance of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and establishment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force's control over Jaffna, the focus is now on relief measures which have started in earnest, according to an External Affairs Ministry spokesman here today.

He told pressperson is that a team of IAS officers and other civilian advisers would leave for Jaffna shortly to work with the IPKF in providing relief measures to the people. They would help restore normality and assist the local administration.

TNEB engineers in Jaffna

Four engineers including two from the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board — a superintending engineer and an executive engineer — flew into Jaffna today to study measures needed to restore power supply in the town. High priority is being given to re-erection of high tension wires damaged by the LTTE and it will be done in phases.

Four medical teams of four members each from the Indian Red Cross also landed in Jaffna today. They will attend to the immediate needs of the people around the Nallur Kandaswamy temple.

The Indian vessel "Island Glory" is unloading relief supplies at the Kankesanturai port and the goods have started moving into Jaffna.

The IPKF yesterday distributed 15 tonnes of food packets to the people around the Nallur temple, the Jaffna University and Navatkuli areas.

The spokesman said the highest attention was being paid in New Delhi to restoring normal civilian life in Jaffna. "Our primary emphasis is on opening a line of communication to feed them (the people) and give them medical assistance," the spokesman said. "We are now looking at the welfare of the people."

The general mood of the people in Jaffna was one of relief. They were emerging from a situation of siege they were in for almost four years.

To another query, the spokesman said that Jaffna has always been a symbol of the LTTE's extra-constitutional authority, which has been removed. Qualitatively, it is a different political situation. They (LTTE) no longer exercise armed control. They have fled." The LTTE men, while fleeing, had ransacked a number of houses on the outskirts of Jaffna, he said.

The IPKF had captured a number of LTTE militants and many other LTTE men were also killed. "To that extent, they have been disarmed." In Navatkuli, one of the LTTE's arms dumps was discovered. The existence of the dump was reported to the IPKF by one of the civilians there.

The spokesman said the "contact continues" with the LTTE even after the "Tigers" had fled.

Replying to a newsperson, the spokesman said Maj. Gen. Harkirat Singh, GOC, IPKF, met Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh, Overall Force Commander, IPKF, today in Madras, after the former's consultations in Delhi. Maj. Gen. Harkirat Singh is expected to be back in Palaly in the Jaffna peninsula in a day or two.

Nallur temple priest hands over three jawans

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI, Oct. 26.

Three jawans of the Mahar Regiment were handed over to the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) by the priest of the Nallur Kandaswamy temple in Jaffna. It is not known where or when they were captured by the LTTE, but 47 soldiers are officially listed as "missing in action." The IPKF has been liaising with the Nallur temple priest who has been helping in the distribution of IPKF relief supplies.

In a last ditch stand, the LTTE today fired on the IPKF from some buildings in the Kokkuvil area. The buildings have been surrounded by the IPKF and it is believed that the area is one of the LTTE's last bastions.

Mopping up operation: An External Affairs Ministry spokesman said here today that the IPKF was now engaged in "mopping-up operations" in Jaffna city to eliminate sporadic fire from snipers. It is also clearing the city of the extensive mines and booby traps laid by the LTTE. Yesterday, the IPKF lost five jawans and 28 were wounded, mostly from mine blasts. The spokesman said 20 LTTE militants had been killed in the last 24 hours.

IPKF helicopters were fired upon while dropping food packets for the refugees in the Nallur temple area. There are 56,000 refugees at 15 locations, the largest concentration being in the Nallur temple and the Hindu College. Sniper fire was directed at the IPKF from buildings around the temple.

The spokesman said the LTTE seemed "bent upon" impeding the IPKF's relief and rehabilitation efforts started on a massive scale. "After having lost their bastions in Jaffna, the LTTE hierarchy is desperately trying to keep the civilian population under its coercive domination.

UNI reports from Jaffna:

Brig. Manjit Singh, Commander of the IPKF at the Jaffna municipal area, ruled out house-to-house searches in this town of 1.5 million people as this could antagonise the local population against the IPKF. He said even the chief priest of the Nallur temple had confessed that his son was an LTTE member.

DMK protest

Madras, Oct. 26: DMK President M. Karunanidhi on Monday night broke a television and a radio set as a token protest against what he alleged was the disinformation campaign by the Centre on the Eelam issue.

Addressing a public meeting at Purasawalkam on the eve of the DMK's picketing of Central Government offices in the City on Tuesday, Mr. Karunanidhi charged the Centre with suppressing the Sri Lankan Tamil militants.

Mr. Karunanidhi said the DMK agitation was not politically motivated, but only to highlight the plight of the Lankan Tamils.

DMK MPs V. Gopalaswami, N. V. N. Somu and party leaders K. Anbazhagan, S. J. Sadiq Pasha and Manjil Manoharan also spoke.

DMK Chief M. Karunanidhi with the TV set he broke as a token protest on Monday night. *Express*

THE HINDU

Pak., Israeli arms seized by IPKF

NEWS

JAFFNA, Oct. 26.

Large quantities of arms with Pakistani and Israeli markings have been seized from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) militants by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).

IPKF officers told this to visiting reporters who were taken round the war ravaged town. The arms included heavy mortars, grenades, medium machineguns and the highly rated Uzi machine carbines.

Though the IPKF announced a successful conclusion of "Operation Pawan" to dislodge the entrenched LTTE from Jaffna, some remnant LTTE cadres continue to be holded up in the town, particularly in their stronghold near the famous Nallur Kandaswamy Temple, the university area and in some pockets in the eastern part of the town.

IPKF sources said though the whole of Jaffna and eastern Trincomalee areas were highly patrolled, there were reports of a recent landing of a large arms consignment by sea.

The sources, citing intelligence reports, said last fortnight the LTTE took delivery of 700 heavy calibre weapons in the eastern province.

The sources said the arms were obviously smuggled in by sea. There were reports in the past of the LTTE owning two ocean going vessels which were used to smuggle in arms following cladestine purchases in South East Asia.

The sources said that after a tipoff last week, the Indian Navy and Sri Lankan patrols had scared off a vessel which was trying to sneak into Sri Lankan waters.—PTI

1000 may have died: At least a thousand people, troops, militants and civilians are estimated to have died in the battle for Jaffna. Even as the (IPKF) said it had gained "effective control" over the municipal limits of the town yesterday, a mine-blast killed the 150th member of the force.

The worst casualties suffered by the IPKF was in the commando raid on the telecommunication centre of the LTTE on the Jaffna University campus on the night of October 12. A company of support troops, landed in the wrong clearing, was surrounded by the LTTE. After holding out for 24 hours, their ammunition ran out and 29 of them were killed.

LTTE loses 700: The LTTE has lost 700 of its men, according to compilations by the IPKF of intercepted radio messages although no physical verification has been made.

Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh, Overall Commander of the IPKF, said the army had no count of civilian casualties. The LTTE claimed through its London offices yesterday that the toll was as high as 200.

More conservative estimates by church authorities put the figure at half that and army officiers here say it is a reliable figure.

LTTE CLAIMS

On 26.10.87 in the morning at about 10 'o clock, at Ponnalai bridge, Indian helicopters, attacked with new types of rocket mortars on the people who have lost their all and were leaving their heerth and home as refugees. The Indian helicopters threw 5 rocket mortars. Five innocent civilians, including a boy were killed and 15 were wounded. Two of them lost their legs and two mini buses were destroyed.

In the fierce battle, that brokeout in the morning at Kokkuvil Junction and Parameswara Junction, between the LTTE and the Indian army, the Liberation Tigers captured 2 R.M.G., 4 S.L.R., 4 S.M.G. and one pasuka rocket launcher from the Indian army.

At Kokkuvil Junction when the LTTE attacked a military truck mounted with cannon, it was completely destroyed. All those in the vehicle were also killed on the spot..

At Peraru in Trincomalee District, the LTTE camp was surrounded and attacked by the Sinhala army. This took place at about 11 a.m. There was no loss of weapons on the side of the LTTE.

Shells fell on Subramaniam ashram Alaveddy 12 refugees died. Number of others injured.

IPKF IN JAFFNA: *Above left:* **Brigadier Manjit Singh, Commander of the IPKF in the Jaffna municipal area, keeping himself fully informed of the current operations.** Indian Express

Can IPKF win over the Tamils?

By VASUKI RAO

Express News Service

Jaffna, Oct. 26: Although the Peace-Keeping Force has virtually won the battle of Jaffna against the LTTE, India appears to have lost the support of the Sri Lankan Tamils.

This is the impression one got during a brief visit to Jaffna on Sunday and even briefer chats with some Tamils at the General Hospital here.

As you fly over Jaffna you see only a vast expanse of greenery upto the horizon, coconut trees rising majestically above them, and the Indian Ocean constantly kissing the coastline. The sky was heavily overcast and rain peppered the island in sudden bursts. There is no fear of drought here.

However, this picture of idyllic bliss was rudely shattered as we landed at Palaly airfield outside Jaffna. The airfield was ringed by gun emplacements of the IPKF, and the only activity around was of the Indian army and air force.

A ghost town: Jaffna is a ghost town with its soul shattered. All buildings have been heavily damaged in the LTTE's quarrels with the Sri Lankan army and the IPKF. Because of the curfew, not a soul was in sight — not even stray dogs. The only sound we heard was the groan of army vehicles, the clatter of air force helicopters, and the caws of crows. These were punctuated by sudden bursts of machine-gun fire, and loud explosions as army engineers destroyed the mines.

It was only at the hospital that a group of visiting Delhi journalists saw civilians for the first time. A young Tamil in his twenties alleged that his shop was bombed by an IAF aircraft. However, at the airfield the only aircraft seen were helicopters and transport planes of the IAF even though fighting was still raging in parts of the town. An old man came out of a ward holding his grandson and alleged that his daughter and several other members of the family were killed in Indian shelling. These chats gave the distinct impression that the IPKF presence is resented. NEWS

Senior army officials said that when the hostilities between the IPKF and LTTE began on Oct. 9, more than 90 per cent of the Jaffna population backed the militants and provided logistic support. This support is still evident, officials said. LTTE snipers have mingled with the population and fire or dart out to lay mines to hit the IPKF.

Gloomy outlook: It is this support and its homeground that enabled the LTTE to fight the might of the Indian army. But what should worry the Indian people is the possibility of the Indian armed forces getting stuck in Sri Lanka for a long period of counter insurgency operations. This will be particularly watched with interest by both Pakistan and China, whose borders with India need constant vigil.

Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh, GOC-in-C, Southern Command, said that from the middle of September the LTTE began a campaign to malign the IPKF. It discouraged the civilians from using IPKF medical facilities. It spread rumours of rape and torture. "The LTTE's public relations was excellent," Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh said. "The people easily swallow such stories, and denials are not effective." However, he claimed that the civilian attitude was changing. Some people had offered to take the IPKF to hidden LTTE arms caches.

Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh said he believed that the bulk of the LTTE cadre had escaped from Jaffna after the IPKF operation began. The army commander said his guess was that this number could range from 1000 to 1200, and conceded that even one guerilla could give a lot of trouble. Among those who escaped early in the operations was LTTE chief V. Prabhakaran, who was last reported to have been seen at Point Pedro in the northwest.

The LTTE has given a good fight to the IPKF. Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh said the Pakistanis would have been envious if they had seen the LTTE fortifications in Jaffna. "I have never in my entire service encountered the amount of explosive content that the LTTE deployed here," he said.

The LTTE has been buying arms from the Singapore market. It received a shipload of 700 weapons in September. It has been using Chinese and Israeli rifles, and Pakistani ammunition. Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh categorically denied that any Indian arms were found with LTTE.

According to army estimates, 600 LTTE militants plus supporters have been killed in the present operations. Other estimates of civilian casualties vary from 60 to 200 dead.

Why is the IPKF concentrating on Jaffna? An official of the Indian External Affairs Ministry said the LTTE had been running the town, it was a state within a state. So its capture would send an important signal both to the people and the LTTE cadre that the rule of armed might would not now be tolerated.

A faint hope: The Indian Government still appears to be hoping that Mr. Prabhakaran will change his mind and come to terms, even though he has made it clear while taking on the Indian army that he will not.

The External Affairs Ministry official said if Prabhakaran lays down arms and supports the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement, the Indian Government will take up with the Sri Lankan Government any proposal he makes for consideration.

Even if the IPKF does not get involved in a prolonged guerilla war with LTTE, it will be present in Jaffna for many months. Army engineers are being brought here to restore electricity and water supplies and begin rebuilding the shattered town. An estimated 60,000 people have gathered at refugee camps, and they will have to be rehabilitated. At present there is no one even to police the town. Administration is the next step and moves are afoot in India on this aspect. 27.10.87

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

Subcontracting Oppression

Ashok Mitra

October 31, 1987

What is now happening in Sri Lanka is known in the language of commerce as subcontracting. The Sri Lanka president has subcontracted the job of restoring law and order in his country to our prime minister. The Indian fire-power, once it has succeeded in killing off a few thousand Tamil activists, would perhaps be able to enforce a kind of silence in the island. The discontent will smoulder inside though, and peace and amity will remain distant entities. Hatred toward Indians and the Indian regime will be the only common point binding the Sri Lanka Sinhalese and the Sri Lanka Tamils.

COMMENT

HYPOCRISY spilleth over. Over the years, the good and honest government of India, with a little prodding from the chief minister of Tamil Nadu, had supplied the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam with all the arms and equipment they have felt the need for, including broadcasting and telecasting transmitters. A few months ago, when a Director-General of Police in Tamil Nadu had his wires crossed and seized some of these equipment, he was given quick marching orders, and Tamil Nadu's chief minister, no doubt with the support and consent of New Delhi, arranged for the post-haste return of the transmitters to LTTE personnel.

I loved her once, but that was in another country; besides, the wench is dead. No, the wench is not dead. The LTTE has outlived its utility, the government in New Delhi has cultivated other friends. It has signed an accord with the Sri Lanka president; that accord is *uber alles*. There is thus the feigning of shock and outrage at discovering transmission equipment with the LTTE cadres. This is known as percentage play in both cricket and tennis; you take your chance, people may not remember that, originally, it was you who had provided the transmitters to the boys now being shot down like dogs in the streets and camps of Jaffna and Trincomalee.

Authoritarianism slides into militarism, and none within the country is seemingly much concerned. The fact that our troops are in Sri Lanka and killing Tamil young men at the invitation of the established government in the island is neither here nor there. Since when have we adopted a foreign policy which asserts that, whenever an external power calls upon us, we will supply, *gratis*, our forces so that they might suppress insurgents bothering it? What is happening is known in the language of commerce as subcontracting. The Sri Lanka president has subcontracted the job of restoring law and order in his country to our prime minister. Our troops are carrying out the assignment. Perhaps no bill will be sent either. The Americans did this on a somewhat grander scale in Vietnam twenty-five years ago; they had the alibi of being invited in by this president Diem or that general Thieu.

The Vietnam analogy is of course somewhat imprecise. The US troops did not mow down in that country anyone who was of American extraction. We have done better; we have taken on the task of exterminating persons of Tamil extraction. All in the line of duty; has not our prime minister signed an agreement with the Sri Lanka president? The terms of the agreement are sacrosanct; whoever stands in the way of the agreement being implemented will be liquidated without compunction. This is officially declared policy in New Delhi, much acclaimed by president Jayewardene. The opposition leaders, so vociferous over Bofors and corruption, have suddenly lost their voice; jingoism is a great leveller of party distinctions. Some amongst the opposition are cheering along our troops because they have suddenly discovered an international conspiracy within LTTE ranks. The American administration and the British establishment too are all for the Indian offensive; president Jayewardene, it is more or less on record, first had cleared it with Washington before inviting the Indians in. It is therefore a formidable joint front, made up of president Reagan, the Indian jingoes and, finally, the Indian ideologues. The agreement has to be saved. If that means obliterating the close-to-three-million Tamil citizens, ah, well, it cannot be helped. The Nazis had a term for such ventures: the final solution. Our jingoes and ideologues would like to call it by a different name: it is restoration of peace, and therefore very much a part of the movement to usher in peace for, and solidarity with, the working masses all over the world. The Americans too, after all, had intended to return Vietnam to tranquillity.

But at least the Americans had the foresight to tag it on to a grander cause: saving the world from communism. In our case, it is only our prime minister's credentials that are at stake. The Tamil boys have to die exclusively on that score. The agreement was not to the liking of the LTTE. There is general recognition that the Liberation Tigers command the loyalty of overwhelming sections of the Tamil community, otherwise neither country's government would have allowed them a majority of seats on the Interim Administrative Council proposed for the northern and eastern provinces. The majority of Sri Lanka Tamils, it obviously follows, are against the agreement. But so what, the Indian prime minister wanted to sign it, the Tamils do not matter. The principal leader of LTTE was flown to New Delhi and kept in semi-detention until he would agree, with reluctance, to announce to the world that while his heart was not in it and he would not sign the accord, he would not actively oppose it either. In the light of further developments, he and his people have now decided to oppose it. Such insubordination cannot be tolerated. They must be taught the lesson of their lives.

Is it impermissible for the LTTE to have a mind of its own, and not to sign on the dotted line notwithstanding the Indian prime minister and his retinue wanting it to? The devolution of powers and resources to the proposed Tamil-dominated province is left undefined in the agreement, but the government of India, about everybody knows, is trying to persuade the Sri Lanka authorities to accept the pattern of devolution settled for our own states in the Seventh Schedule of the constitution. Given the experience of the states here, it would be utterly suicidal for the Sri Lanka Tamils to accept the formula being offered to them. The Concurrent List in our constitution is a sham, for, in regard to each item covered by this List, the voice of the Union, the constitution says, must prevail. The State List too can be played around with impunity; a state government cannot enforce even a land reform legislation without the centre's concurrence, irrespective of the garrulity of the State List. If they fall for the trap of the Indian model, the Sri Lanka Tamils would be unable to run their broadcasting and television programmes. The reservations felt by the LTTE about what the Indian authorities would like to force down their throat are thus both understandable and justified.

Has New Delhi, besides, any *locus standi* to sign an agreement which concerns Sri Lanka's internal affairs? Our prime minister presumed to append his signature on behalf of the island's Tamil population. Because he and his mother had provided shelter and various kinds of other assistance to the insurgent Tamils, he regards it his prerogative to take decisions on their behalf and pin them down to these decisions. If they would not be pinned down, he would shoot them.

There is no provision in the United Nations Charter of Human Rights which allows him such a privilege. If the Tamils would not listen to him, he could have simply asked them to clear out of Indian soil and try to shape their destinies elsewhere. He could have considered the investment on the LTTE as a dead loss and left it there. He could have informed the Sri Lanka president

that, sorry, he was unable to make the Tamils see reason and observe the terms of the agreement, so he, president Jayewardene, was welcome to take whatever measures he chose to take. But, despite the opposition parties, with tails demurely between their legs, supporting him, our prime minister had no business to indulge in the exterminating operation he has at the moment embarked upon.

The rejoinder perhaps would be that, had our troops not gone in and quelled the Tamil insurgency—an insurgency which our government itself had initially fuelled in order to curry favour with Tamil Nadu's chief minister—the Sri Lanka president would have called US troops in, and we could then be indirectly held responsible for American intrusion in the region. Wishes however are not horses, not even president Jayewardene's horses. President Reagan and the Republican administration have for the present enough on their hands. Nicaragua and the Gulf are claiming their harassed, undivided attention. After Iranscan, it would for some time be pretty impossible for the US government to engage itself militarily in any other part of the world without the explicit sanction of the Congress. With a presidential election coming up next year, Congressmen and Senators would have never agreed to be involved in such a dubious cause as Sri Lanka. The American administration had, after all, already done its arithmetic and had accordingly suggested to the Sri Lanka president that he better get his dirty work done by the Indians; New Delhi would have been kept fully informed of the advice tendered by the Americans.

Therefore our prime minister marched his troops—*our* troops—only to satisfy his ego. He and his advisers live by the day, and are incapable of seeing beyond their noses. By going into Sri Lanka, we may have made the island's president, who is ruling by emergency decrees, happy. But to the rest of the Sinhala population—and this would certainly include important functionaries of the government itself—our name is mud. It will now take decades before the Sri Lanka population would once more be prepared to consider us as anything but aggrandisers; no people like to be interfered with. The Sinhalese heap scorn on the accord and are outraged by the Indian presence. The Tamils dislike it with equal vehemence. The Indian fire-power, once it has succeeded in killing off a few thousand Tamil activists, would perhaps be able to enforce a kind of silence in the island. The discontent will smoulder inside though, and peace and amity will remain distant—indeed, very distant—entities. Hatred toward Indians and the Indian regime will be the only common point binding the Sri Lanka Sinhalese and the Sri Lanka Tamils.

By our adventure in Sri Lanka, we have handed over to the Pakistan authorities a bonus propaganda point: if India could do it in Sri Lanka, next time she would be tempted to do it in Bangladesh, or Bhutan, or Nepal, or the Maldives. Some of these nations, much in the manner of Sri Lanka, will keep their fear and distrust of us within themselves and even accept our gifts. They will nonetheless continue to hate India with a cathartic glee, and wait for the first opportunity to do us in. Big brothers, more particularly big brothers who practise the dictum of heads-I-win-tails-you-lose, are not popular in any neighbourhood.

On the other hand, the people who should worry the most are the Chakmas of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh. They are being squeezed out, the Bangladeshis from the plains want to settle in their lands, they are fleeing in droves and seeking shelter in Tripura and some of the other states and union territories in the north-east. Occasionally they have been receiving some bounties from the union government. But they should be watchful. One of these days, the Indian prime minister may feel like signing an accord on their behalf with the Bangladesh government. They might not like it, they would not be given a choice. And if they give vent to any funny intentions, maybe Indian troops would be invited into Bangladesh territory to take care of their intransigence. The glory of the *imperium* that is India would remain intact. The prime minister's more than loyal opposition would nod approving heads. They would oppose him, but only on issues which do not affect the nation's imperial interests. The Tamils and the Chakmas and suchlike are expendable, a great nation soon learns to rise beyond these petty concerns.

Indian troops killed in Sri Lanka—News

Caravan, Oct 87

REPORT

Massacre at the Hospital

The Jaffna Hospital was occupied by the IPKF about 4 p.m. on Deepavali day, October 21, 1987. About 50 people died in the process and their bodies were burnt lay within the hospital premises. On October 23 about 81 bodies were burnt on the orders of Brigadier Brar of the IPKF, the whole operation being supervised by Captain Bist of Headquarters Fort Camp, Jaffna, with the assistance of Dr. Kanagarajah and Dr. Bansari, both of the IPKF. No inquests or postmortems were held before the bodies were disposed of.

The dead included 20 members of the hospital's Administrative and X-Ray Branches. Also killed that day were many patients warded in the hospital and their relatives who were visiting them at the time of the IPKF operation, totalling 30. Another 12 bodies in an advanced stage of decomposition were in the mortuary. None of the 12 could be identified.

All 20 of the hospital staff were identified by their colleagues. Of the other 30 only 11 were identified either by relatives or by the identity cards found on the bodies. Some of the dead were beyond identification as the bodies were badly multilated from the shooting and shelling. Many of the unidentified were believed to have been patients, but positive identification was not possible as many BHTs (Bed Head Tickets) were missing in the chaos and confusion that accompanied the IPKF occupation of the hospital and by the shelling.

Many of the deaths of patients was due to lack of medical care. Several patients badly injured and bleeding profusely after the IPKF shelling of the hospital could not be taken up for immediate surgery as the Operating Theatre had also been damanged by shells. The power failure resulted in the death of 3 patients including an infant in the Intensive Care Unit who at the time was fitted with an electric sucker. The other two were on Ventilators at the time. The Blood Bank could not function after the power failure.

The Jaffna General Hospital literally stinks.

'There is no water and no electricity.'

The mortuary is full of corpses.

Up to Friday, 75 people's (ages ranging from one year to 85) bodies were brought to hospital.

SR learns more bodies are yet to be brought to hospital.

The Nurses' Quarters was hit by shells. The nurses escaped death because they took refuge in the ground floor. They are understandable reluctant to work.

The Tellipalai Govt. Hospital has closed down.

A private hospital at Manipay – Green Memorial Hospital – has also been forced to close down

We give below the names and designations of the hospital staff killed by the IPKF and where their bodies were found:

1. Dr. A. Sivapathasunderam, Consultant Paediatrician (in X-Ray Block); 2. Dr. M.K. Ganesharatnam, Registrar, Sugery (X-Ray Block); 3. Dr. Parimelalakar, MO, OPD (hospital entrance, facing Clock Tower Rd.); 4. Miss. Vadivel, Matron (AO's Office); 5. Mr. Kanapathy Krishnarajah, Overseer (X-Ray Block); 6. Mr. Kandian Selvarajah, Overseer (X-Ray Block); 7. Miss. Mankayatkarasy; 8. Paramanathan, Nursing Office (X-Ray Block); 9. Miss. Leelawathy, Nursing Office (X-Ray Block); 10. Mr. Vaitilingam Shanmugalingam, Ambulance Driver (Overseer' Office); 11. Mr. Ramalingam Suhumar, labourer (Overseer's Office); 12. Mr. Gopalapillai Uruthiren, labourer (Overseer's Office); 13. Mr. Sivaloganathan, labourer (Overseers' Office); 14. Mr. Ponnambalam Varatharajah, labour (Overseers' Office); 15. Mr. Kurusu John Peter, labourer (Overseers' Office); 16. Mr. Markandu, labourer (Overseers' Office); 17. Mr. Muthukumaru Thurairajah, labourer (Overseers' Office); 18. Mr. Kaniah Vetharanium (Wd. 12 corridor); 19. Mr. Rajaratnam Ratnarajah, labourer (Overseers' Office); 20. Mr. Pandian Sivarajah, labourer (Overseers' Office); 21. Mr. Sinnappu Joganathan, labourer (Overseers' Office).

We give below the names of patients, their relatives and civilians who took refuge in the hospital and who fell victim to the IPKF:

22. Mr. Sinnathamby Velupillai, civilian (X-Ray Block); 23. Mrs. Avudaiammah Soodamany, patient, Wd. 8B (X-Ray Block); 24. Mr. Seller Sivapatham, pt. Wd. 15 (X-Ray Block); 25. Mr. Sinnavai Sinnathurai, pt. Wd. 14 (X-Ray Block); 26. Mrs. Rajasri Thiyagarajah, pt. Wd. 9B (X-Ray Block); 27. Mrs. Maheswari Rajadurai, civilian (X-Ray Block); 28. Mr. Mahendran Thuraisamy, civilian (X-Ray Block); 29. Mr. Periyanayagam, civilian (X-Ray Block); 30. Mr. Easwaran, civilian (X-Ray Block); 31. Ramiah, pt. Wd. 19 (Wd. 14); 32. Mr. Subramaniyam, cook, HO quarters (Overseers' Office); 33. a young girl, pt. Wd 8A (died in bed when shell hit ward); 34. elderly woman, pt. Wd. 8 (corridor by Overseers' Office); 35. elderly man, pt. Wd. 14 (in same-ward); 36. elderly man with left eye patch, pt. Wd. 15 (X-Ray Block); 37. a teenaga boy, civilian (X-Ray Block); 38. elderly man with grey hair, pt. Surgical Wd. (X-Ray Block); 39. man, middle-age, pt. Surgical Wd. (X-Ray Block); 40. elderly woman, pt. Surg. Wd. (X-Ray Block); 41. man, middle-age, pt. Surg. Wd. (X-Ray Block); 42. elderly woman, pt. Surg. Wd. (X-Ray Block); 43. elderly man, pt. Med. Wd. (in Wd. 14); 44. young man, pt. Med. Wd. (X-Ray Block); 45. middle-aged woman, pt. Med. Wd. (X-Ray Block); 46. middle-aged man, pt. Med. Wd. (X-Ray Block); 47. middle-aged woman, pt. Med. Wd. (X-Ray Block); 48. young girl, civilian (corridor by Overseers' Office); 49. middle-aged woman, civilian (near hospital entrance facing Clock Tower Rd.); 50. youngman, Wd. 5, Bed 1 (shell blast victim); 51. Mrs. Visuvalingam Yogammah, 50 yrs. Wd. 8B (shell blast); 52. Mr. Subramaniam Suntharesweran, 22 yrs. Wd. 25 (shell blast); 53. Mr. S. Poobalasingham, Wd. 5, BHT 33397 (cause of death could not be ascertained); 54. middle-aged man, Wd. 5 (shell blast); 55. elderly man, Wd. 18 Bed 4 (shell blast); 56. Satheeskumar Ratnasingham, 10 yrs. Wd. 25 (shall blast); 57. Vijayakumar Ratnasingham, 14 yrs. Wd. 25 (shell blast); 58. Mr. Sinnathurai Vinothan, 30 yrs. Wd. 25(shell blast); 59. Mr. Iyadurai, Wd. 6, diabetic ulcer, (died from lack of medical care); 60. Mr. Nadarajah Jeyaseelan, Wd. 25 (shell blast); 61. elderly man, Wd. 25 (casue of death could not be ascertained); 62. Miss. Nilaw, (died when Ventilator could not be operated after power failure); 63. Vinotha, 6 mths. (died when electric sucker stopped with power failure); 64. Jayaseelan, 18 yrs. (died when Ventilator could not be operated after power failure); 65. 4-day old baby (died from neonatal Jaundice); 66. young man, about 20 yrs. Wd. 25 (shell blast); 67. old man, 60 yrs. Wd. 25 (cause of death could not be ascertained).

A report containing all available details as given above was handed over to Dr. Natchinarkiniyan of the Jaffna General Hospital on November 7, 1987.

Jaffna hospital has suffered little

NEWS

JAFFNA, Oct. 27.

The Jaffna Government and Teaching Hospital complex, with its red tiled Dutch pattern blocks, stands unscathed, with no visible signs of damage, as correspondents from international media were taken there by the Indian Peace-Keeping Force.

"We have nothing to hide and you see for yourself", the extent of "vicious lies that were bandied about" by the propaganda machinery of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam that the hospital had been shelled indiscriminately by the Indian troops and that many were killed, Brigadier Manjit Singh told the visiting presspersons.

Not only the hospital but its posh surroundings, with a cluster of good looking bungalows and rows of shops, are apparently untouched in the midst of the eerie silence of the forlorn town of 1.3 lakh people.

"The untampered shops and closed houses also give the lie to the allegations of looting and pillage", the Brigadier said.

"There are patients in the hospital. The IPKF doctors are looking after them despite severe constraints they face in attending to the injuries of our own men", he said.

The journalists were taken around a women's ward where most patients were lying wih plastered limbs, suffered in shelling in different parts of the town and its vicinity.

Mrs. Vasantha, 40, with a big plaster from her shoulder to her left palm, said she suffered injuries when a school in which she had taken shelter was shelled a few days ago. She was not certain who fired them. But "we are being looked after in whatever way possible by the IPKF doctors here," she said. The presspersons, however, could not meet any doctor or nurse in the hospital.

The IPKF stood guard in battle readiness in several rooms.

The press party was taken in army trucks in the company of senior officers with jawans standing on the vehicles holding automatic weapons against sniper attacks by stray LTTE militants from behind the deserted residential buildings.

IPKF jawans in olive green uniforms and camouflaged helmets, were seen entrenched in the residential locality around the general hospital, their guns pointing to the assumed enemy. The railway station, near the hospital, is intact but apparently there are some black patches on the inside walls, possibly due to burning

About 1,500 refugees, including women and children, huddle inside the big complex and the building of the "Our Lady of Refuge" Church, one of the many designated points in Jaffna town and its neighbourhood, where over four lakh people have taken shelter responding to the IPKF call.

The journalists freely talked to the hapless people. The refugees in the church reeled off stories, which no amount of euphemism, however, could hide.

There are problems of sanitation, food and other predicaments. Some complain of "ill-treatment of various sorts by the IPKF", but most of the refugees say the vast majority of the Indian officers and men "are extremely well behaved."

The refugees in the church were almost without food for two days, but the IPKF was giving them food now, said a man sitting with his wife in a corner of the sprawling hall of the church. He introduced himself as a Government employee, but preferred to remain anonymous.

"Canards spread": Regarding complaints against some IPKF men, some refugees said that militants in the garb of civilians were spreading these canards.

The "totalitarian influence" of the LTTE, which ruled by guns in the peninsula for over years, is so overwhelming among the population that they say whatever they are prompted to say. Otherwise, "bullets await them". They have not yet been able to overcome the LTTE spell. Once the IPKF settles down everything, and brings about the normality to some extent, these wild allegations would start withering away, according to a senior army officer.

Earlier, the media people were flown to Navatkuli from the IPKF headquarters in Palaly, a 15 minute hop by choppers and from there to Mandaitivu, connected with the Jaffna Fort by a causeway.

Desolate land: The whole chunk of the land from Palaly to Navatkuli and from there to Mandaitivu. and the Jaffna Fort and places around presented an awesome desolate look with no human being outside, barring the IPKF men in battle readiness. Only tents of the Indian soldiers popp up around Palaly and the Navatkuli sectors like mushrooms in shrubs and fields, as the curfew in the battle-scared Jaffna and its neighbourhood continues for over 15 days now.

In Navatkuli, where the IPKF is now well entrenched with full control over residential areas in the town and rural surroundings, Brig. J. S. Dhilon told journalists that they took control of the area about five days ago after tough LTTE resistance.

They also heavily depended on explosives, land mines and booby traps. We have lost 17 of our men, apart from 93 wounded", Brig. Dhilon said.

An assorted pile of LTTE weapons, ranging rrom land and Claymore mines to mortar shells etc., were displayed at the IPKF camp at Navatkuli. Some of the landmines, an officer says, are as powerful as to blow up heavy tanks.

Distant boom: On the main water tank of the town, at a far distant place, a red flag was seen. When asked, Col. T.P.S. Brar of the IPKF said: Yes, it is the Tiger and we will bring it down." As Brig. Manjit Singh was saying that the guns of the militants had been silenced, a loud boom on the distant horizon greeted his observation amid laughter. The Brigadier said it was at a distance of three to four km in some pockets of resistance by the LTTE. They were being mopped up.

Asked about his assessment of the LTTE as a fighting force, Maj. Gen. A. S. Kalkat, Commander of the IPKF in the north, said it was similar to the other guerilla groups with no compunction in using women and children for their violent campaign.

A CRPF Jawan from Kerala said he had used 300 rounds during the military operations. "They were coming at us from all sides. We had to shoot them or get killed."

A soldier from Uttar Pradesh said it took one or two days for the IPKF to get used to the tactics adopted by the LTTE. Initially, the LTTE had sent small children with explosives strapped to their bodies to the IPKF, he said. "When we gather around to comfort the child there is an explosion and the child as well as our men around are blown to pieces." — UNI - PTI

LTTE's 'double-faced' strategy

NEW DELHI, Oct. 27.

An External Affairs spokesman said here today that the LTTE radio intercepts had indicated that the militants were discussing the possibilities of halting armed action but were simultaneously chalking out plans to re-group their forces. The spokesman did not give details.

The IPKF was continuing its operations to clear Jaffna of snipers and defusing mines and booby traps. Three huge caches of ammunition and explosives had been discovered by the IPKF in the last 24 hours, the spokesman said.

Apart from 125 kg of gunpowder, the LTTE dumps had pistols (2), Claymore mines (30), landmines (26), anti-personnel mines (266), hand grenades (828), rockets (76), detonators (2,380), small arms ammunition (one box) and assorted bombs (15).—Our Special Correspondent

A poster from Madras Medical students

THE INDEPENDENT

Indian troops finally take over in Jaffna

REPORT

27 October 1987

From Bruce Palling
in Jaffna

INDIA HAS finally taken over the heart of Jaffna after the Tamil Tigers abruptly withdrew and disappeared into the heavily populated Jaffna peninsula. More than 100,000 refugees are in need of food and shelter until the Indian army completes the daunting task of defusing hundreds of mines and booby traps left behind in the deserted city.

Although senior Indian officers are putting a brave face on the Tigers' disappearance, it is a serious blow. The Indian peacekeeping force had set out to disarm or crush the separatists.

Correspondents were escorted by Indian troops through the shuttered city yesterday in an armed convoy. Despite the devastation around Jaffna fort, caused by four years of heavy exchanges of fire between the Sri Lankan army and the Tigers, the city appeared relatively unscathed by the latest fighting.

Houses we drove past were abandoned but intact, although some had their furniture strewn on the street where it was used for barricades and road blocks by the Tigers. Market stalls were locked, with little evidence of looting. Apart from Indian troops, the only signs of life were dogs foraging through piles of rubbish.

We could hear occasional machine gun bursts and heavy explosions coming from the north-eastern part of Jaffna. Indian officers said troops were meeting pockets of resistance as the army went about "sterilising the city sector by sector". Indian soldiers appeared to be in good spirits despite losing more than 160 dead and 600 injured. Tiger casualties are a matter of conjecture — the rebels say their dead number only 50; the Indians assert 500 have been killed.

The Indian army would not take correspondents to the biggest concentration of refugees in Jaffna at the Hindu Nallur Temple but instead escorted us to the Our Lady of Refuge Catholic Church. A shell had destroyed a large section of the roof above the altar. It was impossible to discover who had fired the round although many of the 1,200 civilians sheltering there blamed the Indian forces.

By chance, I met a retired schoolmaster who had shown me round Jaffna when I visited here two months ago. He was haggard and dressed in a borrowed shirt and sarong. "The Indians said they didn't bomb — they bombed. They said they didn't shell — they shelled us day and night. If Rajiv really believes this didn't happen, then he is a damned fool," he said. "There is also a feeling that we have been let down by the Tigers after we had such a brief period of peace, but that doesn't mean we should have to suffer at the hands of the Indians."

On our journey out of Jaffna we persuaded the acting Indian commander, Major-General A.S. Kalkat to let us visit the hospital. The Tigers had accused the Indians of reducing it to rubble, killing 300 patients and wounding many more.

There was no sign of any damage to the walls or roof of the hospital, and the 20 patients we spoke to said they were being well treated by the Indian doctors who had arrived at the weekend. Many had lost limbs or were suffering from serious shrapnel wounds.

There is a general sense of betrayal felt by the Tamil population against India. "They [the Indian army] should have stayed away. Why should a big power come and treat us like the Sri Lankan army did?" asked a retired civil servant..

LETTER

PLAYING SUPERPOWER IN LANKA

SIR,—Much of what Sunanda K. Datta-Ray writes in "India's New Role in Lanka" (October 18-19) will be debated but I am particularly intrigued by the conclusion that "the entanglement in Jafna is the price of regional hegemony." But why should India seek to play the superpower or extend a sort of "Monroe doctrine" to Sri Lanka or anywhere else in South Asia? Is it because India is overwhelmingly bigger in size and population that it feels it has a sort of divine right to exercise a form of suzerainty over them? If so, India can hardly criticize the USA for seeking to bring its smaller southern and eastern neighbours under its umbrella.

Traditionally, India has never sought to impose its might on others. What then prompted the Government to embark on this unfortunate adventure which, as Mr Datta-Ray says, may lead to a Vietnam or a Cyprus situation or, I would add, to something similar to the Afghanistan scenario? The answer lies in the lust for personal power on the one hand, and the sense of political instability on the other that haunts and motivates our rulers.

The tragedy of Punjab with its not-so-famous accord, Assam's holocaust and the uneasy accord, the humiliating Mizoram accord and the so-called GNLF negotiations illustrate our rulers' need for personal image-building whenever they feel threatened politically. Because of the Fairfax and Bofors affairs political cosmetics are sought in the Sri Lanka adventure without any thought to the grave consequences that could follow, so that today we are accused of being directly responsible for the holocaust in Sri Lanka.

Rebutting the Sri Lankan Prime Minister's allegations at the U.N., India pleaded that its peace-keeping force went to Sri Lanka at Colombo's specific request. That may be so, but Moscow also claims that its troops have been fighting in Afghanistan for seven years at Kabul's request. Neither answers reveal the whole truth why India in Sri Lanka and the USSR in Afghanistan are militarily embroiled in the affairs of independent and sovereign States. The sooner both get out, the better for all.—Yours, etc.,

P. L. PASRICHA.

New Delhi, October 19.

On behalf of Tamils of Sri Lanka, I thank you for your 'Opinion - Refugees all' in the Sunday Times of October 25th. Mostly all Sri Lankan newspapers were anti Tamil and treated them as pariahs.

Accidentally I happened to read your papers of the 25th and was very happy to note that there is still some body to show sympathy and understanding to the Tamils. Articles like "Girl ate soap to keep alive" explaining the sufferings of the Tamils and their pathetic situation is never seen in other newspapers.

At the present juncture the Tamils need the sympathy and understanding from the Sri Lankan Govt, as well as from their Sinhala brothers. They should not be left to the mercies of the IPKF. It is true that at one stage the Tamils looked up to the IPKF as their saviours.But now the Tamils have come to realise that the Indians are ruthless and no matter whether they are from Tamil Nadu or not their loyalties are to India,togain their own selfish interests.

It seems that the Sri Lankan Govt and most of our Sri Lankan brothers of Sinhala origin have forgotten that the Tamils are also Sri Lankans and are gleeful that the Tamils are being ruthlessly harassed by unwelcome foreign troops.

The Tamils salute you for boldly publishing on the front page of this paper, the article "Indian troops on the Rampage" which no other newspaper would have cared to publish as this pinpoints murder and arson on the part of the IPKF.

The letter to the editor "If Indians can why cant we" by Mr.K.M. Sunil of Rajagiriya is very appropriate with an addition, if the Tamils are treated in par with the Sinhalese, they would look up to Sri Lanka as their own.

Now is the chance to prove this. The international & local press and radio news are full of benefits that are given, to the Tamils 'with love from India'. Even the Indian Red Cross is in full swing.

But from Sri Lankans so far nothing but a stony silence, with appreciations and pats on the back for the IPKF for its misdeeds against a section of their own people. How about the Sri Lankan Govt, and the Sinhalese people filling in this void and sending food, fuel etc. along with love and affection to the Tamils and thus earn a lasting trust of the Tamils.

R.R. Balanthiran
Puttalam

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

KOKUVIL	
Padmavathy	Seenian Kumar
Sudarsan	Arulanandarasu
Manobalasingam	Vipulanandarajah
Kanapathy	**Sellaiah Sellamma**
Ratnam	Sellappa Vamadevan
Selvarasa	Sellappa Veerasingam
Arunachalam	Sellappa Rasamany
Subramaniam	Sellar Thiravium
Parameswary	**Sellathurai Indirani**
Gunaratnam	Velauthampillai
Letcvhumipillai	S. Hudson
Ponnaiah	Sinnakutti Suppaiah
Rasiah	Sinnathurai
Navaneethakrishnan	Thiyagarajah
Subramaniam	Velupillai
Indiran	Rajaratnam
Balasubramaniam	Shanmugalingam
Sajoeviny	Pradeep
Suhindan	**Siyamala**
Kirubaharan	**Vigitha**
Rasiah Kengatharan	Kandeepan
Rasiah Pathmarani	Selvanayagam
Patkunarajah	Ratnarajah
Arumaithurai	Sellappapillai
Kanagaratnam	Pararajasingam
Nalaiyya	**Paikiyalatchumy**
Leelavathy	Navaneethan
Saraswathy	Selvanatkili
Murugesu	**Ponnamma**
Thirunavaukkarasu	Paikiyanathan
Sarveswararuby	Tharmalingam
Ganesaratnam	**Suseela**
Vanaithasan	Thirukethеeswaran
Thambiraj	**Thamilini**

LTTE making last-ditch bid

NEWS

BATTLE □ FOR □ JAFFNA

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI, Oct. 27

Elements of the LTTE were reported to be making a last-ditch stand in the heavily built-up Kokkuvil area till this evening. Heavy mortar and small arms fire were reported from the area suspected to be the main headquarters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) is now using tanks to provide cover to its personnel involved in the flushing-out operations. Unconfirmed reports say that some 12 IPKF personnel were missing in an action in the area. In the Jaffna University area, the IPKF recovered the haversacks and kitbags of the Sikh LI jawans who were killed during the commando raid in the area on the night of October 11/12.

The latest casualty list of the IPKF has climbed to 193 killed, 621 wounded and 35 missing. The additional casualties are the result of seriously injured personnel dying in hospitals in Jaffna and India. The latest estimated LTTE casualties are 740 killed.

Huge arms haul: With the action in Jaffna winding down, the IPKF has begun search and cordon operations to disarm the militants, the original purpose for which it had to fight its way into Jaffna city. These operations are on in the Eastern and Northern Provinces and large quantities of arms and ammunition have been recovered. South of Urumpirai cross-roads, a large LTTE dump was discovered containing anti-tank mines, other anti-tank devices, explosives trigger devices, and AK-47 assault rifle ammunition.

A dump located near the Nallur Kandaswamy Temple had Claymore mines, land mines, magazines, HE-36 hand grenades, 125 kg of gun powder and a large quantity of anti-pesonnel mines.

The IPKF is now restoring normality and providing relief to the Jaffna populace. There have been conferences and meeting between IPKF officials and local citizen committees in the Jaffna area. Yesterday 15 tonnes of food was provided overland to groups of refugees in the Navatkuli area, Kopai North, Nallur temple and the Hindu College. Five tonnes of food packets were dropped in other areas. The loosening of the LTTE grip has enabled air drops from lower altitudes thus making them more efficacious. On October 25, a truck was blown up after it had delivered food to the refugees in the Nallur temple, killing one IPKF soldier and injuring three. There have been no reports of such mining since then.

In the Jaffna sector, food and medical relief is now being supplied at all places where refugees have congregated. In the Jaffna Hospital, the Indian Red Cross provided pre-cooked food and medical supplies while all patients coming to the IPKF military camps are treated.

In the Eastern Province, a joint conference was held in the Trincomalee area in which the Tamil and Sinhala residents participated along with the Sri Lankan Government officials. According to reports, there was a general demand for IPKF protection. In the Trincomalee area, miscreants were reported to have looted a post office at gunpoint and stolen Rs. 5,100 and a large quantity of stamps.

The IPKF is now concentrating on restoring the civic services in Jaffna city but given the reports, considerable time will be needed to make Jaffna safe for normal movement. Even now, small groups of LTTE cadres are very much around and are capable of launching attacks on isolated IPKF pickets. The freeing of Jaffna from the LTTE control does not by any definition imply the restoration of normality. What it means is that the IPKF holds the town militarily — it controls the nodal points, post office, bus stand, railway stations, important cross-roads, etc. The IPKF positions are dictated from the military point of view and there are many areas where the LTTE may be lurking in small groups. They may not be capable of offering any serious challenge to the IPKF military deployment, but they are still capable of striking suddenly at small patrols or pickets especially at night.

Other major tasks: The IPKF will also begin operations to keep the LTTE on the run through suprise raids on suspected hideouts in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. There is some pressure on the force to maintain roadblocks on the main highways from the rest of Sri Lanka to the Eastern Province to prevent any illegal infiltration of Sinhala migrants. This and the repatriation of refugees from India to their homes, covered by the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, are other aspects of the complex situation.



LTTE CLAIMS

Indian helicopter fired rocket mortars at Chavakachcheri between 14.00 hrs and 17.00 hrs. Over 50 people killed. 18 of them died after admission to hospital. 55 admitted to hospital with severe injuries. Most of them have lost at least one of their limbs.

Indians secure an empty victory

Derek Brown in Jaffna reports that the Tamil Tigers may have lost the war but have won the battle for hearts and minds

REPORT

THE BATTLE for Jaffna is all over, bar the shooting. Mortar and small arms fire sounded distantly but steadily yesterday from the ramparts of the town's old Dutch Fort. Three separate curtains of smoke hung over outlying districts.

Brigadier Manjit Singh told reporters during a lull that his men had secured all of Jaffna west of the railway, meaning all important parts of the town. "That is why you are hearing no firing," he said.

A couple of seconds later, an explosion shook the air, followed by a prolonged rattle of automatic fire. "That is probably our north-east column which has not yet linked up with our boys in the town," the brigadier said. "It is three or four kilometres away, not in my area."

Earlier, the new commander of Indian forces in north and east Sri Lanka, Major General Amarjit Singh Kalkat, had formally announced the fall of Jaffna. "There are certain pockets of resistance which will be mopped up," he said.

The general is right. The Indians have taken over the town, but it is an uneasy control, and an empty victory.

Most of the Tamil Tiger defenders, including nearly all the important leaders like the Supreme Commander Velupillai Prabhakaran have melted away.

They will almost certainly regroup the redoubtable Tiger forces in the jungles and towns of the north and east to continue the fight against the Indians on their own guerrilla terms.

Behind them, Jaffna is a broken and silent place of refugees clustered in churches and temples among empty roads. The area around the Fort bears all the signs of two savage campaigns, first by the Sri Lankan army and now by the Indians. It is the Tigers who seem to have won the battle for hearts and minds.

Only one young man interviewed in an admittedly lightning tour of Jaffna Hospital and a nearby refugee camp was prepared to criticise the rebels. "They have missed the boat. They threw away the chance given to them by the Indian Government," he said. "We hate them."

All around him others were saying that though they wanted peace more than anything, the Tigers were "their" boys, and the Indians were the outsiders.

"Some of the soldiers are good to us," said one man in the appropriately named Our Lady of Refuge church. "The south Indians are good to us. They speak Tamil. But the north Indians are rough men."

The man was one of about 1,500 refugees packed into the Catholic church and adjoining school.

Last Thursday, he said, he had been ordered from his nearby house by Sikh soldiers, who were apparently clearing the area before an offensive. One of the soldiers struck him and when his daughter protested, she too was beaten.

Another old man told how his daughter had been killed, when she returned to the family home to fetch her jewellery.

The women's ward at Jaffna Hospital contained many casualties of war.

A middle-aged woman had half a leg missing — blown off by an Indian shell. A 14-year-old girl clutched a stomach wound.

A young woman with a blood-soaked plaster on her leg said she had been unconscious when Indian soldiers "liberated" the hospital last week. She was certain that the Tigers had not been in occupation at the time, as the Indians had claimed.

No civilian doctors or nurses were available for comment, but even a cursory inspection was enough to disprove Tiger claims of Indian atrocities like the 450 deaths in mass shelling and subsequent butchery.

The hospital bears hardly any sign of damage. It has a few broken windows and the odd bullet mark, but that is small beer in this area, at this time.

One senior Indian officer had a sardonic answer to the claims of atrocities. "It makes me so mad when I hear these things, that I want to shoot people," he said.

The Indians talk breezily of the Tigers who have slipped away as the next target of their campaign to restore democracy and freedom to Tamil areas of Sri Lanka.

But the Tigers, with their leadership intact and a seemingly inexhaustible supply of explosives, have lost only prestige in Jaffna.

Major General Amarjit Singh Kalkat, who bears a name meaning ultimate victory in Punjabi, has captured a shadow.

Jaffna calm, but Indians still face Tamil resistance

REPORT **By David Wigg in Jaffna**

THE INDIAN ARMY was in control of the centre of Jaffna yesterday, but was still having difficulty wiping out the last pockets of Tamil Tiger resistance.

After the battle, the town looks deceptively calm.

A splash of tropical green foliage broken by red roofs and white facades of the larger buildings, it sprawls beside a lagoon now empty of boats.

The streets just outside the old Jaffna Fort, which has served as a Portuguese, Dutch, British, Sri Lankan and now Indian stronghold, are deserted except for cows, crows, stray dogs — and an occasional Indian platoon.

The Post Office is a burnt-out shell, pocked by bullet holes. The Regal Cinema will be showing no Hindu musicals for some time. The hands on the clock tower point forever at 6:35. A corner statue of some now unknown worthy has had its face shot off.

There is the occasional dull thud of mortars and then louder blasts as Indian engineers detonate mines and booby-traps.

Slipped away

The remaining resistance will be "mopped up", Maj-Gen A S Kalkat said, as areas are "sterilised sector by sector".

But Velupillai Prabakharan, leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the man the Indians want desperately to capture, is not in the fighting area. He is probably in hiding, waiting to make his escape.

Other leaders may also have slipped away and the Tigers may regroup in outer areas.

In the general hospital, only one ward was open for journalists to see. Two rows of women lay with various wounds that could have come from either side in the combat. The face of one girl was burnt almost completely off. Another girl, about four, lay dying while her mother made a slight breeze with a white fan.

About 2,000 refugees were sheltering in and around the Roman Catholic church.

Fear of troops

They had little food, they said, and they were afraid of the Indian troops who had ordered them there. One man had brought in his 99-year-old mother on his shoulders.

The owner of a guest house said the Indians were killing and looting. "We thought India was our homeland," another said despairingly.

"Many Tigers have mingled with the refugees", Maj-Gen Kalkat said when the complaints were put to him. "We shall identify them".

The people there had suffered half a decade of autocracy, he said: Now "we are bringing them their freedom".

OCTOBER 27

RAPED



Usha 21yn Batticaloa

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01.11.87	This patient Give the H, raped - at 11.00AM. She is having two children L.M.P. 20.10.87 LC - injuries over the a) breast b) buttocks c) back		

Usha Nane

Charlie

Charge denied

Our Madras Staff Reporter writes:

Headquarters IPKF at Jaffna has strongly refuted the report in the section of the press that Indian Armymen were raping Tamil women in Sri Lanka. It described the report as "slanderous, vicious and mischievous, designed to arouse the passions of the gullible."

"The Indian soldiers, whether he is a Maratha, Sikh, Gorkha, Tamilian or any other community, is a model of discipline and moral self-control", it added.

"The respect and reverence for women is a precious part of Indian culture and psyche; it is inconceivable that the Indian soldiers, who have always shown great respect towards all Sri Lankan Tamil men, women and children, can ever commit such a heinous crime."

It also appealed to "all sections of the public not to believe such slanderous disinformation being made by vested interests for their own selfish and political ends, and to wreck the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord."



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P.C.	Rukmany 35yp Married		

K/o assaulted ~~by~~ ~~Rape~~ & Raped by IPKF. Soldiers against her will.

O/E:- No abration / Laceration or bite makes.

Cs.- DR. NO (M) BP- 110/70 LMP:-

Rp/- Clinically normal

AS - Flat abd

Inform police

Door still open, Rajiv tells LTTE

Express News Service

New Delhi, Oct. 27: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on Tuesday reiterated that the door was "still open" to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to "accept to abide by the terms of the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement and surrender arms".

Briefing members of the parliamentary consultative committee attached to the Ministry of External Affairs here, he said, "Any time they did so" they could "come back". But he regretted that they had not so far done so.

The Prime Minister further informed members that before the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement was signed, it had been discussed with "all the parties including LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran" and claimed that none of these had found any fault with the accord proposed at that time.

Mr. Gandhi expressed confidence that both the Governments would be able to implement the agreement despite delays. The LTTE, he charged, had not been honouring its commitments. The IPKF was only doing its job under the terms of the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement, he added.

It would stay in Sri Lanka "as long as President J.R. Jayewardene wants it" members were told by the Prime Minister.

It was also India's aim to see that a "Just and fair dispensation" was given to the Sri Lankan Tamils within the framework of Sri Lanka's territorial integrity. The task now was to "re-build in Jaffna." He pointed out that many members of the IPKF had, sacrificed their lives to uphold the agreement.

The Prime Minister addressed the committee in the morning and later reviewed with senior officials of the External Affairs and Defence Ministries the latest situation in northern Jaffna.

The agreement was signed not only to resolve the ethnic problem but also to deal with important regional security matters.

Earlier, Mr. Natwar Singh, Minister of State, said it was unfortunate that lives had been lost which was a matter of sorrow and anguish.

An official spokesman gave details of the three caches of ammunition seized by the IPKF in the past 24 hours. They contained over 300 mines besides boobytraps, detonators, explosives and other material. Among these were 266 anti-personnel mines, 30 Claymore mines, 26 landmines, 828 hand-grenades, 2,380 detonators and 125 kg of gunpowder.

LTTE to buy time?: Radio intercepts of the LTTE network, the spokesman claimed indicated that the Tigers were discussing among themselves the possibility of stopping armed action and regrouping their forces.

Express News Service reports from Madras: The Nallur Kandaswamy temple and its sprawling grounds have become the sanctuary for the remaining LTTE guerillas who have merged with an estimated 35,000 persons displaced during the fighting. The IPKF is encountering occasional gunfire which it cannot return.

Combing the temple area is proving difficult since guerillas are firing at jawans and relief workers distributing food, reliable sources who visited Jaffna on Tuesday said in Madras.

One JCO was shot on Tuesday while distributing food by LTTE men who merged with the crowds immediately thereafter. As the priority is to avoid civilian casualties, the IPKF is unable to fire back.

Co-ordinating officer: An External Affairs Ministry Spokesman said that a full-time Special Co-ordinating Officer from the IPKF, Brig R. A. S. Kahlon, would liaise with local officials on restoring normalcy in Jaffna town.

The Jaffna General Hospital is also fully functional under the supervision of Maj-Gen. Chahal, Director General of Medical Services, Southern Command.

Rajiv briefed on IPKF moves

New Delhi, Oct. 27 (UNI): Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi reviewed on Tuesday the latest situation in Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka with senior officials of the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs.

Mr. Gandhi was apprised of the new tactical moves made by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) which gained effective control of the Tamil militant stronghold on Monday.

Mr. Gandhi is understood to have underlined the need for quicker disarming of the militants and restoration of complete normalcy.

Mr. Gandhi was given a detailed account of the explosion which ripped through the office of the Indian Deputy High Commissioner in Kandy on Oct. 25.

Express News Service

Colombo, Oct. 27: Four Sri Lankan soldiers were killed in a landmine explosion between Tampalakamam and Monkey Bridge in the Trincomalee district around 8.30 a.m. on Tuesday.

The soldiers, two regulars and two volunteers, were in the course of 'normal duties' when the incident occurred.

7 LTTE men killed

Colombo, Oct. 27 (PTI): Seven Tamil terrorists were killed by Indian Peace Keeping Forces at Pooneryn in northern Killinochchi district, while they were fleeing Jaffna peninsula on Sunday last, the *Island* reported.

Quoting delayed reports from security sources, the news-paper said the terrorists were carrying a large amount of arms and ammunition.

The daily said that the military intelligence sources confirmed that hardcore LTTE terrorists were using Wanni area in the peninsula to slip to safety.

Daily Mail

Peril on the streets where Tigers prowl

ONLY the stray dogs feel free to go about their normal lives in Jaffna.

REPORT

Mailman GEOFFREY LEVY reports from Jaffna

Indian soldiers crouch on street corners, rain-washed white flags hang on sticks from garden hedges, makeshift guerilla barricades of desks and chairs stand like mocking sculptures of war.

Indians claim Jaffna is now 'sanitised' — but the reality is different

Jaffna has fallen. That was the message delivered yesterday with the finality of an annual company report by a man who looks more like a company chairman than a soldier — Major General Amarjeet Singh Kalkat of the Indian army.

He was the man sent to ginger up the offensive against the Tamil Tigers the other day, and he seems to have done rather well rather quickly.

The town, which when I was there last week was still a-bustle with buses, bicycles, tradesmen and pedestrians ignoring the 24-hour curfew, is now in total suspension.

The streets are as empty as the temples are full. The houses are empty too, some of them whole estates of rubble blitzed in two weeks of battle.

The general claimed in fact, in his smooth boardroom manner, that Jaffna fell two days ago. I know what he meant. The Indian army has secured all the major buildings, none of which are open, such as the post office, the town hall — where guerilla leader Prabakaran shot dead the mayor in 1972 — the library, the temple, the Regal cinema, the hospital and the railway station.

But what was that red flag, looking suspiciously like the Tamil Tigers' flag, fluttering on the top of the distant town watch tower?

Shelter

'That?' spluttered an attending brigadier 'Just a flag. We must find time to fetch it down.' He knew very well that lowering the flag would almost certainly cost lives.

The reality is that while major areas of Jaffna town have been 'sanitised' the general's word — all is far from secure over towards the huge Nallur Temple where 35,000 refugees still shelter, and in the crisscross of narrow streets and alleys which may well hold mines and booby traps — as well as Tigers.

The Indian soldiers look tired. It has been a tough campaign, not just physically but mentally. The strain of the unexpected detonations that have killed so many of their number shows in their faces. Snipers are a new problem.

But they are working on the electricity supply and for the moment some of the Indian regiments can rest.

Stories of atrocities by Indian troops continue to buzz among the refugees in the temples and hospitals.

The general denies them. 'I state categorically that no civilian has been shot deliberately by any member of the Indian peacekeeping force.'

Meanwhile, the whereabouts of the slippery killer Prabakaran are, as usual, unknown. The general suggested scornfuly that he might be at one of the ports 'to make a quick getaway.'

More likely, the 33-year-old Tiger leader is planning a war of attrition now that Jaffna has almost fallen, as he always knew it would.

He will get the support of the group of homeless fathers who gathered round me at the Roman Catholic Church of Our Lady of Refuge in the centre of the town. They refused my invitation to blame Tigers for putting them and their families in a place where five lavatories serve 2,500 people.

Seized

'It is the Indians who have done this,' said one and they others swayed their heads in the Tamil way of saying yes. 'Our sons have been fighting them to make us free. Maybe we won't be free, but perhaps one day our sons will be.'

Major General Kalkat did not see it quite like that. 'Those people have been living under the totalitarianism of the Tigers,' he declared. 'We are here to satisfy fair elections. Once people feel that the peace-keeping force is here and will remain here to look after them, this "problem" will go away.'

It sounds as though the Indian army is going to be in Sri Lanka in general, and in Jaffna Town in particular, for a very long time.

AFFIDAVIT

UDAYAKUMAR SIVAKUMARI (31), Madduvil South, Chavakachcheri.

I am the wife of Arumugam Udayakumar (32) who died on 27.10.1987.

He was a Mason.

On 27.10.87 at about 9.00 a.m. my husband left home saying that he was going to Chavakachcheri regarding his work.

At about 5.00 p.m. I was informed that he was killed when the Chavakachcheri Market was attacked by helicopter gunship.

On hearing the news I went there and identified his body which was in almost burnt-out condition.

His body was burnt at Madduvil Cemetery.

I have three children.

After my husband's death we do not have any income.

VATHSALA KANGARATNAM, (17), 23/5 Central East Road Gurunagar, Jaffna.

The deceased Palaniyandi Kangaratnam, aged 34 years was my husband.

He was working as a labourer at the cement factory K.K.S.

Due to the military offensive in our area we took refuge at the St. Patrick's College Refugee Camp through fear.

On 27.10.87 at about 10.30 a.m. my husband left for Chavakachcheri market to buy provision.

As he did not return that evening I became highly worried about his safety.

On the third day I was informed that my husband was killed on 27.10.87 at Chavakachcheri when the market was shelled from the air.

I came to know that his body was buried at the Chavakachcheri burial grounds.

I am expecting a child.

I do not have any income after my husband's death.

I do not have anyone to help me.



VIJIYANIRMALA RAVICHANDRAN (20) No. 10, 1st Cross Street, Vasanthapuram, Colombuthurai, Jaffna.

The deceased Rajadurai Ravichandran, aged 23 years, was my husband.

He was employed as a Mason.

During the October 1987 violence we took refugee at St. Patrick's College.

On 27.10.87 at about 6.00 a.m. my husband left us saying that he is going to Thirunelvely to buy some vegetables.

He did not return that day.

We were highly worried about his non return.

On 30.10.87 I was informed by my brother-in-law that my husband was shot dead by the army at Thirunelvely.

I also came to know that my husband's body was cremated by the army itself.

After my young husband's tragic death I do not have any income or support.



Miss YOGARANEE SUPPIAH (21) Meesalai South, Meesalai.

I am daughter of Mrs. Ponnammah Suppiah who was killed in aerial sheel-fire on 27.10.87.

My mother Mrs. Ponnammah was a vegetable vendor at the Chavkachcheri market.

On 27.10.87 my mother was engaged in her vocation at the Market square, Chavakachcheri when a helicopter gun-ship hovering over started firing artillery - shells directed in the market area.

My mother received a shrapnel-injury on her head and was killed on the spot, yet seated.

My brother proceeded to the market square to fetch my mother when the helicopter had flown away.

He found our mother dead with a head-injury in a sitting-position.

Her dead body was brought home at about 3.00 p.m. and was creamated at the Kotpulavu Crematorium at about 5.30 p.m. on 2.10.87.

My father Velupillai Suppiah was grief-stricken over the death of my mother and neglected his food and health. He died on 12.11.87 following my mother.

My father was a farmer who earned an average monthly income of Rs. 600/-

My mother Mrs. Ponnammah Suppiah earned an average monthly income of Rs 800/-.

Consequent to the deaths of my mother and father I, my brother and sister who were all dependent on our parents have been orphaned and are left with no financial support or assistance for our living and maintenance.

I was a student and had given up my studies as a sequel of my mother's demise to shoulder the family responsibilities.

My brother is yet studying a trade.

My sister is school-going reading in the GCE (O/L) class.



APPASI SELLATHURAI (86) Uppankalati Eveni, Punnalaikattuvan.

The deceased Sellathurai Nadarajah, aged 53 years bachelor was my son.

He was a farmer.

On 28.10.87 at about 4 p.m. my son left home for bathing at a well about quarter mile away from our house as it was his usual practice to take bath there.

Later I was informed that my son was shot and killed by the army while he was on his way to the well.

His body bore many gunshot wounds.

It was my son who maintained and supported us.

My wife is bedridden due to old age.



Miss NAGALINGAM THAVAMANY (24), Meesalai South, Meesalai.

I am niece of Ponniah Karthigesu who was killed in shell blast.

On 28.10.87 Meesalai was subjected to shell attack.

At about 5.00 p.m. on the day (28.10.87) a shell fell on our house and exploded.

My late uncle Ponniah Karthigesu who was seated on the floor with folded arms in prayers in a room was struck by shrapnels severing both his

palms at the wrists and causing a severe chest injury. He died on the spot.

His dead body was cremated at the Vembirai Crematorium on 29.10.87 at 10.00 a.m.

My maternal uncle was unmarried and was 70 years of age.

He was looked after and maintained by my mother and after the demise of my mother the responsibilities rested with me.



NESATHURAI NAGESWARY (36), Nitsamam, Chankani East.

The deceased Nadarasa Nagarani, aged 56 years, a widow, was my elder sister.

On 28.10.87 due to the eruption of violence in our area we sought refugee at Vigneswary Vidyalayam Chankanai.

My sister who initially refused to accompany us to the school changed her mind and followed us little later.

As she was approaching the school gates a shell fell and exploded near her.

When I rushed there she was already dead. After being struck by deadly shrapnels on her neck.

Few others were also killed in the incident.

Her body was cremated at Vilaveli cemetery on the same day.

The cause of death as specified in the declaration of death is fatal injury due to shell explosion.

My sister left her four children under my custody.

I find it extremely difficult to maintain my sister's orphaned children along with my own four children.

My husband is a labourer and his meagre income is not sufficient to support all of us



PONNIAH PAKIYAM (51), Nitsamam Chankanai East, Chankanai.

The deceased person Sinnakutty Ponniah, aged 54 years was my husband

He was a casual labourer.

On 28.10.87 our area was subjected to intermittent shell attack.

At 9 p.m. I fled from my house along with my children.

When the shell fire ceased I returned and found my husband's lifeless body lying in the lane leading to our house.

His body bore shell blast wounds.

His body was cremated at Vilaveli cemetery

PONNIAH RASIAH (65)
Kalasalai Road, Thirunelvely, Jaffna.

I am married and have 9 children of whom 6 are married and live separately.

My son Rasiah Kengatharan aged 22 years was a dumb boy.

He was employed as a Cigar Roller.

On 28.10.87 area curfew was enforced in our area.

In the morning at about 7 a.m. while my children, grand-children and I were at home suddenly armed IPKF personnel about 15 in number appeared near the main gate and then entered our compound.

No sooner we saw the Indian army enter the compound, through fear we started running in all directions.

When my son R. Kengatharan was running behind me he was shot dead by IPKF personnel.

After the IPKF personnel left the area I removed the dead body of my son home at 10 a.m.

As there was panic and tense situation prevailed in the area I buried my son's dead body in our compound with the assistance of my relations.

The dead body of my son bore a severe injury on his chest.

My deceased son was the sole bread-winner and we were solely depending on his income.

When violence erupted in October 1987 my house too was damaged by she attacks and the loss sustained by me is Rs. 25,350/-.



SATHIYASEELAN MAHESWARY (35), Myliddy Palaly South, Vasavilan.

The deceased person Nadarajah Sathiaseelan, aged 35 years was my husband.

He was employed as a temporary watcher at the Village Council Myliddy.

On 28.10.1987 at about 6.00 a.m. my husband left for work.

At about 5.30 p.m. I was informed that my husband was shot and killed by the army at Vasavilan while he was on his way from his work place.

I went to the scene of incident and brought his body home.

His cremation took place on 29.10.87 at Poonayankadu cemetery.

I have five children.

We are undergoing untold hardships after my husband's demise.

SINNAN MUTHURAJAH (38), Kachai Road, Kodikamam.

The deceased Kanthan Ponnu, aged 68 years was my uncle being my father's brother.

On 28.10.87 at about 4.30 p.m. my uncle was on his way to the nearby shop.

At the time a helicopter was hovering overhead.

I heard a shell explosion after my uncle left our house.

Few minutes later I was informed that my uncle was killed when a shell fired from the helicopter exploded near him.

His body was cremated at Kachai cemetery on the same day.

His body bore a gaping wound on his chest.

My uncle was living with us for the last 10 years after his wifes death.



SELLATHURAI SINNATHURAI (67), Pillayar Kovilady, Thavady, Kokuvil.

The deceased person Sinnathurai Indranee, aged 53 years was my wife.

On 29.10.87 our area was under intense shell attack and gun fire.

A shell fell within our house and exploded with great noise.

My wife fell ill due to shock caused by the shell explosions and gun-fire.

She died on the folowing day without recovering from her shock.

Her body was cremated at the Thavadi Cemetery on the same day itself.

I have an unmarried daughter and son.



SINNATHAMBY RAJENDRAM (35), Rajah Mill Lane, Thavady, Kokuvil.

The deceased person Sinnady Sinnathamby, aged 60 years was my father.

He was a casual labourer.

He was living under my care and maintenance after my mother divorced him and re-married.

On 29.10.87 at about 11.30 a.m. some soldiers came to our house.

On seeing them we fled to the next compound for safety leaving my father who was cooking in the kitchen.

We heard a rattle of automatic gun-fire from the direction of our house.

After the army left we returned to our house and greeted with a gory scene.

My father was spread eagled on the floor just outside the kitchen entrance.

Part of his head was blown off by the bullets fired by the soldiers.

We cremated his body in a nearby empty land on the same day itself as we could not go to the cemetry due to the tension prevailed during that period.



VIERAMUTHU THANGAMANY, Kataveddi North, Karaveddi.

During the operation of the IPKF at Jaffna area it was firing and shell attack around the area.

My son Viyeramuthu Sivanantharajah, age 22 was a student in a private tutary at Jaffna.

During this army operation at Jaffna above said son Viyeramuthu Sivanantharajah was shot by the army at Pannai Road, and died at the spot on 29 October 1987.

This was informed to me by one of my relation at Jaffna and I went to Jaffna and took charge of the body of my son and made the cremation at Allankaddai Cemetery, Karaveddi North.

My husband is sick, and my above said son was the sole bread winner of the family of our daughters aged 28,24,20,15 & sons in the age of 30,25.

PONNIAH NAVARATNAM (60) of "Raja Bhavan", Station Road, Kukuvil.

The deceased Kandiah Muthuthurahi aged 70 years a bachelor was my uncle being my mother's brother.

During the October 1987 military offensive we took refuge at the Kokuvil Hindu College, refugee camp.

After the refugee camp was subjected to the military attack we fled from the college and went to Manthenai Murugan Temple leaving my uncle at the college.

On 30.10.87 I was informed by my neighbours that my uncle's body was found at our house at Kokuvil.

When we went there we found only his burn out remains.

I came to know that his body was set on fire after being shot and killed by the army.

MRS. SELVAM SARASWATHY, Mavady, Karaveddy East. Karaveddi.

My son Selvam Selvaranjan was dead on 30.10.1987 at Karaveddy East by shell blast while he was at home.

His body was cremated at Veerakali cemetery.



SINNAPPU THARMALINGAM (70), 117/1 Sivan Kovil North Veethy, Jaffna.

The deceased person Sinnappu Nadarajah, aged 60 years a bachelor was my mother.

He was a farmer.

My late brother was living with my son. Chandramohan at his residence at Kallady.

On 30.10.87 I was informed by my son that my brother was shot and killed by the army near the Iyanarkovilady on 24.10.87.

I learned that he was shot when he went in search of my son who was away from his house for a long time.

I learned that his body was cremated at the roadside.

My late brother was living under the care and maintenance of my son Chandramohan until his death.

SITTAMPALAM NALLIAH (58) No. 11, kachcheri East Lane, Chundickuly, Jaffna.

The deceased Rajathurai Punitharajan, aged 22 years was living under my guardianship from his childhood after his parents death.

During the October, November 1987 military offensive I was at Colombo.

On 30.10.87 I came to know that the deceased was shot and injured by the army at about 300 yards from our house on 24.10.87.

That after receiving first-aid from a doctor who resides nearby he was admitted at the Holy Cross Health Centre where he died at about 1.25 p.m. on the same day.

And that his body was cremated by our neighbours on 25.10.87.

The maternal grandfather of the deceased is alive to whom he used to send money for maintenance.

His grand father Suppar Murugesu aged 76 who is an invalid is both partially blind and deaf.

After his death his grandfather is deprived of his maintenance and support he received from his grand son.

INDIAN EXPRESS

Jaffna: after the battle

REPORT
28.10.87

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

KOKUVIL	
Kanagamalar	S. Pushparanee
Kanahambikaiamma	K. Sakthivel
Sivalingam	J. Simion
Thurairajah	S. Jacob
Veerasingam Thurairaja	KONDAVIL
Rajeswary	M. Sinnathamby
Kandiah	M. Kandiah
Visuvanathan	K. Sellathurai
Thangaiah	S. Arulampalam
Sarvesvararuby	Sivasubramaniam
Veerakaththi	K. Sinnarasa
S. Kumarasamy	Sivapakaiam
M.K. Kandiah	R. Navaratnam
S. Nadarajah	S. Sivakumar
S. Appathurai	K. Nagarasa
S. Muthukumaru	S. Arulampalam
N. Kathiravelu	R. Loganathan
P. Appukutti	K. Tharmalingam
S. Suppiah	A. Sinnathurai
K. Manimuthu	P. Sivapaikium
A. Gnanapiragasam	S. Sivarangam
K. Thanaledchumy	P. Sivapaikium
Ranjithkumar	S. Rajasingam
K. Nirmalarasa	S. Sivapiragasam
S. Mahalingam	S. Ruxal
N. Nadarasa	V. Malini
M. Sathianathan	R.S. Shivarani
T. Kirubakaramoorthy	V. Tharani
R. Kulasingam	T. Pavalarani
R. Ravindran	S. Ponnuthurai
P. Selvaratnam	P. Parameswary
S. Sellathurai	K. Annam
P. Perumal	N. Balasubramaniam
K. Visavalingam	B. Nageswari

By TAVLEEN SINGH
Recently in Jaffna

SO Jaffna has fallen. After over 15 days of bitter fighting and heavy losses, the Indian Army claimed two days ago that they had finally wrested the entire city from the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam). But the war is far from over. In the words of Lt. General Depinder Singh, army commander in charge of the operations, "an estimated 1,200 LTTE guerillas are believed to have escaped from the town once the fighting commenced and each one of them constitutes a lethal fighting force."

In Jaffna itself, the Indian army, or the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), to describe it in its Sri Lanka incarnation, has found little joy in their victory. To their lot has fallen the unenviable task of reconstructing a city from the debris and devastation of a ghost town which today looks as if nobody has lived in it for years. The task of reconstruction will be made even more difficult by the fact that the local population regards the Indian army with hostility and even hatred. Senior army officers, involved in the liberation of Jaffna, believe that this is mainly due to what is described as "very effective propaganda on the part of the LTTE."

In short, if the news from Jaffna was bad before the day trips for journalists had begun, it is worse now that we have been allowed to catch a glimpse of the battle-scarred city with its empty streets, abandoned homes and its eerie, unquiet silence.

Battle for Jaffna: The good news, however, is that we can at least now give you an authentic version of the battle for Jaffna without having to rely on censored snippets from the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). I was one of a party of journalists, including several foreign correspondents, who were taken to Jaffna on the day the IPKF was fighting to take control of the last two square kilometres of the city where the LTTE guerillas were making a last-ditch stand.

We were taken from Palaly airport to Jaffna in Indian Air Force helicopters that had to fly at over 1,000 feet to avoid potshots from LTTE guerillas who are now believed to be hiding out in the peninsula's deceptively lovely, palm-fringed villages.

Our helicopters struggled against blinding rain and strong winds to land about half a kilometre away from Jaffna Fort, which was once the Sri Lanka security forces' only bastion in the city, and which has been the Indian army's operational headquarters since Oct. 9 when the battle for Jaffna began. From the battlements of the Fort we got our first glimpse of the city and with the sound of explosions (mines going off) in the background an officer who had been with the action throughout explained what happened. "That white building there is the library from which they were firing at us, and that over there is the stadium which was also one of their positions ...

On the first day (Oct 9) when we started patrolling, they (the LTTE) came in great strength and pushed us back into the Fort. We had to retreat till the brigade linked up with us and this gave them time to take up defensive positions and plant mines and booby traps all over the city."

Mine network: For those of us who have wondered why the Indian Army took so long to take Jaffna the answer could lie in the fact that till Oct 19 there was only one battalion (1,000 men) in Jaffna and they were virtually immobilised in the Fort while the LTTE proceeded to turn the city into a vast death trap of carefully-laid mines and booby traps. So extensive has been their network of explosives that the army admits that it will take them several weeks to make the city safe for its civilian population to return to their homes. All that has been cleared so far are a few roads.

We were taken down one of them, past the bombed-out telecommunications centre which had been blown to bits by the LTTE suicide squad in a truck filled with explosives, past the Regal Cinema which had been flattered in earlier aerial bombing by the Sri Lanka Air Force, and past a row of houses whose fronts had been shattered and whose gardens had been torn up in Jaffna's recent battle.

The road led to the hospital since the army was keen that we see that at least one of the city's vital facilities had been restored to a semblance of normalcy. The hospital is one of a few buildings in Jaffna that have escaped unscathed in the city's many battles.

Open hostility: Escorted by a posse of army officers and officials from the MEA we were taken to what appeared to be the women's ward in the hospital and here, unexpectedly, we got our only taste of the intense hostility that local Tamils feel for their liberators.

An old woman from Urumparai told us in fluent English, "We are all victims of shelling by the Indian Army. My friend was killed when they fired at our houses from helicopters, and today we don't know if we have any houses left to go back to."

Within minutes, several other patients, including small children, gathered around to talk about how they also had been shelled by the Indian Army, and as television cameras whirred and flashbulbs popped more and more stories came out and the gist of it all was that, in the opinion of the people, it was the LTTE who were heroes and the IPKF who were villains. An old man from Nallore, carrying his injured two-year-old grandson in his arms, said speaking directly to the army officers with us, "The Indian Army has killed my daughter, this child's mother. My name is Thillambanam, I am from Nallore."

Later, army officers admitted that there was no doubt the people's sympathies lay with Mr. Velupillai Prabhakaran and his guerillas and that in the early stages of the battle virtually 90 per cent of Jaffna's civilians had aided and abetted the LTTE.

So the IPKF, however noble their intentions and however gently they fought a very nasty battle, have emerged for the people of Jaffna as the inheritors of the mantle of Sri Lanka's hated security forces, and no amount of counter-propaganda is going to change that. In addition there is the terrifying prospect that our troops are going to have to stay on in Jaffna for a very long time. Since although Jaffna is ours, a large section of the LTTE fighting force is free to create havoc in their attempt to regain control of the northern province which they have run "as a state within a state" for several years now.

According to Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh, the Indian Army could

Prabhakaran may have lost the battle for Jaffna but he will certainly end up winning the war while for us it is a no-win situation viewed from any direction.

The question that our rulers need to ask themselves is: do they really have the right to send our soldiers off to fight battles for them that they are not sure that they want to win?

be stuck in a "classic counter-insurgency situation" and it is anybody's guess how long Indian troops will have to stay in Sri Lanka.

Naturally, things will be slightly more difficult for the LTTE than they have been in the past since they will no longer be able to find shelter in the generous embrace of Madras. But a constant supply of arms has not so far been a problem. According to the army, atleast one boatload of Chinese and Israeli arms was intercepted just before the battle for Jaffna began and it appeared to have come from Singapore.

Confused policy: All in all, things are just about as bad as they can be while our policy-makers continue to bungle along, changing direction when they wish to, and behaving exactly as if we did not really have a clear Sri Lanka policy at all.

Take for instance our attitude to Prabhakaran. Till a week ago the stated policy of the Indian Government was that they refused point blank to negotiate with him until he assured them of an unconditional surrender of arms. Now, suddenly we are informed that in fact if he comes up with a good enough proposal we are prepared to negotiate with him.

At a briefing by one of our friends from the MEA, at Palaly airport, we were told, "the LTTE leadership has been in touch with us and we have appealed to the LTTE cadres to participate in the normal democratic process." In answer to persistent questions he also admitted that the Indian Government had no objections to talking directly to Prabhakaran himself and that nobody was ruling out the possibility that the LTTE (if it agrees to make peace) would be given the lion's (Tiger's) share of representation on the interim council that we hope eventually to set up to rule the northern province till elections are held.

If this happens then it goes without saying that Prabhakaran may have lost the battle for Jaffna but he will certainly end up winning the war while for us it is a no-win situation viewed from any direction.

Perhaps the saddest image that I have carried back with me from Jaffna is that of an Indian soldier in combat fatigues standing in the rain trying to keep alive a pyre in which the bodies of two of his comrades were being burned.

The question that our rulers need to ask themselves is: do they really have the right to send our soldiers off to fight battles for them that they are not sure that they want to win?

THE STATESMAN

CIVILIANS □ KILLED (Operation Pawan)

K. Navaratnam 20.10.87

S. Pancharatnam 20.10.87

R. Prabhakar 20.10.87

Mrs. P. Pushparani 20.10.87

S. Rajeevan 20.10.87

Mrs. Ratna Leela 20.10.87

S. Ruby 20.10.87

K. Sinnathambi 20.10.87

Mrs. Sugirtham 20.10.87

K.M. Thambiah 20.10.87

Thangamuthu 20.10.87

Mrs. Thuraiamma 20.10.87

V. Varadharaja 20.10.87

S. Kandasami 21.10.87

V. Lagubaran 21.10.87

V.S. Nataraja 21.10.87

Nolin 21.10.87

J. Movin 21.10.87

EDITORIAL

OCTOBER 28, 1987

TIME FOR DEPARTURE

DESPITE New Delhi's strenuous attempts to mislead domestic opinion through a campaign that is aimed at exaggerating its military success against the LTTE in Jaffna, it is now clear that the cost of Operation Pawan was unacceptably high both in terms of civilian and military casualties. The Indian army (it is no longer appropriate to describe it as a "peace-keeping force") was guilty of seriously underestimating the military might of the LTTE and its penchant for using civilians as hostages. But more important, the prolonged battle for Jaffna demonstrated quite clearly that the Indians were surprisingly lax in their implementation of that section of the accord dealing with the surrender of all weapons, though they seem to have had greater success in keeping the Sri Lankan forces confined to barracks. Moreover, neither Mr Rajiv Gandhi nor Mr M. G. Ramachandran can evade responsibility for the charge that their generous assistance to Mr Pirabhakaran's forces in effect led to the death of more than 150 Indian soldiers. The irony of New Delhi now projecting the Tigers as extremist fanatics whereas it had earlier condoned LTTE butchery of the Sinhalese and rival Tamil militants is only too apparent, and may be a fundamental reason why the recent military operation in Jaffna has not won it the gratitude of the Sinhalese.

Indeed, the bomb blast in the Deputy High Commissioner's office in Kandy underlines the enormous danger of Indian forces being caught in the crossfire between intransigent Tamils and bigoted Sinhalese. In short, India is now paying a very heavy price for its impetuous adventurism and its amazingly naive belief that the LTTE was carrying out a proxy war on its behalf. It may have been possible to overlook the unfortunate tragedy of Operation Pawan if it was evident that the Tigers had finally been tamed and that it was now possible to do business with a chastened and disarmed Mr Pirabhakaran. Unfortunately, the belligerent statement by the LTTE's Jaffna commander, Mr Manendrarajan "Mahathiya", makes it clear that the Tigers will now switch their tactics from frontal confrontation to underground guerrilla warfare, a move which has ominous implications for an army operating on foreign soil without any worth-while civilian assistance. It is not necessary to side with Mr Karunanidhi's opportunistic conversion to the LTTE cause to argue that India's own credibility in Sri Lanka will not be enhanced by getting bogged down in a dirty war against the Tigers.

On the contrary, if military casualties continue to rise at the present alarming rate, there is a distinct possibility that more and more Indians will begin to question the logic of sacrificing the lives of our jawans in a foreign adventure whose main purpose seems to be to shore up Mr Rajiv Gandhi's sagging domestic fortunes. Rather than risk the ignominy of enforced withdrawal—either on account of military failure or a domestic backlash—it may be more prudent for Mr J. N. Dixit to begin negotiations with President Jayewardene to initiate a phased withdrawal of troops. There seems little point in persisting with the myth that democratic governance in the form of regional councils can be established in the Tamil areas in the face of such violent opposition by an LTTE with a taste for fascist methods of control. Since very little of the original accord is still left for salvaging, India may yet regain some of its waning credibility by cutting its losses and leaving the incomplete task of preserving the unity of Sri Lanka to President Jayewardene's ingenuity. And, since New Delhi's main fear is that Colombo may be tempted to go in for unholy alliances of convenience with other foreign powers, President Jayewardene's offer to safeguard Indian interests in Trincomalee by means of a bilateral treaty may provide the useful starting point of a dignified departure.

The Telegraph

87 October

BATTLE □ FOR □ JAFFNA

Twenty civilians killed, many hurt; market gutted

Indian copters bomb Lanka town

From Sumir Lal

Jaffna, Oct. 28: Indian helicopter gunships yesterday attacked the town of Chavakachheri, 24 km east of here, killing at least 20 civilians and injuring numerous others. The Indian peace-keeping force (IPKF) took control of the town later in the night.

Two helicopter gunships bombed the central market, bus stand and nearby houses in six sorties between noon and 5.30 pm, firing rocket mortars and spraying bullets from medium machineguns. This reporter counted 15 bodies in the market, seven of them charred beyond recognition, and five others in the local hospital soon after the second sortie. The number of casualties is likely to have increased after the subsequent raids.

Chavakachheri was one of the major strongholds of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) which is on the run in the Jaffna peninsula. The helicopter gunships did not strike the house being used as operational headquarters of the LTTE, located some 200 metres from the market, but hit a petrol pump adjacent to it.

This is the first time that the IPKF has deliberately struck at civilian targets. Most civilians and Tigers so far had complained of indiscriminate shelling by Sri Lankan helicopters.

There has been no official admission of the raids but portion of the market was ablaze and stunned boys were recovering the grotesquely mutilated bodies of those killed on the spot. The local hospital was filled with injured persons, many of them still bleeding profusely. The hospital was hopelessly short of basic first-aid equipment.

Even as the citizens recovered from the first series of raids, the helicopters returned for another round of fire. This reporter was among those who had to rush to specially-constructed underground shelter—made during the Sri Lankan Air Force's offensive—for cover.

By evening, hundreds of people had begun fleeing the town and could be seen headed in the direction of Kachchai and Kodikamam to the south of the peninsula. Many of them were refugees who had earlier fled from Jaffna town. Local people claimed that a college being used as a refugee camp had also been hit.

The IPKF moved in after dark and captured the town from the LTTE which had so far been in complete control.

observers speculate that they could have been carried out to scare civilians into leaving the town to enable the IPKF to launch an uninhibited ground offensive against the Tigers. They feel the IPKF has decided to launch a full-fledged offensive, sacrificing civilians in the process, in its final thrust against the LTTE.

When this reporter reached the spot around 1.30 pm, a

IPKF resorts to strafing for the first time

NEW DELHI, Oct. 29.

For the first time, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) has strafed two locations in Chavakacheri town, a LTTE stronghold east of Jaffna, which it later captured, according to an official report here today.

Some 27 bodies of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) militants were found in the area. Six IPKF jawans were killed and six were injured in the operation which had started on Tuesday and ended this morning.

Intelligence reports indicate that the LTTE is trying to regroup in areas of Mullaitivu, Batticaloa, Mannar and Trincomalee.

An External Affairs Ministry spokesman said here today that after capturing the LTTE stronghold, two battalions of the Madras Regiment were asked to secure Chavakacheri.

He said the LTTE had directed heavy volume of fire from an old, isolated building in the town. It was also running a petrol pump in close proximity of the building from which it was directing fire.

Having confirmed through intelligence and reconissance reports that the LTTE was using the building as its headquarters, the IPKF decided to strafe these two isolated locations by helicopters, the spokesman added.

to the unrest in the south of the island following the July 29 Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement.

The English language daily *Island* in a front-page report, today quoted Mrs. Bandaranaike as saying that the Government, by questioning her, was "trying to make out that there was a conspiracy to overthrow it."

"By this they are hoping to appoint a Commission and deprive me of my civic rights again so that I cannot contest the next elections," she told the paper.

40 LTTE men drowned: Over 40 Tamil militants, belonging to the LTTE, were believed drowned when a boat in which they were travelling to Jaffna capsized off the eastern Batticaloa coast, published reports today quoted security sources as saying.

The reports said the boat, which capsized at mid-sea, was travelling at high speed because the militants on board feared being apprehended by a security unit vessel which was chasing them.

The reports also said that more boats carrying a large number of Tamil 'Tigers' had left Batticaloa for Jaffna. They had a large quantity of arms and ammunition with them, security sources said.

A strict surveillance was now being maintained of the Batticaloa coast, sources said.

The spokesman admitted that this was the first occasion when the IPKF had strafed any location in the Jaffna peninsula.

The IPKF has stepped up relief measures. Some 12 tonnes of food was distributed among the refugees during the last 24 hours. The IPKF doctors have treated over 250 civilians.

The IPKF is also been taking steps to restore electricity and provide civic services like water and sanitation in Jaffna.— PTI, UNI

Five IPKF soldiers injured

PTI, UNI report from Colombo:

At least five Indian soldiers, including the commanding officer of the area, Col. Nanchappa, were seriously injured when two IPKF trucks hit a landmine in the eastern Batticaloa district last night.

The landmines exploded between the Akkaraipattu and Tirukkovil areas of the Batticaloa district, authoritative sources said here today.

Details of the incident are awaited.

Curfew was relaxed in Jaffna town for four hours from 8 a.m. today for the first time after the IPKF operations began some two weeks ago.

We had to take more than normal care, says Gen. Kalkat

COLOMBO, Oct. 29.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) never underestimated the strength of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), but certainly underestimated the group's "inhumanity" which made it sacrifice its kith and kin to achieve its ends, Maj. Gen. A. S. Kalkat, Commander of the IPKF in Jaffna, said today.

Gen. Kalkat was here to brief the Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. K. Natwar Singh, on the progress of the IPKF operations to disarm the militants. In an informal chat with newsmen, he said the LTTE had no moral, political and military justification for the "callous indifferece they had shown to the plight of thepeople, whose cause they claimed to uphold"

When the bona fides of the group itself were in question, could anyone give credence to its propaganda about alleged IPKF atrocities against the civilians, he countered in reply to a question.

He said the IPKF had sacrificed many of its members in a foreign country to uphold certain principles and India's basic values of democracy and freedom, "for they are values worth paying for"

Search operations under way: Gen. Kalkat said the IPKF had to take more than the normal care because, in the anxiety to avoid civilian casualties, it always had to take the first burst of fire from the militants who took cover behind the civilians. Not only bombs and explosives, but small arms had also been seized by the IPKF. However, a large number of the firearms were hidden in houses by the militants as they moved from house-to-house and sniped at the IPKF men. Search operations were now under way to ferret out these weapons.

Gen. Kalkat declined to go into how the IPKF proposed to take the Nallur Kandasamy Temple, where a large number of hardcore militants are reported to have taken cover among the thousands of refugees. He said the LTTE, which had desecrated all the temples around Nallur, hoped to make propaganda advantage by forcing the IPKF to storm the temple.

No hurting of religious sentiments: But, he pointed out, no one could dispute the fact that the Gurkha soldiers who were now ringingthe temple were the most religious and wouldo nothing to hurt the religious sentiments ofthe people.

IPKF advance: An Indian High Commission spokesman said the IPKF column which had taken control of the Chavakacheri area, 16km east of Jaffna town on Tuesday night, had moved further east and linked up with a unit at Kodigamam. Seven militants were killed during the mopping up operation in Chavakacheri.

LTTE CLAIMS

Hindu Ladies College, Jaffna comes under indiscriminated shelling for the second time. 3 children killed, 18 injured including 3 children who lost their legs.

Curfew relaxed between 08.00 hrs and 12.00 hrs after many days. But youth between the ages of 18 years and 30 years not allowed to go out of the refugee camps.

India counts the cost of a futile Tiger hunt in Tamil country

REPORT

India is ankle-deep in the quicksands of Sri Lanka, with the prospect of slipping up to its knees and beyond. **Bruce Palling** reports on the hapless 'peacekeepers' of Jaffna.

"MAY I make it quite clear that we are not at war. We do not have a military objective. If that idea has filtered down to you, please remove it. We are involved in a political-military task."

This assertion by General A.S. Kalkat, acting commander of India's troops in the Jaffna peninsula may be accurate in a legalistic sense but neither the Tamil Tigers, the Tamil civilian population, nor even the Indian troops themselves appear to believe it. No such speculation is possible from the estimated 1,000 people on all sides who have died in the past three weeks from the Indian action.

Earlier this week, General Depinder Singh, the Jaffna commander, admitted his troops were not fully prepared for the task of confronting the 2,000-strong Tamil Tiger force thought to be holed up in the densely populated peninsula. He admitted to correspondents that when the offensive began on 10 October, he had only one brigade at his disposal instead of the three he thought he required for the task.

Men and *matériel* were rushed from India at such a rate that civilian jets were commandeered while transport planes flew in heavy equipment. Accurate figures for Indian troops are hard to come by — the best estimates range from 16,000 to 25,000. Signs of haste are all too apparent at the Indian army's temporary headquarters near what was the international airport. Two large satellite dishes have been erected on what was once the Sri Lankan army's basketball court and the football field now plays host to an Indian tank depot.

The general assessment is that the Indian forces are in a terrible mess. Officials will tell you confidently that they have achieved one of their prime objectives by default — namely, the disarming of the Tamil Tigers by virtue of capturing several of their biggest, arms dumps. The Tigers, however, are past masters at smuggling arms from abroad. The belief that the only way out for the besieged Tigers was for them to drop their weapons and mingle with fleeing refugees has also proved naive. As the occasional journalists' forays into rebel-held territory have shown, the town was never effectively sealed until after the Tigers had fled, taking their small arms.

The Indian hope is that the Tamil population will eventually blame the Tigers for causing the renewed chaos and violence, and that the Indians will defuse any temporary anger by assisting in the rehabilitation of the bruised peninsula. No one can confidently predict the success of this scenario but already the association in civilian minds of the Indians as protectors and saviours has been badly battered.

The Sri Lankan army is watching smugly from the sidelines, happy to tell visiting correspondents that the Indians received their come-uppance for thinking that the Tigers would be a pushover. "The Indians had their heads held high when they arrived with their parade-ground drill and discipline. What they failed to realise is that this type of combat is fought on your belly, or at best, at ground level," a Sri Lankan officer said.

There are conflicting messages from Indian officials. On the one hand, the officers say they are prepared to countenance any casualty figures to crush or disarm the Tigers. Non-military sources, however, are discreetly dropping hints that should a settlement prove impossible, the Indians would be prepared to withdraw and walk away. It is difficult to believe, however, that such an option remains.

As a Sri lankan officer said, it is not just Sri Lankans who are watching keenly the progress or otherwise of the Indian armed forces. It is also of great interest to Sikh militants in Punjab, Assamese separatists in the north-east of India and, most important, the Pakistan and Chinese armies deployed on India's other borders.

The Indians are rapidly losing freedom of movement and are increasingly at the mercy of the Tigers. It is the latter who can determine the pace of the action, not the Indian army — and the Tigers show no desire to surrender either their arms or their dream of Eelam, their separate Tamil state.

29 October 1987



R.K. Lakshman, The Times of India, 28.4.87

Now Rajiv's turn for political solution





THE HINDU

IPKF toll touches 214, LTTE's put at 753

BATTLE □ FOR □ JAFFNA

From K. K. Katyal

NEW DELHI, Oct. 30.

A total of 214 members of the Indian Peace Keeping-Force (IPKF) have been killed and 709 wounded in the operations in Sri Lanka so far. Those killed included 15 officers and 14 Junior Commissioned Officers.

An official spokesman said today that the officers who had insisted on being in the forefront to minimise civilian casualties were leading their units. A large number of jawans, who had received minor injuries, have rejoined duty.

The number of the LTTE cadres killed in the fighting have been estimated at 753, however the number of injured persons was not given.

The spokesman referred to a newspaper report that the LTTE regarded the IPKF prisoners as hostages and said:"It is clarified that the IPKF personnel cannot be hostages with the LTTE and should not be subjected to coercion".

Disinformation: According to intelligence sources, LTTE leaders have instructed their cadres and sympathisers abroad to launch a disinformation campaign to accuse the Indian troops of killing civilians and committing atrocities and claim that the supplies of arms and ammunition to the LTTE would not be allowed to dry up. They were also told to send communications, indicting the IPKF, to the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, and Amnesty International and propaganda material to Tamil Nadu.

The IPKF which, according to official information received here, was continuously patrolling the Jaffna peninsula, has established link patrols to prevent the LTTE from laying mines on the roads. A big arms and explosives dump was recovered yesterday in Jaffna in an area between the bus stand and civil hospital.

Arms recovered: The arms recovered included one 120mm mortar, a three-inch mortar and large quantities of other ammunition. A large cache of arms was also captured in Batticaloa on Wednesday. It contained 11 rifles and a big quantity of ammunition. Mr. Balasubramaniam, a hard-core LTTE militant leader, was apprehended by the IPKF in Batticaloa.

Jaffna was gradually returning to normal with the curfew lifted yesterday for four hours. Relief measures were stepped up, and the refugees regularly provided with food and medicines. In Trincomalee, the IPKF set up a medical centre for use of the civilian population.

LTTE leader dead in strafing?

MADRAS, Oct. 30.

An External Affairs Ministry spokesman said here today that he had no information to confirm whether the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) deputy leader, Mr. Mahatiya, was killed in the Indian Peace-Keeping Forces (IPKF) aerial strafing at Chavakacheri in the Jaffna peninsula yesterday.

Answering a question from reporters, the spokesman said "All I can say is that when the 11th and 12th battalions of the Madras Regiment moved around Chavakacheri, we have information that the building which was strafed from the air, was the LTTE headquarters. I have no information to confirm that Mr. Mahatiya was killed in that operation."

He said that if relief supplies were to reach people in the Jaffna town, it was important that the IPKF should retain control of the Chavakacheri road. When two battalions of the Madras Regiment converged to secure the road, they came under very heavy fire from this particular, isolated building. A reconnaissance by them revealed that the building was the LTTE headquarters.

"We could have stormed it and then the Madras Regiment would have taken very heavy casualties. We used helicopter-gunships which came into Jaffna after the town was secured. It was directed against a specific target. I have no confirmed evidence whether Mr. Mahatiya was there, which was the LTTE headquarters," the spokesman added.

In Colombo, the State-owned *Daily News* had referred to intelligence reports suggesting that Mahatiya and Santosam Master, the Trincomalee leader, had been killed.

The newspaper ran the story on the front-page with the heading "Mahattaya killed?" unhurt.—PTI, UNI

LTTE CLAIMS

AUdivil 4 arrested and later shot dead by the IPKF.

Indian army moving from Navatkuli tto Chavakacheri opened fire indiscriminately. About 100 civilians killed all along the road.

NEWS

Human chain planned to press for ending 'war'

MADRAS, Oct. 30.

The Indian Government should immediately stop "the war against Tamils" in Sri Lanka voluntarily and without any precondition to prevent further killings of innocent civilians, Mr. Sp. Veerapandian, convener, Confederation for the Protection of the Rights of Eelam Tamils, told a press conference here today. To press this demand, the confederation, formed recently by about 20 organisations of the people in the literary field, writers, students and others, planned to form a human chain from Parrys Corner to Meenambakkam here on November 2.

The participants would stand in a line holding one another's hand either on the centre of the road or along the kerb and keep chanting "Indian Government, stop the war" for an hour from 4-30 p.m. They would also have placards hung around their necks.

At 22 points, prominent personalities including leaders of political parties would provide leadership and linkages to the 16 km-long chain.

Mr. Veerapandian said Mr. K. Kalimuthu, AIADMK deputy general secretary, Mr. V. Gopalaswami, DMK MP, poets Messrs M. Metha, and Valampuri John MP, and writers Messrs Salai Ilandirayan and Perunchithiranar had agreed to take part in the programme.

DMK will join human chain: The DMK president, Mr. M. Karunanidhi, announced that his party would join the "human chain" programme.

Rajiv's new time bomb ticking in Sri Lanka

DEREK BROWN

REPORT

THERE is a certain sardonic satisfaction among the Sinhalese majority of Sri Lanka, as the body count mounts in the north.

"I think JR is being so clever," a businessman remarked. "He has the Indians doing his dirty work for him."

Like many Sinhalese, he believes that JR (the universal diminutive for President Junius Richard Jayawardene) has cunningly inveigled the Indians into smashing the Tamil Tigers, thus saving "their" country from secession or partition. When the fighting is over, runs the current wishful thinking, the Sinhalese nation will be able once more to impose their majority will.

This is self deception on a grand scale. The Indians came to Sri Lanka precisely to prevent any such thing.

After four years of savage communal warfare, Sri Lanka was, in New Delhi eyes, hopelessly unstable. Much more important, the instability could have spread to India itself, via the southern state of Tamil Nadu. The accord of July 29 was and remains designed to protect India, as much as to solve the Sri Lanka conflict.

The Colombo government has had to cut its military links with Pakistan, and other powers regarded with deep suspicion by Delhi. In addition, JR, who achieved power and retained it by appealing to crude Sinhalese chauvinism, was obliged to concede a measure of autonomy to the Tamils of the North and East. In return, India became the guarantor of Sri Lanka's sovereignty and territorial integrity' and — the big bonus for JR — Delhi accepted the awesome task of bringing the Tigers to heel.

For more than ten weeks, the Indians did all they could to make the Tamil Tigers renounce violence and go political. When the break came, they had no compunction about going for the kill. Nor have they been abashed by the ferocity of the Tiger response, or the desperate plight of the people they came to protect.

After taking close to 1,000 casualties themselves, dead and wounded, the Indians say they have forced the Tigers back to their pre-1983 role of guerrilla fighters. Shorn of their fixed defences, munitions factories, and de facto governing role, the theory goes, the militants will be abandoned by the Tamil people, who have a deep seated instinct to support the winning side. The analysis airily ignores the Tigers' continuing control of most of the countryside, and the fact that their leadership remains intact and fanatically intent on continuing the fight.

However, troops are pouring into Sri Lanka almost every day. There are certainly 20,000 here now, and possibly 30,000. The Indian navy is patrolling the Palk straits. In Tamil Nadu, the Tiger bases have been closed and supply lines cut. The odds must be heavily on India being able to contain, if not snuff out, the rebel resistance.

But that is only phase one of their strategy. Having committed so much blood and money to the military campaign, the Indians are certainly not going to hand over the fruits of victory to the government in Colombo. They came to Sri Lanka, they say, to sort out not just the Tamil militants, but, if necessary, the Sinhalese ones as well.

To that end, India is about to embark on one of the biggest population resettlements of modern times. More than 200,000 Tamil refugees — 130,000 in India, and another 90,000 in Sri Lanka — are to be sent back to their homes, mostly in eastern province.

This will transform the demographic balance there, now more or less evenly divided between Tamils, Sinhalese, and Muslims. It will, almost certainly, mean confrontation with the Sinhalese "colonists" who have been pushing into the east, especially round the port of Trincomalee which links the exclusively Tamil north with the ethnically mixed east.

Indian officials are extraordinarily blunt about their aims, and their determination. There will be self government for the united north and east provinces, they say. There will be full resettlement of the Tamil refugees. If the Sri Lankans intervene, they will be met with force.

This has literally explosive implications for the south, which is the generic term for all the country outside the Tamil areas. An armed campaign by the JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, or People's Liberation Front), a notionally leftist group of ardent Sinhalese chauvinists, is picking up momentum.

There is as yet, no evidence that the JVP is ready to repeat its uprising of 1971, which was put down with savage reprisals (and Indian help) and the loss of around 15,000 lives. But the warning bells are clamouring.

There is turmoil in the universities, most of which have been closed for most of the year. Seventeen members and officials of the ruling United National Party were murdered in the four weeks to mid-October. The Sri Lankan army, and the notorious special task force of paramilitary police, have been widely deployed in the south.

The great mass of the Sinhalese people, just like the Tamils, are no doubt heartily sick of violence and economic disruption. But on both sides there are deep atavistic fears. Even the mildest Sinhalese say, with all seriousness, that they are the rightful Aryan inhabitants of the island, who risk being pushed into the sea by Dravidian hordes from India.

On July 29, when Rajiv Gandhi came to Colombo, it seemed to many that the 2,000 year old nightmare was coming to life. The war in the north has since assuaged the fear. But the relief could be temporary. When Indian intentions in the east become more plain, all the ancient Sinhalese prejudice will be revived. It could turn the Tamil Tigers, in their eyes, from the prime villains into Sri Lankan resistance heroes.

October 29 1987

THE WONDERFUL HALF-HAND OF THE IPKF

LETTER *By Appan, Jaffna*

According to a Sri Lankan paper, *Lanka Guardian* of Aug.1, General Sundarji (one time Sunthararajan?) is reported to have said that the IPKF had to fight with ***"one- and-a-half hands tied behind our back."*** But in mid-May, when *India Today* asked him, "In Operation Pawan, shouldn't you have asked for more time to go in, as Maneckshaw did in 1971?", the General's reply was, ***"In 1971, you had a choice about the timing. Operation Pawan was not just a military operation, but a politico-military operation. After all, the operation was military as well."***

What did this balance half-a-hand do? The half-hand dynamited the printing machines of the ***Eela Murasu and the Murasoli*** dailies on the night of Oct.9, 1987. From 10th Oct. onwards it used its heavy guns at random, and the BBC correspondent called it *"inaccurate artillery"*, though Mark Tully who was in Palaly on a *conducted tour* saw nothing untoward. Mark Tully, a Rajiv groupie, may receive another decoration from the Queen, but at what a price honest journalism? *This half-hand got Sinhalese helicopters to strafe civilians, shell their homes, it drove tanks over rail tracks and productive vegetable gardens to avoid land mines along roads. It shot innocent civilians in their homes and bunkers, erasing entire families in the process; raped maidens, middle-aged women (even pregnant), and grannies. It ordered people to rush to refugee camps and looted their houses and shops. It decimated the entire fleet of buses at the Kondavil Depot, shot into each and every computer at the Jaffna University, imposed a non-stop curfew ranging from 15 days to months. This half-hand is yet brutalising the civilians of North-Eastern Lanka. After cordon off and search, the Indian forces herded the people into centres for "spotting" by their Tamil mercenaries. The people had to squat for hours in the hot sun. Recently at Kopay, while the oppressors had 'Fanta', a bucket of water brought for the civilians was snatched and poured out. Said the Indian sentry, "You people like to fast, now come along, fast." Can Gen.Sundarji deny all the above? Will the Indians allow independent organisations like the International Red Cross to comment on the above? North-Eastern Sri Lanka has been thrown down flat, and is being trampled by the Indians*

Indian Army chief Mr. Sundarji said the peace-keeping mission in Sri Lanka was under taken by Indian army in the interest of India and to make sure that the Tamil population in Sri Lanka got what was legitimate due to it.

According to *Aside*, the Magazine of Madras, dated Sept.16-30, 1988, a high official of the Government of India, who had worked closely with Rajiv till recently, had said in a private conversation, **"Rajiv Gandhi is a *Bhasmaasura*. Anything he touches, he destroys; and now he is touching his own head."** Probably true; because the wailings of our dying babies, children, boys and girls, men and women and grandpas and grannies have to be answered in the name of the beloved GOD above!

"Elai Alutha Kanneer Kooriya Vaalokkum"

THE AGE 87 October

Peace accord ended lives and hopes

REPORT

By CAMERON FORBES, Colombo

Thileeban is to Eelam what Bobby Sands is to Ireland.
— slogan on wall in Jaffna.

RAJASINGHAM NARENDRAN recognised his mother by the gold earring and the blouse she wore. Dogs had eaten most of her body. He recognised his brother's build. Maggots had eaten his face.

Dr Narendran later said to an Indian Peacekeeping Force officer: "When Mrs Gandhi died, she was given a State funeral; my mother was eaten by dogs. She deserved better than that."

Mrs Florence Rajasingham, who was 65, and Rajasingham Manoharan, 38, were killed on the porch of Dr Narendran's house, in the village of Navatkuli, deep in Tamil country about 10 kilometres south of the ancient, bloodied city of Jaffna. Their 65-year-old gardener, Rasaiyah died near the house. Animals had picked his bones.

Seven days later, after receiving news of the deaths and flying from King Faisal University in Saudi Arabia where he is an assistant professor in the agricultural college, Dr Narendran would find them where they fell, cremate them, disinfect the area, then remove the remains of the breakfast they had been eating and the fish his mother had been preparing for lunch. He would lock the house and, next day, search outside the fence, finding three bullet casings, marked OPV86 7.62m80.

Who killed Florence Rajasingham, Rajasingham Manoharan and Rasaiyah? "Very, very likely, it was the IPKF," Dr Narendran says. "The casings have been identified as from a self-loading rifle. The Indian Army uses them. So do the Sri Lankan police, but they were not in the area." Besides, there was one survivor of the slaughter, a 10-year-old servant boy. Dr Narendran will not give his name or whereabouts.

He told of the brother, wary after years of terror and brutality, on hearing three shots, suggesting that the mother go out. Women were less likely to be harmed. The mother was murdered. The brother came out, hands in the prayer position, begging for mercy. He died. The men in uniform, the boy said, spoke a strange language which was not Tamil or Sinhalese.

Perhaps the killers were from the IPKF. Perhaps they were not. Truth dies a hard death in conflicts like the one in Sri Lanka. But the certainty is that, ultimately, the three were victims of chauvinism, atavistic fear and distrust.

During the past four years more than 6000 people — majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils and Muslims — have died. The three, and uncounted hundreds more, have died over the weeks since the signing of a document titled "Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement to Establish Peace and Normalcy in Sri Lanka".

This accord was probably the last, best hope of creating conditions to enable the three million Tamils and the 12 million Sinhalese to end the violence and to share, peacefully, their beautiful island.

But an Indian intellectual I spoke to, who surveyed the old Sri Lankan tragedy and the new danger to his country, now at least ankle-deep in a quagmire, said: "There is no will here, only desire. There is no history, only myths and dreams."

There are, of course, the realities of discrimination and death. But that slogan on the wall in Jaffna — "Thileeban is to Eelam what Bobby Sands is to Ireland" — points to the potency of religion, bigotry, an angry sense of history and of martyrdom.

Bobby Sands was an IRA hunger-striker; Thileeban was a Tiger, a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, who starved himself to death. The hard men of the IRA recall the Battle of the Boyne, 400 or so years past, as if it were yesterday; the Tigers look back to an ancient Tamil kingdom.

The Catholic IRA regard themselves as the protectors of the Catholic Northern Irish; the Tigers have appointed themselves champions of the Hindu Tamils. The IRA wants British troops out and an end to Protestant hegemony; the Tigers want Indian troops to go home, Sri Lankan troops to stay away and the creation of a separate Tamil state — Eelam — in the north and east of Sri Lanka.

The chances of peaceful coexistence between Tamil and Sinhalese faded fast after independence with real or perceived discrimination by the majority. In 1978 the leader of the Tamil United Liberation Front spoke in a parliamentary debate of the separateness of the communities since independence: "... the only change that has been brought about in the name of freedom is that one nation, the majority nation, has been enthroned in the seat of power and the minority nation made a subject nation."

The fears and the separateness spawned escalating violence. The Tigers emerged as the dominant Tamil militants and built their stronghold in Jaffna Earlier this year, after atrocities against Sinhalese, the Sri Lankans attempted to storm the stronghold and crush the Tamils. But a military victory was out of reach and India intervened, air-dropping supplies to the Tamil civilians. And so President Jayewardene took a great gamble, signing the accord with India's Prime Minister, Mr Gandhi.

The accord, "recognising that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which must be carefully nurtured", allowed for the formation of the northern and eastern provinces into one administrative unit. For the Tamils there was to be a devolution of powers. For the Sri Lankan Government, the neutralising of the Tigers, required to lay down their arms within 72 hours, and the cutting off of their support from Tamil Nadu. For the Indians, a domestic and foreign policy victory. They would be seen to champion the Tamils and they would demonstrate their hegemony as a regional power.

President Jayewardene said in July: "We will sign the accord on Wednesday and terrorism will end by Monday." The fact that he was disastrously wrong is partly explained by his accompanying statement that the merger between north and east was a temporary one that would be dissolved by a referendum called for in the accord.

The Tigers — and many Tamils — regard the two regions as rightfully joined. They say the Sinhalese "colonised" the east and drove Tamils out, leaving them the largest group, but not a majority.

Now it is India that has sought a military solution. The IPKF had to march on Jaffna when the Tigers, having savaged their Tamil opposition militants, went into a frenzy after the suicides, turning on Sinhalese.

A grieving Dr Narendran says that after the accord "a diabolic plot" was hatched to destroy the Tigers, tempting and pressuring them into actions that would force India's hand. The leadership, under Velupillai Prabhakaran, blundered he says, and fell into a trap.

Prabhakaran and perhaps 1200 armed Tigers escaped from the physical trap of Jaffna easily enough. The question is whether they have forfeited the respect and backing of the civilians of Jaffna, caught in the middle as civilians always are in such campaigns.

"We confidently look forward to your continued support as our freedom fighters give their lives to defend the self-respect of our people and win our freedom," the Tiger political committee said. "Your continued support is a rock that can never be shattered and no force on earth can crush us."

Clearly the Indians hope that time and a rehabilitation effort will dim memories of the horror of the drive on Jaffna, slowly chipping away at support.

They recognise the difficulty of crushing the Tigers and the dangers of being caught up in a South Asian version of Vietnam, the war Arthur Calwell called dirty and unwinnable. (A military analyst told me this week he was sure that the Tigers were well tapped into the international arms trade and that the loss of the Tamil Nadu conduit would not be a problem.)

What is also in question is whether the Sinhalese have the will to devolve enough powers and responsiblities to the Tamil regions to make the people feel secure.

For much of his life 41-year-old Dr Narendran has lived with insecurity. In 1977 he fled his looted and burning house in Kandy, escaping a Sinhalese mob with only the clothes he wore. The next year he left Sri Lanka. He had planned to come back and set up a dairy farm with his brother. "And I will return still, he says, when I can live in peace." It promises to be a long exile.

RAJIV "ACCORD" GANDHI

COMMENT

Booby - trapped in Sri Lanka

Dipankar Bhattacharya

SUCH are the hazards of waging peace" - that was President R. Venkataraman commenting on the attempted assault on Rajiv Gandhi by a Sri Lankan Naval rating following the celebrated Rajiv-Jayawardene accord. Perhaps little inkling did then he have about the hazards that were to follow a bare 60 days later as waging peace degenerated into waging war, pure and simple. Yes, in the name of consolidating the peace process the one-division strong Indian armed forces in Sri Lanka have just been pushed into a meaningless battle with the Tamil Tigers - termed their "most malignant military misadventure in memory" by a scribe - costing both sides hundreds of lives while the wily Jayewardene and his hawkish cohorts are chuckling away to glory. They have good reasons to do so, for with New Delhi battling it out with the LTTE, Colombo has now really begun to taste the historic diplomatic victory that it had pulled off on July 29.

Events have indeed come a full circle in Sri Lanka. If between July 1983 - when Sri Lanka became a virtual staughterhouse for the island's longsuffering Tamil population - and July 1987, when in a dramatic development Jayewardene and Rajiv Gandhi put their pens together to manufacture that magic of an accord, New Delhi always appeared to be arguing the Tamil case with Colombo, now the broad majority of Sri Lankan Tamils find rajiv Gandhi acting in tandem with JRJ in crushing all their legitimate aspirations. The LTTE which owes much of its present military muscleto earlier Indian assistance now faces the strongest threat so far to its physical existence from the very Indian friends. And ironically enough the unprecedented slaughter of the Tamil Tigers by the "Indian Peace Killing Force" continued even as Rajiv Gandhi was crying himself hoarse at the Vancouver summit of C'wealthh nations about the safety and security of the ethnic Indian majority in Fiji, a sizable section of which comprises none other than Tamils.

Behind the Flare-up...

THAT the implementation of the Rajiv-JRJ accord would not be a smooth affair - fraught as it was with hundreds of ifs and buts - was known from the very beginning, more so to the two assenting parties. Yet instead of making a serious and concerted effort to thrash out the remaining irritants through necessary political and diplomatic follow-up, the Rajiv government deliberately chose to ignore all early warnings. And thus while in India Rajiv Gandhi was busy explaining the "historic significance" of the accord before one and all, in Sri Lanka whatever little uphoria was generated particularly among sections of Tamils was fast petering out as the implementation of the accord began to falter right from the word go. Indian armed forces were quite punctual in their arrival, but the time-frame-work for surrender of arms that was to have taken place within 72 hours of signing the accord had to be extended by another four days. Tamil militants accused Colombo of making unnecessary delay in effecting the promised general amnesty to their comrades and of promoting fresh Sinhala settlements in the East. On their part the militants made a rather symbolic surrender of their arms and the IPKF was flayed in the Sinhala press for inaction on this score. And among themselves the various militant groups resumed their internecine war in a big way with LTTE charging the IPKF with connivance with groups ranged against it. The fast-unto-death by LTTE's chief political organiser, Amrithalingam Thileepan, 23, at the famous Nallur Kandasamy temple in Jaffna town in a bid to press the Tiger's five-point charter of demands - release of the estimated 1,500 Tamil prisoners detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, stoppage of Sinhala colonisation allegedly continuing in Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Amparai and Mullaitivu; stoppage of all rehabilitation work until the formation of the interim government for the North and the East; closure of all the military camps in schools and Tamil villages - and a parallel outbreak of sympathy fasts both in the North and the East in late September were symptoms enough of a marked deterioration in the situation. And the tripartite agreement among the two governments and the LTTE on 28 September on the formation of an Interim Administrative Council for the integrated Northern and Eastern provinces could do little to reverse this process. The agreement itself fell flat with the LTTE suddenly going back on its own panel, insisting on three changes in its representation of seven in the 12-men IAC and JRJ obstinately refusing to okay the proposed replacement of V. Sivagnanam as the Administrator-in-Council by N. Pathmanathan while accepting the two other changes suggested by LTTE. This virtually sealed the negotiations and whatever little scope and hope were still left became altogether taking a sharp downturn following yet another provocation by the Sri Lankan government. On October 3 the Sri Lankan Navy intercepted an LTTE boat off Point Pedro with 17 Tigers, including such top leaders as Pulendran, LTTE's Trincomalee regional commander and Kumarappa, the Jaffna regional commander, on board. Ignoring the LTTE's warning and all persuasive pleas by the IPKF, the JRJ administration went ahead with its declared plan of taking the arrested persons to colombo for the sake of interrogation. On the way the Tigers, as had already been declared by Prabhakaran in his warning message to the IPKF top brass - consumed cyanide, leading to instantaneous death for 12 of them. This was sure sign of a rapidly

approaching point of no return and with the LTTE deciding to avenge the martyrdom of their comrades by indulging in one of those macabre orgies of mass slaughter, liquidating some 150 innocent Sinhala civilians including women and children, the situation was perfectly back to square one. Yet another of those magic accords of Rajiv 'Accord' Gandhi had come violently unstuck. And for cartoonist R.K. Laxman it was yet another prediction come true.

But with a one division strong Indian army stationed in the island and an accord charging India with the task of protecting peace and tranquility the situation this time could not possibly have followed the pattern established between July 1983 and July 1987; and by October 10 with the IPKF launching a full-scale offensive against the LTTE the new dimension was in full play. and on his part Prabhakaran was quite aware of this new dimension as one can find from the following reaction of his to the July 29 accord: "We have so far had to face only the Sri Lankan army. In future we may have to face the Indian army as well". The "future" is now being enacted in all its glory detailed in the battle-scarred streets of Jaffna.

Wily Jayewardene, Foolhardy Rajiv Intransigent Prabhakaran...

THE Indian government is laying the entire blame for the present crisis in Sri Lanka at the door of the LTTE. Most of the commentaries and editorials in the print-media have also echoed this official position, holding the "intransigence" of the Tigers responsible for what are considered as "unfortunate-yet-unavoidable" developments in the island. But any analysis which puts the LTTE in the dock for the present flare-up in Sri Lanka suffers from a fundamental flaw. The so-called "peace process" in the island was sponsored jointly by Jayewardene and Rajiv Gandhi and LTTE or for that matter any Tamil group was never a party to it. Naturally the two governments must have felt that they were capable of maintaining peace whether LTTE accepted the accord or not. And though ultimately most of the Tamil groups including LTTE agreed to give the accord a try they never concealed the fact that they were doing so only because of their "love for India" or because, as Prabhakaran put it, they were left with little option when a big power like India chose to decide their destiny. Naturally, then, if peace has now degenerated into war the responsibility must be shared by those who thought they could enforce peace even without the concurrence of LTTE. The possibility of fresh flare-ups was written into the "peace forces" itself and the violent denouement could well have come through a different chain of events.

Indeed given the history of hostility between the Sri Lankan government, particularly the JRJ administration, and Tamil militants, a mere peace accord - JRJ administration, and Tamil militants, a mere peace accord - that too one by no means whole-heartedly endorsed by any significant section of the fighting Tamil groups or for that matter even by the majority of the Sinhala community - could never possibly radically alter the approaches of the contending parties. On many an earlier occasion Colombo did go back on promises made to Tamil groups and the concessions made by JRJ in the July 29 accord were therefore bound to appear suspect in Tamil eyes, more so when the accord was preceded by the bloodiest military offensive against the Tigers in the entire course of their struggle for national self-determination. In fact Jayewardene's sudden clamour for a peaceful settlement of the ethnic crisis was not prompted by any sympathetic concern for Tamil aspirations - it was only after he realised that his own forces were incapable of allowing him the luxury of a military solution that he switched over to the new gameplan of an Indo-Sri Lanka accord, shifting the entire burden of curbing and crushing Tamil militancy to India's shoulders. For a predominantly military outfit like LTTE which has borne the burnt of the Sri Lankan attack, surrendering all its arms cannot but be a highly emotive issue and demands an enormous amount of political persuasion, backed, of course, by real, concrete evidences of concessions that can be purchased at that cost. Evidently, the so-called Rajiv-Jayewardene peace process had paid little attention to this hard reality. Moreover, even if the Tamils were made a party to such a peace process that could have only meant a change in the course of their struggle for self-determination and not cessation of the struggle itself. But the Rajiv-Jayewardene doctrine of peace would not leave the slightest scope for any such a peace process that could have only meant a change in the course of their struggle itself. But the Rajiv-Jayewardene doctrine of peace would not leave the slightest scope for any such "nonsense".

If war is a continuation of peacetime politics, albeit in a different form, so is peace an extension of wartime hostility through non-military means. Surely Rajiv Gandhi has now spent enough years in politics to understand this fundamental equation between war and peace. We can therefore reasonably presume that when he was putting his signature to the July 29 accord, whereby India was charged with the most unenviable task of keeping two warring sides at peace he knew what he was doing. At least he must have been theoretically aware of the possibility that the Indian armed forces might have to apply some force in ensuring that the Tigers surrendered their arms, though it is only now that he is realising the real dimension of such an encounter between the IPKF and LTTE. But perhaps that was not the time for Rajiv Gandhi to worry about the dangerous prospect of getting bogged down in

Sri Lanka, he was badly in need of some wayout from the menacing Bofors scandal which was then threatening to rip through his crisis-ridden government. And so when Jayewardene offered to "naturalise" India's predominant role in the affairs of this part of the region Rajiv readily lapped it up. The beleagured "Bofors Prime Minister" of India acquired yet another feather of an accord to his cap. An accord that he claimed would not only bring peace in the strife-torn island and ease the military and economic burden of a protracted civil war for both the neighbours, but would also effectively check the process of growing imperialist penetration in this sensitive region by fostering co-operation between the two countries.

While Rajiv Gandhi obviously relished Jayewardene's respectful gestures, for majority of India's "foreign policy elite" this was a clear indication of the fact that India's South Asia policy had finally come of age. The potential regional power, they said, was now well on its way to emerge as the recognised "leader" of the region. Yesterday's "bullying big brother" had come to be regarded as an accommodating elder.

On Punjab Accord :

R.K. Lakshman, The Times of India

Lending Expertise To Crust Popular Unrest: "Regional Cooperation"?

INDIA'S military offensive against the LTTE on the Sri Lankan soil provides further confirmation of her changed approach. Despite all the danger of getting trapped in a Vietnam or Afghanistan-type situation in Sri Lanka Rajiv Gandhi appears determinedt to go the whole hog to buy the confidence of India's smaller and weaker neighbours. He is even quite willing to suffer some losses in the short run to ensure long-term gains in this regard. He knows the old concept of "regional hegemony" is not going to work under today's changed circumstances, it has to be turned inside out -- for today's slogan is regional cooperation. In other words, it has to be a "benevolent hegemony".

It is this doctrine of "benevolent hegemony" that Rajiv Gandhi is faithfully translating into practice in Sri Lanka to the enthusiastic applause of the Western world. And why single out the West, he has sort of won a worldwide approval, with no opposition yet from any quarter. "From the Commonwealth summit meeting at Washington DC, where the Prime Minister met President Reagan and his principal aides, India's peacekeeping role in Sri Lanka won unqualified approval and support", writes the noted foreign policy analyst Bhabani Sen Gupta in an article in 'The Hindustan Times' (October 24), adding, "This unprecedented event has been interpreted in India and South Asia as the first International recognition of India's status as the leading power in this region". Further explaining the significance of this recognition he notes, "Since the Bangladesh war of 1971, in which Indian troops vanquished the Pakistani army in the paddy fields and marshes of what was then East Pakistan, the world has tended to see India as the primary power in South Asia... There was a catch, however.

The Western world recognised India as the regional power in South Asia. But it gave India no role. In order to understand the dichotomy, one has to hit upon a precise concept of the role of an independent regional power in a bipolar world. The concept has to be crafted with three components. First, primacy of the national interests of the regional power in a geopolitical region which the external powers would not violate. Secondly, the regional power must have a determinant voice in the affairs of the region, specially in matters of serious conflict. Finally, junior members of the region will acknowledge the influence of the regional power... Now the world's temper and mood has changed and India is given the role of a regional power" (emphasis ours).

The doctrine of "benevolent hegemony" has also found enthusiastic takers among the Opposition in India, particularly within the CPI(M). These gentlemen do not find anything wrong in India's military operations in Sri Lanka. In fact, far from questioning the advisability of trying military means to salvage a politically and diplomatically moribund accord, the CPI(M) politbureau has come out with a blanket endorsement of the "Indian Peace Mission" in Sri Lanka, laying the entire blame on the LTTE's "Intransigence". After all, they seem to suggest, we have not invaded Sri Lanka, but are only sharing with her our enormous experience and expertise in an extremely high-priority area. Maybe we cannot show our smaller and weaker neighbours the road to economic development and social progress, but shouldn't we at least show them how to preserve "national unity and integrity"? After all, is this not the one area where we possess the latest technology? Why shouldn't we then transfer that and have a collaboration?

Apprehensions have, of course, been expressed that India may get embroiled in a Vietnam or Afghanisatan-type situation in Sri Lanka. But that is only to remind New Delhi that it is as yet only a regional power and not a super power, and so it cannot possibly afford to have as lasting an affair as the Americans had in Vietnam or the Soviets are still having in Afghanistan. Says Bhabani Sen Gupta, "The balance of forces still favours the peace-keeping mission. But it may not be so for a long time. Success of intervention is ensured by its quick termination: this is what made the Indian intervention in Bangladesh a text-book success story. The IPKF is now not much smaller than Sri Lanka's entire army of 24,000. The Tigers will stake everything to prolong the fighting, to get India bogged down. What is needed on the Indian side is determination to

secure the minimum objectives of the fighting in Jaffna – significant disarming of the Tigers – and quick withdrawal of the bulk of IPKF. No more than a few thousand soldiers must remain in Sri Lanka on New Year's day; the thinning out must begin in the next few weeks. This country has always opposed prolonged foreign military presence on the territory of a sovereign State..." (emphasis ours).

So, this is the latest language in whcih our foreign policy discourses are being delivered. But having once walked into the Sri Lankan imbroglio can India now walk out at her own sweet will? Even though the government of India claims to have smashed the LTTE's resistance in Jaffna after more than two weeks of fierce fighting, indications are that this dirty, little war is going to have a protracted, violent aftermath, and cause not a few convulsions in India's domestic affairs as well.

From the Frying "Bofors" Pan into the Raging Sri Lankan Fire

PROMPTED by the immediate compulsion of getting out of the Bofors scandal and the long-term consideration of scoring some more points in the regional power-game, Rajiv Gandhi had stepped up his role in Sri Lanka's ethnic crisis since early this year. After Bofors and Fairfax, Sri Lanka thus became perhaps the third biggest media blockbuster of 1987, by far outstripping everyday potboilers like Punjab. An abortive aidpacked flotilla followed by a high-flying relief mission, a dramatic accord accompanied by some equally breathtaking acrobatics, and now a bloody tussle between IPKF paratroopers and LTTE landmines – India's involvement in Sri Lanka has been a steadily growing affair; but this transition from a mediator's role to that of an active agent has been far from smooth. It has generated a whole new set of frictions, and as Rajiv Gandhi tries to manoeuvre his way through this maze of contradictions, let us have a look at the balance sheet of his adventure so far in the island.

The dramatic discovery of a new "crony" in the octogenarian President Jayewardene and the consequent bonhomie of economic cooperation coupled with Colombo's pledge not to entertain any foreign interest inimical to India are perhaps the only significant external gains Rajiv Gandhi can look forward to. But in the process India has badly alienated herself from the Tamils in Sri Lanka while this action has hardly endeared her to the average Sinhala citizen. If any thing the Sinhalas including a sizable section of the ruling party and the entire party and the entire opposition now look at India with more suspicion, as is bound to be generated by the massive number of Indian soldiers stationed in this island. And beyond the region, this action will erode Rajiv's credibility among ethnic and non-resident Indians throughout the world as a "friend in need".

WHEN PEACE BECOMES WAR....

According to the Indian government, Sri Lanka is now all set to enter an era of "real peace and tranquility", for the newly discovered headquarter of all trouble, the "dreaded" Jaffna peninsula has now been "liberated once and for all" from the "vicious grip" of the Tigers. After a fortnight-long fierce fighting IPKF jawans have "accomplished this historic feat". The offensive, we are told, could have been brought to a successful conclusion much earlier and at far less cost for the Indian side, but the jawans did not press for a quick resolution in order to restrict civilian casualties to a minimum (sic!). Given the "information embargo" imposed by India on the entire arena of her "war for peace" in the Tiger-infested Northern Province one could not get a live coverage of the Indian Peace Killing Mission, all that one can piece together from the reports of refugees who could escape the jaws of death in Jaffna and reach Colombo to narrate their harrowing experience can only be a rough sketch of what transpired there in that fateful fortnight.

Here is a despatch from Gerard Peres, datelined Madras, October 21:

According to frantic messages from civil servants, Christian missionaries and other human rights activists of the Jaffna town to President Jayewardene, over 1000 Tamils, including several local people, apart from youths shot at sight taken to be Tigers, have so far perished in the offensive. However much is the Indian media offensive here, in which defence ministry and the external affairs ministry are going out of their way to please editors and newsmen, the facts will become clear in the long run that this time, it was India, and not Sri Lanka, which was at war with the Tamils.

Now here is the scale of the offensive and the casualty figures on both sides so far: over 1000 Tamils, most of them local people and youth, killed in aerial bombing on those very places where people had been asked to take shelter; over 300 Indian soldiers killed, mostly by landmine blasts, with another 100 para- troopers gunned down in the Jaffna University campus near the LTTE headquarters; 120 mm mortar guns used to shell houses, killing people locked up inside; tanks used to raze down entire residential areas in and around Jaffna peninsula in order to mow down suspected LTTE strongholds; the entire city suffering an economic and military blockade for nearly seven days, causing untold misery to the people who would have liked to stay on with the Tigers; the population being starved out before they are forced to drop their help to the Tiger guerillas who were determined to fight; and last but not the lkeast, the Indian army letting itself loose, whenever given a chance, on the local people – and that includes women.

With the Indian media crying for the blood of the aTigers, the tone of the Tigers, the tone of the discourse in India now is very similar to what has been going on in Colombo for the last four years. Yes, Colombo has been transplanted to Delhi, Madras and the various cities of our country with editors and editorials beaming with joy to scream: Jaffna Falls, Jaffna Falling, Areas Pacified, Tiger Newspapers Neutralised, Tiger Escape Routes Sealed. The war frenzy in the media is evident with none of the newspapers even willing to check up and give the exact figures of the dead Indian soldiers: they could have easily done that by visiting the various military hospitals casually and tapping hospital sources informally... The fact that our editors are satisfied with the official toll figure of 100 speaks volumes for their disregard for check[illegible]g up directly... And then, there has been not a [illegible]rd about the IPKF's blowing up of two T[illegible] newspaper offices from our editors and newsmen. Perhaps they don't know what awaits them in the future.

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

KOKUVIL

S. Paikium	A. Balakumar
K. Puvaneswary	S. Sivapaikium
S. Karalasingam	S. Mahathevan
G. Ruthiran	S. Muthupillai
K. Krishnarajah	T. Sothilingam
M. Puniyakanthan	P. Ramasamy
S. Sumathy	R. Navaratnam
S. Puscal	T. Vaithilingam
K. Sinniah	V. Thambiah
R. Kamalanathan	S. Sivakumar
J. Keethakumari	R. Ponnammah
R. Rajarajan	K. Markandu
K. Sinnathurai	M. Kandiah
Y. Myuri	N. Sridharan
S. Kandiah	R. Kumarasamy
S. Sutharsini	V. Satkunanathan
P. Murugesu	K. Kandiah
S. Sivasubramanium	P. Pumani
S. Thavamani	Panchalingam
S. Sivasankar	Rajakumar
T. Nagaratnam	Sinnappu
S. Rasammah	Sinnakutty
P. Appiah	Nageswary
K. Elangainathan	Kanagalingam
S. Arul Ambalam	Parameswaran
K. Sellathurai	Illangeswaran
S. Arunana	Sellammah
S. Sivasothy	K. Pooranam
P. Subathirai	S. Yogalingam
P. Veeran	S. Chandran
M. Sinnathamby	M. Vimaladevi
S. Saraswathy	S. Balaratnam
S. Kayathiri	A. Manonmany
J. Pathmarani	A. Kamaladevi

On the domestic plane, some commentators argue that this decisive action against Tamil militants will definitely have a "demonstration effect" on our own Khalistani terrorists. But this irony is that while one is yet to find any evidence of such a sobering influence in troubled Punjab, there is every indication that down south the Indian Tamils are fuming with fury. And a seemingly unbreakable Congress(I) – AIADMK marriage has come under considerable conjugal strains. The economic savings that may result if New Delhi can go ahead with its plans of repatriating all Sri Lankan Tamils currently staying in India, have already been more than offset by what the Indian military presence has already cost our national exchequer – put at Rs. 3 crore a day by a Sri Lankan minister – not to mention the huge loss of manpower and hardware suffered by the Indian army till date. And as regards the Congress(I)'s plan to play the Sri Lankan card as a diversionary tactic, the situation has been most succinctly summed up by satirist Rajinder Puri: "People have stopped talking about the mess on Bofors, they talk only of the mess in Sri Lanka.." All in all, for Rajiv Gandhi it has really been a jump from the frying "Bofors" pan into the raging Sri Lankan fire.

It's a National Disgrace...

BUT Rajiv's crashlanding into the Sri Lankan soup is also a matter of shame and disgrace for the entire nation. There's no way we can explain this act of great betrayal to the Sri Lankan Tamils in the name of helping them achieve a peaceful political solution to their long-standing problems. We may prefer a solution to the island's ethnic crisis within the framework of a unified Sri Lanka, and given the geographical and ethnic proximity between Sri Lanka and India we can also try various political and diplomatic means to bring the two sides to the negotiation table. And despite several reservations about the specifics of Indian initiatives, there has never really been any two opinions on this score. But we must always make sure that our political and diplomatic intervention does not become a counter productive proposition. In our bid to improve things we must not make matter worse. And of course, we can never be allowed to go to the extent of forcing our preference or will on either side. Yet the IPKF's Jaffna war has done precisely that. While we could do little to prevent Colombo from its usual dilly-dallying about the implementation of the accord we have spared no effort to smash the LTTE – the backbone of the Tamil resistance movement in Sri Lanka. Indeed, it is a tribute to the Tigers' zeal, skill and close integration with the Jaffna populace that they could keep the advancing Indian troops at bay for more than a fortnight while majority of their ranks could flee to safer areas. But by all means it will take them years to regroup and regain their strength and meanwhile the Sri Lankan government will make all-out efforts to snatch back whatever "concessions" they have so far been forced to make. Already the amnesty has been withdrawn and Colombvo has declared its intention to have a fresh interim Administration Council without any representation from LTTE.

While Tamils on the other side of the strait have thus been directly at the receiving end, there are no less grave portents for the people in India either. The Indian army is now all the more brutalised after the experience they have gained in Sri Lanka and to be sure, sooner rather than later, we Indians will have to face its consequences. The process of militarisation which has already begun to assume alarming proportions in recent years will henceforth be further stepped up with all its disastrous implications for our dilapidated democracy. That military strategists are gradually taking a more and more active role in the formultion of various government policies regarding home and foreign affairs has been known for quite some time now and India's Sri Lanka policy provides a striking instance of this emerging advisors simply do not have a place in it. And last but not the least, there is the dangerous spectre of chauvinism vitiating the whole political climate and our democratic values being overrun – whether by war frenzy or a resurgent Tamil secessionism.

Enough is Enough...

ONLY an effective intervention on the part of democratic forces can forestall these disastrous developments. Let us force Rajiv Gandhi not only to order an immediate withdrawal of Indian troops from Sri Lanka and dissolution of the intelligence network created to assist army operation – that will be now too little, too late – but also to involve Indian and international human rights organisations to find out human rights violations and atrocities perpetrated by Indian soldiers on the civilian population in Jaffna and mete out exemplary punishment to all erring man in uniform. The government must also be compelled to publish a White Paper on its army action in Sri Lanka, giving the true figures of casualties on both sides and also what it has cost our national exchequer. And last but not the least, New Delhggi must be prevented from carrying out its plans of immediately deporting all Sri Lankan Tamil refugees from the Indian soil.

As our "Bofors Prime Minister" remains Booby-trapped in Sri Lanka, this is the minimum that democratic forces can do so as not to find themselves rendered irrelevant by chauvinists of all hues. Moreover, Rajiv's war against LTTE is yet another palpable proof of the kind of a mess he will make if allowed to rule any longer. Should we not heed this warning of history before it gets too late?

C R P

On the 10th October 1987, the IPKF fired its first shot against the LTTE. The LTTE controlled press, *"Eelamurasu"* and *"Murasoli"* had their printing processes blasted by the IPKF at 5 a.m. in the morning. By 10.00 a.m. the IPKF versus LTTE battle was on in all its fury. The IPKF started attacking not only the LTTE out the very people whose lives and property they had allegedly come to protect. The scale of operations and the magnitude of casualties and agencies of the war were unprecedented in the 5 year old ethnic war. The Indians used T-72 tanks gun carriers and artillery and mortars on the ground. Planes and helicopters strafed and bombed from the air. The Indians considered the Tamils a subject race and freely engaged in rape, plunder and wanton shooting and killing.

The population of the Jaffna Town is close to 150,000. The population of the Jaffna Peninsula is nearly 800,000. On or about 10.10.87 the IPKF annnounced over the radio that the civilians were to take refuge in three centres in Jaffna Town viz:- Jaffna Hindu College, Jaffna Hindu Ladies College and Nallur Hindu Temple. No mention was made of other centres within or out of Jaffna Town. People started running to the nearest school, church or temple. Neither the said three centres nor the other places of refuge had sufficient shelter or amenities to cater to such a large number of people. Hundreds of people started moving out of the Peninsula on feet and on whatever means of transport was available. They travelled by road, by-roads along the coast and by canoe. Enrbute quite a number were moved down by mortar fire and helicopter strafing. Rotting bodies lay where they had fallen to be attacked by dogs and crows. Refugee Centres were not spared from attack. Shells fell on refugee camps at St. Patrick's College, St John's Chundikuli Girls School, Jaffna Hindu College, Jaffna Hindu Ladies College, Kokuvil Hindu College, Jaffna Railway Station and Inuvil Amman Hindu Temple just to name a few. At most of these centres some refugees died as a result of the shell attacks. Even in the nights refugees could not sleep. Shells and fragments were falling like rain, day and night.

Some specific incidents of Wanton killing and Destruction

On 12.10.1987 the Indian para-troops were dropped in end near the Jaffna University Campus. About 29 of the para-troops were killed by LTTE ground fire. The next day, 200 IPKF Personnel arrived at the scene and killed 40 civilians - men, women and children. Several Houses in the area were destroyed.

Between 10.10.1987 and 30.11.1987 over 100 residents of Urumpirai were shot and killed by the IPKF. Houses and buildings abutting the roads passing through Urumpirai were blasted.

Between 12.10.1987 and 30.11.1987 the IPKF force stationed at the Ceylon Transport Board Depot at Kondavil destroyed all nearby houses and killed 90 civilians of the area.

On 21.10.1987 137 persons were shot and killed by the IPKF in the Jaffna Hospital premises. 20 of them were hospital staff - 3 Doctors included. The rest were indoor and out-door patients, relatives of patients and those who sought refuge in the premises. A mass cremation took place in the hospital premises on 23.10.1987.

On 22.10.1987 about 100 refugees wanting to leave the Jaffna mainland for Kayts island were fired on by helicopter while they were in boats midway; 19 of them perished.

CIVILIANS □ KILLED (Operation Pawan)

Parasakthi 21.10.87

K.J. Peter 21.10.87

Mrs. Punithavathi 21.10.87

S. Renuka 21.10.87

A. Senaithiraja 21.10.87

J. Theres 21.10.87

K. Vedaranyam 21.10.87

M. Ariyaratnam 22.10.87

Ariyaratnam 22.10.87

Lorthi Peterson 22.10.87

V. Mayilvaganam 22.10.87

S. Sinnadurai 22.10.87

A. Yasodaran 22.10.87

V.A. Cruz 23.10.87

William 23.10.87

Darsan, Darmila 24.10.87

N.S. Krubairaja 24.10.87

D.S. Kulasingam 24.10.87

CIVILIANS □ KILLED (Operation Pawan)

R. Lakshmanan 24.10.87

Rajani 24.10.87

S. Rajasekaram 24.10.87

A. Sellasamy 24.10.87

K. Kripakaran 25.10.87

S. Balachandran 26.10.87

L.J. Dharmaraj 26.10.87

Kamala Devi 26.10.87

Shanmugalingam 26.10.87

I. Vamadevan 26.10.87

T. Dharmalingam 27.10.87

C.T. Kumarasami 27.10.87

K.S. Mathews 27.10.87

P. Sowrimuthu 27.10.87

S. Velayudapillai 27.10.87

A. Visalakshi 27.10.87

N. Jegatheeswaran 28.10.87

Murugiah 28.10.87

CRP

On 25.10.1987 the IPKF directed heavy mortar five on Kokuvil Hindu College. A large number of refugees had taken shelter there. 51 were killed. IPKF apologised later saying that they have taken the College for a factory. Most of the dead were buried or cremated at the site itself.

On 27.10.1987 Chavakachcheri, a small town was hit by rocket and gun fire from a helicopter 35 persons in the market area and vicinity were killed.

On 5.11.1987 Kalapoomy in Karainagar was strafed by helicopter. 12 persons died.

There were nearly 40,000 refugees camping in the precincts of the Nellur Hindu Temple in Jaffna. Like at other refugee centres each had to fend for himself for food and water. They had to make do with a dozen or less number of toilets with the result that within a week, bowel diseased were rampant. Refugees started dying of diarrhoea daily. For days togethere similar conditions prevailed in all refugee centres. People were herded under these conditions till the IPKF relaxed their earlier order and allowed them to return to their homes by the end of October. But even by mid-November, 1987 in the Jaffna Municipal area alone 13,000 refugees were still at the places where they had taken refuge – either their homes were demolished or they had no means to get to their distant homes. Some of these people had entered refugee camps after making abortive attempts to get away from the Peninsula.

Prolonged Curfew:

The curfew imposed at 6 p.m. on 10.10.87 was not lifted till 6 a.m. 15.10.87. It was re-imposed at 10.45 a.m. on 15.10.87. The re-imposed curfew of 5.10.87 was to be an indefinite one in that no time for its relaxation was stated at the time it was re-imposed. It was finally relaxed in the Municipal area of Jaffna at 12 noon on 20.10.87, after a record period of 14 days. There is still a daily curfew though all India Radio States almost daily that Jaffna has returned to near normaley. The curfew in France during Nazi occupation was only from midnight to dawn.

பத்துத் தலைகளும் இருபது கரங்களும்
திக்கெல்லாம் தேடிவரும்

— சு. வில்வரத்தினம்



யார் வருகிறார்?
எந்த அரக்கன்?
எங்கும் ஒரு இனந்தெரியாத துயரின்
எதிர்பார்ப்பு
எல்லாத் திசையும் அதன்
வாடையின் அடைவு.

.....

தொட்டதெல்லாம் நீருக்க நினைக்கும்
பஸ்மாசுரர்கள் இன்னும் இருக்கிறார்களா
அழிய?
அப்படியானால்
மேற்கில் வீழும் பிறை?
இன்று கூத்தன் தலை தவறி வீழினும்
நாளை, மோகினியாய்ப் பொங்கியெழும்
கூர்ப்புடைய எரிகோள்.

— மு. பொன்னம்பலம்

வீரவணக்கம்

LTTE MARTYRS

போற்றுமின், மறவீர்! சாற்றுதும், நும்மை;
ஊர்க்குறு மாக்கள் ஆடக் கலங்கும்
தாள்படு சின்னீர் களிறு அட்டு வீழ்க்கும்
ஈர்ப்புடைக் கராஅத்து அன்ன என்ஐ
நுண்பல் கருமம் நினையாது,
'இளையன்' என்று இகழின், பெறல் அரிது, ஆடே
ஒளவையார். A poem from *Purananooru*, the ancient Tamil anthology in praise of Valour

Das 8.10.87

Vedhamani 13.10.87

Newman 22.10.87

Lt. Elango 14.10.87

Sasi 19.10.87

Preman 13.10.87

Raja 13.10.87

Akbar 13.10.87

Seelan 15.10.87

Ganesavel 16.10.87

Muthu 16.10.87

Remington 21.10.87

Simon 23.10.87

Ganesh 27.10.87

Felix 12.10.87

Kanagasabai 17.10.87

Elango 17.10.87

Linges 21.10.87

Ansar 18.10.87

Kamal 25.10.87

Guhan 18.10.87

Capt Rathish 24.10.87

Baskar 19.10.87

Lt. Veeramani 23.10.87

Thavarasa 10.10.87

2nd Lt. Malathi 10.10.87

Kasthuri 10.10.87

Thaya 10.10.87

Ranjani 10.10.87

Ranjan 10.10.87

Nimal 12.10.87

Amal 12.10.87

Peres 12.10.87

Das 12.10.87

Anton 12.10.87

Ganesh 12.10.87

Charles 12.10.87

Akilan 12.10.87

Ganesh 12.10.87

Chandran 13.10.87

Devan 13.10.87

Mohan 13.10.87

Sun 13.10.87

Daniel 13.10.87

Indran 13.10.87

Rayman 13.10.87

Nawaz 13.10.87

Muthu 13.10.87

Paran 13.10.87

Newman 13.10.87

Sarala 14.10.87

Ramesh 14.10.87

Selvam 14.10.87

Sada 15.10.87

Anusuya 15.10.87

Henrich 16.10.87

Easan 16.10.87

Gajan 16.10.87

Vellai 16.10.87

Mayuran 16.10.87

Maj. Ashok 17.10.87

Vijay 17.10.87

Nandan 17.10.87

Allen 18.10.87

Janaa 18.10.87

Viji 18.10.87

Raj 18.10.87

Noel 18.10.87

Mohamed 18.10.87

Lt. Col. Santhosam 21.10.87

Kumaradas 27.10.87

Puliyan 27.10.87

Das 8.10.87

Vedhamani 13.10.87

Mohamed

Viji

Newman 22.10.87

2nd Lt. Malathi 10.10.87



Lt. Col. Santhosam 21.10.87

லெப்.கேணல்
புலேந்திரன்
லெப்.கேணல்குமரப்பா
மேஜர்அப்துல்லா
காப்டன்ரகு
5.10.87
நினைவஞ்சலி
லெப்.தவக்குமார்
காப்டன்நளன்
ராஜீவின் நம்பிக்கைத்
துரோகத்தால் பலியான
தியாகிகள்
லெப்.அன்பழகன்
காப்டன்பழனி
வேதுலெப்.ஆனந்தகுமார்
வேதுலெப்.ரெஜினோல்ட்
காப்டன்கரன்
காப்டன்மிரேஷ்

KILLING □ FIELD 87 October

claims	IPKF		LTTE		S.L. ARMY		OTHER MILITANTS		CIVILIANS	
	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED
IPKF										
LTTE										
MEDIA										

2

5
13
13
146

6

7

9
98c
14

10
9
7
10
-

11
9 120 43c
40 55 270

12
18 79 163
29 9 44 104

13
44 238 15 7c
11 60

14
66 18c 3
4
18 21c 3 1 2

15
23 11 10*
47 5 2 2

16
14 127
5 7 3

17
27 4c
60 3 30c

18
13 39
6 9 100

19

20
3 40c 41
2c 51 2

21
10 1 733 168

22
2 4 2c

24
3 5 60

25
4 28 65

26
5 28 20 17 15

27
7* 4
2 50 55

28
13 18c 20

29
6 11 67 250
3 18

30
104

TOTAL									
205	421 36c	522	194	4				240	250
208	9 23c	62						1174	802 30c

* - Sri Lankan Information.c-captured. EP-EPRLF T-TELO, P-PLOTE, EN-ENDLF, E-EROS TNA-Tamil National Army CVF-Citizen s Voluntary Force

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

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1987

the heinous crimes of indian peace keeping

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Premadasa charges IPKF with genocide.

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LTTE free 18 IPKF captives without pre-conditions.

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November

21



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The Sunday Observer

There is strong public feeling in Jaffna against the IPKF, reports JYOTI MALHOTRA after a visit

REPORT

Unwanted presence

AS the helicopter rises over Palaly, the Indian Peace-Keeping Force's base in Sri Lanka, a quiet, serene land comes into view: submerged rice fields, clusters of date palms, quaint red-tiled roofs of little houses. In a few minutes beautiful blue-green lagoon stretches into the horizon. Jaffna.

The town is deathly quiet. Occasionally, on the deserted streets, Indian jawans appear in camouflaged gear, patrolling what little there is left: a pockmarked post office, a railway station, old, torn posters of a film flapping on the billboard of Regal cinema, the once-famous Ashoka Hotel reduced to rubble by continuous shelling. In the distance, the intermittent thunder of mines being defused by the IPKF break the eerie silence.

Speaking to a group of a national and international journalists Maj-General AS Kalkat, commander of IPKF operations in Sri Lanka declares, "This is not a war that the Indian army is fighting. We are here to support the two governments in implementing the accord, an essential part of which is to disarm the militant LTTE. In doing so, we are ever mindful that the larger population of Jaffna which has been under the totalitarian rule of the LTTE for almost half a decade, is now coming out of its trauma." He added, "We cannot let terrorists hold at ransom two sovereign nation states who are trying to protect democracy and bring it to this part of the island."

That mutual attempt at the democratisation of the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka found its formal echo in the signing of an accord between the two countries on July 29. Touted as the high point of Rajiv Gandhi's prime ministership, the agreement required the IPKF to disarm the militants (while the Sri Lankan army remained confirmed to the barracks) as well as help set up a post-LTTE administration in the region.

Soon, it was decided that Tamil-speaking IAS officers would be sent to Sri Lanka. Then, two days ago a national daily reported that Indian Air Force gunships had strafed Chavakachery, killing and injuring civilians. With nearly 15,000 troops already fanned out on the island (some said 30,000) and an astronomical daily expenditure of Rs three crores, the similarity with America's war in Vietnam was unmistakable. A senior bureaucrat said, "India has become a colonial power. Sri Lanka has in effect become a puppet state."

An external affairs ministry official added, "The Indian army is not supposed to behave like an occupation army, overrunning the place, unmindful of who came in its way. And, it is for the first time ever that we have let our forces be legally commanded by a foreign government. An Indian peace-keeping force whether in Congo in 1961 or in Gaza, has always gone under the United Nations auspices, never on its own."

Jaffna was taken on the night of October 23 and 24, Diwali, when the IPKF, developing five thrusts — three from the north-south direction and one from the east and west — converged on the fort. The "war" had actually begun 13 days earlier, on October 10, when Nawathkuli was taken. Each column then advanced, gradually occupying territory until it met up with the first Marathas entrenched in the fort.

Despite its "victory" over Jaffna, the city from which the LTTE has traditionally drawn its strength and inspiration, the IPKF was not, even to the Tamil civilians in the town, the liberating army. A refugee at the make shift camp in Our Lady of the Refuge church, whose husband in peacetime worked in the Bank of Ceylon said "Jayewardene has handed over Sri Lanka to India."

She added with feeling, "Yes, the Indian army is feeding us today, but for the first three days we got only tea to drink. But we don't want other people's rice. We don't want India to interfere. We only want to go home and live peacefully." And then realising this correspondent was Indian too, she said accusingly, "So it is you, your people, who are doing all this."

Balasingham, a lawyer, reiterated, "We only want peace. It's unfortunate that the LTTE, which was shaping so well until the end of last month, should have made mistakes. But now we just want this fighting to end. And if the IPKF can give us peace, we will accept it."

The women recounted stories of looting by jawans, saying that during breaks in the 27-day curfew, some had returned home to find their jewellery missing. They admitted, however, that they had not heard of any cases of rape or other acts of physical violence perpetrated on women and children.

Another grocer, Thomas, pointing to the roof shelled by the IPKF, said, "The LTTE are very good people. After all they fought for our rights. The Indian army says it has preferred to die rather than let civilians get killed in the crossfire, but how do you know how many civilians have been really killed." He admitted that the Sri Lankan army had committed atrocities too on the Tamil population in Jaffna, but added, "The Indians are much worse. But anyway, the Tamils will get their rights. We will continue to fight for our freedom."

Sridhar, News Times.

Already, there are 30,000 troops stationed in Sri Lanka. Each day costs the Indian exchequer Rs eight crore. Men from the Central Reserve Police Force have been stationed in the island to assist operations. We appear to be stuck in Sri Lanka with the situation getting more and more complicated with each passing day.

That desperate motivation to die for a cause, characterised by the 14 LTTE men who preferred to swallow cyanide pills rather than be tortured at the hands of the enemy, will ensure that the hands of the Indian army are tied behind its back. Said an external affairs official, "And it may be years, even decades, before we are able to get out of Sri Lanka."

A captain in the army in Jaffna recounted the event, now grown into legend, when Kumarappa and Pulendran, amongst others, swallowed cyanide: Contrary to reports, he said, the 17 men captured on the high seas by the Sri Lankan navy, only had three cyanide pills. On the morning they realized that the IPKF and the Sri Lankans had decided that the latter should keep the men, the LTTE second in command, Mahathiah, slipped along some more pills when he came to give them their breakfast. The men, refused to eat it, for cyanide works more effectively on an empty stomach and slowly collapsed on the tarmac.

A brigadier at the Palaly base said, "We knew the LTTE guys so well, we were like friends. In fact we flew in Kumarappa's girlfriend into Sri Lanka, and I attended his wedding here. And a few days later he was dead."

At Nawathkuli, ten km from Jaffna, an ammunition dump had been laid out for the journalists' inspection, improvised with nails in them, Claymore mines, grenades hoisted on wooden sticks and uncalibrated mortar.

Maj-General Kalkat confirmed that a ship loaded with 500 to 700 sophisticated arms had been caught while offloading at the south-eastern coast of Sri Lanka. The arms had been for LTTE cadres, he added, but refused to say whether the ship had come from Singapore. "We know that the LTTE men mostly use AK-47 rifles and G-3 rifles which are reportedly used by the Mujahedin. Some other equipment with Pakistani markings has also been found," he added.

As the helicopter rises over Jaffna, a quiet, serene land comes into view. A closer look reveals, however, that the quiet is unreal; not a soul moves around the transplanted rice fields. Spirals of smoke rise between the clusters of palms, unmistakable evidence of burning ammunition dumps, and the roofs of the houses gape into the sky, their red tiles shelled out of existence.

IN PARLIAMENT

Opposition walk-out

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI, Nov. 6.

The winter session of the Rajya Sabha began today on a pleasant note of felicitations to the new Chairman Mr. Shankar Dayal Sharma, but soon was caught in the storm of the Sri Lanka issue, culminating in a walk-out of the opposition groups, barring the AIADMK and the National Conference, minutes before the House itself rose for the lunch recess.

The reason for the Opposition discontent was that a discussion on the Sri Lankan situation was not listed in the day's agenda nor was there any clear indication of any statement from the Government being made today. The assurance of Mr. M. M. Jacob, Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs that he would find out when the Government could make the statement did not satisfy them.

Mini discussion: Though a full length discussion was not listed, the Chairman had allowed the Opposition leaders to raise the issue and this turned into a mini discussion for nearly an hour in which the Government of India came under heavy attack from all Opposition groups, including the AIADMK, for using its army against the LTTE.

'You are taking the role of Jayewardene', observed Mr. Aladi Aruna (AIADMK) while joining the other Opposition leaders in demanding an immediate ceasefire without any pre-condition. He wanted the Indian Government to heed the appeal of the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Mr. M. G. Ramachandran, accept the ceasefire offer of the LTTE and negotiate with the LTTE. He noted that the AIADMK was all for the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord but felt the method adopted by the Indian Government was objectionable. 'You cannot implement the accord on gun-point', he added.

Precondition for ceasefire deplored: Mr. Aruna pointed out that already the LTTE had agreed to surrender arms and he wondered what was the difficulty for the Indian Government to accept it. In his view the Government of India should first order ceasefire and then demand surrender of arms by the LTTE. The insistence on surrender of arms as a precondition for ceasefire represented, in his view, a colonial attitude. He also feared that the IPKF might kill the LTTE leader Mr. Prabakaran, and put the blame on different groups within the LTTE. He alleged that the IPKF was engineering rumours of a rift in the ranks of the LTTE for this purpose.

Mr. Murasoli Maran (DMK) described the goings on in Sri Lanka as 'butchering of Tamils by the IPKF' and felt it was shocking and unheard of. He contended that there was no provision in the accord for sending army by India. Those who had supported the accord had thought it would be implemented by peaceful means.

Mr. Sukumoy Sen (CPI-M) expressed anguish over the situation in Sri Lanka which had taken a serious turn, leading to lot of bloodshed.

"No parallel": Mr. P. Upendra (Telugu Desam) felt that there was no parallel to what was happening in Sri Lanka. 'What India was doing in Sri Lanka today is most shameful and reprehensible', he added. He lamented that thousands were being killed in Sri Lanka even as talks were going on here between Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and Mr. J. R. Jayewardene. He blamed the Indian Government for having got involved 'foolishly' in this. He would not blame the Indian Army, which, he said, had been assigned an unpopular task.

Mr. Jaswant Singh (BJP) felt that the rate of casualty among the IPKF personnel was high and asked: which great national purpose or national interest is subserved by this?'

"Accord in shambles": Mr. M. S. Gurupadaswamy (Janata) said the accord was in a shambles and wondered why the Indian Prime Minister was not agreeing to ceasefire while the LTTE leaders had agreed to it. He also could not understand why the Prime Minister was demanding surrender of arms before ceasefire. In his view, the Prime Minister had put at stake his personal prestige.

Mr. Ram Avadesh Singh (Lok Dal) demanded immediate ceasefire.

The discussion was marked by noisy clashes between the Opposition and ruling party members. The first one came when the Prime Minister left the House after the felicitations to the Chairman had concluded. As he was leaving, the Opposition members including Mr. V. Gopalaswamy (DMK) demanded his return. The Union Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, Mr. H. K. L. Bhagat took exception to this demand. He was supported by Mr. A. G. Kulkarni (Cong-I) who described the conduct of the Opposition members as condemnable. Subsequently, Mr. Aladi Aruna (AIADMK) had a wordy duel with the Congress (I) members as he criticised the Government.

Adjourn move not admitted in Lok Sabha

NEW DELHI, Nov. 6

The entire Opposition, barring the AIADMK, staged a walk out in the Lok Sabha in protest against the Speaker's refusal to admit an adjournment motion on the "explosive" situation in Sri Lanka today itself.

Mr. Balram Jakhar told the agitated Opposition members that the Government would make a statement on the Sri Lanka situation on Monday and that he would permit a discussion on Tuesday.

Govt. statement first: Mr. Jakhar observed that he had no objection to the Opposition adjournment motion, sought to be tabled by Mr. Madhu Dandavate and many other Opposition leaders. But said he would allow the discussion after Government's statement.

While leaving the House, Mr. Dandavate and other Opposition leaders contended that an adjournment motion had an element of censure and it could not be deferred. "We want to censure the Government," they added.

Mr. Jakhar said that in his meeting with the Opposition leaders yesterday an agreement was reached on holding a discussion on the situation in Sri Lanka. He would have allowed the debate today but there were certain compulsions, he added.

WITNESS TO ATROCITIES

INTERVIEW

November 2, 1987

'I NEVER believed I would come out alive,' said Sekaram Moorthy of his recent terrifying visit to the Jaffna Peninsula in Sri Lanka.

He, his wife and two young daughters returned to his birthplace for the first time in eight years – and entered a nightmare.

A week after reaching his home village of Urumpirai, a few miles south of Jaffna City, the shelling by Indian troops began.

In the terrifying three weeks before he returned home at the end of October, he witnessed the death of his cousin, the killing of dozens of friends and the disappearance of his own father.

He and his family narrowly escaped death on numerous occasions as Indian helicopter gunships, armoured vehicles and jet bombers machine-gunned and strafed innocent civilians fleeing the army advance.

Sekaram told his story without dates and times: 'When you wake up, you don't know which day it is. For eight or nine days we did not sleep at all.

'The shells began exploding around our house. It goes on for two or three hours.

'Early on I wanted to see the damage. I went out of the back door of my house with my uncle, and through the back yards. There were four men on the side of the road, all dead. Then I passed the dead body of a child. It's back was split open, just as if a butcher's knife had been used.

'There was a man lying nearby, who looked as if he had tried to escape.

'I felt really sick and didn't want to go any further. But my uncle carried on. He went to the temple. When he returned, he said that 14 people including children had died there through a bomb or a shell.

He learned later that his uncle's daughter had died – on her 16th birthday.

'She had said to us the day before "it's my birthday tomorrow, anything could happen". When the shelling

began near my uncle's house, he and other people nearby came to shelter. He was worried that the house would be a target, and he suggested everyone went under a big tree.

'The shell hit the tree, and a fragment of shrapnel about the size of a 50p bit went into her stomach and up into her chest. She died soon afterwards.

'It was that day that I decided we must leave.'

The Indian army was shelling Urumpirai from three points of the compass. While Sekaram was wondering what to do as the shells fell, a group of villagers came running past. The shouted out that Tamil Tiger fighters had urged them to get out of the village down that road.

Sekaram's family dropped everything and ran with them.

'We ran down the road in a group, though my wife suggested we might be a target if we were a group.

'Soon, we saw three helicopters coming. We all ran into a banana plantation and threw ourselves down into the mud.

Helicopters

'The helicopters went overhead, and then one of them turned back. I thought it was coming to shoot us. I told my wife to take one of the children and get away from me. One of us must survive, I thought.

'As the helicopter came back, my eldest daughter asked me: "Daddy, are we going to die?". It was then that I cried openly.

'I had cried before, but I had always tried to hide it from the children and my wife. I still feel a little ashamed of it, but only those who have experienced such fear can know what it is like.'

Luckily the helicopter passed, and the family walked several miles through the country lanes, passing other terrified civilians, many weeping for dead relatives.

Eventually, they found their way to the house of another uncle. A crowd of local people were gathered at his house.

When the Indian troops first came to the region, some Tamils believed that perhaps the slaughter would stop. Bomb shelters constructed under houses were filled in during those early days when the hope of peace was still prevalent.

Sekaram's uncle had the foresight to leave his bunker as it was, and neighbours now gathered to seek shelter there.

But the group were not expecting the other form of terror used by the Indian troops – the jeep and troop carrier using random machine-gun fire. Sekaram's uncle had gone round the back of the house to look out for helicopters when he suddenly reappeared, screaming 'run, run!'

Soldiers

'We all ran out onto the main road, and there I saw a jeep full of soldiers shooting at anything and everything. As we ran, one cousin was hit in the leg. He fell. But you know that if you go back, someone else will be shot. We left him there.

'I learned later that he spent the night lying in the road. He lost a lot of blood, but he just survived.

'I don't know where we ran to after that. I was told later it was a place called Neerbeli. We stayed there the night and went on to Kopi. The shelling had begun there too, so we had to walk another ten miles to Puthur. Eventually we got a lift to Chavacheri. It was the only place at that time where there was a little peace.

'We met many people from my home village, who told us of the killing which had taken place which we knew nothing about. Some said they had seen some dead men near the village, and that one was a relative of mine. I still do not know, but I am living in hope that it was not my father.

'It is hard to know how many have been killed. Out of every ten people we met, I would estimate that six would tell of a dead relative, a son or daughter or father or mother.

'I fear very much for the people we met in Chavacheri. Many refugees from the other villages are gathered there. When the Indian army begin shelling that place, many hundreds will die.

'Others will die of starvation. The Indian army has imposed a 24-hour curfew, which has already lasted 15 days, and has been extended indefinitely.'

As the shelling grew closer to their temporary refuge, Sekaram decided that they must try and escape from the area. The normal route to Colombo was closed at Elephant Pass, where Indian troops had massacred people trying to escape.

The only remaining way out was across a stretch of water on the single ferry. The ferry ran continuously through the night carrying families fleeing the death and destruction of the Indian forces.

The night before they were due to go, gunfire and shelling was heard. Next morning, Sekaram learned of the death of ferry passengers waiting for the boat at the hands of a helicopter gunship.

'I knew we would die if we stayed, and perhaps we would die on the ferry. But I decided we must try and get out.'

The ride in the ferry was terrifying, all the passengers fearing that any minute a helicopter gunship would appear from the sky and find them a sitting target.

But once again, Sekaram and his family escaped death. The minibus ride to Colombo was still filled with fear. Indian troops stopped the vehicle at six separate points.

Savage

Back in England, Sekaram is still in a state of shock after his experience. As he told his story, he paced furiously about, expressing his fear, anger and sadness over the savage destruction of his homeland.

Split up from his relatives at home, he anxiously awaits news. He has already had the unhappy task of breaking the news of the deaths of brothers and sisters to two Tamil friends in England.

His greatest anger is directed against the Indian troops. 'The Indian government are big liars – the biggest liars in the world. They are not killing the Tigers, they are killing innocent people.

'The Indian troops are killing in cold blood and raping women. The young girls say the men are lucky because they will not be raped before they are shot.

'This claim that the Tigers are using civilians as shields is a lot of rubbish.

'When I arrived from England, I was opposed to the Tigers. But I found that the people there believe the Tigers are defending them.

'When the Tigers come past and ask for food, the people give them what they can. One day, my mother gave them food that was meant for us.

'I asked her why she had not kept it for her children, and she replied that now she had many children.

'Sometimes, the women will go out and risk their lives in search of food, or to bring them food. They say: "The Tigers are dying for us, so we must be prepared to die for them."

'I have never been a member or supporter of the Tigers, but this is what I now understand about how the people feel.

'What people must understand is that it is innocent people that the Indian troops are killing.'

IPKF will stay till end of mission: Gen. Sundarji

REPORT

From Our Staff Reporter

JAIPUR, Dec. 9.

Gen. K. Sundarji, Chief of the Army Staff, said here on Wednesday that the Indo-Sri Lanka accord was in the interest of both the nations and that the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) would continue its operations till the accord was implemented fully.

Talking to presspersons here, Gen. Sundarji said the peace-keeping mission in Sri Lanka was undertaken by the Army in the interest of India and to make sure that while the Tamil population in Sri Lanka got what was legitimately due to it the country remained united. Gen. Sundarji was in city to take salute at the investiture parade of the army.

The General observed that an ultimate solution to the Sri Lanka crisis could be brought about only through political means. For a political solution one should create the right atmosphere in that country in which all the parties concerned cooperated, he said. No self-respecting country could tolerate it if one of the parties involved resorted to terrorism and blackmail, he said referring to the activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Gen. Sundarji said every concession was given to the LTTE to lay down arms but instead of cooperating they started attacking the IPKF as well as innocent Tamils. "We did our best to disarm them without the use of force but were disappointed. Our aim still is to persuade them to give up arms in a peaceful way," he said and expressed the hope that the tigers would eventually support the accord and join the mainstream of Sri Lanka society.

Answering a question on Indian involvement in the Sri Lankan crisis, Gen. Sundarji said it was in the interest of India that no unfriendly element remained in or operated from the Lankan soil. The IPKF was in Sri Lanka with a specific mission and it would remain there till the mission was complete, he said.

Referring to the changed stance of the tigers towards India, the General said the LTTE did not truly represent the Tamil population in Sri Lanka. They even kill innocent Tamils, he said. He regretted that people here, particularly those in the south, tended to believe in the LTTE propaganda than Sri Lankan Tamils themselves. The LTTE is alienated and a majority of the Tamils are for peace, he said.

Gen. Sundarji said the crisis would end as soon as the LTTE men laid down arms peacefully. "The present situation was forced upon our country by the adamant stand of the LTTE," he said and added that there could not be any compromise on terrorism within or outside the country.

The General expressed satisfaction over the performance of Indian soldiers in Sri Lanka and denied that there was any failure of army intelligence. He also refuted the propaganda that the casualty of Indian soldiers was more than what was given out.

O.V. Vijayan, The Statesman, 1.11.87.



Krishna Iyer sees a 'tragic irony' in role of IPKF

COCHIN, Nov. 1.

Mr. V. R. Krishna Iyer, former Judge of the Supreme Court, said in a statement that it was a "tragic irony" that Indian troops instead of keeping the peace had been tripped into waging a war against the Tamil militants.

The Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, had without firing a single shot and by using a "proxy army called the Indian Peace-Keeping Force," won the war against the Sri Lankan Tamils.

He said the Indian casualties had been heavy and the only allies on the island, the Tamils, had been estranged. The "atrocious LTTE boys who had assembled arms from miscellaneous sources and had organised themselves with little regular training, were giving battle as if they were a seasoned army." "Certainly, Pakistan must be watching with glee the fate of the Indian forces," he observed.

Mr. Krishna Iyer said he felt humiliated as an Indian that India should have been so neatly outwitted and the patriotic jawans so pathetically stultified.

Helplessness of ethnic Tamils: What would be even more disastrous was the sequel that he apprehended. It was quite on the cards that Mr. Jayewardene might ask the Indian army to quit now that he had crushed the extremists. He might then move his won Sinhala forces. "Thus the total helplessness of the ethnic minority which sought Indian help would be complete, thanks to the adventurism latent in the instant Indo-Sri Lanka pact," he said.

Terrible travesty: The Tigers, Mr. Krishna Iyer said, were a "violent, adventurist, bloodthirsty brood," but the Government of India had lost the initiative in exposing their "blackguardly tactics." In Jaffna, they played the patriots and the Indians the invaders in what amounted to a terrible travesty.

He suggested to the Prime Minister that the administration of the North and the East of Sri Lanka be handed over to Tamil surrogates right now, the Indian forces pulled out and the door opened discreetly for a dialogue with the saner militants and even the progressive Sinhala elements.

International Herald Tribune

REPORT

Indian Military Establishment Rocked by Losses in Sri Lanka

NOVEMBER 2, 1987

By Steven R. Weisman
New York Times Service

NEW DELHI — Indian Army losses to Tamil rebels in Sri Lanka this month have shaken the Indian military establishment and raised questions among many experts about the quality of New Delhi's military intelligence and planning.

More than 200 Indian troops have been killed and more than 700 wounded in fighting in Sri Lanka since Oct. 10, when Indian troops moved to disarm Tamil guerrillas at their stronghold in the northern city of Jaffna. The Indian losses were the largest since the war with Pakistan in 1971.

The Jaffna operation was proclaimed a success when Jaffna was captured by Indian troops last week. But Indian officials also expressed disappointment that the major guerrilla leaders escaped.

India sent troops to Sri Lanka to guarantee a peace accord signed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India and President Junius R. Jayawardene of Sir Lanka on July 29. Under it, Tamil separatists were to give up their arms in return for increased autonomy in largely Tamil areas in the north and east.

For years India had been sympathetic to the Tamil cause, allowing guerrilas to use Indian territory for training and political operations. But when the rebels — who accuse the majority Sinhalese of discriminating against them — refused to accept the accord to end the ethnic conflict, the Indians eventually turned against them.

Many military analysts also say India misjudged the conflict, using a conventional force of 20,000 to 30,000 men against guerrillas skilled at hit-and run tactics. They said India also underestimated the effect of mines and other explosives planted on roads. Scores of soldiers died in such blasts.

A senior Indian official said in an interview that "there has been some inadequacy in intelligence, particularly regarding the activities and whereabouts of the leaders of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the separatist guerrilla group defending Jaffna.

He also acknowledged that the Indian Army had been unprepared to wage a major guerrilla war, since Indian forces went to Sri Lanka thinking that they would only keep the peace and receive weapons voluntarily surrendered.

"The timing of this operation was not up to us," the official said. "It would have been better to choose the operation, obtain intelligence and choose the best timing. Here was something just thrust on us."

But the Indian official and others defended the performance of Indian troops overall, asserting that the major reason for the heavy losses was a decision to avoid aerial bombardments and to move slowly to avoid civilian casualties. Indians recalled that civilian casualties in earlier operations by the Sri Lankan Army enraged Tamil civilians and drove them to sympathize with the guerrillas.

"No other army in the world could have done better," the official said. "Only a highly disciplined army could have taken these casualties and still occupied Jaffna with a minimum loss of life to civilians."

The question of civilian casualties remains a matter of dispute, with India saying the losses were slight and some Tamil spokesmen in Sri Lanka asserting that hundreds of civilians died. India says 600 guerrillas were killed, but the guerrillas insist that most of these were civilians.

Criticism has come from military and diplomatic analysts in Sri Lanka, particularly in the Sri Lankan Army. The Sri Lankans, however, admit to some resentment when the Indian Army came into their country projecting the attitude that it could succeed with the Tamils where others had failed.

"These people made the same mistakes that we made in the beginning," a Sri Lankan official said. "They never learned the psyche of the terrorist. This is a battle that has to be fought on your belly, literally and in other ways. Your brain has to be on the ground and not in the clouds."

A Western diplomat said the Indian Army's performance could have repercussions for New Delhi. "You can be sure that Pakistan and China are watching very closely," he said, referring to the two countries that have fought wars with India and with which border tensions remain high.

Despite the heavy Indian losses, there has been no popular outcry in India for a troop withdrawal. But indications are that inside the military establishment, some blame is being apportioned.

Several Indian news organizations have reported that Major General Harkirat Singh, the commander in the Jaffna peninsula was replaced. Indian spokesmen denied the report, saying he had returned to Jaffna after a period of "consultations" in New Delhi.

Military analysts here say the main failure was that of the Research and Analysis Wing, India's intelligence agency.

DMK president demands ceasefire

COIMBATORE, Nov. 1.

Only an immediate ceasefire by the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) in Jaffna will help resolve the Sri Lankan ethnic problem easily, the DMK president, Mr. M. Karunanidhi has said.

Talking to presspersons, he said an immediate cessation of hostilities and a ceasefire was a "must" and "an appropriate thing" for holding talks and for the LTTE to surrender arms.

Referring to the Indian Government's demand for the LTTE cadres to surrender arms for stopping military action against them, Mr. Karunanidhi said the LTTE men need some arms for self-protection and defence. This matter has to be negotiated and settled. However, irrespective of this issue an immediate ceasefire should be ordered. This alone would help ease the situation and pave the way for an amicable solution.

Mr. Karunanidhi did not know to what extent the press reports on the LTTE leadership seeking a 48-hour ceasefire for surrendering arms is correct. But, he said, a ceasefire should enable the parties to return to their positions as on October 9, when the hostilities began. — Our Staff Reporter

Newsweek

REPORT

India's Quagmire

Sri Lanka's Tamils vow to wage a guerrilla war against the 'peacekeepers'

NOVEMBER 9, 1987

Standing atop the stone parapet of the 17th-century Dutch fort that dominates Jaffna, Brig. Manjit Singh last week described how his Indian peacekeeping troops had just routed the last of Sri Lanka's Tamil guerrillas from the area. As he surveyed the shell-scarred buildings along the city's waterfront, Singh proudly pronounced, "My sector is clear." Suddenly, a burst of gunfire and the thud of exploding mortars broke the spell. "That's not my sector!" the commander interjected. "One of our columns is still fighting two miles away."



India's hard-won capture of Jaffna has proved a hollow victory. As the peacekeeping force closed in on the Tamil stronghold late last month, the Indians allowed the noose to slip; in the final hours of battle some 1,200 fighters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) escaped to fight another day alongside their incendiary leader, Velupillai Prabakaran. Now Indian soldiers patrol the narrow streets in a perpetual crouch to avoid sniper fire. Booby traps and mines set by a small rear guard of Tamil fighters take a daily toll. In the face of a tattered peace plan, a vengeful band of guerrillas and an increasingly hostile civilian population, India's "peacekeeping" operation now shows every sign of becoming a painful, long-term occupation—one that invites comparison to Ulster and Britain's near 20-year standoff with the Irish Republican Army. "This is not the finale of the war, this is only a battle in a struggle," Anton Balasingham, Prabakaran's senior political adviser, told NEWSWEEK at a safe house on the Jaffna Peninsula. "If India is bent on liquidating us, they will create conditions for a prolonged guerrilla war for which we are prepared."

That's hardly a prospect the Indians foresaw when they began arriving in Sri Lanka three months ago. Then the troops were welcomed as the guarantors of peace, courtesy of President Junius R. Jayewardene and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Their vaunted accord promised to end the four-year civil war between Sri Lanka's primarily Buddhist Sinhalese majority and separatist factions of the mostly Hindu Tamil minority. In exchange for the creation of a semiautonomous Tamil "homeland" in the merged Northern and Eastern provinces, the LTTE, the largest and most militant of the separatist organizations, publicly agreed to hand over its weapons to the Indian force. But it's clear now that the plan was built on false hopes and empty promises. The Tigers accepted the terms only under strong pressure from India and never surrendered more than a fraction of their arms. Less than six weeks after the agreement was signed, the Tigers were killing again, and by last month the Indians believed they had no choice but to take Jaffna.

That battle was far tougher than anyone expected, however, and now even the Indian commanders are anticipating a long campaign against an enemy they can neither see nor engage. "If normalcy means riding along streets freely," says Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh, who took direct command over the more than 20,000 Indian troops just three weeks ago, "then it will take a long time to come." The reason, the Indians acknowledge, is that many of the Tigers got away. Those who didn't escape into the

PHOTOS BY ANTHONY SUAU—BLACK STAR

A hollow victory: *Indian troops in occupied Jaffna (left), refugees taking shelter in an old church (above), a young Tamil takes aim*

jungle buried their weapons, changed into civilian clothes and quietly slipped into refugee camps where they became the guests of the Indian government. The Indian Army is trying to screen the camps for LTTE rebels, but without much success.

The Indians should never have been caught so badly off guard. For the last four years, practically until the moment Gandhi ordered his troops across the Palk Strait to Sri Lanka, New Delhi had been the LTTE's patron and protector. Overtly and covertly, India helped arm and supply the Tigers. Support was especially strong in the southern state of Tamil Nadu, home to 50 million ethnic Tamils. There, Chief Minister M. G. Ramachandran, a key ally of Gandhi's, openly allowed the LTTE to run training camps, even as New Delhi officially denied their existence. Despite the many links to the Tamils, however, the Indian peacekeepers seemed genuinely surprised by the size and strength of the Tiger force, and they were completely uninformed about Prabakaran's whereabouts (box). That intelligence blunder apparently led two weeks ago to New Delhi's temporary recall of Maj. Gen. Harkirat Singh, who oversaw the initial assault.

Hit and run: In a full-fledged guerrilla war the advantage will shift further to the side of the Tamils. "We know every inch of this land," said one young militant who was recovering from minor wounds at Jaffna Hospital. "We can hit and escape." The LTTE's military commander, who goes by the name Mahattaya, also escaped the Indian pincers and is said to possess an almost photographic memory of the lush Jaffna Peninsula. He stays on the move, using a walkie-talkie to order his fighters into position for an ambush or out of harm's way, hardly ever bothering to look at a map. Of course the Indian assault on Jaffna did take a toll. In addition to killing several hundred rebel fighters, the Indians dealt the LTTE a psychological blow by denying the Tigers their secure base of operations. The LTTE had grown accustomed to operating in an open, quasi-governmental fashion in Jaffna and must now make the difficult transition to becoming a true guerrilla force.

The Tigers will find help everywhere they turn. After initially welcoming the Indian peacekeepers, Sri Lanka's Tamils have now turned against them with a vengeance. The Indian assault on Jaffna claimed more than 200 civilian lives, and Tamil refugee camps and hospitals are filled with bitter survivors—and unverifiable reports of murders, rapes and pillaging at the hands of the Indian troops. (One 14-year-old girl named Kalla has become a near legend among Tamils since she is said to have electronically detonated a land mine under an Indian Army convoy near Batticaloa, killing at least 20 Indian soldiers.)

Inside Jaffna's war-damaged hospital last week, the wards were overflowing with civilian wounded. One young woman whose right leg had been amputated said she had been shot by Indian soldiers who had fired into a crowd of civilians. Nearby, another woman fanned away the flies from the blood-soaked bandage covering the wound where doctors had amputated the foot of her nine-year-old daughter. Next to them lay her four-year-old son, hit by shrapnel on his back and legs. The mother pulled out the death certificate of her third child, an eight-year-old boy who had been killed when an Indian artillery shell hit their refugee camp. "The Tigers may have indulged in violence, but they are our boys," said an elderly Tamil man tending his wounded son. "The Indians are aliens in our land."

Helicopter attack: The Indians have indeed shown that they are prepared to go to extremes to put down the Tigers. Last week New Delhi acknowledged that its forces had used Soviet-built Mi-24 helicopter gunships to attack an LTTE stronghold east of Jaffna in the city of Chavakachcheri. India reported that 27 rebel fighters had died in the attack, but Indian journalists who visited the scene reported seeing the bodies of at least 20 civilians in the smoldering marketplace. At the weekend Indian troops surrounded a Hindu temple on the eastern outskirts of Jaffna, where as many as 8,000 refugees were camped. The Indian Army suspected that dozens of well-armed Tiger guerrillas were inside the temple and that the area had been mined. They were reluctant to storm the temple, however, for fear of causing more civilian casualties and of further alienating the Tamils.

Against those kinds of odds the Indian peacekeepers will have a tough time winning back much support. The Indian Army is embarking on a hearts-and-minds campaign to convince Tamil civilians it can be

trusted to provide for the community by running the hospitals, feeding refugees, restoring electricity and restoring the peace. "We are bringing succor and security," says Maj. Gen. Amarjit Singh Kalkat, somewhat optimistically. "Once the people feel we are here and will remain here to look after them, then this [trouble] will go away."

Gandhi won considerable praise at home for his statesmanship at the time of the Sri Lankan accord, but public opinion is beginning to turn against him—though the anticipated backlash among Indian Tamils has not occurred. More than 200 Indian soldiers have been killed or have been reported missing during the occupation, and many Indians have yet to be convinced that the results are worth that price. Moreover, the military operation is costing New Delhi more than $3 million a day, a hefty sum in a resource-strapped country already suffering the strains of a severe drought. "If military casualties continue to rise at the present alarming rate," editorialized the daily Statesman, "there is a distinct possibility that more and more Indians will begin to question the logic of sacrificing the lives of our *jawans* [soldiers] in a foreign adventure whose main purpose seems to be to shore up Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's sagging domestic fortunes."

And what of the July peace accord? For all practical purposes it appears dead. Last week Jayewardene said that although provincial council elections would be held as scheduled throughout the island in December, there would be no voting in the Northern or Eastern provinces until peace is achieved. Nor will the government ap-

The Roar of the Liberation Tigers

Velupillai Prabakaran may not be a household name elsewhere, but in Sri Lanka he has become the stuff of legend. He is the wily guerrilla leader whose outnumbered Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) bloodied the Indian Army in Jaffna, then slipped away to fight again another day. He is a strict disciplinarian who neither smokes nor drinks. He wears a magnum revolver, and once kept a leopard cub as a pet. He has slipped past police and soldiers many times—once disguised as a Catholic priest, another time as a peanut vendor. For inspiration he likes to watch Clint Eastwood video cassettes. He is a 33-year-old family man with two small children, but he is also addicted to the sound of gunfire. But above all, Prabakaran is a man obsessed by a dream: to carve out an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka.

Hit squad: In pursuit of that dream, Prabakaran turned to political violence at an early age. Born in Velvettithurai, a fishing town on Sri Lanka's northern coast, he grew up burning with outrage over the discrimination Tamils had to endure in Sri Lanka's Sinhalese-dominated society. He dropped out of school and became a militant Tamil separatist. In 1973 he fled to India, one jump ahead of Sri Lankan police. But in 1975 he returned home and—at the age of 21—led a three-man hit squad that assassinated the mayor of Jaffna. Prabakaran took over the Tamil Tigers, and by 1983 had molded them into a tough and disciplined fighting force ready for battle. That year, on July 23, he and a group of his guerrillas ambushed a Sri Lankan military convoy in the Jaffna Peninsula. The Tigers killed 13 soldiers. Prabakaran, it is said, personally cut down nine of them with his machine gun.

BALDEV—SYGMA

The stuff of legend: *Prabakaran at a Tamil rally in Jaffna*

The convoy ambush caused a quantum leap in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict. Outraged by the killings, Sri Lanka's Sinhalese went on a rampage all across the country. In Colombo alone, Sinhalese mobs killed more than 300 Tamil men, women and children. The anti-Tamil violence gave Prabakaran a pretext to declare an all-out guerrilla war in defense of his own people. But he had no intention of allowing any separatist group other than his own Tamil Tigers to lead the struggle in the name of Tamil Eelam, the Tamil state he hopes one day to establish. Prabakaran has targeted his rivals as ruthlessly as he has the Sinhalese. A year ago Prabakaran's Tigers killed more than 100 rival militants, then paraded the bodies through Jaffna as a warning to other potential challengers. And even after the Indian-sponsored peace treaty was signed last July, the LTTE killed scores more rivals in order to establish absolute Tiger supremacy in the administrative areas proposed in the agreement.

Those who know him maintain that Prabakaran has no political ideology. He sometimes mouths Marxist jargon, and admires Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. But at heart he is a freedom fighter—not a revolutionary. The ideology that drives him is little more than the dream of becoming the father of a new country, the independent state of Tamil Eelam. How he would govern such a state is far from clear. "Prabakaran is not politically astute and doesn't have a detailed grasp of Tamil aspirations or how to achieve them politically," one Tamil source says. "He's only interested in the big picture: how to establish Tamil Eelam."

New lease: Indian officials blame Prabakaran for the breakdown of the Indo-Sri Lankan peace accord arranged last summer by India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. "He had it within his power to give momentum to the process of bringing peace and normalcy," says an Indian diplomat. "But he didn't deliver. If he hadn't been unreasonable, we could have avoided this terrible tragedy." The Indian offensive against Jaffna gave Prabakaran a new lease as a guerrilla leader. "He couldn't play the institutional, diplomatic game with any success," says a Tamil source in Colombo. "But now he's doing what he knows best—fighting." Somewhere in Sri Lanka, Prabakaran and 1,200 survivors of the Jaffna siege are still at large. Sooner or later, they are bound to strike another blow for Tamil Eelam.

ANGUS DEMING *with* RON MOREAU *in Colombo and* SUDIP MAZUMDAR *in New Delhi*

AFP

A hasty retreat: *Cache of rebel bombs*

point interim councils in those provinces—in part, say moderate Tamils, because the LTTE would almost certainly [illegible] any one who cooperated with the Colombo government. "It would be political and literal suicide for a Tamil to accept a seat," says Neelan Tiruchelvam, a leading Tamil moderate. Jayewardene's Sinhalese supporters have been under attack as well—literally. In the last two months Sinhalese nationalist extremists have killed more than 50 party officials and activists who supported the ruling United National Party. Nevertheless, Jayewardene is pressing Parliament to approve the eventual implementation of the peace accord even though peace itself remains—at least for now—beyond reach.

Whatever the Sri Lankans do, India may already have plunged itself into a military and political quagmire. At its current strength, the peacekeeping force would have little chance of defeating the Tigers in guerrilla combat—particularly without civilian support. "You can never really win such a war," mused one Indian officer last week. "It has to be fought politically." But if the Indians allow domestic pressures to force them out, they risk driving Sri Lanka back into the vortex of civil war—perhaps on a much deadlier scale. As Gandhi is now learning, it's dangerous business to get involved in a neighbor's war, and India may be looking for a way out of Sri Lanka for a long time to come.

WILLIAM BR[illegible]th RON MOREAU *and* WILLA[illegible]. GOWAN *in Jaffna,* MERVYN DE[illegible]LVA *in Colombo and* SUDIP M[illegible]JMDAR *in New Delhi*

CIVILIANS □ KILLED (Operation Pawan)



AFFIDAVIT

KARUNANIDHI CHANDRAKUMAR, (17) C/o V. Sivarajah, Chettiavoor, Thondamanar

The deceased person Sellappah Karunanidhi was my father.

He was working as a casual labourer.

My mother committed suicide when I was six years old.

I have a brother named Chandramohan, aged 15 years.

My father used to go to Atchuvely due to his work often and to stay there for many days.

On 5.1.88 I was informed that my father was shot and killed by the army at Atchuvely on 1.11.87.

I also learned that my father's body was burnt by the army itself.

Now we have been rendered orphans.



NAVARATNAM KUNAMANI (33) Veerasingham Veethy, Meesalai South, Meesalai.

The deceased Manickam Navaratnam age 35 years was my husband.

He was employed as a Casual Labourer.

Due to the October-November military offensive we went to Masar as refugees.

On 1.11.87 my husband was arrested by the army.

After about ten days I was informed he was shot and killed by the army at Maruthankerni bridge on 1.11.87.

Some relatives who found the body after three days buried it on the spot.

I have four children.

My children and I have been deprived of the maintenance and support we received from my husband.



VISVALINGAM SRIKALA (14) Silambupuliady, Chankanai.

The deceased person Vaithilinagm Visvalingam aged 56 years was my father.

He was a casual labourer.

During the October-November 1987 military offensive we sought refuge at the Silambupuliyady Vairavar temple.

On 1.11.87 at about 4.30 a.m. a shell fell in front of the temple and exploded.

My father who was struck by shrapnels died on the spot.

His body was cremated at the Vilaveli Cemetery on 2.11.87

I have a sister and a brother.

I am a student.

After my father's death we do not have any income and undergoing untold hardships.

Our mother died three years ago.



CHANTHIRAKUMARI widow of Nagarajah, 3rd Mile Post, Manipay Road, Anaikottai.

The deceased Rathinakkurukal Puvaneswariammah, aged 63 was my husband's mother.

She was living with me and looked after me and my children after the death of my late husband R. Nagarajah.

On 2nd November, 1987, early morning my husband's mother and some other left the camp to purchase some provisions for me and my children. Some time later I heard some gun shot firing.

After some time a neighbour of my house came and told me that my husband's mother R. Puvaneswariammah was shot by IPKF and died laying on the road, at Annaikettai Junction. Due to shock and fear I rushed to spot found her laying dead, at Anaikottai Junction.

Consequent to her irreparable loss. I was chocked and have not recovered from the shock. Since after her demise I am ill and undergoing treatment.

After the death of my husband, my husband's mother was the only chief mainstay of the family. Now I find it very difficult to support myself and my children.

KANDIAH RASAMMAH (59) Thalayadi West, Tirunelveli.

The deceased person Kanapathy Suppar aged 75 years was my father.

He was living with us until fate took him away.

Due to the October 1987 military offensive I fled to Vaddukoddai with my two daughters.

My father and my husband refused to accompany us and opted to stay behind to look after our house and property.

On 2.11.87 I was informed that my father and my husband were both killed on 26.10.87 in a shell blast while they were going towards the Thirunelvely Sivan Temple with the intention of taking refuge.

I came to know that their bodies were cremated by some person who discovered their bodies in a barren field on 27.10.87.

RAMASAMY THEVARASA (30) Silambu Puliyadi, Chankanai.

My late daughter Thevarasa Sasikala, aged 7 years was a grade one student attending the Sivapragasiam Maha Vidiyalayam Chankanai.

From the early hours of 2.11.87 our village was subjected to heavy shelling. Fearing to remain at home the members of my family and the family of my sister Thembamalar fled towards the Silambu Piliyadi Pillayar Temple at 4.15 a.m.

My daughter Sasikala and my brother-in-law Sivanandarasa who were going ahead of us were both hit by shells as they entered the precincts of the temple.

My daughter was grievously injured in her right hand while my brother-in-law killed instantaneously.

My daughter Sasikala succumbed to her injuries as I was taking her to Dr. Naganathan's Hospital at Chankanai.

SIVANANDARAJAH TEMPAMALAR (35) Sillambupuliyadi, Chankanai.

My late husband Manickam Sivanandarajah, aged 33 years was due to leave for Saudi Arabia.

On 2.11.87 from the early hours of the day our village was subjected to heavy shelling.

At about 4.15 a.m. the same day when we were fleeing towards the Vairavar Temple for safety accompanied by my brother and his family a shell fell close by and burst.

My husband Manickam Sivanandarajah was hit and killed instantaneously.

My brother's daughter Thevarasan Sasikala, aged 7 years who was injured succumbed to her injuries when being taken to the Hospital.

My husband's dead body and that of my brother's daughter were cremated at Chankanai the same day.

I have one son aged 3 years.

THILLIAMPALAM SUBRAMANIAM (60) Yarwathai Kopay North, Kopay.

The deceased Kanthia Thangammah (78) was my mother-in-law.

On 2.11.87 a shell fell on our house and exploded. My mother-in-law died on the spot due to the blast.

We removed her body from the spot and cremated in a clearance away from our house.

The deceased is survived by her husband who is around 90 years old.

Our house was completely gutted due to the shell blast. We lost all our belonging which includes our farm proceeds.

THIRUNAVUKARASU SELVAMANI, (32) Silambupuliady, Chankanai.

The deceased Thirunavakarasu Nishakumar, aged 9 years was my son.

He was a student.

On 2.11.87 at about 8 a.m we fled from our house due to the intensive military operation with the hope of taking refuge at the Silambupuliady Vairava Temple.

When I reached the temple with my other children I noticed that my late son was missing.

Later I came to know that he was killed when a shell fell near him and exploded while he was running towards the temple.

His body was cremated on 3.11.87 at Vilaveli cemetery at Chankanai.

I have three children.

PONNUTHURAI PATHMADEVY (30) Kernikarai Alaveddy North, Alaveddy.

The deceased Ponnuthurai Thavarajah, aged 37 years a bachelor was my brother.

He was a Farmer

After our parents died it was my late brother who supported and maintained me.

On 3.11.1987 at about 6.30 a.m. my brother left home saying that he is going to our farm.

As he did not return home I became highly worried.

As about 5.00 p.m. I was informed that my brother was shot and killed by the army while he was working in his farm.

VALLIPURAM MAHADEVAN (59) Marailluppai, Nedunkerni.

The deceased person Mahadevan Mahendran aged 28 years was my son.

He was a Farmer.

On 3.11.87 at about 3.00 p.m. my son set out in a tractor towards Nedunkerni.

At about 6.00 p.m. I was informed that my son was killed when the tractor he was driving was subjected to shell attack from a helicopter.

I learned few other persons were also perished in the aerial attack.

His body was brought home on the same day itself.

His body was cremated at the Morailluppai Village Cemetery on 4.11.87.

I have four unmarried daughters and a son.

It was my late son who bore the burden of looking after our family as I have become old and incapable of doing hard work.

After my son's demise we are undergoing untold hardships.

Mrs. KRISHNAPILLAI PARIMALADEVI (28)

Muthukrishnar Veethy, Chunnakam.

I was married to Kandiah Krishnapillai (28) 11 years back and have 3 children by him aged 10 years, 4 years and the youngest 1½ months.

On 5.11.87 when I was at home with my husband and children sounds of explosion were heard some distance away indicating that shells fired by the IPKF were falling in that area.

At about 10 a.m. the same day when my husband was proceeding towards the well in our compound to have a bath a shell fell close to him and exploded.

When I rushed to my husband I found him dead. My husband had a gaping injury on his neck.

The dead body of my husband was burnt in a barren land in the adjoining areas, the same day with the assistance of relations.

I have been made a widow at this young age and have to bear the burden of providing my children with the basic requirement.

My husband was the sole bread winner and his untimely death has brought untold hardship on me and my 3 children.

ARULLAPU MARY MACTHELENE (65) a widow Navaly South, Navaly.

The deceased person Arulappu Simeson, aged 42 years was my son.

He was a Fisherman.

On 6.11.1987 our area was rocked by explosive shells.

At about 3.00 a.m. my son fled from our house saying that he is going to St. Peters Church.

On the following day at about 6.00 a.m. I was informed that my son was killed when a shell fell inside the Church compound.

His body was brought home immediately.

It was my late son who supported and maintained me.

I do not have any income after his death.

BEFORE ME

The Telegraph

COMMENT

The fall of Jaffna does not end the war against the LTTE

Nikhil Chakravartty

External affairs minister Natwar Singh is indeed a daring person to have claimed, as he is reported to have done after his sudden air-dash to Colombo, that the worst is over with regard to the Indian Army's overpowering of the resistance of the LTTE in northern Sri Lanka.

By all indications, it is clear as daylight that the storming of the LTTE base in Jaffna town is by no means the end of the bloody story. For no guerrilla force, the fall of the citadel is the end of the armed resistance. Rather it is the beginning of a new phase which may turn out to be advantageous for it.

It needs to be noted that the battle for the Jaffna town does not end the virtual war that the Indian Army is now waging against this Tamil militant group in Sri Lanka. After the Jaffna town, there is the thickly populated Jaffna peninsula to be cleared. Beyond that is the rest of the northern province, and after that the more difficult job of tackling the eastern province with its mixed ethnic composition.

It has taken more than two weeks for the Indian armed forces to capture Jaffna town. This has been done with full-scale military operation. By the candid admission of the officers in charge, most of the LTTE armed cadres and leaders have either escaped from the Indian Army net or have gone into hiding within the four corners of the town to try to harass the Indian Army on a hit-and-run basis.

When the Indian Army was despatched to Jaffna under the nomenclature of a peace-keeping force, what it had to undertake was a full-scale military operation, no question of peace-keeping as done by a police force. Now after the capture of Jaffna town with heavy casualties and fairly expensive destruction of property, there has come disturbing reports—one of the first by the plucky correspondent of **The Telegraph** —that the Indian Army has now been using helicopter gunships to bomb out other towns and habitations which it suspects to be LTTE nests. This way, the Indian Army instead of slowing down its military operation after the capture of Jaffna, seems to have stepped them up. In the bargain, it seems to be taking the risk of higher civilian casualty.

What does it really imply? The Indian authorities seem to have no idea whatsoever how to isolate the LTTE. The civilian population that has had to face Indian Army attacks including straffing from the air, would certainly not be heartened by its presence in the Tamil provinces. Rather, the Tamil population in the area would be hardened in its bitterness against the Indian Army.

One also hears nowadays in official circles that efforts would now be made to activate the other Tamil militant groups so that the LTTE could be isolated. Hasn't this job been thought of rather late in the day? All these months, the approach of the Indian authorities was that the other militant groups did not matter and the LTTE alone would have to be talked to. Then suddenly in the second week of October, a full-scale military operation was mounted against it. Of course, the plea trotted out by the Indian authorities from the Prime Minister downward has been that the LTTE broke every promise it made.

The question that the Indian authorities owe to the public is: all these months and years, what sort of intelligence appraisal was being made about the LTTE strength and attitude? Compare this with the meticulous work done at the time of the Bangladesh operation. Mukti Bahini groups also were not easy to handle, but the political leadership in the government at the time was mature enough to handle them with care.

The perspective before the Indian Army in Sri Lanka is fearsome. The scope of conventional positional operation is minimal: instead, it will have to grapple with full-scale guerrilla attacks by a determined, well-armed group, well-entrenched in the support of the local population. The fall of Jaffna town need not have crushed the morale of the LTTE. It is a determined unflinching do-or-die group, ready with the cyanide. Had the Indian authorities made a serious assessment of this type of adversaries to contend with, they would have realised the enormity of the disaster in which our armed forces are pushed into.

What is bizarre is that a Tamil militant group is now marked out as the adversary of the government of India, while the Jayewardene government has become its closest ally for whom our jawans are facing risks of a serious magnitude.

If the authorities in New Delhi pause and seriously ponder they would find it difficult to answer honestly a simple question: for whom are our jawans shedding their blood in the inhospitable terrain of Jaffna and beyond? For guarding the frontiers of India? For carving out a greater India beyond our frontiers? For propping up a tottering regime in a neighbouring country? For whom?

Such a question needs to be answered honestly before the country is dragged further into this misadventure.

Tamilen aus dem Kreis Goslar: Hungerstreik im St.-Annen-Haus.

MONTAG, 2. NOVEMBER 1987

The war for

REPORT

With the Tamil Tigers putting up stiff resistance, will the Indian Peace-keeping Force be able to gain control of Jaffna and ultimately restore peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka?

(Top) IPKF arms set off from Palaly: tough going

LTTE supremo Pirabhakaran: never-say-die

The operation was swift and businesslike, but hopelessly restrained. The Indian Peace-keeping Force (IPKF) charged with the responsibility of salvaging a collapsing accord, threw a noose around Jaffna and proceeded to tighten it. By 20 October, it was consolidating its position in west Jaffna, joining up with a group of soldiers beleaguered in Jaffna Fort, cutting off the LTTE's (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) Jaffna lagoon where they had stored arms and ammunition earlier. Finally, the IPKF was advancing on Jaffna from five different directions.

Once the Indian Navy had destroyed several 'supply boats' in the LTTE

peace

George Francis /Scorp

India has got herself into a difficult situation. The attempt to implement the 29 July agreement has not only brought the IPKF at loggerheads with the Tamil militants, but also exposed it to vicious slander from Sinhalese quarters

stronghold of Gurunagar, the IPKF flew in 300 more troops to start mopping up operations. The Tigers then switched from conventional warfare to guerrilla tactics, sniping at IPKF troops from buildings and laying booby traps and mines in their way. The battle, even in its final stages, was fierce and bloody. And even though the IPKF was avoiding the use of offensive artillery and air support, it could not prevent the increasing toll being taken on civilian lives: by 22 October, the fighting had left 300 citizens dead, and some 500 injured. The IPKF itself had lost 100 of its men, while 500 others were wounded—several of whom were flown to the military hospital in Pune. Nevertheless, the Indian forces pressed on relentlessly, refusing to suspend hostilities unless the LTTE surrendered unconditionally and agreed to abide by the 29 July accord. Noticing that several LTTE guerrillas wanted to end their resistance, the Indian forces even offered a general amnesty to all those who surrendered. But the LTTE leader, Vellupillai Pirabhakaran, who had himself escaped and was directing the battle from afar, was clearly determined to make his men fight to the bitter end.

The irony is inescapable. Once regarded as a patron and benefactor of the Tamil militants, India, having committed itself to a treaty with Sri Lanka, now finds itself in the role of a peacekeeper fighting Sri Lanka's war against its own friends. And with the LTTE resisting dourly, there is another fear: will the war against the insurgents come to an early end, or will it spill over into Tamil Nadu, where the Tigers might take their fight for an Eelam (Tamil homeland)? "Only in that event," said a foreign ministry official, "does the question of having any regrets arise, not otherwise. And from all indications, it seems the problem will be settled." One will have to wait and watch. But by the third week of October, there were rumours that the Indian army had suffered more casualties against the LTTE in Sri Lanka than it had in Bangladesh in 1971, and also that a number of senior Indian military officials were against sending the army into the island nation with its hands tied. Is this war proving too high a price to pay for statesmanship and diplomacy? Has India bitten off more than it can chew?

Apparently, during the fighting, the LTTE had sent a letter to the Prime Minister, through the DMK leader in Madras, M. Karunanidhi. The Tigers would like to surrender but insisted that their political differences with the Indian government must be settled through negotiation. An LTTE commander in Jaffna had sent a note to the IPKF, on the same lines. But the IPKF stood firm—the surrender had to be unconditional. Soon after this, the IPKF learnt, by intercepting radio communication between LTTE units, that a debate was going on about how long to continue the fight. While the IPKF claimed that the Tigers were debating the question of surrender, travellers from Jaffna who spoke to journalists in Colombo said their actual objective was somehow to slip out of Jaffna and continue the struggle in other places. The IPKF, however, took this opportunity to drop leaflets all over Jaffna, appealing to the militants to surrender, and assuring them that if they did so, they would be able to participate fully in the democratic and political process and live with honour and dignity.

"This is not a war," said a government official in Delhi, "so the question of negotiating a cease-fire does not arise. It is an operation to disarm the Tamil militants, and stop the violence. The LTTE has brought it upon itself." On 14 and 16 October, Indian government spokesmen, in response to the reports saying that Pirabhakaran has sent a letter to Karunanidhi, reiterated Rajiv Gandhi's statement that he still hoped that the LTTE will join the process of ensuring the restoration of peace and normalcy and help secure the legitimate



George Francis / Scoop

Arms seized from the Tamil Tigers in Jaffna: clampoown on secessionists

demands of the Tamils of Sri Lanka rather than pursue the goal of self-aggrandisement. But there was no response from the other side.

The IPKF used the conventional "pincer movement" strategy employed for any large settlement. They approached Jaffna from all sides, sealed off the escape routes and linked up their columns. But, as an official pointed out, their advance into Jaffna was hindered by their inability to "soften" up their route with air strikes and artillery shelling. The LTTE, on the other hand, initially defended their bunkers, but later retreated to housetops and within buildings, from where they sniped at advancing IPKF troops. Then they would run ahead, laying mines (many of which were electronically controlled) in their wake.

Once they gave up their battlements—from where they had used sophisticated shoulder-to-shoulder rockets, steel-capped bullets, AK-47 assault rifles, mortars and heavy guns—they merged with the rest of the population. "The main problem Indian soliders are facing," said a government official, "is that the LTTE guerrillas wear ordinary clothes. When the IPKF orders people out of a building, the militants usually come out without their arms, leaving them in some safe place, to be collected later. The jawans are helpless. The point is that the people of Jaffna are not our enemies."

Not only were the militants merging with the population, they were also taking advantage of the Indian forces' inability to strike at civilian targets. As the IPKF linked up their columns from Navatkuli and Jaffna Fort—a major advance—and established their hold on all major buildings in Jaffna, the militants started using women and children as shields to attack them from behind. The Indians, however, managed to take the LTTE headquarters in Koppai North, and later Koppai South,thus getting near the famous Nallur temple in the outskirts of the town. 40,000 Tamils had taken refuge here and the LTTE boss, Velupillai Pirabhakaran was also rumoured to be hiding within. The LTTE, in order to discredit the Indian forces, gave out stories that its soliders had assaulted and raped Tamil women, and shelled civilian targets near Jaffna Hospital. An inquiry into these charges is currently going on, though the IPKF spokesmen have called them "blatant lies".

Once regarded as a patron and benefactor of the Tamil militants, India, having committed itself to a treaty with Sri Lanka, now finds itself in the role of a peacekeeper fighting Sri Lanka's war against its own friends

However, the militants managed to hold out against the Indian assault much longer than expected. On 23 October, fierce house-to-house fighting was still going on in Jaffna where the LTTE continued to resist the IPKF assault using civilian hideouts. The Indians being unfamiliar with the streets and by-lanes of the town, found it hard to deal with the hit-and-run tactics of the guerrillas. Said a a government official, "Jaffna is not Calcutta or Delhi. The IPKF is out in the open. It does not know who is who—even though Jaffna is just a small town." And if the Indian troops were under strict orders to avoid hurting ordinary people, the Tamil militants were callous and ruthless: they blew up a bus carrying Tamil citizens, escorted by IPKF personnel, killing mostly Tamils. In another incident, the militants set off a landmine under a truck carrying IPKF personnel in Thannamullai, in eastern Batticaloa, killing 20 soliders. Five other Indian soldiers were burnt alive by placing blazing car tyres around their necks in Jaffna. The IPKF learnt about this incident by intercepting a radio message in which the guerrillas said, "We are frying the Indians." No further confirmation, however, was available.

Had the IPKF miscalculated the strength of the LTTE? According to an Indian official, the IPKF had gone into Jaffna fully aware of the difficulties of dealing with an enemy that was largely invisible. It is possible, of course, that they had gathered some intelligence about the LTTE's fortifications, not only from the Sinhalese forces but also from splinter Tamil groups which have fallen out with Pirabhakaran and his men. The use of women and children to launch attacks and counterattacks on IPKF positions had made the guerrillas lose a lot of sympathy within their own community in Sri Lanka. The locals started cooperating with the Indians, instead. Some of the Tamil groups are already gunning for the LTTE. "The LTTE has engaged in wanton killings of fellow Tamils and mercilessly bumped off rival groups," said one official. He also pointed out that the LTTE had endangered the lives of the more numerous Tamil population living outside the northern and eastern provinces, who are extremely vulnerable to Sinhalese attacks. So far, even though the Tamils had butchered the Sinhalese in Jaffna, the Sinhalese in other regions have not reacted.

In spite of all roads in Jaffna being sealed, an exodus of 1,25,000 Tamils



Tamil refugees in Rameswaran: troubled existence

George Francis / Scorp

preceded the military action. 25,000 of them were accommodated in camps inside the country, and a lakh outside the country. Inside Jaffna, the IPKF has been providing regular medical aid and assistance to the population, as well as airdropping food packets. While wounded IPKF soliders have been brought to military hospitals in India, sick and wounded Tamils have been accommodated in Jaffna Hospital.

No doubt, India has got herself into a difficult situation. The attempt to implement the 29 July agreement has not only brought the IPKF at loggerheads with the Tamil militants, but also exposed it to vicious slander from Sinhalese quarters. In any event, India is now committed to intervening if there is any conflagration. Apart from the costly military operation it has had to conduct, the IPKF now faces the onerous task of either bending or breaking the Tamil Tigers. But can the LTTE be wished away, even if it is temporarily defeated? Even today, many hope that the LTTE will surrender its weapons to the IPKF and join the search for a political solution to the ethnic problem. That represents the brightest hope for peace. The LTTE, after all, has to be recognised as an important political factor in the northern and eastern provinces. As long as Tamils remain part of Sri Lanka's political set-up, the Tigers will be an influential group. But what are the availabe choices if the militant faction, committed as it is to Eelam, is set on a course of self-destruction?

Is the Indo-Sri Lankan accord collapsing? If the accord had ever given rise to any illusions about India bringing about a quick solution to the ethnic tangle in Sri Lanka, they have now evaporated. At the time of writing, it had become amply clear that even the capture of Jaffna would not end the battle. Instead, it would mark the beginning of a long Indian involvement in Sri Lanka—depending on the political situation there. The fact that Sirimavo Bandarnaike's Freedom Party and other Sinhalese groups are virulently opposed to the agreement does not augur well for its longevity. But that is another matter.

It is clear that the militants will not give in. The LTTE, still rigid about not surrendering its arms, is reluctant to accept the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement *in toto*, and its cadres might spread out into the surrounding jungles, and creeks and lagoons to carry on a protracted war of attrition—which is precisely what the IPKF is trying to avoid. And if Tamil militancy continues, it might become harder to control the southern Sinhalese extremist elements, spearheaded by the banned Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), which has already become active again, after the signing of the agreement. The JVP, apart from killing and injuring members of the ruling United National Party in the southern districts, has been raiding Sri Lankan army camps in a drive to collect arms. President Jayewardene has himself said that he feared the JVP and Tamil extremists had established convenient links, and that they were determined to overthrow the Sri Lankan government and set up one of their own. "Guerrillas, with their commitment," said a political observer, "rightly or wrongly, are never obliterated, they spawn and proliferate."

The IPKF used the conventional "pincer movement" strategy employed for any large settlement. They approached Jaffna from all sides, sealed off the escape routes and linked up their columns

The ethnic situation is confusing and volatile. Apparently, there are various national and international forces at play. The international powers which have been applauding the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement are said to be none too happy about India's re-emergence as a regional superpower, and are anxious to see that the accord does not succeed. Within Sri Lanka, the cynicism is confined to the Freedom Party, influential sections of the Buddhist clergy and a cross-section of the Sinhalese people. Some members of the ruling UNP are constantly whipping up anti-Indian feelings by criticising the IPKF's presence and playing up the fact that it poses a serious threat to Sri

Lanka's sovereignty.

These critics—who are counting on Sinhalese pride to push and prod their case—maintain that the IPKF first sided with the Tamils, and is now taking much too long to accomplish its task in Jaffna. In an interview with the daily, *Island*, Mrs Bandaranaike said: "... Reports do not indicate an overwhelming success by the IPKF. I do not think that one of the biggest armies in the world would run into so much difficulty against terrorists who, in the estimation of Mr Dixit (the Indian high commissioner) himself, had only 30 per cent of their weapons." She went on: "Now that the Indian army has launched an offensive in the north and many Indians have died, they will not leave without getting what they came here for." She said it was not for nothing that Indian forces had brought with them armoured cars, anti-aircraft guns, field guns and powerful tanks.

The Sri Lanka government itself is hopelessly divided on this issue. Apart from President Jayewardene, the agreement seems to have more opponents than well-wishers. The recent statement by Prime Minister Premadasa, who, to the astonishment of Indian representatives had accused India of nurturing the Tamil guerrillas, and the manner in which the Indian and Sri Lankan governments have been contradicting each other on the question of granting amnesty to Pirabhakaran and other LTTE guerrillas, are not very encouraging signs either. While the IPKF has assured all members of the LTTE that they will be free men if they surrender, the Sri Lankan government has put a high price on Pirabhakaran's head—though it is said he will never be captured alive, because he has decided to swallow cyanide, like some of his LTTE colleagues, if the enemy gets anywhere near him.

The real test of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord will be now. Will the IPKF outlive its utility for the people of Sri Lanka? Or will the Sri Lankan government use it for purposes other than that for which it was brought in? The ethnic strife is unlikely to end soon. Already, it has caused extraordinary damage to the country: the losses in terms of destruction of public buildings and railway tracks, as well as the total collapse of certain important sectors and roads amounts to an estimated 15 billion Sri Lanka rupees. The island nation's agrarian economy has been greatly affected.

For India, the stakes are political credibility and goodwill; for Sri Lanka, sheer survival. Will the 29 July accord live to see a happier day?

Nirmal Mitra / *New Delhi* 1—7 November 1987

Pak opposed to Lanka accord, says Rajiv

New Delhi, Nov. 11 (UNI): Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi tonight said that the opposition to the Indo-Sri Lanka peace agreement had come from two quarters — Pakistan and some political parties at home.

Pakistan had vehemently opposed the accord at the Kathmandu SAARC summit because it knew what had been achieved, Mr. Gandhi said, and pointing to the opposition benches, he remarked: "You are criticising (the accord) because you have not understood its significance."

He denied the opposition charge that India had gone round seeking certificate on the accord in international forums. The recognition, in fact, had come without India's asking, he added.

Mr. Gandhi was giving clarifications (sought by members in the Rajya Sabha) on his statement concerning his foreign tour.

Earlier, DMK member V. Gopalasamy warned the House that "seeds of disintegration" will be sown in the country if the killings of Tamils continued.

The Indian Peace-Keeping Force must pull back to the Oct. 9 position so that killings are ended and a ceasefire declared forthwith. Mr. Gopalasamy thundered while initiating a discussion.

Mounting a scathing attack on Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, he accused the Government of India of "betraying" the interests of Tamils. "This unkindest cut of all has come from the most unexpected quarter (India)."

He urged the Prime Minister to substantiate the charges he had levelled against the LTTE and its commander, V. Prabhakaran.

The LTTE was never a party to the agreement signed between Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jayewardene. Till date the Government of India had not clarified this point.

Mr. Gopalasamy's charge that the IPKF has committed "genocide", as per press reports, sparked angry protests from the treasury benches.

Several opposition members, including Mr. T.R. Balu (DMK), came to the rescue of Mr. Gopalasamy as ruling party members protested.

Minister of State for External Affairs Natwar Singh was on his feet saying that Mr. Gopalasamy should withdraw his remark.

Mr. Gopalasamy: I will not.

Mr. Gopalasamy said the suicide incident involving high-ranking LTTE leaders triggered the militant group's confrontation with the IPKF.

Keshav, The Hindu, 6.11.87.



Rajiv's politics of accords

KULDIP NAYAR

In a recent interview, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi claimed that the various accords that he signed have brought peace to the country. And he took the credit for taking the initiatives in effecting and implementing them. But he has been successful only in as far as signing the accords; most of them have not been implemented at all. In fact, he has made matters worse; the loss of his credibility is such that the general impression is that he does not mean what he says.

Take, for instance, the Sri Lanka accord. By twisting the arms of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), India brought peace which was only a shortlived one. The LTTE chief, V. Pirabhakaran, was not in favour of the accord and when he agreed to it, it was a means to an end, not the end itself. Rajiv Gandhi saw all the virtues in the accord, even though some people warned him of the hazards which went with it. It is said that once when Edward Kennedy, the then US President, sought the advice of the late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, on what he should do in Vietnam, Nehru had told him not to send the forces as it could amount to America creating a bottleneck for itself.

From a contingent of 6,000 soldiers—which constituted the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) when the accord was signed—the strength has now risen to 10,000 men, one division, backed by tanks. More soldiers may have to be sent in the near future. Sure enough, the outcome is hardly positive. All the bad name that Colombo got for its soldiers' punitive action against the militants in Jaffna and elsewhere will now come to New Delhi.

The Punjab accord was said to be Rajiv Gandhi's first major breakthrough after winning the polls in 1985. But not even a single clause of the accord has been implemented. When Rajiv Gandhi signed the accord with the late Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, he did it as the Prime Minister of India and it was said to be an accord with the Sikh community. But today the Sikhs are more alienated than they were before the accord. Punjab is now in the throes of ever-increasing violence that not only endangers peace in the state but also in the whole country.

Rajiv Gandhi signed several accords to take the wind out of the sails of those who were pressing for solutions; he never meant to implement the accords, neither in letter nor in spirit

Much was made of the two accords in Kashmir and Assam. But one has only to visit Kashmir to see how the accord that Rajiv Gandhi imposed on Farooq Abdullah, the state chief minister, has angered the people there. Over the years, the Kashmiris had got used to the idea of having a measure of autonomy within the country, without the constraints of New Delhi's tutelage. At that time the pro-Pakistan elements, which exploited religious sentiments made no headway and secular forces had the upper hand. After the accord, the fanatics and fundamentalists have come to the fore, and Farooq Abdullah, who at one time could take the bull of communalism by the horns, has been weakened, as he is now seen to be a part of the New Delhi establishment.

The Muslim United Front (MUF), an organisation for Mullahs and Maulvis, has begun to spread communal poison, particularly among the youths while Farooq, the staunch secularist, looks helpless with the millstone of the accord around his neck. For gaining a few ministerial seats for the Congress(I) in the state, Rajiv Gandhi has damaged an apparatus that had stood the test of time right through the Sheikh Abdullah regime and the earlier term of Farooq. Is there any doubt that the state is more unstable than ever before and the country a lot weaker?

The outcome of the Assam accord can be summed up with the words of the state chief minister, Prafulla Kumar Mohanta, whom I met during his last visit to New Delhi. He said that the accord existed only on paper; New Delhi simply refused to implement it. "Whatever promises Rajiv Gandhi made to us have been flouted," he stated emphatically. He even complained that his letters to the Prime Minister on the subject remained unacknowledged.

Little wonder that the All Assam Students Union (AASU), which was in the forefront of the agitation that culminated in the accord, has threatened to block the flow of oil from the state as a protest against the non-implementation of the accord. The proposed blockade may take us back to the days when practically every Assamese was up in arms against the Centre and when at the call of AASU thousands had come into the streets to voice their protest peacefully.

One might say that the accord with Laldenga in the neighbouring state of Mizoram has brought peace. But at what price? The accord has set up a dangerous precedence: the state now enjoys the rights to have direct trade with neighbouring countries. Even Jammu and Kashmir which has its own constitution, does not have that leeway. And now after the Mizoram experience, other north-eastern states have started demanding similar rights. Once when Sheikh Abdullah had proposed that the Muree Road to Pakistan should be opened to facilitate timber trade, the Centre curtly rejected it. Logs of wood still flow through the Jhelum from Kashmir to Pakistan, but New Delhi is not willing to offer to Srinagar what it has extended to Aizawl. And the irony is that despite all this, the Mizoram accord is said to be running into difficulties. Some of the remarks made by Laldenga of late are not too happy.

No doubt Rajiv Gandhi took the initiative in signing the accord which his mother, Indira Gandhi, did not. When the accords were signed, people heaved a sigh of relief and Rajiv Gandhi received kudos. But it is now clear that he signed them—often involving a bit of drama—to take the wind out of the sails of those who were pressing for solutions; he never meant to implement the accords, neither in letter, nor in spirit. All of it was propaganda; he has done very little to be boastful. ■

TIME

REPORT

NOVEMBER 9, 1987

India Steps into a Quagmire

The Tigers are defeated, but the battle has just begun

Two Soviet-built Mi-24 helicopter gunships hovered 200 ft. above a marketplace in Sri Lanka's northern Jaffna Peninsula last week, emptying their formidable arsenal of rockets and rapid-fire shells. Indian pilots and gunners inside the distinctive double-bubble cockpits were trying to destroy a temporary field headquarters of the Tamil Tiger guerrillas. The Tigers had been waging a deadly rearguard action against the Indian peacekeeping force for more than two weeks, and the Indians were determined to wipe out the last pockets of resistance.

When the Mi-24s wheeled away from the marketplace, at least 21 civilians lay on the ground dying. Yet the Tiger headquarters a few feet away was hardly touched. At a hospital several miles to the north, foreign medical volunteers spent the afternoon amputating limbs and suturing bodies pierced by Mi-24 bullets. "All these patients are civilians," scrawled New Zealand Surgeon H.D. (Dick) Rawson on a list of people he had treated that day, including two who died.

India's war against the Tigers has turned into a shadowy conflict with no front lines, where civilians rather than soldiers are more likely to be casualties. Among the victims of last week's fighting was TIME Reporter Qadri Ismail. He was standing with a taxi driver on a country road watching a helicopter attack a target a mile away when the gunship suddenly turned and beelined for the two men, letting loose a burst of fire that left bullet fragments in the reporter's neck.

Indian peacekeeping forces last week ended their offensive against the Tamil Tigers, but they have failed to defeat and disarm the vast majority of the guerrillas, who have been trying to sabotage the implementation of the peace accord that was supposed to end the four-year-long Tamil rebellion. Instead of destroying the Tigers as a military force, the Indian army took heavy losses and could not prevent the Tigers from melting away with their guns, ammunition and explosives into the back lanes of Jaffna and the jungles of Northern province.

While the Indians were claiming to have killed more than 700 Tiger guerrillas, independent Sri Lankan sources and foreigners who witnessed some of the fighting put the number at less than 100. Indian forces showed visiting journalists a captured Tiger cache of homemade mines and mortars but were able to display only two of the Kalashnikov automatic rifles that the Tigers use. Concluded a worried Sri Lankan intelligence official: "As a fighting force, the Tigers have survived largely intact."

Ready for an ambush: Tamils plan their next moves in Northern province

Despite the latest offensive, the guerrillas have survived as a fighting force.

The Tigers slipped the Indian net, vowing to continue their struggle for an independent Tamil nation for years to come by waging an underground guerrilla campaign. In fact, that battle seems to have already begun. Tiger snipers last week were roaming Jaffna town, exploding mines in eastern Sri Lanka, and are suspected of bombing an Indian government office in the city of Kandy.

India, the regional superpower of southern Asia, appears to be on the verge of slipping into a quagmire comparable to the ones that trapped the U.S. in Viet Nam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Indian forces are bogged down in a foreign land, living among a hostile populace and fighting a counterinsurgency war that it cannot win despite overwhelming power and high-technology weaponry. Says a Western diplomat in the Sri Lankan capital: "The Indians are in very, very serious trouble."

The Indian army had to pay a heavy price for its advance through Jaffna. Its own casualty figures, according to reliable sources, are considerably higher than the 214 officially listed. The soldiers have been shaken by guerrilla warfare, in which the main weapons include booby traps and homemade mines, and by the fearless Tigers, who are ready to die for their cause. Indian soldiers frequently blunder into ambushes laid by the Tigers.

The result has been increasingly jumpy Indian soldiers who have shot and killed Tamil civilians before realizing that they were unarmed innocents. TIME's Ismail confirmed instances where nervous soldiers mistakenly shot at a boy who was climbing a tree looking for a coconut, and at a middle-aged woman, inside a house, whose shadow was momentarily visible through a window. Estimates of civilian deaths in the offensive range upward from 400.

Despite claims to the contrary, Indian artillery and mortar units were not pinpointing their fire on military targets but were aiming broadly. In two cases, Indian shells landed directly on refugee camps. "Indian shelling is worse than Sri Lankan bombing," said one refugee. "You can see bombs falling from a plane, and you can run for cover. But when the shells come, you don't know where they're from or where they're going." People could not understand why this was happening and kept saying, "The Indians came here to protect us, and look at what they're doing to us."

The Tigers, though, have committed their share of atrocities. They entered Jaffna Hospital to set an ambush for advancing Indian troops, despite pleas from doctors to abide by an old agreement placing the hospital out-of-bounds for all armed combatants. When the Tigers opened fire on the unsuspecting Indians entering the hospital, both doctors and patients were killed in the cross fire.

Most Indian and Sri Lankan officials are downplaying the fact that the Tigers are still a formidable fighting force capable of inflicting havoc in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. But one Sri Lankan Cabinet minister admitted that it will prove impossible to implement the peace accord and restore democracy in areas where armed Tigers can still roam free. As long as that is happening, it will be equally impossible for the Indian peacekeeping force to return home. —*By Ross H. Munro/Colombo*

An Indian Air Force Mi-8 helicopter lands at an improvised helipad on a road strip 2 km short of the Jaffna Fort.

IPKF jawans getting ready to board an Indian Air Force MI-8 helicopter in Palaly-Jaffna, to move to an operational area. *Defence pictures.*

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS KILLED

KOKUVIL	
S. Shanmugalingam	**S. Annapuranam**
R. Kumarasamy	**S. Ponni**
P. Kanagammah	**R. Chandravasanthy**
V. Nadarasa	S. Kandasamy
M. Nadanasabapathy	K. Thangarasa
V. Sinniah	J. Gunabalasingam
S. Nallammah	S. Ratnam
R. Panchanathan	S. Annamalai
S. Mahadevan	**S. Ledchumipillai**
N. Thirunavukkarasu	S. Nalliah
S. Selvaratnam	**S. Annapooranam**
N. Sureshkumar	S. Seelan
S. Sinnappu	K. Thillaimaran
N. Malarkody	R. Sivathasan
K. Sivakolunthu	A. Kandiah
N. Sinnammah	**R.S. Vasanthy**
S. Veerasingam	T. Chandramohan
V. Murugesu	K. Thangarajah
Puvaneswary	S. Ravindranathan
S. Kandasamy	V. Paikiyasamy
K. Thangalingam	R. Rasanayagam
S. Kanagalingam	V. Thangavelauthan
K. Sachithananthan	A. Thanarasa
K. Sinnathurai	K. Sinnamany
N. Kathiri	*KANKESANTHURAI*
M. Paramalingam	V. Velautham
V. Kandasamy	C. Thangavelautham
K. Paramanathan	A. Thambithurai
K. Markandu	**A.T. Sridevi**
N. Iyathurai	**A.T. Sivajini**
K. Sellammah	**A.T. Subajini**
P. Sajeevini	A.T. Kethes
L. Padmavathy	A.T. Kones
L. Annalingam	R. Poobalasingam

AFFIDAVIT

MURUGAN THANGAMMAH, (45) Palaly South, Vasavilan.

The deceased Nanian Murugan (56) is my husband.

My late husband above named was a daily waged labourer and he was supporting me and my son, Murugan Pon Ratha (12) from his earnings.

On 6th of November, 1987 at about 8.00 a.m. I was conversing with my late husband. At that time there were continuous gunfiring and blow of Mortar shells from all directions. Suddenly a Mortar shell fell on the compound and blasted heavily. Sustaining severe injuries he died at the spot.

The prevailed tension did not permit me in proceeding for a sudden death inquest, as such no inquest was held.

The dead body of my son was cremated at Kuddiapulam Cemetery, Vasavilan on the same evening at 4.00 p.m.

The untimely death of my husband was caused irrepairable loss to me and my son. He has left us without no source of income.



Mrs. VALLIAMMAI NAGALINGAM (43) at No. 80, Lotus Road, Vannarpannai West, Jaffna.

I am the mother of Nagalingam Navanesalingam, killed in shell blast on 6.11.87.

My husband Nagamany Nagalingam is sick and physically unfit to move about.

I and my family took refuge at the Koddayampathy Sri Sivasubramania Temple when Vannarpannai became a target of shell attack during the last week of October 1987.

On 6.11.87 at about 2.00 a.m. shells were lobbed on the Temple when there was a melee and refugees ran helter-skelter.

My son Navanesalingam ran out and waited near a wall on the outer court yard of the Temple when a shell fell closeby and blasted causing severe abdominal injuries.

He was dead on the spot.

The dead body of my son was taken home for the funeral.

His body was cremated at the Kombayan Manel Crematorium at about 11.00 a.m.

My deceased son was 25 years old, unmarried, a Mason by profession who earned an average monthly income of Rs. 1,500/-.

My late son was the main bread winner of the family as my husband is an irregular wage earner due to his sickness.

I have ten children, of whom six are school going, who depended on the earnings of my deceased son for maintenance and up keep which has now been denied.

SOKKALINGAM RETNAM, (48) 5th mile - post Kudathanai.

The deceased person Sokkalingam Chandralingam, aged 22 years was my son.

He was a farmer.

On 7.11.87 at about 7 a.m. my son left for his farm.

At about 9 a.m. I was informed that my son was shot and killed by the army while he was on his way to his farm.

I came to know that he was accidentally shot when the army hiding behind a coconut grove opened fire at a speeding van.

His body was brought home and was cremated on the following day at Sudalaipitty cemetery.

My husband deserted me ten yers ago.

My daughter Kanthimathy is a heart patient and a deafmute.



VAITHY JACOB (66)
Subramaniam Street, Chunnakam.

I am a Fruit Seller at Chunnakam Market.

My wife, children and I were living in our house at the above said address.

Curfew in this area was lifted at 8 a.m. on 7.11.87.

I left home at 8.05 a.m. and went to the church.

When I was in the church, few of our relatives who came to the church brought my son J. Jude Anandakumar (14) to the church.

I observed that my son was bleeding profusely from injuries on both thighs.

My son J. Jude Anandakumar succumbed to his injuries at the church.

I removed the dead body home and burial took place the following morning.

My son J. Jude Anandakumar was a student Skandavarodaya College, Chunnakam.

I came to know that my son J. Jude Anandakumar too had left home at 8.15 to go to the church and had been shot by Indian Peace Keeping Force personnel stationed at the Chunnakam Junction sentry Post.

VARATHARAJAH NAGAMMAH, (32) Palavodai, Uduvil.

The deceased Kidnan Varatharajah, aged 33 years was my husband.

He was a Casual Labourer.

On 7.11.87 at about 6 a.m. my husband left home saying that he is going to a nearby shop to purchase some provisions.

After he went I heard some explosion from the direction of the shop.

Little later I was informed that my husband was killed when a shell fell near the shop and exploded.

I rushed to the scene of incident and found my husband's lifeless body which bore a gaping wound on the neck caused by shell shrapnel.

His body was cremated at Palavodai cemetery on the same day itself.

I have four children to support.

After my husband's untimely death we are left without any income and undergoing severe hardships.



ABOORVANATHAN MAHAMARI (33) Kulanai, Araly North, Vaddukoddai.

The deceased child Aboorvanathan Jeyavathani aged 10 years was my daughter.

On 8.11.87 at about 5.00 p.m. my daughter was playing with two other children in front of a closed shop which is situated in the next compound.

A shell fell near her and exploded.

She was killed instantaneously.

Other children escaped with minor injuries.

The burial took place on the following day.

I have four children.

My husband is a poor mason.



JOSEPH NICHOLAS EMMANUEL, (30) Periyamathavady Arasady, Maviddapuram, Tellipalai.

I am the younger brother of the deceased Antony Joseph Sebastian who was killed in shell blast on 8.11.87.

My late brother a vegetable vendor, while waiting at his stall in the Jaffna market square was hit by shrapnels darting from a shell explosion. The shell fell in front of the stall.

He received severe abdominal injuries and died on the spot.

His dead body was removed by Santiapillai Arulanandam and was delivered at his residence at 204 Grousalt Road, Jaffna.

On receipt of information on 9.11.87 I came to Jaffna and his body was buried in St. Mary's burial ground on the same day.

My brother ran a vegetable and grocery stall at the Jaffna Market and earned an average monthly income of Rs. 1,500/-.

My brother was unmarried and he looked after and maintained my younger brother and sister who are school going.

Since his death, they are undergoing hardships due to non receipt of maintenance and financial assistance and they are orphans.

I am not in a position to maintain the two as my earnings are hardly sufficient to maintain myself.

J. N. Emmanuel.

MYLVAGANAM SADACHARALINGAM (34), Hensman Lane, Chavakachcheri.

I was employed as a Fitter in the Power Loom of the Chavakachcheri M.P.C.S. Ltd.,

On 8.11.87 IPKF soldiers who were won patrol duty while passing our house shot at me when I was standing at the entrance of my house.

I suffered a gun shot injury on the right shoulder joint resulting in a compound fracture.

I was admitted to Chavakachcheri Govt. Hospital the same day and transferred to General Hospital, Jaffna on 23.11.87.

I was hospitalised till 28.11.87 and discharged but continue to receive physiotherapy treatment.

I cannot bend or lift my right arm.

I have been informed by hospital authorities that I may have to undergo an operation in two month's time if there is an improvement.

I have now lost my job due to this injury and seek assistance until such time I am able to use my right hand.

NADARAJAH MAHESWARY (48) Kulanai, Araly North, Vaddukoddai.

On 8.11.87 at about 5.00 p.m. a shell fell within our compound and exploded.

I was struck by a shrapnel on my spine and started to bleed profusely.

Three family members were killed on the spot.

I was warded there for 17 days.

Later I received treatment at a private dispensary nearby till 25.12.87.

I am unable to use my right hand or leg due to the nerve damage after the incident.

I am unable to walk properly or attend to my household chores.

I have five children.



PATHMAVATHY THURAIRAJAH, (51) widow of the Late Thambirasa Thurairajah, Theni Lane, Valvettiturai.

I am the widow of the Late Thambirasa Thurairajah killed in Army gun-fire.

The IPKF conducted a search operation in our area on 8.11.87 commencing at 5.00 a.m.

At about 10.00 a.m. on 8.11.87 when my husband was returning home on his push cycle after visiting a relative of ours, Indian Army Personnel coming from the opposite direction opened fire on some youths running away.

My husband was hit by a bullet on his chest causing a severe bleeding injury. The bullet entered his left chest making its exit through his back.

He fell dead on the spot and his body was brought home by relatives.

His dead body was cremated at about 1.00 p.m on 8.11.87 at the Oorani Crematorium, Valvettiturai.

My husband was a farmer who earned an average monthly income of Rs 1,500/-

I and my children have been left with no maintenance or financial assistance since his death.

My house was damaged in aerial bombing by the Sri Lankan Forces and I with my children live in a room which escaped damage.

I have four children and all are school-going, and the eldest is 25 years, and the youngest is 17 years.



SEENI PARAMESWARI (47) Navaly East, Navaly, Manipay.

The deceased Karthi Seeni (54) was my husband.

8.11.87 the army was firing shells as it advanced through our village.

We left our house and took shelter inside the nearby Murugamoorthy Temple.

At 12 noon I was informed that my husband was wounded by a shell which fell inside our house compound as he was about to leave for the temple to join us.

I went to our house and carried him back to the temple.

He had a large wound on his back caused by a shell fragment.

He died on 13.11.87.

We cremated his body on 13.11.87 near our house as we were unable to go to the crematorium due to the tension prevailed on that day.

I have one unmarried daughter (12).

IN □ PARLIAMENT

Accord only hope of peace: PM

NEW DELHI, Nov. 9.

The following is the text of the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's statement in Parliament today on the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement:

I rise to inform the House about progress on the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement, including the background to the operations of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in the Jaffna peninsula.

The Agreement has been acclaimed internationally. There is a widespread consensus that the full implementation of the Agreement will be of universal benefit. Tamil aspirations would be met, the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka preserved, and peace and stability restored to the region. Some of our important security concerns would also be met. Therefore, the Government of India is committed to the full implementation of this Agreement. We believe that this resolve is shared by the Government of Sri Lanka.

Satisfactory progress: In the three months since the Agreement was signed, we have made satisfactory progress on many fronts. Sri Lankan security personnel have stayed in their barracks. Home Guards in the East Province have been disarmed and the Special Task Force has been largely withdrawn. Over 3,300 Tamil detenus have been released under an amnesty, and the rest would have been freed if the LTTE had not disrupted the return to normality.

The contours of civil administration in the North and East were being drawn on lines suggested by Tamil representatives ranging from the LTTE to the TULF. The Interim Administrative Council had been announced, with the LTTE given a decisive majority. The return of the refugees from India had been planned in consultation with the Government of Sri Lanka. We had identified priority areas for rehabilitation, to be financed through a grant of Rs. 25 crores annouoced by India.

Peace had been established in the North and East of Sri Lanka. The return of normality was imminent. It is a matter of great regret that the LTTE threw all this away. They went back on every commitment they had given to us. They deliberately set out to wreck the Agreement, because they were unable or unwilling to make the transition from militancy to the democratic political process. The LTTE were given every possible encouragement and opportunity to join the political mainstream and even to play a leading role in the process. The LTTE leadership, which had masterminded the killings of over 600 rival Tamil militant cadres, were permitted to retain their personal arms for their security. They were allowed to handover their arms at their own pace, even though this enabled motivated parties to question our resolve to implement the Agreement.

LTTE demands conceded: Our High Commissioner flew to Jaffna several times to find out what the LTTE leadership wanted. On September 28, an agreement was reached. The minutes signed conceded every single demand of the LTTE concerning the composition and functioning of the Interim Administrative Council. In return, the LTTE reiterated their support to the Agreement and once again promised to lay down arms. The establishment of the Interim Administrative Council was announced in accordance with this Agreement. But within hours the LTTE went back on their commitment. The LTTE chose to adopt a course of violence.

While they promised us support to the Agreement they started a propaganda campaign against India and the Agreement through meetings and through their illegal broadcasting facilities. They organised disturbances in Jaffna, disrupting normal life and the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation. They threatened all Tamil civilians who disagreed with them. They hunted down and massacred about 100 members of other Tamil militant groups. They tried to inflame Tamil opinion in Jaffna by imposing an unnecessary and tragic fast unto death by one of their cadres to demand concessions that were already under discussion and were resolved to their satisfaction. At this stage the unfortunate suicide of 12 LTTE cadres took place.

Armed attacks on IPKF: The LTTE killed the eight Sri Lankan soldiers in their custody and massacred over 200 civilians in the Eastern Province. They publicly repudiated the Agreement and started armed attacks on the IPKF. The LTTE's repudiation of the Agreeement, their attacks on Sinhalese and Muslims in the East and their murder of Sri Lankan soldiers threatened to produce a Sinhala backlash that would have destroyed the Agreement and produced a cycle of violence worse than any island had so far seen. The victims would have been mainly Tamils especially in the South and in the Central Highlands.

The House will appreciate that this could not have been allowed to happen. In these circumstances the IPKF were given instructions to apprehend anyone carrying arms or involved in the massacre of civilians. At this point the LTTE launched attacks on the IPKF There was then no alternative to disarming the LTTE.

The IPKF were given strict instructions not to use tactics or weapons that could cause major casulties among the civilian population of Jaffna, who were hostages to the LTTE.

The Indian Army have carried out these instructions with outstanding discipline and courage, accepting, in the process, a high level of sacrifices for protecting the Tamil civilians.

I place on record Government's very deep appreciation of the dedication and high moral standards with which the Indian Armed Forces have conducted their operations in Jaffna, against a group that flouts every norm of civilized behaviour, coercing old men, women and children to act as shields, using innocent children as human bombs, murdering prisoners, and boobytrapping houses of the people of Jaffna on whose behalf they claim to be fighting.

Food supplies: We wish a speedy recovery to our wounded soldiers. I pay homage to the soldiers who have laid down their lives. I am sure the entire House will join me in conveying our tribute to our gallant armed forces and our deepest sympathies to the bereaved families. Despite grave risk to IAF helicopters, emergency food supplies were airdropped over the city even during the fighting. The IPKF shared their rations with the refugees in Jaffna. Cooked food was sent to refugee camps as soon as these came under the IPKF's protection.

We have made a major effort to restore civil supplies, amenities and administration to Jaffna. Simultaneously, ship loads of essential food and other supplies have been sent to the port of Kankesanthurai. Relief convoys are being sent to Jaffna even though the LTTE continues to attack these humanitarian missions. Electricity and telephone communications which had been sabotaged by the LTTE, have been partially restored with equipment flown out from India to replace what had been damaged.

A small team of civil administrators has been sent to advise and assist the IPKF in relief and rehabilitation work. The Indian Red Cross, have sent over their personnel and in cooperation with the local Red Cross, they are doing a remarkable job of providing relief and medical assistance in the city.

The unfortunate developments in Jaffna were not of our making. We reacted with a heavy heart when there was no alternative. We got the LTTE everything they wanted, disregarding the cost to our credibility with other Tamil militant groups and all communities, including the Tamils. We overlooked the LTTE's vicious propaganda even before the outbreak of hostil-

O.V. Vijayan, News Times, 14.11.87.

ities, not just against the Agreement but against India and the IPKF.

In the Interim Administrative Council, they were given a clear majority of seven out of twelve, including a Chairman of their choice. Other Tamil militant groups were excluded at their insistence. While the Government of India have accommodated every concern of the LTTE, the LTTE have not honoured any of their commitments. Even after they attacked the IPKF and precipitated the hostilties, we have repeatedly said that if the LTTE hands over their arms, supports the Agreement and renounces the path of violence they can still play an important role in the future democratic set-up. President Jayewardene has already promised them amnesty again if they surrender their weapons and support the Agreement. The LTTE have responded only with ultimatums and renewed propaganda, spreading misinformation and lies aimed at tarnishing the image of India and our armed forces. We still hope that better sense will prevail.

Return of refugees: Throughout, we have worked towards ensuring an early and effective devolution of powers so that the legitimate aspirations of the Tamils are met and they can live in security with dignity and honour as equal citizens of Sri Lanka. Even while trying to control the violence unleashed by the LTTE, we have been mindful of the need to ensure an early return of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees from India and the need to ensure that fresh colonisation of Tamils areas does not take place.

There were reports of Sinhala colonisation in the East even after the Agreement was signed. This naturally caused concern to the Tamils, particularly since large number of Tamils of the province are still refugees, either in India or in the North. We have taken this up strongly with the Government of Sri Lanka to ensure that this does not happen. The Sri Lankan Government have agreed to the formation of a Monitoring Committee consisting of all communities, to investigate complaints of fresh colonisation. We are keen to ensure an early return of Sri Lanka refugees in India to their homes. The Government of Sri Lanka have also agreed to cooperate with us to facilitate the early return to their homes of Tamils who have been internally displaced. We hope the process will start soon. Long term peace in Sri Lanka will hinge on the devolution package.

The Sri Lankan Government have already introduced legislation in their Parliament to amend their Constitution to provide for the creation of Provincial Councils and the devolution of powers to them.

The legislation also provides for the creation of a single Tamil Province in the North and the East. In the light of Sri Lanka's unitary Constitution, this legislation is unprecedented. The powers it seeks to devolve to the Provincial Councils are considerable. However some of its provisions do not fully meet Tamil expectations. This matter was discussed extensively with President Jayewardene in Kathmandu and during his three-day working visit to Delhi. We have received firm assurances that if, ever the coming months, difficulties arise the Sri Lanka Government will make such changes as are found necessary.

The Government of India believe that despite some problems and delays, many of which were foreseen but unavoidable in the resolution of an issue of this magnitude and complexity, this Agreement represents the only way of safeguarding legitimate Tamil interests and ensuring a durable peace in Sri Lanka.

Difficult role: Some have chosen to criticise the Agreement. None has shown a better way to meeting the legitimate aspirations of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, restoring peace in the country and of meeting our own security concerns in the region.

We have accepted a role which is difficult but which is in our national interest to discharge. We shall not shirk our obligations and commitments. This is a national endeavour. I am confident our efforts will have the full support to the House.

The agreement has been acclaimed internationally. There is a widespread consensus that the full implementation of the Agreement will be of universal benefit.

• • •

The Indian Army have acted with outstanding discipline and courage accepting, in the process a high level of sacrifices for protecting the Tamil Civilians. I place on record Government's very deep appreciation of the dedication and high moral standards with which the Indian Armed Forces have conducted their operations in Jaffna, against a group that flouts every norm of civilised behaviour.

• • •

The LTTE have responded only with ultimatums and renewed propaganda spreading misinformation and lies aimed at tarnishing the image of India and our Armed Forces.

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We have accepted a role which is in our national interest to discharge. This is a national endeavour.

Anjolie Menon

RAPED

I am Miss. YOGARANEE THANGARAJAH aged 19. My father is dead and the head of my family is my mother Arulamma who has the responsibility of looking after a family of seven. With hardly any means my mother tried to educate me. I had the fortune to read up to the G.C.E.O/L at the R.K.M. Vevekananda Girls M.V and had to be at home with my sister eleven year Sripriya now and then joined by my niece while other members of the family went out for breadwinning during the day time.

It was on such a day the 23rd November this year that the said incident in my unfortunate life happened. It was a fine morning, sunny but cool. At about 10.30 the dogs from the neighbouring homes began barking, the signal that unknown or unwelcome vistors were around; the members of the IPKF were around. Two of them entered the compound. Fear and suspense could be felt and I told them that there were no Males at home Yet they came on. Unsuspecting my sister told them that the two of us with our four year old niece were the only occupants, the other went near my sister and started threantening her not to shout. Then she was beaten by one of them while the other held me hard when I tried to get free, now afraid that I was going to be beaten too. I could hear my sister shriek and fall down and I was feeling very giddy. I was pushed down and the ground was turning under me. I could see the man as if in a dream lying on me and tearing my jacket. In vain I tried to push him. I could not see much and felt a hand baring my legs and using force on me. After he got up the other man did the same thing. I could not see anything but felt being kicked. Then it was complete blank.

When I opened my eyes I was being examined by a doctor in a dispensary. Later I was taken to the General Hospital in Batticaloa.

My life is blasted by the Peace Keepers from India. My only wish is that no such fate overtakes any female in the future in the universe.

T. Yogarani

NEWS

Human chain in protest against IPKF

MADRAS, Nov. 6.

Hundreds of people linked arms from Parrys to Saidapet in the "human chain" organised today by the Confederation for the Protection of the Rights of Eelam Tamils to protest the military action by the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka.

Apart from the DMK, DK and TNKC, a large number of students, Sri Lankan Tamils, old men and women and even some children took part in the protest, which lasted from 4-30 p.m. to 5 p.m. The AIADMK stayed away from the protest following a party decision. The protest was originally planned for Monday, but the organisers had to put it off as it rained heavily that afternoon.

Pouring in: On Friday, participants began pouring on to the roads, a 10-km stretch, even by 3-30 p.m. and standing in a line. Volunteers went about trying to join the links in the chain. However, at some places there were gaps. Many parents had brought along their children, some of them infants, others barely five or six years old.

The protestors shouted slogans denouncing the Indian military action in Jaffna and urging the Centre to "stop killing innocent Tamils in Sri Lanka." An Army truck that was going on Anna Salai near Arts College was stopped by some of the protestors and the driver was jeered at. The police intervened and restored order.

Traffic was snarled on most roads since the police would not allow vehicles to enter the main roads cutting across the "chain". The DMK President, Mr. M. Karunanidhi, drove in a car, inspecting the "chain". Among those who participated in the protest were, Mr. Sadiq Pasha, DMK treasurer; Mr. N. V. N. Somu, MP., Mr. K. Veeramani, DK General Secretary; Mr. P. Nedumaran, TNKC President, several MLAs, film personalities and literary figures.

College girls forming a part of the 'human chain'.

NOT BLIND TO HUMAN BONDAGE: Two of the disabled participants in the 'human chain' organised on Friday. *Express*



THE HINDU

Govt. gets brickbats, bouquets for involvement in Sri Lanka

IN □ PARLIAMENT

NEW DELHI, Nov. 10.

Opposition members in the Lok Sabha today assailed the Government for "unnecessarily" committing the Indian army to fight the Tamil militants in Sri Lanka in what they called an "impossible" situation.

Participating in a special discussion on the state-ment made in Parliament yesterday by the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv. Gandhi, over the events leading to the operations launched on October 10, 1987 by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to disarm the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Opposition members expressed the unanimous view that the Sri Lanka President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, had tricked India into rushing to pull his chestnut out of the fire.

"Misadventure": Mr. Dinesh Goswami (AGP) said the Indian Government's handling of the Sri Lanka situation since the signing of the July 29 agreement between the two countries was its "greatest misadventure on both the diplomatic and political fronts".

India, he said, had unnecessarily gone in for a military solution to an internal ethnic problem of a neighbouring country, in violation of the basic tenets of India's foreign policy. No one was happy with the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement, neither the Tamils nor the Sinhalese, Mr. Goswami said.

Mr. Goswami, who initiated the four-hour debate, demanded an immediate ceasefire to facilitate negotiations with the Tamil militants and an early pullout of the IPKF from the island. "We must come out of Sri Lanka at the earliest", he demanded.

Stating that the events after the agreement had proved correct the apprehensions of many members in the Opposition, Mr. Goswami asked under what authority had the Prime Minister signed the accord when the problem was basically an internal one.

Undeclared war against LTTE: Besides, he said, India should not have signed it knowing well that the LTTE's cooperation was not forthcoming. "We have now gone in for an undecalred was against the LTTE."

Heavy war cost: Mr. Goswami said he was not supporting the LTTE for all that its members were doing. "But I admire their commitment to a cause." Besides losing the lives of Indian soldiers, India was also spending large sums of money on the Sri Lanka operations at a time when the country was facing a serious financial constraint.

It is in interst of all: Cong (I) member Mr. Dinesh Singh (Cong-I) disagreed with the Opposition contention and said the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement was "in our national interest, in the interest of Sri Lanka and in the interest of the whole South Asian region. "Both in signing the agreement and in its implementation, India discharged its responsibility in the best interest of all."

Referring to the background to the signing of the agreement, Mr. Dinesh Singh said they should see the far-reaching aspects of the agreement. "One neighbour seeks our cooperation to find a solution to their problem and to check foreign intervention. Are we to turn a blind eye to it"? When Bangladesh sought India's support in the past, the Indian Government offered its cooperation.

Mr. Dinesh Singh said that when the Government decided to support Sri Lanka, it took all steps to ensure that everyone concerned with the ethnic problem was consulted. "I have no reason to doubt that the leader of the LTTE himself agreed to the accord and decided to abide by it." It was not India which sought a military solution.

Total negation of facts: India's forces went to Sri Lanka to disarm the militants and to see that the agreement was fully implemented. If the LTTE had kept its word and surrended its arms, there would have been no problem. To say that India was seeking a military solution was a "total negation of the facts".

Commotion: There was comotion when Mr. N. V. N. Somu (DMK) interrupted as Mr. Dinesh Singh was praising the Indian army's role in taking precautions to avoid civilian casualties.

Mr. Dinesh Singh retorted, "It is unfortunate that there are members who are not proud of being Indian and of their army".

Mr. Somu: I am a Tamil.

Mr. Dinesh Singh: I am an Indian.

In the din that followed the Indian Union Muslim League member, Mr. G. M. Banatwalla, unsuccessfully pleaded with the Chair to expunge the remarks of Mr. Dinesh Singh saying it amounted to casting aspersions en bloc.

Mr. Dinesh Singh said he had no intention of casting aspersions against any particular individuals. The Speaker, Mr. Balram Jakhar, said he did not think there was any member who was not proud of being Indian or about the Indian army.

Mr. Madhu Dandavate (Janata) said that when somebody said he was a Tamilian it did not conflict with his being an Indian.

Mr. Dinesh Singh concluded that the army was doing its job with great care and dignity and the Government was discharging its responsibility in implementing the agreement in the national and larger interests.

Mr. Dinesh Singh said the Indian Government was very patiently putting up with all that was done by the LTTE and still got for it the most in the power package. Denying the charge that India had opted for a military solution, he said it was the LTTE which had gone in for it. The LTTE had killed more Tamils than the Sri Lankan armed forces had done, he added.

"Tamils bulldozed into accord": Mr. Madhava Reddy (TDP) said the Government of India bulldozed the Tamil groups of Sri Lanka into agreeing to an accord which was not in their interest.

He also criticised the Government for not "reprimanding" the Sri Lankan President for his reported statement accusing the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Mr. M. G. Ramachandran, of harbouring extremists.

R.K. Lakshman, Times of India,

Mr. Reddy pleaded for an immediate ceasefire in Jaffna saying that "the LTTE was not our enemy, they might be misguided."

Mr. Bhagawat Jha Azad (Cong-I) countered the charge by an Opposition member that the IPKF was working to force a "military solution". He said first the Sri Lankan Government and now the LTTE were in fact trying to force a military solution, while the IPKF had gone there to ensure the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord which had been hailed the world over.

Pat for IPKF: Congratulating the IPKF for the tremendous restraint it had shown under "a very difficult situation," Mr. Suresh Kurup (CPI-M) regretted that the LTTE had once again taken to the militant path.

The former External Affairs Minister, Mr. Baliram Bhagat (Cong-I), pointed out that the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, which reflected the unanimous opinion of the House, fitted in with India's foreign policy.

'Diplomatic absurdity': Terming the agreement "a diplomatic absurdity", Syed Sahabuddin (Janata) said it was a document signed in haste "to draw attention away from certain domestic issues." The agreement had "a fatal flaw" in that the LTTE was not made a party to it and now there was a grim outlook that the Indian forces were in for a prolonged war into which they had been sucked, he said.

Likening the situation to those in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Lebanon, the former diplomat regretted that the Indian forces were at the beck and call of a foreigner who could at any time order them out.

He called for an immediate ceasefire, military disengagement and resumption of India's mediatory role in finding a solution to the ethnic problem. The process must lead to a direct agreement between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil militants.

Extract apology: Mr. P. Kolandaivelu (AIADMK) criticised the offensive against the LTTE and accused the Indian authorities and the IPKF of inaction against the initial Sri Lankan violation of the accord. He demanded the Government extract an apology from the Sri Lankan President for his charges against the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister.

Mr. Kolandaivelu said the implementation of the July 29 accord with Colombo had gone awry from the date of its signing. The Jayewardene Government had violated the provisions of the agreement and the IPKF "at our expense is killing our own people on Lanka soil."

Mr. Kolandaivelu said the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Mr. M. G. Ramachandran, had asked for an immediate truce. "If the LTTE leader, Mr,. Prabakaran does not respond, then the Government is free to act on its own. "The ball is in your court," he said.

Mr. P. R. Kumaramangalam (Cong-I) called for implementing the accord in full but questioned the wisdom of giving "more than necessary" importance and latitude to the LTTE, which he said, was not the sole representative of the Sri Lankan Tamils. Thee were several other groups which should be associated with the agreement and its implementation.

Mr. Indrajit Gupta (CPI), reiterating his party's support to the accord, felt that it suffered from the "basic flaw" of attaching too much significance to Mr. V. Prabhakaran's assurances. He doubted whether Mr. Prabhakaran and the LTTE had any ideology at all and said they seemed to be "wedded to the creed of violence."

Call for unilateral ceasefire: Mr. Gupta called for a "bold step" of a unilateral ceasefire by the IPKF and time to the LTTE to surrender arms. If the LTTE did not come out well out of this "test", then the IPKF should go all out to achieve the job at hand.

Mr. R. Jeevarathinam (Cong-I) blamed some political parties in Tamil Nadu for supporting the LTTE, knowing fully well that "Eelam" for the Sri Lankan Tamils was not possible. By defending the atrocities committed by the LTTE, they were trying to make political capital.

The debate will be resumed tomorrow. — PTI, UNI

IPKF jawans unloading supplies from "Island Glory" at Jaffna on Tuesday.



R.K. Lakshman, Times of India, 8.11.87.

NEXT BATTLE FOR IPKF

To win over the Jaffna Tamils

REPORT

IT was an overriding death-wish that seized LTTE in the month of October. It was with cold fanaticism that the LTTE men took on the IPKF and they knew that they were doomed to failure.

V. Prabhakaran assumed for himself the familiar role of saviour of his people, but he only managed to lead the 1,30,000 population of Jaffna into a deeper morass of suffering. Jaffna today is a ghost city, its face pockmarked by bullets. It is a city with mangled electric poles, buildings with gaping holes, broken statues, burnt petrol bunks and the stink of death pervading the air in some of the most populated areas. Said an army officer: "When we came here, the Jaffna lagoon, with its multitude of boats, presented such a pretty sight in the evening. Now we can only see crows crowding the place. And some water fowl which we often shoot."

The Jaffna Tamil has often seen his homeland turn into a war zone. Different people have been training their guns at him at different times. It is this suffering which would, according to Indian policy-makers, cut through the charisma of Prabhakaran and sever the links between the Jaffna Tamil and LTTE. It was argued in Delhi—and believed also by influential sections—that the Jaffna Tamil would, once the back of LTTE is broken, come to identify himself with the IPKF.

Said a spokesman of the external affairs ministry: "It is for the first time in years that people in Jaffna know what democratic freedom is, having been rid of the totalitarian rule of LTTE." But it is apparent, after a visit to the Jaffna hospital and a refugee camp, that the Indian policy-makers had miscalculated. The charisma of Prabhakaran and his Tigers still holds. It was not LTTE coercion which had made the Jaffna Tamil support the Tigers.

The LTTE supremo is seen by most people of Jaffna as a rebel on the run, one who had gone to Delhi to wake up to an accord he did not envisage, and to which he had agreed after a great deal of cajoling and some pressure. That he was virtually kept a prisoner in Delhi has not been entirely forgotten by the people of Jaffna.

If there is anyone who has upset the Indian policy—or the lack of it—in Sri Lanka, it is Prabhakaran. The IPKF is now in control of Jaffna but the popularity of LTTE is not on the wane.

Most of the Tamils in Jaffna this correspondent talked to spoke highly of the Tigers and their leader. Thirty-five-year-old Martin, employed in a soft drinks factory in Jaffna, said he preferred LTTE because the Tigers at least did not fire at them or drop shells over their houses—referring obliquely to what the Jaffna citizens believed the IPKF had done in its march against the Tigers. Martin along with 3,500 others had sought refuge at the Lady of the Refuge Church and so did not know what was happening outside in the city, but tended to believe that Indian soldiers had broken into their houses and looted property.

T. Vimla, 45, who lived near the Jaffna railway station was afraid of being caught in the crossfire. She decided to move to the refugee camp when she saw a group of Indian soldiers make passes at her daughter. She did not understand their language but the gestures were obvious enough. At the refugee camp there is a feeling of collective security. Besides, unlike the stray Indian soldiers, the officers of the Indian army are a polite lot and helpful.

Silva Rajan, a 51-year-old driver, heard rumours that Indian soldiers were rather rough with civilians who were caught sheltering the Tigers. He

Briefing newsmen. *Brig. J.S. Dhillon, whose men captured a Tiger arms cache*

Most of the Tamils in Jaffna spoke highly of the Tigers. One said that the Tigers at least did not fire at them or drop shells over their house—referring obliquely to what he believed the IPKF had done.

did not want to get into any unnecessary problems with the IPKF and decided to move into the camp.

Mrs Dominique, a mother of six,had already spent seven days in the camp. The IPKF soldiers had not misbehaved with women in her household. But she had heard that such instances had taken place in other parts of the town. Dominique, however, merely smiled when asked about LTTE. A teenager nearby remarked: "We're for the Tigers." Most of those standing in the vicinity nodded their heads in confirmation.

A registered medical practitioner, Dr Ram Rattan, who lived close to the Lady of the Refuge Church, saw his house being ransacked by the Indian soldiers. The jewellery he had in the house was taken away. He quietly ignored questions asked about LTTE.

Even as newsmen were talking to the inmates of the refugee camp, armymen intervened to say that interviews were over because of the tight schedule they had on their hands. But one had a sneaking suspicion that men of the IPKF were reluctant to let the pressmen have a free and fair assessment of what the Tamils in Jaffna really thought of the Indian intervention. As an army officer privately admitted, "there's no way out except a political solution"

A doctor in the Jaffna hospital now under IPKF control said that when the force first arrived on the scene, none in Jaffna had believed that it would harm civilians. But after the IPKF launched its offensive against the Tigers, more and more people began having second thoughts. The doctor denied that there were Tigers holed up inside the Jaffna hospital.

After the Jaffna hospital was taken over, the IPKF sent army doctors to get the medical services running again. Top priority was given to removing the dead in the hospital. Next came the need to establish a rapport with the patients 'They were all huddled together in the corner of a room—patients as well as doctors. We really had to coax them to come out. It took a lot of effort to convince them that we meant no harm," said a doctor from the Army Medical Corps, who had been deputed to the hospital.

Some of the patients, he added, could be members of LTTE. "But we don't ask them such questions. Our job is to look after them and provide the best medical treatment, which we're doing."

To make sure that the IPKF was providing adequate medical aid to the injured in Jaffna, Major-General J.S. Chahal, one of the best known orthopaedic surgeons in the country, was himself placed as the head of the medical teams.

It was a colossal rehabilitation programme which the IPKF launched in the last week of October. Major-General A.S. Kalkat, who is overall in charge of the IPKF in Jaffna, explained: "Our operation has not only been military but also meant civil action on a gigantic scale." He added that most of the local doctors the IPKF had recruited were taken away by LTTE at gunpoint to look after its wounded cadres.

Major-General Kalkat admitted that civilians could have died in the fighting. LTTE, he said, had claimed that nearly 200 civilians had died in the shelling by the IPKF. Even if this were true, it was not too high a figure in a war which had been fought with such intensity, he maintained.

"But who is responsible for the civilian casualties? It is LTTE which turned the population into a human buffer," said the senior army officer.

Major-General Kalkat said that the IPKF wanted everyone, except the hard core, back in the mainstream. "We have apprehended some persons—nearly 100 in all. We're trying to sift the hard core from the rest."

It is essentially the function of a police force which the army has taken upon itself. This reporter strayed into the Jaffna police station, a short distance from the Dutch-built fort, only to be confronted by an army officer conducting an interrogation. "Who has allowed you to come here? You're not supposed to be here at all," he said. The officer, with a contingent of Maratha Light Infantry troops who had laid a ring round the police station, was obviously trying to ascertain whether the young men in their custody, most of them teenagers, had anything to do with the Tigers. Some of the teenagers begged for mercy with folded hands as the staccato of slaps landed across their faces.

Most IPKF officers are of the view that it was the mass suicide of the LTTE men on October 5 that set off the current crisis in the island nation. When they were taken into custody by the Sri Lankans, the Tigers had with them a handful of arms and three delayed action cyanide capsules. The moment the IPKF heard about the arrests an Indian army contingent virtually laid siege to the air force centre at Palaly where the Tigers were held.

While the Sri Lankan forces insisted that the men would be flown to Colombo, the IPKF said that it would never allow that to happen. Messages passed between Jaffna, Delhi and Colombo. It was Delhi which asked the IPKF to call off the siege, a decision which many in the IPKF find inexplicable. Balasingham, in the meantime, had been able to slip in more cyanide capsules to the men in custody. The Tigers finally took the plunge when a Sri Lankan colonel announced to them that they were being taken to Colombo. Said an army officer: "It is the stuff of which movies are made. Why don't you ask someone to come and make a film on it?" What has led to the current Jaffna crisis is an unusual mix of the flippant and the tragic.

It was apparent by the first week of October that the IPKF would have to take on the insurgency in Jaffna, as the Tigers launched a brutal reprisal against the Sinhala civilians. Though the Sri Lankan forces provided logistics support—their sentry was among the first to be shot dead while on guard duty at the Jaffna Fort where fighting broke out on October 10—the brunt of the fighting has been borne by the IPKF. Remarked an army officer: "They (the Lankan forces) seem to be enjoying themselves. While here we go about in our battle fatigues; they are, as you can see for yourself, playing volleyball."

That it is an unpopular war the IPKF is fighting is clear. While a government spokesman denied reports which had appeared in a section of the press that Major-General Harkirat Singh, sent to Sri Lanka as the officer-in-charge of the IPKF, had been recalled, the IPKF personnel in Jaffna feel that the incident is symptomatic of what has gone wrong with the army operation. Explained an army officer: "He was recalled because the IPKF operation did not provide the dramatic results which the Indian government expected."

Other IPKF personnel were of the view that he was recalled because of his supposed proximity to the LTTE chief. But Harkirat Singh was one among several army officers who had a close working relationship with the LTTE cadre

When hostilities began, IPKF did not have sufficient rations for nearly five days. Almost everything had to be flown from India, to feed not only the soldiers but also the refugees.



The IPKF headquarters in Jaffna

before the hostilities between them broke out into the open. Major-General Harkirat Singh was expected to reach Jaffna and address the visiting newsmen on October 27, but he did not.

The command problems could not but have been accentuated by intelligence failure. According to an assessment prepared by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the military operations in Jaffna were to be over in three days. The external intelligence gathering agency had based its assessment on the information that LTTE had ammunition, supplied mostly by India, to last only two days. Senior army officials in Jaffna disclosed that they had time and again pointed out that it was an overly optimistic report. "Keeping in view the situation prevailing here, we had never set a time limit to the operation we were launching against LTTE. At no point of time had we committed to the government that the operation would be wrapped up in three days," said one officer.

As it turned out, LTTE has kept the fight going for more than a fortnight; it had been receiving arms from abroad, particularly Singapore, about which the Indian intelligence agency did not have the least idea. Besides, the intelligence supplied by the Sri Lankans was very poor, if not downright misleading, even about such elementary data as the terrain and the layout of roads.

Besides the lack of intelligence, the logistics presented a formidable problem. When the hostilities began, the IPKF did not have sufficient rations for nearly five days. Almost everything, including broiler chicken, had to be flown in from India. The IPKF has to feed not only its men but it has to feed refugees in the various camps. Several inmates at the Lady of Refuge Church pointed out that they were surviving on meagre rations—every day a family received one cup of dal and one cup of rice.

But the biggest obstacle the IPKF had to overcome was psychological. It had to take the offensive against erstwhile allies, it had to contend with a fast rising number of casualties, and face the horror such a conflict generated. Said an army doctor: "Every day in the army hospital at Palaly, we receive 25 to 30 casualties on an average. Death anywhere amounts the same thing to us—whether it is of a Tamil Tiger or of an Indian soldier brought to us on a stretcher. It is but natural for us to ask the question: is the sort of war we are fighting justified?"

It is evident that the IPKF sympathises with the plight of the people in Jaffna. This is one reason why the civilian population has hesitated from expressing an open resentment against a force which has virtually driven LTTE into a corner. "The people by and large are not hostile because they can see for themselves that we are only carrying out the orders issued to us. More than the army it is the politicians whom they are holding responsible for the mess in Jaffna," said a soldier.

The IPKF has, under the constraints that it has faced, done a splendid job. The war it has been fighting in Jaffna is not of its making. It was, as most of the soldiers believe, a war imposed upon them by two leaders of neighbouring nations with dwindling domestic support. The common subject of discussion is the dirty politics which has led to this impasse. The contradiction in the Indian policy, under which they had to operate, is obvious from the fact that the IPKF has gone all out to win the support of the Tamils in Jaffna, even as it has unleashed an operation to eliminate the LTTE with which the same masses identify.

For the IPKF the battle in Jaffna did come as a challenge. Sometimes the men had to put up with atrocious living conditions. "Come and see for yourself how we live. Sometimes our beds have to be made over ankle-deep water," remarked an army officer.

"Let an army come forward and do better than what we have done. We're proud of the way we have fought the battle," said an army commander. Having done that, it is now time for politicians to take over. Prabhakaran has already sent overtures to the Indian government and spelt out his conditions for peace: the LTTE leader would like the IPKF to go back to its positions as on October 9, followed by a 15-day ceasefire period, after which the Tigers would lay down their arms before the Indian army. An offer for the Indian government to evaluate.

NOV. 8–14, 1987 —G.K. SINGH in Jaffna

THE ORDEAL OF THE PEOPLE OF JAFFNA

REPORT

On 1st November, 1987, the Civil Rights Movement of Sri Lanka issued a statement which we carry in this issue in full for purposes of record :

"The Civil Rights Movement of Sri Lanka is appalled at the plight of the civilians of Jaffna, whose lives continue to be at risk and who are subject to great suffering and deprivation.

"In a recent statement 'The Island-Wide Violence after the Peace Accord' CRM referred to the situation of political detainees in the South of the country, and also to recent events in the North and East, including the failure to provide protection to Sinhala and Muslim residents in Trincomalee who were massacred and driven from their homes. Concerning the situation in Jaffna, this statement, issued ten days after the commencement of the Indian forces military offensive, referred to the difficulty of getting adequate or reliable information in many matters, and regretted in particular that the absence of press or other independent reports due to the refusal to allow journalists into Jaffna was serious drawback in assessing the situation.

"Though there are still many gaps and deficiencies in accessible information some press reports and first-hand account have since become available.

"At the beginning of the offensive, over 120,000 residents of the city of Jaffna were, according to an Indian High Commission spokesman, asked to report to three Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) 'checkpoints' — Nallur Kovil, Jaffna Hindu College and Hindu Ladies College (Daily News 12 October). It was reported that by 14 October nearly half the population of the Jaffna peninsula was displaced, 375,000 residents having sought refuge in schools, temples and kovils (interview with High Commission official, Sun 15 October).

"However these places of refuge were totally unprepared for such a vast influx. Reports of conditions in the Nallur Kovil, for instance, where an estimated 50,000 persons were camping out, many in the open, with only three toilets, are particularly appalling.

"The continuous curfew of over 12 days under which the peninsula was placed was another major cause of civilian distress. It is just not feasible to expect an entire population to remain indoors for days on end, without breaks to search for food, to take sick people for treatment, to bury the dead. It is inevitable that people will break such curfews after a time; if all 'curfew breakers' are preusmed to be combatants and shot on sight, many unjustifiable civilian deaths will then occur.

"Civilian deaths and injuries have occurred in the course of crossfire, as a result of serial attacks for instance at Chavakachcheri on 27 October, where an attack allegedly directed at a nearby LTTE installation left some 27 civilians dead and many more injured in the market place and bus stand. People have died in their homes and elsewhere as a result of shelling. One woman, a mother of six children, is reported to have been killed even in a place of refuge - Hindu Ladies College - as a result of aerial attack. How arbitrary or indiscriminate such attacks were, whether the LTTE was responsible for particular instances of shelling or the IPKF, how far such killing and injury was avoidable it is not possible for CRM to now assess. Nor is CRM at the moment dealing with allegations of reprisals and other misbehaviour by the IPKF, except to say that all these should be impartially investigated. For the movement CRM wishes to emphasise just the two factors mentioned earlier, namely the sudden mass displacement of the population without provision to care for it, and the continuous curfew. These indicate an unacceptable lack of preparation to fulfil basic obligations towards the civilian population; such preparation should have been given priority before the launching of any major military operation.

"There are clear international norms of conduct governing the protection of civilian populations in times of armed strife. Certain of these are to be found in the Geneva Conventions to which Sri Lanka and India are both parties; others are found in the Protocols Additional to those Conventions which they have not yer signed. What is relevant is not whether a particular provision is binding in terms of strict law in a given situation because one or the other party has not signed it. The provisions reflect universal principles of humane and decent conduct accepted by all civilised nations and our own people have a right to the benefit from these. We refer, for instance, to Article 17 of Protocol II which provides :

> Prohibition of forced movement of civilians
>
> The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition.

"CRM stresses that it is and has always been the responsibility of the Government of Sri Lanka to ensure the safety of its citizens of all communities throughout the country. The Government has invited Indian assistance in order to implement the peace agreements. That the IPKF is now enforcing one of the terms of the agreement, i.e. to disarm the militants, does not absolve the Government from the responsibility of safeguarding the civilian population.

"CRM now calls upon the Sri Lankan and Indian Governments to review the nature of the present operation in order to absolutely minimise further damage to the civilian population; to explore other options for collecting arms and disarming militants which do not place the entire civilian population in jeopardy; to establish some form of impartial investigation of charges made against the IPKF and to take measures that will restore the momentum towards a negotiated political solution.

"CRM calls upon the Government of Sri Lanka to ensure immediate relief to the civilian population of Jaffna and to take all steps towards their speedy rehabilitation. CRM repeats yet again its appeal that the Government accept the offer of the International Committee of the Red Cross to perform the full range of its services in Sri Lanka."

THE HINDU

IPKF will go ahead with its job: Minister

IN PARLIAMENT

NEW DELHI, Nov. 11.

The Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. Natwar Singh, today firmly ruled out any unilateral ceasefire in Northern Sri Lanka and said the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) would go ahead with the job of disarming the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Mr. Singh was replying to a two-day special debate on the Sri Lankan situation in the Lok Sabha where members took, in the words of Mr. Singh, "a multi-dimensional look" at the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement. The DMK member, Mr. N. V. N. Somu, walked out in protest after Mr. Singh concluded his reply. "Stop killing Tamils. Order ceasefire," Mr. Somu shouted as he left the House.

The Minister said, "We are quite clear in our minds that the task assigned to the IPKF has to be completed in the larger interest."

Mr. Natwar Singh said the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement sought to ensure that "our environment remains free from outside interference." "It would not be in our interest if Sri Lanka is to become a cockpit of superpower rivalry, or rivalry among other countries." Nor would it be in India's interest if countries not friendly to India were to get a stronghold there," he said.

India wanted that the military activity thrust on it was terminated as soon as possible so that the political process and reconstructon work could start in Sri Lanka and the necessary administrative arrangements and the economic blueprint could be made.

Not an accord in haste: Mr. Natwar Singh said the July 29 agreement was not made in haste. Many weeks of hard work at various levels had gone into it. All doubts raised by critics of the agreement had been allayed and provision made for every eventuality.

"Since agreements are made by human beings," he said, "if there was any constructive suggestion to improve it, we can do so," Mr. Natwar Singh said.

Ill-informed judgments: It was easy to pass ill-informed judgments on the agreement. But it had been acclaimed the world over as an act of statesmanship on the part of the Indian Prime Minister and the President of Sri Lanka.

Not one of the critics of the agreement had come out with a viable alternative. "It is easy to be critical, but difficult to be creative." One should take a look at the map of South Asia to see what responsibility geography placed on India. "We can't shy away from our responsibility."

If one looked at the situation in a balanced and dispassionate manner, the Minister said, one would see that what was at stake in Sri Lanka were the rights of the Tamils, the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and the security environment in the region. In signing the agreement—for which there was no example in recent history—both sides realised what was at stake.

Complicated work: Referring to the criticism that the time-table envisaged in the agreement was not being kept, Mr. Natwar Singh said this was a most complex and complicated exercise. There might be some hurdles and imponderables.

If the LTTE was willing to abide by the agreement then it should lay down arms and for this purpose contact the IPKF. "But this is not happening ... And the task of the IPKF has to be completed in the interest of the implementation of the agreement."

The IPKF came on the scene because the militants had refused to lay down arms to the Sri Lankan army and preferred to do so only to an Indian force. "The expectation after the symbolic public laying down of arms was that the process would continue smoothly ... but the LTTE reneged on the agreement. What it now wants is incomprehensible," Mr. Natwar Singh said, throwing up his hands.

All Tamil groups consulted: The Minister reiterated that all Tamil groups were consulted and kept informed of developments when signing the agreement. "Moreover, every single doubt of Mr. Prabakaran was set at rest by the Prime Minister when they met in New Delhi." The agreement was signed by the Governments of India and Sri Lanka because all earlier accords that Colombo had reached with the Tamil ethnic groups had failed.

adventurism for the political benefit of the Sri Lankan's President Mr. J. R. Jayewardene.

In an emotional speech Mr. N. V. N. Somu (DMK) asked why the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) had resorted to strafing, area bombardment and helicopter gunships and other weapons to disarm a small band of the Tamils, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It was a "shame" that the marvellous Indian army which had an excellent record has now been reduced to a mercenary force and its image tarnished to satisfy the "ego of one man." Besides, the bombing of a hospital and university was a serious violation of the peace accord, he alleged.

Mr. Somu, whose speech was heard in silence, compared the LTTE's role to the Mukti Bahini Bangladesh which had spearheaded the liberation struggle in that country. Although the people in erstwhile East Pakistan had not clamoured for an independent State, India intervened and created Bangladesh. But in Sri Lanka, the Tamils who were fighting against all odds for their cause were being "butchered and called terrorists." He described the IPKF as "the innocent people killing force."

"Double standards": Urging the Government to give up its "double standards" in dealing with a similar situation in two different countries, Mr. Somu called for an immediate ceasefire to give a chance to the Tamils.

Mr. Ram Bahadur Singh (Janata) said it was unfortunate that the peace accord had turned out to be a military solution instead of a political solution.

Mr. Saifuddin Soz (NC) wanted to know why the LTTE was not made a party to the agreement signed with Sri Lanka. Although the objectives of the accord were laudable, it could involve India in a long-drawn out battle.

Sinhala colonisation not stopped: Mr. Datta Samant (Ind) pleaded with the Government to heed the sentiments and feelings of the Tamil militants who had been fighting tooth and nail for a cause for so many years. They had been deprived of their democratic rights since 1978 and their status reduced to that of second class citizens. But the Government of India reached an accord ignoring all their aspirations. It had also failed to stop the colonisation of the Eastern province by the Sinhalese. The Government should give up its adamant attitude and resume negotiations with Mr. V. Prabakaran, LTTE leader, he said.

Mr. P. Namgyal (Cong-I) said the agreement showed an important development of change of attitude towards the Tamils on the part of the Sri Lankan Government. He thought a unilateral ceasefire would not be good as it would give opportunity to the LTTE to regroup. UNI

DMK member warns of "seeds of disintegration"

NEW DELHI, Nov. 11.

Opposition members in the Rajya Sabha led by Mr. V. Gopalasamy (DMK) today called for a ceasefire by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka.

Initiating a short-duration discussion on the Sri Lankan issue raised by Mr. Gopalasamy and 40 others, the DMK member questioned the reluctance on the part of the Indian Government to offer ceasefire.

Mr. Gopalasamy wanted to know if the LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran had made any authoritative request to the Indian Government on November 6 calling for a ceasefire. During the 50-minute speech, he time and again referred to the alleged atrocities committed by the IPKF in Jaffna which was objected to by the ruling party members.

The Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. K. Natwar Singh, urged the Vice-Chairman, Mr. H. Hanumanthappa to ask Mr. Gopalasamy to withdraw the allegation. Mr. Gopalasamy refused to do so.

Mr. Anand Sharma and Mr. V. Narayanaswamy (both Cong-I) raised points of order objecting to Mr. Gopalasamy's allegation which they said was based on "distorted facts".

Mr. Gopalasamy warned that any failure to solve the Sri Lankan issue would sow the "seeds of disintegration" in the minds of Tamils in India. He demanded the Government to substantiate its charge that the LTTE went back on its commitments and that it had wrecked the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement. The IPKF must pull back to the October 9 position so that killings were ended and a ceasefire declared forthwith.

PM criticised: Mounting an attack on the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, for his statement in Parliament on the situation in the island, Mr. Gopalasamy said it was not the LTTE which was responsible for the prevailing tragic situation but the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene with whom the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement of July 29 was signed.

He accused the Government of India of "betraying" the interests of Tamils in Sri Lanka. This unkindest cut of all has come from the most unexpected quarter (India)." He urged the Prime Minister to substantiate the charges he had levelled against the LTTE and its leader, Mr. Prabakaran.

At the outset, Mr. Gopalasamy said the LTTE was never a party to the agreement signed between Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jayewardene. Till date, the Government of India had not clarified this point.

The member reminded the House that contrary to Mr. Gandhi's statement, the Sri Lankan Government had not conceded the legitimate demands of Tamils for a traditional homeland and right of self-determination.

Angry retorts from treasury benches: Mr. Gopalasamy's charge that the IPKF has committed "genocide" as per press reports, sparked angry protests from the treasury benches.

Several Opposition members including Mr. T. R. Balu (DMK) came to the rescue of Mr. Gopalasamy as ruling party members protested. The Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. Natwar Singh, was on his feet saying that this remark should be withdrawn. Mr. Gopalasamy: I will not.

Mr. Gopalasamy said the suicide incident involving high ranking LTTE leaders triggered the militant's group confrontation with the IPKF in Jaffna. Mr. Prabakaran had written a letter to the Prime Minister via the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Mr. M. G. Ramachandran, that the LTTE was willing to cease fire. He wanted to know whether such a communication had been received from the LTTE leader.

LETTER

PeaceInSriLanka

Sir,—As one who was earlier deeply sceptical of the enforcement of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement, I now fear that India is getting into a Vietnam-like situation in Sri Lanka.

In effect (if not also intentionally) the Sri Lankan government has transferred to India the burden of a solution to their Tamil problem. While the Indian people are sympathetic to such of the demands of the Sri Lankan Tamils which are within the framework of the Sri Lankan constitution why should Indian armed forces get bogged down in Sri Lanka indefinitely or await the decision of President Jayewardene to throw out Indian forces from Sri Lanka?

Also, now that it seems that the more important of the Tamil groups have indicated by their actions that they care little for the continued presence of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF), I think India ought to withdraw the force on its own, before it is too late.

If this amounts to India reneging on the agreement with Sri Lanka, so be it. It is better to admit a mistake and to cut one's losses before it becomes too late to retrieve the situation.

M. S. RAJAN

New Delhi.

Times of India, 10.11.87.



Sudhir Dar, The Hindustan Times

AFFIDAVIT

THANGATHIRAVIAM wife of Shesuger Fernando (48) Old Market Road, Mathagal

I am the only child of my late mother Rasammah Rasadurai.

On 8.11.87 IPKF were advancing towards Mathagal when I with my children and late mother fled from our home for refuge at St. Thomas Church.

On the way a shell fell in proximity and exploded.

Shrapnels darting from the blast caused severe abdominal injuries where she fell. She succumbed to her injuries before a medical officer could be summoned.

Her dead body was buried in the compound of a relative closeby.

My mother was 65 year old and my father has already pre-deceased her.



THIRUGNANASAMBANTHAR PARAMESWARAN (18), of 442 K.K.S. Road, Jaffna.

The deceased Kanagasabai Thirugnanasambanthar (64) is my father. He was a retired District Land Officer.

My father K. Thirugnanasambanthar left house at about 8.30 a.m. on 8.11.87 taking with him Rs. 3,000/- to buy certain items and settle some debts.

Almost immediately after my father left an explosion was heard followed by gun fire.

Following this incident curfew was declared in our residential area for an indefinite period. As such we could not go in search of him.

When the curfew was lifted a search was made and we traced my father's bicycle at Nachchimarkovilady.

On further inquiries it was revealed that my father had been shot dead by the IPKF on 8.11.87 on the K.K.S. Road, Jaffna; and that his dead body had been buried by the people of that area.

A gold chain, 2 gold rings, a wrist watch and cash to the value of Rs. 28,000/- were in the possession of my father at the time of his unfortunate death.

ANNAMALAR, wife of Sellathamby Thurairajah (83) Alaveddy South, Alaveddy.

I am the above-named affirmant and mother of the late Thurairajah Jeyarajah killed in shell blast on 9.11.87. He was unmarried.

On 9.11.87 at about 1.00 p.m. when my son was returning home on his push cycle after his usual coconut trade at Pandateruppu Market, a shell fell close to him on the road and exploded.

Shrapnels darting from the shell-blast struck him causing severe bleeding injuries on his chest, head and abdomen. He fell dead on the spot.

On receipt of the information regarding his death. I and my relatives ran to the scene, half a mile away, and found he was lying dead in a pool of blood and his bicycle was fallen on the road, badly damaged.

The dead body of my son was taken home and later cremated at the Alaveddy Crematorium at about 5.00 p.m. on 9.11.87.

My husband is a T.B. patient and is not an earning member of the family.

My late son was the family bread-winner.

He earned an average monthly income of Rs. 1000/-.



ANNAMMAH NALLIAH (54) Veladi, Kopay North, Kopay.

The deceased Murugesu Nalliah aged 58 years was my husband.

He was the principal of the Sravanabhavanander Vidyalaya Kopay at the time he met his tragic end.

Due to the October 1987 military offensive we left our residence and went to Madduvil for safety.

On 9.11.87 we returned to our residence.

On 10.11.87 at about 2 p.m. my husband left our house saying that he is going to his school which is about quarter mile distance from our house.

At about 3.15 p.m. I was informed that my husband was seriously injured during a shell blast.

I went to the place of incident on hearing the grave news.

He had many deep wounds on his body caused by the shell shrapnels.

He died a little later.

His cremation took place in a nearby field on 11.11.87.

I have a daughter Jeyagowri aged 25 years.

After my husband's demise we do not have any income.



APPUTHURAI PARARAJASINGHAM (63) Suthumalai Road, Thavadi, Kokuvil.

The deceased person Pararajasingham Yogarajah, aged 20 years was my son.

He was a vegetable vendor.

On 9.11.87 at about 6.00 a.m. my son left for Pandaterrippu in his bicycle saying that he is going there regarding his vegetable business.

At about 6.00 p.m. on the same day I was informed that my son was shot and killed by the army at Navaly at about 7.00 a.m.

On hearing the news I rushed to Navaly and found my son's body lying on the roadside with gunshot wounds.

I cremated the body on the same day itself at Navaly Cemetery.

My late son was our sole breadwinner as I am old and feeble and unable to work as before.



BUWANESWARY (51) widow of the late Sundaram Nadarajah, 253 Sangarapillai Road, Anaicoddai.

My late husband Sundaram Nadarajah was in business running an establishment at the house where the goods in trade were stocked.

Anaicoddai was subjected to military operation and shell attacks and tension prevailed in the area. On or about the 15th October 1987 I and my family including my late husband moved away from our home and took refuge in the Murugamoorthy Temple at Navaly.

My late husband occasionally visited our house to ensure against thefts of household effects and goods in trade.

On 9.11.87 my late husband Nadarajah while returning to the temple in the evening from our house was shot dead about 300 yards away from the house. He died on the spot.

My husband's body was removed from the place of the incident and placed on the verandah of a house closeby.

I received the information regarding my husband's death late in the evening but it was not possible for me to have visited the scene immediately.

I with my children visited my house at Anaicoddai in the morning on 10.11.87 where the corpse of my husband has already been brought and placed.

He received gunshot injuries on his back and on his legs near ankle.

The corpse of my late husband was cremated in an open land close to my house at about 10 a.m. on 10.11.88.

My husband was in receipt of an average income of Rs. 2000/- per mensum.



KANDIAH SIVALINGAM (42) Suthumalai West, Manipay

The deceased Sivalingam Sivarajeen (9) is my son. He was a student in grade 3 of Suthumalai Sinniyabara Vidyalayam, Manipay.

On 9.11.87 at about 6.30 a.m. when my son S. Sivarajeen was standing in our front compount a mortar shell fell close to him and exploded.

Fragments from the explosion caused multiple injuries on both legs of my son Sivarajeen.

Sivarajeen was immediately rushed to General Hospital, Jaffna and was admitted to ward 9 A.

Sivarajeen succumbed to his injuries a short while after his admission.

My daughter Sharmini (11) also sustained injuries in this incident.

Cremation of the dead body of my son Sivarajeen took place the same day evening at Kombayan Manel Crematorium.



PARARAJASINGHAM PUVANESWARY (52)
Sandilipay centre, Sandilipay.

I am a teacher.

My late husband Muthiah Pararajasingham aged 53 years was also a teacher at Sandilipay Mahavidyalayam.

On 9.11.87 at 8 a.m. shells fell on the Kalvalai Pillayar Temple at Sandilipay. 4 persons Sivagurul Gunaratnam, Sanmugavadivel and Thanaledchumy were injured. My late husband rushed them in Car Number EY 5573 to the Tellipallai Hospital.

At about 1.30 p.m. the same day my husband came back home in the same car and informed me that some patients who had to be removed to the Jaffna General Hospital from Tellipallai were in the Car and that they had obtained the necessary permit to proceed to Jaffna. He then left in Car.

My husband did not return home that night.

On 10.11.87 at 7 a.m. I was informed by Subramaniam of Kaddudai also a member of the staff of the Sandilipay Mahavidiyalayam that my husband and 5 others in the car had been shot dead at Navaly on 9.11.87 by the Indian Forces.

We proceeded to Navaly at 8 a.m. where I found the dead body of my husband along with those of K. Gunaratnam K. Thanaledhumy, K. Sriranganathan K. Valliammal and of the Driver K. Thanabalasingam.

All the six dead bodies were cremated at Navaly on 10.11.87.

I was informed by one Peter who is a teacher that on 9.11.87 when he was at the Navaly Church as a refugee he had seen a car passing by being fired at by Indian Troops and that when he went up to the car after the troops had left the area he had seen my husband and all others dead in the car.

I have a son aged 22 years and 3 daughters aged 21, 19 and 6 years. None of them are married.



PAKIANATHAN RITAMMAH (47) Atchuvely North, Atchuvely.

The deceased Thevasagayam Pakianathan, age 55 years was my husband.

The deceased was a businessman at the time of his death.

On 9.11.87 hearing army reprisals we took refuge inside the St. Antony's Church, Atchuvely.

After sometime I left the Church and returned to our home leaving my husband to help some people to bury a person killed by the army on the previous day.

Later someone came and told us that my husband was shot and killed by the army at Valai along with three other people.

I went to the spot and found my husband's dead body and removed it to our house with the help of some others.

His body was buried on 10.11.87.

I have two unmarried daughters;

We were depending on my husband's sole income for support.

Now we find it very difficult to support my family.



IYADURAI THANGATHURAI (36) Mullaiyady Veethy, Chankanai East, Pandateruppu.

The deceased Poopathy Veluppillai, aged 61 years a widow **was my** aunti. (Mother's sister).

She was living with me at the above address for the last twenty years since her husband's death under my care and protection.

Due to heavy shell fire during the military operation of the IPKF on 10.11.87, I sought refuge along with married sister and her children at Murugan Kovil leaving behind my aunt Mrs. V. Poopathy as she was sick and bed - ridden.

At about 11.00 a.m. when shell fire ceased I visited my house in order to remove my Aunti to the above Murugan temple where we sought refuge.

But to my dismay I found that she was dead due to the shell attack and I noticed a deep cut injury on her chest.

We cremated her dead body at Vilaveli Cemetery at 3.00 p.m. the same day.

My house too was badly damaged due to the above shell blast.



JOVAMPILLAI SEBASTIAMPILLAI (40)
Senthankulam, Illavalai.

I am a fisherman.

My wife, children and I were living in our house at the above said address.

Indian Peace Keeping Force at Kankesanturai moved towards our locality in heavy vehicles, gun carriers and jeeps on 10.11.87.

While moving they fired shells from the gun carriers on both sides of the roads.

Through fear, people living along the main road sides fled to safer places.

My father-in-law and his family too sought refuge at my house, which is quarter mile away from the main road.

A shell fired from the gun carrier fell on two houses away from our house and exploded.

On hearing this explosion, my family and my father-in-law's family started praying in our hall

While we were praying a shell pierced through the concrete wall and exploded in the hall.

Shrapnels from this explosion killed my wife S. Viveenamma age 30 years and my sister-in-law Ceysilta and injured my three children and mother-in-law.

The dead bodies of my wife and sister-in-law were buried the following morning at 10 a.m.

The injured persons were treated locally as continuous curfew was in force.

After burial, we sought refuge at Ilavalai.



NAGESWARY MOGANANATHAN (32) Vattu East, Sithankerny.

The deceased Thambirajah Mogananathan, aged 32 was my husband.

He was vegetable vendor.

On 10.11.87 my husband left home at about 9. a.m saying that he is going to Thavadi to sell vegetables.

Later I came to know that he was shot and injured by the army at Thavadi.

He was brought home by relatives.

He died on the same day.

His body was cremated at the Vattu East cemetery 11.11.87.

I have one son named Thanurasu aged 6 years.

My daughter Thathayini, aged 24 years died within fifteen days of my husband's death.

I do not have income or support

PONNIAH SIVAPATHALINGAM
9, Arasady Lane, Jaffna.

On 10.11.87 the IPKF going along Jaffna Manipay road entered my father's house and opened fire as a result my father living in the house NO. 821 Manipay road (Alady junction) received a gun shot and died. I was not able to go there on 10.11.87 as there was army movement on that day.

On the following day 11.11.87 I went there and found the house burnt and the dead body of my father partially burnt.

I am attaching the death certificate No. 1304 issued by the Registrar of deaths. Cause of death; Death due to gun shot injuries.

SINNATHANGAM, widow of the late Mr. Sinnathamby Ponniah, at Kalamparai, Kopay North, Kopay.

I have been living with my husband and children at the above address which is my own house and property.

At the time, the worse situation prevailed in Jaffna on and after the 10th of October 1987, there was tension and panic amongst the people of the area and in the suburbs, and all were fleeing away from their residences.

At the military operation's escalation to our area my husband Sinnathamby Ponniah, - aged 65 - was caught in a cross-fire, sustained injuries and succumbed to death on 12-11-1987.

My husband was the only bread-winner of my family and as a result of his death, we have now been driven into utter starvation; immense hardships, and are now displaced.



SINNATHAMBY NAGAMUTHU (52) Pothipulam Mathagal North.

The deceased Nagan Sinnathamby aged 56 years was my husband.

He was a Fisherman.

On 10.11.87 at about 9 a.m. my husband left our house for the nearby seashore for fishing.

At about 11 a.m. we heard a gunshot sound close to our house.

At about 12 noon I came to know that my husband was shot and killed by the army.

His body was found close to our house with gunshot wounds.

It was cremated at Pothipulam cemetery a few yards from our house on 11.11.87.

My children and I have been deprived of the maintenance and support we received from my husband.

We do not have any income and lost most of our belongings during the disturbances and undergoing untold hardships.

I pray for relief.



THILLAINATHAN RAJALUXUMI (37) Thavadi North, Kokuvil.

The deceased child Thillainathan Ushananthini, aged 14 years was my daughter.

She was a student at the Hindu Tamil Kalavan School, Thavadi.

On 10.11.87 at about 4.30 p.m. a shell fell on my house roof and exploded.

My daughter was injured in the blast.

She died on her way to the Hospital.

Her body was cremated by the Hospital Authorities.

I have four sons, my late daughter being the only female child.



VAITHI VALLI (67), a widow, Kesan, Urumpirai North, Urumpirai.

I am the wife of the late Kandan Vaithi (81).

At about 7 a.m. on 10.11.87 my late husband and I proceeded to our plot of land situated closeby.

At about 8 a.m. the same day IPKF personnel, who suddenly came into our plot opened fire at random.

I fell on the ground and feigned dead.

Immediately after the IPKF left I looked at my husband and found him dead with gun shot injuries on his chest.

The dead body of my husband was removed home and buried on 11.11.87 at the Urumpirai Colony Cremotarium as facilities for cremation were not available that day.

All my children are married and are living separately.

I have lost my husband and breadwinner and appeal for assistance.

When IPKF opened fire on 10.11.87 one Nadarasa who was in an adjoining plot of land was also killed.

Hundreds join hands against IPKF role

NEWS

From Our Staff Reporter

COIMBATORE, Nov.11.

People from different walks of life linked hands to form a human chain through the main streets of Coimbatore for a distance of about 10 km, starting and ending at Town Hall.

This was to protest against the military action of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka and the agitation was sponsored by the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam. Hundreds of party volunteers, advocates, traders, teachers and students formed the "human chain" in the middle of the road for 30 minutes.

They shouted slogans against the action by the IPKF against the LTTE and demanded withdrawal of IPKF. Messrs. M. Kannappan, district secretary of the DMK, A. Natarajan, MLA, M. Ramanathan,C.T. Dhandapani, and Era. Mohan,were among those who joined the human chain formation.The police diverted traffic at some places.

Students of many schools and colleges in and around Coimbatore today attended classes wearing black-edged cards condeming the IPKF action in Sri Lanka.

Reports of such protest were received from other towns throughout Tamil Nadu.

MADURAI: About 3,000 persons joined the demonstration on Alagarkovil Road from the Periyar statue at Tallukulam here and around the four Veli Streets.

The president of the Tamil Nadu Kamaraj Congress, Mr. P. Nedumaran, was among those who participated in the agitation. Mr. Muturamalingam, MLA and Mr. Vijayakanth, actor went in an open jeep along the route. A joint appeal by the Dravida Kazhagam leader, Mr. K. Veeramani and the Tamil Nadu Kamaraj Congress here today said that the Tamil Nadu Assembly should resolve that the Indian Peace Keeping Force should stop the wars with LTTE and start negotiations. This appeal was made to all MLAs.

The appeal referred to Sri Lanka President, Mr.Jayewardene's threatening statements about interim government and banning of LTTE.

VELLORE: Hundreds of volunteers, mostly DK and DMK workers, participated in a human-chain demonstration in Vellore and its outskirts on Wednesday.

Though the chain was not continuous, the demonstrators formed human chains at several stretches on the 10-km route from Thorappadi to Sathuvachari. They raised slogans demanding a cease fire by the IPKF in Sri Lakna. The agitation did not hinder traffic.

KANCHEEPURAM: The response to the call given by the DMK and its allies in the district headquarters for the "human chain" protest against the IPKF action in Sri Lanka was poor in Kancheepuram. Less than 1000 participated in human chains formed in the middle of roads at three different areas — the longest was from the municipal office to the bus stand, in which 500 participated.

Two other smaller chains were formed at Gandhi Road from the temple car stand to the Javulikadai Chatram and from Sankara Mutt to Kumarakottam. After shouting slogans for 30 minutes they dispersed.



Certainly, INDIA TODAY was eyewitness to one incident when Mi-24 helicopter gunships bombed and strafed the town of Chavakacheri, 32 km east of Jaffna and 20 civilians were killed. The Indian Government first denied that helicopter gunships were being used in an offensive operational role. Once it became clear that the eyewitness reports would appear in the Indian press, they finally admitted that the incident had taken place but still claim that it is the only one of its kind. They also claimed that only an "isolated building" where suspected Tigers were hiding had been shelled. INDIA TODAY was witness to the fact that shells had landed in the main marketplace and the main bus-stand where large numbers of civilians had gathered.

The Tigers, in their propaganda war from Jaffna, claimed that over 200 civilians have been killed by the IPKF and numerous buildings, including the Jaffna Hospital, destroyed. The Catholic Church in Jaffna has put the number of civilian deaths at 100. Some western journalists who entered Jaffna after the battle started, have returned with horror stories of IPKF troops going berserk after their comrades were killed and accused them of shooting innocent people and of raping Tamil women. The Tigers refer to the IPKF as the Innocent People Killing Force.

The Globe and Mail

REPORT BRYAN JOHNSON

Jaffna coverage refutes war tale

The dead Indian soldier, his helmet lying in a crimson pool, gazes sightless from every newsstand in this country. And the full-color photo in India Today magazine competes for shelf space with a half-dozen other cover stories on the same grisly subject.

The war in Sri Lanka may not yet be India's Vietnam, but the impact on the home front is eerily similar to the United States in the late 1960s.

Few Indian readers - of the vast Englsih-language press or its even larger counterpart in regional tongues - can ignore the lurid, detailed accounts of the Jaffna fighting. Much of the coverage is slavishly pro-government and jingoistic, but a few brilliant exceptions match the best war journalism produced anywhere.

When the village of Chavakacheri was strafed by Indian gunships two weeks ago, New Delhi blithely maintained that its "deep concern for civilians" prevented any such use of airpower. The bureaucrats didn't reckon with a courageous Calcutta reporter, who endured the attack and splashed it across the front pages of The Telegraph.

After a day of denials, the military finally conceded its helicopters had blasted the village with rockets. But it was billed as a surprise attack on a Tamil Tiger base camp, with devastating effect on militants and no harm to civilians.

Wrong again. The Indian journalist had seen two dozen men, women and children killed in the assault. And an India Today photographer captured that and other grotesque tableaux in a spectacular photo spread.

In one shot, a grinning Tiger guerrilla stands among six bullet-riddled Indian corpses, waving happily to readers on the subcontinent. Another photo shows 13 bodies of dead Chavakacheri civilians, lined up on a sidewalk, beside their grieving relatives.

Equally powerful is the laconic description that photogrpapher Shyam Tekwani penned to accompany the layout. He describes the Tigers' "pulling out chocolate from the shirt pocket of a bloody corpse and passing it around while idly kicking at the remains of a human brain."

Mr. Tekwani — unlike Western reporters in Jaffna — was not on an Indian-guided daytrip to the battle zone. And his reports contradict the standard press picture of a dispirited Tiger pump, barely hanging on against the world's fourth largest army.

The Tigers' "confidence and exuberance... are remarkable," he noted. "In the middle of all-out war, it appears unreal to hear them laughing and jabbering away like the kids they are... Like a group of boys playing cops and robbers" with real bullets.

On the key point of mainstream Tamil support for the guerrillas, the photographer is unequivocal: "There is no mistaking the complete identification of the Jaffna civilians with the (Tiger) fighters."

That claim is contradicted daily in most Indian newspapers, which echo their government's version of events on Sri Lanka's northern peninsula. The Hindu, for instance, repeatedly informs its readers of the "lack of popular support" and "pressure of public opinion" which have brought the 2,500 man Tiger army to a "collapse of organised resistance.

The newspaper, a Madras-based national daily with a large readership among India's own Tamils, has suddenly turned turtle in its coverage of the conflict. The paper had unparalleled access to the Tigers during the four years they were backed by India, and it produced numerous on-the-spot exclusives.

Now that the Tigers are villains, The Hindu reports on Jaffna public opinion from New Delhi — based on daily briefings at the foreign ministry.

But even the most blatant attempts to blacken the guerrillas can be illuminating. Only Indian reporters have access to the wounded soldiers recuperating here. And their accounts of the "shameless" Tiger use of women and children is unwitting testimony to the extraordinary depth of civilian commitment.

"Women and children, too, fired at us," one astonished Indian soldier told a local magazine. "Even 8-year-old children and pregnant women are armed."

LTTE shells hospital

DELHI, Oct. 23

The IPKF did not return the fire as it wanted to avoid damage and casualties. After the hospital was captured, the LTTE sent radio messages calling for heavy mortar fire around the boundary wall of the hospital. The spokesperson did not give casualty figures but said the IPKF doctors were attending to the sick and wounded in the hospital.

NEW DELHI, Oct. 29.

For the first time, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) has strafed two locations in Chavakacheri town, a LTTE stronghold east of Jaffna, which it later captured, according to an official report here today.

Some 27 bodies of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) militants were found in the area.

THE HINDU

Co-ordinating Committee of
Citizens' Committees of the
Northern and Eastern Provinces
Y.M.C.A. Building
Jaffna 9-11-1987

Hon. Rajiv Gandhi
The Prime Minister of India

Dear Revered Excellency,

This hour of extreme peril and eminent extermination of the Tamil people of Sri Lanka has come as the inevitable sequence to the military operation of the Indian Peace Keeping Force against LTTE. We wish to place before you the following facts for your kind consideration and immediate action.

There is no electricity nor lighting fuel, no exchange and flow of money owing to closure of all banks and all sections of the people are deprived of their monthly income and daily wages. The continued artillery shelling, interspersed aerial bombing and helicopter strafing has driven the whole population from their homes abandoning all their possessions. There are chaos and utter confusion among the entire people and they are in the grip of fear and apprehension, worst of all the people have no place or facilities to take even the gravely wounded for treatment as all hospitals remain closed.

Your excellency would have been appraised at the indefinite curfew imposed throughout the Jaffna peninsula from the 10th of last month by the Indian Peace Keeping Force. This operation against LTTE has brought to standstill all economic activities of the Tamil People of Jaffna and the entire population faces complete starvation and slow death. All transport has been paralysed cutting off supply lines of food commodities from Colombo and other places and distribution of existing stocks of food.

The Jaffna Government Hospital which has been catering day and night for all urgent cases from all parts of the Jaffna peninsula remains permanently under the IPKF control and there is no access whatsoever to this provincial hospital to the needy patients.

The Jaffna Hospital came under heavy fire from the IPKF on the Deepavali day, that is the 21st of October. It is with great regret and grave concern that we are forced to bring to your kind notice that on the attack made by the Peace Keeping Force 3 doctors, the Matron of the Hospital, 3 senior nurses, 2 overseers, the ambulance driver, the telephone operator, the lift operator, the store keeper and eleven minor employees and about 100 patients and their relations were shot dead. Following this attack, all the supervisory medical officers and all other staff have kept away from work out of fear. The whole hospital administration has collapsed and the hospital remains inaccessible to the public. All the doctors and staff of the hospital will give evidence if an impartial inquiry is held. The names of the hospital staff killed are as follows:

Medical Officers

1. Dr. A. Sivapathasundaram
   Paediatrician
2. Mr. M.J. Ganesharatnam
3. Dr. Parimelalagar

Matron

4. Mrs. Vadivelu

Nurses

5. Mrs. Leelawathi
6. Miss. M. Ramanathan
7. Miss. Sivapackiam

Ambulance Driver

8. Mr. V. Shanmugalingam

Telephone Operator

9. Mr. Kanagalingam

Overseers

10. Mr. K. Krishnarajah
11. Mr. K. Selvarajah

Minor Employees

12. Mr. R. Sukumar
13. Mr. Sivaloganathan
14. Mr. Marutharajah
15. Mr. John Peter
16. Mr. Markandu
17. Mr. Thurairajah
18. Mr. Sivarasa
19. Mr. Jeganathan
20. Mr. K. Vedaraniyam
21. Mr. R. Ratnarajah

The above are some of the grave hardships mercilessly imposed on an innocent peace loving people who have been looking forward to your Excellency's help for deliverence from the atrocities and gruesome killings by Sri Lankan armed forces. The entire population of Jaffna has reached the last minute of their power of evidence and we have recourse all into providence, if Your Excellency does not come to our rescue immediately.

We, therefore, appeal to your Excellency, to your sense of even justice, to your concern for the preservation of human rights and to your unfailing faith in the peaceful solutions of all problems to order an immediate ceasefire and employ more peaceful and suitable political measures to enforce the acceptance of the peace accord by LTTE and rendering their aims.

yours faithfuly,

President S. ARUNASALAM

Secy. S. SIVANANDARAJAH

Coordinating Committee of the Citizens Committees

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

THE HINDU

'Try diplomacy to bring LTTE round'

NEW DELHI Nov. 12

IN PARLIAMENT

Sharp critiques of the Government of India's handling of the Sri Lanka problem and a call for a political solution to it were the features of the second day's debate on the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement in the Rajya Sabha today. The most effective intervention was made by Lt. Gen (rtd.) J. S. Aurora (Akali Dal-B) who said that a call for the complete and unconditional surrender by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was wrong and would lead only to greater bitterness. Militarily it would be wrong to go in for a 'stop-go' type of operation and rather than a ceasefire, 'friends of the LTTE should undertake covert diplomacy to resolve the basis for a fresh modus operandi for disarmament.' The continuance of the current disarming operations by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) ought to be no bar to these negotiations. The Government of India ought to encourage such a policy and carry it out.

In his opening remarks the General, who had masterminded the Indian Army's most succesful war to liberate Bangladesh, said the Indo-Sri Lanka accord was desirable and is still desirable but even the best of intentions could go astray unless these were put into practice systematically and with an eye to detail. Obliquely referring to Punjab, the General argued that the accord had been arrived at without sufficient preparation or an understanding of the possible consequences.

Blame Govt., not army: He characterised the Indian Army as a 'disciplined and gallant' force which functioned wholly professionally. It was the best integrated body in the country and the 'steel frame' for the integrity of the country. However, sometimes it was made to carry out tasks which were not properly studied and appreciated. In the Jaffna operation, such circumstances had led to it being caught 'flat-footed' initially and the operation lost momemtum and the IPKF took heavy casualties. He said civilian casualties were inevitable in an operation like this and such a situation caused enormous anguish to the soldiers concerned. It was wrong to say that the army was wilfully killing civilians. 'If you must blame anyone, blame the Government of India's bumbling policy,' he added.

He called on the Government to carefully examine the future options and realise that India's friends in Sri Lanka would always be the Tamils. So nothing should be done which would cause a divide and defeat the purpose of the accord. He agreed that the task would be difficult and the consequences heavy. 'We had failed to carry the militants with us initially and for this we have paid dearly. We have involved the Indian Army in a no-win situation thoughtlessly.'

Policy in tatters, says Jaswant Singh: Another telling criticism was made by Mr. Jaswant Singh (BJP), a former army officer. He said the "bungling of the Indian Government's policy in Sri Lanka" had landed the country in a very serious, adverse security situation. The issue was not the LTTE but the Indian Government's Sri Lanka policy. 'We find it in tatters and we are unable to recognise its contours,' he said.

Mr. Jaswant Singh strongly criticised the Prime Minister's contention that only the Opposition and Pakistan opposed the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement and said Mr. Rajiv Gandhi had forgotten the Sri Lankan Prime Minister, the militant groups and even the TULF on this score. The Government had failed on all three counts of protecting the Tamil aspirations, restoring peace and amity in the island and protecting India's security concerns. The Indian army had been involved in a situation where it had to resolve the Government's gross political errors.

Disquieting aftermath: Another nuance of the critique was heard from Mr. Valumpuri John (AIADMK) who said that the right and wrongs were not currently the issue but a ceasefire. He said his party was for the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement and still stood by it but the aftermath had raised some disquieting issues. For example, while disarming the LTTE was part of the agreement, the only guarantees the militants got for their security were verbal. He wondered how even such guarantees could work in circumstances where the Prime Minister of India had been attacked in Colombo after signing the agreement. The Sri Lankan Government, he argued, had no intention of putting the agreement into practice. The situation had 'created a great strain in our sense of belonging to India.'

The AIADMK member said that while his party fully supported the steps under the agreement, they did not like to be placed in the 'precarious' position with regard to their sense of belonging to the country.

Stop bloodshed: Mr. Chaturanan Misra (CPI), speaking, in home-spun Hindi, said that the Government of India had been caught in a quagmire in Sri Lanka. However, now that the LTTE had been shattered, this was the time to talk to it. Since the main issues with regard to India's security concerns too had been realised, he called on the Government not to make the operations against the LTTE a prestige issue and take steps to halt immediately the bloodshed.

'More dangerous than Punjab'

PTI, UNI report :

Mr. Jaswant Singh said Tamil Nadu had been plunged into "political turmoil" because of the happenings in the island across the Palk Strait. Sri Lanka had become a "graveyard" of Tamil aspirations and Tamil citizens.

Although he did not agree with certain observations of Mr. Gopalasamy (DMK) yesterday, Mr. Jaswant Singh said the DMK member's warning that "seeds of disintegration" had been sown should not be taken lightly.

After Punjab, Tamil Nadu had become the second State to "revile" against the Indian army. This is a very dangerous situation, he warned.

Mr. Jaswant Singh underlined the need for a closer scrutiny of India's foreign policy vis-a-vis Sri Lanka in the light of what he called the failure of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. "An effectiveness of a polity is to what extent the policy has been able to achieve on the ground," he said.

The BJP member said the worsening situation in the island nation would force the superpowers to make their presence felt in the region and pose a threat to India.

Mr. Ramamurthy (Cong.-I) said that India was con-

Mario, The Week, 22.11.87.

cerned with the well-being of all the Tamils in Sri Lanka and not just of any particular group.

Resuming his speech on the short duration discussion on the situation in Sri Lanka raised by Mr. V. Gopalasamy in the House yesterday, Mr. Narayanaswamy (Cong.-I) said the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was not only fighting the other groups of Tamils in the island but was confronting the Indian Peace Keeping Force. It had gone back on the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement.

Mr. Valampuri John said disarming the LTTE would take away its only bargaining power. The Tamils had struggled for 30 years and the gun was their last resort. It not only weakened the LTTE, but also strengthened Mr. Jayewardene's hands.

Mr. Thangabalu (Cong.-I) described the peace agreement as unprecedented. The present problems arose because the LTTE was not interested in democratic rule. The agreement was signed only after the LTTE and its leader, Mr. Prabakaran had agreed to it.

Ask for interim council: Mr. Thangabalu said the LTTE was now fighting the IPKF in a "shameful manner". It earlier ruled Jaffna forcibly before the city was liberated by the IPKF. He urged the Indian Government to influence the Sri Lankan Government to immediately announce the interim council for the Northern and Eastern provinces.

"India in a mess': Mr. M. S. Gurupadaswamy (Janata) said the Indo-Sri Lankan accord was dead and had landed India" virtually in a mess." He wondered whether the agreement was timely and that it should have been tripartite involving the Tamils in Sri Lanka.

The concurrence of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, especially the LTTE, was essential. It was not clear whether all Tamil groups had been consulted by the Indian Government before signing the accord.

The Janata leader said the basic mistake of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement was that it was signed in a hurry and as a result, India was interfering militarily in Sri Lanka. "We are playing a diabolically reverse role," and the IPKF was now doing what the Sri Lankan army was doing earlier.

Call for realistic approach: He said the Indian Government should adopt a realistic approach and shed the dangerous illusion that the Sri Lankan issue could be resolved militarily for this would mean "peace only over dead bodies of Tamils."

'Petty regionalism': Mr. Anand Sharma and Mr. Kapil Verma of the Cong. (I) charged the Opposition with not viewing the IPKF operation in Jaffna with the national perception but with "petty regionalism". Mr. Sharma said it was wrong to term the operations as battle, saying it was just the disarming process.

Mr. J. P. Goyal of the Lok Dal wondered how the IPKF had changed its role to one of offensive against the very people it had gone to protect. The accord was not valid as the LTTE and some other militants were not a party to it.

Mr. S. P. Malaviya (Lok Dal) said India should have remained an arbitrator, without becoming a party, by signing the accord to solve the ethnic issue. The main purpose of sending the IPKF to Sri Lanka — to maintain peace — was not being achieved but getting more and more complicated.

Mr. Chitta Basu (FB) criticised the shifting stands of Mr. Jayewardene.

Minister's reply today: The debate concluded today, but Mr. Natwar Singh, Minister of State for External Affairs will give his reply tomorrow. — UNI PTI

LTTE to blame: Minister

The Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. Natwar Singh, today blamed the LTTE's shifting attitude for landing India in the present situation in Sri Lanka.

"I am profoundly and deeply sorry that the attitude of LTTE and its leadership had altered so drastrically in the last few weeks that we have landed in this situation", Mr. Singh said in a brief intervention in the Rajya Sabha discussion.

CIVILIANS □ KILLED (Operation Pawan)

Rasammah 6.11.87

Mrs.Ratnam 7.11.87

Santhi 7.11.87.

N. Iyam Pillai 8.11.87

G. Subbiah 8.11.87

S. Thambi Iyah 8.11.87

K.T. Sambandar 8.11.87

A. Ratnam 9.11.87

Sivalogarathan 10.11.87

S. Subramaniam 10.11.87

A. Padhmanathan 11.11.87

Mrs. Parameswari 11.11.87

I. Yogeswaran 11.11.87

D. Gurusami 12.11.87

V. Malini 12.11.87

N. Paramanathan 12.11.87

P. Rasiah 12.11.87

R. Selvarani 12.11.87

THE STATESMAN

COMMENT

MISADVENTURE IN LANKA

But India Cannot Back Out Now

COMPARING New Delhi's propensity to sign accords with Muhammed-bin-Tughlaq's misdeeds, Wing Commander Amar Zutshi says that Parliament should "institute some Constitutional safeguards to prevent such misadventures in future". He also wonders how sincere the Sri Lankan Government is about implementing the accord, given the reports of Sinhalese being settled in the eastern parts of the island and the disinclination to hold elections or set up provincial councils in the Tamil areas till normal conditions have been restored. Also suspicious of U.S. intentions, Wing Commander Zutshi believes that having been involved in the war, India will have to complete its task no matter how high the cost.

AMAR ZUTSHI

12.11.87

TWO months before the Sri Lankan accord was signed on July 29 the Washington-based Heritage Foundation had presented a special paper on the Sri Lankan problem to the U.S. State Department suggesting joint Indo-Sri Lankan naval patrolling of the Palk Straits to check militant traffic, as well as Indian mediation to settle the island's ethnic strife On the face of it, this sounded too good to be true from the Indian point of view. But analysts familiar with nosy U.S. manoeuvres sensed a catch somewhere.

The developments ever since the accord became a reality seem to indicate that the U.S. policy makers perhaps saw India's Vietnam in the making in the Sri Lankan situation. How else is one to sum up the U.S. applause of the accord which actually threatens the future of the vital U.S naval facilities at Trincomalee and that of the nearby Voice of America complex, Colombo having virtually surrendered its sovereignty over the latter to the USA in terms of the lease agreement?

How did New Delhi enter into an agreement with Colombo over a dispute the latter had with its own nationals? The die having been thus cast by the flawed terms of the accord the blaze was ignited by the perhaps calculated insistence of the hardliner, Mr Lalith Athulathmudali, who demanded his pound of flesh in the transfer of the 17 doomed LTTE prisoners from IPKF custody to the Government in Colombo. Thereafter, New Delhi was sucked into a situation not of its own choosing. It was not for nothing that another hardliner the Sri Lankan Prime Minister, Mr Ranasinghe Premadasa, gloated in Los Angeles on how the accord had "turned the protectors into hunters".

DISCORD

New Delhi's proclivity for designing such disingenuous accords has aggravated the country's problems. These will go down in history as accords for discord, reminiscent of the misdeeds of the legendary Tughlaq. The rout of the LTTE in Jaffna does not mean its annihilation. The battle may have been won but winning the war can be elusive. What the Sri Lanka Government could not do for four years, the Indian Government undertook to achieve in a tight schedule of weeks and that too without the consent of the Tamils. Despite New Delhi's reassuring claims, the situation in Sri Lanka has acquired dangerous dimensions that can spell disaster for India both in the military and diplomatic fields.

For the first time, Indian troops have been placed under the control of a foreign Government on foreign soil. At the time of writing more than two divisions of troops backed by tanks, APCs, field guns and commandos are waging a war. Besides other small boats, there are at least two Leander class Indian frigates in the Palk Straits. The IAF's transport fleet is running countless shuttles to and within the island State in support of the ground forces. Official claims notwithstanding, no less than 300 Indian officers and jawans have been killed and many more injured. The financial burden is equally high.

The military has again been misused to salvage national interests and retrieve the Government's credibility which has been damaged by inept political handling. Whether in Amritsar or Jaffna, why use Indian troops to shed Indian or ethnic Indian blood? Why unnecessarily subject the fair image of the Indian jawan to criticism by a section of its own countrymen? Waging a war in built-up areas, townships and streets is an excruciating operation, most dreaded and hated by an infantryman.

Close Quarter Battle (CQB) in such areas is brutalizing as it involves the unavoidable loss of innocent civilian lives and property. Committing Indian troops to an undeclared war on foreign soil in so cavalier a fashion is too serious an issue to be decided by a besieged Government looking for success. Parliament should institute some Constitutional safeguards to prevent such misadventures in future.

Of the various militants in Sri Lanka the LTTE is the most highly trained and battle-conditioned, besides being a strongly motivated and heavily armed guerrilla group. Public memory is short, but let us not forget how Sri Lankan Tamils have been oppressed, hounded and discriminated against by their own Government in yet another manifestation of apartheid Because the LTTE guerrillas staked their lives to defend the Tamil minority, they are emotionally identified as the saviours. No wonder the IPKF war has antagonized the island's Tamils whom it was meant to protect.

If the concept of guerrilla warfare is any guide the journey to Jaffna is going to be a long and perilous one. It does not behove the mighty Indian State to bring down to its knees a small militant group sparing not even aerial strikes to silence them Both New Delhi and Colombo should recognize that to make a success of the accord, they will ultimately have to make peace with the LTTE. The IPKF should never again commit the mistake of handing over any LTTE prisoners to Colombo which has announced a million rupees for the head of its supremo, Mr V. Pirabhakaran, and his close deputies.

India would do well to tell President Jayewardene that whatever be his domestic compulsions such pronouncements as withdrawal of amnesty to the militants or the dropping of the jinxed interim administrative councils or the postponement of the provincial council elections till the restoration of normalcy has further undermined his credibility in the eyes of the Tamil minority. There should be no attempt to renege on the terms of the accord if

you want to bring the dissidents back into the political process.

Equally alarming are the persistent reports that Colombo is busy settling Sinhalese in the east to tilt the balance against the merger of the Eastern and Northern provinces with the latter's Tamil majority. In this context, President Jayewardene's recent suggestion for signing a fresh treaty in terms of the annexure to the Indo-Sri Lankan accord sounds intriguing. The statement says that Sri Lanka has agreed to ensure that the Trincomalee port "will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interest". As for the Voice of America, President Jayewardene says that it should be used "solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military intelligence". But the two activities cannot be isolated. Perhaps under domestic and foreign pressure, the intention is to dilute the solemn undertaking for putting an end to the foreign military use of Trincomalee port as well as of all foreign broadcasting facilities in the island. Quite rightly, the idea has not found favour with New Delhi. To safeguard their mutual interests the two countries should enter into a long-term treaty of peace and friendship.

ACCORD

There is no dearth of people in Sri Lanka who are opposed to the accord. Will the IPKF have to discipline them as well to save it? However, such elements should realize that the only way to bring peace and harmony to the island is to meet the rightful demands of the Tamil minority. Other detractors of the accord would do well to remember that by now Indian involvement in Sri Lanka is so deep and complete that nothing can deter India from implementing the accord, no matter how high the cost or what hurdles come in the way.

The Indian objective is limited to ensuring a prosperous, unified, peaceful, democratic and friendly Sri Lanka that recognizes India's primacy in the region and does not act in any manner affecting our security interests. An amateurish handling of the situation by our political leadership has landed us in a mess for which the nation is paying a heavy price. But national honour demands that we now resolutely stand by the commitments made by the Prime Minister, no matter how onerous the task. There is no getting away from it. The stakes are too high. Issues of regional stability are involved.

LETTER

14.11.87.

IPKF TOLL

Sir,—In "Justifying IPKF Casualties (November 2-3), N. R. Batra has highlighted a matter of serious concern—the mounting Indian casualties in Sri Lanka. The cavalier manner in which troops are committed in dubious adventures by political leaders casts doubts on their capacity to understand the role and employment of the Army as well as their motivation.

Mr Rajiv Gandhi to refurbish his fading image, has involved the Army in a "No-win" situation in Sri Lanka The Army is now called upon to kill the same Tamils whom until yesterday, we were training and equipping. Whether it was an American ploy or Mr Jayewardene's manoeuvre is of little consequence; the fact is that from the military point of view, the number of army casualties is unacceptable.—Yours etc., J. S. BINDRA (Lt-Col, Retd).

New Delhi, November 7.

Sir,—It is evident that our brave officers and jawans were pushed into the Sri Lanka battlefield with their hands tied behind their backs No air cover was provided to our commandos when they were dropped by helicopter nor reinforcements sent immediately to the besieged soldiers. It is apparent that no thought was given to all these eventualities by commanders in the field hence the heavy casualties sustained by our officers and jawans.

Will the AG's branch of Army Headquarters conduct a Court of Enquiry and let the public know who is responsible for the loss of so many precious lives.

I who took part in World War II, the Kashmir operations after partition and the Hyderabad police action, have never seen such a heavy loss due to faulty tactics adopted by our Field Commanders. This must be probed.—Yours etc., K. KUMAR.

New Delhi, November 8.

Sudhir Dar, Hindustan Times, 8.11.87.



"Good work, Referee .... keep him on the run!"

AFFIDAVIT

I, PONNAMPALAM LOGENDRAN, Aged 22 years, of THENIYAMBAI, VALVETTITURAI, SRI LANKA being a Hindu do hereby solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm as follows :-

(1) That I am the affirmant above-named holding national identity card No : 663391224-V.

(2) That the Indian Peace Keeping Force (I.P.K.F.) assumed control over our Valvettiturai area from 6th Nov. 1987 without any resistance whatsoever and continues to be in peaceful possession since then.

(3) That, on 16-11-1987 at about 12.30 p.m. I paid a visit to my friends (former collegemates) Messrs. VAITHEESWARAN JEGATHEESWARAN and NADARAJAH PREMANATHAN both of KAMBARMALAI, VALVETTITURAI.



(4) That, when I was with them at Kambarmalai, round about 1.00 p.m., the members of the I.P.K.F. came to Kambarmalai Junction and made an announcement over a loud-speaker to the effect that they were going to issue free rice, wheat flour and dry fish then and there. Owing to the fact, that, a continuous curfew was in force in the Jaffna Peninsula for ever one month there had been an acute shortage for all essential food items. Hence, in response to the announcement the local people of that area, who were virtually under starvation, rushed to the spot. Very soon there was a considerably large crowd of people. Then the I.P.K.F. started issuing a small quantity of rice and flour to the crowd.

(5) That, to our surprise, all of a sudden all the people there were rounded up by the I.P.K.F. Later they selectively arrested seven youths including the above-said friends and myself. Other detenues are by the names of :
PARMASAMY PARAMANATHAN, SIVASUBRAMANIAM SIVANATHAN, SRISKANTHA RAJAH VATHANARAJAH and MUNUSAMY BABURAJ. Soon after we were all brought to Valvettiturai.

(6) That, I was kept behind bars at a temporary camp functioning at the house named "EESWARI VASA", Valvettiturai along with V. JEGATHEESWARAN and N, PREMANATHAN. We were not provided with any meals for 2 days. Exceptionally on one occation one member of the I.P.K.F. personnel guarding us had shown magnanimity towards us by giving us some morsel of food around midnight and warned us not to ask the incident of the supply of meal as he was under strict orders not to provide any meal to us. But we underwent intermittent tortures of various forms. We were manhandled with hands, legs, clubs and especially with wooden slaps.

(7) That, on 18-11-1987 we were taken to the house of Dr. BALAKRISHNAN the Ex. District Medical Officer, Valvettiturai which was one of the several houses forcibly occupied by the I.P.K.F. and was functioning as the main camp cum residence of the area Commander at that time and kept just in front of "Kalanithy stores" with our hands tied together.

(8) That, a short while later, M. BABURAJAH and S.SIVANANTHAN were brought to the same spot from Valvettiturai Junction. Later S. VATHANARAJAH was brought by some other soldiers from the opposite direction. We were ordered to get into "ELF" Mini van which was parked there. Then the corpse of P. PARAMANATHAN was brought by some military personnel along the road by which S. VATHANARAJAH was brought and loaded in the same van.

(9) That, we had been brought to Vallai Velli (a vast open space which is the border of Vadamarachy and the rest of the Jaffna Peninsula) in the same vehicle. As the van was proceeding more number of members of the I.P.K.F. joined us on foot on route. At the terminal end over a hundred-I.P.K.F. Officials had assembled.

(10) That, the mini van in which we were taken was parked by the side of the main road. Later some of the soldiers dug a grave and took the corpse of Paramananthan and buried the same there. As the scene of incident was within a short distance from the said van, we were able to have a clear view of what was taking place.

(11) That, thereafter all the remaining six including myself were taken to the adjacent sector. Our hands were untied and instead we were asked to keep our legs apart at a distance of about two feet and tied up with the same rope so that we could respond to their further order of digging in six more graves. The Officer who was in command at that spot appeared to be a Hindi speaking gentleman.

(12) That, then Munusamy Baburaj (one of the remaining six) was ordered to lie down in one of the graves with the hands and legs straight and face upwards. Then the commander ordered a particular officer to shoot him. While he made attempts to do

so, we all got panicked and started raising a hue and cries. We begged of them not to kill that innocent youngster. Furthermore Premanathan intimated them the fact, that, Baburaj was an Indian by birth. But all our requests fell on deaf ears. Baburaj was shot at thrice and killed whilst in the grave.

13) That, thereafter we were all ordered to stand near each one of the graves dug by us. Then we were interrogated by the I.P.K.F. personnel at gun points with the assistance of one Tamil soldier by the name Ramachandran who conducted the translation. Pressure and even physical torture were exerted on us to make us admit that we had contacts with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. (L.T.T.E.). Furthermore we were forced to reveal informations with regard to the whereabouts of Tigers, their arms and ammunitions. As repeated attempts were made to shoot us, we started screaming fearing imminent death.

(14) That, then the officer in command informed us that he was kind enough to extend our life span for twentyfour hours and that if we failed to come out with the relevant facts within our knowledge before the ultimatum we would be brought to the very same spot, killed and buried.

(15) That, then we are brought back to Valvettiturai again and kept together in confinement at an upstair building situated at Valvettiturai junction named "Mahendra Vilas". We learned the following facts from Mr. S. Vathanarajah :-

(A) He was previously detained at "Balasunthara Bhavanam" located at Theniyambai, Valvettiturai along with Mr. P. Paramanathan, the deceased.

(B) The torture meted out to them was very severe. They were even hung with the head down and mercilessly handled.

(C) The said Paramanathan succumbed to the injuries he sustained in front of his eyes.

(D) One young Tamil I.P.K.F. personnel named Anilkumar played a very vital role in torturing both of them. He went to the extent of burning the genital organ with a piece of detonator.

(16) That, all the remaining five had relatively lesser agony afterwards. I will be certainly failing in my duties if I fail to mention that one Mr. armed personnel from Tamil Nadu was gracious enough to sympathise with us and consoled us with soothy words whenever we were undergoing hardships.

(17) That we all were transferred to the Kankesanturai detention camp on 22-11-1987 where our parents were permitted to visit us.

(18) That, as a result of the various steps taken by my father I was enlarged on parole on 12-12-1987 together with N. Premanathan. V. Jegatheeswaran was released two days later. S. Sivananthan too was freed. But S. Vathanarajah is still languishing in the I.P.K.F. cell at Kankesanturai. We were asked to come and report at the I.P.K.F. main camp at Valvettiturai for a few days.

(19) That, we all were given an official letter by Major, M.S. SUNDU, of 4th unit, the Parachute Regiment who was in overall charge of Valvettiturai, Udupiddy and Thondamanaru areas then, where he had made mention about our apprehension and the subsequent release. The condition of reporting at the I.P.K.F. was dispensed with later.

(20) That, I am constrained to divulge that the impact of the torture and horror perpetrated on me and others in my presence still keeps me in an unbalanced mental disposition and psychological fear. In addition I still have physical pains. P. Logendran

Read over and admitted correct and signed by the deponent at VALVETTITURAI on this 28th day of February, 1988.

Before me,

S. Thenthalamthaeiyar
The Justice of the Peace.

PASS

Shri. P. LOGENDRAN, son of Shri. Ponnambalam, resident of village Theniambai., P.O., Valvettiturai was apprehended by this unit and released after interrogation.

He may not be apprehended again unless circumstances demand. This Unit may please be informed in case of his apprehension.

G.S.SUNDU
Maj.

AFFIDAVIT

I, KRISHNAPILLAI SRISKANTHARAJA, Age 50 years, Labourer, of BHARATHY VEETHY, KAMBARMALAI, VALVETTITURAI, SRI LANKA, being a Hindu do hereby solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm as follows :-

(1) That, I am the declarant herein holding National Identity Card No :- 381170144-V

(2) That, I am employed as a labourer under a private building contractor.

(3) That, the details of the other members of my family are as follows :-

(A) Rajeswarai	- wife	42 years-house-wife
(B) Vasanthini	- daughter	22 years-unemployed
(C) Vathanarajan	- son	19 years-Student
(D) Vasini	- daughter	18 years Student
(E) Sivasini	- daughter	12 years Student

(4) That, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (I.P.K.F.) arrived here in SRI LANKA on or about the 29th day of July 1987. They brought our Valvettiturai area under their control as from 06.11.1987 without any resistance whatsoever and continue to be in undisturbed and uninterrupted control over us since then.

(5) That, on 16th Nov.1987 round about 1.p.m. some officials of the I.P.K.F. paid a visit at our hamlet-Kambarmalai and made an announcement over the loud-speaker to the effect that they were going to issue free rice, wheat flour, dryfish etc. then and there. Most of the people of our area being either peasants or labourers who are leading a hand to mouth life. As, at that time, the curfew was in force in our area for over one month without any break, there had been a virtual impoverishment and starvation. Furthermore there was an acute shortage for all essential commodities. Hence there was a good response to the announcement made. Soon after the announcement, there was a vast crowd of people at our junction. Then the I.P.K.F. started issuing a small quantity of rice and wheat flour.

6) That, to our surprise, all of a sudden, all the people there were rounded up by the I.P.K.F. Later they selectively arrested six youths by the names of V. Jegatheeswaran, N. Premanathan, S. Sivananthan, P. Paramanathan, N. Baburaj and P. Logendran.

7) Then, some of the I.P.K.F. personnel came to our house which is situated by the side of the junction and took our above-said son Vathanarajah into custody on mere suspicion while he was giving tuition to his younger sisters. My wife and daughters started screaming out of fear and excitement. My wife and self begged of them not to take him away by bringing the following facts to their attention:-

(a) he is the one and only son of mine.

(b) he is a keen and brilliant Advanced Level Student of Commerce at Neklliyadi M.M.V. Owing to the major military offensive launched by Sri Lanka armed forces in May, 1987 in the name of "OPERATION LIBERATION", he had to inevitably skip the A/L final examination held in 1987. He is now preparing for the same to be held in April, 1988.

(c) He is a law abiding citizen having no involvement in any violent or military activities whatsoever.

But all our pleadings fell on deaf ears. Our attempt to earn their sympathy by falling at their feet also proved to be fruitless. He was forcebly taken away.

(8) That, thereafter we took various steps to locate his whereabouts, but unsuccessfully. Only after a lapse of about one month we came to know from Messrs. V. Jegatheeswaran N. Premanathan, P. Logendran, and S. Sivananthan who were arrested along with him and released later on, that, my son was kept behind bars at the I.P.K.F. camp at Kankesanturai.

(9) That, after obtaining a pass from the Indian Civil Administrator attached to the Kachcheri, Jaffna, I proceeded to the said I.P.K.F camp at Kankesanturai. I was asked to come after 5 days. I was provided with the first opportunity of meeting my son on or around the 25th-Dec. 1987.

(10) That, upto now, we have been permitted to visit him about ten occasions. During my 1st visit I noticed partially healed wounds in his both wrists and ankles. I asked him asto how he sustained those injuries. He kept mum. He was seen to be subdued then. Subsequently I was told by him that these were all marks of torture. He further intimated that Mr. P. Paramanathan and himself were kept in confinement together at "Balasunthara Bhavanam", Valvettiturai and were mercilessly manhandled by the I.P.K.F. soon after their arrest. They were even hung with the head down and beaten. Mr. Paramanathan succumbed to the injuries he sustained in his immediate presence. Later on (on 18-11-1987) some of the I.P.K.F. personnel

took him and the other remaining five detenues to vallai open space along with the corpse of Paramanathan and buried the same there. Then they got them dig six graves, asked M. Baburaj to lie down in one of the graves and shot at and killed him in the presence of all other detenues. Thereafter they all were threatened to be killed.

(11) That, out of the seven youths apprehended at Kambarmalai on 16-11-87 two were silenced for ever by the I.P.K.F. Four others were freed. Hence only my son is still languishing behind bars. As he is now in receipt of the admission card to sit the A/L examinations in April, this year, I fear, that, his prolonged stay in the detention cell may jeoparadise the entirity of his future.

(12) That, I being the father of three young girls and one with a heavy financial responsibilities, am largely depending on my son, Vathanarajan and fervently hoping that he would share the brunt of my family burdens.

Read over the admitted correct
by the affirmant hereof
and signed by him in my
presence at Valvettiturai
on the 18th day of Feb., 1988.

Before me,

Before me,
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE

I, (MRS.) PECHCHIYAMMA MUNUSAMY, Age 52 years, of BHARATHY VEETHI, KAMBARMALAI, VALVETTITURAI, SRI LANKA, being a Hindu do hereby solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm as follows :-

(1) That I am affirmant above-named.

(2) That, I am an Indian by birth but became a citizen of Sri Lanka by registration. I married one Mr. Munusamy who was a citizen of India upto the time of his demise in 1983. About 14 years back we shifted our family from Sea street, Colombo to Kambarmalai and got settled down here.

3) That, we have nine children, out of whom the eldest three were married and settled elsewhere. Following are the children in my custody at present :-

(A)	Indiraghandi	daughter	25 years unemployed
(B)	Baburaj	son	24 years employed
(C)	Maheswari	daughter	21 years unemployed
(D)	Yogeswari	daughter	19 years student
(E)	Rathithevi	daughter	17 years student
(F)	Antony Raj	son	15 years student

(4) That, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (I.P.K.F.) assumed control over our area as from 06-11-1987 without any resistance and continued to be in peaceful position since then.

(5) That, on the 16th Nov. 1987, at about 1 p.m., the I.P.K.F. visited our hamlet, Kambarmalai and made an announcement over the loud - speaker, that, they are going to issue free rice, wheat flour, dry fish etc. Majority of my villagers are either peasants or labourers who are leading a hand to mouth life. As the curfew was in force for over one month without any break, there had been a virtual impoverishment and starvation then. Relatively the plight of our family was still worse. Hence there was a good responce to the announcement made. Soon after there was a vast crowd of people at our junction. I too rushed to that spot with my son, the said Baburaj.

(6) That, all of a sudden, to our surprise, all the people there were rounded up by the I.P.K.F. They started arresting a few youths selectively. My son Baburaj was also taken into custody along with six others by the names of P. Paramanathan, S. Vathanarajah, S. Sivananthan, N. Premananthan, V. Jegatheeswaran and P. Logendran. I was shocked, grieved and raised hue and cries. As our house is situated in the close proximity to the scene of incident my daughters too came and joined me in begging the I.P.K.F. officials not to take him away. But our requests fell on deaf ears.

(7) That, upto now, I am not provided with any opportunity to see my son. I have made several fruitless attempts to locate his whereabouts. I have repeatedly visited various I.P.K.F. camps. I am really driven from pillar to post.

(8) That, out of the six youths apprehended by the I.P.K.F. on 16-11-87 along with my son, four were freed after the lapse of one month. They are Messrs. N. Premananthan, P. Jegatheeswaran, S. Sivananthan and P. Logendran. They all were quite good and close to my family. In spite of this fact, they seem to avoid me after being released. One of the youths arrested by the I.P.K.F. by the name of S. Vathanarajah is

kept behind bars at Kankesanthurai. His parents came to know about his whereabouts through the above-said gentlemen and are paying visits now and then. I voluntarily went to the house of the said youths and made inquiries. To my disappointment, I was told that they were utterly clueless about my son and his whereabouts. As I was able to notice some sort of excitements in them I am compelled to think that they all are hiding some facts to me for fear of consequences.

(9) That, I am constrained to make mention about another relevant fact. As I was frequently visiting various I.P.K.F. camps in the Jaffna Peninsula in search of my son. I have come in to contact with certain armed personnel. On one occasion, an I.P.K.F. personnel attached to Manthikai camp, who is persumably a gurka, asked me with the assistance of another soldier who managed to speak broken tamil, as to why I was visiting that camp every now and then. I told everything to him in detail. He further asked me asto whether I am really an Indian. I said "Yes". He was seemed to be very much moved. He affectionately tapped on my head and told me "no point in coming here in search of your son. He won't come back. You better go and pray to God". I observe even tears in his eyes.

(10) That, anyhow major Multani of the Civil Service cell at Manthikai, Point Pedro, the civil administrative officer attached to the Kachcheri, Jaffna and other high ranged officers are still giving hopes to me, but without making any revelation about his whereabouts.

(11) That, my said son - Baburaj was the sole bread-winner of our family. Upto the time of his arrest we were exclusively depending on him for our subsistance. As he is not with us now, we are undergoing untold psychological, physical and financial strains. My youngest son, Antony Raj is a bright and studious student who usually comes first in his class. Due to the force of circumstances, I may be reluctantly compelled to put an end to his further studies. [illegible]

The contents of the forgoing affidavit having been duely read over and explained by me to the affirmant above-named who appears to understand the same and affixed her signature at Valvettiturai on this 28th day of Feb., 1988.

I, Miss. Vasanthaleela Sivaguru (age-30 years) of "Kottu Valavu", Valvetty, Valvettiturai, being a Hindu, do hereby declare and affirm as follows :

(1) That, I am the affirmant above-named.

(2) That, I am the member of the teachers' Staff of American Mission College, Udupiddy.

(3) That, I was residing at the above-mentioned address with my late mother, Mrs. Thangamma Sivaguru (age-67 years) and my elder sister Mrs. Varathaleela Selvendran both of whom are widows.

(4) That, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (I.P.K.F) assumed control over Valvettiturai area on 06.11.1987.

(5) That, the members of the I.P.K.F. started shelling on 16.11.1987 at about 8.15 p.m. without any apparent provocation whatsoever. They would have fired about 8 shells. Round about 8.30 p.m. our house was struck by two shells fired from the direction of Valvettiturai Junction in succession at a brief interval of five to eight minutes.

(6) That, as a consequence, my mother, the said Mrs. S. Thangamma sustained grievous injuries on her left chest and left arm caused by the sharpnels of the shell. As continous curfew was in force in our area for over one month my mother could not be taken to hospital or surgical treatments. As a result , she succumbed to the injuries on the following morning (i.e on 17.11.1987) at 4.45 a.m.

(7) That, owing to the dreadful situation prevailing in this part of Sri Lanka and owing to continuous curfew, Courts & Police Department were not functioning then. In addition, there is no District Medical Officer (D.M.O) in our Peripheral Hospital, Valvettiturai since 06.11.1987. Hence our endeavours to have magisterial inquest and post-mortem have been proved futile and we had a brief funeral on 17.11.1987 itself after lodging official complaints to the nearby A.G.A and to our Village Headman (G.S.).

(8) That, myself too received injuries by the splinters of the shell in the course of the explosions. As at present our hospital is functioning only for few hours in the day time, I was not hospitalised. I underwent treatment upto 21.11.1987 both at Valvettiturai Government Hospital and Point Pedro Base Hospital.

(9) That, my nephew Mas. Selvendran Pradeeban (age-4 years) also became a

target of the said same shelling. He sustained injuries on to his head and back. He accompanied me to both hospitals for treatments. His treatments are still in progress.

(10) That, our house, windows, kitchen, furniture, cloths and plantations got largely damaged by the said two shells.

Read over and admitted correct by the affirmant here of and signed at Valvetty on this 30th day of November, 1987.

I, Mrs. Pathmavathie Thurairajah of Theni, Valvettiturai, being a Hindu, do hereby solemnly, sincerely and truely declare and affirm as follows :

(1) That, I am the deponent above-named.

(2) That my late husband Mr. Thambirajah Thurairajah (age 56 years) was a landed proprietor cum cultivator. After 1983 communal disturbances, we have come to our home town, Valvettiturai, deserting our estate in Trincomalee District.

(3) That, the Indian Peace keeping Force (I.P.K.F.) assumed control over Valvettiturai area on 06.11.1987 and continued to be in possession without any resistance since then.

(4) That, on the 8th day of November, 1987, at 9.00 a.m. my husband left for the market to buy vegetables, as this permanent market building comes within the area declared by the I.P.K.F. as their Security Zone. The Valvettiturai market was not functioning, hence we have to go hither and thither in search of provisions and vegetables.

(5) That, at about 10.00 a.m. someone came and informed us that my husband was lying down at the Vembadi Junction after being shot at by the Members of the I.P.K.F. men who came marching in the opposite direction.

(6) That, I rushed to the scene of the incident with my relations and expied his body lying on the Southern edge of the road near Vembady Junction in a pool of blood. As I.P.K.F men were pointing their guns at us from their nearby sentry at American Mission School we brought his body home in a hand cart without any delay. As curfew was in force then, we could not make arrangements for either Magisterial Inquest or a post-mortem. His death was confirmed by a final year Medical Student who attended the funeral. The injuries sustained by my late husband were shown to me by Mr. S. Pasupathy a retired Supreme Court Registrar. The entry would was in his right chest, corresponding exit one was found by the side of his right back plate.

(7) That, taking the dreadful situation into consideration we had a hurried funeral at 1.00 p.m. on the same day itself.

(8) That, the detail of other members of our family are as follows :

1. T. Mukuntharajan	- son	- 25 years
2. T. Muraleetharan	- son	- 22 years
3. T. Varni	- daughter	- 19 years
4. T. Sharmini	- daughter	- 16 years

Owing to the untimely demise of my husband I have severe physical, psychological and financial strains and undergo untold hardships.

Read over and admitted correct by the affirmant who duly signed at Valvettiturai this 30th day of November, 1987



LETTER

Christian Community,
St. Joseph's Church,
Thannamunai
Batticaloa.
SRI LANKA.
17-11-1987

His Excellency Cardinal George
Basil Hume Oss
Arch Bishop's House
West Minister
LONDON SWIP IQJ

Your Excellency Rev. Minister,

An Appeal to take any steps to mediate for peace and settlement

On behalf of the entire Christian community and men of good-will, we appeal to the Christian organisations around the world to condemn all kinds of violence from any quarter it comes; especially the violence that prevails in our country (Sri Lanka). The Christian organisations have been always preaching peace and harmony, and consistently maintaining friendly relationship with all cross-sections of people.

The incident that caused the death of twenty or more soldiers from IPKF is very much regretted, and we express our sympathy to their kith and kin and to the mourners. At the same time, the behaviour of the IPKF men, that ensued this incident is abominable and not justified by any measure of justice, and needs to be condemned in the same if not with greater force of detestation.

We who are workers of the Roman Catholic and Methodist churches, received complaints from the victims who have been affected by the behaviour of the IPKF men after the incident on the 15th of October. The IPKF was acting in a manner that was unprecedented against the innocent civilians and against the holy place and its minister. As this group had totally or partially undergone this sad experience, we try to be as factual as possible. We have also gone to the refugee camps to gather the details and the extent of the havoc wrought by the IPKF.

Within an hour of the land-mine explosion, good many wagons of soldiers were near the site of the explosion. Then in groups, the IPKF went in different directions covering three adjoining villages viz; Thannamunai, Sathurukondan and Thannamunai colony as well as Sathurukondan colony taking pick-axe, mammoties, thick-poles, knives...etc along with their usual weapons. As they went they were out of control, and began their looting, setting the houses ablaze, molesting the women, raping as well as beating the people indiscriminately. They went house to house and thrilled to inflict all kinds of inhuman activities.

First as they went to the houses, they chased the inmates of the houses and began looting by forcefully opening the almyrahs, cabinets and travel bags. The complaints show that they were stealing golden ornaments, cash, wrist-watches, calculato s, bed alarm clocks .....etc.,

Secondly, they poured petrol or oil and set the houses ablaze, dig houses, cottages and cattle-sheds, or damaged furniture and set the clothes, in a pile and burnt them.

The mission house which was the parish for all the other churches in the north of Batticaloa with all its 150 years of records, parish money and boarding funds and house and personal goods and clothes of the parish priest were set on fire or looted, especially the cash donations received in foreign currency were either looted or burnt.
Thirdly, house-hold utensils and electrical goods like T. V., radio, cookers...etc were purposely damaged or broken.

Fourthly, the vehicles tractors, cars, motorcycles, bicycles were burnt.

Fifthly, the entire village was indiscriminately and mercilessly beaten and some were cut. Even a few months old babies and pregnant women, sick men and women were beaten in the same way.

One man was beaten to death and two others were assaulted and burnt alive. Innocent women and girls were molested and raped. Women who were consecrated were molested and beaten.

Such nefarious and inhuman activities were continued for three consecutive days, even when His Lordship has appealed to the commander-in-charge to keep the area where the consecrated women (Reverend Sisters) have a farm for training young girls.

It is to be observed that the IPKF from India is acting in a fashion that doesn't become its purpose. We appeal to men of all ranks of good-will to extend a friendly hand to our nation and help us out from the mire of troubles we have gone through.

Thanking You.

Yours in Christ.

.....

(Signed: A. Arulanandhan.)
For Christian Community.

PARISH PRIEST
ST. JOSEPH'S CATHOLIC CHURCH,
THANNAMUNAI.
Sri Lanka.

(Signed)
PARISH PRIEST
St. NICHOLA CHURCH
CHENKALADY
Sri Lanka

COMMENT

INDIA-SRI LANKA ACCORD

Unfolding Implications

AFTER nearly four long weeks of what has been termed as one of the bloodiest battles in the history of the Indian army, the IPKF is nowhere in sight of the end of the operation to 'ensure the cessation of hostilities' and the 'surrender of arms' by the militants in Jaffna. There is however, no doubt that the massive military manoeuvre is well on its way to wrecking the LTTE military network and organisation. On the other hand, even if the LTTE accounts of the IPKF atrocities are to be discounted, it would be hard to believe that the Indian army could have achieved much success against a group well-entrenched among the local population without large-scale operations involving civilians. It is not surprising that the peace keeping forces are widely reported to have also succeeded in turning the tide of Tamil opinion, which at one time may have viewed the Accord as a possible, even though limited, solution.

However, it is not so much the situation in Jaffna as that in the south which makes India's role in Sri Lanka more complex. According to some reports in the international press, LTTE's continued resistance is part of a plan to keep the security forces occupied in the north, while the Janata Vimukti Peramuna lets loose a spate of violence in the south. Whatever be the truth of all this, it may well be that India will be called upon to enlarge its specified role in Sri Lanka. Significantly, Jayewardene when asked about the possible deployment of Indian troops in the south, merely said "it is not specified in the Accord". The absence of a categorical statement as regards the extent and limit of the movement of Indian troops can only mean that the issue is still very much open.

Natwar Singh's statement in parliament is also rather curious. He has said that declaring a unilateral ceasefire would not be possible because it would damage the morale of the IPKF. Clearly the morale of an army can hardly be the only consideration in deciding to put an end to a war—not unless a crucial and long-term role is being envisaged for it.

In the circumstances the question of setting up a provincial government in the north and discussions on the devolution procedures are but of academic interest. Except of course insofar as the current exchange in the Sri Lankan parliament over the two bills on the issue gives some indication of the opposition to the Accord within and outside the government. As we go to press comes the news that the Sri Lanka minister for agriculture has resigned over differences with the government over the bills. He is the second MP and the first minister to have taken this step. Moreover, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party's opposition to the proposed constitutional amendement which would make possible the devolution of authority is of considerable significance in the context of the growing instability in the country. Even if the SLFP is not by itself capable at this point of toppling the government, it is quite possible that the people's protests that it has been organising will provide a cover, as has been alleged, for JVP's more militant anti-government activities. There have also been several reports of student protests against the Accord and the two bills. In other words, the threat to Jayewardene's government is very real.

It would appear that inevitably India has become committed to propping up Jayewardene. It is in this context that the recent announcement about the proposed Indo-Sri Lanka friendship and defence treaty must be viewed. Jayewardene has indicated his keenness for signing such a treaty and apparently a draft is under preperation. According to the president the treaty would be similar to the one that India has signed with the USSR and Bangladesh. India is reported to be cautious in its response and would prefer to wait until after the current situation in the country has been resolved. Interestingly, Jayewardene has emphasised that "the treaty will have nothing to do with what is happening in Jaffna". At the same time he has also said that the treaty would embody the letter and annexures of the Accord. Thus, it would appear that both the leaders have been well aware of the real nature and implications of the Accord, whatever be its public garb.

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

KANKESAN TURAI	
S. Thuraisamy	Anton Balamohan
S. Pushparajah	V. Kandiah
T. Babysingam	S. Maheswaran
Veerasingam	K. Sithamparanathan
Soman Chelvanayam	S. Ramachandran
KARAVEDDI	**Karuththan Valli**
K. Thillairajan	Victor Joseph
V. Tharmalingam	Nallathamby Rasiah
V. Rajagopal	*MYLIDDY*
K. Tharmabalan	T. Parameswarn
S. Rajakulendran	**M. Kanagaranee**
T. Sivakumaran	Sritharan
K. Thavaparan	Ravigandiah
K. Thaneswaran	Kovinthar
K. Vijayatharan	P.K. Sannathirathan
K. Kanthappu	N. Vijayakumaran
M. Subramaniam	M. Chandra Sekar
KODIKAMAM	Kanthan Sinnarasa
Yogarajah	P. Wigneswaran
Annammah	S. Arumainayagam
K. Murugan	P. Mahalingam
Sarojah	E. Pasupathy
Vallipillai	R. Parameswaran
Kandan Balan	M.E. Sylvester
Nathan	M. Panchardcharalingam
Pulendran	S. Jeyakumar
Vairavan Gurunathan	M. Anantharajah
MIRUSUVIL	V. Sivapalan
Rajendram Iyathurai	**V. Ponnammah**
Gugathasan	K. Sayanthar
Yogarajah	Vishnumohan
Ponnammah	A.E. Gnanachandran
Sinnathamby	K. Joseph Peter
Yogeswaran	Mylurasa

IN THE SRI LANKA

TIGERS' DEN

■ **Indian soldiers killed in Kokuvil encounter (left)**

■ **Portrait of a Tiger guerrilla (top)**

■ **Posters of LTTE martyrs in Chavakacheri**

INDIA TODAY'S SHYAM TEKWANI *was the only photographer present in the combat zone at the height of the battle for Jaffna. Having been taken into Jaffna, skirting the advancing* IPKF *columns, by the* LTTE, *Tekwani was witness to actual battle scenes and obtained a unique insight into the Tigers, their morale, weaponry and tactics. His photographs reproduced on these pages are the only authentic pictures from the battlefield. Below is his eyewitness account of the five days he spent in the Tiger's den.*

IN their shorts or lungis, with beardless faces and bare feet, they look anything but battle-hardened guerrillas who have taken on the might of the fourth largest army in the world. Many are barely in their teens, some are young women, none looks a day older than 30. Yet, the lethal weaponry they wield with such proficiency, the revolutionary zeal in their eyes, their intimate knowledge of the local terrain and their absolute disdain for death describe how they have managed to give the 20,000-strong IPKF such a run for its money.

Spending five days with the Tigers at the height of the battle, I saw sights that, despite the occasional brutality and callousness for human life the Tigers display, evoke reluctant respect. I saw one LTTE guerrilla shot in the stomach, calmly swallow a cyanide capsule rather than hold up his companions in the battlefield. I saw a stunningly beautiful young woman standing



proudly in the middle of the road with an AK-47 in one hand and a comb in the other. Their confidence and exuberance in the face of near-certain annihilation by a superior force are remarkable.

In the middle of an all-out war, it appeared unreal to hear them laughing and jabbering away like the kids they were. Ansar, 18, who drove me to the hide-out where 18 Indian soldiers were being held captive, was apologetic about blindfolding me. As if to compensate, he entertained me with songs while he drove through the downpour for two hours. Nishantan's greeting accompanied with a huge smile was typical: "At last we are fighting for real," he said, as if their three-year battle with the Sri Lankan security forces had been just a warming up session.

At Kokuvil, where 13 Indian soldiers were killed, Babu, 18, and Keethan, 17, were arguing about who would go and finish off the remaining two soldiers. I arrived barely minutes after the action, in time to witness a sight I hope never to see again—Tiger guerrillas, barefoot and in short pants, cutting down the two remaining Indian soldiers in a hail of gunfire. There was one very energetic and enthusiastic lad, totally unarmed, who scurried like a rat across the street every time an Indian soldier fell, to retrieve weapons and ammunition with no care for the bullets whizzing around. The overall mood was one of excitement and a sudden zest for the blood sport they have started to enjoy the most—killing.

■ **Daily reports put up at street corners by LTTE**

■ **Indian soldiers taken prisoner and (top) helmet and identity card of dead soldier displayed by cyanide-carrying guerrilla**

At times, the scene was surreal, like a group of boys playing cops and robbers, the only difference being the bullets were for real. Occasionally, the blood lust came through, when they pulled out chocolates from the shirt pocket of a bloody corpse and passed them around while idly kicking at the remains of a human brain.

Not once did they give any sign that they were facing one of the most powerful armies in the world. In fact, it was just the opposite. "Any one of our Tiger cubs can take on the IPKF in man-to-man combat and defeat them," said one. Their confidence, after two weeks of fighting, comes from their conviction that the IPKF is untrained in the kind of urban guerrilla warfare that, for many Tigers, has been their whole life. The trademark cyanide phials are no longer worn inside their shirts but flaunted openly.

From October 24, when I met the Tigers at Vavuniya and asked them to take me to Jaffna and the combat zone, till October 28, when I finally left the peninsula, only once did we run into direct IPKF fire, at Chavakacheri, which was being strafed by helicopter gunships. That was adequate indication of how well they know every single lane and by-lane, every lagoon and hiding place, and of the effectiveness of their sophisticated communication network that gives them advance warning of any IPKF movement, unless it is a sudden attack from the skies.

Blindfolded, I was taken to the spot where 18 Indian soldiers are held captive. They are in chains, which are removed for my benefit. Seventeen are from the 8th Mahar Regiment and one from the Sikh Light Infantry. They look cheerful enough, perhaps because they have not heard the horror stories about the 'tyre treatment'—burning tyres put around the necks of captives. "We have been treated well, we eat what our captors eat and there has been no mistreatment," says Gora Singh of the Sikh Light Infantry. Perhaps they are being kept as a propaganda weapon to show the world—or India—that the Tigers are not the brutal terrorists they are being made out to be. Perhaps they may be already dead, victims of a war they know nothing about, executed by an enemy they have never had to face before.

On October 26, I was taken to meet the LTTE's Deputy Commander Mahattaya on the outskirts of Jaffna. When I arrived, I found him instructing his cadres on how to fight the IPKF. He looks like a large, cheerful businessman and nothing like the dreaded number two man in the Tiger hierarchy, next only to the man they call Thambi (younger brother), Velupillai Prabhakaran. His first question was straight to the point: "Are you here as an Indian or a journalist?" On being reassured that I was no spy, he spoke proudly about his boys and their heroics and bitterly about the Indian Government that he says has betrayed the Sri Lankan Tamils. "We will fight to the last man" he says, though he admits that if a cease-fire were offered by the IPKF, they would be willing to consider it, but under the LTTE's conditions. He turns to his boys, gives them rapid-fire instructions. Holding aloft three fingers, he intones: "Stealth, speed and surprise." With that, he sends them off cheerfully into battle.

■ **A grenade with LTTE stamp**

There is no mistaking the complete identification of the Jaffna civilian with the LTTE fighters. But equally, there is no hatred for India, only criticism of the Indian Government and its representatives: High Commissioner J.N. Dixit in Colombo, and Rajiv Gandhi himself, who is referred to as the 'cub fox' while Jayewardene is the 'old fox'. The only occasion when the criticism became more bitter was immediately after the helicopter attack on Chavakacheri.

The real victims of an unreal war are the refugees. They were everywhere, fleeing on foot, on bicycles or hand carts or, for the luckier ones, in trucks, usually through drenching rain. At moments, it appeared that they really had no destination, merely wandering around in circles, anywhere, to escape the deadly sound of gunfire that has become their personal symphony since 1983. The women wept silently as if the tears had run out. All had just one question to ask: when would this madness end? That is a question to which nobody can provide an answer.

PRAMOD PUSHKARNA

IPKF soldiers in Jaffna bunker

REPORT

A BLOODIED ACCORD

THE western press corps currently congregated in Colombo have a name for it—they call it the Five O'clock Follies, the same sobriquet given to the regular press briefings by the US Army in Saigon during the Vietnam war. The comparison may be odious, but the daily 5 p.m. briefings at the new Indian High Commission chancery in Colombo on the Indian Army's operations in Jaffna contained some chilling parallels. The disputed body counts, the territorial tug of war, an invisible enemy, and above all, the growing realisation that it is a war where victory and defeat can mean much the same.

Across the lushly-carpeted, lagoon-laced countryside of the Jaffna peninsula in northern Sri Lanka, the thunder of gunfire was slowly stilled last week. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), after 16 days of battle in unfamiliar terrain, finally wrested control of the Tigers' lair, the labyrinth of narrow, winding lanes and concealed bunkers that make up Jaffna town, the heavily-fortified and thickly-populated stronghold of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

But Operation Pawan, as the IPKF's activities in Sri Lanka is code-named, is a chapter of Indian military history that will contain none of the honour and glory of a victorious campaign. Notwithstanding the fact that the IPKF fought against daunting odds and under severe constraints, the "liberation" of Jaffna last week was essentially what one IPKF officer described as "a dirty little war, and that too by proxy".

For two long weeks, the 20,000-strong IPKF, taken from the Indian Army's 4th, 36th and 54th Divisions, slowly and steadily inched its way across the heavily-mined and booby-trapped areas around Jaffna. Through a withering fire-storm, their five-pronged operational axes (*see map*) then linked up, enabling them to corner the 2,500-odd Tigers holed out in their Jaffna redoubt, many of them the same guerrillas that the Indian Army had obligingly trained in Tamil Nadu to combat the Sri Lankan security forces.

The irony has stretched to tragic dimensions. Despite its vastly superior numbers (INDIA TODAY sources put it at as much as 30,000 apart from the paramilitary contingent), unlimited fire-power and acknowledged professionalism, the IPKF has suffered unexpectedly heavy losses in the fortnight of fierce fighting. Officially, at the end of the 16-day siege of Jaffna, the IPKF admits to 214 dead, including 15 officers, two of them colonels. Another 36 soldiers are missing, captured and presumably killed by the Liberation Tigers, while over 700 IPKF personnel have been wounded in the action. Unofficially, however, army sources admit that the death toll in the first Indian Army

operation that has taken place on foreign soil since 1975, could be closer to 400.

In military terms, those are somewhat inglorious statistics, but then, it was also an inglorious war. Less than three months earlier, the Indian Government sent in, at the request of Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene and under the stated terms of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord, a 6,000-strong army contingent that was, paradoxically, called the Indian Peace Keeping Force. The main brief was to provide protection to the Tamil-dominated population of Sri Lanka's northern province. But only two months later, the IPKF suddenly found itself locked in incongruous combat with the LTTE, which is militarily the most powerful of the Tamil militant groups and which regards itself the self-appointed protector of the local Tamil population.

That tragic turnaround put the IPKF in an unenviable military position—facing guerrilla fighters, many barely in their teens including young women, in a heavily built-up and densely populated urban area already fortified and extensively mined during the three-year-old battle between the militants and Sri Lankan security forces. Admitted Lt-General Depinder Singh, general officer commanding, Southern Command and the overall force commander of the IPKF: "Urban guerrilla war is a comparatively new phenomenon as far as the Indian Army is concerned." More important, the IPKF was hamstrung by their strict orders to avoid heavy civilian casualties and extensive damage to buildings. "Ours had to be a proportioned response. There was large-scale mining of the Jaffna area and almost every building was booby-trapped. The LTTE made extensive use of these buildings and used the civilian population as prophylactic protection. Our progress, therefore, was necessarily slow," says Major-General A.S. Kalkat, director of military operations, Southern Command.

The IPKF, moreover, appears to have miscalculated not only on the fierce resistance put up by the Tigers but the extent of their weaponry as well. Every road leading into Jaffna was pitted with powerful Claymore mines or huge drums filled with explosives buried under the ground. The buildings were booby-trapped with highly sophisticated bombs that were capable of being detonated by remote or radio control from a distance of over a kilometre. In one such explosion that was set off under an army convoy, 29 IPKF personnel were blown up and an equal number were seriously wounded. The IPKF then requested for a regiment of T-72 tanks to counter the mines.

Apart from the mines, the highest number of IPKF casualties were from LTTE snipers located in buildings and even tree-tops, equipped with sophisticated, high-powered rifles with telescopic infra-red sights. At least five helicopters of the Indian Air Force were badly damaged by snipers when they were dropping troops in designated areas. Finally, the IPKF had to induct six armour-plated Mi-24 helicopter gunships since none of the Mi-8s or Chetaks could fly below 2,000 ft without the risk of being shot at.

Map by B.K. SHARMA



The extent and range of the LTTE arsenal made a mockery of the Indian Government's much-publicised arms surrender by the militants in early August. Arms caches were scattered all over the Jaffna area, many wrapped in water-proof packaging and secreted in the myriad lagoons that dot the countryside. The Tigers had a vast arsenal of Chinese-made AK-47 assault rifles, one of the most effective weapons in urban guerrilla warfare, Soviet-made RPG-7 anti-tank rockets, mortars firing 60 mm bombs and shoulder-fired rocket launchers. "They were not very accurate in their marksmanship but they fought like tigers," admits Brigadier Kulwant Singh, deputy divisional commander, Southern Command and one of the key strategists in the battle for Jaffna. The fiercest battles between the Indian Army and the Tigers were fought at Kopai North, Kokuvil and Kurruparai where the LTTE managed to stop the IPKF advance in its tracks. Says Havildar Raosaheb Gaekwad, 38, of the Maratha Regiment: "The people we were fighting were no more than kids. But they seemed to have unlimited ammunition. It was a constant barrage."

Over 100 paratroopers from the 1st Para who were dropped by helicopters on the night of October 11, in the open ground around the Jaffna University area were caught in a merciless cross-fire and suffered the worst casualties of the entire operation. Unofficial sources say over 30 soldiers were killed and 18 soldiers taken prisoner.

Sepoy Lok Ram, 38, of the 1st Para regiment was one of those wounded in the paradrop. Says he: "We thought everything was fine but when we were sliding out of the seventh helicopter, we suddenly came under heavy fire from all sides. It was an impossible situation as people would come out of the houses and fire at us and then disappear. There were gunmen on tree-tops, even on top of coconut trees. Since we were not using heavy weapons, it was impossible to advance. We were surrounded by an enemy we could not even see." The paratroopers were pinned down for 24 hours and were eventually rescued by Indian Army tanks which provided them cover to escape.

Major Anil Kaul, 40, of the armoured regiment, was the first officer to be wounded during the extensive deployment of tanks to rescue IPKF personnel who were cornered by the Tiger guerrillas. Says he: "The Tigers had a contradictory approach. Their movements, the way they took fire, showed professional training. But their tactics were not those of a professional army. We were not fighting a uniformed enemy equipped with the same kind of weapons."

Though part of their training includes urban combat, the Indian Army's strategic planning has never included the kind of urban guerrilla warfare that Jaffna

entailed. Says Havildar Kuldeep Singh of the Sikh Light Infantry, who was badly wounded in the face during the action: "We were pinned down for 12 hours by snipers firing at us from all sides. Five men from our unit died. It was very difficult. We have not been trained for this kind of battle—and we were also ordered not to use any heavy weapons."

The other handicap is their lack of knowledge of the local terrain. Eighteen IPKF soldiers who have been taken prisoner by the Tigers were forced to surrender after the convoy they were in lost its way. The last four trucks in the convoy got separated from the rest and were caught in a cross-fire and pinned down. Of the 24 soldiers travelling in the trucks, five were killed and two were seriously wounded. The remaining 18 were forced to surrender after they ran out of ammunition.

The IPKF's problems were compounded by the fact that it was impossible to distinguish between the Tigers and the Tamil civilians. One senior officer entered a Jaffna house as part of the house-to-house search operations and found it empty except for a young woman. The moment he turned his back to leave, she whipped out a Sten gun and shot him in the back. Says Sepoy Govindan of the Madras Regiment: "It was impossible to say who was a Tiger and who was not. Everyone, male or female, above the age of 10, could be armed and dangerous. We saw little girls producing guns from under their frocks and shooting at us. How do you fight them?"

Very carefully, is the answer that most IPKF commanders reluctantly give. Says Brigadier Manjit Singh of the 41st Infantry Brigade: "They are good fighting men, who are also very highly motivated. And we were fighting with one hand tied behind our backs." In their efforts to minimise damage to buildings and civilians, the IPKF's most powerful weapons were the 105 mm light field artillery, Carl Gustav rocket launchers and the 105 mm guns on their T-72 tanks. Admits Brigadier Kulwant Singh: "We were fighting under constraints that we are not used to."

The turning point in the battle for Jaffna came when the IPKF, under Colonel 'Tippy' Brar, broke out of the Old Dutch Fort area on October 20 after being cornered for over two days, to link up with the other advancing columns of the Indian force and effectively seal off the Nallur area where the Tigers were concentrated.

On October 26, Jaffna fell to the IPKF and the guns were silenced, but the war is far from over. To date, the IPKF claims to have killed over 700 Tigers but, as Major-General Kalkat admits: "We have no actual count since we were busy in advancing and not stopping anywhere to count bodies. All I can say is that their losses were much higher than ours."

But even if their estimates are approximate, the total Tiger strength in Jaffna was estimated at around 2,500, apart from the sympathisers and collaborators from among the local population. In fact, it has been established that many teenagers actually joined the LTTE while the battle was raging and INDIA TODAY actually met a number of young women LTTE fighters bristling with lethal weaponry. The IPKF claims to have taken around 80 Tigers prisoner, which means that at least 1,500 Tigers have managed to evade the IPKF noose and mingle with the locals or have escaped to other areas. LTTE chief Pirabhakaran and other key leaders like Dilip Yogi, Anton Balasingham and the Jaffna commander Mahattaya are believed to have slipped out of Jaffna to regroup in one their many hideouts in the Mannar, Batticaloa, and Vadamarachi areas.

PRAMOD PUSHKARNA

■ **Home-made mines and rockets captured from LTTE**

The Indian Army's miscalculation of the Tigers strength and resistance has already had its first casualty in the form of Major-General Harkirat Singh, the man initially put in charge of Operation Pawan. Because of his inability to take over Jaffna quickly, as originally anticipated, Harkirat was made the scapegoat and replaced by Kalkat.

But having lost total faith in the Indian Government and engaged in combat with the IPKF, the Tigers are certain to carry on their guerrilla war using the hit-and-run tactics similar to the terrorists in Punjab. The only difference is that they will be facing the Indian Army who privately admit that they could be bogged down in northern and eastern Sri Lanka for at least another two years. In fact, according to top level defence sources, the Indian Army is in the process of setting up a reserve Southern Command headquarters sector in northern Sri Lanka under Lt-General Khajuria, a former director of Military Intelligence, which obviously means they are prepared to stay around for some time.

Despite the fact that the Indian Army is now left with no southern reserve divisions and at least 30,000 Indian troops will be tied up in Sri Lanka for an indefinite period, that strategy is inevitable. Like the Sikh terrorists in Punjab, the Tigers know the terrain intimately and can mingle with the local population

LT-GENERAL DEPINDER SINGH

"There were constraints"

THE overall commander of the IPKF *in Sri Lanka is Lt-General Depinder Singh, 58. Masterminding Operation Pawan between Madras and Palaly, the General has so far avoided the press. But last fortnight, he made an exception for* INDIA TODAY. *After a quick dash to Jaffna on October 29, he discussed the* IPKF*'s military strategy, Operation Pawan, and allegations of civilian deaths with Madras Correspondent* S.H. VENKATRAMANI. *Excerpts:*

Q. *Why was the* LTTE *not disarmed by the* IPKF *under the accord's terms?*

A. The charter of the IPKF was to maintain peace between the Sri Lankan Army and the LTTE, not interfere in inter-militant-group clashes. So we were naturally very cautious. If the Sri Lankan Army could not disarm them in four years of fighting, how could we in a day? And we knew that if it came to taking their arms by force it would end in a military confrontation with them.

Q. *What were the main hurdles that the* IPKF *faced in the battle for Jaffna?*

A. Initially, there was a paucity of troops. When the battle broke out, there was only one brigade in the whole of the Jaffna peninsula. There was half a battalion at the front, one at Point Pedro and one west of Palaly. Actually we had not mobilised for war. And each battalion available had only 50 per cent strength; people had gone on leave or for training. Secondly, the LTTE's use of civilians as human shields was a constraint. Thirdly, to avoid damage to civilian life and property we did not employ our full range of heavy weaponry.

Q. *What weaponry did the* IPKF *use?*

A. We used small arms and light mortars only. Later, when we encountered heavily fortified bunkers and resistance from concrete houses, tank guns were used only to knock out bunkers.

Q. *What are the MI-24 helicopter gunships being used for?*

A. There has been a great deal of to and fro movement from the Jaffna peninsula to the neighbouring islands and the mainland of Sri Lanka through the lagoons and shallow waters. This movement in the initial stages, brought in reinforcements of personnel and logistics and later on exfiltrated LTTE cadres from Jaffna. The gunships were used in the lagoon areas to interdict such movement. We used helicopters for carrying troops. But they came under sniper fire. So we had to give orders that they should bring down suppressive fire in turn. I wish to state, categorically, that we did not use offensive air power in the operation to free Jaffna town.

Q. *But the helicopter gunships were used in Chavakacheri.*

A. Yes. One or two helicopter gunships were used. But we had confirmed military intelligence that the Tigers were present in sufficient strength in Chavakacheri. Also, we had two companies of our soldiers east of Chavakacheri, and there were two battalions of the Madras regiment in Navatkuli. The idea was for the battalions in Navatkuli to link up with the two companies east of Chavakacheri, but we met with strong resistance from the Tigers. So we were forced to use the gunships. We have only four or five helicopter gunships in Jaffna. There were admittedly a few civilian casualties in Chavakacheri, the death toll was 27.

Q. *How much support did the Tigers have from the local population?*

A. The LTTE had been running the civil administration in Jaffna for the last few years. In the process, the civilians had been intimidated to toe the LTTE line. There were, of course, some active sympathisers, but I cannot believe that the vast majority also actively sympathised. There were instances where the LTTE instructed the local populace not to visit IPKF facilities to record complaints or seek medical assistance. Despite this admonition, the civil population continued to visit. Now that we have entered Jaffna there have been cases, gradually increasing in number, where civilians have volunteered information about the location of LTTE camps and caches. I can say with confidence that the vast majority of civilians are interested only in peace.

Q. *Was the* IPKF *prepared or trained for the kind of urban guerrilla warfare involved in the operations?*

A. Urban guerrilla warfare is a comparatively new phenomenon for the Indian Army. But given the professional competence of the junior leaders and the men's dedication, it didn't take long to understand the nuances of this type of environment and master them.

Q. *Considering that many of the Tigers have escaped, what strategy will the* IPKF *adopt to protect the local population and counter the guerrilla war that is certain to continue?*

A. At worst, it will involve deploying for a classic counter insurgency scenario. However, I am sanguine that cut off from the free use of Jaffna and its facilities, the LTTE will join the peace process. Our immediate stress is on relief, renovation, and rehabilitation.

Q. *There have been allegations of heavy civilian casualties, and soldiers going berserk and raping women.*

A. It has been our endeavour, at considerable risk to our officers and jawans, to keep damage of civilian property and life to the minimum. And, as the heavy casualties of our officers indicate, they have led from the front and therefore, the question of indiscipline just cannot hold water. For every two or three armed men, the LTTE has another two or three unarmed sympathisers. And in a fire fight, they take all their casualties to hospitals and register them all as civilians. I certainly think it dishonourable to pull out people from a house, line them up, and shoot them. We have not done that at all. But if soldiers return fire and direct it at a house from which they were fired upon, you can't accuse them of killing civilians. They can't distinguish between civilians and LTTE cadres in that house.

without detection. Whether out of fear or sympathy, they also have the support of the local population. Also, despite the Indian Navy's blockade of the Palk Straits, a number of boats have managed to slip through the cordon and reach the Tamil Nadu coastline. That could also mean that boats carrying arms and ammunition can still get through to the Tigers. In any event, the Tigers seem to have no shortage of ammunition at the moment. The LTTE's Jaffna commander and currently the number two man after Pirabhakaran, Mahattaya, told INDIA TODAY last week: "We are short of weapons though we have plenty of ammunition. But the IPKF is fooling itself if it thinks it has cut off our supply lines."

There are also signs that the LTTE will link up with the outlawed Sinhalese extremist group, the JVP, which has been responsbile for a number of recent killings and bomb explosions in south Sri Lanka, including the one that almost killed President Jayewardene and key members of his cabinet last August. Similarly, the powerful bomb that ripped through the office of the assistant high commissioner of India at the tourist resort of Kandy in southern Sri Lanka last week is one indication of the Tigers' capability to strike at Indian targets outside the northern and eastern provinces either on their own or in collaboration with the JVP.

The IPKF's immediate goal in the north is to isolate the LTTE leadership from the cadres or wipe them out in the belief that the less committed members will surrender under the terms of the amnesty they are being offered. That, however, could be wishful thinking. None of the key leaders, specially Pirabhakaran, will allow themselves to be taken alive. If cornered, they will almost certainly swallow the cyanide capsules that is their trademark. Pirabhakaran as a martyr to the Eelam cause is as potent as Pirabakaran alive.

However, Mahattaya told INDIA TODAY on October 27: "We will be willing to a cease-fire under three conditions. The Indian Army should cease-fire immediately. The IPKF should return to the camps where they were prior to October 10, and only then will we be willing to talk about surrender of arms." However, those are conditions that the Indian Government will obviously not agree to. Nor is it clear whether Mahattaya is speaking for a section of the LTTE or even Pirabhakaran.

In any event, the task before the Indian Government is to win over the local population in northern Sri Lanka. The Indian Government is already flooding Jaffna with food and medicines. It will also undertake a crash programme to rebuild damaged houses, as well as set up projects to ensure employment for the local population. Last week, in an attempt to bring about normalcy and get the economic wheels moving again, Indian doctors and government engineers were flown in to restore essential services like hospitals, electricity, water-supply and food distribution. This will be followed by all-out efforts to set up the ill-fated interim administration and raise a Tamil police force for the north.

But the success or failure of that mission will largely depend on the kind of damage there has been to civilian property and the number of civilian deaths during Operation Pawan. IPKF sources claim that civilian casualties were unavoidable considering the type of war they had to fight, but insist that the numbers are minimal. However, many independent reports from Jaffna have spoken about large-scale civilian deaths but in the welter of propaganda and counter-propaganda being put out by the Indian Government and the Tigers, it is impossible to establish the truth. Certainly, INDIA TODAY was eyewitness to one incident when Mi-24 helicopter gunships bombed and strafed the town of Chavakacheri, 32 km east of Jaffna and 20 civilians were killed. The Indian Government first denied that helicopter gunships were being used in an offensive operational role. Once it became clear that the eyewitness reports would appear in the Indian press, they finally admitted that the incident had taken place but still claim that it is the only one of its kind. They also claimed that only an "isolated building" where suspected Tigers were hiding had been shelled. INDIA TODAY was witness to the fact that shells had landed in the main market-place and the main bus-stand where large numbers of civilians had gathered.

The Tigers, in their propaganda war from Jaffna, claimed that over 200 civilians have been killed by the IPKF and numerous buildings, including the Jaffna Hospital, destroyed. The Catholic Church in Jaffna has put the number of civilian deaths at 100. Some western journalists who entered Jaffna after the battle started, have returned with horror stories of IPKF troops going berserk after their comrades

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■ **IPKF personnel occupy a Tiger bunker in the heart of Jaffna**

were killed and accused them of shooting innocent people and of raping Tamil women. The Tigers refer to the IPKF as the Innocent People Killing Force.

Till the Indian Government started flying in journalists and photographers into Jaffna, the Tigers were clearly winning the propaganda war. The only way for journalists to enter Jaffna was with the LTTE. It is difficult to establish whether the so-called victims of IPKF atrocities were tutored by the Tigers or were genuine. Jaffna Hospital, which the Tigers claimed was bombed by the IPKF, was free from any major damage when journalists were taken there last week.

Certainly, judging by the ferocity of the action, civilian deaths would have been impossible to avoid. But on the other hand, the Indian Army is not a rag-tag indisciplined outfit like the Sri Lankan security forces. It is a highly professional and disciplined force that has been compared to the best in the world. Says Lt-General Depinder Singh: "I cannot believe that Indian troops will ever go berserk to the extent of raping or killing women as it is against our ethos and our culture. Further, as the heavy casualties to our officers and JCO's indicate, they led from the front and therefore the question of indiscipline just does not hold water."

Yet, there can be no denying that the local Tamil population currently views the IPKF with suspicion and even hatred, though they also see them as tools in a larger geo-political strategy. Says Dilip Yogi, one of the top LTTE leaders: "We do not blame Rajiv but his advisers who are misleading him on the situation. We do not blame the Indian soldiers, they are only carrying out orders. But we will never surrender. We can keep fighting for another 10 or 20 years. For every Tiger killed, another is born."

Clearly, the IPKF has an unenviable task ahead and in private, senior army officers are already making comparisons with Vietnam and Afghanistan. But that is more the fault of South Block than the soldiers who are merely carrying out the orders of their political bosses. The Indian Government's main bungle was in not disarming the militants when they had the chance immediately after the signing of the accord. IPKF officers say they were instructed to turn a blind eye to the arms that the militants had cached away or were even openly flaunting. Obviously, New Delhi had been over-confident of handling "the boys".

New Delhi's next and most serious blunder was in their attempts to cut the LTTE down to size and prop up the other rival militant groups in the classic political strategy of divide and rule. "The idea was to reduce the dominance of the Tigers since the other groups were under our control and thus ensure that the interim administration and the provincial council had more people who would abide by Delhi's directives," says a senior intelligence source. But that strategy backfired when the groups engaged in a bloody internecine battle which left hundreds dead and a larger number of civilians killed in massacres. That one aspect alone destroyed the image of the IPKF as a force that would ensure security for the Tamil population, and the Tigers played on that with considerable effectiveness.

Now, having taken Jaffna with such heavy cost—an estimated Rs 3 crore a day in terms of money, apart from the loss of lives—the politicians are once again back in the game. New Delhi's strategy is to fully disarm the militants, a near-impossible task, and win over the local population by ensuring that:

- there is no colonisation by the Sri Lankan Government in the eastern province;
- Tamil refugees in India are returned to Sri Lanka as early as possible;
- the devolution package envisaged in the accord is fully implemented;
- the merger of the northern and eastern provinces under one administrative unit takes place;
- a Tamil police force is set up as quickly as possible; and
- Tamils are permitted to enrol in the Sri Lankan Army.

Says an Indian High Commission source: "We have extracted all these assurances from the highest levels of the Sri Lankan Government. If Colombo reneges on any of the conditions, they are in worse trouble than before. With 20,000 Indian troops sitting in the country, it will lead to another Cyprus-type division. We are confident that Jayewardene will not allow that to happen."

Fortunately for New Delhi, the reaction in Tamil Nadu to the IPKF offensive against the Tigers has been muted. In a recent poll in the state, 67 per cent of those interviewed said that Rajiv had not let

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

■ **Distributing medicines to refugees at Jaffna Hospital**

down the Tamils. A majority also believed that the LTTE was responsible for starting the trouble and that the IPKF should stay on in Sri Lanka. The Karunanidhi-led opposition DMK has, however, launched a massive protest campaign against the IPKF offensive that could snowball in coming days. Says party President M. Karunanidhi: "We will continue our agitation till the Indian Army stops its actions in Jaffna." Adds party General Secretary K. Veeramani: "The Mossad stood to gain by their actions in Sri Lanka. The Indian Government, on the other hand, is to ignore them altogether in their future negotiations on the composition of the interim administration and the provincial councils. That may prove another fatal mistake. The LTTE may have lost much sympathy for its intransigence and brutality, but the Tigers are still seen in northern Sri Lanka as the only people who gave their lives to protect the Tamils against the Sri Lankan security forces when other groups like the Tamil United Liberation Front were safely ensconced in Colombo or Tamil Nadu.

But the key issue is that with the most

SUBHA NEWS

■ **Anti-IPKF demonstration by D K volunteers in Madras city**

spending Rs 3 crore every day of the taxpayer's money for their operations."

But the fact that the major offensive against the Tigers is over could blunt the thrust of the anti-IPKF movement, unless, of course, there are confirmed reports of large-scale civilian killings by the IPKF. In any case, if Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran, currently undergoing medical treatment in distant Baltimore, puts his weight behind the Indian Government, public opinion in Tamil Nadu will remain subdued. Rajiv in fact met MGR in New York last fortnight and is believed to have solicited his full support.

The danger is that with the LTTE having lost Jaffna—a major psychological defeat—New Delhi might be tempted dominant Tamil group having taken on the Indian Army, the accord itself could be the biggest casualty. The Tigers have resumed their battle for Eelam and thus rejected the accord. Jayewardene stated last fortnight that the elections to the provincial councils in the northern and eastern provinces will only take place "after the complete cessation of hostilities, the surrender of all arms and other weapons in the hands of the terrorists and the resettlement of all those who had been displaced owing to violence".

By even the most conservative estimates, to fulfil any of those conditions will take at least a year, at most, forever. Under the terms of the accord, elections to the provincial councils were to be held within three months, that is, October 29, or, "in any event before 31st December". That is now clearly impossible and the actual elections could be stalled indefinitely. Further, Indian negotiators are now unlikely to even consider the LTTE in any future provincial council set-up, which will rob it of much of its credibility in the eyes of the Tamil people.

Already, in Colombo, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party leader Srimavo Bandaranaike has challenged the constitutionality of the Provincial Council Bill in the Supreme Court. The bill, in any case, requires a two-thirds majority in Parliament to become part of the Constitution. That step could now prove a major hurdle with the anti-accord JVP having started a terror campaign against ruling party MPs, having already killed three and, in other cases, members of their families. Under that kind of threat, their support for the bill is in serious question.

However, Jayewardene, by staying away from the Vancouver Commonwealth meeting, has demonstrated that he means to stick by the accord and use all his considerable political guile to keep his party and cabinet in line. For him, considering the widespread opposition to the accord by the majority Sinhalese, the accord was as much of a gamble as it was for Rajiv. "The average Sinhalese may be gloating over the fact that we are doing their dirty work for them, but the fact is that Jayewardene is determined to ensure the accord works, however long it takes to implement," says an Indian High Commision source in Colombo.

But so far, none of the initial clauses of the accord —the lifting of the emergency conditions in the north and east, the provincial council elections and the interim administration, disarming the militants—has been implemented. If the Tigers continue to hold out against the IPKF, which is more than likely, the accord could collapse by default. The IPKF may have cleared one dangerous minefield but another, infinitely more dangerous one, lies ahead.

—DILIP BOBB in Jaffna with S.H. VENKATRAMANI in Madras and M. REHMAN in Pune

NOVEMBER 15, 1987 ◆

AFFIDAVIT

Mrs. ALAGAMMAH SINNATHURAI (66), Nuragiyapulam, Alaveddy South, Alaveddy.

I am the widow of the late Sinnathamby Sinnadurai who was killed in gun-fire by the IPKF on 11.11.87.

At about 5.00 p.m. on 11.11.87, IPKF who had already taken positions in Alaveddy, kept on firing when my husband who was standing in the courtyard was struck by bullets.

He received a severe bleeding gun-shot injury on his right thigh and died on the spot.

His body was cremated in an open land close to the house on 12.11.87 at about 11.00 a.m.

My husband ran a dairy and earned an average monthly income of Rs. 1,000/-.

I and my three unmarried daughters have now been left without any maintenance or support for our existence since the demise of my husband.

ARUMUGAM ARUNTAVARAJAH
Poothar Madam, Kopay North, Kopay.

N.I.C. No. 321932045 V.

On 11.11.87 there was shelling and a shell fell on our house and my mother in law Theivanaipillai widow of Sinnathamby died on the spot. We ran away from the house carrying the body.

We cremated the body in the evening.

I am attaching the death certificate No. 5088 issued by the Registrar of Deaths

Cause of Death: - Death due to fall of shell.

NADARAJAH PARAMASIVAM (54) New Chemmany Road, Nallur North, Jaffna.

The deceased Nadarajah Rasammah, aged 79 years was my mother.

My mother was living with my sister at Tellipalai during the October-November 1987 military offensive.

On 11.11.87 at about 5.30 p.m. I was informed that my mother was killed when a shell exploded within the home compound at 3.30 p.m.

I rushed to my mother's place and found her body which bore injuries on her head and buttock.

Her body was cremated at Tellipalai Cemetery on 12.11.87.

NALLAMMAH, widow of the late Antony Marucilin, (35) Nitchamam, Chankanai.

My late mother Sinnapillai widow of Suppar, aged 66 years lived with me and was maintained and looked after by me.

On 11.11.87 at about 2 p.m. when my mother Sinnapillai was seated on the verandah a shell fell on the house and exploded.

Shrapnels darting from the explosion caused severe injuries on her head and neck and she bled profusely. She succumbed to her injuries in a few minutes.

Her body was cremated at the Nitchamam Hindu crematorium at about 11 a.m. on 12.11 87.

I was first married to Sinnaddi Veerasingham who deserted me in 1973 and I married Antony Marucilin in December 1973 who died in June 1980.

I am a widow and have two children and both are school going.

RAMASWAMY NAVODAYAN (39) Courts Road, Mallakam.

The deceased Ramupillai Ramasamy aged 77 years was my father.

He was a retired estate teacher.

On 11.11.87 at around 4.30 p.m. a shell fired by the army fell in front of our house and exploded.

My father was seriously injured in the blast and we were unable to take him to the hospital due to the 24 hours curfew imposed in our area.

He died on 12.11.87 without any medical help.

As my mother and sister are abroad my father was living with my family until he met his tragic death.

SIVAPALAN LEVATHYANNAH (30), a widow Chavalkadu, Suthumalai.

The injured child Yogeswary alias Sivanthini, aged 5 years is my daughter.

Due to the October-November 1987 military offensive I sought refuge at the Manipay Hindu College.

On 11.1.87 at about 4.00 p.m. a shell crashed through the roof of the school building and exploded.

My husband Iyathurai Sivapalan died on the spot after being struck by shell splinters.

My daughter sustained lacerated wounds on her left knee and left hand.

She was taken to the Jaffna General Hospital on 12.11.87.

She was warded till 22.11.87.

The diagnosis card is attached herewith.

After the incident she is unable to walk as the shrapnel damaged the knee cap.

She finds it difficult for her to flex her fingers on her left hand due to the injuries she sustained.

I have three children.

Mrs. THAMBIPILLAI ANNAMMAH (55)
Chunnakam West, Chunnakam.

I am married, have 5 sons and 4 daughters of whom 2 sons and I daughter are married and live separately.

My eldest son R. Satkunalingam (36) is a driver and a bachelor and the only earning member in our family.

My husband Thambipillai aged 75 years was a farmer and now he is sick and feeble and bed-ridden.

At 11.00 a.m. on 11.11.87 my eldest son Satkunalingam left home with his sister Naguleswary on a bicycle to Inuvil Mc-Leod private hospital taking lunch to a relation of mine who was sick.

To my dismay, when I was at home awaiting for my son and daughter, at 2.00 p.m. my daughter Naguleswary brought the dead body of my son Satkunalingam in a van with the assistance of the people from Inuvil.

I was informed by my daughter Naguleswary that my son Satkunalingam was shot dead by the Indian Peace Keeping Force near Inuvil Theatre at about 12.00 noon when they were proceeding to the above private hospital.

Cremation of the dead body of my son was held at Koththiyalaci Cemetery, Chunnakam at 4.00 p.m. the same day.

My daughter Naguleswary who accompanied my deceased son at the time of incident escaped injuries by the grace of God.

My deceased son bore bullet injuries on his chest.

The sudden demise of my son the sole bread-winner caused me a great hardship and pain of mind and mental stress.

THURAISAMY RASAMMAH (48) widow of Kumarakottam, Kondavil.

The deceased Thuraisamy Kirubaharamoorthy **aged 22 years was my son.**

On 11.11.87 at about 9 a.m. my son left home in his bicycle.

Little later I was informed that my son was shot and killed by an army patrol close to the Arasady Pilliyar Temple, Kondavil which is about quarter mile distance from our house.

I came to know that my son was chased and shot by soldiers who came in an army jeep.

I learned that his body was removed immediately by the army in their jeep.

Due to the tension prevailed during that period I would not leave my house.

I do not know what happened to his body afterwards.

I have four children.

My husband died six years ago.

THOMASPILLAI VIRSITTAMMAH (63) Tholagatty, Vasavilan.

The deceased person Nagarathinam Manoharam Thomaspillai, aged 72 years was my husband.

He was a retired mechanic of the Ceylon Electricity Board.

On 11.11.1987 our area was subjected to intensive shelling.

At about 7.00 p.m. a shell crashed through the roof of our house and exploded with a tremendous noise.

A portion of our house was completely damaged in the blast.

My husband who miraculously escaped from the shrapnels fell ill instantaneously due to the shock.

We could not take him to the Hospital due to the tense situation prevailed during the period.

He expired on 18.11.87 without recovering from his illness.

His body was buried at the Thologaty burial ground on 19.11.87.

I have four children and a grand child.

My son Jonshon lost his use of his right hand after being shot and injured by the army in 1986.

My son Terrenson and daughter Grace Violet are suffering from asthma and remain at home.

My grand daughter Yogeswary is living under our care and maintenance after her mother re-married after being deserted by her husband.

THANGARANI widow of Ponniah Navaratnam, Soranpattu, Pallai.

I was married to the late Mr. Ponniah Navaratnam on the 13th August, 1976, according to Hindu Rites, at my residence at Soranpattu, Pallai, and have four children by the said marriage.

My parents are 1. Sinnar Kandiah (father) and Selliah Vallipillai (mother.)

The parents of my late husband are (1) Murugar Ponniah (father) and (2) Nagappu Thangammah (mother).

My husband died on the 11th October 1987, due to gun shot injuries caused by the IPKF.

Miss. THEIVAMANY SINNATHURAI C/o Mr. M. Elayathamby, Navalar School Lane, Kopay South, Kopay.

Since the death of my both parents I have been depending on my younger brother Subramaniam Sinnathurai, aged 37 years who was a bachelor and was a farmer by profession.

We have been cultivating an agricultural land to an extent of 10 lachchams and out of the income from the garden produce the family was maintained.

At the time the unrest and abnormal which existed in Jaffna peninsula on and after the 10th October, 1987, there were tension andpanic among the people of the area and nearby areas and were fleeing away from their resisdence in securing shelter and protection, but at the same time we both remained in the house and unfortunately on the 15th Ocotber, 1987 **my younger brother the above-named sustained inuries as a result of the piercement of the sharpnels from the exploded shell which had fallen on my brother in law Mr. M. Elayathamby's house. Due to lack of proper treatment, my younger brother died on 7.11.87.**

Due to the above said incident I have sustained a loss to the tune of sum of Rs. 25,000/- being the garden produces and the death of the livestocks;

Since the death of my younger brother late Sinnathurai Subramaniam who was the only sole bread-winner of the family, I have been displaced and is placed under destitute circumstances without proper income out a livelihood.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

Peace by Force: Lankan Tamils' Tragedy

M S S Pandian

COMMENT

The armed intervention by India in the Jaffna peninsula has given added legitimacy to the LTTE which represents Tamil national chauvinism in its most populist and ruthless form. If the Sri Lanka Tamils have believed that national chauvinism is the answer to their national oppression by Colombo, this conviction is now going to be enormously strengthened.

November 14, 1987

IN holding out the olive-branch to the Tamils, the Sri Lankan president J R Jayewardene played the coquette. His sudden love for the Tamils was to avert an impending military coup which would have swept him off the centre-stage of Sri Lankan politics. The fact of the impending coup was admitted by Colombo after the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) reached Sri Lanka on July 30. There were other compelling and immediate reasons as well, which forced Jayewardene to make peace with the Tamils of the embattled northern and eastern provinces of the island nation. The Janatha Vimukthi Perumuna (JVP), which authored the 1971 armed insurrection against Sirimavo Bandaranaika's rule and preaches a blend of radicalism and Sinhala chauvinism, was threatening to stage a comeback in southern Sri Lanka. There were reports about the JVP's infiltration into the Sri Lankan defence forces.

If India saw reason in Jayewardene's proposal for peace, it was for its own reasons. Jayewardene's offer to allow India to have its say in the use of strategically important Trincomalee port by foreign powers and to have military collaboration with India was a sure temptation for a country which wants to extend its regional supremacy in South Asia. For India to pursue peace in Sri Lanka is to pursue its own goal of gaining regional supremacy. South Block, which had ranted all along about the insincerity of Jayewardene in finding a solution to the Tamil question in his country, suddenly found in him a saviour for the Tamils.

The Indo-Sri Lanka accord of July 28, which was based on these two different interests, has failed to get off the ground. If the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is blamed today for the failure of the accord, that is only part of the truth. The most important factor which led to the collapse of the accord was the very nature of the accord.

The most potent self-destructive clause in the accord is section 2.3 which provides for a referendum to be conducted latest by December 1988 in the eastern province to decide whether "the eastern province would remain with the northern province as one administrative unit" or not. This means, if the result of the referendum goes against the long-standing and principal Tamil demand of creating an autonomous Tamil province by merging the northern and eastern provinces, they will lose what they have fought for so long. Justifiably the Tamils consider the northern and eastern provinces as their traditional homeland. There is sufficient evidence to show that this section of the accord is a deliberate device by the Sri Lankan state to leave the Tamils high and dry after they surrender their arms.

First, J R Jayewardene himself made it known that he was against merging the northern and eastern provinces. Soon after signing the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, he went on record saying he would campaign during the referendum against the merger. This statement of Jayewardene betrays his true intentions.

Secondly, Jayewardene, in the post-accord period, made blatant efforts to discredit the LTTE in the eastern province. The original list of nominees suggested by the LTTE for the interim administrative council had a number of names from the eastern province, though it suggested the name of a Jaffna Tamil, Sivagnanam, to head the council. Jayewardene rejected the names of the LTTE's nominees from the

Ravi Shankar, Indian Express, 14.11.87

eastern province. The LTTE tried to overcome the new situation by suggesting the name of a Batticaloa Tamil, Padmanathan, as the head of the council instead of Sivagnanam. Neither Jayewardene nor India accepted the LTTE's suggestion, the implication of which is only too clear. Jayewardene wanted to paint the LTTE as partisan, favouring the northern province Tamils—a campaign point against the LTTE during the referendum. On this issue, nothing can be truer than what the political committee of the LTTE had to say in its statement dated October 13: "Jayewardene has had the wily idea of grabbing the eastern province of the Tamils. That is why he rejected the selection made by the LTTE from the eastern province for the interim administrative council. . ."

Thirdly, the present day ethnic distribution of population in the traditional Tamil stronghold of the eastern province is not in favour of the Tamils. If traditionally the eastern province was predominantly populated by the Tamils, today there is an equal number of Tamil Hindus, Moors and Sinhalese in the province. The main reason for this shift in the ethnic distribution of population is that, during the last twenty years, the Sri Lankan state has been deliberately settling Sinhalese in the eastern province under state-sponsored land colonisation schemes. Land colonisation by the Sinhalese under Gal Oya and Padaviya irrigation schemes are telling examples of how the Sri Lankan state wants to reduce the Tamils to a minority in the eastern province. If the Sinhalese will not vote for the merger of the eastern and the northern provinces, the Tamil-speaking Moors may also decide against the merger. Over the years, the Sri Lankan state has been successful in brewing trouble between the Tamil Hindus and the Moors of the eastern province. Given these factors, there is a high probability of the referendum going against the Tamil demand of merging the two provinces.

Importantly, even after the Indo-Sri Lanka accord was signed, there had been cases of state-sponsored land colonisation by the Sinhalese in the eastern province and Jayewardene himself said, if necessary, he would deploy the Sri Lankan armed forces to provide security to the newly settled Sinhalese in the province. If a 23-year old LTTE cadre Amirthalingam Thileepan died in Jaffna after 12 days of protest fasting, one of his five demands was that India should stop Sinhala land colonisation in the eastern province.

While the provision for referendum in the eastern province is a time-bomb set inside the accord meant to destroy the accord itself after the Tamil militants lay down arms, there are other events that expose the insincerity of the parties to the accord in implementing the accord. We shall cite only one instance— the denial of amnesty to and the subsequent death of 13 LTTE cadres, including the LTTE's Jaffna commander Kumarappa and Trincomalee commander Pulendran. The Sri Lankan state denied amnesty to seventeen LTTE cadres arrested in the high seas of Sri Lanka and decided to fly them to Colombo for interrogation. In Sri Lanka interrogation is a honourable word for torture. The LTTE asked India to secure the release of its arrested cadres and forewarned that they would, otherwise, end their lives by committing suicide. India did not put sufficient pressure on the Sri Lankan national security minister Lalit Athulatmudali, who is more a Sinhala hawk than anything else, to abide by the amnesty provision of the accord. The LTTE men waited till the last minute and consumed their cyanide not anywhere else but on the tarmac of Palaly air-base minutes before they were to be flown to Colombo. It is an irony of history that Palaly was the very air-base where the LTTE representative Yogi received the general amnesty papers for the Tamil militants from the Sri Lankan defence secretary general Attingalle on August 5.

In this scenario where does one place the LTTE, the Tamil militant organisation which is responsible for the cold-blooded murder of Sinhala civilians and fellow Tamils belonging to rival militant organisations? In one word, the LTTE stands for Tamil national chauvinism in its most populist and ruthless form. The LTTE is the second tragedy of the Sri Lankan Tamils, if the Sinhala chauvinism of Colombo is their first tragedy. It is unfortunate that the armed intervention of the IPKF in Jaffna peninsula (Operation Pawan) has given added legitimacy to the LTTE among the Tamils of Jaffna peninsula and thus paved the way to prolong this tragedy of the Tamils. There are various means by which Operation Pawan has committed this historic blunder.

First, during Operation Pawan, not only has the civilian population in Jaffna endured untold suffering, but a large number of them have lost their lives. Contrary to the external affairs ministry's claim, now one knows quite a bit about what happened to the civilians in Jaffna at the hands of the so-called Indian Peace Keeping Forces. The BBC correspondent Phil Jones, whom the LTTE smuggled into Jaffna by sea reported that civilian casualities in Jaffna ran into thousands. He also recounted how the Indian army reduced Tamil business areas in Jaffna to rubbles. The Sri Lankan correspondent of *The Hindu*, D B S Jeyaraj, who stayed in Jaffna from October 10 to 20, reported shelling of and serial attacks on residential areas in Jaffna by the Indian army. According to his head-count about 200 civilians were killed and 500 injured during the first ten days of Operation Pawan. He further reported that local residents of Kokuvil confirmed the widespread rumour in Jaffna town that the Indian army killed 40 civilians and run over seven of the bodies with heavy armoured cars as retaliation against the LTTE killing 29 Indian army commandoes. When Brig Manjit Singh of Indian army said, "the LTTE has achieved a certain amount of success in maligning the IPKF", possibly he meant that the IPKF itself has done a substantial part of this job for the LTTE.

Secondly, the LTTE cadres, who are mostly in their teens or early twenties, engaged the Indian army in fierce fighting for fifteen days. They died fighting the Indian armymen or escaped into jungle hideouts to engage the IPKF in a war of attrition in future. But not a single LTTE cadre bartered away his or her gun for the amnesty offered by the IPKF. The supreme commander of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran, whose capture would have earned the IPKF one million Sri lankan rupees from Jayewardene, did an incredible disappearing act. The Tamils of Jaffna peninsula will not overlook the immense self-sacrifice of these Tamil youth and will treat them as heroes. What they will obviously overlook, given the IPKF's role in Jaffna, is the grotesque ideology of the LTTE.

Thirdly, the Indian army never tried to convince the Tamils that they were in Jaffna not to wage a war against the Tamils. During Operation Pawan, the LTTE offered at least thrice (on October 14, 17 and 21) to come to the negotiating table. But the Indian army never utilised any of these opportunities to declare a unilateral cease-fire which would have helped to counter the popular Tamil opinion that the IPKF are Jayewardene's mercenaries out to decimate the Tamils. The LTTE took the brunt of Operation Pawan.

In short, all these facts indicate that the bursts of gunfire one predicts will be heard from the jungle hideouts of the LTTE will have the popular support of the civilian population in the Jaffna peninsula. Operation Pawan has given a longer life-span to what the LTTE stands for—Tamil national chauvinism. If the Tamils have believed, though wrongly, that national chuavinism is the solution to their national oppression by Colombo, now they are going to believe in national chauvinism more strongly and for a longer time. This is the worst thing India has done to the Sri Lankan Tamils so far.

AFFIDAVIT

Mrs. YOGESWARAN THILAKAMBIKAIYAMMAH (59)
Kandarodai, Chunakam presently residing at No. 457, K.K.S. Road, Jaffna.

My deceased husband Eliyathamby Yogeswaran aged 51 years was a Teacher.

My 5 children all under 19 years and I were living with my late husband at the above mentioned Kantharodai address.

My husband left home on 11.11.87 at 2.15 p.m. after having his lunch on a bicycle to the Jaffna General Hospital to visit his aged mother who was admitted in the above Hospital.

As he did not return home till late in the evening or thereafter I started searching for him with the assistance of the neighbours but my efforts proved futile.

I continued my search for about one month with the help of my relations without success.

After about two and a half months, on 12.01.1988 on an information my elder brother Dr S. Sivaramalingam proceeded to Muthali Lane, Kokuvil and found that my husband Yogeswaran had been shot dead by the Indian Peace Keeping Force on 11.11.87 in the evening when he was proceeding to Jaffna General Hospital.

Thereafter it was confirmed when my brother Sivaramalingam found his spectacles and a Vesti that he had been wearing on that day when he left home near the above lane where he had been shot dead.

Further it was reported that the dead body of my husband had been buried by the people of the area after 5 or 6 days.

The untimely death of my husband is an irreparable loss to my family.

KANAPATHY SOODAMANY, (75) Punnalaikadduvan North, Chunnakam.

The deceased Avudaiammah Soodamany, aged 55 years was my wife.

My wife was admitted to the General Hospital Jaffna in June 1987 for an operation in her abdomen.

On 12.11.87 I came to know through my daughter that my wife died due to gunshot injuries and grenade attack at the Jaffna General Hospital on 21.10.87.

I also came to know that her body was cremated with the hospital compound on the same day.

I have an unmarried daughter named Sathyabhama aged 40 years.



MUTHIAH NADESU, (75) C/o Chinniah Kanthiah, Invuil West, Inuvil.

The deceased Kanthiah Gopalapillai, aged 32 years was my step - son being the offspring of my wife from a previous marriage.

He was employed as watcher in a coconut oil mill at Inuvil.

I came to know that my step-son was shot and killed at his work place on 12.11.87, during the November, 1987 military offensive.

I was also informed that his body was cremated at Inuvil.

It was my late step-son who supported me.

After his death I do not have any income and undergoing severe hardships.



VALLIPILLAI (50)
NIC No. 377190513V. Residing near Railway Station, Kondavil.

There was heavy shell-fire directed on our area on 12th November 1987.

When the firing started, I and my family including my deceased husband hurriedly moved to the Karaikal Sivan Temple where we took refuge.

At about 1 p.m. on 12th November 1987 my husband returned home to collect provisions and secure the valuables there.

At about 4 p.m. on finding my husband had not returned, I was uneasy and worried but there was no possibility of going back home to look for him as there was constant shell firing.

At about 5 p.m. a neighbour informed me that my husband was killed in a shell explosion and that my house was burnt.

I and my eldest son immediately went home and found my husband lying dead in the court-yard with his stomach stripped and the intestine come out due to shell-fire.

I and my son Pulendran took the body of my dead husband in a cart to the General crematorium at Karaikadu at 6 p.m. on the same day of 12.11.87 where we cremated the body.

/The death was registered on 2.1.88 with the registrar of Deaths, Jaffna (General) who issued Death Certificate bearing No. 773.

NALLATHAMBY PARIMALAM (58) Karanthan Neerveli.

The deceased Kanthiah Nallathamby, aged 70 years was my husband.

He was a Farmer.

On 13.11.87 at about 11.30 a.m. my husband left home to buy some medicine for me as I was indisposed at that time.

As he did not return home I became highly worried.

Only on the following day being 14.11.87 at about 8 a.m. I came to know that my husband was shot and killed by the army at Urelu Pilliyar Temple Road.

His body was cremated in a near by field on the same day.

I have an unmarried daughter Jagatheeswary, aged 25.

We do not have any income or support after my husband's death.



Mrs MEENAMBIKAI APPAIAH (56)
Kalaiyadi, Pandateruppu.

My husband Visvalingam Appaiah (67) was a driver.

My husband, un-married children and I were living with my married daughter in her house.

On 14.11.87 at about 7 a.m. my husband left home to purchase vegetables.

At about 7.30 a.m. shells were fired by the Indian Peace Keeping Force stationed at Uduvil, towards our village.

People of our village fled to the Amman Temple closeby and I too sought refuge at the same temple with my children.

My children and I returned home at 10 a.m. the same day when the shelling ceased.

On finding that my husband had not returned home my nephew and I went out in search of him.

We found the dead body of my husband on the road side near the Pandaterruppu Post Office.

About five dead bodies were found on the road side including that of my husband.


YOU TOO INDIA?



'ஹெலிகொப்டரின்' இரைச்சலில்
அவலக் குரல்கள் அழுக்கப்பட்டன.

காலந் தோறும் இப்படியேதான்
எங்கள் குரல்கள் நசுக்கப்பட்டன
இன்றெமது குரல்வளைகளும்.

அரக்கன் விரித்த ஆயிரம் கரங்கள்
திக்குகள் தோறும் முளைக்கத் தொடங்கின
எங்கும் ஒடுக்கும் கரங்களின் இயக்கம்
எங்கள் முதுகின் மேலாய்
அதன் நிழல் இறக்கம்.

எங்கே திரும்பினும் அவன் கரம் முளைக்கும்,
எப்போது எங்கள் குரல்வளை நெரியும்
என்பதை அறியோம்.

சந்தியில் சாலையில்
ஒழுங்கையில், முன்றிலில்
எங்கும் முளைக்கலாம்
எங்கள் வீட்டினுள்ளும் முளைக்கலாம்.

துவக்கின் விசைகள் அழுத்தப் படுகையில்
விடுகள் தோறும் பிணங்கள் விழலாம்
விதிகள் கடகாய் பரவலாம்.

.....

கண்ணில் பனித்த கண்ணீர்த் துளிகள்
காலடியின் மண்ணில் சுவற
வானத்தின் அந்தகாரத்தைப் பார்த்து
என்ன நினைவுகளுடன் அவர்
தன்னிரு கை நீட்டினரோ?

அண்ணாந்து நானும் பார்த்தேன்
சூரியனும் என்னைப் பார்த்துச் சொன்னது
நீ ஒரு தமிழனென்று!

I was informed that my husband and others were killed when a mortar shell fell close to them and exploded.

The dead body of my husband was removed and cremated the same evening as curfew was in force.

I have 3 unmarried children two sons and a daughter who are attending school.

Dr. NAGALINGAM THERUGNANA SAMPANTHAN, (71) 32, Palaly Road, Kondavil

My family and I were living in our own house at the above address prior to 14.10.87

Violence erupted in our area on 12.10.87 morning, when shells started falling all arounds us.

I sought refuge at Nallur Kandasamy Temple on 14.10.87 evening along with my family.

My brother Kandappar Nagalingam Jeyaseelan, aged 68 years who was a retired Divisional Agricultural Extension Officer was living with his wife, son and two domestic aids in his own house 'Easwara Illam', Irupalai Road Kondavil.

On 01.11.87 at about 11.00 am when I was a refugee at 268, Navalar Road, Jaffna a neighbour of my brother came and informed me that my brother, his wife Mrs. J. Rukmani (60) his son J. Gnana Easwaran (23) and the two domestic aids Kanaga Kalarani and Kanaga Wijayaledchumy were found dead with gun shot wounds, in the near portion of 'Easwara Illam'.

Neither myself nor any member of my family could go to the spot, because of the curfew and disturbances in that area.

A few days later, other neighbours of my brother informed me that the remains of the five bodies were cremated in the same compound.

On 16.01.88 we went to 'Easwara Illam' my brother's house and found the house in an untidy condition with most of the familier articles missing. In the compound we found signs of bodies burnt and few pieces of bone left.



SIVAKOLUNTHU ANNAMMAH (53) Navaly South, Manipay.

The deceased person Kandiah Sivakolunthu, aged 56 years was my husband.

He was a retired Post Office employee.

On october 14th 1987 at about 9,00 a.m. my husband left for market in his bicycle.

As he did not return home I went in search of him at various sources including army camps.

On 1.11.1987 I saw him at the Uduvil army camp.

Thereafter I did not see him.

Few months later I was informed that my husband died at the Jaffna Hospital on 13.11.87.

I learned that he was admitted by the army at the Hospital with gunshot wound on 8.11.87.

I also learned that his body was disposed by the Hospital authorities.



ARUNTHAVAMANI THURAIRAJAH (68) widow, Urumpirai East, Urumpirai.

The deceased DharmalingamThurairajah, aged 68 years was my husband.

He was a Farmer.

On 15.11.87 a shell fell on our house and exploded.

My husband was struck by splinter on his right leg and several parts of his body.

We took treatment from nearby private doctors.

Later we had to leave our house due to military offensive and thereafter sought refuge at the Nallur Murugan Temple along with my injured husband.

We returned to our house and my husband died on 2.12.87.

His body was cremated on 3.12.87 at Urumpirai.

My house was also damaged by the shelling and we lost many of our belongings.

My husband was the sole breadwinner of our family which consisted a son who is a student.

B. SEETHALAKSHMY
Uduvil South, Manipay.
Officer in Charge, Y.M.C.A, Jaffna.

I, Sellathamby widow of Late Nadesa Thambithurai Uduvil South, Manipay beg to put to your kind notice of my pathetic existance.

On the 15th November 1987, my husband Nadesa Thambithurai (labourer), My children and myself were at home, at about 6.30 a.m. the Indian Peace Keeping Force came home on a move towards Suthumalai and started indiscriminate firing at my husband and me. My children ran away owing to fear of life. My husband died at the spot and I was injured and was taken by the IPKF to their Inuvil camp and treated for my injury. Later I went home and with the help of my neighbours, I cremated my husband's dead body in my neighbouring compound. I am helpless and I have no any other source of income for my existence - day to day life. During this incident my house was also burgled. So please consider my sympathetic situation and make some arrangements to help me for my existence.



KASILINGAM THIRAVIAM (50) C/o K. Kasilingam Sivaguru Lane, Kokuvil West, Kokuvil.

The deceased Kanthiah Kasilingam, aged 55 years was my husband.

He was a Cigar-roller.

During the October-November 1987 military offensive we sought refuge at the Iyenar temple, Kokuvil.

On 16.11.87 at about 4.30 p.m. my husband was sent by some one at the temple to purchase some hay for their cow.

On 17.11.87 I was informed that my husband was shot and killed by the army close to the temple on the previous day.

We could not recover the body.

I later learned that it was cremated by the army itself.

Inquest did not take place due to the tension prevailed during the period.

I have six children at home.

After my husband's death we do not have any support if or maintenance.



The Week

REPORT

Deeper into the muddle

Indian policy-makers fumble, Jayewardene scores again

A vice grip? *Jayewardene being received in Delhi*

NOTHING really went right with Indian foreign policy in the first week of November. The biggest embarassment for Rajiv Gandhi and his foreign policy advisers was the continuing impasse in Sri Lanka. India could not have its way on the Lankan accord at the recently-concluded SAARC summit. The three-day visit to New Delhi by Sri Lankan President Junius Jayewardene immediately after the meeting only caused more embarrassment for the Indian government.

What has become increasingly clear is that Jayewardene is out to keep the Indian army in Jaffna as long as possible. Though both Rajiv and Jayewardene inevitably swear by the accord, its only effect so far has been to pit the Indian army against the LTTE guerrillas. And Jayewardene dropped a bombshell of sorts when he suddenly spoke of signing a treaty with India on the lines of the Indo-Soviet treaty or the Indo-Bangladesh one. He made it clear that he would like the IPKF to remain in place till the provincial council elections are over which, he said, he was confident of holding by December-end.

Fortunately, the Indian side managed to put off all talk about a new treaty. Rajiv Gandhi, in fact, said that no proposal for a defence treaty had been put forward by Jayewardene. But even as he left, the Sri Lankan President once again harped on the subject.

But the major source of embarrassment for the Indian side came when Jayewardene openly attacked the Tamil Nadu government and MGR. He blamed the Tamil Nadu leaders for extending training facilities to the militants and giving them funds. He also added that he was only stating facts and that he should not be misunderstood.

> Jayewardene left after achieving his immediate objective of convincing India to extend the IPKF's stay in Jaffna.

But that is precisely the effect that his utterings had. By lavishing praise on Rajiv even as he blamed the Tamil Nadu leaders, Jayewardene apparently sought to give the impression that the Tamil Nadu government was acting independently of New Delhi. More important, it left the Centre in the awkward position of having to explain to their allies, the AIADMK, why it was allowing Jayewardene to attack Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran from Indian soil.

In the midst of all this, India was trying to push Jayewardene into accelerating the process of devolution of powers. But then the TULF has now raised some objections, particularly with regard to the distribution of subjects between the central list and the concurrent list. Besides devolution, the question of colonisation and return of refugees to the eastern province was also taken up. New Delhi also wanted Colombo act more effectively for resuming normal economic activity in Jaffna and the east. Now that the Elephant Pass line between the north and south has been opened, India would like to see Colombo send more food, fuel and medicines, which the IPKF has been supplying so far.

To all this, the Lankan President gave one vague-sounding assurance: that he would act at the earliest. Apparently, he left after achieving his immediate objective of convincing India to extend the IPKF's stay in Jaffna. He seems to have been worried that India might pull out the troops because of public pressure back home.

In effect, Jayewardene has proved to be too clever for our foreign office mandarins. There was a palpable mood of sulkiness in the ministry of foreign affairs. The foreign policy makers seem to be puzzled and uncertain. What next in Sri Lanka, they seem to ask themselves. No one is really sure what the wily Jayewardene has in store for India.

NOV. 15–21, 1987 —A CORRESPONDENT

Costly campaign

REPORT

FROM OUR SOUTH ASIA CORRESPONDENT

THERE was a chance for peace in Sri Lanka last week. On November 19th the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam handed over 18 Indian soldiers captured in Jaffna in October. The Indians responded by declaring a 48-hour unilateral ceasefire, starting on November 21st.

However, India could not accept the terms that the Tigers demanded to negotiate a timetable for surrendering their arms. They insisted that the Indian peacekeeping force should pull back to the positions it held before the fighting began seven weeks before, and stop its patrolling and search operations. This would have meant handing Jaffna town back to the Tigers. Members of other Tamil organisations, and the Muslims and Sinhalese in the east, would have been left defenceless.

So the Indian force resumed operations on November 23rd. It had already penned many of the most battle-hardened guerrillas into two areas north and north-west of Jaffna. To the north, it has encircled Vadamarachi, the Tigers' political nerve centre. To the north-west, the Tigers' main formations are said to be trapped in two villages, Moolai and Suthumalai.

Their encirclement was completed in the two weeks before the ceasefire, as part of an Indian change of tactics that has apparently paid off. The Indians concentrated on making house-to-house searches to unearth arms caches and keep the guerrillas on the run. These tactics seem to have induced those Tamils who had no love for the Tigers to offer the Indian force more help. A spokesman for the Indian army claimed that in the eight days before the ceasefire the flow of information to the force had sharply increased, enabling it to seize 75,000 rounds of ammunition and large quantities of explosives: enough to cripple the Tigers' bomb-making capacity.

The Indian government now favours a swift campaign because it thinks the Tigers are less interested in making peace than in making propaganda for their cause among their fellow Tamils in India's southern state of Tamil Nadu. The Tigers had insisted on handing over their Indian prisoners in the presence of journalists from Madras, Tamil Nadu's capital.

India hopes to declaw the Tigers by seizing their arms caches rather than by destroying the guerrilla bands themselves. For one thing, there are fears in Delhi that, if the Tigers were wiped out, the Sri Lankan government might be less willing to carry out the India-Sri Lanka agreement under which Tamil areas will be granted a degree of autonomy. For another, the fighting has already cost the Indian army dear.

Privately, Indian defence ministry officials concede that 500 soldiers were killed in northern Sri Lanka (twice the number publicly acknowledged) and almost as many wounded; 25 of the dead were officers. The Tigers' casualties, on the Indian count, have also been high. The Indians have taken 480 prisoners and estimate the number of guerrillas killed at more than 600. But the Tigers are still picking up recruits. The battle for Sri Lanka is far from won.

THE ECONOMIST NOVEMBER 28 1987 ■

LETTER The Hindu, 14.11.87.

Sir,—It is really painful to observe the fact that the LTTE and the IPKF are still engaged in an unbalanced war with each other. The Indian Government should consider immediately the cease-fire offer made by the LTTE for the reason that it is the LTTE which protected Tamil civilians from State-sponsored atrocities for almost three years. Even if the LTTE does not keep its promise of participating in the peace process after the cease-fire, the consequence on the negative side would be the same for the Indian Government—i.e., our Army can easily overcome the feeble resistance of the LTTE which would not be a difficult task as is evident from the ongoing fight.

However, the positive consequences of the cease-fire, followed by the participation of LTTE in main stream politics would be far more superior than the present state of affairs—it would stop the loss of lives on both sides and also prevent the death of innocent civilians; there is scope for avoidance of guerilla warfare in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka; and more importantly, it would provide a big relief to the Tamilians in India. In addition, if the LTTE reneges on its words this time, the Sri Lankan Tamils will cease to have any confidence in them.

The second point which we would like to mention is that the Indian Government should have criticised Mr. Jayewardene's recent comments on Tamil Nadu. He had accused the Government of India, on April 28, 1987 of following a "Hitlerian" policy vis-a-vis Sri Lanka and of "helping people to adopt violence against a friendly and democratic country". Now what made him isolate Tamil Nadu in his criticism? It is part of his diabolical game and it is our feeling that our Government should not have allowed the President of a foreign nation to question the integrity of our federation.

G. Chokkalingam and five others, Bangalore

Ponnappa, Deccan Herald



RAPED

5.11.87	Urumpiray	Many women, among them were a two month pregnant lady and an un-attained teen aged girl.
5.11.87	Batticoloa	One girl (14)
6.11.87	Batticoloa	2 girls
7.11.87	Manikollai	6 young girls
15.11.87	Ariyalai/Jaffna	one mother
16.11.87	Kondavil/Jaffna	9 women (2 of them died)
16.11.87	Chunnagam/Jaffna	4 young girls
16.11.87	Jaffna Town Hospital	3 LTTE women cadres
21.11.87	Uduvil	At the Uduvil army camp several women were raped by the IPKF men. Later the parents went to report this to the higher authorities and they were told, "Rape is a very common occurance - Don't come here to complain about it - if a person had been shot dead, ofcourse we are ready to take note of it."

'Tigers' on the run

NEW DELHI, Nov. 19. (UNI) — The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam militants seems to be running out of ammunition and are on the run in Sri Lanka, according to Defence Ministry sources here tonight.

The sources said that yesterday the Indian Peace-Keeping Force seized 19600 rounds of ammunition from LTTE hideouts.

During the week, the IPKF has discovered about 56000 rounds of ammunition.

The fact that the LTTE is running out of ammunition has prompted its leaders to come out in the open and some of them are now asking for negotiations to settle the crisis, the source said.



O.V. Vijayan, News Time, 27.11.87

THE ONLY ROAD TO PEACE

There is no peace today either in the North or the South. The Jayewardenes and the Amirthalingams must bear the responsibility for this situation. The people in the North are, in addition, subject to the military terror of a foreign army. After signing the secret pact with Gandhi, the Jayewardene-Dissanayake fascist clique is acting to repress the people's opposition by murderous assaults on patriots. . . . .The violence of the patriots is only a reaction to the State-sponsored fascist violence of the Jayewardene-Dissanayake clique.

The monopoly in violence that the Jayewardene regime enjoyed is now at an end. Being frightened, they are now escalating violence against the people. This will bring them to their inevitable end. All those who talk about peace must understand one thing: peace can be obtained only by chasing away the illegitimate, treasonous, fascist clique of Jayewardene-Dissanayake-Thondaman.

★ In order to bring peace to Sri Lanka, the traitor Jayewardene, an avatar of Hitler, must be removed from power.

★ In order to bring peace to Sri Lanka, the stooges of Jayewardene — Dissanayake, Ranil Wickremasinghe, Ananda Tissa de Alwis and all other traitors — must be thrown out.

★ The Indian aggressor forces must be sent out of Sri Lanka.

★ The Secret Jayewardene-Gandhi Pact must be totally rejected.

★ The Provincial Councils legislation, which is a betrayal of the rights of the majority of the people and which actually increases inequality, must be repealed.

★ The anti-democratic legislation must be repealed.

★ Eelamist terrorism must be de feated.

★ The State terrorism of the Jayewardene clique must be ended.

★ All foreign intervention in the affairs of Sri Lanka, including that of India, must be ended.

★ The territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, the sovereignty of its people and full democracy must be reaffirmed and restored.

We do not want today a provincial council election. What the country requires is a general election and a presidential election. Therefore, all opposition parties must boycott the provincial council elections, and agitate and struggle for general elections. In order to achieve the objectives mentioned, the opposition forces must ask the people for a two-thirds majority power in Parliament. We are confident that a united opposition can win this power. All patriots, all true opponent parties, all groups must realise this.

Central Committee of the
JANATA VIMUKTI
PERAMUNA

November 18, 1987

Ravi Shankar, Indian Express, 16.11.87.

LTTE NEWS 'blamed'

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI, Nov. 12.

An External Affairs Ministry spokesman today said that the LTTE must be 'squarely blamed' for the inconveniences and problems being faced by the population of Jaffna town and the peninsula. He said the absence of electric supply to the urban centres was caused by the 'extensive and deliberate' damage of power stations by the LTTE.

The bulk of the power needs of the Jaffna peninsula and the town was met by power stations in the south. With the disruption of long-distance power lines by the JVP and the LTTE this source has been rendered inoperative.

A clerk working for the LTTE has revealed that it used to extort Rs. 20 lakhs every month from liqour shops and bars in the Jaffna area. It was because of the drying up of such sources following the IPKF operations that the LTTE resorted to acts of looting and extortion in the Batticaloa and Vavuniya areas.

The spokesman said reports indicated that the inhabitants of Batticaloa and Velvettithurai were denying food supplies to the LTTE. They were also preventing them from laying land mines.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force after wresting from the LTTE its bastion of Jaffna city fanned out to other areas of the peninsula. Picture shows a group of IPKF men on the move.

LTTE releases all 18 Indian soldiers

NEWS

COLOMBO, Nov. 19. (UNI & PTI)

ALL the 18 Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) soldiers held captive by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were released tonight at Chavakacheri in the northern Jaffna Peninsula.

Nine of the soldiers were released by the LTTE in the evening, which was followed by an announcement that the remaining would be handed over to the IPKF later.

A Defence Ministry spokesman in New Delhi confirmed that all the 18 soldiers had been released.

The first of the nine soldiers were brought to Chavakacheri, 16 km east of Jaffna, and handed over to the Commander of the IPKF formation there in the presence of a team of Indian journalists.

LTTE Deputy Leader G. Mahendrarajah alias Mahathiya and another leader Shankar arrived at Chavakacheri earlier to supervise the handing over. The soldiers have been in LTTE custody since the second week of October.

Indian High Commissionr J. N. Dixit called on Sri Lankan Prime Minister R. Premadasa this evening and apprised him of the latest developments in Sri Lanka's north and east, where the IPKF is engaged in disarming Tamil guerillas.

Mr. Dixit told UNI later that he told Mr. Premadasa that his continuing support for the devolution of powers to the provinces within the framework of the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement was important for the stability and peace in the island nation and also for improving regional cooperation.

Resistance waning

The Indian envoy was calling on Mr. Pramadasa, a staunch critic of India, for the first time in 16 months.

The organised armed resistance by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam is now on the wane and no armed action against the IPKF has been lately undertaken by them, an official spokesman said in New Delhi today.

The militant cadres seem to be disillusioned by their so-called armed struggle because two LTTE militants surrendered to IPKF at Nallur temple, he said.

R.K. Lakshman, Times of India, 10.11.87.

Frontline

End of Captivity

November 28-December 11, 1987

The release took place at Chavakacheri in the Jaffna peninsula on November 19 in two batches of nine. The residential locality around the District Court building was eerily silent with no sign of life. In a surprise move, 31-year old Mahatiya himself turned up to hand over the jawans to the IPKF. They were received by the tall and imposing Brig. J. S. Dhillon. (The expectation was that the chief of LTTE's political wing, Yogi, would release the men. There were also reports that Mahatiya had been injured).

The brief and simple handing over ceremony took place around 5.45 p.m. as dusk was falling. Mediapersons had been flown in from Palaly in the Jaffna peninsula in two helicopters. IPKF soldiers, with their sten-guns on the ready, ringed the make-shift helipad.

Around 5.30 p.m., Mahatiya, accompanied by Shankar and Bharatan, two other LTTE functionaries, arrived in a van flying a white flag and also the red LTTE flag with the Tiger emblem. He was introduced to Brig. Dhillon and others. One of the reporters appealed to Mahatiya and Brig. Dhillon to shake hands and the two obliged, when flashbulbs winked. Then, as if from nowhere, the first batch of nine captive soldiers emerged from across the playfield. Dressed in lungis and shirts, they looked happy though a bit wan. They lined up for a few moments for photographs.

Shankar later told reporters that while Gura Singh of the 13th Sikh Light Infantry was captured on the Jaffna University campus on October 11, the 17 others of the eighth battalion of the Mahar Regiment were surrounded at Chittankerni near Vaddukoddai in the peninsula on October 16. Brig. Dhillon said the Indian soldiers "ran short of ammunition in the fight and were surrounded. They had no choice."

He explained that "the original plan was to release nine prisoners at Udduvil at 11 a.m. and another nine at Chavakacheri around 1.30 p.m. It is their (LTTE's) request that they wanted to hand over our soldiers to us. They contacted us on the radio. We gave freedom of movement for their vehicles to collect the soldiers. We escorted them up to a point and then they left on their own."

A short interview with Mahatiya followed the freeing of the soldiers. "We are keen that a ceasefire should be effected first," he declared. "The Government of India should take into consideration the goodwill shown by the LTTE in releasing them and order a ceasefire, and the Tamils' problems should be solved." He listed a series of conditions for the LTTE to lay down arms: "A ceasefire should be announced first. The attacks on the Tamil people should be stopped. The ban on the LTTE should be lifted. General amnesty should be granted to our leader V. Prabakaran. The IPKF should return to the pre-October 10 position. Later, when the situation becomes secure for our people, we will hand over the weapons after discussions."

Mahatiya alleged that "2,000 innocent Tamil civilians were killed" in the IPKF operations and four lakhs had become refugees. "All news about problems here have been blacked out in India and to the world. A mischievous propaganda has been unleashed against us that we tortured Indian prisoners and burnt them. It is not true. Ask them whether we tortured them. We did not lay conditions for their release. We look upon them as friends. We wanted to meet you because we wanted to express the truth to the world," he claimed.

The release of the second batch took place at the same venue around 6.30 p.m. The jawans were handed over by Shankar this time.

★ ★ ★

But the process of handing over was not without any hitch. The reporters who arrived at Palaly in the morning had first been taken in two helicopters to Udduvil where the first part of the release was originally scheduled to take place. The eight-minute hop revealed the scenic beauty of the peninsula, but no movement of people was visible down below despite a relaxation of the curfew between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. Even at Udduvil, where the helicopters landed in a paddy field near a rice mill, the scheduled venue of the release, there was absolute silence.

Soon a van pulled up in front of the mill and Mahatiya stepped out, accompanied by Shankar, Bharatan and three bodyguards, with AK-47 assault rifles.

The atmosphere between the LTTE representatives and the IPKF officers seemed cordial enough. Mahatiya had a long chat with Raheem of the LTTE who had been flown in with the journalists from Madras where he was under "house-arrest." After discussions between Mahatiya and the IPKF officers it was announced that the soldiers would be released at Chavakacheri in the evening. The original plan was to release nine of them at Udduvil and the rest at Chavakacheri. The change in the programme was necessitated because the vehicle bringing Mahatiya could not meet the van bringing the nine soldiers owing to a "communication gap."

As the journalists flew back to Palaly before going to Chavakacheri, they saw the first evidence of life on one of the roads below — three men riding cycles and also cattle running, scared by the noise of the rotors.

★ ★ ★

The IPKF officials had told the reporters that it would not be possible to interview the released jawans. While Mahatiya urged them to ask the freed men whether the LTTE tortured them, Sepoy Waman Chite just managed to say in Hindi that they were treated well and were all right. Immediately, all the nine men were taken away and flown to Palaly in a waiting helicopter.

After Mahatiya spoke to the press, he distributed photographs to some presspersons. IPKF officers tried to snatch away the photographs, but the journalists managed to retrieve them.

However, after the reporters returned to Palaly around 6.15 p.m. and a two-hour wait there, a top officer of the IPKF insisted that the photographs be handed over to him. He argued that since the presspersons had come as "guests" of the IPKF and had been allowed to bring their own cameras, they should not take the LTTE photographs. He warned that if the journalists did not return the photographs they would be frisked. An officer of the Press Information Bureau in Madras threatened the reporters that they would be "blacklisted" if photographs were recovered from them and not allowed to come on any more press tours. Finally the reporters gave up. They started the return journey from Palaly as late as 11.15 p.m. because of a "snag" in the aircraft and reached Madras around 1 a.m. T. S. Subramanian

Ceasefire ends, IPKF resumes operations

From K. K. Katyal

NEW DELHI, Nov. 23.

The ceasefire in Sri Lanka is off. The Indian Peace Keeping Force resumed its operations to recover arms and ammunition in Jaffna peninsula and other areas on the expiry of the 48-hour suspension of operations this morning.

The Government took this decision because the LTTE did not reciprocate the gesture and, instead, set unacceptable preconditions even for considering the surrender of arms. They thus belied the expectations of well-meaning persons in Jaffna and Tamil Nadu that the militants would utilise the respite provided by the ceasefire for a realistic reappraisal of the military and political situation, and agree to join the processes envisaged in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement.

While announcing the official decision on Friday ceasing operations for 48 hours, the Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. Natwar Singh, spoke of the Government's willingness to extend the ceasefire in case there were positive moves by the LTTE and of that there was no evidence. Even during this period, the Government became painfully aware of the rigidity in the attitude of the militants, but confined itself to an expression of regret. However, negative pointers continued, leaving it with no option but to resume the operations — which, as immediately before the ceasefire, were in the nature of searches and seizure of arms and ammunition, held by the militants in violation of the Agreement.

Intimidatory acts

The Government was surprised by the tone and the contents of the letter sent by the LTTE deputy leader, Mr. Mahatiya, requiring the IPKF to return to the positions held by it prior to October 10, when the operations began. Secondly, as the External Affairs Ministry spokesman said today while announcing the Government's decision to resume operations, there were instances of the LTTE cadres threatening to kill persons who assisted the Peace Keeping Force and putting up posters calling for stoppage of functioning by the Indian Red Cross and closure of Government offices and banks. The acts of intimidation claimed two lives, it was stated.

All this was just the opposite of the two basic requirements repeatedly indicated by the Government — that the militants hand over their arms and unequivocally support the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. A positive response would have led the LTTE to join the mainstream of political life and play an important role in the future democratic set-up, to use Mr. Natwar Singh's words.

The Government felt vindicated that it had announced the ceasefire unilaterally and not as a formalised arrangement based on inadequate indications from the LTTE of its willingness to play its part of the game. The onus had now shifted to those like the former Jaffna Municipal Commissioner, Mr. V. Sivagnanam, who were confident that a ceasefire for 48 to 72 hours would be utilised by the LTTE for laying down arms.

The reports that the LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran, planned to come to India for talks were officially discounted. The Government's position, as reiterated today was that there was "no question of discussions with the LTTE on terms other than those announced by Mr. Natwar Singh."

The following is the text of the statement by the spokesman on the Government's decision to resume operations: "On November 20, Mr. Natwar Singh said in Parliament that the Government has decided that for 48 hours starting with 7 a.m. on Saturday, the IPKF will not open fire on its own initiative. Mr. Natwar Singh expressed the hope that the LTTE would use this opportunity to hand over arms and unequivocally support the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement in the larger interests of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and do so during the period of 48 hours.

We deeply regret that after Mr. Natwar Singh's announcement, the LTTE did not respond positively and is now insisting on a number of unacceptable preconditions prior to its considering the question of its laying down arms. Also in the period after Mr. Natwar Singh's announcement, there have been a number of incidents where the LTTE threatened to kill citizens assisting IPKF and put posters at various places saying that the Indian Red Cross should stop functioning and Government offices and banks should not open. There have also been incidents at Navatkuli village and in Jaffna where citizens were killed by the LTTE to intimidate the population and to force them to refuse cooperation and support to the IPKF.

In the absence of any positive response by the LTTE to our offer and because of the threats posed to the safety, security and well-being of the people of Northern and Eastern Provinces and the continued possession of arms by the LTTE in violation of the provisions of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement, the IPKF operations to recover arms and ammunition have been resumed on the expiry of the 48-hour period.



Keshav, The Hindu, 20.11.87.

REPORT

NORTH BECOMES A SUB-PLOT

Drama shifts to South Lanka

From MERVYN de SILVA in Colombo

TWENTY-SEVEN "Tigers" are killed by the IPKF. Six Tigers a few days later. More the next day. Many towns in the East and outside the peninsula are under curfew, continuously for three days in some cases. Another Indian troop ship arrives. Nobody can enter or leave the peninsula without an IPKF **laissez passer,** it is announced.

In Colombo, such news still makes the front page, but it is a big yawn. Outside the city, hardly anybody cares, unless some Sinhalese settlers or fishermen or Muslims are killed. The "war" and "mopping up" in the North are becoming a closed chapter in the average Sinhala mind, and this is increasingly true even of the Sri Lankan political establishment. The "North" is a Tamil problem, and an Indian affair.

The isolation of the North psychologically is no tacit acquiescence in permanent "separation." It is a by-product of a new preoccupation with the mounting crisis in the South. In a way, the Tamil conflict, once an all-encompassing concern, is now a sub-plot of the drama which opened in Parliament last week.

HOLLOW WIN

On Thursday, the Provincial Councils Bill and the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution were passed by a crushing 136 to 11 majority. It was a personal triumph for President Jayewardene, but a hollow victory for his party. Speaking to the Chamber of Commerce, in October, Mr. Jayewardene had boasted "my party will vote **en bloc,** make no mistake." The confident prediction came in the wake of quite credible reports that Prime Minister Premadasa, an outspoken critic of the accord and of Indian policy in particular, controlled a parliamentary caucus that would frustrate the President's plans.

It was highly unlikely, though, that Mr. Premadasa would dare to take the enormous risks involved in such a confrontation. Opposition hopes were sufficiently buoyed, however, by his public attacks on devolution, merger and Indian initiatives, that the number of prospective defectors rose each week.

In fact, just 30 members from the United National Party's 140 MPs could have caused a debacle by merely abstaining, since the Bill required 113 votes, a two-thirds majority. As it happened, the Government suffered a few moral defeats, but 136 MPs, including the PM, stood solidly behind the President.

SUSPENDED

Two UNP MPs abstained on the second reading, but were quickly back in line for the third reading. Mr. Cyril Mathew, the former Industries Minister, a virulent Sinhala-Buddhist champion who was dismissed from the cabinet last year, voted "no." He was suspended from the party the next day.

The real blow to UNP prestige was delivered by Agriculture Minister Gamini Jayasuriya, a party veteran and former General Secretary. His unchallenged reputation as "Mister Clean", a nearly extinct species in the present political environment, made his resignation from the cabinet, party and seat a bruising blow.

The overwhelming majority reaffirmed the authority of the Presidency, and Mr. Jayewardene's total command over his party, but the three-day exercise also exposed to public gaze the illusion of numbers. At the end of the day, the massive vote could not conceal the fact of a disunited and enbattled cabinet and party. The opposition's meagre 11 were high-spirited and aggressive, while the 138 were dispirited and defensive.

Using all his linguistic and oratorical gifts, Prime Minister Premadasa suppressed his chagrin at having to vote for the Bills by savaging his own ministerial colleagues to the delirious delight of the opposition. His victims were the top front-benchers, Lands Minister Gamini Dissanayake, Finance Minister Ronnie de Mel and National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali. On occasion, he found himself in total agreement with Opposition leader Anura Bandaranaike or complimenting him. The provocation for this extraordinary outburst was most revealing.

Poverty and unemployment, Mr. Premadasa argued, were the breeding ground of youth unrest and violence. He had appealed for the removal of the ban on the JVP to the President, to the cabinet and the government Parliamentary group. To no avail, he lamented, scoffing at those "pundits" who thought that the World Bank was a treasure-house of wisdom, and those others who placed "security" above everything, without having the foggiest notion of the socia-economic roots of political violence. Poverty and economic disaffection are the root causes of "terrorism," argued the Premier.

The shadow of the JVP which had fallen darkly and dramatically over Parliament on August 18, when President Jayewardene and the Premier had escaped death narrowly and two Ministers were seriously wounded in a grenade attack, was now proving to be a long, menacing spectre. The public galleries were closed and TV coverage of the proceedings prohibited by the Speaker. Both for security reasons.

A far more striking image of a besieged regime was a daily tableau. Each morning, a heavily guarded convoy of tourist buses drove from the Hotel Lanka Oberoi to the Parliament House four miles away. Their precious human cargo consisted of UNP MPs, including ministers and their deputies. Armoured personnel carriers led the way, helicopters hovered protectively overhead. All these precautions for a party that had a five-sixths majority in Parliament.

RESIGNING

If the party voted **en bloc,** members of the UNP-controlled JSS, the trade union, and elected UNP men in local councils were resigning **en masse** and having their decision reported in the papers. UNP affiliated student unions in several of the southern campuses were disbanding themselves. All were

responding to death threats from the JVP or allied organisations. At least 61 UNP activists and another 20 village officials, policemen and suspected informers had been killed.

A bomb blast in the heart of the city at rush hour on the day before the debate, whoever the perpetrators, ("Tigers" or JVP) created the ideal atmospherics before the curtain rose. Thirty-one died, over a hundred were wounded.

The JVP denied complicity in the city terrorist attack and the evidence points to the LTTE. Yet the JVP was soon to demonstrate it was not altogether averse to carnage and mayhem. As the debate began, two trains were derailed, one South of Colombo and the other near Kandy, in Central Hills. Only luck prevented a disaster.

REAL SUPPORT

Student strikes and protest fasts, and sabotage in the South which plunged many districts into total darkness, indicated the JVP's real support bases — the campuses and high school students, and the deep South, with a fairly wide swathe of the discontented lower-middle class. It has one major advantage in the political climate, and this advantage may magnify its actual popularity. Anti-government feelings are high over grievances accumulated in the ten-year rule of a party that has clearly overstayed its welcome. These passions have found in the "peace accord" a perfect rallying point, especially for the Sinhala Buddhist majority. A tactically smart JVP has become its militant voice and instrument.

Already another phenomenon has darkened the political scene, with ominous possibilities. A counter-terror has been launched. While each MP has been assigned 200 armed "home guards," vigilantes are hunting down suspected "subversives and saboteurs." The Opposition calls them "Kola Kotiyo" (green tigers) or "green guards," green being the UNP colour.

Breaking her long silence on these trends, Mrs. Bandaranaike released a signed article to the Sunday press. She warned that this new "creed and practice of political violence" was a threat not only to the regime but to social stability and democracy. The postponement of elections, authoritarian rule, "State terrorism," youth unemployment and inflation, the all-pervasive "stench of corruption" and the "hypocrisy" of the rulers, she said, had spawned widespread youth unrest. The Government's response would only help repeat in the South, the tragedy which had been enacted in the North. 21.11.87

EDITORIAL

21.11.87

Truce in Sri Lanka

THE 48-HOUR cease-fire announced by the Indian Peace-Keeping Force in Sri Lanka will be widely welcomed. The decision of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to release the eighteen Indian soldiers in its custody might have lost much of its goodwill value as a result of repeated postponement of its implementation. What little was left was perhaps destroyed by the fresh acts of violence in the Northern and Eastern provinces after their release on Thursday. Even so, a matching response from the Indian side was called for. The attempts to belittle the LTTE gesture as a step forced on it by its immense field losses were, in any event, not very convincing. The fact is that, long after the Indian troops took control of Jaffna peninsula, the LTTE was able to retain the prisoners in its custody. The safety of the prisoners could not have been a major consideration for the militant cadres who attach so little value even to their own lives and those of their supporters. It is evident that without a wide measure of support and co-operation from the local population the LTTE could not have held on to its catch. Since, according to the Indian military and Government spokesmen, the LTTE men had run out of ammunition and the IPKF had not found it necessary to undertake any armed action against them lately, there was no valid reason for refusing to order a cease-fire, as demanded by various political parties in this country who have been alarmed by the turn of events in the island.

Hopefully, the latest developments will pave the way for speedy implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord. While the guns remain silent, efforts should be made to persuade the LTTE to part with the arms still in its possession and participate in the political process. Simultaneously, President J.R. Jayewardene should be nudged into reviving the proposal to set up an interim administrative council for the Northern and Eastern provinces with adequate representation for the LTTE. This is necessary to ensure that provincial elections can take place by the year-end as envisaged in the accord.



REPORT

The war goes on

New Delhi caught between MGR and Premadasa

IT's a classic no-win situation. The Indian Peace Keeping Force's attempts to bring the LTTE fighters to heel have been thwarted. The Tigers, in the face of a full-scale assault, have beaten a well-planned retreat. The tactic is to get away from the firing line, regroup and fight a guerrilla war.

Back home, in Delhi, the policy-makers are running out of time and idea. In a desperate move, they roped in Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran to play the mediator. It took a lot of persuading by Union Minister of State for External Affairs Natwar Singh and external affairs ministry spokesman G. Parthasarathy to bring MGR around. But then, even MGR, the LTTE's godfather all this while, could do little.

The Tigers are no longer willing to trust him explicitly. They would rather keep their options open, now that the DMK has consented to playing their benefactor. The stand-off continues, the Tigers unwilling to accede to India's terms and India refusing to declare a unilateral ceasefire.

Sudhir Dar, The Hindustan Times, 20.11.87.

"Don't believe it, my friend... India's selling arms labelled 'Made in Pakistan'!"

Every extension of the IPKF's stay in Jaffna is fraught with grave consequences. Apart from the mounting criticism from the opposition parties, the Centre has to guard against the growing public resentment in Tamil Nadu. The DMK has let it known that it would take the battle to the streets, but even more alarming is the trenchant criticism of India's action by AIADMK leaders in both houses of Parliament.

The Tigers, though virtually cornered, seem to be holding out in the hope that domestic developments would force Delhi to halt the operations if not call them off altogether. Already, India has made a come-down from its earlier rigid stand. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has said that a ceasefire would be effected in 30 minutes if LTTE asks for it.

Even that failed to mollify the Tigers. Rather, as Natwar Singh stated in the Rajya Sabha, "the attitude of the Tigers and the leadership has altered so drastically in the last few weeks that we have landed in this situation."

They may have been encouraged by the fact that MGR asked Delhi to effect a ceasefire in response to such a plea from a prominent Jaffnaite, C.V.K. Sivagnanam. This was followed by an appeal from LTTE for a 48-hour ceasefire to enable its leaders to discuss India's terms. Though the request was routed through MGR, Delhi failed to respond.

The Tamil Nadu chief minister sulked for the next few days, refusing either to endorse India's action or to support LTTE. As if on cue, AIADMK MPs went on the offensive. Aladi Aruna was most bitter in his comments: "You cannot implement the accord at gunpoint. If the Centre does not know how to persuade LTTE, leave the matter to our chief minister MGR." The AIADMK members had another reason to be agitated: Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene's criticial references to MGR in Delhi. The onslaught from the MPs prompted the Prime Minister to assure Parliament hurriedly that "there were no differences between the attitude of our government and the attitude of MGR". It was only on November 11 that MGR issued a statement, expressing "continued support to the Central government to find a permanent solution to the ethnic problem." He also clarified that the views of party MP Aladi Aruna "do not reflect the views of the party".

MGR's crucial endorsement came in the wake of the DMK's calls to its members to "prepare to sacrifice themselves in the party's future campaign." Significantly, LTTE's man in Madras, Kittu, had two meetings with MGR before the latter issued his official statement.

Meanwhile, the moderate TULF criticised the Tigers for taking a tough stand. Said a TULF leader in Madras: "It is the people who are at the receiving end again. They want peace but the ball lies in the Tigers' court. India has gone the farthest in its offer. The Tigers are sticking to their guns. They are to blame." Other Tamil militant groups are unaware of the Tigers' plan of action. "They are running out of ammunition since the sea blockade has been tight," said an EPRLF member.

However, news trickling in from southern Tamil Nadu indicates that the Tigers still undertake the risky boat ride across the Palk Strait by a circuitous route, starting off from the Thanjavur coastline. A source told THE WEEK that the Tigers were purchasing arms from some militants who are idling there. But sources in Rameswaram said that the patrolling along the south coast was so intense that even local fishermen had not been able to go out to sea at night. Intelligence agencies, fearing that the Tigers might use fishing as a ruse to get in and out of Tamil Nadu, are keeping a close watch.

Evidently, the Tigers are prepared for a long-drawn out conflict, despite the heavy casualties they have suffered. The IPKF, just as it is consolidating its hold over Jaffna, may now be requisitioned to tackle the violence unleashed by Sinhala extremists in southern Sri Lanka; more troops were sent to the island in the second week of November.

As the face-off continues on the battlefield, plans to restore the administrative process on the Jaffna peninsula have been disrupted. The TULF has made a strong plea for setting the administrative process in motion. "We can have a non-political set-up so that the problem of power-sharing among the groups and parties does not arise again," said one TULF leader. "So what if the Tigers don't come forward for a ceasefire? There will be violence here and there, but that is also happening in the south. It is the people who want life to get moving.

For the policy-makers in Delhi, the immediate worry is whether they can save the Indo-Sri Lankan accord at all. Sceptics already are saying that this too will go the way of the other accords the

Rajiv government rushed through in the last three years. It has then become a prestige issue for Delhi; the accord has to be saved at all costs, even if it meant a bloodbath in Jaffna.

President Jayewardene, wily as ever, was hardly of any help. He refused to incorporate the provisions of the accord in the two bills relating to the devolution of powers. Citing domestic opposition, he pushed the bills through without incorporating the changes.

He added to Delhi's problems by his intemperate remarks while on a working visit to the national capital. He accused the Tamil Nadu chief minister of encouraging terrorism and said that Velupillai Prabhakaran, LTTE supremo would be treated like a criminal once captured. Later, at Rajiv's prodding, he tried to explain his stand. Said Jeyewardene: "I hope my remarks about Tamil Nadu were not misunderstood. But it is a fact that some people in Tamil Nadu have trained, have provided the Sri Lankan terrorists with arms, money and taken them as best friends. Somebody asked whether Prabhakaran would be treated like a criminal. He has confirmed that he has murdered the Tamil mayor of Jaffna because he belonged to the political party of Mrs Bandaranayike. We searched for him—at that time I was in the opposition, Mrs Bandaranayike's government did. He ran off to India. Maybe at that time the extradition laws did not permit him to be sent away. We are trying to change them under the SAARC convention. But I understand that you will send him over here till the laws are changed.

"I think Rajiv Gandhi tried to send some people but they went to the court and that was abandoned. But I would ask you how if the murderers of Indira Gandhi came to Sri Lanka and I entertained them as my friends, used them to start a private army on my behalf, looked after them and collected crores of rupees and gave them to carry on their movement, what you gentlemen through your press and through other media would say? What you would say I have said. That is all. Examine your mind and see whether what I am saying is not correct.

"Fortunately, Rajiv Gandhi and I have agreed that terrorism in Sri Lanka was assuming a shape and form that could have possibly broken up the stability of Sri Lanka and also changed the regional security of this region. He has realised it, I have realised it. And we are working together. There may be differences of opinion, disagreement about approach, but the basic goal is that Sri Lanka should continue to be independent, should continue to be a unitary state, should be free of violence against a democratically elected government, which is his dearest wish for India too. So we can get on. And I hope the leaders in Tamil Nadu will follow his example."

Whether he was making public what he and Rajiv agreed in private, the blunt talk embarrassed Delhi no end. All attention then on was on persuading Jayewardene to withdraw his remarks. Rajiv Gandhi and Natwar Singh met the grand old man of Sri Lanka to explain the constructive role played by M.G. Ramachandran throughout the Lankan crisis. Rajiv reminded Jayewardene that in fact it was he who created problems for MGR by forcing the exodus of 1,30,000 refugees into Tamil Nadu. It was also pointed out that his remarks on Prabhakaran would have an adverse reaction among Tamils in India and affect all plans for a settlement.

Jayewardene readily agreed to make amends. While he withdrew his remarks on Prabhakaran and said that he would be given amnesty if the accord terms were accepted by him, in the case of MGR he just said that his remarks were about the pre-accord days.

When it came to the question of withdrawing the Indian forces, Jayewardene insisted that India should first complete its task of disarming the Tamil militants.

Meanwhile, Jayewardene's utterances on MGR were having their reaction. Curt messages were conveyed over the phone from Madras to New Delhi. Rajiv Gandhi could ill-afford to alienate the Tamil Nadu chief minister. He immediately despatched Natwar Singh and G. Parthasarathy, the able official spokesman for the ministry of external affairs, to Madras. The duo successfully assuaged the wounded feelings of MGR.

But there were other reports from Tamil Nadu that were worrying Delhi. Public opinion was turning and people were questioning the wisdom of the accord itself. What is more, the reports of IPKF operations too were having their impact. Very few could understand the logic behind India's changed role from protector to hunter of Tamils in Sri Lanka. There were indications that Karunanidhi was slowly gaining politically. Rajiv immediately asked G.K. Moopanar to remain in Madras and mobilise public opinion in favour of the accord and to explain the difficulties to partymen.

However, what rattled the Central government was the concerted attack in Parliament. Both AIADMK and DMK demanded immediate ceasefire. That

Ramamoorthy, Deccan Herald, 11.11.87.



Sudhir Dar, The Hindustan Times, 18.11.87.

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

(Operation Pawan)

Sethumadava Iyer 12.11.87

N. Sivaguru 12.11.87

V. Iyadurai 13.11.87

V. Natarasa Lingam 13.11.87

G. Thavamani 13.11.87

S.S. Kanakendran 14.11.87

S. Rajamma 14.11.87

V. Ariyalingam 15.11.87

N. Chellah 15.11.87

N. Rajakumar 18.11.87

Shanmugasundram 19.11.87

T. Sivanathan 19.11.87

Sudhamathi 19.11.87

S. Udayakumar 19.11.87

S. Rajadurai 20.11.87

M. Kadirvelu 21.11.87

P. Vijayaraja 26.11.87

Miss. Pushpadevi 26.11.87

was the first time AIADMK took a different stand on the Sri Lankan issue from that of the Congress(I).

Members from the opposition had many questions to ask. What was the idea of signing an accord in which LTTE is not a party? Why should India send its troops to kill Tamilians who all along stood with India? The most ominous statement came from V. Gopalaswamy, the irrepressible DMK member of the Rajya Sabha. He said: "Sir, if you want to protect the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka at the cost of the lives of Tamils, then the unity and integrity of this country will be in jeopardy. You are sowing the seeds of disintegration in the minds of Tamils. I warn you."

Outside too criticism was mounting. Said A.P. Venkateswaran, former foreign secretary: "It is a hastily concluded accord, which has very little safeguards of implementation, where we have put the cart before the horse." He added that India should have first settled the issue of devolution of powers but India went by the assurances of Jayewardene, though Jayewardene was known to go back on his words. "The accord is a Himalayan blunder, not behoving the maturity of an intelligent people like the Indians."

Back in Colombo, the Sinhala hawks were on the offensive as Parliament convened to pass the bills on devolution of powers. First, Agriculture Minister Gamini Jayesuriya quit. Then came an outburst against India by Prime Minister Premadasa. He accused the IPKF of genocide in Jaffna and said: "We know who made our children militants so bold. It is our neighbour who is responsible for the disobedience of our children. The children who had run off to their uncle complaining against their father were now saying that the father was far better than their uncle."

Despite the many obstacles in its path, New Delhi would not give up hope. Towards the second week of November Indian officials were contacting LTTE leaders individually for negotiating a laying down of arms. This was facilitated by the active role played by MGR. The idea is to isolate Velupillai Prabhakaran if necessary and persuade others to cooperate with India. The South Block mandarins believe that once the elections to the provincial councils are over, the temptation to share power will make many in LTTE to come around. However, the fact remains that the majority of Tamils and Sinhalese, for whom the accord was signed, are still opposed to it.

—K. GOPALAKRISHNAN and VINCENT D'SOUZA

THE HINDU

87 November

REPORT

No talks before arms surrender, says Natwar Singh

From K. K. Katyal

NEW DELHI, Nov 24.

Dismayed by the lack of any positive response from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to the ceasefire, the Government of India today ruled out a dialogue with it unless it surrendered arms and declared unequivocal support to the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. Particularly absurd, according to the official view, is the militants' demand for the return of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to the October 10 position.

The two basic requirements are not new but, in the changed context, the Government has made their acceptance a precondition for talks. The official stand was outlined by the Defence Minister, Mr. K. C. Pant, who, along with the Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. Natwar Singh, briefed the Opposition leaders on the latest in Sri Lanka. Mr. Natwar Singh also updated his statement to Parliament last Friday, when he announced the ceasefire.

The meeting was useful, for it provided an opportunity for interaction to the two sides on this sensitive issue, specially when Parliament did not take up the situation leading to and resulting from the resumption of the IPKF operations. Opinions and assessments were sharply divided on the course to be followed now, though most of the participants appeared to recognise the absurdity of the plea for withdrawal of the IPKF to the October 10 position, as also of the action of the LTTE leader, Mr. Prabakaran, in writing to the United Nations.

A section of the Opposition felt that New Delhi should have tried the path of negotiations instead of resuming operations. The Government representatives explained the rationale behind the move. The ceasefire was announced, the Ministers said, in the hope that the respite thus provided to the LTTE would be utilised by its leaders to join the political processes envisaged in the Agreement. The Government was strengthened in the belief by what the LTTE deputy leader, Mr. Mahatiya, told the Indian Commanders at the time of the handing over of the soldiers — that the ceasefire would pave the way for the laying down of arms and related steps. It was a great pity, Mr. Pant said, that instead of responding positively to the ceasefire offer, which was welcomed by all sections, the LTTE came out with a set of nine demands.

Party lines varied, as was reflected by the questions put by the Opposition members. The DMK and the Telugu Desam were highly critical of the Government stand. The AIADMK too made known its disapproval while keeping it in a low key, while the two communist parties and the BJP asked searching questions to elicit information. The Akali Dal representative, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Jagjit Singh Aurora of the Bangladesh war fame, cautioned the Government against involvement of the Indian troops in a Vietnam-type situation.

Meeting with Kittu in Madras: Mr. P. Upendra, Telugu Desam, made a case for talks with Mr. Prabhakaran and regretted that suggestions to this effect had been brushed aside. On the basis of his recent talk with Mr. Krishna Kumar alias Kittu, the LTTE representative in Madras, Mr. Gopalasamy, DMK, said that the militants were prepared for talks and that the modalities for the laying down of arms could be discussed in the negotiation process. Mr. Gurupadaswamy, Janata Party, too, preferred dialogue to resumption of operations.

It was in response to these queries that Mr. Pant came out with the categorical stand against talks unless the pre-conditions were met. The Government, it was pointed out, could not call the LTTE leader for talks when the IPKF was engaged in the mission of disarming the militants. Mr. Gopalasamy, supported by Mr. Vajpayee, BJP, wanted to know how the security of the militants was to be ensured after they laid down arms. That was what the IPKF was there for, they were told in so many words.

Mr. Dipen Ghosh, CPI(M) inquired whether any assessment had been made of the cadre strength and arms and ammunition at the command of the LTTE. Mr. Natwar Singh replied that large quantities of arms and ammunition had been seized but the militants had managed to get fresh supplies from Singapore and other places. How was this possible in view of the joint patrolling of the Palk Strait Mr. Upendra asked. That was because they operated in a large number of small boats, was the reply.

Self-imposed curbs: At one stage, Mr. Pant remarked that the IPKF could have finished the job in half a day but it had to operate under self-imposed constraints to avoid civilian casulties. Mr. Pant objected to Mr. Gopalasamy's angry reaction to his remark and this led to a minor clash between the two.

Dealing with questions on the attitude of the people in Jaffna and other places, Mr. Natwar Singh said that the IPKF was getting full support locally, with some among the citizens volunteering information on the LTTE hide-outs. Opposition members wanted the Government to be sure of its sources of information and not to rely exclusively on the intelligence agencies which had given misleading reports in the past. One of them suggested that independent observers and journalists be sent there to find out the true position.

Responding to a query by Mr. Chitta Basu, Forward Bloc, Mr. Natwar Singh was stated to have remarked that the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Mr. M. G. Ramachandran, felt letdown by the LTTE's attitude.

Apart from the discussions at the briefing session, there was an overwhelming feeling here that Mr. Prabhakaran had been ill-advised in making an approach to the U.N.

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

MYLIDDY	MANIPAY
Sritharan	
S.K. Gugathas	A. Thambiran
E. Kathiravel	M. Mariamuthi
T. Krishnarajah	M. Theeleepan
A. Sebastiampillai	S. Saraswathy
R. Nadarajah	J. Aruganayagam
M. Reginold	A. Nicholas
Jayabalan	K. Gnanasegaram
Veeran	Mariyadas
Poologarasa	T. Jeyasiri
Kanagaratnam	S. Thiruharan
V. Mylvaganam	S. Jeyasuntharan
M. Navaratnam	Thevathasan John
S. Sinnachi	Sooryakumari
Kanthan Ponnu	Sinnathamby
Sivapathy	Sinnathurai
S. Kumaravy	Thambithurai
J.S. Herbert Fernandurai	P. Sellathurai
MEESALAI	A. Benedict
V. Arumugam	V. Annapillai
K. Velupillai	Thanganayaki
MANKULAM	A. Rosammah
I. Jeyarasa	Sivakolunthu
B. Varathanathan	P. Kanapathy
K. Maheswaran	P. Arumaithurai
V. Verasingam	R. Selvarajah
K. Sothinathan	T. Maruseelan
A. Selvarajah	T. Swampillai
K. Sothirajah	N. Annammah
R. Kanniah	K. Pasupathy
Jeyarajah	C. Balaratnam
Calnaidu	P. Thavarasah
Rajaratnam	K. Sellathamby
S. Rajeswary	R. Kandeepan

APOCALYPSE

The pain, agony and fear of a people trapped

Dear Friends

I have lost count of the days
I don't know the day or the date
I know it's more than a month since the war started
You want events, numbers, case histories?
Not now please, because my mind is strangled
I know it's strange, but, that is what I feel
That is what we live
Pain, agony and fear - always fear

I ask you, could you write straight
When people die in lots?
When you find them
Dead like flies - not one, two
Left by the roadside
In Kopay, in town
In Kokuvil, Rasaveethi, Urumpirai
In there, over here
Left on the hospital corridors, to the elements
For the birds and dogs to scavenge?

When you certify death and bury your
Neighbours in their own garden?
When people - thousands and thousands
Always more than ten thousand are
Herded into kovils, churches and schools
For almost a month
When the beautiful sandy precinct of the temple
Becomes nothing but one whole shit dump
A hell hole with a teeming mass of people
When doctors are removing shrapnel and giving drips
And people shit just outside?

If night after night, you lay under the table
With your children, immobile
Listening to the sound of boots
Marching up and down your road
Not even a candle you light
For a shadow or even a sound could kill the whole household

What else?
We have no electricity
We have no money
The majority of the people have hardly any food
Our workplaces are flattened out
We have no functioning hospital
No drugs, no fuel

Fear? Now we know of Rape
I'd like to get together with other women
But I know of nobody to get in touch with
All of us are scattered

The Indian army is everywhere
Walking, in trucks
In open vehicles, closed vehicles
The Gurkhas are even trying out bicycles
And enjoying our livestock
Chickens, goats, everything
'Came hunting tigers
catching goats now'
The people still have their sense of humour

The Gurkhas, the turbanned Sikhs
The southern Indians from various states, speaking Tamil
Such a diverse people - brought to you
Booted, with arms in their hands

Rajiv clearly says, we have gone to Sri Lanka
For our nations's goal
Our middle classes have always been saying
India won't allow Jaffna to be taken
Now India has taken us
Any street you have walked
Any building you have been in
All have been shelled
So thorough is the destruction
The Indian army learns how to smash an urban guerilla movement
Sure to come in handy

On top of all
No one cares for the people
The Sri Lankan government, the Indian army
Not even the tigers nor the other movements
Today we are a trapped people
We are made to walk this suicidal trip
Our great brave defenders and freedom fighters
Lure the enemy
Right to our doorstep
To the inside of the hospital
Start a fight
Ignite a landmine
Fire from each and every refugee camp
Escape to safety
And then come the shells whizzing, whizzing
Bloody hell
Tigers have withdrawn, while
We the sacrificial lambs
Drop dead in lots

15 years of war
And now a hopeless halt
Our society has no will to organise
It is totally crumbled
There isn't a single civilian structure to connect up with
The era has demised with
So much loss
And bitterness all round

Jaffna, **Nov.18th 1987**



AFFIDAVIT

SUBRAMANIAM PARAMASAMY, born 1941.04.01 at Bharathi Road, Kambarmalai, Valvettiturai.

I am the father of Paramasamy Paramanathan (19 years) who was arrested by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) on 16.11.87.

On 16.11.87 about 10 a.m. the IPKF made it known that they were distributing free rations near the reading room in our locality (Kambarmalai).

My wife (Rasaledchumy) went to collect the free rations offered at by the IPKF.

While the rations were being distributed, the IPKF men suddenly arrested the young males among the crowd and in the vicinity of the reading room at Kambarmalai.

Some of the youths who were caught were bound hand and foot and put on the ground in the scorching sun.

My son Paramasamy Paramanathan had earlier left home for the tutory, it being a Saturday.

To my wife's horror she found that our son Paramanathan was one of the youths bound and lying on the ground.

My wife and I later learnt that my son was returning from the tutory and as he was passing the reading room, he was caught by the IPKF.

After some time the youths were taken in a van. My son was among them.

That evening I went to the IPKF Camp at Valvettiturai but was refused permission to see my son.

Thereafter for nearly 8 days I went to the said Camp daily but was always refused permission to see my son.

Thereafter on one occasion when I went to the same Camp, I was told that my son and other youths who were arrested together had been sent to the IPKF Camp at Kankesanthurai.

About the fifteenth day after the arrest of my son I sent a letter to the IPKF Town Commandant at Jaffna appealing for the release of my son.

About the end of the December, 1987, two of the boys (Jegathiswaran and Premanathan) arrested along with my son, met me and told me that my son had been beaten to death by the IPKF.

In January, 1988 Varatharajah another youth who was arrested with my son and who was freed later, met me and gave me details of how my son met with his death.

He told me that my son was severely beaten along with him and that he (my son) died as a result of injuries received during the beatings.

My son died on the second day after his arrest. My son's body was buried at Vallai - Velli - (Vallai Plain) of Valvettiturai by the IPKF.



MUTHUTHAMBY PANCHALINGAM (48) Palaly Road, Urelu East, Chunnakam.

The deceased Somupillai Ariyanayagam, aged 70 years bachelor was my uncle being my mother's younger brother.

After my parents death which occurred while I was a small child it was my uncle who raised me.

Due to the intensive military operation in our area we left our residence and sought refuge at the Ganeshavidyalaya Urelu.

My uncle due to old age refused to accompany us and preferred to stay at home.

We used to visit him whereever possible and to prepare our meals.

On 16.11.87 I was informed that my uncle was shot and killed by the army at about 6.30 a.m. just outside our house gate.

On hearing the news which reached me only at about 4 p.m. I rushed to my residence.

I found his body lying in the road about 25 yards from the gate.

There was a gaping gun shot wound on his chest.

I cremated his body at the spot where his body was found on 17.11.87.

Until his death last November he was residing with my family as it is my duty to support and maintain him.



SELLAN MYLAN, (65) Manthuvil Kodikamam.

My son Mylan Sivam, 25 years, my two daughters and I were living in our own house at the above said address.

On 16.11.1987 at about 4 p.m. my son left for our garden close by to water chilly plants.

At about 2 p.m. IPKF surrounded our area and started firing at random.

At about 6 p.m. one T.Kunam a relative of ours who went to his farm came home and informed that my son was shot killed by the IPKF in our farm.

I rushed to the farm as the IPKF left our locality and brought the dead body home with the assistance of our relations.

The dead body of my son bore an injury in his chest.

Cremation took place on 17.11.87 at noon at Pluven cemetery.

My two daughters and I lost the only earning member of our family.



SUBRAMANIAM JEYAKUMAR (23)
NIC No 64 179 2977 V Kaally Kovil, Thavady South, Kokuvil.

I am one of the sons of the Late Arumugam Subramaniam (52) who died on 17.11.87 as a result of shooting by the IPKF.

I and my three brothers and three sisters left home on or about 10.11.87 and took refuge at Pathirakally Hindu Temple at Thavady.

My father chose to remain at home.

On 17.11.87 at about 10 a.m. IPKF soldiers arrived in the locality of our house. Which was only 75 yards from the temple where we had taken refuge.

The IPKF soldiers were shooting while in the said locality.

The IPKF within about 10 minutes.

Since we feared for the safety of our father, I and my grandmother went towards our house.

When I went home we found my father shot dead at the entrance of our house.

There were bleeding gun shot injuries on the region of his stomach.

We buried the body in a temple garden nearby.

Death Certificate No 1616 was issued in respect of my father's death.

The surviving seven members of our family are I, Subramaniam Jeyakumar (24), Subramaniam Paskar (20), Sumathy (18) Rasan (15), Vanitha (13), Anitha (9) and Rasin (7) all sons and daughters of the deceased.

MATHAN THARUMU Nagalingam Road, Thavady South, Kokuvil.

My wife's brother Murugan Ganesu died as a result of gun shot injuries on 18th November, 1987 at Thavady.

My wife Sinnammah wife of Tharumu and deceased Murugan Ganesu were in the refugees camp, during the violence errupted in our Area.

On the 18th November, 1987, both my wife and her brother Murugan Ganesu ande some others left the camp in search of rice and provisions for the day meal.

While they were going along the road, the Army personnel opened fire and my cousin was one of the victim and died on the spot due to Gun fire.

His body was identified by me and Sinnathamby Theiagarajah of Nagalingam Road, Thavady South, Kokuvil.

My wife's brother Murugan Ganesu lived with us for last 25 years and he looked after me and my wife.

As my cousin had promised to look after me, I bequeathed him everything I had.

I am a disabled person and my right leg badly affected by polio.

Therefore, Now I am out of income. I have lost my chief mainstay of my family.

RATNASABAPATHY SAROJENITHEVY (45) widow of Inuvil West, Inuvil.

The deceasedd Apputhurai Ratnasabapathy, aged 55 years was my husband.

He was working as a Cigar-roller.

During the November 1987 disturbances we sought refuge at the Madathuvasal Pilliyar Temple Inuvil.

On 18.11.87 at about 2 a.m. my husband went outside to urinate.

A shell fell within the temple compound and exploded, critically wounding my husband.

My husband died at about 7.30 a.m.

His body was.cremated in a nearby field on the same day.

I have three children including two daughters.

My children and I have been deprived of the maintenance and support we received from my husband.

I do not have any income after his death.

SARATHADEVI, widow of Vallipuram Shanmugasundaram, Inuvil South.

The deceased is my husband, Vallipuram Shanmugasundaram, aged 50 years.

On 18.11.87 while we were in our house a shell fell on our house and exploded.

My deceased husband received injuries on his chest and legs. I could not take him to any hospital because of the tense situation.

He succumbed to the injuries on 19.11.87.

The body was cremated on 20.11.87 at Inuvil Cemetery.



ESWARY AMMA AYATHURAI (62) Veemankamam, Tellipalai.

The deceased Velupillai Ayathurai aged 71 years was my husband.

On 18.11.87 our area was subjected to heavy shelling.

At about 7 p.m. a shell fell near our house and exploded.

My husband became excited and complained of a chest pain.

He died within a on hour.

The death of death was due to heart failure as a result of shell shock.

His body was cremated at the Kothiavadi cemetery.



Mrs. KAMALAMBIKAI THANGARASA (30) 465/3, K.K.S. Road, Jaffna

I am a widow.

The deceased, my husband Sinnathurai Thangarasa aged 36 years was the owner of a mini-bus and was earning an income of Rs. 2,000/- per month by transporting people.

My two sons aged 10 and 8, 2 daughters aged 12 and 5 and I were living with my late husband at 465/3, K.K.S. Road, Jaffna.

Due to the IPKF military operation, I along with my husband and 4 children took refuge at Navalar School, Jaffna on 20.11.87.

While remaining in the above school premises, shells fired by the IPKF started falling in the premises and exploded.

On 26.11.87 at 5.30 p.m. when my husband was standing in the school premise along with some refugees he was killed by the shell explosion on the spot along with 6 other Tamil Civilians.

All the dead bodies including that of my husband was burnt by the IPKF the same day at 6.30 p.m. in the school premise.

I have no means of living.

I may be given assistance to look after my children.



NITSINGHAM NAGESWARY (56) Hospital Road, Chankanai,

The deceased person Thambiah Nitsingham, aged 58 years was my husband.

He was a Farmer.

On 20.11.87 at about 9.30 a.m. my husband left for Jaffna Town.

He did not return home afterwards.

On the following day I came to know that he was killed in a shell blast at Arukal Nadam, Anaicoddai on 20.11.87.

I learned that his body was cremated by the army itself.

I do not have any income.



PARARAJASINGHAM ARUNTHAVARANY (52).

The deceased Kasipillai Pararajasingham aged 47 years was my husband.

He was a Farmer.

On 20.11.1987 at about 8.00 a.m. my husband left home saying that he is going to Neervely to purchase some provisions.

At about 3.00 p.m. I was informed that my husband was seriously injured after being caught in the cross fire during a battle between the army and the militants at about 10.30 a.m. while he was returning from Neervely.

I rushed to the place and brought my husband who was in unconscious state.

He died within few minutes of his arrival at our house.

He had a large gunshot wound on his abdomen.

His cremation took place on 21.11.87 at Achchelu cemetery.

His father who was living with us also died of shock following his son's death.

I have two children.

My children and I have been deprived of the maintenance and support we received from my husband.

We do not have any income and undergoing untold hardship.



Mrs SUSEELADEVI PARAMANATHAN (34)
Sivahami Amman Kovilady, Inuvil East, Chunnakam.

On the 20th of November 1987 my husband Kanapathipillai Paramanathan (38) left home at 6 a.m. to visit his farm close to Karaikal Sivan temple Inuvil situated about 1/4 mile from our home.

At about 8 a.m. the same day I was informed that my husband had been shot dead by Indian Peace Keeping Force Personnel opposite the Karaikal Sivan Temple.

As IPKF personnel were in the area none could proceed to the spot immediately. The dead body of my husband was brought home only at 12 noon.

The dead body of my husband bore gun shot injuries, an entry wound on his chest and an exit would on the back of his chest.

The dead body of my husband was cremated the same day at 4 p.m. close to the Rail track as the body could not be removed to the cemetery.

My husband was a farmer and we were depending entirely on the benifits derived from the cultivation of these plots.

My husband leaves behind myself and 3 children, 2 daughters aged 7 and 5 and a son aged 8 years.

My father-in-law Vyravanathar Kanapathipillai (74) and my mother Manicker Rasammah (70) were provided for and looked after by my husband. husband.

PARAMESWARY wife of Sellappah Paramasamy, 3-Notary Lane, Ariyalai, Jaffna.

On the 21st November, 1987, which is our festival-Deepavali day, my husband Sellappah Paramasamy, aged 55 years and a labourer by profession, was at home with us.

On the above-said day, the personnel of the IPKF came to our house and took my husband into custody.

Thereafter my husband's whereabouts are not known.

I would submit, with all respect to the Commanding officers of the IPKF that the IPKF cannot deny responsibility to my husband's safety or plead ignorance to my hsuband's whereabouts in view of the fact that my husband was taken into custody in my presence and that of my children at our house.

I have four chidlren, three of them are learning in schools.

My husband is the sole breadwinner of our family, and we have no other income whatsoever.

Mrs. THAVARANJITHAM SOTHINATHAN (32) Brown Road, Kokuvil East, Kokuvil.

The deceased Somasuntharam Sothinathan, aged 35 years was my husband.

He was a Farmer.

Due to the IPKF military offensive I sought refuge at Pathirakali Amman Kovil along with my daughter and husband

As I was ten months pregnant I had pains on 21.11.87 morning from 8.00 a.m. onwards.

Immediately my husband left the above temple refugee camp and went home to collect some clothes for me to admit to the Jaffna General Hospital for confinement.

As my late husband was getting late to return and due the increase of pain I was taken to the hospital by my mother.

On 26.11.87 while I was in the ward, to my dismay my brother-in-law came to the hospital and informed me that my husband was shot and killed on 21.11.87 by the IPKF at Thavady junction and the body was burnt on the spot by the army itself.

Due to the sudden demise of my husband the sole bread-winner of my family I am now made destitute along with my child 1 1/2 years and undergo untold hardship without any income.



Mrs. GANGADEVI SHANMUGARATNAM, (37) Urelu West, Chunnakam.

I am the daughter of Mrs. Nallammah Vaithilingam who was killed in a shell – blast.

I am the youngest daughter and my 75 year old mother lived with me and was looked after and maintained by me

At about 11.30 a.m. on 23.11.87 a shell fell on the Tamarind tree standing in the house-compound and blasted.

My mother who was standing in the court – yard was struck by shrapnels darting from the explosion, causing severe bleeding injuries on her neck and legs.

As I rushed to the spot I found she was dead.

Her dead body was cremated at Pokkanai Crematorium on 23.11.87 at about 3.00 p.m.

My husband is a casual labourer.

I have three children who are all school going.



MAHATEVAN RAJESWARY (33)
Memorial Lane, Manipay North, Manipay.

I am the mother of Mahathevan Thileepan (02) who died on 24.11.87.

I am also the daughter in law of the late Mrs. Marimuthu Nagammah who died on 24.11.87.

On 24.11.87 about 3.00 a.m. a shell fell in the front premises of our house.

The shell burst and struck my said mother-in-law and my child. Both my mother in law's body was cremated the next day. My child was buried the next day.

Death certificate No. 1739 and 1740 were issued in respect of the deaths of my child and my mother in law, Marimuthu Nagammah, Mahathevan Thileepan.

My late mother in law was a widow at time of her death.

She has two surviving children - one my husband and the other Mrs. Indranee wife of Rasalingam of "Eswary Indira Vasam", Manipay East.

My mother in law lived with us and was solely dependant on me and my husband.



THEVARAJAH MANGAYATKARASI (31), Palaya Vaikal, Mirusuvil.

The deceased person Rajaratnam Thevarajah aged 32 years was my husband.

He was a Businessman.

On 24.11.87 my husband left for his shop.

At about 5.00 p.m. I was informed that my husband was shot and killed by an army patrol outside his shop at Mirusuvil.

His body was buried at Mirusuvil Catholic burial ground.

I have two children.



IYAMPILLAI RAJARATNAM Navakiri, Atchuvely.

On 25.11.87 there was a direct cross firing and a clash between the IPKF and the LTTE near my sister's house which was situated by the side of my agriculture land. **One of the gun shots attacked my sister, Iyampillai Pathmavathy who was unmarried and she died instantaneously.**

I have sustained a further loss of my belongings to the tune of Rs. 1,10,000/- by way of damages and missing items.



IYATHURAI YOGESWARY (37) Kovil Veethy, Inuvil South, Inuvil.

The deceased person Suppar Iyathurai, aged 70 years was my father.

He was staying with my family.

On 25.11.87 at about 11.15 a.m. a shell launched by the army fell within our compound and exploded.

My father was struck by the shrapnels darting from the explosion and sustained injures on his head and right leg.

My mother died instantaneously after being struck by the shrapnels.

My father received treatment from a private practitioner.

We could not take him to the hospital due to the curfew imposed during the period.

He died on 25.11.87 despite the treatments given to him.

His cremation took place at Thavadi cemetery on the same day.



NANNIAR THURAISINGHAM (54) Uduvil South, Manipay

The deceased Ponnan Sellam aged 77 years was my mother-in-law being my wife's mother.

During the November 1987 military offensive we sought refuge at the nearby Enjadi Vairavar Temple Suthumalai.

As my mother-in-law is very old she refused to accompany us to the temple and opted to stay at home.

On 25.11.87 at about 5.30 p.m. I returned to my house.

There I found my mother-in-law crtically injured in a shell explosion which also damaged our house.

She died four hour later.

Her body was cremated at the Thavadi cemetery on 26.11.87.

She was living with us until she met her tragic end.



PONNIAH SELVARATNAM (46) Dutch Road, Inuvil, Chunnakam.

My late brother was assaulted by the IPKF while he was at home on 25.11.87.

He was taken to a private medical practitioner for injuries on his two legs.

He was taken to the Jaffna General Hospital only on 7.1.88 and discharged on 20.1.88.

He died 6 days after being discharged from hospital.

The cause of death as specified therein states - injuries received in assault during disturbances and shock.

My late brother was not married.

I have three other brothers and a sister.

I am a line man in the CEB.

My late brother was a labourer (part time).

He lived with me and was supported by me.

RATNASABAPATHY PATHMAVATHY, (53)
C/o S. Ratnasabapathy, Rail Road, Kondavil West, Kondavil.

The deceased Nadarajah Sinnamma, aged 75 years widow was my mother.

On 25.11.87 at about 7.00 a.m. a shell fell within our compound and exploded.

Shrapnels darting from the explosion and the glass splinters flying from the shattered window struck my mother and injured her.

We could not take her to the hospital due to the prevailing situation.

She died at about 12 noon.

Her body was cremated at the Karaikal cemetery on the same day.

She was living under our care until she met her tragic death.



APPADURAI THIYAGALINGAM, (41) Thavady North, Kokuvil

I am son of the late Mrs. Appadurai Thangammah who was killed in shell blast on 26.11.87.

At about 6.30 a.m. on 26.11.87 when my mother was standing in the court yard of the house, a shell fell in the compound about 30 yards away from her and exploded.

Shrapnels darting from the explosion struck her causing a severe bleeding injury on her chest.

She died within 15 minutes before any medical attention could be provided.

Her dead body was cremated at the Thavady Crematorium on 27.11.87.

Mauled by the Tigers

Injured IPKF personnel at the Command Hospital in Pune recount the grim experiences of fighting the LTTE guerrillas in their fortified bastions in Sri Lanka

REPORT

Far removed from Jaffna city, where armoured cars are a familiar sight and mine blasts a regular affair, where snipers on house and tree tops and armed women and children have lent a new dimension to street-fighting, the injured Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) personnel at the Command Hospital in Pune recount grim experiences of the guerrilla warfare waged by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka.

"Booby traps, camouflaged high voltage wires running on open ground for about two km, remote-controlled mines, the LTTE has used all possible ruses and tricks of the trade to hinder the IPKF and make our task as difficult as possible," says Major Anil Kaul of the Armoured Regiment, who lies severely wounded at the officers' ward of the hospital. Major Kaul, who has served in the army for 15 years, was hit by a rocket propelled gun (RPG) which injured his right eye and left hand, while he was going to rescue a troop of paracommandos of the Sikh Light Infantry, barely hours after he landed at Jaffna on 12 October.

He recalls: "We had reached a T-junction and were deciding whether to turn left or right. With my hand on the commander's cupola, I tried to come out of the tank when the rocket hit the tank. I was bleeding profusely and couldn't see properly but my immediate reaction was to go back inside and fire. Ultimately we got to the place where the boys were. Sometime during the night I was given a shot of morphia and later—time was of no consequence then—of pathedine. I was groggy most of the night, but carried on normal conversation. I was brought to a safe house and evacuated only 14 hours after I got hit. Thereafter, I have been under dedicated medical care."

Major Kaul was sent to Madras and then to Bangalore. Later he reached Pune on 5 October. He has already been operated upon five times and requires a sixth operation soon. His right eye will have to be reconstructed too. At Pune, his father, Brig. (retd.) K.K. Kaul, and wife Rekha are at his bedside, but his two daughters, aged ten and six, are back home in central India, where he was stationed before he left for Jaffna. Like Kaul other injured IPKF personnel were taken to different southern cities before being brought to Pune, the headquarters of the Southern Command, which has outfitted the IPKF in Sri Lanka.

Naik Dhrampad Singh (38) from Haryana has served with the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) for 15 years. He was sent to Sri Lanka on 23 September and was based in Trincomalee. However, when the fighting escalated on 10 October, he was patrolling the lone police station in Jaffna. "On 14 October, we were warned of an attack. Firing started around midnight." Hurt in his left upper arm, he is at the Command Hospital for reconstructive

Vallabha Kulkerni

AWWA delegates visit the injured IPKF personnel at the Command Hospital and (inset) an IPKF jawan keeps vigil near Jaffna

(plastic) surgery.

Twentyfive-year-old Shyamlal Bhatt of the Garhwal Rifles was injured when a mine blew up in Batticaloa. "Twelve of us and a JCO were patrolling the area in a three-tonne truck. I was carrying the wireless. After driving for 35 km and around midnight we could not make contact with platoon number two and three. We decided to go ahead and check what had happened. Between platoon number two and three there is this four km area which the LTTE had mined. As we reached the centre of this area, the mines blew up on both sides. We opened fire, but our truck blew up. I was among four or five casualties," he says. A bullet pierced through from just below Bhatt's right eye to his left cheek. He was sent to Madras two days later on 13 October. In Pune, he has regained vision in one eye and has been assured that the other one would heal too. But he has not sent news of his injury to his parents and wife back home in Uttarkashi in UP. "I sent them a normal letter. I did not want to frighten them," he explains.

Bhatt is now looking forward to returning to Jaffna. *"Fouji aaadmi isi liye to paala jata hai* (a soldier is trained for this)," says he and goes on to recount his experiences: "The LTTE lured us by running into houses and as we opened the door, a mine would blow up. When we went up the stairs, another mine would go off. Women and children too fired at us." Adds Kulwant Singh, a sepoy with the Sikh Light Infantry, who received a bullet in his right arm from a sniper on a treetop: "As Indians, we would feel sorry for the women and children and move back. The LTTE used this to their advantage."

According to B.B. Malgavi, naib subedar clerk with the Maratha Light Infantry, "Even eight and ten-year-old children and pregnant women were armed." Malgavi, whose right leg was injured during an attack, was in Sri Lanka since 31 July. He says with a faint trace of bitterness, "We (the IPKF) went to help them (the LTTE), to see that they got a good deal. And they respected and even welcomed us at first. They surrendered arms but that was apparently not all they had. When the problems began and the IPKF intervened, they transferred the blame on to us."

According to a defence spokesman, the casualties have been heavier because the IPKF was fighting a peculiar battle. It had to capture a city without harming the civilians. Says Major Kaul: "We were instructed not to kill innocent civilians, but how were we to distinguish between an innocent and a Tiger? Or between a Tamil, Sinhalese or Christian? The only difference was whether they were armed or not. For instance, a crowd shouting slogans came out from a semi-settlement and advanced towards us. And then, before you could say Jack Robinson, they sat down and LTTE men opened fire. The day I landed in Jaffna this is how I was briefed: 'Today there is a curfew, so anybody outside is an LTTE. But we kept our restraint. However, when we saw firing from houses, we returned fire and we did blast a couple of them out of the way. There was, for instance, this house where a white flag was being surreptitiously waved from a window. Even as I was pointing this out to a colleague, they opened fire from inside the building. It was through sheer sixth sense that I had swivelled the commander's cupola to the side for protection and this saved me."

Shyamlal Bhatt of the Garhwal Rifles, who was injured when a mine blew up in Batticaloa, recalls, "The LTTE lured us by running into houses and as we opened the door, a mine would blow up. When we went up the stairs, another mine would go off. Women and children too fired at us"

B.B. Malgavi, a naib-subedar clerk with the Maratha Light Infantry,says, "Even eight and ten-year-old children and pregnant women were armed...We (the IPKF) went to help them (the LTTE). When the problems began and the IPKF intervened, they transferred the blame on us"

Of the total injured, 147 have been admitted to the Command Hospital since 15 October while 47 are at the Military Hospital in Khadki nearby. According to a defence spokesman, the aircraft which left Pune with supplies, returned with the wounded. He says that only three, including Major Kaul, are seriously injured. The spokesman explained that the injured can be classified into three categories: those who require treatment up to four weeks, those who require it for more than four weeks, and five to seven per cent of whom require even further treatment.

Naik J.L. Babu from Andhra Pradesh is being shifted to the Military Hospital in Secunderabad. Thirtyeight-year-old Babu, who is a driver with the ASC (Army Supplies Corps) battalion, was injured while driving from Killinochi to Jaffna on 11 October. Swerving to avoid a group of LTTE men armed with Light Machine Guns (LMG), he ran over a mine. He was brought to Madras in an unconscious condition. Though he can move about now he has lost his sense of hearing in his left ear.

According to Major Vohra, the medical officer at the Command Hospital, 54 of the 80 injured men in ward number three in various stages of recovery (the IPKF casualties are occupying two wards of the 500-odd bed hospital), were transferred to hospitals in Secunderabad and Agra on 27 October. Several more are to be transferred, while some are even going to be discharged. This is being done not only to make room to admit others but also to keep the injured closer to their base and/or next of kin.

However, at the hospital in Pune, no effort is being spared to make the soldiers both mentally and physically fit. The president of the AWWA (Army Wives Welfare Association), Mrs B. Depinder Singh, started off by presenting a transistor radio to each of the wounded. Subsequent delegations of the AWWA as well as local charitable and women's organisations and college students has flooded the immates with flowers, fruits and so many other things to express their good will. But it is not all that easy to cheer up the soldiers who have had a bitter experience in Sri Lanka. When a group of women visited the hospital on the day of Bhai Duj (brother's day), one anguished voice cried out, "The women in Jaffna were my sisters too. And look what they've done to me."

Ranjana Kapur /Pune 15-21 November 1987

RAPED



21.11.87	Annaikoddi/Jaffna	A girl (then killed)
22.11.87	Neervely	A women
23.11.87	Aragampathy	Miss Yogaranee Thangarajah (19)
24.11.87	Puthur, Vadarawathai	20 females
25.11.87	Valachenai	2 women.
26.11.87	Kiran/Batticoloa	4 women
	Kondavil west	Mrs. G. Selvanayagam
27.11.87	Morakottanchenai	2 women (one of them Maragatham)
	Kondavil West	Satgunavathy
30.11.87	Nalady, Valaichekki	3 Muslim women and one Tamil girl

கற்பழிப்பு முறைதானோ?
கண்ணியம் என்பது இதுதானோ?
சிங்களன் பாதையில் செல்வதுசரிதானோ
இட்லரின் வழியில் இந்திய அரசா?



Protestors burnt the effigy of Mr. Rajiv at Madras

DMK posters condemn rape and other atrocities of the Indian Army

நம்மினத்திற்கே கேடு விளைவிக்கும்
மத்திய அரசிற்கு நம்எதிர்ப்புக்கணைகள்
தமிழ் ஈழமலரென
வெடித்தெழட்டும்!

எதிர்ப்புக்கள் இடிஒலியாய் எழுந்து -
தமிழர் இன உணர்வு பேரொளியாய்
சுடர் விட்டும்!

இவண் 18 வதுவட்ட தி.மு.க. இளைஞரணி.



The INDO-LTTE Conflict

CRITQUE

Our point of view.

It is a tragic paradox that the Indian Peace Keeping Force which arrived in the Tamil homeland with a mandate to maintain peace, to protect the life and property of our people, to foster cessation of hostilities between Sri Lankan troops and Tiger guerrillas are now engaged in a full fledged war against the LTTE. This war has brought disasterous consequences with a heavy toll of civilian casualities, immense sufferings to our people with severe disruption of their socio-economic existence. Having engaged themselves in a war with violence, brutality and terror, the IPKF has lost its status as an instrument of peace but has assumed the role of a repressive invasion army, typically eliminating both the Tamil Freedom fighters and innocent civilians. The Indian military intervention has again shattered the peace in the Tamil region, shattered all civic hopes of return to normalcy and caused violence and bloodshed. Along with the military offensives the Government of India has mounted a massive propaganda war to rationalise and legitimise her action. This propaganda campaign is vicious, malicious and distortion of truth, aimed to discredit our organisation in the eyes of the Indian and World public opinion. It is precisely for this reason, we wish to articulate our point of view on the developing of Indo-LTTE conflict and the consequences that followed.

In our talks with the Indian Prime Minister on the day before signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord, we expressed our reservations on certain vital issues, but pledged to support the implementation of the accord and uphold the interest of our people. We also promised to hand over our weapons on certain guarantee and assurances given by the Prime Minister of India. Recognising the pre-eminent role of India in the South Asian region, respecting India's Geopolitical sensitivity and compulsion, we wanted to avoid any conflict with Indian interests. But at the same time we were sincerely concerned with the interest and political aspirations of our people. We sincerely felt that the sections of the accord, which deal with the set of proposals for setting up of Provincial Councils fall short of the Tamil aspirations. We thought that the Government of India understood our position.

INDIAN PROMISE OF INTERIM ADMINISTRATION - NEGATIVE ACTIONS BY SRI LANKA & 'RAW' - LAPSES IN INDIAN DIPLOMACY

One of the assurances given by the Indian Prime Minister was the formation of an Interim Administration with LTTE playing a dominant role. There was a delay in this matter. In the meantime, the Sri Lankan Government had suddenly launched a programme of intensive colonisation of Tamil areas in Mullaitivu and Trincomalee districts. Further more, Sri Lanka has started opening up police stations in Tamil areas with the calculated plan of re-establishing its state apparatuses in the Northern Sri Lanka. Alarmed over this development, we registered our protest, with India, but no action was taken. What was more disturbing at that time, was the arrival of armed Tamil groups from South India, who, with the patronage of the IPKF, established bases in the North and East and started harassing the LTTE as well as the public. We were rather shocked and surprised why the Indian Intelligence Agency 'RAW' has armed and despatched these men to the Tamil areas at a sensitive time, when the peace process was introduced, when disarming was taking place. This was one of the main reason that led to our disenchantment with the policy of the Indian Foreign Ministry. It is because of these negative developments, our movement launched a fast unto death campaign spearheaded by Mr. Thileepan, which soon expanded into a massive non-violent agitation with the active participations of the people. On the 9th day, when Thileepan was reaching the brink of death, the Indian High Commissioner Mr. Dixit arrived in Jaffna to listen to our grievances. At the first meeting, Mr. Dixit offered BIG assurances which failed to

meet our 5 points demand. The fast continued and Thileepan died. It is after Thileepan's death Mr. Dixit offered some concrete proposals for the setting up of an Interim Administration. If the Government of India had acted without delay Thileepan's life would have been saved. His death was a tragic loss to our movement and to our people. This tragedy further added to the estrangement of relations between India and the LTTE.

SILENCING THE MEDIA, THROTTLING THE VOICE OF TAMILS HERALDED THE MILITARY OFFENSIVE BY THE PEACE KEEPING FORCE.

In this war which has lasted more than a month and a half what has shaken our people is the brutal and ruthless manner the Indian troops behaved, with a war-weary population who has already suffered immensely at the hands of Sinhala military. The war could not be confined to the LTTE but extended into a military action in comparting the entire Tamil masses with an extend of terrorising and subjugating them. In the early hours of 10th October, 1987, the day the offensive started, the Indian troops confiscated all the copies of two daily news papers, 'Murasoli' and 'Eelamurasu', blasted with explosives the printing machinery and arrested the journalists and workers. On the same day LTTE's Television Station 'Nitharshanam' was also closed. This highhanded action to silence the local media which functioned as the only voice of the Tamils, constituted a serious violation of the freedom of the press and expression. Our people were shocked to see that India, which claims to be the guardian of democratic ideals has adopted a totalitarian method to muzzle the Tamil media.

RUTHLESS ACTIONS - INNOCENT CIVILIANS AT THE RECEIVING END

The military of the IPKF was callous and ruthless with total disregard for human lives and property. It appeared the resistance by the LTTE caused a good amount of material on board at the armoured column which opened up with the mortar and artillery shelling on civilian areas, took heavy toll of civilian casualities. Aerial raid by helicopter gunships caused severe devastation. Several areas the troops went in, tortured and massacred innocent civilians. Tamil women were raped. Even elderly and the children were tortured. Houses and shops were plundered. Hospitals, schools and temples were bombarded. Troops stormed the Jaffna hospital and massacred a large number of sick and injured. In this offensive operation several hundreds of innocent Tamil Civilians were senselessly done to death and hundreds of them sustained injuries primarily due to indicriminate shelling. Many of the injured died without treatment.

PROPAGANDA WAR BY INDIA - MEDIA MEN AND HUMAN RIGHT ACTIVISTS KEPT OFF

Our allegations of military brutality by the IPKF was rejected by India by a full scale propaganda. But the Government of India refused to allow the Indian and the International press to visit the affected areas and interview the public. The colombo based journalists who witnessed the events of war in Jaffna for nearly two weeks had reported the horrors of military atrocities to Sri Lankan Government on the request of the Indian High Commission. Without communication link, there was a total black-out of news. In the meantime, the Government of India utilised the state controlled media to malign theTigers and put out fabricated stories, about the war. We pleaded with India to send a team of observers from Amnesty International and International Commission of jurists to investigate the violation of human rights and extra judicial killings. The Government of India turned down the request.

The military offensive operation undertaken by the IPKF brought extreme hardships to the civilian population. The electricity and water supply were purposely cut-off. The food and medical supply from the rest of the Sri Lanka was blockaded. Public transport was halted. There was restriction on fishing. There was continuous round the clock curfew in Tamil areas for a month with occasional relaxation in certain specified areas. Because of these hard measures, the innocent civilians suffered immensely with the total disruption of their social and economic existence.

The LTTE leaders, pointing out the human tragedy brought about by this war, appealed to India for a cessation of hostilities and start negotiations to bring about peace and normalcy. But India continues to insist that LTTE should lay down the arms and surrender and accept unconditionally the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement.

VIOLATION OF AGREEMENT BY SRI LANKA - WITHDRAWAL OF GENERAL AMNESTY - INDIA LED TO THE TRAP

The incident that led a severe blow to India-LTTE relation was the arrest and detention and the tragic death of our two regional Commanders and 10 senior members. Though they were arrested by the Sri Lankan Navy, they were kept in the protective custody of the IPKF at the Palaly camp, while negotiations were taking place, between Mr. Dixit and President Jayewardene in Colombo. Though Sri Lanka insisted on taking our leaders to Colombo for interrogation, we were given assurances by the Indian side that they would be released. The arrested Tigers had already warned both Sri Lanka and India that they would swallow cyanide pills and kill themselves rather than facing torture and possibly death in the hands of the enemy. We argued with the Government of India that the arrest of these LTTE leaders and cadres constitute a serious violation of the agreement, wherein LTTE men were given General Amnesty. The two weapons they had were for the personal protection of the regional Commanders. We also insisted that the protection of the lives of our members, was the responsibility of the IPKF which assured the role of avoiding any clashes between the Sri

Lankan troops and the Tamil guerillas. We also warned India of a possible outburst of violence if these men were massacred. Our plea to secure the release of our leaders was a minor concession we demanded from both India and Sri Lanka, we have just entered a major agreement with the objective of resolving the ethnic conflict. But J.R. Jayewardene was adamant, intransigent and belligerant. Mr. Dixit, was well aware of the disasterous consequences of the Sri Lanka's obstinancy failing with diplomatic endeavour. The result was a great tragedy. The massacre of 12 prominent LTTE men who were true heroes of Tamil Liberation has, outraged the Tamil sentiment. Pulendran, the regional Commander, Trinconamalee and Kumarappa, the former regional Commander of Batticaloa, were highly respected leaders. Their tragic death sparked of spontaneous racial violence which resulted in the death of several Sinhala civilians. Sri Lanka accused the LTTE for the outburst of violence and killings. India too joined Sri Lanka in blaming the Tigers. What followed was a high level conference in colombo between India and Sri Lanka in which a series of tough measures, including military action against the LTTE were decided upon.

PROXY WAR OF INDIA - JAYEWARDENE SCORES

The decision to involve India in a war against the LTTE was a major diplomatic victory for Jeyewardene. India, which has been hither to accused of providing sanctuary and assistance for the Tamil resistance movement, suddenly took over Sri Lanka's military job of liquidating the Tamil freedom movement. A week earlier the LTTE was officially recognised by both India and Sri Lanka as the major representative organisation of the Tamils and was marked to form an Interim Government. But now LTTE was banned, and the amnesty given to the movement withdrawn. The IPKF which played the role of a protector and Peace maker was turned to an instrument of terror of war. India, thus finally fell to the diplomatic trap of the Sri Lanka's racist ruling regime and turned the guns against the Tamils.

LIMITED CHOICES TO LTTE

The LTTE, was left with no choice other than to fight for self-preservation and die with honour rather than surrender with humiliation and perish. Even in our wildest dreams we never contemplated a war with India. We never wanted to fight the Indian soldiers whom we regarded with great admiration and love. But the Indian leaders forced us into a situation which has left us to choose between honour and humiliation, between self - preservation and death, we decided to resist. Yet we pleaded with India to call off the unjust war against our movement

TRAGIC PARADOX - INDIA CHOSE TO IMPOSE DEMOCRATIC WILL BY MILITARY ACTION

It is surprising that the Government of India which had advised Sri Lanka for several years to give up the military option and solve the problem by peaceful negotiation is adopting the similar methodology of military offensive, terror and torture to impose its will on the Tamil people. India's attitude is unfair and undemocratic. LTTE, the main representative political movement of the Eelam Tamils, should not be denied the democratic rights of the freedom of decision and expression. In so far as the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement is concerned we reserve the right to articulate our view. In our view, the set of proposals envisaged in the accord for the settlement of the Tamil problem has serious limitations, therefore fall short to fulfill the political aspiration of our people. Hence, we pledge to extend our co-operation to the implementation of the accord in so far as it upholds the rights of our people. Therefore it is unfair and unreasonable for a democratic country like India to demand unconditional support for the accord at the point of a gun. We hope that the people of India would appreciate and understand our position on this matter.

ISSUES AND NON ISSUES

On the question of surrendering arms, we pledged to handover our weapons to India and accordingly, LTTE was the first organisation which handed over substantial portion of its arms, as a goodwill gesture towards the implementation of the accord. Furthermore, we agreed to handover the rest of the weapons according to modality worked out, in the minutes of the deliberations we had with the Indian High Commission. We wanted to co-operate with India on the question of arms. There was no need for us to possess arms once the ethnic question is amicably settled with adequate guarantee for the safety and security of our people. Now I feel the real problem is not simply the possession of arms, but the crucial issue of the protection of life and interest of our people. Therefore we earnestly request the Government of India to abandon its military approach and engage in negotiations on the question of arms and other relating matters.

GESTURE OF GOODWILL AND A SALUTE TO PROTECTORS OF DEMOCRACY

In the presence of the jounalists we release the 18 captured Indian soldiers unconditionally. This action is on purely humanitarian reasons and as a gesture of goodwill towards the people of India. We hope the Government of India will respond to our desire for peace and call off the offensive operations and open door for peaceful negotiations of substantial benefits.

In India, it was the journalists, who have been preserving and protecting the concepts of democracy. To honour them we decided to release 18 captured Indian soldiers in the presence of Indian Journalists.

V. Prabhakaran.
Leader, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

Jaffna.
18.11.1987.

Stance on LTTE not softened

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI, Nov. 28

The stance of the Government of India with regard to the LTTE leadership seems to have retained the tough edge taken by the Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. Natwar Singh, while announcing the 48-hour ceasefire on November 20. The Government disappointment over the lack of a positive LTTE response was borne out by the statement issued by the External Affairs Ministry spokesman following the expiry of the period, which referred to the LTTE's actions in killing fellow Tamil militants and members of the Sinhala and Muslim communities.

The Government action was the result of suggestions made by a number of prominent people who had said that the time-period would be helpful in allowing the LTTE to reach a decision on the surrender of weapons and the acceptance of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, the two requisites laid down by the Indian side. The November 20 ceasefire declaration was finally touched off by the signals given by the LTTE's deputy leader, Mr. Ajit Mahatiya, to senior IPKF officials at Chavakacheri at the time of handing over of the first nine of the 18 Indian captives. Mr. Mahatiya had wanted some sort of reciprocity for the LTTE action and was not insisting on the hardline position subsequently adopted, calling for a return of the IPKF to the positions of October 10. Among the issues raised by Mr. Mahatiya was the issue of the security of the LTTE cadres in the event of their surrendering arms as well as their rehabilitation. The first of these issues has been repeatedly raised and answered by the Indian officials who have pointed out that the security of the disarmed LTTE cadres has been their responsibility from the beginning. The second issue has been addressed by the Government's detailed offer to rehabilitate any LTTE cadres who choose to surrender.

IPKF will reckon with LTTE sniping: Pant

NEWS

LUCKNOW, Nov. 29.

Confrontation on an organised basis in the Jaffna peninsula of Sri Lanka has come to an end with the dispersal of LTTE men, but the possibility of continued sniping had to be reckoned with, the Defence Minister, Mr. K. C. Pant, said today.

Replying to newsmen's questions after a "bara khana" with officers and jawans of the Central Command here, he said it was very difficult to set a time-limit for peace to return to the island-nation.

Asked about the possibility of foreign forces behind the LTTE, Mr. Pant said: "In such situations, various types of forces come into play."

The Minister attributed the upsurge in the LTTE activities in the Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka to the movement of the hard-pressed LTTE cadres from Jaffna to the east. He, however, refused to comment when asked whether the IPKF would now be shifted from Jaffna to Batticaloa and the other affected areas in the east to deal with the situation.

Mr. Pant reiterated that India was committed to the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and would not allow "anybody or any force" to come in its way. He said he was hopeful that the LTTE would see reason and surrender its arms.

Mr. Pant visited the base hospital and talked to the wounded IPKF officers and soldiers who were flown here. Most of them who have almost recovered told the Minister that they were "raring to go back" to rejoin their regiments on the frontline in Jaffna.

In India's interest: Defending the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, the Defence Minister asserted that it was in the interest of the Sri Lankans, the Tamils and India itself.

It was in the interest of India because "certain elements and mercenaries were getting involved in the ethnic conflict and the possibility of more forces not friendly to India getting in there was very much on the cards".

Asked to comment on the presence of Israeli mercenaries in Sri Lanka, Mr. Pant said, "the IPKF is keeping vigil in Jaffna and the Eastern Province. It is our troops who are on the ground".

Interests not the same: When his attention was drawn to the criticism of killing of the Tamils whose interests India wanted to safeguard, Mr. Pant said, "The interests of the Tamils and the LTTE are not the same always".

On the recent 48-hour ceasefire being utilised by the LTTE for regrouping, the Minister said, "I don't think any major regrouping could be done".

He said although India was a peace-loving country and wanted friendly relations with its neighbours, "experience has taught us that peace cannot be maintained unless others too wanted it. "That is why our objective has been to remain alert and be in a position to defend the country's borders on our own strength," he said.

Modernisation drive: Mr. Pant told the jawans that the Government was making all efforts to ensure that the Indian troops did not have to face any disadvantage on the front. "We have procured modern arms for you and would continue to do so." He, however, told them not to relax vigilance on the borders.

The Defence Minister said that along with the modernisation drive, efforts were also on to seek self-sufficiency in defence production. Our scientists have achieved a breakthrough in armament production," he said.

Exposure to 'urban warfare': Major R. S. Rathore of the Mechanised Infantry, who was wounded in action on the outskirts of Jaffna, told newsmen that this was the first time that the Indian Army had been exposed to 'urban warfare'. "This was a novel experience for us and we have learnt a lot."

This was also the experience shared by personnel of the other regiments. Mr. M. Muthuswamy of the Madras Regiment said the "LTTE was ruthless. They caught me in a crossfire and even as I shouted to them in Tamil, they replied with a hail of automatic gunfire."

Mr. Jagroop Singh of the Sikh Light Infantry said the Army Headquarters had informed his family promptly of his getting wounded in battle and had shifted him here from the Command Hospital in Pune after an operation so that he could be near his family. — UNI, PTI

The Telegraph

Is this the time to celebrate the fall of Prabhakaran's village?

COMMENT

The president of the World Bank honoured us by a visit earlier this month. He pleased offficialdom by announcing a special loan to the tune of 350 million US dollars, or close to Rs 560 crores. The loan will help the government, he assured press correspondents, to fight the battle against this year's unprecedented drought by facilitating the import of foodgrains, edible oils and petroleum products. Since the additional strain on India's balance of payments on account of the drought, according to the Bank president's own estimate is likely to exceed, Rs 1,300 crores, the loan would help only partially. And he did not mention the other factors which are going to add to the nation's fiscal and external payments burden this year: a minimum extra outlay of Rs 1,500 crores because of the war we are engaged in to liquidate the Tamils in Sri Lanka, and defence purchases of an undisclosed amount from the United States which our Prime Minister committed himself to during his recent trip to Washington, DC.

Ashok Mitra

But these payments are—or should be—the Government of India's worries, not the World Bank president's. The Bank, as spokesmen of the US administration never tire to inform Congressional committees, is an instrument for the implementation of American foreign policy, which has two principal current concerns vis-a-vis the governments of the poorer countries: (a) arms purchases by these governments must continue unimpaired, and a large chunk of such purchases should take place from the American market, and (b) they should increasingly "liberalise" their system, that is, allow free import of foreign goods and capital, and create such conditions as will encourage private investment of all hues. The turmoil in the stock exchanges and the resulting convulsions in the American economy make it imperative that these objectives are pursued with greater vigour, so that any slackening of demand within the United States itself could be partly compensated by larger exports to the countries of the so-called Third World. The loan of 350 million US dollars is sophisticated bribery. Following his meeting with our Prime Minister, the World Bank president was beaming all over: the bribe will work, the Government of India he felt confident, will not stray from the path of progressive liberalisation and reliance on market incentives the Bank has been preaching to it.

In other words, the Bank president must have received a kind of commitment from either the Prime Minister himself or some of his colleagues that despite the deepening fiscal and balance of payments crisis, India will not reduce its purchases from overseas, the present level of imports of capital goods, luxury consumption goods and arms and weaponry will be maintained, the tempo of liberalisation will not be slowed down, and, despite domestic political difficulties, there will be no reversal of the policy, vigorously pursued of late, of permitting private investors to have a very large say in determining the direction the economy should move.

True, as champion panhandlers of the world, we have practised almost to perfection the art of being all things to all men; if next week a trade delegation arrives from the Soviet Union and mildly enquires about our long-range economic intentions, we would be equally capable of instantly churning out an essay which will prove that our system is even more socialistic than that of many East European countries. Nevertheless, the superciliousness with which major economic issues are being handled in New Delhi cannot but cause intense worry. Retail prices and cost of living indexes suggest that we are once more in the throes of double digit inflation, but official sources turn a Nelson's eye and keep referring to trends in wholesale prices. Within two years of its being launched with much fanfare, the Seventh Five Year Plan has collapsed; both its targets and its resource calculations have fallen by the wayside. Farm output will perhaps drop by as much as 10 per cent this year, the explosive industrial growth for which the votaries of liberalisation had made advance claim is visible nowhere, and a steep decline in national income is inevitable. A cloak of secrecy shrouds the government's fiscal operations, the nation is not told how bad the state of affairs is. Even if account is taken of some improvement in revenue collection over what was anticipated in the Budget, and the proceeds of the new World Bank loan are thrown in, the arithmetic cannot but be frightening, since the splurge of expenditure, particularly in the name of defence and also in part to provide natural calamity relief, has been mind-boggling.

The mind can be boggled though only if you happen to possess one. Giving a bloody nose to Velupillai Prabhakaran has emerged as the principal objective of governance; substantive issues have lost their relevance. All talk of curbing non-essential expenditure thus has an air of unreality. By cutting down on the foreign trip of one or two junior officials or by postponing the purchase of stationery and furniture in this or that government office, you save only fractional amounts. The Government of India's largest spending outfit is the ministry of defence. When the sums are added at the time of the presentation of next year's Budget in February, none need bat an eye if defence expenditure is found to overrun the amount originally budgeted for by at least Rs 2,000 crores. The defence budget in the current year, if only we care to remember, was already higher by 40 per cent than what it was last year. Obviously, even the sky is not the limit here.

Something however has got to give. So the usual exercise is on. It is development expenditure which is dispensable. Already word has gone round that Plan outlay for each state

Keshav, The Hindu, 20.11.87

and each Union ministry in 1988-89 will be frozen at this year's level. There will be no growth of national income this year, there will in fact be a decline. The government's prescription for remedying the situation is to cut back further on development activities. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund will applaud from the sidelines. Their perseverence in trying to train up the boys in the Government of India is bearing fruit; the government, they have been stating all along, must curtail its spending, and allow scope for private initiative. These international organisations are discriminating, that is, choosy. They do not disapprove of all types of public spending; they frown upon spending for development, but not upon defence spending.

Within the government, there is seemingly little of residual capability or will to channel thinking along directions which do not toe in entirety the Bank-Fund line. The subversion has taken place over a number of years. With a Prime Minister whose instinctive sympathy is for an elitist economic philosophy, a ruling party populated by mostly gutless, self-seeking individuals, and an Opposition which is incapable of proceeding beyond cliches, it will therefore be empty bravado to talk of putting a halt to the process. For reasons of political exigency, there will of course be constant prattle about socialist principles and the need for a strong and resilient public sector, and voluminous shedding of crocodile tears over the plight of the nation's poor. All this will be in conformity with the conventions of hypocrisy. Meanwhile, the World Bank president has extracted a commitment. India will follow the rigid capitalist path, come what may. She will keep her system open, open to the maraudings of transnational corporations and international private banks, and will not mind walking into an external debt trap.

For that is precisely where we are heading. Suppose the current crisis in the stock markets forces the American administration to reduce drastically the size of its Budget deficit and, at the same time, to cut back on imports. The consequences for countries like ours will be two-fold. First, the US contribution to the World Bank's soft-loan affiliate, the International Development Association, will be slashed, scotching the project of increased concessional credit from that body. Second, once a general curtailment in imports is decided upon, our exports of garments and other textiles, leather goods, handicrafts, diamonds and jewels and such like to the United States will fall dramatically. Provided Wall Street continues to behave in the manner it has in recent weeks, the scope of the World Bank to raise funds in the American capital market will also be narrowed, placing a further constraint on the Bank's ability to lend to countries such as India.

Consider the other grave possibility too. Given their extensive stock-holdings in the United States, many affluent families in the Gulf countries will begin to feel the finch. One consequence could be a major drop in construction and other activities in these countries. Once that happens, the enormous remittances we have been receiving from our workers over there could simply evaporate.

There is no indication at all that any of these uncertainties is bothering the regime in New Delhi. No reappraisal of economic or other policies is on the anvil. Defence outlay continues its upward climb, there is no attempt to clamp down on the import of petroleum products, and the morale of the urban fringe of the nation is sought to be sustained by Reliance Cup-like hooplas. The likely outcome at the end of the next few years is a bulge in our external payment obligations for which we will have no cover. The Fund and the Bank will regret their inability to finance us further, the wolf will be at our door, we will have to borrow heavily, and at high interest rates, from private international banks so as to service the past borrowings. That is to say, we will be entering the classical debt trap.

None is however listening. Prabhakaran's village near Jaffna has fallen to our troops, Let us celebrate.

THE STATESMAN

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS KILLED

MANIPAY

T. Cyril	S. Paheetharan
T. Somasuntharam	K. Kanahammah
A. Mary Loyala	S. Sathasivan
N. Vethanayagam	N. Sellakandu
K. Thavaluxmy	M. Nagamuthu
S. Sri Ranganathan	N.A. Selvararaja
M. Pararajasingam	A. Sukanyah
K. Thanabalasingam	T. Selvaratnam
Rasalingam	Mahadeva
Parmalasingam	T. Jeyaratnam
N. Vijayaratnam	S. Kanagar
R. Nileshan	K. Kandiah
K. Thayaparan	M. Palagowry
K. Rathinam	S. Thesingarajah
R. Manoharan	K. Kumarasamy
J. Alexander	K. Sellathurai
I. Ponnammah	P. Kandiah
[illegible]	[illegible]
S. Suganthini	S. Arunthavarajan
J. Michel	S. Ladchumy
A. Gnanapragasam	A. Velayutham
T. Sritharan	S. Sinnapody
V. Rajendran	A. Thambirajah
K. Nadarajan	R. Selvaratnam
K. Sinnathurai	S. Nagaratnam
S. Ponniah	T. Sinnathamby
Sivapala	S. Thangamany
S. Thuraisingam	K. Manimuthu
K. Mahadeva	N. Mahendran
T. Achchipillai	T. Cyril
N. Paramaguru	S. Maheswary
C. Patkunarajah	K. Sinnathathurai
R. Thiruchelvam	K. Velauthapillai
P. Thambirajah	Thioglus

A NO-WIN SITUATION

EDITORIAL 24.11.87

THERE can be no doubt that the much-publicized release of 18 IPKF prisoners in Jaffna, following which India was compelled to announce a 48-hour cease-fire, was an impressive propaganda victory for the LTTE. Being dependent on a domestic reaction in this country to ease the military pressure on the Tigers, Mr V. Prabhakaran has shrewdly calculated that token gestures such as the release of the jawans and carefully worded homilies aimed at Mr M. G. Ramachandran will increase the pressure on Mr Rajiv Gandhi to extricate himself from the mess in Sri Lanka. Certainly, President Jayewardene's blunt anti-Tamil Nadu tirade earlier this month, what might be described as Mr Premadasa's show of ingratitude and even Mr Gamini Dissanayake's muted misgivings, have provided valuable ammunition to those who are under the belief that Indian interests will not be served by fighting Colombo's proxy war against the LTTE. The near-unanimous acclaim that greeted Mr Natwar Singh's unilateral cease-fire announcement in Parliament on Friday is an indication that there is no domestic consensus behind the Indian involvement in Sri Lanka; it also suggested that there is total confusion as to the future course of action. Not surprisingly, Mr Pirabhakaran has not been slow to capitalize on this strategic impasse.

Obviously, there is a strong lobby in both Madras and New Delhi which is opposed to the IPKF training its guns against the LTTE out of a misplaced sense of ethnic solidarity. On its part, the Union Government has contributed to this mushy sentimentalism by failing in the past to stress the crucial distinction between Indian and Tamil interests. Critics of Mr Gandhi's recent anti-LTTE posture can hardly be faulted for believing that Colombo is the real villain of the piece when New Delhi has made a massive show airing its reservations on the devolution package passed by the Sri Lankan Parliament, unmindful of the fact that genuine federalism can only emerge out of a clearly unwinnable referendum. Interestingly, Indian criticism of the devolution package has allowed the moderate TULF a convenient way out of having to oppose the adventurism of the LTTE and directly confront its anti-democratic credentials. It is also likely that the pro-LTTE lobby will be more emboldened if the likely confrontation with the Tigers in Vavuniya results in Sinhalese casualties, which in turn will encourage the more extremist sections in Colombo to indulge in fresh anti-India tirades.

But if New Delhi is ambivalent about its own pro-LTTE lobby—mark Mr Natwar Singh's distinct change of tone in Parliament—it has also failed to keep on the right side of the Sinhalese. It was futile, and somewhat hypocritical, of Mr J. N. Dixit to issue a formal protest against the Sri Lankan Prime Minister's statement that Indian troops would not have needed to sacrifice their lives if New Delhi had not encouraged the militants in the first place, when that is also the prevalent view in India. Indeed, what the policy-makers in New Delhi do not seem to appreciate is that Sinhalese opposition to the Indo-Sri Lankan accord is not based on the rabid anti-Tamil hysteria to which it is often attributed but on a suspicion of India's larger geopolitical imperatives and its violation of Sri Lankan sovereignty. Mr Premadasa may have been unnecessarily abrasive in saying he hoped that hostilities would end by December 4 "because then we will be able to pack them (the IPKF) back home", but he was merely expressing a sentiment that is popular with his countrymen. As it is, the resignation of the veteran Minister, Mr Gamini Jayasuriya, from the Cabinet should send alarm bells ringing for those who tend to exaggerate President Jayewardene's own domestic clout. For the uncomfortable truth is that having blundered into a costly misadventure, India is in a hopeless no-win predicament; the apparent phoney war notwithstanding, a rapid withdrawal still remains the only pragmatic option.

DECCAN HERALD

87 November

Situation in Sri Lanka more complex than it looks

LETTER

Sir, — The recent debate in Parliament on the problems in Sri Lanka has failed to bring out all the complexities of the situation there. The Government benches and some others have tended to simplify matters by putting the blame squarely on the LTTE for the present situation. This is not entirely so.

Surprisingly the Tamil Nadu protagonists of the LTTE have not pinpointed two facts which have contributed to the present situation. The first was the uncontrolled influx of the majority Sinhala people into the Eastern Province soon after the peace accord. The LTTE claimed that under the guise that these were former colonists returning to their homes the Sri Lankan Government was bringing in new colonists so that when the proposed referendum was to be held later the balance would tilt against the merger of the two Provinces. The second was the capture of 17 LTTE men by the Sri Lanka Navy off the Jaffna coast, and the plan of the Sri Lankan authorities to take them by air to Colombo for questioning. All the efforts of the Indian High Commission officials failed to prevent this plan and the LTTE men took cyanide capsules rather than face the questioning in Colombo. Amnesty International has alleged that such questioning involved torture.

Clearly having intervened physically in Sri Lanka there was a responsibility on the part of India to have intervened effectively in both these cases. The return of Sinhala refugees should have been a carefully controlled process with suitable checks to ensure that they were genuine former residents.

The IPKF should have intervened, by force if necessary, as it has now done against the LTTE, to prevent any transfer of the 17 militants from the area of capture to Colombo and should have insisted on interrogation in Jaffna itself.

The perception, proved correct in the event, that India would not use force against the Sri Lankan Government to ensure a fair implementation of the accord has been the main reason for the collapse of the accord and the present mess. Since the Sri Lanka Government has a record of reneging on its accepted proposals it was unrealistic to insist on the total surrender of arms by the LTTE at so early a stage. This should have been a phased out operation running parallel with the implementation of the accord by the Sri Lankan Government.

The significance of the fast to death by an LTTE leader in support of five demands seems to have been lost on our policy-makers. Here was a young man who sacrificed his life by not taking even water. Would anyone, and especially one in his twenties, make such a sacrifice unless he had genuine grievances? What action was taken to look into those grievances even after his death? Anyhow this should have opened the eyes of all involved that they were dealing with deep emotional issues and that simplistic formulae, such as surrender of all arms in a couple of days' time, would not work.

What of the future? There have been demands in Parliament and out for the early withdrawal of the IPKF. But is that possible? Having broken the capacity of the LTTE to wage a stand up fight against the Sri Lanka Army can the IPKF be withdrawn allowing the Sri Lanka Army to rampage through the Northern and Eastern Provinces? Clearly this is unthinkable. India now has a moral obligation to protect the Tamilian population from an undisciplined army. But remaining in Sri Lanka also has ominous portents.

Even before India went into Sri Lanka there were large sections of the Sinhala people who were hostile to India on account of what they perceived as India's role in the problem. That hostility has not lessened quantum wise. If one section has been appeased by the action against the LTTE another, such as the militant JVP, has become hostile for what they consider as an infringement of Sri Lankan sovereignty.

C.J.M. Mathew.
General Secretary,
Rashtriya Sanjay Manch.

New Delhi. 27.11.87

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

MANIPAY

K. Pathmasini	N. Arunthavaramu
V. Markandu	Regina Saravanai
S. Sellammah	S. Kanthasamy
Geethanchali	S. Paikiam
S. Rubina	R. Jeya
T. Kathirkamanathan	S. Mahalingam
B. Yoganathan	M. Nadanasabapathy
P. Yoganathan	K. Kanagammah
P. Nagappar	S. Ratnam
S. Selvarani	V. Yogammah
K. Puvanenthiran	S. Sinniah
Violet Philippiah	I. Vamathevan
K. Palan	K. Sooriyapirakasam
S. Seeniammah	P. Sooriyapirakasam
S. Yoganathan	S. Sooriyapirakasam
Sarojinidevi	S. Thayananthan
K. Sithamparanathan	S. Nagamuthu
S. Mariathasan	T. Nagamuthu
K. Kopalan	G. Jeyarajah
I. Sivalingam	V. Sabapathy
P. Nageswaran	G. Suntharalingam
Jeyatharan	S. Sockalingam
Manikkam	Rasammah
Nageswary	G. Nadesan
Jesuthasan	Joskus Darmarajah
Umathevy	S. Sivasubramaniam
T. Pavalaratnam	T. Thurairasa
S. Nageswary	S. Balasuntharam
Cyril Yogammah	T. Vijayasri
V. Murugesu	T. Thavamany
M. Lawrance	K. Nanthakumar
Sri Ranjini	A. Micholas
P. Kumarasamy	N. Thambipillai
T. Thiresamalar	M. Balasundaram

INDIA TODAY

SRI LANKA

A Battle of Wits

REPORT

Jayewardene buys time but accord is still vulnerable

NEW Delhi's entanglement in the Sri Lankan situation is starting to drag it ever deeper into the shifting sea of quicksand that the island's ethnic crisis now resembles. By last fortnight, with the violent opposition to the accord in Sri Lanka acquiring frightening dimensions, South Block was finding itself uncomfortably wedged between a rock and a very hard place. In the inflamed northern part of the country, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was making major advances but the Tigers are far from cornered—the daily body count is a sobering reminder that the battle will continue to be a bloody one.

In the south, the situation is even more explosive. The bomb blast that ripped through a crowded market in a Colombo suburb on the day the Sri Lankan Parliament met to debate the accord bill, took innocent lives and injured many more. But the real victim could be the accord itself, now under siege from all sides. The resignation of Gamini Jayasuriya, a senior cabinet minister, in the midst of the parliamentary debate was not all that surprising—he was a "conscientious critic" of the accord. But the timing is crucial.

The bomb outrage which killed 31 persons—Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims, women and schoolchildren—and injured 130 more, was symbolic of the threat. Two days before the bombing, the full bench of the Supreme Court had ruled five to four that the provincial councils bill and the 13th Amendment to the Constitution did not violate the 1978 Constitution of Sri Lanka, except for two sections. The sections deal with the repeal of the Provincial Councils Act. One of the judges, Parinda Ranasingha, held that if this section was not withdrawn or suitably amended, the proposed amendment would have to be put to a national referendum.

Significantly, four judges ruled that the whole enactment was inconsistent with the Constitution and required a referendum. Their ruling cheered the opponents of the draft laws—led by former prime minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, two smaller opposition parties and a great many Buddhist organisations which filed petitions in court arguing that the devolution of powers proposed in the provincial councils bill violated the fundamental principles of a unitary constitution.

Since these were the first legislative steps taken by Jayewardene to fulfil his political obligations under the accord, a single decision the other way would have placed the President in a quandary and jeopardised the accord itself, with incalculable consequences.

Jayewardene, who has been staking his life and the survival of his regime on the accord, had one more crucial hurdle to cross. The ruling United National Party (UNP) could count on 140 votes in the House when only 113 were required to pass the bill. But the question of whether the UNP MPs would vote for the bill in the required numbers was in doubt.

The previous week, almost all UNP MPs received a "final warning" from the Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya (DJV). If they did not absent themselves, abstain or vote against measures that were "a treacherous sell-out to Tamil separatists and Indian expansionists," they would forfeit their lives and those of their family members.

Sri Lankan Police say the DJV is a front of the banned Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP). Since the accord, 51 UNP activists have been killed. The Government's response was to create a party militia. Apart from being provided with armed guards, MPs from out-of-town constituencies were billeted at the Lanka Oberoi and driven to Parliament House in an armed convoy. But despite the threat, they demonstrated their loyalty to the President by backing the bill with an overwhelming majority. "We have sailed with him for 10 years, and we could not desert him now," said one.

The scene of the Colombo blast

The recent bomb outrage in Colombo is symbolic of the threat that the accord is facing.

But still, the backdrop to the parliamentary drama was bloody. Apart from the bomb outrage, JVP sympathisers staged strikes on campuses, burnt state buses, tried to derail trains and threw three southern towns into darkness by sabotaging power lines. Jayewardene, with his divisions inside the House (140 out of 168 seats) and his armoured columns outside, may have won the Parliament battle. But nobody is under any illusion that his battle to push through the accord will not be a protracted and painful one.

There was some consolation that, in the Jaffna Peninsula, the fortunes of war appear to have finally swung the IPKF way. Having learnt some hard lessons in the initial stages of their war against the

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam(LTTE), the IPKF seems to have mastered its new and unfamiliar operational role. After taking Jaffna, the main Tiger stronghold, the Indian Army's strategy was clear—to push the Tigers out of the congested urban areas into the countryside, where the advantages will be more even. The Tigers know the terrain, but the Indian Army has experience of guerrilla warfare in thinly-populated areas, as in their operations against the rebels in North-East India.

That strategy also had another objective—to put the greatest pressure, militarily and psychologically—on the hardcore leadership, mainly Vellupillai Pirabhakaran, the Tiger leader. Pirabhakaran is rumoured to have been badly wounded in the leg during the IPKF attack on Chavakacheri, and his men have been slowly retreating in the face of the IPKF advance. The Tigers are now breaking up into smaller groups and have re-adopted the hit-and-run tactics they used against the Sri Lankan Army. "Without a regular chain of command, we are confident that they will get more disorganised and scattered. Once the cadre is isolated from the leadership, our main military objective will be accomplished," says an IPKF source.

But so far, the IPKF's main success has been psychological. After securing Jaffna, the IPKF quickly fanned out into the Vadamarachi area, another LTTE stronghold and more important, Pirabhakharan's home ground. By wresting control last fortnight of Velvettithurai, the Tiger leader's hometown, the IPKF has struck a major blow. The operational thrust resembles the classic tiger hunt, an ever-narrowing circle of beaters attempting to drive the prey into the waiting nets.

To ensure that Pirabhakaran and his key lieutenants do not slip out of the noose, the IPKF has attempted to block the known bolt-holes. Tiger hide-outs in Point Pedro, Mannar, Kaytes Island and Maniparai have been secured in the past week. That, coupled with the fact that the IPKF has raided a number of LTTE arms dumps and arms manufacturing units in the western wedge of the peninsula, is also an indication that their intelligence has markedly improved. In most cases, the information has come from rival militant groups but now, increasingly, from local Tamils.

Indian Government sources claim that the mood of the populace has undergone a dramatic change. But having lost ground in the north, the Tigers are still capable of causing havoc in the vulnerable eastern province, as last fortnight's slaying of 20-odd Sinhalese fishermen showed. The IPKF has reportedly flown in 2,000 additional troops into Batticaloa to insure against any such large-scale massacres. The Indian Government has so far ignored appeals for a cease-fire. "We will accept a cease-fire only if the request comes from Pirabhakaran directly, ensuring an unconditional surrender of all arms and an immediate acceptance of the accord," says an Indian official.

For that unlikely eventuality, New Delhi is banking heavily on Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran. Rajiv Gandhi quickly rushed his Minister of State for External Affairs, K. Natwar Singh, to Madras to soothe the feathers ruffled by Jayewardene's injudicious remarks in New Delhi critical of Tamil Nadu's role in the island's ethnic crisis.

Indo-Sri Lankan talks in Delhi

PRAMOD PUSHKARNA

New Delhi believes that MGR is the only one who can convince Pirabhakaran to lay down arms.

New Delhi's desperation is based on its belief that MGR is the only one who can convince Pirabhakaran to lay down arms and end the current impasse in northern Sri Lanka. Delhi was overly keen to enlist MGR into mediating between the Indian Government and the LTTE. MGR is believed to have already sent a message through Kittu, the LTTE's Jaffna commander now recovering from a leg amputation in Madras, to Pirabhakaran asking him to issue a statement on arms surrender and in support of the accord. MGR has also reportedly suggested that Pirabhakaran can fly to India for an audience with Rajiv Gandhi if he has any misgivings.

But Tamil fears over the Sri Lankan Government reneging on future promises still exist, especially after Jayewardene refused to budge on the devolution package to the north during his visit to New Delhi. Said Tamil United Liberation Front(TULF) Secretary-General Appapillai Amrithalingam: "We have been assured by the Government of India that Jayewardene would liberalise the provincial council bills at a slightly later stage and give more autonomy to the Tamil province. Jayewardene had said that the presidential proclamation on the merger would come only after the Tamil militants have been fully disarmed. Since the IPKF has nearly completed that job, the President should announce the merger without any further loss of time. That would allay Tamil fears to a certain extent."

But the key to the success or failure of the battle lies currently with Colombo. By ensuring that the crucial bill gets the approval of the Parliament, Jayewardene has bought himself enough breathing space to fight the war on the political front while the IPKF tackles the Tigers. But the options are now increasingly limited—one false step and the weakened edifice of the accord could come crashing down.

—DILIP BOBB with MERVYN DE SILVA in Colombo and S.H. VENKATRAMANI in Madras

NOVEMBER 30, 1987

INDIA TODAY

The Lankan Quagmire

EDITORIAL

NOVEMBER 30, 1987

WITH hindsight, the timetable seems to have been hopelessly optimistic: cessation of hostilities within 48 hours of the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, the surrendering of all arms in another 72 hours, a general amnesty, the immediate formation of an interim administrative set-up, elections to the northern and eastern provincial councils in three months, and a referendum on uniting the two provinces by the end of next year. By now, all but the last of those steps should have been taken. In fact, not even the first goal (cessation of hostilities) has been achieved. The Sri Lankan situation is messier than ever before, and Rajiv Gandhi's unhappy record of bungled accords continues.

One result is the blast in Colombo last fortnight, which killed more than 50 Sri Lankans. Another is Rajiv Gandhi's laboured effort to explain his Sri Lanka policy to a crowd of drought-stricken farmers in Maharashtra. But worse could be in store. Indian soldiers have already paid a heavy price while battling the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and now they face the unwelcome prospect of a long-drawn-out guerrilla war that may extract a price out of proportion to possible diplomatic or military benefits. Yet, an immediate pull-out will damage the army's morale. So should the country risk a Vietnam, or should Rajiv do what Henry Kissinger did in Paris: mask a withdrawal from battle with a fig-leaf accord? The choice is not an easy one.



Politically, the accord has run into an almost impossible minefield. Even the moderate Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) has said that the proposed devolution of powers under the bills now before the Sri Lankan Parliament is inadequate, but President J.R. Jayewardene has stuck to his stand that he will not yield further ground just now. The Sri Lankan Supreme Court nearly threw another spanner in the works by decreeing that a referendum was necessary on some provisions of the proposed 13th amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution. The Sri Lankan Cabinet has quickly moved to prevent this by amending some of the provisions. Nevertheless, these are indicators of the kind of hurdles that will crop up in the future too.

Jayewardene might, as he often has in the past, pull a rabbit out of his hat, if only because his own survival and place in history are at stake. But the fact remains that he has to tread very carefully if he is not to lose the support of the Sinhalese majority. Both Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa and National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali have made their dissidence known: Premadasa even launched an anti-Indian tirade at the United Nations. The blast in Colombo was another warning signal. Perhaps inevitably, Jayewardene has been blowing hot and cold too, making intemperate remarks about Tamil Nadu and the TULF before somewhat modifying his stand. He is either not sure of his own position and cannot keep his ministers in line, or he is being the old fox that many regard him to be.

Other pressures restrict manoeuvring this side of the Palk Straits. The mood in Tamil Nadu is uncertain, and could pose problems if fighting continues on the island or if either of the Dravida parties in the state successfully whips up Tamil feeling. Both Jayewardene and Rajiv have to tread gingerly.

Neither leader has covered himself with glory since the accord was signed in late July. Under Jayewardene's nose, the eastern province continued to be 'colonised' by the Sinhalese, obviously with the intention to influence the outcome of the proposed referendum on merging the northern and eastern provinces into a single administrative unit by reducing the Tamils to a hopeless minority. And the almost deliberate insistence on taking captured Tamil Tigers to Colombo to stand trial (provoking the mass suicide and everything else that followed) did not speak of a desire to sort out a long-standing ethnic problem as amicably as possible.

Rajiv Gandhi in turn has obviously underestimated both the chicanery and will-power of the LTTE, even as he aroused its suspicions after the accord was signed, by allowing Indian security forces to be partial to the non-LTTE militant groups. Militarily, the most serious error was in giving the LTTE time to mine and booby-trap Jaffna town in a manner that made the final assault on the town so costly. Even before this, Indian troops were committed to a difficult task on alien soil without enough thought to what might happen if things go wrong.

At the moment, proposals on defence treaties are being combined with hopeful talk of provincial elections being held next month. But the over-all situation remains fluid and unpredictable because there are so many players with completely conflicting interests and objectives. If the Government's present strategy of pulverising the LTTE and bringing it to its senses works, the accord still stands a chance of being implemented. If not, there should be a fall-back strategy aimed at reducing the army's role on the island, in order to avoid getting into a protracted guerilla war. Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.G.Ramachandran should meanwhile be used as a conduit to communicate with the LTTE and bring the Tigers to the talking table. With an army pull-out of some sort and the navy ensuring that no fresh arms reach the Tigers from outside, Jayewardene and the Tigers should then be asked to come to terms with each other, with India playing the role of umpire rather than combatant in somebody else's war.

AFFIDAVIT

Mrs. MANONMANI CHINNIAH KULANTHAVELU (50) Iyanarkovilady, Alaveddy North.

The deceased is my son Kulanthavelu Paramagurunathan, aged 19 years.

My late son worked at the Durga Amman Temple.

On 26.11.87 while he was at the temple a shell fell in the temple compound and exploded.

The shrapnels from the explosion struck my son on his chest and legs. He died at the spot.

The body was removed to Alaveddy on 27.11.87 and cremated there.

My husband does not live with me. The deceased son was supporting me with his earnings.

I have no means of living. I may be given some assistance.

RAMANATHAN KAMATCHI (52) C/o M. Kandasamy, Thavadi North, Thavadi.

The deceased person Murugesu Ramanathan, aged 60 years was my husband.

He was a Farm Labourer.

Due to the November 1987 military offensive I left my residence along with my children and went to Akarayan.

My husband refused to accompany us and opted to stay at home.

On 26.11.87 I was informed that my husband was shot and killed by the army while he was on his way to the Suthumalai Amman Temple on 20.11.87.

I learned that his body was cremated by relations on the same day itself.

I have three daughters and a son.

My son is deaf and dumb and remains at home.

After my husband's death we do not have any income and undergoing untold hardships.

SITTAMPALAM PONNAMMAH (52) Panipulam, Pandatherippu.

The deceased Sittampalam Sathiyapalan, aged 24 years was my son.

He was a Farmer.

On 26.11.87 at about 8.00 a.m. my son left for his farm.

At about 5.00 p.m. **I was informed that my son was killed in a shell blast while on his way back from his farm.**

His body was brought home in a bullock cart.

His body was cremated at Champalthurai cemetery, Chulipuram on 26.11.87.

I have two children.

It was my late son who supported and maintained our family.

Now we do not have any income.

THEVASULOSANA RATNASINGHAM (27), Kovilady, Uduvil, Chunakam.

The deceased Ponniah Vijayarajah aged 21 years was my younger brother.

He was employed as a driver.

On 26.11.87 as my brother was languishing with a fever he set out to see a doctor at Uduvil.

At about 2.00 p.m. I heard that he was shot and killed by the army near the Uduvil American Mission School.

His body was brought on 27.11.87 at around 6.00 a.m.

His body was cremated as Uduvil Cemetery on the same day.

He was residing with us until he met his tragic end.

SINNATHURAI SELVARATNAM (33) 4th Mile Post, Anaikoddai.

The deceased child Selvaratnam Pathmarajini, aged 7 years was my daughter.

During the November 1987 disturbances I sought refuge at the Ladies College, Manipay with my family.

On 27.11.87 at about 6.00 p.m. we went towards our house to bring back some necessary things.

A shell fell on the road and exploded fatally injuring my daughter.

She died before we could seek medical assistance.

Her body was buried at the Manipay Annammah Church burial grounds on the same day.

I have four children.

SATHASIVAMPILLAI GUNARATNAM (48) School Lane, Thavadi, Kokuvil.

The deceased Sathasivampillai Ganesharatnam, aged 39 years a bachelor was my brother.

He was working as a temporary Labourer at the Irrigation Department.

During the October-November 1987 disturbances Kokuvil was subjected to shelling and intensive military operation.

We fled from our house and took refuge at the Kokuvil Manjavanapathy Murugan Temple refugee camp.

On 27.11.87 at about 7.30 a.m. my brother left the temple saying that he wanted to inspect our deserted house.

As he did not return that night I became highly worried.

On 28.11.87 I left the temple in search of my brother.

On my way I was informed by my relatives that my brother was shot and killed by the army at Thavady.

I found his body with gunshot injuries at Nandavil Lane, Thavady.

I removed his corpse to Thavady cemetery with the help of some relatives and buried it there on the same day.

I was the guardian of my late brother S. Ganesharatnam who was not married.

Mrs. SATKUMAMANI SIVALINGAM (39)
Katpulam, Urumpirai East, Urumpirai.

My mother Ponnan Iyah (67) and my aged father Vairavan Ponnan, my husband, children and I were residing at the above address.

On 27.11.87 my mother Ponnan Iyah who was in a lane by the side of our house was shot dead by Indian Peace Keeping Force personnel at about 9 a.m.

My husband was away from home and on getting to know that IPKF were approaching I fled with my children.

My mother who had difficulty in walking was lying to follow when she was shot dead.

My father Vairavan Ponnan has lost his eyesight both my mother and father were cared and look after by me.

I have 6 children aged 15, 12, 10, 7, 4, 1½.

The dead body of my mother was buried in a barren land some distance away from our home.

சி. சற்குணமணி

BALASINGAM SELVARANY (45)

Uduvil North, Uduvil.

N.I.C. No. 42 763 1273 V

I am the widow of the late Vairavan Balasingam (45) who died on 28.11.87.

On 28.11.87 at about 5.00 p.m. shells started falling near the house we lived in.

My husband, I and the children ran towards the nearest Church - Our Lady of the Rosary.

The church and compound were full of people who had taken refuge there.

We could find place only in the compound of the Church.

A shell fell soon afterwards in the Church compound.

My husband died on the spot, several were injured and taken to Hospital.

My husband's body was buried the next day.

Death certificate No. 1502 was issued in respect of my husband's death.

Cause of death as specified therein is: - shock and haemorrhage resulting from shell injuries.

The names of dependents including myself are:

(a) Selvaranee Balasingham (wife) (46 Yrs) Midwife

(b) Balasingam Balahiritharan-Son (14) Student

(c) Balasingam Vellparan-Son (12) Student

(d) Balasingam Nivethini-daughter (10) Student

(e) Balasingam Nitharsini-daughter (08) Student and

(f) Balasingam Pratheepan-Son (05) Student

My husband was an Attendant at the Tellipalai Government Hospital in receipt of an income of Rs. 740/- per month.

My salary as a Midwife will not be sufficient to maintain myself and the children since my husband is dead.

ப. செல்வராணி

DAVID THERESAMMAH (37) 82, Manipuri, 3rd Cross, Colombuthurai.

The deceased person David Stephen Kennery, **aged 19 years was my son.**

My son was engaged as a welder.

On 28.11.87 at about 8.00 a.m. son left home saying **that he is going to** the welding shop at Colombuthurai.

At about 4.00 p.m. I was informed that my son was shot and killed by the army at Colombuthurai.

His body was brought home and buried at St. Mary's burial grounds on 29.11.87.

I have eight children.

My husband is a poor labourer and it was my late son who bore the burden of supporting our large family.

டே. தெரசம்மா

Mrs. POOPATHY MYLVAGANAM (28) Mudaliyaveli Lane, Kerudavil, Chavukachcheri.

I am the widow of the late Ganapathy Mylvaganam killed in army firing.

At about 8.00 a.m. on 28.11.87 my husband left home on his push cycle to the Chavakachcheri Market for the purchase of provisions.

After making the purchase as he started on his homeward journey, he was fired at by the soldiers who had taken position in the upper – floor of market buildings.

He fell dead on the spot on the Kandy road.

On receipt of information of his demise, my brother-in-law rushed to the spot to find my husband lying dead in a pool of blood with chest injuries.

His corpse was brought home at about 1.00 p.m. on the day.

The funeral took place on the following day and his body was cremated in the Vembirai crematorium and Meesalai South.

My late husband Ganapathy Mylvaganam was Manager of the Chavakachcheri Branch of the Palmyrah Development Board, in receipt of a monthly salary of Rs. 1000/-

I have five children, three girls and two boys.

Since the demise of my husband, I am left with no maintenance of support to bring up my children and attend to their up-keep and necessities.

ம. துயிலி

SINNARASAH VASANTHAKUMARI (21), Kundukulam, Chunnakam West, Chunnakam.

The deceased person Vadivelu Sinnarasah, age 27 years was my husband.

He was employed as a farm labourer at time of his death.

On 28.11.87 my husband was working in a farm.

At about 5.30 a.m. army was advancing along the road which ran by the side of the farm firing in all directions.

Sometime later I heard that my husband was shot by the army and I rushed to the scene.

His body was cremated by the army the same day.

I have two children.

I was depending on my husband's income until his untimely death.

Now I am left without any income and there is no one to support us.

வசந்தகுமரி

Mrs. NADESAN SIVAPAKIAM (39), S. Kathiravelu of Vasuki Vasam, Sandilipay.

My husband Gnanapiragasam Nadesan aged 41 years was a driver attached to the Home Finance Ltd., Jaffna.

My husband, children and I were living in a rented out house at the above address.

On 29.11.87 at about 7 a.m. two of my children and I left to the Market to purchase vegetables.

My husband and other two children remained at home.

At about 7.30 a.m. firing of gun shots were heard close to our house and the people of our locality started to flee from the market to safer places.

My 2 children and I too left the market and reached home at about 9 a.m.

To my surprise I found IPKF were in our compound and my husband was lying in a pool of blood.

My two children who were at the house were seated by the side of my fallen husband.

The children who joined me to the market and I were taken to our compound by the IPKF personnel and asked to sit along with my other two children.

An IPKF commander came to us and allowed me to give water to my husband.

While giving water my husband informed me that he was shot by the IPKF.

On the instructions of the IPKF commander my injured husband children and I were taken to Pandateruppu IPKF Camp and where my husband was treated at the camp.

On the following morning we were taken to Jaffna in a truck and my injured husband was admitted to ward-6.

My husband succumbed to his injuries at the Jaffna Teaching Hospital on 30.11.87 at 12.10 p.m.

My children and I left the dead body at the General hospital, as we did not have money to perform his last rites.

I have 4 children by him and all are school going.

I have no other source of income or savings.



SELLATHURAI SIVASUBRAMANIAM (37) Sandilipay West.

My late father Kandiah Sellathurai aged 68 years was an in valid.

On 29.11.87 at about 8 a.m. I.P.K.F. advanced towards our village firing at random.

Fearing to remain at home my wife children and I fled to the Pillayar temple at Chankanai for refuge.

My late father remained at home.

My brother Navaratnam came to the Pillayar temple at Chankanai at 7 a.m. on 30.11.87 and informed me.

I.P.K.F. had advanced to our area at 10 a.m. on 29.11.87.

I.P.K.F. entered my house and sounds of firing were heard soon after.

When he went to my house after the I.P.K.F. had left he had found our father Aandiah Sellathurai dead with an injury on the right side of his chest.

My father's dead body was cremated in an adjoining compound at 2 p.m. on 30.11.87.

SINNATHAMY THANAPACKIYAM (48) Navakiri, Puttur West, Puttur.

The deceased person Perumal Sinathamby was my husband,

He was a Farmer.

On 30.11.87 at about 9.00 a.m. my husband left for his Farm which is situated at about half mile distance from our house.

As he did not return home I became highly worried.

On the following day I was admitted at the Jaffna General Hospital due to high blood pressure.

On the seventh day of my husband's disappearance I was informed at the Hospital that my husband was killed in a shell blast on 30.11.87 near his farm and that his body was found in a decomposed state by his brother.

I also learned that his remains were cremated at Thoppu Cemetery, Atchuvely.

I do not have any children.

After my husband's death I do not have any income or support.



BALASINGHAM KAMALADEVI (30), Gandhiji Veethy, Kokuvil West, Kokuvil.

The deceased Nagamuthu Rasam, aged 76 years was my mother-in-law being my husband's mother.

Due to the intensive military operation at our area we went to Poonahari for safety leaving my mother-in-law at our residence at Kokuvil.

Only after we returned home from Poonahari during the latter part of November, I came to know about my mother-in-law's death.

I learned that she was killed during a shell blast at Kokuvil.

I came to know that her body was disposed by some persons immediately afterwards.

My husband who became blind three years ago remain at home.



Sunil Bhagawat

RAPED

KONDAVIL WEST,
KONDAVIL.

30th November, 1987.

The Major,
I.P.K.Force
Kondavil West,
KONDAVIL.

Sir,

IMPROPER BEHAVIOUR OF SOME MEMBERS OF THE INDIAN PEACE KEEPING FORCE AT KONDAVIL WEST

We thank you for assuring us that innocent civilians will not be harassed by the peace Keeping Force. However, it appears that Superior Officers of the Peace Keeping Force are not aware of the attro cities that are being commited by some of the Jawans of the Peace Keeping Force. We like to report some incidents in the hope that you will take effective measures to prevent a recurrence of similar incidents as such incidents will certainly not help to win the hearts minds of the people of the area.

(I) On the 27th of this month between 8 A.M. – 10 A.M. two Jawans posted at the K.K.S. Road Muthaddu Madam Lane Lane Junction entered the house of Mr. and Mrs. R. Sukumaran at Muthaddu Madam Lane. They tied up and assaulted the husband. They then intimidated the wife S. Satkunathevy, silenced her and raped her. The neighbours went to the sence later and consoled the family.

(II) On the 26th of this month while the I.P.K.F. was going on, a group of Jawans entered the house of Mrs. G. Selvanayagam between 9 A.M. & 10 A.M. and raped her.

These incidents have driven fear into the minds of the people of the area and some of them are fleeing from the area.

We welcomed the Indian Peace Keeping Force in the hope that your presence here will put an end to the tyranny of the Ceylon Army and the hardships that the people had to undergo in the hands of the Ceylon Army. But we are disappointed and saddened that in 50 days of action by the Peace Keeping Force the people here have suffered much more hardships and have lost many of their kith and kins and their property. We lived in temples and schools without food and sanitation for several days and when we returned to our house in the hope of living in security we are being harassed in the manner reported above by some Peace Keeping Personnal. We have not undergone such indignities even in the hands of the Ceylon Armed Force. We are confident that you as a Superior and understanding Officer will pursue this matter and prevent a recurrence of such incidents.

Yours truly,
Signed - 47 persons

Charge against IPKF 'motivated'

TIRUCHI, Nov 29.

The Union Minister of State for Home, Mr. P. Chidambaram, today urged the people to appreciate the good intentions of the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, in signing the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement which only demonstrated his concern to protect and safeguard the interests of the Sri Lankan Tamils.

Addressing a public meeting organised by the Congress (I) at the Town hall here Mr. Chidambaram explained various aspects relating to the accord. The refusal of the Sinhalese to recognise the Sri Lanka Tamils was the main reason for the ethnic animosity, he said. Mr. Chidambaram said that right from the beginning India was opposed to a separate Eelam and any accord with Sri Lanka was possible minus Eelam as a separate entity. This was made clear to the leaders of the Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran.

Mr. Chidambaram wondered why Mr. Prabakaran swore by military confrontation and was not prepared to come to the democratic stream.

The vituperative attack against the Indian Peace Keeping Force by the DK, DMK and other vested interests was "mischievos". Allegations that the IPKF killed innocent Tamils and went on a looting and raping spree were all "motivated" to besmirch the image of the Indian Government, he said.

Mr. Chidambaram said he found that the people of Tamil Nadu were able to identify these "separatist elements" which wanting for an excuse to rebel at every opportunity against the Indian Government, had been exploiting in vain Mr. Prabakaran's intransigence for their political gains. These forces ultimately found that their efforts were now unproductive as the people of Tamil Nadu had been indifferent to all their calls for agitation against the IPKF role.

The IPKF was doing a humanitarian service in Sri Lanka, Mr. Chidambaram pointed out. Even while signing the accord, the Prime Minister had hinted that the process of implementation of the accord would have to undergo several tests. The ultimate aim was in the larger interests of all the Tamil groups and to usher in lasting peace on the island

INDIAN EXPRESS

The LTTE is definitely a spent force.
–Lt Gen Depinder Singh

NEWS

LTTE leadership 'obdurate, selfish'

Express News Service

Bombay, Nov. 27: A comparison of the Indian peacekeeping force (IPKF) role in Sri Lanka with the United States involvement in Vietnam was "irrelevant," according to Lt. Gen Depinder Singh, the General-Officer-Commanding in Chief, Southern Command.

Asked how the Indian soldier viewed his role in Lanka, the General, who is incharge of the operation in Sri Lanka said, "The Indian soldier is paid to obey orders. He is not in the US ethos where the GIs questioned the policy."

As to how long the IPKF was likely to remain in Sri Lanka, the General said he would not like to speculate.

Elaborating as to why it took so long to gain control of Jaffna, he said that the unfamiliar terrain was one reason for slowing down the operation. The LTTE on the other hand were fighting in familiar landscapes.

Moreover, the LTTE were a motivated lot, as the Indian army had found out during the two months of interaction before the fighting broke out. They had training pamphlets from West European countries which had been translated into Tamil, the General revealed. Their weapons were mainly of Chinese make and there was evidence of their links with the PLO also. Ironically, at the same time the role of Israel in arming and training the LTTE was also evident, the army commander said.

The General who was in the city for the prize distribution ceremony of the southern command polo cup, said that the strength of the LTTE was the possession of Jaffna town, which created the impression that they were a state within a state.

Asked whether Jaffna was under full control of the IPKP he said since the public was also there, the IPKF could not prevent the odd sniper or the occasional grenade blast or some booby traps. He said it was difficult, to differentiate between the general public and an LTTE man, as the latter did not have a uniform and could easily merge with the crowd.

He refuted the allegation that helicopter gunships were being used against civilians, and said in a shocked tone, "How can we do a thing like that against civilians." He however, admitted that some civilians may have been killed by accident.

He was optimistic that the latest package offered to the LTTE rank and file would be accepted. The package aimed at assuring the LTTE personnel, who wanted to surrender, that they would be protected.

The General was critical of the LTTE leadership, which he said was "obdurate and selfish," because they were coming in the way of the peace process.

He denied reports that the casualty figures among the IPKF were higher than the official figures and insisted that the official figures were "the God's own truth."

At the beginning of the operations, the IPKF numbered just about 800 to 1,000 men.

O.V. Vijayan, The Statesman, 18.11.87.



REPORT

What Price Peace?

A vote for local Tamil rule follows a bloody bombing

"The peace that is brought in by an alien conqueror does not provide the restful qualities of the real article," Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa told a packed Parliament in Colombo last week. The quote, taken from Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, had a ring of irony. And truth. Nehru was referring to Britain, which ruled a racially and religiously divided India for a century and a half, until 1947. Premadasa was alluding in turn to India, which last July joined Sri Lanka in signing an agreement aimed at ending a four-year battle by the island's Tamil separatists for an independent homeland. Since that time India has discovered how difficult it is to be a guarantor of peace in a foreign land.

Survivor: a victim of the explosion receives aid in Colombo

That point came home with deadly force last week when a bomb, probably planted in a moving bus, exploded in Colombo's bustling Maradana commercial district. The toll: 28 dead and 104 injured. The blast damaged 21 vehicles, broke the windows of nearby buildings and strewed chunks of human flesh up to 20 yards away. "It was terrible," said a bystander. "There were parts of people and blood all over the place."

The terrorist attack came on the eve of a debate in the Sri Lankan Parliament on two bills that would provide for provincial councils in the predominantly Tamil areas of the north and east, thus giving them a measure of self-government. The primary suspects were the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. But authorities did not rule out the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna, a militant band drawn from the ethnic Sinhalese majority. The J.V.P. opposes Tamil autonomy as well as what it perceives as Indian encroachment on Sri Lankan sovereignty. Although the bombing victims were mostly Sinhalese, the J.V.P. may have cynically calculated that the Tamils would be blamed, thus provoking a well-timed backlash against the parliamentary bills.

Security was unusually tight the next day as phalanxes of rifle-wielding troops lined the road leading up to Parliament. Sinhalese extremists had threatened legislators from Sri Lankan President Junius R. Jayewardene's ruling United National Party with death if they voted for even a limited measure of Tamil autonomy. Not that the President's forces were unanimous in supporting the bills. Agriculture Minister Gamani Jayasuriya angrily resigned from the Cabinet after he was prevented from taking part in the debate because of his opposition to the proposals. By week's end, however, the bills passed by a vote of 138 to 11.

As the legislators met, Sinhalese militants, suspected of being members of the J.V.P., damaged power and telecommunications installations, rail lines and state buildings. These acts of sabotage, coupled with student demonstrations and hunger strikes, convinced the government that the Sinhalese protests could be violent and long lasting. Rather than fight two separate civil insurgencies, Colombo late last week sent feelers to the J.V.P. offering to lift an official ban on the outlawed group in exchange for a renunciation of violence.

Ironically, even moderate Tamils do not approve of the laws that Jayewardene's supporters risked their lives to pass. As for the militant Tigers, their spokesmen did not bother to comment on the new laws. "They will make the bills irrelevant," predicted a Tamil lawyer in Colombo who feels the Tigers have not given up their dream of a separate state. In effect, the Tigers wield a veto over the whole peace process: elections to the newly established provincial councils cannot take place until they voluntarily surrender their weapons or are disarmed by Indian troops, neither of which appears imminent. —*By Susan Tifft. Reported by Qadri Ismail/Colombo*

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

Rajinder Puri, The Statesman, 13.11.87.

V PRABHAKARAN

A Cornered Tiger

A profile of Velupillai Prabhakaran, Supreme Commander of the LTTE

PROFILE

ILLUSTRATION BY RAM KRISHNA SALVI

The IPKF may well use Baroness Orczy's doggerel on the *Scarlet Pimpernel* in referring to the LTTE chief: "We seek him here, we seek him there. Is he in heaven? Is he in hell? That damned elusive Velupillai Prabhakaran."

Jaffna, the stronghold of the LTTE, has fallen to the IPKF but Prabhakaran eludes all attempts to capture him. Some reports say that Prabhakaran was last seen at Point Pedro, others say that he has shifted base to the eastern sector. But by all accounts, he is still alive and directing the LTTE's armed resistance to the IPKF.

In the third week of October, Indian soldiers spotted a leopard which they shot dead. The animal had a collar which indicated that it was a pet, most probably Prabhakaran's. The pet leopard, a reputation as an ace sharpshooter and an image as a ruthless military tactician, have all made Prabhakaran a cult figure for Sri Lankan Tamils. Prabhakaran carries a price of Rs 1 million on his head but even IPKF officers say that Prabhakaran will never be captured alive, that he would prefer to swallow a cyanide pill rather than surrender.

Prabhakaran has kept away from the media and not much is known about his personal life. He was born on November 26, 1954 in the coastal town of Valvettiturai in Jaffna which was later to become the nursery of the Tamil militant movement. His father, Velupillai was a land development officer. The anti-Tamil violence of 1956 affected him deeply. Prabhakaran himself recalls an incident in Panatura, Colombo, in which a Brahmin priest was burnt alive by Sinhalese mobs.

"I was the youngest child in my family. So everyone petted me and spoilt me a lot. I was not allowed to go out of the house very often so I spent a lot of time reading books. When I read about revolutionaries and when I saw the oppression of my people all around me, I could not help but be inspired by ideas of revolution," Prabhakaran says explaining his attraction to revolution at an early age. His tuition master V Navaratnam played an important role in shaping his views. Navaratnam recently quit the Federal Party and the younger members in the party followed suit. Recalls Prabhakaran, "He used to talk about various world movements, about how nothing can be accomplished by parliamentary means." Prabhakaran was deeply impressed. The seeds of revolution had been sown.

I was not allowed to go out of the house very often so I spent a lot of time reading books. When I read about revolutionaries and when I saw the oppression of my people all around me, I could not help but be inspired by ideas of revolution.

Soon after, Prabhakaran — hardly into his teens — dropped out of school like countless young boys who now make up the LTTE cadre. Popularly known as "thambi" (younger brother), he soon came to symbolise the aspirations of the Tamil youth who had become disenchanted with the non-violent forms of struggle for the rights of Tamils. When only 18, Prabhakaran founded the "Tiger" movement which was initially called the "Tamil New Tigers" (TNT). On May 5, 1976 it was renamed "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam" (LTTE).

Associates say that even at that young age, Prabhakaran displayed astute military acumen and organisational skills. Structured as a disciplined urban guerilla force, the LTTE hit the headlines with the assassination of the Jaffna mayor and Sri Lanka Freedom Party activist Alfred Duraippa. The activities of the militants continued and soon the LTTE became the most feared underground organisation. Prabhakaran personally took part in the LTTE ambush of a Sri Lankan military convoy to Jaffna on July 23, 1983 — the incident that was the cause of a wave of anti-Tamil violence.

Much of the success of the LTTE in carving a name for itself in Jaffna and in exterminating all other rival groups stems from the fact that Prabhakaran exercises tight and ruthless control over the cadre. Until recently, the cadres were not allowed to marry and even now drinking and smoking are strictly prohibited. Every member carries a cyanide capsule around his neck at all times.

In 1984, Prabhakaran married Madhivadhan. They have a son, Charles Antony, named after one of his trusted lieutenants, who was killed in the 1983 ambush. Prabhakaran also has a daughter, Dwarka. His wife and children are currently holed up in Kadaithivu Island, closely watched by the IPKF, in case Prabhakaran attempts to contact them.

Prabhakaran is fluent in Tamil but knows very little English. He is a self-taught sharpshooter and is said to be adept at handling different weapons. He has two sisters and a brother.

Photographs of Prabhakaran show him sitting beside photographs of Lenin and Che Guevara, an alert leopard by his side. It remains to be seen whether the IPKF has any more success than the Sri Lankan army in trapping the biggest tiger of them all.

NOVEMBER 16-30, 1987 **Lalita Dileep**

CONFRONTATION

2

COLOMBO, Nov. 2.

Five Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) soldiers were killed in a powerful landmine explosion in Sri Lanka today on the Mankulam — Mullaitivu Road, 10 km from the northern district town of Mullaitivu.

An Indian High Commission spokesman said three soldiers were seriously injured

Achuveli captured: The IPKF today captured Achuveli, an LTTE stronghold about 20 km from Jaffna, the Sri Lankan national news agency, Lankapuvath, said

After the capture of Achuveli, the IPKF was now moving towards Vadamarachi, one of the LTTE bastions which came under heavy attack during the May offensive of the Sri Lankan forces, the news agency added. — PTI

IPKF fires at civilians who went to buy their provisions at Kaithady. Many civilians killed.

The famous Watrapalai Amman Temple hit by IPKF mortar fire. 6 civilians killed and over 15 injured.

3

Indian para-commandos today raided an area near Moolai in the western part of Jaffna peninsula, killing an estimated 25 LTTE personnel and blowing up a van carrying ammunition as well as caches captured by them. The commandos landed at the area at 3 a.m. today and moved a couple of kilometres inland to engage the LTTE which was entrenched near Moolai town.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force believes that a disused hospital near the town is being used by the LTTE as its new headquarters. The area is being heavily defended by rings of heavily fortified bunkers and the IPKF engaged the ones in the north-westen approach. The para-commando force captured a .50 calibre heavy machine gun and two general purpose machine guns while destroying the ammunition since it was too difficult to carry it away. The force was able to exfiltrate from the scene of action by 7 a.m. The action was supported by Akbar helicopter gunships which engaged the LTTE bunkers and inflicted heavy damage.

Six LTTE vans destroyed: Helicopter gunships patrolling the Point Pedro — Vadamarachchi and the Moolai-Telliapali roads destroyed six vans flying the LTTE flags. The IPKF lost two infantry combat vehicles in the Mullaitivu area when they were blown up by mines emplaced by the LTTE and five IPKF personnel died in this action. The IPKF is now fanning out to establish its presence in the rest of the Jaffna peninsula and the rest of the Northern province. Today, the IPKF secured Chempianpatu, Vadamarachchi and Thondamannaru areas and established a stronger presence in Mannar, Kilinochchi and Vavunia.

IPKF engineers were busy repairing the damage caused by the LTTE to the Chempianpatu causeway. These areas had been held by small IPKF formations and now the effort is on to prevent the LTTE from consolidating itself in these areas after its setback in Jaffna city.

Turning to small unit action: The force will now concentrate on small unit action such as ambushes and road-blocks combined with the use of helicopter gunships to deny the LTTE freedom of movement on the roads of the peninsula. These actions are designed to prevent the LTTE from being able to shift its forces from one place to another easily.

IPKF sources feel that the LTTE is now heavily concentrated in the western part of the Jaffna peninsula, notably the Moolai area. They also feel that the LTTE now plans to step up its actions in the Eastern Province as well. Intelligence reports indicate that a shipment of arms and ammunition has been received by LTTE personnel in the Batticaloa area through transhipment in small boats from a larger vessel that slipped through the blockade. They feel that the actions may include attacks on civilians, notably Muslims and Sinhalas as well as attacks on buses, mining of roads, etc.

Mahatiya may still be around: While the IPKF does not like to speculate on the fate of the top LTTE leadership, they feel that the LTTE number 2, Mahatiya, may still be around and in fact, be in charge of the western peninsula. In fact, the IPKF has picked up an intercept of a voice purporting to be that of Mahatiya and reassuring the LTTE cadres that he was still alive. They feel that the high LTTE official reported killed in Chavakacheri area may in fact have been Mr. Yogi, the head of the political wing of the LTTE. They indicate that the whereabouts of Mr. Prabakaran are still unknown though wireless intercepts have picked up pre-recorded messages from him refuting the IPKF appeals broadcast through pamphlets. They deduce that this may be a consequence of a feeling in the LTTE leadership that their popular support was in danger of slipping.

Stray cases of sniping: Stray cases of sniping are still there in Jaffna city though life is returning to normal. From tomorrow onwards, Brig. Kahlon of the IPKF will begin operating as the Town Commissioner from the Residency building to coordinate the relief and rehabilitation measures. The Nallur Kandaswamy temple has been cleared of 70 per cent of the refugees who had been sheltered there and the others emerging are being screened by the IPKF personnel.

LTTE's fighting potential: IPKF sources say that the LTTE's fighting potential is still considerable. They say that proportionately fewer weapons have been recovered compared to the ammunition caches discovered. This implies that LTTE cadres who may have merged with the civilian population still have arms and smaller caches of ammunition to continue to operate as a fighting force. With regard to the talk of ceasefire, they say that the factual position is that it is the LTTE which is firing at the IPKF and so 'ceasefire' can be one in which the LTTE stops firing at the IPKF. They assert that it would be dangerous at this stage to permit a

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

MANIPAY	
M. Ambalabanar	T. Velan
R. Sritharan	*NEERVELY*
MALLAKAM	S. Rajathurai
Kathiramalainathan	S. Subramanium
Govindasamy	S. Thangaratnam
Santhkumar	S. Subramanium
T. Subramaniam	S. Rajadurai
T. Thangammah	*NALLUR*
P. Akila	M. Arunothayan
S. Santha	M. Rajitha
K. Sothinathan	J. Kannipillai
R. Jeyanthy	R. Sathiyabama
N. Sellathurai	Muthiah
Sellappah	S. Mariathas
K. Kandasamy	*NAVANTHURAI*
Velautham Akila	Marusalne
Robert Nixon	Lucas
K. Pathmanathan	M. Thiravium
S. Rathiaf	Vitalis Nelson
I. Sritharan	A. Jeyakumar
I. Makenthiran	A. Soosaipillai
N. Sellaih	S. Benedict
R. Nahuleswaran	A. Premachanthar
S. Thrunalingam	Sothylingam
V. Nagarajah	S. Annammah
S. Thambirajah	S. Jeganathan
T. Sriparan	K. Thangarasa
S. Rathinam	I. Vamadevan
S. Jothirajah	T. Kanthiyah
R. Selvarajah	S. Rajevan
K. Paikianathan	T. Nadarajah
M. Manaharan	K. Jesuthasan
R. Thanabalasingam	Thangaiah
V. Ayathurai	S. Thambirajah

'freeze' in the situation — cease-fire or no cease-fire. Under all circumstances, the IPKF ought to be permitted to continue its process of disarming the LTTE while retaining the option of firing back should the LTTE fire at them.

On the 3rd November 87, there was a landing of Indian soldiers at Ponnalai. There was also a helicopter attack the same day. The famous Ponnalai Krishna Temple was one of those places attacked. The refugees there were forced to leave the place.

4

What was the meaning of the crippling blow to the LTTE, mentioned by reports from Jaffna today or of the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene's assessment that the LTTE had almost been crushed?

This became clear today from the figures of its casualties — 800 killed, 400 apprehended by the IPKF or surrendered to it. The IPKF losses were as follows: — 223 killed, 786 injured and 35 missing. Nearly 40 per cent of the injured, it was stated, had been discharged from hospitals and had either resumed duty or were in the process of doing so.

On the 4th November 87, there was heavy attack by bombers and helicopters on Moolai Hospital and places around were heavily damaged.

5

Reports reaching here confirm that the LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran was injured in the leg by a shrapnel during the IPKF operations in Chavakacheri town, east of Jaffna, on October 28-29. Mr. Prabakaran was said to have personally conducted the operations from an isolated, old building in the town which was being used as the LTTE headquarters. Two of his aides were killed and one of them has been identified as Mohanraj from Mannar.

Two battalions of the Madras Regiment had been deployed to secure the building. They had encountered so much of intensive fire from the building that the IPKF had to send helicopters on strafing missions. In all, 27 bodies of the LTTE men were recovered from the building and the petrol pump adjacent to it after the operations.

An External Affairs Ministry spokesman said today that the IPKF had unearthed LTTE arms dumps near the Nallur Kandasamy temple and in Koppai North. In the last 24 hours, six LTTE men were killed and six others apprehended, taking the LTTE toll to 773 killed. One IPKF jawan was killed and four others were injured in the 24-hour period.

The LTTE was resorting to abduction, extortion and murder of prominent members of the local citizens councils to terrorise the populace nd deter them from helping the IPKF. On November 3, it kidnapped Mr. Iliyathan Mahalingam, Principal of the Pudur Mahavidyalaya and killed him in a jungle near Kalladi.

In the Eastern Province, the LTTE militants have stepped up intimidation and coercion by demanding taxes from the local fishermen. They have also threatened businessmen and prominent citizens with death if they did not pay them money. It may be recalled that the September 12-13 massacre by the LTTE in the Eastern province occurred when the local citizens objected to the illegal tax collection.

On the 5th November 87, too, there was shell attack by artillery and by helicopters. As the result of the attack, besides causing sacrileges to the same Ponnalai Krishnan Temple, the Moolai Teaching Hospital facilities have been deprived to the urgent section of the population of the area. This has affected the victims of the air and shell attacks and now the people have no hospital to go to. There were cases of people dying in the absence of medical aid. Five people have died and several injured because of the attack. A number of houses too have been destroyed.

Fourteen year old girl raped by IPKF at Batticoloa. Many girls humiliated.

6

COLOMBO, Nov. 6.

One soldier of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) was killed and four wounded in an LTTE planted land-mine explosion today at Sambaltivu in eastern Trincomalee district, official sources here said.

7

New Delhi, Nov. 7 (PTI): In an effort to strike terror, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) militants have started abducting and killing civilians in eastern Jaffna, an official spokesman said here on Saturday.

Briefing newsmen on the incidents, the spokesman said in Muttur area, LTTE militants killed two civilians and abducted two on Friday. In Batticaloa, two civilians were abducted and one of them, Mr. Sathyunam, was killed by LTTE men and his body tied to a lamp post.

The spokesman said the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was continuing vigorous search operations in Jaffna and other sectors to unearth arms caches.

Eleven LTTE militants were killed in an encounter with the IPKF in Kankesanthurai on Friday. Parts of mortar bombs and equipment for making improvised explosive devices were recovered from them.

IPKF goes on rampage at Mankollai, Kankesanthurai. Many civilians killed and females raped. 11 bodies of civilians identified. 6 girls found unconsious after being raped. 6 people from one family are reported missing.

IPKF made 25 people, including old people, women and children, stand nude in the Chunnagam Market square.

IPKF went on a patrol using females as human sheilds.

Large scale raping going on in Batticoloa.

8

NEW DELHI, Nov. 8.

While the LTTE militants were putting up little resistance in their strongholds in the Vadamarachchi area which have been 'secured' by the IPKF yesterday, they attempted to oppose an IPKF search operation at Manipai, near Jaffna suffering heavy casualties. An External Affairs Ministry spokesman said here that 26 LTTE cadres were killed in the operation while seven IPKF personnel were wounded. One IPKF soldier was killed but the spokesman did not specify the place.

The IPKF is now in full control of Nelliyandi, Point Pedro, Moolai, Manipai, Mannâr, Karainagar and Kaytes Island. The LTTE has been resorting to some isolated firing in Mullaitivu where mopping up operations were on.

In a search operation in Aluvankérni in the Batticaloa sector, three LTTE hardcore militants were captured and one carbine, one hand grenade and a boat with a 8 horsepower outboard motor were recovered from them

The spokesman said it appeared now that the LTTE had lost the ability to put up an organised resistance to the IPKF. Reports indicated that the LTTE was losing the sympathy of the local populace as its cadres could barely hide in any one place for more than a few hours. Also, more and more information was coming in from the local citizens on LTTE activities especially their mine laying operations.

Meanwhile, LTTE tactics have become more desperate in Jaffna where it has been trying to sabotage the IPKF's relief measures. Yesterday the LTTE set ablaze one Red Cross godown, destroying a large quantity of relief supplies, including medicines. One Red Cross jeep plying from Kankesanthurai to Tellipalli was hijacked by the militants.

9

NEW DELHI, Nov. 9.

Eighteen LTTE cadres were killed, including 12 in Manipai, in northern Sri Lanka in the past 24 hours as operations by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to disarm LTTE militants continued.

An official spokesman said 14 suspected LTTE men were apprehended, one IPKF personnel was killed and 10 wounded.

In Chavakacheri, the IPKF recovered one 160 mm mortar, five 120 mm mortar barrels, one 160 mm mortar barrel, 15 claymore mines and three improvised devices, he said.

According to reports received here, two LTTE militants were killed at Tannyiutu, south of Mullaitivu. One hardcore militant, Suman Anton was killed yesterday at Velvetiturai. Ten LTTE suspects were held at Sittandi.

According to intelligence reports, one LTTE leader, Pasilan, along with his lieutenant, Kalidas, was killed at Mullaitivu.

The spokesman said at a meeting at Puttur, near Jaffna, 200 militants held a meeting where a majority favoured surrendering their arms, according to intelligence reports. The LTTE cadres are stated to be holding a series of such meetings.

Reports said the civilian population at the LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabhakaran's birth place, Vadamarchchi, distributed fruits, sweets and cigarettes and brought these to the IPKF camp.

LTTE has reportedly launched a disinformation campaign against the "atrocities" by the IPKF by sending telegrams, mainly from London, to the U.N., the western countries and Third World nations. — UNI

Three people, Mr. Kunam (50), Mrs. Kunam (45) and Thangaluxmy (27) were injured when an IPKF mortar shell hit a temple where refugees were staying at Sandilipay. The 3 injured people, Mr. Pararajasingam (Head Teacher) and his driver who were taking the injured to Jaffna hospital in car flying a white flag were shot dead by the IPKF at Navaly. The car was also burnt with bodies still inside.

Thousands of IPKF personal and Sri Lankan Police Commandos moved towards Mandoor from Batticaloa and Valaichenai using 300 civilians as human shields. The IPKF shot dead 50 civilians of their human shield and burn 75 houses belonging to Tamils at Mandoor.

3 civilians were killed and 15 were injured due to ariel bombardment at the Kokuvil Ramakrishna School refugee camp.

10

NEW DELHI, Nov. 10.

Twenty Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) men were killed in an exchange of fire with the Indian Peace Keeping Force at Anakoddai, 10 km southwest of Jaffna last night, an official spokesman said here today.

The firing, which resulted from an attack by LTTE on an IPKF patrol, left one Indian soldier dead and three wounded.

In the past 24 hours, the IPKF captured a large quantity of ammunition and explosives at Chavakcheri, besides one 150 mm mortar, one three-inch mortar, 10 improvised mortar barrels and fourteen 60 mm mortar bombs the spokesman said. — UNI

Many civilians killed at Puthukudiyirupu due to aerial bombardment on residential areas.

2 civilians killed when the IPKF opened fire at a civilian van between Mulagavil and Velankulam in the Mannar District.

25 civilians including women and children brutally murdered by Sri Lankan Security Personnel at Batticoloa.

11

Tamil militants killed 15 Sinhalese fishermen and wounded two others at Batticaloa, about 230 km from here, an Associated Press report said.

The victims were shot dead when they went to sell their catch at a village jetty.

The IPKF also came under heavy firing at Thavady and at Kopay south yesterday in the peninsula. The Indian troops retaliated killing three militants at Kopay south. Seven Indian soldiers were injured

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

THAVADY	K. Shanmuganathan
K. Kunam	S. Suntharalingam
P. Kanagasingam	Suntharalingam
P. Manonmany	K. Appiah
P. Malini	K. Sellathurai
S. Nesarasa	K. Rasiah
K. Vadivelu	R. Selvaratnam
TIRUNELVELI	S. Kandiah
R. Luxman	T. Valliammai
S. Thanikasar	S. Navaratnam
N. Rasaratnam	S. Pushpam
T. Thangamany	G. Ramasamy
K. Gunaratnam	S. Nadarajah
K. Puwaneswaary	K. Annammah
S. Ramalingam	S. Veeran
V. Paramarasa	K. Ramasamy
S. Wigneswaran	M. Navaratnam
N. Annammah	T. Ketheeswaran
S. Sivasubramaniam	T. Mohankumar
P. Thevy	P. Rasenthiram
P. Angaramoorthy	S. Sellathurai
S. Sabaratnam	G. Gnanamuthu
N. Thanabalasingam	S. Mohanachandran
R. Tharumalingam	T. Rasammah
P. Suntharam	S. Kandasamy
S. Jeyakumar	S. Jeyakumaran
S. Sinnathamby	V. Santhalingam
S. Sathasivam	S. Gunaratnam
V. Sinnah	G. Valliammai
P. Sivapatham	*TELLIPALAI*
S.O.K. Muthaliyar	V. Santhalingam
K. Maheswaran	P. Muthuthamby
Maheswaran	Sivasothy
A. Sivaguru	Y. Geethanjali

in the encounters.

Meanwhile, according to reliable reports received here, "Ousai," one of the first 10 in the LTTE hierarchy, was killed on November 7 during the IPKF operations in the Vadamarachi area.

2 IPKF SOLDIERS KILLED: Three LTTE men and two Indian soldiers, including a junior commissioned officer, were killed and 10 members of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force wounded during the past 24 hours in the battle-torn Jaffna peninsula and eastern Batticaloa.

On the 11th November 87, fifteen people were killed and 25 seriously injured at Nedunkerni when a helicopter gunship attacked a civilian target. A hospital of the area was also damaged. Patients in the hospital also were injured.

12

Colombo, Nov. 12 (PTI): Twentyfive civilians were killed on Thursday in a big landmine explosion at Chettikulam, in Sri Lanka's northern province in Mannar district, according to top Sri Lankan security sources.

The sources said the civilians were travelling in a van, three miles off Chettikulam, when the landmine planted allegedly by the LTTE "terrorists" exploded killing the civilians.

According to unconfirmed sources, the LTTE claimed that the members of its rival militant group, PLOTE were travelling in the van.

LTTE men killed: Thirteen LTTE men and two Indian soldiers were killed in Jaffna in the last 24 hours as the IPKF continued its operations to disarm the Tigers, the External Affairs Ministry spokesman told reporters in Delhi, on Thursday.

Ten other Indian soldiers were wounded in the operations and 23 LTTE members were apprehended by IPKF, the spokesman added.

13

LTTE leader 'Suren' was killed and three hardcore militants were captured in the northern Mannar region during search and combing operations, the official added.

He said of the 25 killed in a landmine explosion at Chettikulam in Mannar district on Thursday, 13 were identifed as Tamil militants, belonging to PLOTE, and 12 civilians.

The 'Tigers' lost 13 of its men as the IPKF continued its mopping up operation in the Jaffna peninsula, the State-owned Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation (SLBC) said in its evening bulletin on Friday.

Twenty-three militants were captured by the IPKF which lost two of its soldiers, the bulletin added. It however, did not mention when the militants were killed.

Meanwhile, a senior official of the Indian High Commission told newsmen that the first civil mail from Jaffna reached Colombo on Friday by air. Mail had remained suspended in the wake of IPKF operation.

14

3 LTTE MEN KILLED: Three LTTE militants were killed while laying mines in the Konduvil area of Jaffna on Friday while two surrendered to the IPKF in the Kachevi residency area.

An External Affairs Ministry spokesman said in New Delhi today five militants were apprehended by the IPKF during the past 24 hrs.

He said an IPKF patrol was ambushed by the LTTE in Nedunkeni in the Vawaniya sector, resulting in light casualties on both sides.

CHOPRA ADMITS

The following piece of secret information *(case file No:5301/1/G dated 14.11.87)* although received here late, confirms the atrocities committed by the IPKF during *operation Pawan in* Jaffna:

"On taking over area Urumpirai, Bus Stand area and Thirunelvely East, it is observed that there has been systematic destruction, plundering of each and every house and shop - as for your information, please - Capt. S.S.Chopra."

15

Twentyseven persons were killed and 20 injured today in a clash between Tamil guerillas and Indian Peace Keeping Force in the north of Sri Lanka, official sources said.

Most of the casualties were said to be among the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Independent sources said an unspecified number of civilians were killed in the fighting, which took place in Vandaramollai, about 15 km west of the town of Batticaloa.

In other incidents, four LTTE men were killed in a landmine explosion near a refugee camp at Vavuniya in the north and 10 LTTE suspects were arrested in the Jaffna region, State radio said.

Eats cyanide: Indran (30), believed to be the political adviser for the LTTE in Batticaloa, killed himself by taking cyanide when he was apprehended by the Ampara police on Saturday, ENS adds.

Indran and his woman companion had been arrested at Arantha-

lawa

The woman was brought to Colombo under heavy security for questioning.

A lady was raped in front of her daughter at Arivalai.

2 people Thagarajah (27) and Sinnakanu (80) who was staying at the Urelu Amman Temple shot dead by IPKF.

A 16 year old boy was tortured to death Kommanthurai, Batticoloa.

3 people shot dead at Eravur by the IPKF.

Theivanayagam (58) was hit to death and 400 houses belonging to Tamils were burnt by the IPKF at Vandarumoolai in Batticaloa. 3 shops and about 200 houses were looted by the IPKF, 15 houses were badly damaged due to bombardment by helicopters.

6 Tamil speaking Muslim girls raped by the IPKF.

2 girls raped at Vandarumoolai and Uppodai.

The people of Vandarumoolai, Marugaiyadi, Sengalady, Kommanthurai and Sithandy have left their houses and have taken refuge in Temples and Schools.

16

Express News Service

Colombo, Nov. 16: Thirty LTTE cadres were reported killed in four separate engagements yesterday in the Batticaloa district. According to reports from Batticaloa, the LTTE had ambushed an IPKF column going from Batticaloa to meet up with a column coming from Trincomalee. The road from Batticaloa to Vallaichenai being usually mined, the IPKF was on a foot patrol when LTTE men opened fire.

Sixty IPKF personnel are believed to have been injured in the engagements which began around 9.30 a.m. and continued till about four in the evening in the Sithandy, Morakotanchenai and Chenkaladi areas.

Unconfirmed reports said that a number of civilians were among the dead. A number of houses in the vicinity were reported destroyed. An LTTE leader from Vavuniya is reported to have been killed in the encounters, and Karuna and Agasthinan from Batticaloa seriously injured.

Seven militants were killed and at least 20 wounded when they engaged the peace force in skirmish in eastern Sri Lanka, military sources said on Monday, reports *Reuter*.

Three girls of the LTTE arrested by the IPKF are being raped at the Jaffna Hospital.

4 women were raped by IPKF at Chunnakam. 9 women including a pregnant lady and an unattained girl were raped by the IPKF at Kondavil, when they went to get their food provisions supplied by the IPKF.

A girl was raped repeatedly till she became unconscious at Kinniyadi, Valachenai. About 9 males arrested

One Tamil speaking Muslim died due to the indiscriminate shelling by the IPKF.

17

Colombo, Nov. 17 (UNI): Fifteen Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) men and two IPKF personnel were killed and an IPKF vehicle was destroyed during operations against the militant Tamils today.

An Indian High Commission spokesman said here that one jawan and one junior commissioned officer were killed in the peace-keeping operations today. The LTTE, however, suffered a crippling blow when the IPKF raided their "transport headquarters" and seized a large number of vehicles late yesterday.

20

COLOMBO, Nov. 20.

Militants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam launched a series of attacks in Sri Lanka as they freed 18 Indian Peace Keeping Force soldiers held captive for more than a month in the North, military sources said on Friday.

At least four soldiers were killed and 11 wounded when the LTTE opened fire on an Indian supply convoy at Mulliyawalai, 100 km southeast of Jaffna on Thursday afternoon, the sources said. They also reported attacks against Sri Lankan police positions and clashes with Indian troops in the eastern districts of Batticaloa Amparai and Trincomalee.

LTTE guerillas launched a series of attacks as they freed the 18 soldiers, military sources said today, reports Reuter from Colombo.

At least four Indian soldiers were killed and 11 wounded when LTTE men opened fire on an Indian supply convoy in Mullaiyawalai, 100 km southeast of Jaffna yesterday afternoon.

The *Island* newspaper said at least four people were hacked to death in an attack on a Sinhalese area in Amparai. The dead were a 78-year-old man, his son and grandson and their neighbour a homeguard.

21

NEW DELHI, Nov. 21.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) today fired at an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) patrol in Sri Lanka despite the unilateral 48-hour ceasefire announced by the Government of India beginning 0700 hrs this morning.

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

SUTHUMALAI	PANDERTHAIPPU
I. Arulaiah	S. Velautham
S. Annammah	H. Antonitta
I. Sivapalan	T. Jeyarajah
K. Mahadevan	S. Thiyageesan
T. Sellathurai	K. Ganeshalingam
M. Vaithalingam	T. Uruthirarajah
M. Vaithalingam	V. Pathmaranee
K. Nalliah	Srikandarajah
P. Thavarajah	Balachandran
N. Annaladchumy	K. Veerasingam
T. Selvarasa	M.K. Pathmanathan
A. Shanmugalingam	S. Hubert
S. Vigneswaran	A. Alex Jusin
S. Nandakumar	PUDUKUDUIRUPPU
S. Rasathurai	Mary Loyala
SANDILIPAY	V. Krishnamoorthy
G. Nadesu	K. Kandiah
Arumugam	R. Packianathan
Ranganathan	K. Pathmanathan
M. Pararajasingam	S. Sebamalai
S. Thanaladchumy	PULOLY
Thanabalasingam	T. Karunanantharajah
V. Swaminathan	A. Ravichandran
S. Rasalingam	A. Vigneswaramoorthy
T. Sritharan	URUMPIRAI
S. Paramasingam	N. Shanti
PANDERTHAIPPU	P. Navaratnam
S. Velautham	K. Kanagasingam
H.A. Arunthathy	V. Navartnam
T. Jeyarajah	S. Nadarajah
S. Thiyageesan	K.M. Thambian
K. Ganeshalingam	V. Navaratnam
T. Uruthirarajah	S. Velautham

An External Affairs spokesman said here tonight that the LTTE fired from a building at Saralai, near Chavakacheri, in the Jaffna peninsula despite being aware of the decision that the IPKF will not open fire on its own initiative. The IPKF patrol fired back.

The LTTE men left behind a wounded member of the militant group while fleeing from the building.

The IPKF recovered one two-inch mortar and a rifle from the building, the spokesman said.

The LTTE had caused extensive damage to a transformer at the main power station at Chunakam. Engineers of the IPKF and the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board have been working continuously to restore power supply.

According to intelligence reports, the LTTE has asked its cadres to kill those people in Jaffna who assist and cooperate with the IPKF or do not give money to the LTTE when it so demands.

The IPKF is, however, striving to ensure that law-abiding citizens are given due protection, the reports said. — PTI



22

New Delhi, Nov. 22 (PTI): Over 100 members of the LTTE who were wounded in the Indian Peace Keeping Force operations in Jaffna were forced by the 'Tigers' leadership to swallow cyanide pills and die, according to realiable reports with the Government of India.

This was stated by the External Affairs Ministry spokesman on Sunday

IPKF violates the 48 hrs cease fire. Search operation by the IPKF at Parapukadanthan, Paraiyankulam and Aandaankulam in the Mannar district.

A man miraculously escaped after being shot at by an IPKF Patrol at Sithandy, Batticolao.

A civilian boat fired at by the IPKF at Thanichankerny

An LTTE base was rounded up by the IPKF at Thattamalai in Batticoloa at 07.30 hrs. 6 civilians were also arrested there.

A woman was raped by the IPKF at Neervely in Jaffna.

5 civilians including 2 Tamil speaking Muslims killed when the IPKF opened fire at Trincomalee.

23

Besides in the 48-hour "cease-fire" period, which ended at 7 a.m. today, the LTTE had killed two Tamils, one in Navatkuli village and another in Perumal Koil street in Jaffna, in order to intimidate the people and keep them from co-operating with the IPKF, the spokesman said.

A girl was shot dead on the 21st night by the IPKF at Annaikoddai, Jaffna after she resisted all attempts by the IPKF to molest her.

On the 21st, many women were raped by the IPKF at Uduvil. When the parents reported this to the Officer in charge, he said "Raping is a small incident, there is no need to report this".

24

UNI reports:

Heavy fighting broke out between the IPKF and the LTTE as the IPKF surrounded the large number of LTTE men in the jungles of Pulipanchakallu, 25 km north of eastern Batticaloa town.

Informed sources in Colombo said the IPKF surrounded the area following intelligence information that the LTTE was preparing for an ambush of an IPKF convoy, going on Kiran Road. The LTTE men, taken by surprise, were now trapped in the area and were trying to break out through the IPKF cordon, the sources added.

Sources in Batticaloa said helicopter gunships were giving cover to the IPKF. The area was uninhabited and a known LTTE stronghold, they said.

The fighting is the first since the expiry of the 48-hour unilateral ceasefire observed by the IPKF. The ceasefire ended yesterday.

Many houses destroyed due to aerial bombardment on and around Kiran in Batticolao district.

More than 5000 people vacated the villages of Kiran Santhivelly, Koorakallimedu, and Kinniyadi due to fear.

20 women 5 from Puttur and 15 from Vadarawathai were raped by IPKF who were camped at Somiaskanda College, Puttur.

25

COLOMBO, Nov. 25:

At least eight LTTE militants and one Indian soldier were killed in eastern Batticaloa and Jaffna on Tuesday in encounters.

The eight Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam men were killed as the IPKF repulsed an ambush attempt on them by the LTTE at Pullipanchakilla, 26 km north of Batticaloa town yesterday, according to official reports reaching here today.

A large number of LTTE members and supporters were captured along with arms and ammunition after the encounter, the reports added.

In another confrontation near Kiran at Chenkaladi, also in Batticaloa district, the LTTE attacked an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) convoy with small arms. The attack was repulsed by the Indian soldiers with helicopter support. The casualty figures are not known yet.

IPKF soldier dies: One Indian soldier was killed at Puttur in Jaffna peninsula yesterday, when he tried to loft a land mine during search and combing operation.

The IPKF, it was reported, recovered a large haul of arms and ammunition from Manipai, Sandileppai and neighbouring places in Jaffna yesterday.

Informed sources in Batticaloa said that while some of the militants were killed in the exchange of fire, others, finding their escape

Four girls were raped, 12 civilians were shot dead and 10 houses were burnt by the IPKF at Kiran in Batticoloa.

2 women were raped by the IPKF who came escorting a train from Batticoloa to Valachenai to Morakottan Chennai. One of the women who was raped, Marakatham of Mavadivembu identified one of the men who raped her to the officer in charge. The officer punished the man responsible. The other girl is in a critical condition.

26

COLOMBO, Nov. 26.

At least eight Tamil Tigers and an Indian army officer were killed in battles in the Jaffna peninsula, as the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) continued its operation on Wednesday to flush out the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) militants who are now apparently going behind the lines and launching renewed attacks, official sources said here today.

Six militants were shot dead at Uduvil, about 8 km north-west of Jaffna town, in a fierce fight with the IPKF. A large quantity of ammunition along with three AK-47 rifles and two rocket launchers were captured after the operation which sent the LTTE militants on the retreat.

The Sri Lankan national news agency, 'Lankapuvath', reported today that two LTTE men were killed and nine wounded in another major confrontation yesterday at Neerveli, about 4 km north-east of Jaffna. One IPKF officer was also killed and three soldiers were injured, it said quoting official sources.

(However, a Reuter report, quoting military sources, said four Indian soldiers were killed in a clash yesterday at Neerveli. Nine soldiers were wounded and 10 militants captured during the battle.)

Yesterday's operation in the Jaffna peninsula came in the wake of a fierce clash at Pullichankulla and Kiran in Eastern Batticaloa district on Tuesday, when at least eight LTTE militants were killed after the IPKF thwarted an attempt by the LTTE to ambush it and launched a counter aerial and ground offensive. Some of the LTTE boats fleeing are reported to have capsized as the IPKF offensive went on.

Some newspapers here gave the casualty figure of the LTTE in the Batticaloa fighting on Tuesday as between 16 and 18. But it could not be immediately confirmed. — PTI

27

New Delhi, Nov. 27 (PTI): Seven Indian Peace Keeping personnel were killed and five wounded in Mullaitivu when their patrol was fired at by the LTTE during intensified search operations for weapons and ammunition, according to official sources.

The sources said the LTTE casualties were not known as yet. Search operations by the IPKF were continuing, they added.

Civilians shot dead: Tamil militants shot dead four civilians in eastern Sri Lanka, official sources said today.

They said the four men, including two government officials, were killed on Thursday night in their office at Kuchchaveli, 30 km north of Trincomalee.

Officials blamed the LTTE for the killings and said the guerillas had established new jungle hideouts in the eastern district.

28

Five persons were killed and 14 injured, some of them seriously, when members of the LTTE lobbed hand grenades indiscriminately at a large crowd which had gathered to collect relief supplies in Jaffna today, according to an official spokesman here.

About 300 to 400 people had assembled at Chavakachheri in Jaffna town to collect food and medicine being distributed by the IPKF personnel with the help of the local administration.

Two members of the LTTE threw grenades at the crowd and the five were killed on the spot, the spokesman said.

In their search operations, the IPKF defused a 'mine necklace' laid across the railway line.

Five civilians died in Neervely, Jaffna due to the indiscriminate shelling of the IPKF. 68 houses belonging to Tamil speaking Muslims burnt by the IPKF at Neeravipiddy.

29

MADRAS, Nov. 29.

The LTTE has denied reports of its involvement in the killing of five civilians, including an Assistant Government Agent, in Trincomalee district on November 27.

In a press release from Jaffna, issued here today, the LTTE denied both Indian and Sri Lankan radio reports that it was responsible for the Kuchchuveli killings. The LTTE alleged that it was the work of the Sri Lankan Navy and was meant to discourage Tamil and Muslim officials serving in the Eastern region and to fulfil its plans of Sinhala Colonisation in the region.

COLOMBO, Nov. 29.

At least ten suspected Tamil militants were killed during a search operation by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) at Kachai near Chavakacheri in the northern Jaffna Peninsula yesterday, reports reaching here said today.

They said the search operations were launched following the hand-grenade attack by two LTTE men on civilians receiving food and other relief assistance from the IPKF at Chavakacheri resulting in the death of five people and injuries to four.

Meanwhile, press reports here said that the IPKF launched a massive search operation in the Paduwankarai area in the eastern Batticaloa district yesterday. The IPKF infantrymen were backed by helicopter gunships and armoured vehicles in the operation, they said.

The reports said about 30 youths had been taken into custody for questioning.

IPKF opened fire at a crowd of civilians who were collecting their rations at an army out post in Chavakachcheri. 5 were killed and 15 were injured.

6 civilian killed by the IPKF at Upoddai in Batticaloa.

30

COLOMBO, Nov. 30.

Twenty Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam members and 12 Indian Peace Keeping Force personnel were killed in four separate incidents during the last 24 hours as the IPKF stepped up operations to disarm militants in Sri Lanka's north and east, Sri Lankan sources said today.

The sources said the IPKF destroyed a major hideout of the LTTE near Kiran, about 15 km south of the eastern Batticaloa town, in a dawn raid today, killing eight militants and wounding an estimated 50 others.

The IPKF recovered hand-grenades, walkie-talkies, camouflage uniforms and a large quantity of ammunition from the hideout.

The sources said 11 IPKF men were killed when a landmine they were trying to defuse in Jaffna town exploded yesterday. The landmine had apparently been planted by the militants before the IPKF wrested control of the northern town.

The sources said one IPKF jawan was killed in an encounter yesterday with the militants at Achchuveli in Jaffna peninsula.

The IPKF killed 12 militants in a heavy exchange of fire at Sandilipai, also in the peninsula, on the same day. The IPKF did not suffer any casualty.

In the northern district of Mullaitivu, where the IPKF and the LTTE have been locked in fierce fights from Friday, at least 15 'Tigers' including a front-ranker named 'Robert' and nine Indian soldiers were killed, reports today said. Five soldiers were reported to be wounded. According to earlier accounts, seven Indian soldiers and 10 Tigers were killed in the Mullaitivu battles.

Published reports quoting reliable sources said three IPKF men were missing in Mullaitivu. They are believed to have been captured by the "terrorists".

The English daily *The Island* quoting sources said that the Mullaitivu LTTE leader, identified as Paseelan, was leading the group numbering about 100 in the battle.

The daily reported without giving the date that in an encounter at Kondavil, the IPKF killed five "Tiger elements." Another LTTE militant committed suicide, taking cyanide.

Three policemen were killed in an LTTE raid on the Muttur police station in eastern Trincomalee district today, reliable reports said. The Sri Lankan police along with IPKF were engaged in repulsing the attack till about midday yesterday, the reports added.

A tamil speaking Muslim woman was raped by the IPKF at Navalady village in Siavettuwarn in Valaichchenai.

7 people were killed and 9 including 2 IPKF personnel were injured when a shell fired by the Sri Lankan Army from the Muttur camp fell on the St. Anthony's church which was housing refugees.

Tamils demonstrate
demanding ceasefire
London..

Madras.....

A Diary MOHAN RAM

23.7.87

It is a no-win war in Sri Lanka, wearing into its fifth year today. The battle for the Jaffna peninsula (population 830,000), the last bastion of the Tamil secessionist guerrillas fighting for a homeland of over 2 million people, is stalemated. Sri Lankan forces which launched a major offensive on 25 May have stopped short of their decisive assault on Jaffna city (pop. 200,000).

After an Indian flotilla of fragile fishing boats flying Red Cross flags and carrying food and medicines for the béleaguered people is turned away by the Sri Lankan navy on 3 June, five Indian Air Force transport planes escorted by two Mirage-2000 combat aircraft drop twenty-five tonnes of relief supplies. The sortie is a technical violation of Sri Lanka's air space.

There is a lull in the fighting amidst speculation that India, having got the message across to Sri Lanka that it can rain bombs down on the country with impunity if it chooses to, is engaged in quiet diplomacy. Indian and Sri Lankan newspapers report a political settlement is round the corner and the two countries might sign an agreement in the next few days.

A dramatic development. Velupillai Prabhakaran, the charismatic thirty-three-year-old President and Commander of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who has been directing the guerrilla campaign in Sri Lanka since late 1986 from his hideout in Jaffna, is flown, with his aides, into New Delhi to meet Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi who wants to discuss the proposed agreement with him. This is a sensible move as the LTTE, the most significant Tamil militant group, will have a veto on any settlement. Significantly, till now, the LTTE has not been a party to the negotiations between India and Sri Lanka.

26.7.87

Talks between Indian government representatives and the LTTE leaders, held incommunicado in New Delhi's plush Ashoka Hotel, and guarded by the elite Black Cat commandos, continue.

28.7.87

Prabhakaran has a ninety-minute meeting with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, and media reports based on Indian official briefings, suggest that the LTTE intends to go along with the agreement and its reservations are limited to the time-table for the surrender of arms.

But the LTTE leader does not endorse the agreement. He merely says he is satisfied that Rajiv Gandhi has understood Tamil fears and aspirations.

Meanwhile, Sinhala opposition to the proposed agreement (its contents have been leaked) has been building up. The agreement is seen as capitulation to Tamil secessionism. Curfew is imposed on Colombo, the Sri Lankan capital, after riots the previous day. Curfew is then extended to the whole island so that the agreement is signed on 29 July.

Violence continues in Sri Lanka (nineteen are killed in Colombo as police fire on mobs). There is uncertainty in New Delhi about Rajiv Gandhi's two-day visit to Colombo to sign the agreement. The general feeling is: why not wait till the Sri Lankan President, J.R. Jayewardene, overcomes opposition to the agreement and restores normalcy in the island?

The Political Affairs Committee of Rajiv Gandhi's cabinet meets to evaluate reports from Colombo. It thinks cancellation of the Prime Minister's visit would add to Jayewardene's problems and the agreement should be signed to schedule.

29.7.87

Colombo under curfew is eerily silent. Black crows fly in formation over the city's roof-tops and empty streets, a tableau reminiscent of Alfred Hitchcock's film *The Birds*. About 10,000 Sinhalas, including Buddhist monks in saffron robes, gather on the city's outskirts to march to the airport and demonstrate when Rajiv Gandhi arrives. They break the police cordon and five die as the police open fire. Rajiv Gandhi and his wife Sonia, along with a bullet-proof limousine for their use, and a large contingent of officials and New Delhi-based media persons arrive in a chartered jet. They are whisked away from the airport to Galle Face Green, the vast open space overlooking the sea in the heart of the city, for the ceremonial reception. Not to be seen on the welcoming committee are Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa and six other members of the twenty-seven-member cabinet. They are known to oppose the agreement*, which is signed later in the day in the panelled audience hall of the seventeenth century Presidential palace, once the private residence of the last Dutch Governor of Ceylon, Johan Cerard Van Vandelbeak.

30.7.87

The government-owned *Daily News* has the following quote from Shakespeare's *Henry IV* for its customary 'Thought for the Day'

> A peace of the nature of conquest
> For then both the parties are nobly subdued
> And neither party loser

A couple of hours after the newspaper is delivered in hotel rooms, Rajiv Gandhi survives an assassination attempt while inspecting a guard of honour. A naval guard slams his rifle at him but misses the Indian Prime Minister's head. (There is perhaps no precedent in contemporary world history of an attack on a visiting dignitary reviewing a guard of honour. The closest parallel is the assassination of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt while taking the salute at the national day parade.) President Jayewardene apologizes for the outrage. Rajiv Gandhi flies back to New Delhi.

Indian troops begin landing in Sri Lanka, at Jayewardene's request, on a peace-keeping mission.

31.7.87

Two frigates of the Indian navy carrying a crack commando force, and helicopters in support, anchor off Galle Face Green in readiness to rescue Jayewardene and India's High Commissioner, Jyotindra Nath Dixit, in the event of a coup.

An unknown assailant kills a ruling United National Party

Member of Parliament Jayadasa Weerasinghe despite the curfew to contain the violence. There are fears of an insurrection by the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), a Sinhala nationalist youth group outlawed since the July 1983 anti-Tamil riots which were largely responsible for escalating the ethnic conflict.

The arrival of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) is officially announced. The Indian military presence, limited to the two Tamil majority northern and eastern provinces, relieves pressure on Sri Lanka's armed forces. The Sri Lankan army is redeployed in the Sinhala areas to thwart the JVP threat.

4.8.87

Prabhakaran, who has rejected the 29 July India-Sri Lanka agreement, returns to Jaffna. (He had insisted in New Delhi that he be taken back to his home base.) News that he would be addressing a public meeting (he has been living 'underground' or has been in exile since 1973) eases tensions because people in Jaffna fear that he is being held captive in New Delhi (the jeep of the officer commanding the IPKF is rocked, in one incident, by an irate mob demanding that their leader be restored to them).

Prabhakaran speaks in Tamil from a prepared text. The English translation is made available by the LTTE.* It is significant for the content and the nuances because it contradicts India's version of the LTTE's attitude to the agreement.

The points he makes:

- The agreement was concluded without consulting the LTTE
- When confronted with the draft of the agreement, the LTTE told India that the agreement was no permanent solution to the Tamil problem
- The agreement primarily concerned India-Sri Lanka relations and contained 'stipulations for binding Sri Lanka within India's big power orbit'
- The agreement put a stop to the armed struggle the LTTE had built up over fifteen years, and disarmed the organization without getting the consent of its fighters or without working out a guarantee of the people's safety and protection (because of this the LTTE would not surrender its arms)
- If the LTTE did not hand over its weapons to the Indian Peace-Keeping Force, it would be in the 'calamitous' situation of having to clash with it
- The monster of Sinhala racism would devour the agreement soon
- Only an independent Tamil Eelam could be a permanent solution to the Tamil problem.

5.8.87

A sullen, grim-looking Dileep Yogi (his real name is a secret), a political aide to Prabhakaran, whips out a Mauser pistol and drops it on the table at a ceremony organized for the LTTE's surrender of its weaponry. Sri Lanka's defence secretary, Gen. A.S. Attiyagalle, touches the weapon to symbolize his acceptance of the 'surrender'. The bespectacled Yogi refuses to repeat the act for cameramen who missed it in the first instance. Nor does he shake hands with the official who hands him the letter of amnesty.

All in all, it is a reluctant farewell to arms for a proud band of fighters at the Palaly airbase near Jaffna. India would like it to be seen as a 'surrender' of arms but this concept is too humiliating for the LTTE to bear and it is for this reason that they have rejected the idea of turning in their weapons at a grand public spectacle near Jaffna railway station. The media notes that Prabhakaran is represented at the ceremony by a political aide, Dileep Yogi, and not a military leader of the LTTE.

18.8.87

President Jayewardene survives an assassination attempt in which grenades are hurled at a meeting of United National Party (UNP) MPs that he is presiding over. Prime Minister R. Premadasa and National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali are among those who escape with injuries.

14.9.87

Peace is under seige. The IPKF, after securing the disengagement between the Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan forces, is yet to disarm the groups completely. Clashes between the LTTE and the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), another militant organization, leave eighty dead in Batticaloa district in the eastern province. The EPRLF says that the LTTE attacked its cadres while the Indian soldiers looked on. It demands that the IPKF maintain peace or return the arms it surrendered so it could defend itself against the LTTE which has said on 1 September that it is taking over the civil administration in the Tamil province to curb 'anti-social activities' (which means, once the persiflage is stripped away, that it is trying to assert its primacy in the eastern province, which it doesn't yet control).

15.9.87

It is unusual for a militant group to try fasting as a political weapon, though the extremist groups in Ireland have tried it on occasion. Amirthalingam Thileepan, 23, chief of the LTTE's propaganda wing, begins a fast unto death to press for a charter of five demands including the release of all political prisoners and detenus held under anti-terrorist laws, an end to Sinhala colonization of Tamil areas, the disarming of the Home Guards (a predominantly Sinhala paramilitary force used against the Tamils in the past) and the closure of all army and police camps in the Tamil areas.

20.9.87

The LTTE backs Thileepan's fast with peaceful picketing of government offices (this has been going on since 16 September) while India warns the militant groups against sabotaging the peace process. The LTTE is specifically blamed for the Batticaloa killings and its political campaign is seen as being aimed at diverting attention from 'fratricidal' killings Meanwhile Thileepan is reported 'near death'.

24.9.87

The IPKF, earlier welcomed by Tamils as saviours, fires on a violent Tamil mob in front of its camp in Mannar* killing one. India warns that its troops will be compelled to respond with even stronger measures if the LTTE provokes violence.

25.9.87

Thileepan dies rousing strong Tamil emotions even as India's High Commissioner in Colombo, J.N. Dixit, goes

to Jaffna to persuade the LTTE to co-operate with the peace agreement.

28.9.87

The LTTE is offered seven places in the twelve-member Interim Administrative Council proposed for the unified Tamil province (comprising the northern and eastern provinces).

2.10.87

There are widespread Sinhala-Tamil clashes followed by Sinhala mob attacks on the IPKF in Trincomalee in the eastern province. Serious doubts are raised about India's military role and the future of the tenuous agreement. Are the Indian forces getting bogged down in a law-and-order role which they disdain to play even at home?

5.10.87

LTTE fighters are known to carry ampoules of potassium cyanide slung down the neck. All the LTTE activists held by a Sri Lankan naval patrol off Point Pedro (and lodged in Palaly camp) on 3 October attempt suicide by swallowing cyanide because they refuse to be taken to Colombo for interrogation (and torture?). Twelve of them, including two ranking military leaders Kumarappa and Puleendran, die immediately.

6.10.87

The LTTE charges India with failure to avert the cyanide deaths and to protect its cadres in general. Prabhakaran declares the cease-fire does not bind them any more. In gruesome retaliation, the LTTE executes eight Sri Lankan soldiers it has been holding hostage for six months. Two policemen are burnt alive and another killed in Jaffna. The interrupted war resumes.

7.10.87

The LTTE goes on a spree of reprisal killings in the eastern province and 150 Sinhalas are reported killed.

8.10.87

More killings, curfew in Jaffna. The IPKF is ordered to shoot at sight after India's army chief Gen. K. Sunderji visits Sri Lanka to assess the situation. (This was necessitated when Jayewardene had threatened to withdraw the IPKF from Trincomalee if it failed to keep peace there.)

9.10.87

India's Defence Minister K.C. Pant rushes to Colombo for talks with Jayewardene. Both declare that the India-Sri Lanka agreement will be implemented.

11.10.87

Jayewardene's amnesty to the Tamils is off since 9 October, when a price of a million rupees is put on Prabhakaran's head.

Indian forces launch a massive offensive, raiding LTTE camps, seizing their radio and TV stations and closing two Tamil dailies *(Eelamurasu and Murasoli)* from Jaffna after their printing presses are destroyed by shelling.

The strength of the IPKF is raised to 15,000 against the LTTE's force of under 2,500.

India is fighting Sri Lanka's war.

14.10.87

A pincer movement on Jaffna city by the IPKF is supported by airdropped para commandos.

25.10.87

The IPKF takes Jaffna with heavy casualties on both sides.

13.11.87

Prime Minister Premadasa charges the IPKF with genocide in the Jaffna peninsula.

18.11.87

The LTTE frees eighteen IPKF prisoners, after repeated postponement. There are hopes of a cease-fire after intermittent clashes and the recovery of LTTE arms caches by the IPKF.

20.11.87

India announces a unilateral forty-eight-hour cease-fire to enable the LTTE to surrender arms amidst pressure in India for a political initiative and an end to military operations. The LTTE ignores the cease-fire and there is no surrender of arms.

23.11.87

India rejects the LTTE demand for an IPKF pull back to the 9 October positions as the condition for the laying down of arms.

2.12.87

Jayewardene says the IPKF is 'on top' of the situation and will complete its mission 'very soon', wiping out terrorism from the Tamil provinces because the LTTE is no position to confront its adversary.

As a riposte to Jayewardene, Maj.-Gen. Harkirat Singh, an IPKF commander, says his men take orders from the Indian government and no one else and they will not leave the island 'until the Tamils are satisfied and their aspirations are met'. Sri Lanka's press takes exception to this statement.

9.12.87

Gen. K. Sunderji, India's army chief, says there is no question of an IPKF withdrawal until the LTTE lays down arms—withdrawal now would only demoralize the Indian army and reduce its credibility.

13.12.87

The IPKF goes on 'red alert' amidst reports that the LTTE plans to crush rival groups.

19.12.87

Jayewardene vows to crush the Tamil militants in the north and the east and the JVP 'subversives' in the south.

21.12.87

Rajiv Gandhi says in Madras that a long-term solution of the Sri Lanka problem is in sight and the LTTE should not be allowed to sabotage it.

23.12.87

Harsha Abeywardene, chairman of Jayewardene's UNP, and three others, are killed in Colombo by unidentified JVP men.

25.12.87

M.G. Ramachandran (MGR), Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, dies in Madras. Though a supporter of the India-Sri Lanka agreement, his sympathies were with the LTTE. He had tried to arrange a Christmas truce in Sri Lanka which Rajiv Gandhi vetoed.

31.12.87

As Tamil Nadu mourns the death of its Chief Minister, a fierce succession struggle ensues in MGR's All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) Party and the Sri Lankan ethnic issue takes a back seat.



சாட்சியாயும் சத்தியமாயும்

பொறு ஈழமே!
புதிதாய் உனது
பூமியை மிதிக்க

இந்தியப் பூட்சுகளுக்குக்
கொஞ்சம் அவகாசம் தேவை.
அதன்
இரும்பு லாடங்களுக்குள்
ஒட்டிக் கொண்டிருக்கும்
இன்னும் ஒருசில.

பூவின் இதழ்கள்...
துடைக்க வேண்டாமா?
எவ்வளவு சுறுசுறுப்பான கூத்தாடிக்கும்

ஒரு மறுவேடம் பூணக்
கொஞ்சம் நேரம் வேண்டாமா?
குரூரம் இறுகிய முகங்களுள்
தற்காலிகமாகவாவது

ஒரு புன்னகையைப் பொருத்தச்
சிறிது காலம் வேண்டும்.
"இந்திய ராணுவத்தை
உடனே அனுப்பு.
ஈழத்தை மீட்க
உடனே அனுப்பு."
உள்ளம் அறியாது
உதடுகளில் திணிக்கப்பட்ட

முழக்கங்களுக்குக் கீழே
மிதிபட்டுத் துடிக்கும்
உண்மையின் ஓலம்
எனது கரைகளுக்கே
எட்டாதபோது
உனது கரைகளைத்
தொட்டாவிடும்?
நாளை இவ்வரிகள்
சாட்சியாய் இருக்கும்
நாளை இப்பாடல்
சத்தியமாய் இருக்கும்
வலக்கன்னம்

பாசிசக் கைகளால் வீங்க
இடக்கன்னத்தைக் காட்டுவது
இந்தியாவுக்கா?
அறிவாயா?

பருந்தின் கூரிய சொண்டுகள்
பிரிவது
ஒரு புறாக்குஞ்சுக்கு
முத்தம் கொடுக்கவோ?
உள்ளான குஞ்சே!

எமது கரை
உனக்குப்
பதுங்கு குழியாகட்டும்.
அண்ணாந்து பார்!

இந்த வானத்தின்
கிழக்கிலும் மேற்கிலும்
உதிர்ந்து கொண்டிருப்பவை
அனாதை இறகுகள்.

பறந்து கொண்டிருப்பதோ
பருந்தின் பரிவாரம்
என்விழிகளில் முட்டிநிற்கும்
கண்ணீர் ஊடகத்தின் வழியே
மங்கலாக
ஒரு காட்சி விரிகிறது.

சுதந்திர வெளியில்
உன்னைத் தழுவ
என்சிறைகளை நான்
உடைத்துக் கொண்டிருக்கிறேன்.

— இன்குலாப் **1985**

வீர வணக்கம்

2nd Lt. Suman 3.11.87	Girisanthan 8.11.87
Lt. Kutti 3.11.87	Suren 10.11.87
Sugandan 15.11.87	Thuyilan 27.11.87
Ronnie 15.11.87	Lookman 16.11.87
Lal 15.11.87	2nd Lt. Murugesh 10.11.87
Gopu 16.11.87	Sabari 3.11.87
Darsini 16.11.87	Maj. Pasilan 8.11.87
Lt. Ailen 27.11.87	Lt. John 8.11.87
Kulam 28.11.87	Murali 26.11.87
Mayuran 8.11.87	Sivakumar 26.11.87
Lt. Mohanram 2.11.87	
Capt Nathan 8.11.87	
Inbu 8.11.87	
Rohan 29.11.87	
Nakulan 9.11.87	
Geethan 12.11.87	
Lt. Vincent 30.11.87	
Ashok 22.11.87	
Seelan 17.11.87	
Panjan 24.11.87	
D. Murhty 11.11.87	
D. Murhty 11.11.87	
Karan 28.11.87	

துடி எறியும் புலைய!
எறிகோல் கொள்ளும் இழிசின!
கால மாரியின் அம்பு தைப்பினும்,
வயல் கெண்டையின் வேல் பிறழினும்,
பொலம்பூண் ஓடை அண்ணல் யானை
இலங்குவாள் மருப்பின் நுதிமடுத்து ஊன்றினும்,
ஓடல் செல்லாப் பீடுடை யாளர்
நெடுநீர்ப் பொய்கை பிறழிய வானை
நெல்லுடை நெடுநகர்க் கூட்டுமுதல் புரளும்,
தண்ணடை பெறுதல் யாவது? படினே;
மாசில் மகளிர் மன்றல் நன்றும்,
உயர்நிலை உலகத்து, நுகர்ப; அதனால்
வம்ப வேந்தன் தானை
இம்பர் நின்றும் காண்டிரோ, வரவே!
சாத்தந்தையார்.

Lookman 16.11.87

Lt. Nakulan 9.11.87

2nd Lt. Murugesh 10.11.87

Sabari 3.11.87

Maj. Pasilan 8.11.87

Lt. John 8.11.87

Roni 15.11.87

Murali 26.11.87

Sivakumar 26.11.87

Lt. Allen 27.11.87

KILLING FIELD 87 November

claims	IPKF KILLED	IPKF WOUNDED	LTTE KILLED	LTTE WOUNDED	S.L. ARMY KILLED	S.L. ARMY WOUNDED	OTHER MILITANTS KILLED	OTHER MILITANTS WOUNDED	CIVILIANS KILLED	CIVILIANS WOUNDED
IPKF	5	3								
LTTE									6	15
MEDIA										

3
25
3
1

4

5
1 4 6 6c
12

6
1 4

7
11
3 3c
11 6c

8
1 7 26 3c

9
1 10 18 14c
57 15

10
20
27

11
2* 17* 5* 3* 15* 2*

12
2 10 13 23 25*

13
1* 3c*

14
3 7c

15
31* 20* 12c
3 7

16
60* 30*
2 1

17
2 15

20
4* 11* 4*

21
1

22
100
5 6

23
2

25
1* 8*
12

26
1 3 8 9

27
7 5 4*
1

28
5 14
1
5

29
10
30c
11 15

30
12* 20*
2 7 7

31

TOTAL
4 0 23 4 250 55 45c 1 53 16 33c
2 10 150 58 6c

* - Sri Lankan Information.c-captured. EP-EPRLF T-TELO, P:PLOTE, EN-ENDLF, E-EROS TNA-Tamil National Army CVF-Citizen's Voluntary Force

CHAPTER 6

1987

the heinous crimes of indian peace keeping

December

19 J.R. vows to crush northern 'terrorists' and southern subversives.

23 H. Abeywardene, chairman UNP and 3 others are killed by J.V.P.

25 MGR died.

EDITORIAL

India in Sri Lanka

Do We Have to Be Pushed out?

December '87

IT'S almost two months since the IPKF began its "peace offensive" against the LTTE. It's also more than a month that the LTTE's hold over Jaffna, we were told, had been completely smashed. But the war is still on. If it has not grown in intensity, it has now spread over a much bigger area. And the toll keeps rising, every day, every hour. Every morning we wake up to the by now routine reports of yet another couple of IPKF-LTTE encounters : 9 IPKF men die in blast, 12 IPKF men hurt in LTTE attack in the East, 20 militants killed near Jaffna. Yet, there are no signs, absolutely no signs of any pullout of Indian army from the island in near future. Perhaps our battered and bruised jawans and the "brave" brass will return only when there is a "pushout". Like the two senior Indian diplomats in Colombo who were recently deported back to India on the orders of Jayewardene. That is, after they were exposed to be intelligence agents.

But right now, both Jayewardene and Rajiv Gandhi want the IPKF to stay in the island, even if for reasons altogether different. Old Junius is a much relieved soul now. Who else would have obliged him the way the Indian jawans are doing his dirty job in the jungles of Jaffna? And the dirty work need not end with the liquidation of the "threat" from LTTE, down south the JVP is always a potential "threat". Nearer home, for young Rajiv too these are indeed moments of happiness. Fun times. Look at the laurels the boys have brought him from the island expedition. Seldom has an Indian Prime Minister received such nice accolades from the heads of the neighbouring countries. And how nicely has the otherwise gloomy security scenario in the Indian Ocean suddenly brightened up, thanks to the IPKF presence in Sri Lanka. So, three cheers for Rajiv-Jayewardene accord! Long live the "Indian Peace Mission" in Lanka!

Menawhile, with every passing day, the Indian army is exposing, more and more of its weaknesses. The war with LTTE has exploded the myth of our forces being a really fighting and modern military outfit. Far less are they an expert in conducting counter-insurgency operations. And with every loss it is suffering, the transformation of the so-called peace-keeping force into an occupation force is becoming complete. And that perhaps demolishes yet another myth about our men in uniform. Given the chance, they are equally violent and vindictive.

So, what does it all add up to? The same scenario is going to continue : 7 shot, 11 captured, 13 released, truce declared, truce broken. Till we can compel our rulers to pull out. Or, till the Sri Lankans push us out of their territory.

Rajinder Puri, The Statesman, 8.12.87.

The price of power

Indian opposition questions military role in Jaffna

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi has been winning some political victories after a long, losing streak. He carried Nagaland by a one-vote majority but with 4 Independents to support the Congress, there should be a stable government. Its job now is to end the insurgency. More crucially, Mr. Gandhi has retained the support of MGR in Tamilnadu and this prevented a Tamilnadu backlash over the IPKF's operations in the Sri Lankan north. All the effors of Mr. Karunanidhi and his DMK to cash in on the situation in Sri Lanka have so far failed.

However, this does not mean that the IPKF's presence and work in Sri Lanka is not a major political concern for the Gandhi regime. It is, and will become a nagging worry if the IPKF gets too deeply entangled in a mess, protracted war against the LTTE. Much would depend on the LTTE's fight-back capabilities and its skill in advancing the fight into a new and different phase. And that in turn will rest largely on the sentiment of the Tamil majority. Have the ravages of the war, especially the civilian death toll and the hardships and sufferings of the community, left behind to many deep scars. Or will the bitterness be slowly erased by the human urge for peace, security and normal life, and the process of adjustment.

Meanwhile, the role of the IPKF and its future still remain a major debate in political circles in India and among the Indian intelligentsia. Salamat Ali, South Asia Correspondent of the FEER, wrote this report from Delhi.

Lanka Guardian, 1.12.87.

REPORT

For the first time in the four years since the Sri Lankan ethnic crisis escalated, the Indian Government and the opposition are openly divided on a major foreign-policy issue. While the government maintains that organised Tamil militant resistance to the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka has crumbled, the opposition believes that India is caught in a trap and must find ways of extricating itself at the earliest opportunity.

Rarely in Indian politics do parties adopt antipodal attitudes on foreign-policy issues involving the Indian armed forces. The government thinks its peace accord with Colombo, which sent Indian troops to Sri Lanka, is a major achievement. The opposition calls it a military misadventure and diplomatic absurdity.

Those supporting the government's view argue that Indian troops had to be sent to Sri Lanka because the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the largest Tamil separatist group, was not prepared to surrender its arms to the Sri Lankan army. Also, India could not watch Sri Lanka disintegrate and thereby threaten regional stability, including India's own security. It is also argued that the peace accord and the IPKF operations signify the emergence of India as the regional power. Any hasty retreat from Sri Lanka would make a mockery of the Indian diplomatic goal of keeping external forces from intruding into South Asia.

Replying to the opposition's scathing criticism in parliament on 11 November, Minister of State for External Affairs K. Natwar Singh emphasised the security of India's environs as one important reason for the agreement with Sri Lanka and added that India did not want Sri Lanka to become a "cockpit" of superpower rivalry and that by sending in its troops. New Delhi had prevented hostile forces from striking roots in Sri Lanka.

The opposition wants the IPKF to be withdrawn soon. Although the opposition would be willing to give the government some time to implement such a pull-out. It is loath to admit this in public. Indian critics assert that while the army went in to protect the minority Tamils, it has ended up killing many of them.

However, the government has declared that the IPKF would stay in Sri Lanka until the LTTE is disarmed or voluntarily surrenders its arms and extends unconditional support to the political solution laid down under the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement. Ceasefire pleas by the LTTE have been turned down by India and there will not be a unilateral ceasefire by the IPKF.

Although the opposition has not yet made an issue of it, it is grumbling over the financial costs of the IPKF operations and the casualties. At the beginning of the operations India had about 8,000 troops in Sri Lanka. Since then Indian strength has increased to two infantry divisions in addition to several battalions of paramilitary forces. Sri Lankan official sources said India was spending more than US$1 million per day on the operation. All this extradram on the public coffers is being sustained at a time when the Indian economy is reeling from the worst drought of the century.

The opposition suspects that the government is not disclosing the true casualty figures and that the announced toll any way did not include the paramilitary forces, which were not trained to deal with Claymore anti-personnel mines, booby-trapped houses and other such hazards. Jaswant Singh, one of the opposition's defence specialists, said in parliament on 6 November that Indian casualties in Sri Lanka were much higher than in any war the country has fought so far. The opposition hastens to clarify that it is not criticising the Indian armed forces but only those who sent them to Sri Lanka to fight an undeclared war on a foreign soil for a purpose which is not clear.

The Indian Government's strategy seems to be to hold the LTTE at bay, let a unified administration for Sri Lanka's northern and eastern provinces take hold and pave the way for a referendum on the unification of the two provinces.

COVER STORY

UNDER FIRE

"War is too serious a matter to be left to generals"
—Talleyrand

REPORT

Perhaps. But what then of peace? Sixteen years after it fought its last great war, the Indian army finds itself used more often to wage peace than to conduct war. It is not a role that the army is happy—or comfortable—with. But circumstances have conspired to turn it into one gigantic peace-keeping force that is always on call for civilian duties. If order has to be restored after communal conflagrations, then it is the army that is summoned. If vital supplies have to be kept moving in the face of agitations, then the call goes out for the army. If the police and paramilitary authorities seem unable to grapple with extremism in Punjab, then the army is asked to capture the Golden Temple and comb Punjab villages searching for terrorists. And if President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi finally arrive at an accord that will resolve both Sri Lanka's ethnic problems, and the simmering discontent in its relations with India, then of course, it is the Indian army that will be asked to police the accord; its post-1971 role formalised under the title of "Indian Peace Keeping Force".

Ashok Vaishnav

Whether all this is any good for the army has long been considered. After all, should a military fighting force be allowed to be sidetracked into a secondary role of backing up the domestic authority of the political apparatus? But in recent weeks, in the aftermath of the Sri Lanka operation, a second, harsher question has begun to be asked: Is the army any good at any of this? Judging by

Right: Indian jawans in Jaffna, Sri Lanka — fighting someone else's battle; and (top) Pakistan surrenders to India in December '71: days of valour

reports of its performance in Punjab in 1984 and Sri Lanka in 1987, say the critics, the Indian army has demonstrated overconfidence and ineptness. Worse still, it has acted with indiscriminate brutality, causing needless civilian casualties.

The provocation for the recent controversy was the Indian army's performance in Sri Lanka. As reports of high casualties streamed in, there was first, mystification that what had seemed like a simple enough operation had turned so sour, and then anger that Indian blood should be spilled in a foreign country to settle an ethnic feud that in no way involved India. There were suggestions that Lanka's wily President Junius Jayewardene had tricked Rajiv Gandhi into agreeing to do his dirty work for him and that the army was being made to pay the price for the Prime Minister's naivety.

"I do not see why our men were sent to Jaffna when the Sri Lankan army is sitting in its barracks," said a bitter J.C. Malhotra, the father of a young officer who was wounded in the fighting. Added his son, Major Deepak Malhotra of the 18th Garhwal Regiment, recuperating in hospital from a shrapnel injury, "It was clear when we were sent that we had not been asked to go and fight a war." And yet the army had found itself in a pitched battle with an experienced and tricky enemy who was prepared to fight to the death.

Off the record, the army brass made its position clear. The army had not been consulted about the 29 July accord when it was being negotiated. Even when it was informed that its men would constitute the Indian Peace Keeping Force, it was given to understand that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were India's friends and to be treated gently. At no stage was it warned that it would be pitched into a bloody and treacherous guerilla battle against the Tigers. At best, it was suggested, that the army could expect a repeat of the April 1971 precedent when India sent a brigade to help Ceylon capture the headquarters of the Sinhalese JVP extremist group. Says one serving officer (who, by tradition, cannot be identified): "We were told to turn a blind eye to our Tamil friends and if necessary, protect them from the government after they laid down their arms. The real danger, we were informed, came from the Lankan armed forces who might try to stage a coup against the Jayewardene regime."

This situation altered quite radically after 5 October, 1987 when 17 LTTE members consumed cyanide pills while in Lankan custody. The shock of that mass suicide led to the LTTE attack on the Batticaloa district the following day and made it clear that with the LTTE in a fighting mood, no peace was possible. And in a sudden reversal, the IPKF, charged with keeping the peace, was told to take on the Tigers.

But even then, claim Ministry of Defence (MOD) officials, the men in the field found themselves receiving conflicting signals from the political and administrative establishment. Says a senior official of the Directorate General of Military Operations (DGMO), which guided the IPKF strategy: "One of the reasons for the IPKF's lack of preparedness was that the political developments were not conveyed to us in time." Moreover, suggests the official there was a complete lack of co-ordination between the MOD, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) which further confused the IPKF, 4,000 miles away from home.

Soldiers who have returned from Jaffna hold the DGMO responsible for not taking decisions in time. One officer recalls how his unit informed base on their hotline that the LTTE had hoisted its flag on a strategic installation in Jaffna. Should they attack and have the flag lowered? Remembers the official: "We were waiting around while headquarters dithered about taking a deci-

Wounded IPKF soldiers in a Pune hospital

Major Deepak Malhotra

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sion. We were finally given the go-ahead and had the flag lowered but this kind of indecisiveness slowed down our combat rate in the field." For their part, DGMP officials argue that all such decisions had to be cleared with the other involved ministries and hence could not be taken at once.

Most of all says the army, it was sent into Jaffna with totally inadequate intelligence back-up. It blames the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) for seriously underestimating the strength of the LTTE and its weaponry. Agrees Shreedhara Rao of the Institute of Defence studies and Analysis: "Somebody (in the intelligence set-up) was obviously making a mess of it."

According to the angry army brass, the IPKF did not even have updated maps of the Jaffna peninsula. The vintage maps the troops were supplied with were of little use and the first detailed maps used in the operation were put together from photographs taken by the Indian Air Force's (IAF) reconaissance helicopters. Because the IPKF did not understand the terrain, it could not block exit points from Jaffna during its prolonged siege of the town and nearly 1,000 LTTE men (including leader Pirabhakaran) slipped out to safety.

That's how the army sees it. Not everybody else agrees with that interpretation. Officials in the Ministry of External Affairs and the Prime Minister's office are outraged by the army brass's claim that they were not consulted before the accord was signed. They insist that the chief of the army staff, General K. Sundarji, was fully conversant with the details of the Accord and quite aware of the possibility that IPKF may actually have to wage war. Nor do they accept the DGMO's contention that there was a lack of co-ordination between the MOD, the MEA and the PMO. On the contrary, they say, a core group containing representatives from all three ministries was formed with the specific aim of avoiding such a lack of co-ordination.

"The problem", says a senior government official with more than a touch of annoyance, "is that the Indian army went to Jaffna with an exaggerated sense of its own capabilities and an over-optimistic assessment of how soon it could neutralise all opposition. When these calculations proved wrong, all the old excuses were trotted out: political interference, bureaucratic inertia, intelligence failure, etc."

Certainly, the figures suggest that it has been uphill all the way for the army in Jaffna. The government concedes that

Within the army, there is dismay that its new role as a gigantic peace-keeping force will give the generals ideas and an insistence that civilian authority will always be recognised as supreme

the IPKF, which includes men from the 4th, 36th and 54th Infantry Divisions comprises 29,633 personnel. (Unofficial estimates say the figure is even higher. Compare this to the Sri Lankan army's total strength of 10,856). It concedes also that it is costing India a whopping Rs three crore a day to keep the IPKF in Jaffna. Against this, the Indian estimate of LTTE strength is just over 4,000 and it is doubtful if the Tigers can spend Rs three crores over the whole campaign, let alone every day.

Yet, the IPKF has had it rough all the way. It has taken days on operations that it thought would take hours and the casualties have mounted. The Ministry of Defence's casualty figures are relatively low—260 dead and 700 wounded—but nearly everybody agrees that this is an underestimate just as the MOD's figures for LTTE casualties—between 700 to 800 dead—are probably on the high side. But even the MOD's own internal assessments demonstrate that the rate of casualties among senior ranks has been the highest of any operation since 1947. According to one assessment the ratio of casualties among officers and Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) to other ranks is 1:6.7. In comparison, the figure for the 1965 War was 1:9.3 and in 1971, it was even lower—1:9.8.

In Sri Lanka, the army was also shaken by the hostility of the local population. As a well-trained guerilla force, the Tigers would quickly change into civilian clothes and merge with the civilian population once the IPKF advanced

No wonder the foreign press is suggesting that the Indian army is making a hash of things. Even more worrying from the army's point of view are the repeated allegations that the IPKF has stopped distinguishing between Tigers and civilians and is now indiscriminate in its choice of targets. The LTTE claims that over 1,000 civilians have died during the operation and uses words like genocide. The army concedes that innocent civilians have died in the cross-fire between the two forces but puts the death toll at between 200 to 300.

The Indian army is used to public support even when things go badly wrong as they did during the 1962 conflict with China. It is therefore hurt and nonplussed by suggestions that it is a hamfisted, largely over-rated force. Officers argue that it is unfair to judge the performance of the army on the basis of the Sri Lanka operation because of the constraints under which it has operated.

And certainly, even if the brass's claims of intelligence failure and political interference are to be disregarded, there can be no denying that the army has been functioning in extremely unfavourable conditions.

Because it is a peace-keeping force, it has been required to fight, in its own terms, with one arm tied behind its back. It has been prevented from using heavy artillery, or from shelling civilian areas. Its men have advanced without air cover and have often not known who the enemy was. During the first week of fighting, the IPKF suffered the maximum casualties and General Harkirat Singh, the General Officer Commanding the 54th Division had to rush to Delhi and plead with his superiors for more troops and for helicopters that could strafe Jaffna.

It was only after his request was granted that the IPKF advance swiftened and two MIG 25 helicopters found their targets in the Chavakacheri areas. When the IPKF heard that the militants were holding a secret high-level meeting, they used helicopters for heavy precision gunfire and were able to wound Pirabhakaran in the leg and throw the LTTE into some form of disarray.

The army was also shaken by the hostility of the local population. As a well-trained guerrilla force, the Tigers would quickly change into civilian clothes and merge with the civilian population once the IPKF advanced. Consequently, every Tamil civilian seemed suspect; a

situation that made the IPKF feel like an army of occupation. Soldiers who tried to bridge the gap with the locals sometimes met with unfortunate consequences. Army sources tell of a young Junior Commissioned Officer who saw an old Tamil woman weeping. Overcome by sympathy, he stopped his jeep and went over to console her. He was still being reassuring when the woman pulled out a grenade from under her clothes and blew the both of them up.

Critics of the army's progress in Lanka point out that it was India that trained the Tigers and supplied them with arms. This, they say, should have made it easier for the IPKF to have dealt with them especially once the supply-line was cut. The army disputes this and claims that firstly, the LTTE had enough arms to last for a month; secondly that the grenades and mortars were all produced locally; and thirdly that overseas Tamils continued to finance and supply the Tigers even after India cut off supplies. Agrees an MEA spokesman: "We intercepted shipments coming from Singapore. More such shipments keep coming. We can't guard the casualties of 172 (official figure), over 200 civilians were killed in the cross-fire, the Harmandir was nicked by bullets and the Akal Takht was destroyed. Ten days after Bluestar began, when President Giani Zail Singh visited the Temple, there were still snipers hiding in the buildings and one of the army officers escorting Zail Singh was shot in the arm. Afterwards, the army blamed R&AW, argued that the restrictions placed on it were unreasonable, and insisted that the extremists were much better fighters than had been assumed at first.

After Bluestar came Operation Woodrose in which troops combed the villages of Punjab looking for terrorists. Punjab politicians say the military behaved in a hamfisted and arbitrary manner, needlessly maltreating innocent youths and acting like an army of occupation. The army denies the charges but the damage to the Sikh psyche caused by both Bluestar and Woodrose has been incalculable. Even Sikhs in the army rebelled over Bluestar. Around 2,000 Sikh soldiers mutinied and had to be forcibly captured by their colleagues. It was the first major mutiny in the history of the independent Indian army.

There are two ways of looking at the army's experience in Punjab. The first is to argue that the army botched up Bluestar and made a hash of Woodrose in which few real terrorists were captured and many new ones probably created. The second is to argue that the army should never have been placed in the role of having to bail out civilian authority from political problems that were largely of its own creation. The army's job is to wage war against India's enemies, not to kill our own people.

Predictably, the army brass incline to the second view and in the aftermath of Lanka there is a great deal of resentment over the manner in which the army is being counted on to help solve the regime's political difficulties. This resentment marks a new phase in relations between the Army and the government which have generally been business-like and non-controversial. Never has a civilian directive been seriously questioned let alone disobeyed. Only once, when Indira Gandhi wanted the army to march into Bangladesh in March 1971, and the chief of staff General S.H.F.J. Manekshaw refused, saying his men would not be ready till December, did the army have to insist on having its way.

During wars, the government has generally accepted the army chief's advice. For instance in 1965, when Pakistan attacked India from Akhnoor and Chhamb, General J.N. Chaudhuri told Lal Bahadur Shastri that he would prefer to concentrate on Lahore and Sialkot and the government let him do things his way. "The civilian directive, of course, has to be obeyed," says General Jagjit Singh Arora , "but we usually try and pull our chestnuts out of the fire."

Of course, there are those who believe that there were times when civilian authority should have been told where to get off. A case in point is Pandit Nehru's famous order to 'throw out' the Chinese in 1962. According to General S.K. Sinha (Retd.) it was a "major mistake" and shouldn't have been accepted by the army. "To obey such an order", he says, "is unfair to the nation so the army chief should resign."

On the whole though, the army has resisted attempts to politicise it. Generals still recall the courageous stand of General M.K. Raina, the chief of staff during the Emergency, who resisted all attempts by Mrs Gandhi to use army personnel and property for her political ends. Naturally, there have been exceptions. Says General Sinha: "I have never forgotten the day when during the Army Day parade in 1983 in Delhi, the chief of staff, General Krishna Rao, made Rajiv Gandhi the chief guest even though he was only an ordinary MP whose only claim to fame was that he was his mother's son."

In recent months, there has been a certain chilling in relations between General Sundarji and Rajiv Gandhi. The coolness began early this year, shortly after the border confrontation that nearly led to a war with Pakistan. In the light of the tensions between the two countries, the government thought it advisable to scale down the scope of Operation Brasstacks, the massive exercise that cost Rs 300 crore as 1.7 lakh armymen simulated war conditions in the deserts of Rajasthan. Brasstacks was Sundarji's brainchild and he resisted all attempts by the government to reduce its magnitude. Finally, Sundarji had his way but the government was not pleased.

By mid-year, the Prime Minister made his apprehensions about India's military priorities known at an army commanders conference that he addressed. India, he said, had obviously gone wrong in its assessments resulting in an undue escalation of tension in the western front. "We should", declared Rajiv Gandhi, "be more prudent." Subsequently, the magnitude of Operation Chequer Board, an exercise scheduled for the India-China border, was scaled down. The differences in perception have continued through 1987 and at the height of the controversy over the Bofors gun, the Opposition hoped that Sundarji would go public with his stand. There was even talk of negotiating a second term as chief to keep him happy, but in the finest traditions of the Indian army, the General has refuted all stories of coolness and shunned controversy. Still, the tales of differences have not dried up and even over the Lanka

The army brass made its position clear, regarding the Lanka operation, off the record. The army had not been consulted about the Rajiv Gandhi-Junius Jayewardene Accord when it was being negotiated. Even when it was informed that its men would constitute the IPKF, it was given to understand that the Tamil Tigers were India's friends and that they were to be treated gently

operation, there are suggestions that Gandhi and Sundarji have disagreed.

There have been some differencesof opinion between generals and the political establishment before. General Thimayya, as chief of staff, conducted a running battle with defence minister Krishna Menon and Menon fell out with many senior officers (including Sam Manekshaw, then a Brigadier) who he subsequently disgraced. But the differences have been personal rather than operational in nature and rarely have they been thought to matter because the supremacy of the civilian establishment has always been regarded as absolute.

This situation has changed a little in recent years because of the increasing dependance of the political establishment on the army. Perceptive observers of the Indian political scene have always viewed with concern the experience of the Pakistani army which was carved out of the old Indian army. In Pakistan, as civilian unrest grew more and more unruly, the administration kept counting on the army to resolve order. Finally, when it tired of bailing out the politicians, the army stepped in and seized control itself. A brief post-1971 experiment with democracy under Z.A. Bhutto suffered the same fate.

Conscious that something similar could happen in India the government raised an array of paramilitary forces, control of which was vested with the home ministry rather than the defence ministry. The Border Security Force (BSF) and the Central Reserve Police (CRP) were supposed to intervene when the local police failed to contain civilian unrest so that there was no need to depend on the army.

In the troubled 70s, this arrangement collapsed, particularly during communal riots. The pattern was nearly always the same. After the local police, the armed constabulary, and the paramilitary forces had failed, the army was sent for and usually succeeded in restoring order in such major towns as Varanasi, Aligarh, Moradabad, Ahmedabad, Baroda, Bombay-Bhiwandi and Meerut. During the 1984 anti-Sikh riots, the army was called out in virtually every important Indian city.

All of this has made nonsense of the plans for a paramilitary buffer and seemed to vindicate Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck who, when the uniform of the post-Independence army was being devised, insisted on olive green over khaki on the grounds that as the army would be called out into the streets so often, it was better that it sported a different colour from the police. The home ministry now plans to raise an additional 20 to 30 CRP companies but there are doubts about how effective this move will be.

Within the army, there is dismay that its new role as a gigantic peace-keeping force will give the generals ideas and an insistence that civilian authority will always be recognised as supreme. But everybody is aware that the army cannot function as both a peace-keeping force and a war-waging outfit indefinitely.

For one, sending units out into the streets disrupts their training programme and interferes with their efficacy in battlefield conditions. For another, the army will go the way of the BSF and the CRP if it is overused for civilian purposes. Familiarity breeds contempt and frequent duty could well diminish the deterrent effect of the army's presence.

Nor is it good for army morale to be used for civilian purposes. The army is used to the respect and admiration of the Indian people. And yet, no army can fight insurgencies with its reputation intact. The British in Ulster, the Israelis in Beirut, the Americans in Vietnam and

Gen Sundarji with commanders of the IPKF in Jaffna: no cooling of relations with Rajiv Gandhi

the Russians in Afghanistan have all been accused of brutality and of committing atrocities against civilians. Much the same sort of thing has happened to the Indian army. The people of the North-East—in Nagaland and Mizoram especially—have horrific stories to tell of torture, murder, rape, looting and indiscriminate destruction of property. The stories are probably exaggerated or even fabricated—but they damage the army's reputation. And while, the North-East was sufficiently removed from the national mainstream for this to not matter unduly, Punjab is too close to home. In the aftermath of Bluestar and Woodrose the same kinds of stories began makiing the rounds and some commentators even alleged that the army had pilfered the collection boxes at the Golden Temple. While such charges are without foundation, it seems clear that the Indian army is unable to operate with the minimal force required for civilian operations and that finally this will lead to irreparable damage to its reputation should it continue to be used as a peace-keeping force.

There is, of course, one great question left that is never asked: how good is the Indian army in the battlefield conditions for which it is trained? The official line is that the army is perfect and to question it is to be unpatriotic. (Dinesh Singh reiterated this stance in Parliament recently: "It is unfortunate that there are members who are not proud of being Indian and of their army".)

And yet, traditionally, Indians are supposed to make bad soldiers. Ever since the Aryans, every single invader has had no difficulty in subduing local resistance and taking charge. Writes Field Marshal Montgomery of Alamein in his classic *History of Warfare*: "Indians were interested in war, liked it, but reached no standard. The Hindu soldiers and their commanders were not lacking in courage, but even the great individuals such as Chandragupta Maurya seemed to have lacked vision and had little strategical or tactical sense."

History is replete with instances of Indian military failure such as Porus who was surprised by Alexander because he had not expected the Greeks to form a bridgehead and launch a sudden attack. Of the Rajputs, our famous fighters, Montgomery says: "The Rajputs were tremendously brave—but equally stupid." The Moghuls had little difficulty in demolishing Indian resistance despite their numerical disadvantage and the British swept aside Indian armies with an easy nonchalance. The ultimate humiliation was probably the Battle of Plassey in 1757 in which 800 Europeans together with some 2,000 sepoys and eight pieces of artillery defeated an Indian army of 34,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry and 53 cannons!

Lt-Gen Harkirat Singh with IPKF in Jaffna

Supporters of the army would argue that the post-Independence Indian army has proved that leopards can change their spots. Detractors can retort that India-Pakistan battles prove nothing because the fight is not against outsiders and that the one time that the Indian army has faced foreigners—the Chinese in 1962—it has crumbled. The army's own internal audit of that debacle, the Henderson-Brookes Report (technically secret but quoted by Neville Maxwell in *India's China War*) reveals a sad story of bungling and incompetence.

And even the two wars with Pakistan have not necessarily covered the army with glory. The 1965 conflict was a stalemate and the Indian operations came in for much criticism from strategists. Wrote Nirad C. Chaudhuri: "Each step and each decision appear to have been an improvisation taken under the influence of an impulse." In 1971, India won but many military strategists feel that considering that we were fighting an army of occupation with the support of the local populace, we took at least three days too long to enter Dacca. Says a high government official: "It became very embarrassing when the army kept missing the dates in its own timetable." Apparently, this delay cost General Arora the job of the chief of staff, which should otherwise, have been his.

In the aftermath of Lanka there is a great deal of resentment over the manner in which the army is being counted on to help solve the regime's political difficulties. This resentment marks a new phase in relations between the army and the government which have generally been business-like and non-controversial

Finally, however, these judgments are academic. The Indian Army may or may not be the finest fighting force in the world, but the real problem is more immediate: can India afford to keep using the army as a gigantic peace-keeping force? The answer seems to be an unequivocal 'no'. The cost to the army is simply too high.

But what is the alternative? The government is already talking about a phased withdrawal from Lanka and a gradual replacement of the army by paramilitary forces on the Punjab pattern. Should this happen, most Indians—and certainly, the army—will welcome the move. But that will not be the end of the problem. Every time there is a domestic insurgency or a communal conflagration that blazes out of control, the cry will still go up: send for the army. And until that changes, the army will continue to pay the price for civilian failures; damaging and diminishing itself in the process. **SUNDAY** 29 November–5 December

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SRI LANKA

A Nation Disintegrates

By Steven R. Weisman

COMMENT

ON AN ISLAND in a pristine lake near Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka, gunmen guard the sleek new Parliament building, which a terrorist bomb ripped through last August, wounding the Prime Minister and barely missing the President. Downtown, the scattered vacant lots and burned-out buildings are remnants of the riots of July 1983, when hundreds of Tamils were pulled from their homes and burned alive, or hacked to death with axes in the streets.

At the ancient capital of Anuradhapura, the sacred Bo tree — grown from a cutting of the tree under which Buddha achieved enlightenment — is scarred with bullet holes, left from a 1985 attack by Tamil separatists in which 150 Sinhalese died. Throughout Sri Lanka, one sees the saffron robes of Buddhist monks. Traditionally an emblem of peace and tolerance; they have become symbols of militancy and martyrdom — especially after 29 monks were dragged off a bus last June, gunned down by Tamil terrorists and left to die in the dirt.

Near the southern coast of Sri Lanka are blocks of drab concrete dormitories, a Sri Lankan Army camp in which Tamils — a Hindu minority in the country — are interned and, according to Amnesty International and Tamil spokesmen, regularly beaten, tortured and sexually assaulted. Farther up the coast is the burned-out shell of a house owned by a local minister, now occupied by a platoon of Sri Lankan soldiers whose task is to subdue Sinhalese terrorists, members of the island's ethnic majority who oppose any accommodation with the Tamils. (A map is on page 85.)

In the north and east of Sri Lanka, Indian troops patrol in jeeps and trucks — part of a 20,000-man foreign army that has joined the war against the Tamil guerrillas. In the once-bustling trading city of Jaffna, shattered storefronts and hollowed-out houses testify to the bloody days of October, when the Indians laid seige to the city — managing to capture it only after losing more than 200 men.

In Jaffna and other northern towns are enormous posters of fallen guerrilla heroes, their guns pointed into the air. The latest martyrs are 12 Tamils who, after being captured by the Sri Lankan Army in September, swallowed the cyanide capsules that all guerrillas wear around their necks.

When Sri Lanka was still called Ceylon — the change was made in 1972 — the name evoked an alluring paradise of misty hillside tea plantations and Buddhist monasteries, of pristine beaches and elephant sanctuaries. The country was led by one of the most civilized establishments in Asia, patrician heirs to a 2,500-year-old culture. As recently as the beginning of this decade, Sri Lanka was hailed as a model of economic progress and stability in the third world.

Now, after four years of bloody civil war, more than 7,000 Sri Lankans are dead, 500,000 have been routed from their homes and herded into refugee camps, and the island's economy is in ruins. Hopes were raised last summer, when India sent in its army to enforce an accord between Sri Lanka and India to end the war. But the Indian "peacekeeping" troops soon became caught up in their own war with the Tamils, the very people they were meant to protect. Today, Indian troops continue to battle the Tamils in the north and east, while the Sri Lanka Army occupies the south.

In Sri Lanka, there is no such thing as original sin. As with Northern Ireland, the Middle East and other historic areas of conflict, every atrocity is justified as revenge for an earlier outrage. The cycle of revenge has no end because it seems to have had no beginning.

Still, Sri Lanka's disintegration reflects tensions found in many developing countries: the tension between economic development and economic equality, for example, and between a national commitment to democratic principles and an ethnic minority's assertion of its rights. Most lethal of all, perhaps, has been Sri Lanka's inability to balance its assertion of ethnic and religious pride with the ideals of pluralism and secularism.

IT IS NEARLY three years since I first visited Sri Lanka. The Tamil separatists who had been pushing for the establishment of an independent state in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of the island — "Tamil Eelam," or "Tamil homeland" — were already waging a full-scale insurgency.

Nonetheless, the national authorities in Colombo insisted that on Feb. 4, 1985 — the anniversary of independence from Britain — all public buildings raise the Sri Lankan national flag, an order that especially irked people in Tamil areas. In the east coast town of Batticaloa, a place of peaceful lagoons and rice paddies, four gunmen accosted the Gov-

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ernment's chief local agent in his office and made off with a stack of Sri Lankan flags.

Independence Day came, and the Government agent — a Tamil civil servant named Marianpillai Anthonimuthu — made his way to an empty soccer stadium, surrounded by security forces, and defiantly raised the flag. "We recognize we are potential targets," Anthonimuthu told me nervously at the time. "We get no protection. But still we do the job."

Last October, Anthonimuthu was driving in an Indian Army convoy when a precisely timed explosion demolished his car, killing him instantly.

Anthonimuthu was only the most recent moderate Tamil official to be assassinated by Tamil extremists, who accused him of collaborating with the enemy. Sinhalese extremists, who oppose any accommodation with the Tamils, also specialize in assassinating Sinhalese leaders, as demonstrated most spectacularly in the bomb attack on Parliament last August. Since President Junius Richard Jayewardene signed a peace accord with India in July, no less than 50 activists in his ruling United National Party have been listed as murdered.

The image on the Sri Lankan flag raised by Anthonimuthu in that empty stadium nearly three years ago symbolizes the nation's problem. The flag is dominated by a roaring golden lion — the emblem of the Sinhalese majority. According to the most recent census, taken in 1981, 74 percent of Sri Lankans are Sinhalese, 18 percent are Tamil and 7 percent Moslem.

AT ITS HEART, the story of national disintegration is the story of two peoples, two ethnic groups, each feeling increasingly threatened by the other, each driven to take action that can only reinforce the other's fears.

Many say that race is the main source of the conflict. The Sinhalese, most of whom are Buddhist, trace their origins to lighter-skinned Indo-Aryans of Central Asia who migrated to Sri Lanka 2,500 years ago; the Tamils, most of whom are Hindu, are descended from the darker-skinned Dravidians of southern India, who are believed to have arrived slightly later.

In fact, today many Sinhalese are dark and many Tamils light; scholars believe the concept of two separate races is largely myth, that no single race can claim to have possessed the island first. Yet, when I asked a leading Buddhist monk to describe the source of the island's separate identities, he told me it was race. Were the Sinhalese a superior race? "All races feel superior to each other," he answered. "We are proud of our own race, but we don't look down on others."

Yet the Sinhalese, instead of viewing the Tamils as a minority on the island, tend to consider them a dominating majority — backed as they are by the 50 million Tamils living 18 miles away in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu.

The Sinhalese religious mythology contributes to their sense of siege. The earliest Sinhalese records tell how, 2,500 years ago, Buddha sent emissaries to the island to establish a place for his purest teachings. The most sacred place on Sri Lanka is a temple in the old mountain capital of Kandy, where Buddha's tooth is enshrined.

"In this little country, history has given the Sinhalese race the position of being a majority with the characteristic of a minority," explained Colvin De Silva, a Marxist political leader in Sri Lanka. "The Sinhalese nurse this sense of peril, a belief that, like the Jews, history has vested them with a role of maintaining their traditions."

The island's history is the story of Sinhalese and Tamil kingdoms rising and falling, clashing with one another, and together suffering a succession of invasions from the Indian giant to the north. Modern times brought new invaders: the Portuguese, the Dutch, and finally the British, who in 1815 imposed unity on the island for the first time in a thousand years.

Independence came in 1948; in the first flush of hope of a new nation eager to take its place in the postcolonial world, the Sinhalese and Tamil communities managed for a time to submerge their historic antagonisms.

But the potential for conflict was still present; indeed, it had been increased by an important legacy of the departing colonialists. British missionaries, who worried about angering the island's Buddhist majority, found it easier to proselytize among the Hindus in Tamil areas. Many missionary schools were established in Tamil regions, and by independence the Tamils had parlayed this educational advantage, and their passion for hard work, into a dominant posi-

The Tamil minority and Buddhist Sinhalese majority are locked in a bloody cycle of revenge.

tion in Sri Lanka's universities and civil service.

But Sri Lanka's modern political leaders were always upper-class Sinhalese patricians, many from landowning families of the old plantation economy of tea, rubber and coconuts set up by the British. Often more comfortable with the ways of their English colonizers than with their own culture, the ruling families enjoyed privileges because the Crown considered them "natives imbued with the right spirit," as Yasmine Gooneratne, a Sri Lankan literary scholar, puts it in her evocative memoir of one of the most powerful ruling families, the Bandaranaikes.

Mrs. Gooneratne recalls how the families of these would-be rulers traveled to London on ocean liners, wore Western clothes and took pride in their light-colored skin and plummy British accents. Many believed that British rule had essentially alienated them from the culture and people of their own country.

But a change in attitude came with a vengeance in 1956, when Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike was elected Prime Minister. Bandaranaike set out to restore dominance to Sinhalese culture, and his program showed the potential for a tyranny of the majority.

First, Bandaranaike made Sinhalese the sole official language of the nation, an act that was at the root of riots between the Sinhalese and Tamils in 1956 and 1958. Next, his Government imposed quotas on Tamils in the civil service, in the universities and elsewhere in the educational system.

The Government also embarked on a program to develop areas in the north and east of the island, resettling thousands of Sinhalese families in areas the Tamils considered their homelands. Demonstrations, riots and attacks continued; each effort to accommodate Tamil grievances failed. Each side accused the other of killing innocents.

Sri Lanka's difficulties deepened during the 1970's, as its economy sagged. Years of Government flirtation with socialism and increasing economic regulation had stifled investment and growth. It became increasingly difficult for Tamil and Sinhalese youths, even those with an education, to find jobs.

Compounding their disaffection were lingering resentments over caste discrimination, and the fact that leadership positions in both the Sinhalese and Tamil communities still tended to be held by upper-class, landowning families.

Radicalism among the Sinhalese flowered in 1971, when a Sinhalese revolutionary organization called the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (or People's Liberation Front) rioted in an attempt to overthrow the Government. More than a thousand Sri Lankans died before order was restored. Resentment grew among Sinhalese youth, and also among the Tamils.

President Jayewardene concedes, "For the last 20 years there has been some discrimination" against Tamils.

NORTH OF SRI LANka's central highland forests and tea plantations, the scrub jungles give way to sandy flat wastelands on which peasant farmers struggle to grow vegetables, chilis and tobacco. Along the coast of the Jaffna Peninsula, 20 miles from India, are a string of fishing villages that seem a world apart from the playing fields, law courts and prosperity of the capital of Colombo.

Velupillai Prabakaran grew up in one of those fishing towns, the son of a Government land officer. Deeply shy as a boy, he withdrew to read stories about the bravery of ancient Hindu warriors, Napoleon, and Indian fighters. He also learned from his family about atrocities against Tamils, such as the time in 1958 that some Sinhalese broke into a Hindu temple, tied a priest to his cot, poured gasoline on him and set him on fire.

"This left a very deep imprint on my mind," Prabakaran once recalled. "If such innocent lives could be destroyed, why could we not strike back?"

Today, Prabakaran — 33 years old, short, stocky, with a drooping mustache — is the supreme commander of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a guerrilla organization of perhaps 2,000 men under arms, and with many thousands of supporters. Tamil leaders say that, like the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna among the Sinhalese, the guerrillas have drawn support from young people bitter about lack of job opportunities and resentful of leaders who they feel have been insensitive to their needs.

Known to his men as Thamby, or little brother, Prabakaran has spent most of the last decade underground, and has led his cadres by emphasizing self-sacrifice — symbolized by the cyanide capsules strung around their necks. From his troops, Prabakaran demands discipline, celibacy, adherence to a puritanical code forbidding drinking and smoking, and ruthlessness in battle.

During the 1970's, the nascent Tiger movement carried out robberies and assassinations. But the movement reached a turning point when "the boys," as they are often called, began assassinating elected Tamil leaders who, they felt, had betrayed their people. In 1975, Prabakaran and two other young men ambushed the car of the Mayor of Jaffna and shot him dead.

One midnight late in July 1983, a group of Tigers led by Prabakaran faced the Sri Lankan Army in a shootout and killed 13 Sinhalese soldiers. Shock spread throughout the island; in Colombo and other towns, Sinhalese mobs rioted, burning and killing hundreds of innocent Tamil men, women and children. The riots, in turn, brought new support and momentum for the Tamil Eelam cause.

The pattern has continued, with each new attack bringing on a new retaliation. Sometimes the guerrillas would storm a police station. Sometimes the Sri Lankan Army would rampage through a Tamil town, shooting people, setting fire to houses, rounding up hundreds of young men.

As Tamil militancy spread, mainstream Tamil politicians grew increasingly impatient with Colombo's slow responses to their appeals for justice. In 1983, the Tamil members of Parliament refused to take their seats, charging that President Jayewardene had reneged on promises to grant greater autonomy in Tamil areas.

The Tamil Eelam movement, meanwhile, had split into myriad factions that were soon waging a brutal war against one another. Prabakaran, who had a shootout with one rival in 1982, has been the most aggressive in launching attacks on other guerrilla groups. During the last two years, the Tigers have killed hundreds of men in two other Tamil Eelam organizations, accusing them of drug-running, shaking down merchants, robberies and other "antisocial activities."

THE TROUBLES OF Sri Lanka seem etched in the face of its President, 81-year-old Junius Richard Jayewardene. His is the ravaged countenance of a patriarch whose long career is rooted in a privileged childhood, followed by fiery campaigns waged on behalf of Sinhalese nationalism, and finally the agonizing struggle for accommodation of the last few years. Earlier this year, Jayewardene was asked why he had not moved more quickly to meet Tamil demands. The President shrugged; it was, he said, "lack of intelligence, lack of courage, lack of foresight on my part."

"For the last 20 years, there has been some discrimination," Jayewardene acknowledged in a recent conversation at Ward Place, a spacious bungalow in a fashionable Colombo neighborhood. The house, surrounded by mango trees and frangipani shrubs, has been his family home for more than 50 years. "We have corrected these defects. Of course, there were difficulties of implementation — there always are. But the Tamils were in too great a hurry. They were always being pushed from behind by the terrorists, who for no reason began to kill."

The son of an eminent jurist, Jayewardene, who was called Dick as a young man, was a scholarly boy who played tennis and cricket, studied history and won many prizes for oratory.

In 1977, Jayewardene ran for Prime Minister, promising to revitalize the economy by restoring free enterprise and investment. His victory marked the first time a single party had achieved an absolute majority of the vote. He took advantage of his margin of victory by changing the Constitution, assuming the new position of President in 1978, and winning re-election by popular vote in 1982.

Jayewardene's critics say he exacerbated the country's divisions by blocking a new parliamentary election and, instead, pushing through a voter referendum that will keep in place the Parliament elected in 1977 until at least 1989. Although he claimed the referendum was essential because leftists were plotting to overthrow the Government, there were widespread charges of vote rigging, and many diplomats say the President simply seized on Sri Lanka's turmoil as an excuse to subvert the country's once-lively democratic processes.

TO BRING AN END TO SRI Lanka's conflict, Jayewardene had to recognize the reality of India's involvement. For years, Sri Lanka had complained that India had provided sanctuary for and even training to the soldiers of the major Tamil insurgent organizations at bases in south India. The complaints were ignored, partly because the aspirations of Sri Lankan Tamils have long enjoyed great sympathy in the huge southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu and its capital, Madras. According to reports in the Indian press: years ago, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, seeking to shore up her own political support in Tamil Nadu, had authorized Indian intelligence agencies to assist the Tamils directly.

After Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated in 1984, her son and successor realized that the Sri Lankan insurgency might threaten the stability of southern India itself. Rajiv Gandhi had reason to be apprehensive about the possibility of an Indian-supported separatist movement succeeding in Sri Lanka. Among other things, his own attacks on Pakistan for supposedly aiding Sikh separatists in India began to look increasingly hollow as New Delhi uneasily rode the back of the Tigers.

In 1985, Gandhi declared that he was unequivocally opposed to the establishment of Tamil Eelam, and pledged to try to mediate a political compromise. The talks among the Tigers and Sri Lankan and Indian officials sputtered along for two years, gradually narrowing disagreements about how the island should be governed.

Last summer, the sudden success of the Sri Lankan Army forced India's hand. After years of military bumbling, the 30,000-man military had transformed itself — with some training and other assistance from several Western countries, including Israel — into an effective fighting force that for the first time seemed capable of achieving a military solution to the conflict.

During the last year, the Government forces managed to drive the Liberation Tigers out of much of the north and into the Jaffna Peninsula.

Last spring, Sri Lanka decided to try to finish the job, attacking the Tigers with helicopters and planes. In India, defenders of the Tamils cited news reports that hundreds of civilians were being killed, and accused Jayewardene of committing genocide. Gandhi intervened, airlifting 25 tons of food to besieged Tamil areas — in effect signaling Jayewardene that India intended to prevent him from crushing the Tigers by force.

The Indian action created a major crisis in Jayewardene's Cabinet. Hardliners demanded the Sri Lankan Army continue the assault on Jaffna. Doves warned that might provoke an Indian invasion. The Sri Lankan Army chief of staff feared India might ship shoulder-launched antiaircraft missiles to the guerrillas, letting them shoot down Sri Lankan planes and helicopters. Without air cover, he said, Sri Lanka would have to abandon its effort to oust the Tigers from Jaffna.

Presiding over a fractious Government, Jayewardene seized Gandhi's offer to work out a compromise. "I don't mind giving in to India, I could not give in to Prabakaran," he recalled, referring to the Tamil guerrilla leader.

Under the accord signed by

Gandhi and Jayewardene last July 29, Sri Lanka agreed to grant greater political autonomy, including some local control of police and security forces, to Tamil areas in the north and east. In return, India persuaded the guerrillas to begin surrendering their weapons to the Indian Army.

But Sinhalese extremists were furious at what they saw as the de facto creation of Tamil Eelam. As Gandhi reviewed troops on a visit to Colombo in July, a Sinhalese sailor tried to club the Indian Prime Minister with the butt of his rifle. A few weeks later, the bomb exploded in the Sri Lankan Parliament.

Government authorities blame the resurgent People's Liberation Front, the Janatha Vinukthi Peramuna, for the Sinhalese reaction. The front appears to have dropped its old Maoist rhetoric and taken up a nationalistic credo of Sinhalese identity under siege. According to Sri Lankan officials, the front has a wide following among trade union members, students, Buddhist monks, policemen and soldiers.

Despite the threat of Sinhalese reprisals, Jayewardene persuaded Parliament to fulfill the accord with India by granting limited political autonomy to Tamil areas. Whether the President can succeed in calming the Sinhalese majority, and quieting the misgivings in his own Cabinet, now depends on the Indian Army — and whether it can enforce peace in the north and east, then leave the island quickly.

THE ACCORD HAD one fatal shortcoming — it was never signed by the only party in a position to guarantee its success, the Tamil guerrillas. Prabakaran called it a "stab in the back," even while he pledged to turn over his weapons to the Indian Army. He felt compelled to yield to India's considerable leverage — its ability to cut the rebels' supply lines, as well as Gandhi's promises of protection for the Tigers.

In September, the accord broke down. The Sri Lanka Navy, patrolling north of the island, stopped a suspicious-looking boat and found 17 heavily armed Tigers on board.

The Government charged that because these Tigers had not disarmed, they were not entitled to amnesty and must be conveyed to the prison camps in the south for interrogation. Among the guerrillas was a long-sought prize — the alleged mastermind of the massacre of 127 bus passengers in April. Rather than face what they said would be "certain torture" in the south, all 17 Tigers swallowed their cyanide capsules. Twelve died. To Prabakaran, their suicide was dramatic proof of India's failure to protect his men. The Tigers resumed their attacks on civilians, then began attacking Indian soldiers.

Gandhi knew that his army must respond, or else Jayewardene would order the Indian troops from the island. Gandhi authorized his army to disarm the Tigers by force — only to discover the limits of such force in a guerrilla conflict.

Already this fall, more than 250 Indian soldiers have been killed and nearly 1,000 wounded. The guerrillas strike, then melt away. Their losses have been serious, but they remain able to attack throughout the island. "It will take years for the Indian Army to round us up," a guerrilla leader boasted recently.

India, meanwhile, is learning the necessity of winning over hearts and minds, and developing an alternative civilian Tamil leadership willing to stand up to "the boys." Both tasks are proving extremely difficult.

The Tamil public seems to feel resentment toward the Indian Army; toward the Tigers they seem to feel a mixture of intimidation and respect. Tamil politicans say that though the Tigers might not win an election, they are widely admired as heroes whose stubbornness and sacrifices ultimately protected Tamil rights. Moderate Tamil politicians are thus reluctant to freeze them out of the process. And if they tried, they know they might be killed.

"We must face the fact that the Tigers can carry on their guerrilla war for a long time," said Appapillai Amirthalingam, leader of the Tamil moderates. "The only hope is for them to join in a political settlement. Instead, Prabakaran has overplayed his hand. He has brought this tragic situation on all of us."

Yet despite India's early offer to let the Tigers dominate an interim administration and even to oversee elections, Prabakaran continues to fight. After years of ruthless combat, years of hiding underground, the solitary guerrilla leader, many people say, has come to distrust politics and to fear for his life. He knows that rival guerrilla groups have targeted him for assassination. A journalist close to Prabakaran called him a "haunted man" trapped by a "paranoid" vision of the world.

"He sees the ghosts of his own men who died for a cause he cannot betray," said the journalist. "and he sees the ghosts of the men he has killed who want revenge."

TODAY, VENGEFUL ghosts are everywhere in Sri Lanka. Perhaps the carnage could have been prevented; perhaps, had the moderates compromised earlier, they might not have lost control of events to the extremists, whose killings gave birth to the revenge-tragedy, which continues to feed on itself.

How long can it go on? Whether New Delhi can sustain its involvement in Sri Lanka has become a matter of debate throughout South Asia, where India's other small neighbors watch with growing apprehension. Despite the heavy losses in men, Indians appear to support their country's intervention. Even in the southern state of Tamil Nadu, opinion polls show that the people want the Tigers to accept the sovereignty of their island nation.

Still, it is possible to imagine that Sri Lanka will be permanently wounded. Already, people are whispering the unthinkable — that India may be unable to leave for many years, that it could finish by annexing the north and east of the island, following the precedent set by the ancient south Indian kingdoms that invaded the island more than 1,500 years ago.

The Tigers, too, are haunted by this history, seeing themselves as fulfilling the destiny of other ancient Tamil rulers in Sri Lanka — just as the Sinhalese look on themselves as heirs to their kingdoms of old.

It is a paradox that what hope there remains in Sri Lanka may spring from a new spirit of national identity that has been spurred on by India's intervention. In private and in public, Tamils and Sinhalese agree on one thing — they don't want to be dominated by India. One even hears a kind of perverse pride voiced by many Sinhalese in the Tamil guerrillas' fierce resistance to the Indian Army.

How could peace be secured in Sri Lanka? Economic development must somehow be shared more equitably, avoiding the overlay of feudalism and caste; a national culture must be nurtured that threatens neither people.

But, finally, the only way Sri Lanka will achieve unity is by revising its view of history, by somehow rescuing the future from the gravitational pull of the past. ■

Understanding Sri Lanka

RGK

OPINION

I have long been itching to write on Sri Lanka. But I have felt intimidated by the great quantities of matter already churned out by the media on the subject. To write perceptively on Sri Lanka it is not enough to base oneself on newspaper reports or on the views expressed with varying degrees of eloquence by editorial writers.

The Sri Lanka problem must be studied from all possible angles. It is to start with an internal question for the natives of the Island to tackle. The second question to consider is whether we have been unwittingly dragged into an issue that is for the Sinhalas and the Tamils to solve among themselves. Why is the Tamil issue of great concern to us and how is it that the Sri Lanka authorities have agreed to our part in finding a solution to it whether or not wholeheartedly?

One of the cardinal mistakes most of us make is to regard the Tamil question of Sri Lanka as an ethnic problem. The term ethnic is difficult to define and I don't think the Sinhalas and the Tamils are ethnically vastly different. Indeed they have a common racial and cultural heritage and the differences they represent are not different from those of people in India.

A second mistake is to view Sri Lanka as a problem that strictly concerns only Tamil Nadu. The government of India must be able to view it in a wider perspective. In other words the objective must be not to appease this or that lobby in Tamil Nadu but to tackle the Sri Lanka question independently of the changing scene in Tamil Nadu. I am afraid the Prime Minister and his foreign policy aides are unable to see the problem in Sri Lanka as that of a persecuted minority. They refuse to look at it outside the framework of the views of M.G. Ramachandran and his supporters.

In my view, the problem of Sri Lanka is basically religious and linguistic. It has been created by Buddhist fundamentalism. We usually associate the teachings of the Sakyamuni with gentle yellow-robed monks meditating on the Buddha and the Bodhisattavas. The Theravada Sinhala Buddhists have obviously strayed from the middle path and taken a violent, extremist view. They cannot tolerate the existence of a community other than their own, speaking another tongue or practising another faith. The idea of any part of the Island being dominated by the Tamils is repugnant to these extremists. Indeed, their ultimate objective is to make Sri Lanka exclusively Buddhist and Sinhala-speaking.

One additional point must be made here. The Sinhalas are in some psychological fear of the Tamils. It is here that Tamil Nadu comes in. Recent decades have witnessed the rise of a Tamil nationalism in India. The so-called Dravidian movement has fuelled separatism in India and created the awareness that the Tamils are the proud inheritors of a distinctive culture. Jaffna is regarded by most Tamils in India as an outpost of the Tamil imperialism of the past. Rightly or wrongly, the Sinhalas fear that one day the island will be engulfed by a wave of Tamil resurgence. The fear of course is unrealistic but we must reckon with it in any discussion of the Sri Lanka problem. I am also prepared to concede that during British rule the Tamils had the upper hand in Sri Lanka. (I am forgetting for the time being the indentured Tamil labour from India that sweated for the prosperity of the island. These Tamils constitue a different problem.)

> **"The problem has been created by Buddhist fundamentalism. The ultimate objective is to make Sri Lanka exclusively Buddhist and Sinhala-speaking."**

Most of us in India recognise that JRJ is among the world's most astute politicians. Our own statesmen and diplomats are like infants before him. I personally distrust JRJ's rhetoric, his frequent appeals to Buddhism and his attempts to go back to the springs of Indian nationalism. But there is no doubt that he is anxious to settle the Tamil question in his lifetime. I wouldn't say the same about other Sinhala politicians. They would like to prolong the struggle in the island and it is likely many of them are engaged in undermining the understanding arrived at between Rajiv Gandhi and Jayewardene. We must also bear in mind that politicians like Sirimavo Bandaranaike will be far more unsympathetic to the Tamil cause than JRJ.

There is the wider geopolitical factor to consider. Sri Lanka is ideally situated for being the hunting ground of foreign powers. A Sri Lanka in which the superpowers acquire a foothold will be a serious threat to our own country. It is claimed that the New Delhi-Colombo agreement has the effect of fending off greedy neocolonial powers. There is some merit in the claim.

But the Indian presence in Sri Lanka is not something about which we should be proud or we can be proud. This is not the sort of peacekeeping job that we had been expected to do. The Tamil guerrilla forces are not easy to quell though I concede that Prabhakaran is no Tamil Giap. The Indian action is likely to inflict a deep wound in that section of the Tamil population which is against the agreement. And how long are we going to be on the peace-keeping job? There has been a serious failure of diplomacy on our part. And also a failure to understand the real dimensions of the problem.



R A P E D

2.12.87 Arayampathy
– one girl
2.12.87 Punari
– A nursery school teacher
13.12.87 Manipay
– 20 young girls
14.12.87 Arayampathy
– 2 women
14.12.87 Kollavil, Amparai
– Thambirajah Dhanalakshmi (20)
– Another girl
16.12.87 Nedunkeni
– 11 women.

Sri Lanka

REPORT

Paradise as Hell

***Gerard Peres** reports on the continuing Indian army offensive in Sri Lanka. Also an account of the outlawed Sinhala militant organisation, the JVP.*

THE preamble of the Indo — Sri Lankan peace agreement states that India has all the respect for the sovereignty of the island-nation. What does this really mean? In this clasic case of doublespeak, this means that India has all the right in the world to devour the island-nation to protect the loftiest of ideals — peace, security of the region, and of course, "national interests".

What else can be made of the full-fledged starting of radio and television programmes by the Indian government in the North and the East of the island? Though the programmes are said to be for the "valiant" Indian soldiers, this is cultural invasion of the worst kind. Moreover, the Indian government has refused journalists, human rights activists, Christian missionaries entry into the "occupied zone", under the pretext that their security cannot be ensured. Also, the tantrums of Army officers and I & B officials during the visit of Madras-based journalists to witness the release of 18 Indian soldiers by the LTTE show the true nature of "invasion and occupation".

Well, the invasion may become complete once India takes true cognisance of the "threat" to the South. This regional policeman role, played to super perfection by the Indian government, may assure itself and the middle-class citizenry of its "self-righteous" presence in Sri Lanka. And those fierce "anti-imperialists" in the Congress and the parliamentary left paties may also gloat over the Indian role in Sri Lanka. which augurs well for "world peace and peaceful co-existence of nations".

Meanwhile, as phone calls, news reports and frantic messages sent through couriers reveal, the Indian armed forces have resorted to the most unspeakable of brutalities against the Tamil people. And they are poised to repeat the show with other communities of the island, as the "going berserk" of an Indian soldier in Trincomalee last week has revealed. This was the first accepted incident of an Indian soldier killing Sinhalese and Muslims, numbering six. More such incidents, which would bear out as to what the Indian government is upto in Sri Lanka, are likely to be admitted in due course.

As to the war with the Liberation Tigers, the Indian government has perhaps decided that the Indian army cannot be kept at rest. The drama of ceasefire was enacted primarily as a media event, to wrest the initiative from the Tigers who released 18 Indian soldiers unconditionally in a true gesture of peace. Interestingly, the set of nine demands put forth by the Tigers for laying down of arms includes declaration of an indefinite ceasefire by the Indian government. This must

Behind the Bars

● Total number of political prisoners (Tamils) released after the July 29 peace agreement	.....	1600
● Total number of Tamil political prisoners yet to be released by the Sri Lankan government (including women)	.....	3000
(The release of detenu stopped on the first week of September. The Sri Lankan government has said it would launch prosecution against 3000 persons. No response from Indian government).		
● Total number of Sinhala political prisoners in Colombo jails (JVP suspects)	.....	1000
● Total number of Tamil militants arrested between July 29 and Oct 9 by the Indian army and the Sri Lankan army	...	not less than 100
● Total number of Tamil militants arrested after the Oct 9 offensive against Tigers (most arrested as suspects and sent to Andamans)	.....	1000
● Total number of Tamil militants kept inside Tamil Nadu jails (some for political purposes and others for petty crimes etc.,) — most of them belong to PLOTE, ENDLF, TELO, and EPRLF all of which support the agreement.	.....	200
● Number of Sri Lankan Tamils held in Tihar Jail, Delhi.	.....	50

have insulted the Indian leadership, which thinks that it alone can decide the meaning of war and peace, security and insecurity, truth and falsehood, and what not in this wretched South Asian region.

As to the agreement "guaranteeing" the rights of Tamils, it would lapse by itself. And everyone including the Sri Lankan president knows this, except our high-flying world-knowing Prime Minister... The agreement, he thinks, is the only way the Indian army can be kept in Sri Lanka, which may shortly be converted into a set of military bases... The basis for this military dominance, if it does not come from the agreement, can be brought by a security treaty between New Delhi and Colombo.

This scenario, coupled with the fact that the entire Tamil Nadu coastline has been militarised beyond recognition, is extremely distressing to all democratic-minded citizens both in Sri Lanka and in India. (Except the parliamentary left parties who stand for "world peace and peaceful co-existence between nations".) News reports in the local press reveal that Indian fishermen have been barred from fishing after a stretch of two km from the coast. Some of them who did not stick to the security "guidelines" were taken to the naval camp in Kayts - one of the islands off the Jaffna peninsula - and tortured by the Indian naval personnel... A clean repeat performance by the Indian navymen of what their Sri Lankan counterparts had been doing for the last several years...

There are innumerable such reports from across the Palk Straits. As a Madras-based militant leader put it across, "it is an occupation zone. Nothing which happens there shall reach the world. If it reaches the world ever, the world would ignore the voice in distress."

All militant groups, including those which supported Indian offensive against the LTTE, are keeping their fingers crossed. The ball, they feel, is not with the Tigers as is widely believed. The Tigers now are a beleaguered lot, willing to sit for peace talks. It is India, which is not interested in a tripartite talks, consisting of the Sri Lankan government, the militant and moderate groups and the Indian government, which would ensure a really long-term solution keeping out India both militarily and politically. Also, the Sri Lankan government has manoeuvred itself out of having to hold any talks with the Tamils.

The True Toll

THE toll of the dead and wounded during the Indian offensive, according to independent sources and calculations :

Tamil people	(dead)	1,300
	(wounded)	4,000
Indian soldiers	(dead)	1,200
	(wounded)	3,000
LTTE members	(dead)	125
	(wounded)	300
Total number of people rendered refugees		4,00,000

December '87

REPORT

Letter to PM condemns IPKF

letter from Ms Angela Hesse of the Tamil Solidarity Group in West Germany to Mr Rajiv Gandhi asking him to immediately stop military attacks by the Indian Peace-Keeking Force in the Tamil regions of Sri Lanka.

The following is the text of the letter:

"With much concern and shock we are following the military offensive of your army in the north and east of Sri Lanka Although you yourself initiated a "peace accord" with the Sri Lanka President, Mr J. R. Jayewardene, your troops now enforce cruel, inhuman actions against the Tamils in Sri Lanka

"By this you are carrying on the oppression of the Tamil Minority of which you yourself have accused the Sri Lankan Government only a few months ago and which left more than 6,000 dead more than 2,000 'disappearances' and thousands of destroyed buildings.

"Although foreign observers are hindered to enter the fighting places, we received news that there is a high number of casualties among the Tamil civil population. The use of heavy artillery, the brutal rape of Tamil women and the blockade of essential supply lines give evidence that the actions are not only meant to liquidate the resistance fighters but are also directed against all Tamils who are struggling for their self-determination

"We are even more shocked by your behaviour in the Tamil conflict, because as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement you spoke for the freedom and self-determination of peoples and against repressive regimes like the one in South Africa

"We ask you to stop military attacks on Tamil regions immediately, to enforce the disarmament of the Sinhalese Home Guards to stop Sinhalese colonization of Tamil homelands, to give the north and east of Sri Lanka to Tamil self-determination and to advocate for the immediate release of the 5000 Tamil political prisoners as it was affirmed under the accord".

8.12.87

LETTER

Citizens' Committee
Mullaitivu District 7th Dec 1987

The United Nation's Secretary General
The U.N.O.

Your Excellency,

It is with great concern and dismay that the people of Mullaitivu District, a part of the Northern Region of Srilanka wish to urgently make known to the United Nations high command and to all people who love democracy, freedom and fair play about the incidents and the intolerable violation of human rights now being perpetrated on our people. The behaviour of the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) has been highly reprehensible, atrocious and shocking, with a far cry from the situation screened up by the Indian embassy at Colombo.

The great Indian Democracy to day, now' is increasingly considered by our people of having the greatness for strategic suppression of people even beyond its borders, its action very much in conflict with its declared objective of erasing the miseries, affecting the Tamils of Srilanka. We give below a few instances to illustrate clearly the present condition prevailing in the North and East of Srilanka and chiefly to draw the attention of the world to the dire and urgent necessity to rescue the Tamil people of Srilanka from their present plight. These incidents refer to what has happened or what is yet happening in the Mullaitivu district.

1. The people of the villages of Mulliyawalai, Watrapalai, Thaneerootru, Nedunkeni, Pilawathai, Pudukudiiruppu and Oddusuddan were forced to vacate their villages and flee into the jungles and live there for days before they were able to conquer their fear of the IPKF and commence seeking asylum in other places, sometimes as much as 40 miles away, before being caught by the ferocious and inhuman attack of the IPKF on innocent villagers without any notice or even a modicum of provocation. This even raised the fear among our people that some of the attacks may have been made while the soldiers were under the influence of drugs, as there seems to be no other explanation for their uncivilized and savage onslaught.

2. On their search operation the IPKF drag out people from their homes and march them on the public highway (with their hands directing the sky) for even as much as 3 miles, in the meanwhile beating and kicking them, in effect to cause maximum humiliation. Random groups of people were left gathered in the fear of the moment without even a preliminary enquiry and subjected to the atrocities of the IPKF men. Respectable government servants (teachers included) and even elderly women have had their skull torn by receiving blows with sticks fitted with blades. Equipments in homes were destroyed before the eyes of the inmates and valuables lost. In short the people of whole villages were terrorised and forced to flee their houses.

3. The people left behind in these villages the old and infirm were beaten or shot to death. On one particular day 4 of them, aged over 60 years, were shot. In another incident, a patient under treatment for snake-bite at Mullaitivu hospital was forcibly removed from the ward and interned at the IPKF Camp.

4. Hospitals at the major population centres have been incapacitated by the IPKF. Those at Mulliawalai, Nedunkeni and Pudhukudiiruppu are now non-functional as a result of shelling by the IPKF helicopters. Hospital buildings have been damaged and the medical staff have left for parts unknown. Even private dispensaries are now deserted in these areas. There is a serious dearth of medicine for the control of ravages of Malaria and diarrhoea now rampant among these displaced people.

5. In the meanwhile, the IPKF is continuing to shell villages, indiscriminately and unnecessarily causing heavy destructions to lives and properties and their military helicopters are functioning efficiently to judge the havoc and destruction caused.

6. The foremost temple in the district, the Vattapalai Amman Kovil and its immediate surrounds received 17 shells in a single day from the IPKF camp at Mullaithivu causing much damage to the main building. Similar damage has been caused to the Alambil Murugan Kovil, schools, market places and other public utilities have also received damage due to the same cause — mortar or artillary shelling.

7. Under the pretext of unearthing the weapons of the LTTE, the IPKF have outraged ordinary citizens with their method of search. The old and especially the parents of youths are subjected to bear methods of search which are disturbing and are very humiliating. In short the goodwill the IPKF is supposed to have towards the general Tamil population they have come to serve and protect, is nowhere to be seen in their action.

8. Transport services have been disrupted with the IPKF firing (the excuse for practice) on even stationary buses. In two instances, a bus load of passengers were fired upon with no reason or rhyme. These buses are state owned. Though the president of our country is no longer ruling us, he seems to have abdicated the vital function, one of which is to safe guard us as citizens of this country with a basic human right to live. Perhaps the IPKF is indulging in activities to terrorise and ultimately subjugate our people who have already suffered enough. The people of Mullaithivu, especially living away from the town are deprived of sufficient food and medicine due to the disruption of the transport services and also due to their having fled far away from their homes without being able to take along with them basic necessities of lives. An urgent relief operation has to be mounted to save the majority of these people from starvation and possibly death. From the behaviour of the IPKF, it is evident that they suspect all people of being in support of the LTTE. (That is any Srilankan Tamil is the prime suspect.) If so whom are the IPKF trying to save from or from us? The need to rescue our people from the present calamity is for the United Nations, to send a representative to study the situation on the spot. The Indian government and its representatives in Colombo (as usual they are adept at lying abroad for their country) are acting and are capable of nullifying our appeal with the fund of make belief and propaganda. They are great in these activities too. Even before they commenced their inhuman attack on our people, they commenced no less than 3 radio programmes to deceive them in the name of 'love' and 'peace' (India's broadcasts for our people have been named 'Nesakarangal', 'Anbu Vazhi' and 'Vetrimalai'). The present real activities of the IPKF as opposed to the Indian declaration of the good faith by the Tamil people of this country displays the premeditated objective (unknown to us and known to them only) in which the well being of our people is taking a back seat. Our people are now beginning to believe that the declared intention of the Indian Government is merely an eyewash and certainly what they have sent over to our country is no Peace Keeping Force. The IPKF is innocent of anything peaceful. But our people are now appealing for the truly Peace Keeping Force—a body duly approved and appointed by the world body to over see our rehabilitation and see what are the necessary and desirable accomplishes as the one imposed on us at present does not prevail.

Hence we appeal to your honour and to the world organisation to extend a hand to succour and hope to a destituted and hopeless section of humanity.

Hoping to obtain immediate redress and relief, we remain,

Yours sincerely K.K. KATHIRAVELU
The Secretary of Citizens'
Sd..... Committee of Mullaitivu

The Week

REPORT

A SIGH OF PEACE

Will LTTE return to the negotiating table?

INDEPENDENT India's longest war, though undeclared, ended, at least temporarily, at 7 a.m. on November 21. It ended as abruptly as it began on October 9. Never before had Indian forces been bogged down for so long though in the Sri Lanka operations circumstances were different. More important, they were sent into action by an inexperienced political leadership.

New Delhi ordered the IPKF to cease fire for 48 hours. This conciliatory gesture came within 24 hours of the release of 18 Indian soldiers by the LTTE. However, this seems to have been in response to an earlier appeal by the LTTE for a 48-hour ceasefire.

The appeal, made on November 1, was routed through former Jaffna municipal commissioner and LTTE confidant, V. Sivagnanam. Sivagnanam's message to the IPKF commander noted that any solution at this stage without the LTTE will not be a long-standing solution for the people of Jaffna. The Tigers have gone underground and they will keep fighting. It asked for a ceasefire for about 48 to 72 hours to give the Tigers a chance to come to the negotiating table.

Further, Sivagnanam said that he was confident that LTTE would surrender arms and if it failed to do so after the ceasefire, the people of Jaffna would chase the LTTE men and kill them.

The reaction of the government of India was that it did not know whether the LTTE was a party to the appeal. Said an official spokesman then: "If the LTTE makes a categorical statement to hand over arms and abide by the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement, we will certainly consider the offer." The truth was that in those days of anti-LTTE frenzy no one in the government was prepared to make a move which might help the LTTE even indirectly. Even Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran's appeal to Rajiv Gandhi "that the request of the LTTE through Sivagnanam for a truce for 48 hours may please be agreed to" went unheeded.

The background to the Indian army's offensive against the LTTE is well known. Such was the intensity of the army operations that all three services had to be pressed into action. And despite the disadvantage of unknown terrain, and fighting a virtual counter-insurgency war for which they were ill-trained, the forces gave a creditable performance though they suffered heavy casualties in the process. But they obviously could not have carried on in this fashion indefinitely and something had to be done to prevent more casualties to the IPKF, whose strength had swelled to nearly 30,000 men by the time the ceasefire was announced.

There were many appeals for a ceasefire in between from a number of friendly quarters. But none was acceptable to the Indian government till the evening of November 20. The reason for the stubborn stand was apparently that Rajiv Gandhi had felt let down by the LTTE leadership and his apparent desire that they should be taught a lesson. Overnight in south block and in the Prime Minister's office, moderate officials became hawks.

So much so that Rajiv Gandhi, in his utterances, began sounding more and more like President Jayewardene. Rajiv's announcement in Parliament that the IPKF would remain in Sri Lanka as long Jayewardene wanted embarrassed foreign ministry officials, who advised Natwar Singh not to make any such remarks in his statement in the Parliament. And in the rush to paint the LTTE with the blackest brush, many stories were planted. One was that the LTTE used to collect money from retail dealers of foreign liquor amounting to Rs 28 lakh per month. It was no wonder then that in those days no sincere appeal was entertained.

Within a fortnight, however, Delhi was in a more accommodative mood. In the afternoon of November 20, newsmen were alerted that there would be a statement on Sri Lanka by Minister of State for External Affairs Natwar Singh in Parliament. His announcement of the ceasefire, had an unmistakably harsh tone to it.

Said Natwar Singh: "The people in the areas now under IPKF control are beginning to emerge from their nightmare. They realise that they no longer need to fear for their lives, or to live under coercion. They are beginning to come forward to point out LTTE arms caches to the IPKF; there are reports that in some areas they have prevented LTTE operations. All this has helped the IPKF.

"Perhaps realising that they no longer represent the wishes of the people, a number of LTTE personnel have become disillusioned, surrenders are taking place, and there have been indications that increasing number of the LTTE cadres now realise that there is no future in a continued and futile confrontation with the IPKF.

"Faced with the resentment of the people of Jaffna, who are unwilling any longer to countenance LTTE obduracy, and in the face of sustained IPKF pressure, they have now released the 18 IPKF soldiers in their custody. This is a positive development and is a vindication of the policy followed by (the Indian) government, of firmness, coupled with a willingness to keep the door open for negotiations."

Finally Natwar announced: "A number of well-meaning people, who have been in touch with the LTTE leadership, believe that the LTTE needs a little time to hand over its weapons and declare its support to the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement. These sentiments have been echoed in the House. In response, the government has decided that, for 48 hours, starting from 7 a.m. tomorrow, the 21st November, the IPKF will not open fire on its own initiative."

The move for a unilateral ceasefire was set in motion on October 19, following the release of the Indian soldiers. First there were informal discussions between Defence Minister K.C. Pant, Cabinet Secretary B.G. Deshmukh, Defence Secretary S.K. Bhatnagar, Foreign Secretary K.P.S. Menon, Army Chief K. Sundarji and chiefs of the intelligence agencies. The consensus seems to have been in favour of a 48-hour ceasefire. When informed, Rajiv Gandhi too agreed.

Now, the official stand is that India

never wanted to break the LTTE, but only wanted it to bend. The government would never like to alienate the Tamils of Sri Lanka. Nor did it want to humiliate the militant leadership. What it wanted was that the Tamil militants should lay down arms and once that was achieved, the democratic process of setting up the provincial council could begin.

When the LTTE chose to hand over the captured Indian soldiers, New Delhi responded positively. The idea was to find out whether there was a change of heart among the LTTE leadership. If normalcy could be restored through negotiations, India was all for it.

It was even hinted that the IPKF knew where the LTTE leaders were stationed and that it could have destroyed them if it wanted. Rather, New Delhi wants LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran and Ajit Mahatiya, his deputy, who are in Chudumalai and Moolai areas and political leaders like Balasingham, who is in Vadamarachy, to deliberate on the accord and take a final decision. As an official who preferred to be anonymous said, "if they agree to cooperate, we will only be too ready."

Another consideration of the Indian government was that the LTTE had of late been adopting a conciliatory approach as evidenced by the release of the soldiers. To top it all, New Delhi had received intelligence reports that the LTTE leadership was plagued by dissensions. It seized the opportunity to offer peace.

These developments apart, domestic reasons too seem to have played a hand. First, there was growing tension in Tamil Nadu following the Centre's rigid stand on the appeals for a ceasefire. Tamils, specially in Tamil Nadu, were feeling that the Centre is prejudiced against them. What is more, even AIADMK leaders gave open vent to their feelings. Valampuri John, MP, spoke of the "deadly strain" put on the Indian Tamils' sense of belonging to the nation.

DMK chief Karunanidhi's campaign against India's Sri Lanka policy was having its impact among the masses. Two young Tamils committed suicide. Even some Congress(I) MPs felt that ceasefire was the need of the hour. At least one party MLA conveyed the ground realities to Rajiv Gandhi.

Even outside Tamil Nadu, discussions in the drawing rooms were invariably on the military operations. For whom are we fighting for? many asked. "We were told that Indian army has gone to Sri Lanka to protect Tamils. Now our army is killing Tamils. Why?" That was the common refrain. They were not willing to listen to the official talk of strategic compulsions and big power rivalry.

Even in defence services clubs, messes and barracks, the operations came to be questioned, especially after the IPKF casualty rate started going up. They very logic of fighting this undeclared war was under fire. There was also fear that the IPKF might end up fighting an unending guerrilla war, because there was every sign that LTTE would go underground rather than surrender. It was noted that such a committed organisation would never give up—visions of Jaffna turning into another Ireland or Beirut. The best way out, it was felt, was to call a ceasefire and negotiate an end to the conflict.

Interestingly, the attitude of the Sri Lankan leadership also helped Delhi make up its mind. The utterances of Prime Minister Premadasa and some of his cabinet colleagues on the accord made the Indian leadership realise that it wouldn't be advisable to embrace the Sinhalese and ignore the Tamils totally. Continued operations would have turned the Tamils into sworn enemies. Signs were already visible. Velupillai Prabhakaran had already approached the United Nations. The letter appealed to the UN secretary-general to use his good offices to urge the government of India to call off the military offensive and seek a solution by peaceful negotiations.

Prabhakaran's letter showed the bitterness of the Tamil Tigers towards India. At the same time, Sinhala leaders, barring perhaps Jayewardene, too harbour such feelings towards India. At least some senior officials felt that it is not wise to trust the Sinhala leadership. Some foreign office mandarins also felt that by offering a ceasefire, at least a section of the Tamil leadership could be won over. New Delhi was also worried that its adversaries may raise Prabhakaran's letter in international forums.

Many attach significance to the date of the ceasefire announcement. It was on the day Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryshkov arrived in New Delhi. A few days earlier, a senior Soviet official spoke to an Indian leader on the need to temper force with kindness in such operations. This suggestion may have been a subtle message or a friendly advice, but the ceasefire came within a few days.

—K. GOPALAKRISHNAN

Sudhir Dar, The Hindustan Times, 5.12.87

The Telegraph

COMMENT

Centre must declare an immediate ceasefire in Lanka

By Nikhil Chakravartty

6.12.87

This week the Indian armed forces would be entering the third month of their military operation against the militant Tamils in Sri Lanka. In duration this is the longest operation that the Indian Army has undertaken since independence. And that too in a country beyond the frontiers of India.

When the Prime Minister of India signed the agreement with the President of Sri Lanka on July 29, 1987, the assumption both at home and abroad was that while President Jayewardene would be honouring the commitments on behalf of the Sri Lanka government, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi would see to it that the elements confronting the Sri Lanka government among the Tamils of Sri Lanka, carried out the terms of the agreement, concerning them. This was broadly India's commitment since the Tamil leaders of that country, both militants and moderates, were for historical reasons supposed to have been under India's influence, having close ethnic affinity with the public in Tamil Nadu.

Nonetheless, this was indeed an unusual agreement. Even at that time, many wondered why Rajiv Gandhi chose to be a signatory to this agreement, since strictly speaking, the two parties directly involved in the conflict at that time were the Sri Lanka government and the Tamil groups in the island—that is the Jayewardene administration on the one hand, and the Tamil groups on the other, and the foremost among them, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). At best, India could have underwritten an agreement between the two parties.

Under this agreement, the Government of India went on further to offer "military assistance" to the Sri Lanka government to implement the proposals. While the text of the agreement promised Indian "military assistance," the annexure turned it into "an Indian peacekeeping contingent" to be called by the President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities.

The euphoria generated over the agreement was largely because it was felt on all hands that it would bring peace in a strife-torn country, and secondly it would ensure the long-desired devolution of powers to the Tamil-dominated region. In New Delhi, it was further given out that the agreement averted the imminent danger of outside forces being called in by Jayewardene in desperation. Hindsight makes it abundantly clear that nobody at that time had any clear idea of the far-reaching commitments made by Rajiv Gandhi who at a public meeting in Madras four days later ecstatically declared: "It is an agreement without precedent in history. It is an agreement which does not have a parallel in the world. It is an agreement which puts into practice the ethical ideals of Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Indiraji."

All this sounds so bizarre in the situation that prevails today. The agreement was supposed to ensure peace and security for the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Instead, what we are witnessing today is that nearly two divisions of the Indian armed forces have been engaged for two months in full-scale military operation—by land, sea and air—in the very area where the Tamils dominate, resulting inevitably in large-scale destruction and dislocation, which brings neither peace nor relief but misery and deprivation to the hapless civilian population.

The plea that all this devastation would not have descended upon the Tamil area had the LTTE leadership not gone back on its word, betrays an amazing lack of assessment of the situation on the ground when the agreement was signed. As is now clear, the Government of India had no close rapport with the Tamil militant leadership nor of its military strength and capacity despite the fact of their having been active for more than three years under its protection. In fact, the Tamil Nadu chief minister, a political ally of Rajiv Gandhi, has always been a high visible supporter of the LTTE, and there is no reason whatsoever for the Rajiv government to plead now its innocence of the LTTE's strength, influence and policy.

Even on the question of surrender of arms, Rajiv Gandhi had received no prior assurance from the LTTE leadership when he signed the agreement with Jayewardene which explicitly stated that the process of surrendering of arms would be "completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities coming into effect" which in turn would be effected "within 48 hours of the signing of this agreement." That is, within 120 hours of the signing of the agreement, the Indian Prime Minister formally assured that all arms would be surrendered by the militants.

Yet on the very same day, a little after the signing of the agreement at Colombo, Rajiv Gandhi during his joint press conference with Jayewardene, admitted that "we are still talking with them (the LTTE)." Which means the Prime Minister of India had received no firm commitment from the LTTE about its surrendering arms when he actually signed the agreement which enjoined the surrendering of arms within 120 hours.

This is not the only example of amazing lack of homework before any major decision is taken in New Delhi nowadays. It is this total absence of serious in-depth approach which

has dogged every step of the Government of India in the very complex situation in Sri Lanka that has landed it in a mess today. If the so-called peacekeeping force has become a misnomer as it has been engaged in military combat, the fault certainly does not lie with our armed forces which have a proud record of discipline and fighting mettle, but with the political leadership which seems to use it with cavalier irresponsibility.

What is the upshot of this grotesque incompetence at the highest level? The very Tamil population for whose protection India is supposed to stand, is now faced with the hazards of a war situation. The Army which was sent there to look after the people, finds itself facing an embittered populace. And the grim prospect before this Army is to meet the challenge of a desperate guerrilla bond in an alien environment. By this act of folly on the part of the government, the military action which was supposed to preserve the integrity of Sri Lanka, has in effect hardened the desperation of the secessionist forces. Any objective assessment of the situation on the ground today is that the trend towards an independent Eelam has been hardened, rather than weakened, by the Indian military operation.

What is to be done now? Some of the government's critics have raised the demand for the unilateral withdrawal of the Indian Army from Sri Lanka. This is by no means a solution: rather this will be as hazardous in its political fallout as the continuation of the present military operation.

The solution to this crisis lies in firmly going back to the political process. The sage counsel that New Delhi was offering Colombo six months ago, namely that the use of armed force would bring no solution as there could be no alternative to a political settlement, is applicable today with greater effect on New Delhi's own policy perspective. Having reached a totally blind alley, it is not surprising that one hears in the capital that the Indian armed forces might have to stay in Sri Lanka for more than a year, and also that the LTTE has to be liquidated in a fight to the finish. Both are signs of political insanity.

Spelt in specific terms, the Government of India has to declare an immediate ceasefire. It has to take the initiative in sending an all-party delegation to Sri Lanka. The emphasis has to be on the all-party national character of the delegation. Such a delegation must proceed to Jaffna first, talk to all concerned groups including the LTTE and establish the much-needed rapport. Volunteers of all those interested in the promotion of good neighbourliness must be sent in thousands to stay in the northern and eastern provinces as an effective *santi sena*. The all-party delegation must then proceed to Colombo and impress upon all political parties the urgency of conceding real devolution of powers to the Tamil region. No longer dependent on the whims and fancies of President Jayewardene but building bridges with the entire national spectrum of Sri Lanka politics. All this cannot just be a one-shot affair. There has to be sustained united endeavour on the part of all our political parties on this score. Then and only then will be built the necessary infrastructure which can replace the decision by arms that the government has been grievously mistaken in resorting to at present.

The dangerous domestic fallout of the military misadventure in Sri Lanka can be minimised only at the cost of our national unity. Not surprisingly, the temper of the public in Tamil Nadu has changed beyond recognition in the last four months, particularly since the military operation in Jaffna. From the chief minister downward, the overwhelming public demand is for cessation of military operations in the Tamil area. This temper can hardly be ignored or flouted. It has to be respected as a matter of urgency. For far too long New Delhi has been fed by wrong reports by its cronies and agencies. What is needed today is a bold re-appraisal and initiation of a new policy-perspective guided by wisdom. Time is running out on both sides of the Palk Strait.

At Navatkuli in the Jaffna peninsula, Brig. J. S. Dhillon displaying weapons seized from the LTTE..... substantial haul.

Locally made rocket launchers at Navatkuli (above) and AK-47, A-3 and G-3 rifles at Palaly, all seized from the LTTE by the IPKF..... a deadly assortment.

ACHIN VANAIK

IPKF IN SRI LANKA

FOR WHOSE SAKE?

Why has India embroiled itself in a Vietnamesque situation in Sri Lanka? Is it because the prime minister wanted to divert the nation's attention from the controversies enveloping him, as some commentators have speculated? Or is the objective altogether different?

In its anxiety to emphasise its hegemony in the region, says Achin Vanaik, the Indian government has displayed disdain for Sri Lankan sovereignty and international morality.

All nations with larger ambitions justify their foreign policy in the name of such well-worn cliches as 'preserving regional stability'. In most cases this is just a way of dressing up the naked pursuit of a nation's own interests in the garb of some 'altruistic' larger interest for the region in question, or even the world. India's rationalisation for its behaviour in Sri Lanka today is no different from what one is more used to hearing from Washington or Moscow. The American ambassador who tells senior Indian journalists that the US approves of what India has done and that this country was now 'coming of age' ie assuming the so-called 'responsibilities' of a big power, hit the nail on the head.

Supporters of the Indian *imposition* of the India-Sri Lanka accord and the military decimation of the LTTE, belong to two categories which of course, do overlap to some extent. There are, first, the cynical realpolitikers who have delighted in the display of what they would consider the much delayed assertion of India's 'natural pre-eminence'. They are unencumbered by any moral notions of what is just, but happy enough to use rationalisations which pass muster or succeed in persuading the public about the 'rightness' of the Indian 'cause. Then there are those who actually convince themselves that what India is doing is both necessary and just, ie in the best interests of the Sri Lankan Tamils themselves.

It is this hypocrisy and self-delusion that must be stripped away. With the cynical realpolitiker who says tough luck to the Sri Lankan Tamils but Indian interests (as defined by the Indian state) are paramount, there is little to argue about except to state one's opposition and hostility to the Indian action. But at least the lines are then drawn clearly and one is spared the spectacle of being fed one deceit after the other and asked to swallow them in the name of patriotism!

Whenever a conflict situation emerges, the most important thing is to establish who the principal victims are. Situations may be so complex that it is not always possible to unambiguously establish this. In the case of Sri Lanka, however, there is no such problem. The Sri Lankan Tamils are the principal victims just as the governments of Sri Lanka (whether headed by Jayewardene or Bandaranaike) have been the main victimisers responsible for institutionalising social, economic and political discrimination against the Tamils for some three decades.

Elementary principles of justice *and* democracy demand that it is the interests of the principal victims that are considered *paramount* and not those of any other actor in the drama, be they the 'deluded' Sinhalese masses, the Indian government, the Tamil Nadu government or even the Tamil masses in India. The point is not that these interests should not be considered or 'reconciled', if possible, with those of the Sri Lankan Tamils, but that they can *never* be elevated above those of the latter without betraying basic principles of political justice and democracy.

What is more, those interests must be expressed by the Sri Lankan Tamils themselves through their own representative bodies. These bodies may be 'good' or 'bad'. Others may certainly disagree with what one or the other of these bodies demands. It is perfectly legitimate for others, eg the Indian government to seek to persuade the Sri Lankan Tamils and any or all their representative bodies to adopt what it thinks is the 'right' course, or to politically support one representative group over another. But this form of behaviour is fundamentally different from the *imposition* of views by those who are not the principal victims of political injustice on those who are, even if the former have all kinds of urgent interests in resolving the conflict in question in their favour. That is to say, it is *wrong* to forcibly deny or curb *the exercise of the right of Sri Lankan Tamils to define their own political future.* This can of course, only be done through their *own* representative organisations.

It is vitally necessary to state these basic principles because not a single serious commentator has denounced the Indian government for its stand on Tamil Eelam. The point again, is not that the Indian government should support this concept. It is free to oppose it and has reasons for doing so, some good, others bad. The essential point lies elsewhere. How can India arrogate to itself the right to declare that it will never tolerate Tamil Eelam's existence? If the majority of Sri Lankan Tamils decide through their representatives that they cannot live with the Sinhala chauvinist regime in Sri Lanka any more, then one can seek to persuade them otherwise. But by what right can the Indian state say to the Sri Lankan Tamils in effect—"regardless of whether you want Tamil Eelam or not we will never allow it to happen"?

The answer is obvious—by the 'right' that more powerful countries always assign to themselves to defend their interests even if it means overriding the rights and interests of those who are the principal victims of the affair or issue in question. In this arrogant assertion of Indian interests as *primary* lies the seed of a basic intolerance and contempt for the Sri Lankan Tamils which can then surface (and has) at other levels, in other ways.

It should not altogether have been a surprise then that subsequently the Indian government *imposed* an accord on *all* the Sri Lankan groups including the TULF. When the LTTE opposed both the accord and the fact of imposition, the Indian state self-righteously justifies crushing them for not ultimately going along with an accord that was imposed upon them in the first place!

But before going on to examine why New Delhi went in for such an accord and why, as Prime Minister Premadasa memorably (and accurately) put it, the one-time "protectors have become the hunters" of the LTTE, it is necessary to disabuse oneself of the notion that New Delhi has anything but the most shallow and cynical concern for the Sri Lankan Tamils themselves. For reasons of space only the following propositions will be listed.

1 Throughout the three decades of steady institutionalisation of discrimination against the Sri Lankan (and plantation) 'Indian' Tamils by Colombo, New Delhi had done nothing concrete to help them despite their 'ethnic' and geographical proximity.

2 Indeed in 1964 the Indian government signed a disgraceful Shastri-Sirimavo pact which legitimised the refusal of Colombo to give citizenship to all 'Indian' Tamils born in Sri Lanka but endorsed the repatriation of a large number of them to India in exchange for others being enfranchised.

This deal was in fact cited in the early seventies by Martin Webster, a leader of the fascist National Front in Britain (and other supporters of Enoch Powell) as a valuable precedent in their campaign for compulsory repatriation of British residents of Asian origin in the UK.

Colombo, however, did not live up fully to their side of even this shabby bargain. They did not enfranchise all the people they promised to. One of the minor and generally unremarked upon clauses of the latest accord in fact whitewashes this failure by Colombo by agreeing to a further repatriation of 'Indian' Tamils.

3 The Indian government only began to seriously express concern for the 'tragic plight' of Sri Lankan Tamils when the refugee exodus began and the issue became a serious factor in domestic politics; it also developed larger foreign policy ramifications for India, through the growing struggle for self-determination by the Tamils, including the more increasingly voiced demand for Tamil Eelam.

4 The Rajiv government for most of the period when it was seeking to act as a 'mediator' showed a definite bias towards Colombo. It pushed for negotiations at Thimpu last year regardless of whether all the Tamil groups would be present or not. It attempted to deport Chandrahasan. It systematically promoted the 'moderate' and more 'acceptable' (to Colombo) TULF until even New Delhi had to acknowledge that the LTTE had become the dominant force in the Tamil resistance..

While the airdrop of supplies in Jaffna was a clear signal that it would not allow Colombo to have a 'military solution', New Delhi consciously refrained from arming the guerrilla groups in a manner (eg with anti-helicopter/aircraft missiles) which would have enabled them to seize the military initiative.

5 The Indian government dropped the role of 'mediator' to sign an accord without reference to the Tamil groups and has now proceeded to carry out Jayewardene's 'dirty work' of crushing the only indigenous force capable of effectively resisting the military might of the Sri Lankan army *now or in the future.*

While New Delhi has sought to disarm by force all representative groups of the oppressed Tamils, it has never sought to disarm in like manner the principal victimisers.

Why has New Delhi plumped wholesale for this accord? Why has it dropped like a hot brick its earlier role as 'mediator'? Why has it gone way beyond the terms of the accord to crush the LTTE? The accord only demands that the Government of India give the Government of Sri Lanka "such military assistance as and when required." Instead, the IPKF has taken over the complete military campaign, from establishing the objective (total decimation of the LTTE as a fighting force) to deciding the scale and scope of the campaign at various places and points of time.

The terms of the accord itself cannot be an explanation. The minimum demand of even the TULF for permanent administrative merger of the northern and eastern provinces is not guaranteed but made contingent on a referendum in the eastern province in which a majority (Sinhalese plus Muslims) would most likely vote against the merger. Incidentally, this majority was created by Colombo's policy of deliberately promoting land colonisation in the eastern region by the Sinhalese.

To be sure the referendum can be postponed, but only by the Sri Lankan President. It would be ludicrous to presume that Jayewardene can be guaranteed upon to indefinitely postpone such a referendum. In the light of all that has so far happened it would also be utterly naive to believe that the Indian government is determined to secure the 'best' interpretation of this accord as distinct from merely seeing that the letter of the accord is 'faithfully' implemented. Statements from both New Delhi and Colombo have now made it clear that the former does not want the IPKF to stay longer than it has to ie after finishing off the LTTE, and that the latter will call for the IPKF to leave after it has 'done its job'.

So what was the Indian government really after? The prize New Delhi was seeking was not this rag-tag of an accord, but the letter

exchanged between the two prime ministers, which is appended to the accord and is now apparently to be formally incorporated in it. This letter commits Sri Lanka not to enter into relationships with third countries in any way (whether it is leasing Trincomalee or setting up a transmitter), which India might see as detrimental to its interests. This is, in effect, a partial Monroe Doctrine! It represents a ceding of Sri Lanka's sovereign rights in favour of India which, for example, neither this country nor Pakistan would ever dream of emulating with respect to another neighbouring country. Clearly Jayewardene took this step with American urging, ie the US signalled its disinterest in the Trincomalee 'card'.

This partial Monroe Doctrine is a huge prize, far more important than the accord itself and represents a decisive step forward in the process of India establishing its regional hegemony. This process is an objective fact, not a matter of subjective conjecture. It is a process which has involved steps which can be seen as 'just' (and defended as such) as well as others which are patently 'unjust' (and should be opposed as such). It is enough to enumerate the basic historical landmarks of this process—the political incorporation of Indian Kashmir, the liberation of Goa, the attritional warfare against the insurgents of the north-east (especially the Nagas), the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 (formation of Bangladesh), the Pokharan explosion of 1974, the search for an India-Iran regional power axis between 1973-78, the Indian (and CIA) involvement in the post-Mujib coups in Bangladesh in 1975, the absorption of Sikkim in 1976, the contingency plans to militarily take over Kathmandu if ever necessary (only a fool would believe these don't exist), the decision to allow political refuge to Tamil guerrillas fighting a government with which New Delhi has friendly relations, and finally the India-Sri Lanka accord and the IPKF action.

The year 1971 was the first decisive turning point in this process of India establishing its 'natural preeminence'. After two inconclusive wars with Pakistan, India in 1971 decisively and irreversibly altered the relationship of power between itself and its principal regional rival in its own favour. This accord is the second decisive turning point—for the first time ever, India is acting as guarantor of civic peace in a neighbouring country with the 'consent' of the ruling regime. The Indian state has, in effect, agreed to help the Jayewardene government to get the upper hand in its domestic conflict with the LTTE in return for the Sri Lankan President's dramatic concession in the realm of foreign policy. This is the *essence* of the bargain represented by the new India-Sri Lanka relationship.

Certain voices in the Sri Lankan government, eg the land development minister, Gamini Dissanayake, have raised their objections to the partial Monroe Doctrine, ie the terms of the letter. But this only suggests that even the big powers have difficulty in ensuring that Monroe Doctrines endure. Certainly in the case of the US it no longer does. But the basic point remains—big powers search for their versions of the Monroe Doctrine or Brezhnevite 'limited sovereignty' and are prepared to sacrifice others' interests in pursuit of this self-interest which is then justified in the name of 'regional stability' or 'larger interests' or whatever.

The reversal of the Indian attitude to the LTTE also required rationalisations from the apologists for New Delhi's actions. The LTTE it is said, is by its nature bad for the 'genuine' interests of the Sri Lankan Tamils. This may be true. But it is for the Tamils to determine what are their best or genuine interests and who should represent them. And the Indian state's opposition to the LTTE is primarily motivated not by concern for these interests but for its own, in the pursuit of which it will 'sup with the devil himself'. For if the LTTE is now to be characterised (not wrongly) as a highly militarised body guilty of anti-Sinhalese terrorism and chauvinism and of vicious intolerance towards other Tamil groups, how then is one to characterise the Sri Lankan governments which by their *deeds* against the Tamils have behaved far more criminally than the LTTE?

In fact till early 1986 when Colombo embarked on the 'military solution', the LTTE was nowhere in the picture. It was the TULF that was the best known body with the best claim to being the strongest representative group. The LTTE gained its popularity and stature at the expense of the TULF by being the most resolute defenders of the Tamil people's physical and material well-being in the face of Colombo's brutal assault. One must not forget this fact even as one condemns the LTTE for repressing the other guerrilla groups to the detriment of the Tamil resistance as a whole.

The reaction to injustice cannot be morally equated with those responsible for it in the first place. This is not the first time that brutal repression engenders a brutal opponent which nevertheless represents a crucial bulwark against this repression. The rise of the Khmer Rouge in the face of the USA's brutal repression of Kampuchea is another example. But would anyone with any empathy and solidarity with the oppressed Kampuchean masses of that time have demanded that the Khmer Rouge be crushed by an external force while US bombing and repression of that country was going on? Is it legitimate to demand that a 'nasty' representative group of the victims be punished to the point of elimination when there is no comparable punishment of the victimisers? Yet this is what is being demanded in Sri Lanka today.

The LTTE opposed the accord, then flirted with the idea of cooperating with it. They then raised one objection after the other till New Delhi decided they had to be 'taught a lesson'. The LTTE's reluctance to co-operate with India and Sri Lanka can be put down to a combination of at least four factors: a) frustration at an imposed accord; b) desire to overwhelmingly dominate the interim council; c) uncertainty about sustaining their power and influence in a civilian set-up; d) distrust of Sri Lankan and Indian bona fides behind the drawing up of the accord and with

respect to the terms itself. Whatever their failings, the LTTE had every reason to hold these fears. Why should the bona fides of Sri Lanka and India be trusted? And certainly LTTE behaviour with respect to the accord can in no way justify the IPKF action.

More extreme characterisations of the nature of the LTTE that have appeared in the media have only served by their very timing, as well as their content, to justify the iniquity of New Delhi's behaviour. These characterisations not only let the Jayewardene and previous Sri Lankan regimes 'off the hook', so to speak, for their brutal and institutionalised repression of Tamils, but contrary to their purpose they only serve to further highlight the hypocrisy of New Delhi's actions. For if the LTTE is so terrible why was New Delhi willing to give it a place, let alone a dominant one, in the interim council? Why is New Delhi even now willing to let the LTTE come into the 'political process'?

Time and again, appeals to nationalism and patriotic feeling have been used by governments and their supporters to silence critics or to alienate the wider public from them. This time is no exception. And even the critics of what the Indian government is doing have been afraid of seeming 'unpatriotic'. That is why their criticism has been put forward on the ground that India's own interests are not served by what it is doing in Jaffna ie that the situation will turn out to be India's 'Vietnam'.

In this context it is more than ever necessary to assert that it is not India's interests that are paramount and that need defending, but those of the Sri Lankan Tamils *as defined by them.* India's behaviour in Sri Lanka must be opposed not so much because it means this country might sink more into some political 'quagmire', but because what India is doing is *wrong,* indeed reprehensible. It is the Sri Lankan Tamils and their representatives who are paying a most painful price for the perpetuation of this injustice. ■

DECEMBER 6, 1987

EDITORIAL 22.12.87

THE COST OF WAR

THE hasty Indian rejoinder to President Jayewardene's claim that nearly 700 Indians had been killed in the military operations against the LTTE has not set at rest widespread fears in this country that the cost of taming Mr Prabhakaran's bellicose Tigers is becoming increasingly unacceptable. The Sri Lankan President may have his own compulsions for suggesting that the IPKF will complete its military task within the next 45 days—it may be recalled that he had earlier identified August 15 as the date of withdrawal—but the recent attacks mounted on IPKF camps in the Eastern Province, and the LTTE's warning that it will "eliminate" all other rival Tamil groups, indicate that this optimism is based on an incomplete understanding of the prevailing military situation. True, the Indian forces have demolished most of the LTTE's known military bases in the Jaffna peninsula and are now engaged in a similar operation in the Batticaloa district, but the task of weeding out the insurgents from the expansive stretches of Vavuniya, Mannar, Trincomalee and Amparai districts may be far too hazardous to be completed by the end of January. What has really complicated the situation is that the IPKF has been unable to obtain any form of civilian assistance, the brutal retaliatory tactics of the Tigers offering only a partial explanation for this failure. The muted protests by Professor S. Vithianathan, the Vice-Chancellor of Jaffna University, and the TULF leader, Mr A. Amirthalingam, at the "atrocities" allegedly committed by the IPKF may help to explain why the liberators of yore have been transformed into an army of occupation in the eyes of most Tamils.

It is also interesting that criticism of the Lanka misadventure within India is no longer confined to Mr M. Karunanidhi and the DMK. Mr Jyoti Basu's recent demand that the Government come clean on what exactly is taking place across the Palk Straits may be a fairly accurate indication of Indian public opinion. The ultimate irony, of course, is that the perceived beneficiary of the military intervention, President Jayewardene, has himself been pushed into a very tight corner. The belligerence with which the outlawed JVP spurned Colombo's offer to return to normal politics may not only be an indication of Mr Rohan Wijeweera's commitment to adventurist politics, but a pointer to the mood of the Sinhalese. Nor is it without significance that President Jayewardene has not been able to extend support for the Indian military presence within his Cabinet beyond the charmed duo of Mr Ronnie de Mel and Mr Gamini Dissanayake. The opposition of the Prime Minister, Mr R. Premadasa, is, of course, well known, but Mr Lalith Athulathmudali's guarded statement that while the "objectives" of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord "make sense", its "methodology and procedure raise a lot of controversy", suggests that the formidable chauvinistic lobby in the ruling UNP is not yet reconciled to President Jayewardene's unilateral manoeuvres. In a nutshell, the problems of the ethnic conflict do not appear to have diminished since July 29, New Delhi's conduct hardly inspiring confidence in either Jaffna or Colombo. As for opinion in this country, the question that is foremost in everyone's mind is: Whose war are we fighting in Sri Lanka?

AFFIDAVIT

ALVAPILLAI SOMASUNDARAM (48)
N.I.C. No. 40360230X Karkia Walavu,
Puloly East, Point-Pedro

The deceased Somasundaram Vishnupalan (16) is second son. He was a student in Grad. 9 of Velautham Maha Vidyalayam.

At about 9 p.m. on 4.12.87 our area surrounded by the Indian Peace Keeping Force Personnel.

When IPKF personnel tapped on our door I opened the front door.

At this time my wife and children were in the rear section.

Wnen my wife opened the rear door I.P.K.F personnel who were in the rear compound shot dead my son S. Vishnupalan who was inside the house.

The dead body of my son Vishnupalan was taken away by the IPKF.

The dead body of my son was traced to Manthikai Govt. Hospital and was removed from there on 8.12.87 at about 10 a.m. with the permission of the IPKF as a full day curfew was in force.

The dead body of my son S. Vishnupalan was cremated the same day 5.12.87 Aanaivilunthan cemetery.

PONNIAH NAVAMANY (59) Viyavilan South, Viyavilan.

The deceased Suppiah Ponniah, aged 70 years was my husband.

He was a farmer at the time of his death.

On 4.12.87 a shell fired by the army fell on our roof and exploded.

My husband fell unconscious immediately due to the shock and passed away few hours later.

We cremated his body the next day.

I have got a daughter deserted by her husband who is now a dependant of mine.

I find it very difficult to maintain my family as there is no income after my husband's death.

VIGNESWARAN GANDHI ALIAS MAHARANI (34) widow, 13/1 Malar Mahal Veethy Ariyalai.

The deceased Nallathamby Vigneswaran aged 42 years was my husband.

On 4th. December 1987 at about 8.00 p.m. my husband complained about acute heart pain.

Due to the curfew which was imposed from 5.00 p.m. till 6.00 p.m. we could not take him to the Hospital.

I along with my husband's sister, brother-in-law and a woman from the neighbourhood went to the nearby army camp with a white flag.

We pleaded with the soldiers to grant permission for taking my husband to the Hospital.

They refused to give permission and advised us to take him to the Hospital in the morning.

My husband expired at about 3.00 a.m. without receiving any medical help.

He would have survived if we had taken him to the Hospital immediately, as it was his first heart attack.

I have six children

After my husband's demise we are undergoing untold hardships as we do not have any income.

I. KANDASAMY SIVARAJADURAI (26)
R.C. Lane, Manthuvil, Kodikamam.

My brother Kandasamy Pulendran, age 20 years a bachelor, my two sisters and I were living in our own house at the above said address.

We have lost our father and mother long ago due to sickness.

On 6.12.87 at about 2 p.m. my brother left for our garden closeby to water chillie plants.

At about 3 p.m. Indian Peace Keeping Force surrounded our area and state Firing at random.

At above 6p.m. K. Moorthy a relative of ours who went to his farm came home and informed that my brother was shot and killed by the IPKF in our farm.

I rushed to the farm as the IPKF had left our locality and brought the dead body home with the assistance of our relations.

The dead body of my brother bore an injury in his chest.

Cremation took place on 7.12.87 at noon at fluvan cemetery.

My un-married sister and lost the only earning member of of our family.

KANTHASAMY PUSHPARANEE (41) Seppukaddi, Alvai West, Alvai

The deceased Sithamparapillai Kandasamy aged 46 years was my husband.

On 7.12.87 at abo 9 p.m shell fell within our house compound and exploded.

My husband sustained on deep injury on his shoulder joint caused by a flying shrapnel.

He lost his consciousness following excessive bleeding.

We could not take him to the hospital due to the tension prevailed during those days.

He died on 10.12.87 without regaining his sense.

His cremation took place at Tikkam cemetery on 11.12.87.

I lost a son on 31.5.87 when the security forces dropped of incunding bombs on Thulapilliyar Kovil Thikkam where we were taking refuge.

I have a son aged five years.

We do not have any income after my husband's tragic death and undergoing tremendous hardships.

SINNARAJAH THANGAMALAR, (40) Madathadi, Sirupiddy North, Neervely.

The deceased Selvanayagam Navaratnam, aged 42 years was my elder brother.

He was a farmer.

On 7.12.87 at about 3.30 P.M. there was a conformation between the army and the militants near my brother's house.

At 4.30 P.M. I came to know that my brother and his wife were killed after being caught in the crossfire.

I rushed to my brother's house and found his body lying in the courtyard.

It bore a gaping wound on it's neck.

My sister-in-law's body was found about 75 yards from her house.

Her body bore a gunshot wound on its stomach.

The eldest child Yasotha is under my custody maintenance and care.

The fact that my brother surrendered at the IPKF Camp was witnessed by Mr. Muthulingam, President of the Citizens Committee of Inuvil.

My brother was removed from the IPKF Camp to the Marthanamadam IP.K.F. Camp on 31.12.87. People who saw my brother being taken gave this information to me.

On 1st January 1988 my brother and I went to the said Camp and inquired about my brother.

We were asked to come the next day.

On 2.1.88 my mother and I went to Maruthanamadam IPKF Camp at about 8.30 A.M. and inquired about my brother.

We are asked to wait. At about 1 P.M. my mother and I were taken into the camp and shown my brother.

My mother and I found my brother. We spoke to him. He said that the IPKF had promised to release him in three days time. He wanted some clothes to be brought. I and my mother were with my brother for about 30 minutes.

He did not appear to bear any signs of assault.

On 3.1.88 my mother and I went to the IPKF Camp and asked for permission to see him. We were told to come the next day but the clothes we took for him were taken by the soldier.

On 5.1.88 my mother and I went again to the IPKF Camp. This time to we took some clothes. The clothes were taken by a soldier but we were refused permission to seem him as the soldier said that my brother was being interrogated. Said that my brother was being interrogated.

We went every other day thereafter but was refused permission everytime. On 13.1.88 when my mother and I went, were were told not to come and that we would be sent a letter after my brother's interrogation was over.

On 16.1.88 a boy named Nithiyananthajothi alias Periyarasa said to be a member of the "Three - Stars" militant group came and told us that my brother was seriously ill at the IPKF Camp.

My mother, my two sisters and brother and I rushed to the IPKF Camp Maruthanamadam and asked to see my brother.

There we were told that my brother had died. Two senior Officers of of the IPKF asked us whether we wanted the body or whether we wanted them to dispose of it.

We undertook to remove the body home. When we asked how my brother came by his death we were told that the time had come for him to die.

The body was handed over to us at 3 P.M.

We brought the body home and examined the body.

We made the following observations :

(a) The left arm was dislocated at the shoulder.

(b) The left shoulder joint was swollen.

(c) There were blackened stripe marks the whole length of both arms (people who saw this said these were the effects of electric burns)

(d) On both legs there were lacerated wounds.

(e) On his back also there were lacerated wounds.

The Gramma Sevaka (Village headman) came for the funeral as he was rather pally with my brother.

A boy who was held in the same camp as my brother came and told us that soldiers with boots used to trample over the body of my brother while he was in custody.

That before my brother died he had been so subject to electric shocks and beatings that he had become nearly blind.

We were unable to get a certificate of death in respect of my brother's death as the Gramma - Sevaka (Village headman) though he attended the funeral and was also pally with my brother was afraid to state the real cause of death and because the IPKF itself had given a certificate relating to the death.

The IPKF sent us a certificate regarding the cause of death of my brother which we do not believe in so far as the cause of death is concerned. A copy of the certificate is annexed hereto.

As a result of my brother's death my widowed mother and brother and sisters are left without any maintenance and support.

My late brother who was the only wage earner of the family was in receipt of a salary of Rs. 1000/- P.M. as watcher for Village Council, Uduvil.

The dependants are :-

(a) Kanagalingam Parameswary (50) – Mother.
(b) Miss. K. Patheerathy (25) – Sister.
(c) Miss. K. Kanthavadivu (20) – Sister.
(d) Miss. K. Lingeswary (19) – Sister and
(e) Mas. K. Kuhanathan (13) – Brother.

My mother is very ill after untimely death of my brother and is therefore unable to come and make this statement.

MRS. NAGESWARY NAVARATNAM widow (55) Alukkai, Aleveddy North, Alaveddy.

The deceased was my son Navaratnam Naguleswarn, a bachelor aged 27 years earned an income of Rs. 1000/- per month by running a tea boutique at Alaveddi.

I have 5 children of whome 2 are sons and 3 are daughters on whom a son is married and lives separately.

My late son Naguleswarn left home at 7.00 A.M. on 30.12.87 on a motor-cycle to his tea boutique as usual.

At about 7.30 A.M. a neighbour came house and informed me that my son Naguleswarn had been shot dead by an unknown uniformed person at chempadu which is half a mile away from our house.

The dead body was brought home by my relationes at 8.50 A.M. in a tractor and the cremation took place at 1.00 P.M. the same day at Mellakam cemetery.

I observed a severe bullet injury on my son's head.

THARMALINGAM SARASWATHY (34) Thikampurai Vasavilan.

The deceased person Ponnan Pali, aged 61 years widow was my Aunt.

My aunt adopted me after her children's death.

She was living with me until she met her tragic demise.

On 30.12.87 our area was the target of intensive mortar and artillery shelling.

At about 2.00 p.m. a shell fell in the next compound and exploded with a thundering noise.

Through fear we fled from the House to Selvanayagapuram leaving my aunt who refused to accompany us due to her old age.

On 31.12.1987 I was informed that my aunt was killed in a shell blast on the previous day on the wake of our hurried departure.

On hearing the grave news my husband went back to our house and brought her body in a bullock cart with great difficulty.

She had three shrapnel wounds on her head.

Her body was cremated at the Pillayan Kandu Cemetery on 31.12.87.

She was under my care and maintenance till her death.

NEWS ANALYSIS

JRJ Caught between Devil and the Deep Sea

December 1987

The Sri Lankan President, J.R. Jayewardene, who had heaved a sigh of relief in October end as the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) crushed the virile resistance of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the Jaffna peninsula, now finds himself in political quagmire. Viewed either from the vantage point of the hardliners within his ruling United National Party (UNP) or the raving Opposition groups, the "supremo" is evidently caught between the devil and the deep sea.

On October 11, the minister for agriculture, Gamini Jayasuriya, a severe critic of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord, resigned from both the cabinet and membership of Parliament in protest against two constitution amendment Bills seeking the merger of the northern and eastern provinces and setting up of a provincial council for devolution of power in the local affairs. The immediate provocation for his exit being that his name was ot listed among the official speakers taking part in the three-day debate on the Bills. Sensing the mood of dissent in the ruling party, Prime Minister R. Premadasa, while replying to the debate, launched a scathing attack on India. Even though his stance did not come as a surprise to observers because he had been raising an accusing finger against India right from the days of its involvement as a mediator in the negotiating process to solve the island's ethnic problem. What came as a surprise was that he had orchestrated his arguments with those of the Opposition. While keeping himself firmly planted on the treasury side, he was expressing his determination to sabotage the accord in its implementation. While shedding crocodile tears for the beleagured Tamil militants, he spat fire on India. He said: "We know who made our children (referring to the Tigers) militants so bold. It is our neighbour who is responsible for the disobedience of our children." He mockingly persisted with his "our children" theory, saying that the 'children" who ran off to an "uncle" after complaining against "their father" were now saying, "the father was far better in treating than the uncle." He betrayed his lack of statesmanly introspection that it was the step-fatherly treatment of the Tamils, whom he referred to as "children', and reducing them to the status of second-class citizens which brought the nation to its present plight.

Premadasa accused the IPKF of committing "genocide", adding: "There is nobody who accuses India of genocide. Whatever mistakes big people make no one speaks about them." The Indian soldiers need not have sacrificed their lives in Jaffna had New Delhi not encouraged the Tamil militants, training them and arming them during the past four years. After raising a discordant note about the proposal for merging the northern and eastern provinces, he apologetically took the government stand that the proposed autonomy would in no way pose any threat to the unitary character of Sri Lanka. "The Bills were for those who accepted the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the country," he asserted. Then he hinted at the government's intention of sidetracking the implementation aspects, saying that the President could not just go and amalgamate the northern and eastern provinces. "There are certain conditions. I will do everything possible to prevent the amalgamation, which is not particularly beneficial for the Muslims who are living there for generations."

By picking holes in the Bills and through making barbed references against India, Premadasa was obviously playing to the Opposition benches, particularly to the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) members. The Leader of the Opposition, and SLFP leader, Anura Bandaranaike, spoke in the same tone and vein, betraying an undercurrent of understanding between the two. Bandaranaike said despite the much-talked about accord, peace in the island remains a far cry. "We have, instead, seen carnage, violence and more and more massacres since the agreement was signed about three and a half months ago," he said, alleging that the IPKF had massacred Tamils who had nothing to do with the LTTE and, over 400,000 people in Jaffna were refugees. Charging the government with having "sold our country", he demanded: "Get India out of our soil, out of our country, if you want the people to remain free." Bandaranaike told the government: "If you had dealt with India on an intelligent, systematic basis, India would r er have bullied us into submission. You tried to bully India and they bullied back, and you got frightened."

In his reply, Premadasa echoed the sentiments of the SLFP leader's. He said: "You should understand the plight in which the President was placed. Our army had carried out its duty for four years. When victory was at hand after the Vdamrachichi operations, our great friend India gave us a signal, and the operations had to be stopped." The Prime Minister stressed that there should be reciprocity on the foreign that no one either in Colombo or New Delhi is willing to sing paeans about the accord, about which Rajiv at the outset spoke in a vein of "never-in-the-human-history" superlatives. Today both Jayewardene and Rajiv are at pains explaining the circumstances that led to the signing of the accord and the noble intention of doing justice to the Tamils in the island. All that is history. The words of the two are for records. The close advisers of Rajiv and Jayewardene and their more-loyal-than-king supporters would even go to the extent of saying that the accord should be choreographed in golden letters. But, seen in the day-to-day implementation, the

accord has, indeed, got stained with blood. Since it was signed, the island has the southern part of the island. Now it has established networks in other parts. The transport and other utility services workers' unions have been so heavily infiltrated by JVP activists that they could disrupt normalcy at any moment; which, indeed, they have been doing in recent weeks. Colombo and other major cities like Kandy, Anurathapura and Badula were subjected to bomb explosions set off by them as Parliament was discussing the constitution amendment Bills. Scores of people were killed and hundreds maimed. The newspapers, mostly government-controlled, and the state-owned electronic media, invariably failed to pinpoint the culprits, or attributed the evil doings on the Tamil militants.

The desperate LTTE went on a killing spree by gunning down the innocent Singhalas and the Tamils Muslims in eastern province. As the IPKF, having hounded out and hunted down the LTTE in the Jaffna peninsula, now faces the regrouped Tigers in the eastern province. During the entire month, the daily briefings by the peace-keeping forces and the government spokesmen in Colombo gave accounts of so many killed, so many wounded and so many captured. However, the counts of the casualty alone did not speak of the magnitude of the tragedy of Sri Lanka. The trauma of the people of the island went far beyond the stark details of the bloodletting that has been going on. The psyche of the entire population, irrespective of ethnic identity, remained crippled. On the one side, there was the overwhelming fear as death lurked in every nook and corner. There was nothing nearing normalcy in any part of Sri Lanka. People openly talked about the reckless policies of the government that has pushed the nation to the brink, and the contingency which made the intervention of Indian troops for peace keeping operations inevitable. Correspondents visiting the islands wrote about "cyclonic anger" building up among the common people. They said Jayewardene, known for his genial wit and pleasant homilies, has become tense and withdrawn to the point of being jittery. The emerging dialogue between the UNP members and the Opposition

SLFP is the cause of Jayewardene's mounting worries, as the nation has reached the threshold of presidential and parliamentary elections. His decision to put off the provincial council elections, taking cover under the emergency situations, is indicative of his fear to commit the ruling party to face the electorate.

There are intelligence reports that the JVP and a faction of the Tamil guerillas have established contacts. The bomb blasts in the Singhala-dominated areas, and in the major cities, which are attributed to the JVP, is seen as a prelude to a possible nationwide insurgency. With the Sri Lankan army and police ranks being heavily infiltrated by the JVP men, the President is in a miserable plight. His own life is being guarded by Indian commandos. The UNP-SLFP axis could have emerged because of the fear of a civil war being on the scheme of things of the JVP.

All these pose a portent in handling the Sri Lankan imbroglio for India. Caution can at no point be thrown to the wind, as it happened while signing the accord. The Sri Lankan President, who is neck deep in a political mire, may want India to play a "political lifeguard" role for him. For whatever he might have made or marred—in his desparate attempt to find a way out of the ethnic crisis—he should be left alone to pay in for political terms. India's stand on Sri Lanka ought to be abundantly clear—that being to honour the island republic's integrity and sovereignty. On the part of Sri Lanka the commitment to devolve power to the northern and eastern provinces and ensuring the right of the Tamil people to run their civic affairs in the areas where they are in majority is inalienable, according to the accord, for which India has paid heavily. The Sri Lankan parliament has passed the necessary Bills. It now remains for Jayewardene and his UNP to muster public support to implement the provisions. As a house divided within itself, Sri Lanka is allowing a political drift that might lead to a nationwide insurgency. India would certainly like political stability in the island. But it is certainly not India's business in assisting any political party or personage there to achieve it.

W.S. Titus

LETTER

New Delhi's puppet

Correspondent Manik de Silva states that the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) supports the Indo-Lanka peace accord of 29 July [**Terrorists in the south** REVIEW, 12 Nov.]. In fact, while welcoming moves to resolve the ethnic problem peacefully, the central committee of the LSSP has questioned the Indian involvement in Sri Lanka's domestic affairs. Far from supporting the accord, the committee has resolved that the accord will not solve the ethnic problem, and has put forward its own proposals. The truth is that the only party, apart from the United National Party, to support the accord is the Communist Party of Sri Lanka.

The mass of the people of Sri Lanka are opposed to the accord. The question at hand is not that of the ethnic dispute, but that of India's expansionism. One-third of Sri Lanka, including the strategic port of Trincomalee, is de facto Indian territory. The two Indian army divisions in Sri Lanka outnumber the Sri Lanka army, and more troops are on the way. The government of Sri Lanka has become New Delhi's puppet.

In this situation, where democratic opposition is stifled, the people will turn more and more to the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, which is now establishing "liberated zones" all over the south. Unless democracy is restored, terrorism will triumph.

Rajagiraya, Sri Lanka **M. Zaidi**

FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW • 17 DECEMBER 1987

EDITORIAL

Get the IPKF out of Sri Lanka

IT IS NOW ADMITTED THAT THE INDIAN government is not being truthful while publishing figures of the casualties suffered by the Indian Army in Sri Lanka. There is reasons to believe that at least 600 Indian soldiers have been killed till November end in Sri Lanka and over 1500 have been so seriously injured that many of them will have to live the life of cripples.

The Government of India had no business to get involved in the civil war in Sri Lanka. R. Gandhi who was embroiled in a domestic crisis because of his involvement in the Bofors kickback and other scandals needed a diversionary move to take the spotlight away from his predicament. The Americans not only wanted India to be involved in a military adventure in a foreign country, but also wanted to bail out their protegy Jayewardene from a politically and militarily hopeless situation, besides wanting to prevent the emergence of Sirimao Bandaranaike.

And the Indian troops are now dying to fulfil the ambition of R. Gandhi to make India a "regional super power". Gandhi's ambition which is pandered to by the Americans and the Russians for their own vicarious reasons is costing the nation very dearly both in terms of men and money. By a modest estimate, the war in Sri Lanka is draining the Indian exchequer of Rs. 5 crores a day. This is something we can ill-afford. Ultimately it is the poor people of our country who will have to underwrite with their empty stomachs the cost of Gandhi's follies and ambitions.

Since most national political parties are still not clear on how to deal with the situation created by India's involvement in Sri Lanka, it becomes the responsibility of the Hind Mazdoor Kisan Panchayat to take the initiative to organise the people to raise their united voice demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Indian Army from Sri Lanka. The HMKP had, at its national convention in Visakhapatnam, on November 15-16, made such a demand, and it should not waste any time in mobilising the people behind it. Meetings, demonstrations and other forms of protest actions must be organised at various levels in the entire country. A notice should be served on the government that if the troops are not withdrawn at once, then a more vigorous form of protest action would be initiated. Several regional political parties and mass organisations in Tamil Nadu which have been campaigning for India's withdrawal from Sri Lanka should be approached for support in the launching of a wider nation-wide movement.

the OtherSide □ December 1987

SLFP leader demands withdrawal of IPKF

NEWS

COLOMBO, Dec. 4.

The Opposition leader, Mr. Anura Bandaranaike of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party made a strong plea in the Sri Lanka Parliament yesterday for withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from the island and said the relations between the two countries would improve and become more cordial as soon as this was done.

Speaking on the votes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Bandaranaike said the principal task of the IPKF was to achieve the surrender of arms by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and other militant groups But the LTTE continued to kill and destroy.

'IPKF on the rampage': He alleged that the IPKf was going on the rampage, "whose scale is thousand times that of the Sri Lanka Army." "We don't want to become the "Vietnam" of India or the "Afghanistan" of Russia," he said. Criticising the Government's foreign policy, he said that his Sri Lanka Freedom Party did not follow a policy of "deliberate hostility" to India. "We were not stupid enough to do that. We, the SLFP, did not put our country in a position where we had to turn to India and say, "please help us solve our Tamil problem."

Forced to sign accord: Mr. Bandaranaike alleged that for its help, India had forced Sri Lanka to sign the accord, which had resulted, if not in the total loss of the island's sovereignty, at least in its abridgement. "What is the price we have to pay for the great price India is paying to station the IPKF in the north, another SLFP member asked.

Replying to the debate the Foreign Minister, Mr. A. C. S. Hameed, said that if the SLFP had participated in the All-Party Conference in 1984 and cooperated in the efforts to solve the ethnic problem, the country could have avoided a great deal of bloodshed.

Status of Trincomalee port: Referring to the charge that the Opposition was not consulted prior to signing of the accord, Mr. Hameed said such negotiations were not conducted publicly. He said Sri Lanka had assured India that Trincomalee and other ports would not be given to any country for military purposes. "We would allow naval ships to enter for refuelling or bunkering, but not, if they are carrying nuclear weapons." he said.

The Voice of America station had a "wide dimension", but Sri Lanka had taken the precautions against the VOA disturbing any other country, he added. — UNI

REPORT

'IPKF will stay on till mission is fulfilled'

From T. S. Subramanian

JAFFNA, Dec. 3.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force had gone to Sri Lanka "with a mission given to fulfil the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement" and "will go back only when the Agreement is implemented", Maj. Gen Harkirat Singh, General-Officer Commanding of the IPKF said here today "Time is of no consequence to us".

Gen. Harkirat Singh was talking to a party of reporters at the Palaly headquarters of the IPKF in the Jaffna peninsula. A team of reporters from Madras was earlier taken for a five-hour trip of Jaffna town and the peninsula.

"We are telling the (local citizens) that the Indian Army has come here with a mission given to fulfil the Agreement. The Indian Army will not go from here till the Tamils are satisfied and their aspirations are met," he said.

Referring to the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene's statement that the IPKF would complete its operations against the Tamil militants "very soon," Gen Harkirat Singh said "We take orders from the Government of India."

And "as far as the Government of India is concerned, we will implement the accord. We will stay here. Time is of no consequence. We have to ensure that the Agreement signed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, is implemented," he observed.

"It is time for the people to look ahead for a peaceful era. You cannot keep harping (on the past)," Maj. Gen. Harkirat Singh said. The people were fed up with war and they wanted peace. "The IPKF will not go away from here. This is not a people's war. This is a war guided for a few individuals' gains," he added.

Answering a question on the reaction of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to the 48-hour ceasefire declared by the Government of India, he said, "Whatever the reaction to the 48-hour ceasefire, we have not given up. We will continue to maintain pressure and the intensity will increase every day. We will look for contacts with the militants and wherever we contact, they will be destroyed. We will not give them a bouquet of flowers. They are the ones who started the war. They are the ones who fired first. The Overall (Force) Commander had spoken to them on October 8 but they did not listen."

In the last 72 hours, the IPKF had nabbed more than 100 "hardcore" LTTE men. "They are coming and willingly surrendering to us. They are taking us to the hideouts. The Navatkuli catch was on a tipoff. They (IPKF) searched and searched, and they found it. It was a tipoff given by the LTTE men. Some of them want to surrender to us. They are not being allowed to surrender."

Information from reliable sources had indicated that the LTTE had totally run out of explosives. "The amount of explosives we have destroyed is enormous. We don't want to carry it. We don't want to exaggerate, it is a reality," Maj. Gen. Harkirat Singh said.

R.K. Lakshman, The Times of India.

IPKF under command of Jayewardene: Sri Lanka

COLOMBO, Dec. 10.

Sri Lanka today said the Indian Peace Keeping Force was under the command of President, Mr. Jayewardene, the Commander-in-Chief, and Indian soldiers are in the country at the invitation of the Island Government.

The activities of the IPKF in Sri Lanka "are governed by the executive powers of the President, who is the Commander-in-Chief", the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, Mr. Vincent Perera, told Parliament.

The national agency, Lankanuvath said Mr. Perera was making a statement in the House on behalf of the Prime Minister in response to a question on Tuesday by the Opposition Leader Mr. Anura Bandaranaike.

Mr. Bandarnaike had referred to a statement reportedly made by the G.O.C. of the IPKF in Jaffna, Maj. Gen. Harkirat Singh, to a group of correspondents that Indian "troops take order from the Government of India."

Mr. Perera said enquiries with the Government of India revealed that portions of Gen. Harkirat Singh's statement had been carried out of context in local newspapers.

Mr. Perera said, according to the Indian Government, what was published, did not do justice to the opinions expressed by the Indian Commander.

"The IPKF will leave Sri Lanka when asked to do so by the President", he added.

He said the fact "has been stressed in several statements made by the Indian Prime Minister", and there "is no need to pay undue attention to the statement by the Major General which does not constitute an official statement."

படைகளின் பழிவாங்கல் ஷெல் அடியில் பொதுமக்கள் 32 பேர் உயிரிழந்தனர்

32 people killed in IPKF shelling

1987 டிசம்பர் 4

இச் சம்பவம் வாழைச்சேனைக்கும், ஓட்டமாவடிக்கும் இடையில் இருக்கும் மைலங்கரச்சி என்ற இடத்தில் கடந்த புதன்கிழமை மாலை நடந்தது.

இச்சம்பவம் குறித்த மேலும் தெரிய வருவதாவது–

சம்பவ தினம் பிற்பகல் 2 மணியளவில் இந்தியப் படையினர் 12 வாகனங்களில் பிரயாணம் செய்து கொண்டிருந்தனர்.

மைலங்கரச்சி என்ற இடத்தில் பாடசாலை ஒன்று இருக்கிறது. அந்த இடத்திற்கு அருகில் இந்தியப் படையினரின் வாகனங்கள் வந்த போது புலிகள் தாக்குதல் களை ஆரம்பித்தனர்.

முதலில் கைக் குண்டுகளால் தாக்கினர். பின்னர் இயந்திரத் துப்பாக்கிகள், கனரக ஆயுதங்கள் ஆகியவற்றின் மூலம் அதிரடித் தாக்குதல்களை மேற் கொண்டனர். இத் தாக்குதலில் இந்திய தரப்பில் ஒன்பது பேர் கொல்லப் பட்டனர்.

இந்த மோதல் பல மணித்தியாலங்கள் நீடித்தது. இம் மோதலை முறியடிக்க மேலதிகமாக இந்திய துருப்புகள் அந்த இடத்திற்கு விரைந்தன.

இதனை அடுத்து ஷெல் தாக்குதல்களை இந்தியப் படையினர் மேற்கொண்டனர். துப்பாக்கிப் பிரயோகமும் இடை விடாது மேற் கொள்ளப்பட்டது.

இந்தியப் படையினர் மேற் கொண்ட தாக்குதல்களினால் பொது மக்களில் 32க்கு மேற்பட் டோர் கொல்லப்பட்டனர். 200 க்கும் அதிகமானோர் படுகாய மடைந்தனர்.

கொல்லப்பட்டவர்களில் 19 பேர் முஸ்லிம்கள் என தெரிய வருகிறது

வாழைச்சேனை வீரகேசரி நிருபர் யு. எல். இஸ்மாயிலும் கொல்லப்பட்டவர்களில் ஒருவர் ஆவர்.

காயமடைந்தவர்கள் மட்டக் களப்பு, வாழைச்சேனை ஆஸ்பத்திரிகளில் சேர்க்கப்பட்டுள்ளனர்.

INDIAN DOCTOR CONFIRMS VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS

INTERVIEW

Dr. M.S. Khan calls the Peace Force - Peace Killing Fore in Sri Lanka - KJELL GJERSETH - 4th December, 1987.

I don't understand what the Indian Government's motives are. What they call the Indian Peace Keeping Force, IPKF is something quite different, namely Indian Peace Killing Force. This force has shown two terrible capabilities; ability to destroy and the ability to kill civilians. The Indian doctor M.S.Khan says this to the "Afterbladet" in Jaffna.

Dr. Khan is working for the Indian Red Cross and came to Sri Lanka as a volunteer. He as in Jaffna during the bloody weeks after the offensive against the LTTE/the Tamil Tigers began on 10th October, 1987.

Dr. Khan says that he is appalled at the conditions in Jaffna, both health and sanitary. Hundred of wounded people do not receive satisfactory medical treatment. He confirms the allegations by both Tamils and Sinhalese in the North and South of Sri Lanka that "The IPKF has killed a large number of civilians." "I cannot say how many. However I am convinced that people were right when they claimed that only one of ten killed by the Indians, was a guerilla fighter", says Dr. Khan.

A regular bus-service from Jaffna to Colombo was started from the beginning of last week. The striking feature was that the buses were over-crowded by passengers when they left Jaffna. Only about 20% of the city's population are left from the total number of people resident before the Indian troops began their offensive. This means that over 250,000 people have fled from Jaffna. When Afterblad's correspondent noticed last week-end was that people from the districts were moving into the town!

The Tigers have spread themselves out and attack Indian positions thorughout the Jaffna Peninsula. They lay land mines not only on the Main roads but also on other local road nets. The Tigers are experts on mines. The paradox is that they learnt it in India.

Many Indian soldiers were killed by mines, often 10-15 soldiers in one explosion. The Tiger's network of mines and their success give rise to the seepticism about the number of Indian fatalities, admitted by the IPKF. Jaffna citizens claim that hundreds of Indian soldiers were killed in street battles. The Tigres place mines every where after withdrawing from their position.

Officially 265 Indians are dead but the real number could be three times that. An earlier announcement by sources in the Peace Fore admitted to Afterblad that over 900 were killed.

During the journey from Colombo to Trincomalee and further north towards Jaffna, we passed tens of refugee camps. Both Tamil and Sinhalese refugees have surprisingly undergone the same experiences at the hands of the Indians and both groups hate the Indian soldiers. They also share a common fate – homelessness. The refugees receive only just enough food supplies to keep starvation out and nothing more. The 400,00 refugees in Sri Lanka receive only minimum help. This applies to the Sinhalese refugees from the Eastern areas, also. An estimated 60,000 to 80,000 of the refugees are Sinhalese.

'LTTE has not stood by commitment'

MADRAS, Dec. 22.

The Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, today declared that the Government of India would not allow whatever had been gained for the Tamils in Sri Lanka to be lost.

"We will ensure the rights for the Tamils of Sri Lanka and we will not allow anyone, not any intransigent group or anybody else to take those rights from being granted to the Tamils now", he said.

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi was addressing the Congress (I) workers on the Teynampet grounds. The TNCC (I) president, Mr. M. Palaniyandi and the State Youth Congress president, Mr. A. Jayamohan made a token presentation to him of the over 50 lakh signatures the party volunteers had collected from all over Tamil Nadu in support of the India-Sri Lanka agreement and the IPKF actions in Jaffna.

Towards the end of his 30-minute speech, the Prime Minister referred to the Sri Lankan Tamils issue. He said the agreement went well beyond anything that the Tamils had ever put forward. "It is an agreement which for the first time looked at almost every single problem of the Tamils, found answers to those problems and a guarantee for those answers".

'Best agreement'

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi reiterated the point that before he went to Sri Lanka and signed the agreement, he had talks with every militant group of Tamils from Sri Lanka; he also had talks with the other major groups of the Tamils.

"All of them agreed that it was the best agreement they could have ever imagined and that they would work along with the agreement".

Many of them, he said, raised new points, but "they were not looking back, they were looking forward". They were asking as to what would happen to development, to those who were unemployed or displaced and how would they go back. And, "we found solutions to every single point that was raised".

The Prime Minister asserted that even the LTTE agreed to go along with everything that india had done. It raised three or four new points; these were included and the LTTE got "exactly what it wanted in those points". But, the LTTE had not stood by any of its commitment or promise it had given.

"Today, we find that the LTTE, a small group of Tamils without a base, without a following, is holding all the Tamils in Sri Lanka to ransom, holding the agreement which will benefit all the Tamils of Sri Lanka from not being implemented because of personal ambitions and intransigence", Mr. Rajiv Gandhi said.

The Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, talks to an injured jawan of the Indian Peace Keeping Force at the Military Hospital in St. Thomas Mount, Madras yesterday.

THE HINDU, December 23, 1987

THE ILLUSTRATED WEEKLY OF INDIA

COMMENT

BODY-COUNT

The battle in Jaffna, says O V Vijayan in this unusual point of view, is yet another manifestation of Aryan conquest.

DECEMBER 13, 1987

By the time this gets into print, the Tamil Tigers of Jaffna will have been vanquished, in what history will record as an inglorious and unheroic war of one armoured division against a mere two-and-a-half thousand natives fighting for selfhood. Perhaps theirs was a hysterical nationalism etched in sordid tints, but then all nationalism, denied peaceful expression, turns hysteric; hysteria is what ties together sorrow and passion and denied justice into a bloody whole.

Perhaps, again, history, *our* history, may never record the tragedy and the shame of our army being reduced to the status of mercenaries in somebody else's genocidal war, a war of racial swamping. Because *our* history is the history of the legitimisation and glorification of the Aryan conquest, while the history of the Dravidian is asleep in the quiescent Deccan plateau and the ancient and unrisen Western Ghats. Two thousand five hundred Tamils, misdirected or otherwise, now scatter before 30,000 armoured invaders, to become a residue of consciousness, and spill over into the sullenness of India's own Tamil peninsula.

I cannot help dissociating myself from the current insensitivity that the Indian North has acquired in its understanding of the confrontation. They deal with the strife in terms of complacent references. I have heard some of the most incredible opinions; a retired major of the Indian army who had taken part in the Bangladesh war, commenting on a parallel crisis, once told me that the Bengalis were incapable of looking after their own affairs. The conversation, following the inexorable logic of crudity, ended in an assertion of the superiority of Punjabi dairy farming.

"You know," said the major, "our buffaloes yield more milk."

"I don't doubt it," I assented with the Southerner's deference to the central suzerain.

"You feed your buffaloes grass and hay. We feed ours pulses."

I had no doubt of that either; I was aware, though, that in farms in America and Canada and Australia as well, the fat cows and buffaloes were fed pulses, and that this excess protein was the stuff that imperialism was made of. Not the imperialism against the backdrop of which Lenin interpreted Marxism, but an imperialism of colour, of shades of pigment, and an arrogated superior sexuality.

It is time we recognised that the Tamil, unlike the Maya or the Aztec, has survived into our fragile present carrying with him unspoilt, the resplendent memories of his myth. The cyanide capsule worn round his neck is his talisman of immortality, of his conquest of the fear of death. Such conquest ensures his triumph over the irrelevances of current history, over the transience of petty statehood.

The inconvenience experienced by Punjabi settlers in Britain, people gone to make hedonistic demands on the British welfare state, outraged the North's sense of mercenary nationalism. The Jaffna Tamils are locked in an infinitely more legitimate battle, and yet our North looks on it as an insurgency which 'imperial' India is destined to quell. The Aryan psyche is surfacing from beneath the tawdry frippery of protocol, and taking sides most unjustly in a battle of the races.

As men of the Indian Peace Keeping Force fall in battle, the heartland critic of Rajiv Gandhi indulges in a body-count, and complains bitterly that his kin are being killed by Jaffna's Dravidians. Incidentally, it is curious that he never recalls that in the policing patterns of British India men of lighter skin had always been used to suppress those with darker skins and vice versa, the heartlanders against the peripherals and vice versa.

That was a neat game, but a game of empire. Free India chose to go on with the game while the going was good, and ignore the need to humanise the differences of its peoples. Forty years were spent playing the game; it caused no alarm, as yet it involved no large segments of the population. The game escalated, and the body-count has begun. It augurs well for no one, and still the men in power choose to ignore the fearsome signals of the body-count.

I am no racist, and still believe that it is possible to conceive of the complementarity of racial variance, of the separate perfections in which God made his peoples. I am inspired by this human variety in which there is fulfilment for everyone. If black is beautiful in the United States, it is so in Africa, and so too in the memory-laden Tamil country.

Marauding imperialists, traders and compradores, and pundits of the bourgeoisie, have divided the organic territories of the races and given to this deceit the mask of patriotism. They have enslaved the black people, whether in Africa or in Asia, deprived them of their native nutrients, enfeebled their physiognomies, and undermined their confidence in their beauty and their sexuality.

This is what battle in Jaffna is about; it is a battle soon to be fought on the plains of Aryavarta from where the Indus Valley civilisation was put to flight by the Aryan vandals.

AFFIDAVIT

PATHMANATHAN PARAMESWARY (38) Kalikovil, Mulai, Chulipuram.

The deceased Subramaniam Pathmanathan, aged 37 years was my husband.

He was employed as Carpenter.

On 11.12.87 my husband on hearing the death of his sister who died in a shell blast at Mallakam left home for Mallakam to bring her body to Mulai.

That evening I came to know that my husband was killed when a shell fell and exploded while he was at his sister's house.

Both their bodies were brought to our home at Mulai on the same day.

My husband's body along with his sister's body was cremated at Pithanai Cemetery, Mulai.

I have a six year old daughter.

My child and I have been deprived of the maintenance and support we received from my husband.

THANGESWARY SIVASUNTHARAM, (36) Vigneswara Veethy, Chankani East, Chankani

The deceased Seenior Sivasuntharam aged 40 years was my husband.

He was a Farmer.

On 13.12.87 the army was surrounding our area with a shell barrage.

We left our house and went to the Vigneswara Vidyasala with the intention of taking refuge there.

As we approached the school gate a shell struck the school compund wall and exploded.

My husband was struck by shrapnels and died instantaneously.

His body was cremated at Vilaveli cemetery Chankani on 14.12.87.

My children and I have been deprived of the maintenance and support we received from my husband.

KANTHASAMY SINNAPILLAI (52) C/o. C. Kandasamy, Kalati Lane Kondavil, West, Kondavil.

The deceased Kanthasamy Thillaikumaran, aged 18 years was my son.

He was a Grade. 9 student at Periyapulam Maha Vidyalaya.

On 14.12.87 we were coming from Anikottai towards Thavadi.

At about 11 a.m. shell fell beside my son and exploded injuring him seriously.

I took him to my relative's house at Thavadi.

We could not take him to the hospital due to the tension prevailed at that time.

He died on 17.12.87.

His body was cremated at Thavadi cemetery on 18.12.87.

I have two surviving children.

ARUMAINAYAGAM SIVAPACKIAM (44) widow, Chankanai.

The deceased Muthan Kanapathy, aged 71 years was my father.

The deceased age was wrongly given in the death certificate as 47 instead of his true age 71.

He was a vegetable vendor who supported and maintained our family.

On 15.12.87 our area was pounded by the army with mortar shells.

At about 2.00 P.M. as the shells started to explode in our neighbourhood we fled from our house.

My father opted to stay at home as he could not run fast enough to escape the wrath of the shell fire.

Before I could proceed further I heared an explosion in the direction of our house and ventured back to see.

There I found my father's dead body lying in a pool of blood.

After my husband's death ten years ago it was my late father who supported and maintained our family through his vocation as a vegetable vendor.

I have two children.

KANTHIAH SORNAMMAH (68) 15, K.K.S. Road, Thavadi, Kokuvil.

The deceased person Kasipillai Thangarajah, aged 70 years, a bachelor was my elder brother.

My brother was living with my daughter, Shanmugasundaram Pushpavathy at her residence at Thavadi until he met his death.

During the October, 1987 military offensive, I was residing at Kilinochchi.

I came to Jaffna on 15.12.87 on hearing that my brother was seriously injured, when the Kokuvil Hindu College refugee camp in which he was a refugee was cannon charged by the IPKF on 26.10.87.

The news reached me very late due to the tension prevailed during that period.

I went and saw my brother who was admitted at the Jaffna General Hospital.

On 17.12.87 my brother expired.

The cremation took place at Navali on 18.12.87.

SANGARAPILLAI PARAMESWARY (42) Nelliyan, Chempain Pattu

I am the bereaved wife of Karthigesu Sangarapillai (48) who died on 15.12.87.

He was employed as a post peon who was forced to leave his job due to mental illeness in 1985.

During 1987 he underwent medical treatment at Point Pedro Base Hospital.

In December 1987 my husband went to Puloly and stasyed in a relative's house as it is situated near the Point Pedro Base Hospital where he was being treated for the mental illness as an out-patient.

On 16.12.87 I was informed that my husband was shot and killed by the IPKF at Puloly South when he was went out of the house where he stayed.

On hearing the news I went there and cremated the body at Anaivilunthan cemetery.

RASALINGAM CELESTINE FELICIA (28) Ward 10, Nedunthievu.

The deceased person Kanthiah Rasalingam, (34) was my husband.

My husband was a fisherman.

On 15.12.87 at about 5.00 p.m. my husband left in a boat for fishing.

After I heard several cannon shots from the sea.

My husband did not return afterwards.

I learned that he was shot and killed by the navy while he was in the sea.

His body was not recovered.

I have two daughters.

We are undergoing untold hardships.

PONRAJAH AMMANKILI (38) c/o K. Parimalam, Point Pedro Road, Palaly North, Myliddy.

I am the wife of Selliah Ponrajah (47) who died on 16.12.87.

He was a Fisherman.

On 16.12.87 at about 10.00 P.M. my husband left for fishing in a boat with another person.

On the following day at about 7.00 A.M. the person who accompanied my husband came and informed me that my husband was shot and killed by uniformed men while they were engaged in fishing.

His body was brought home and cremated at Palaly cemetery.

I have four daughters and a son

After the death of my husband who was our sole bread-winner we do not have any income.



MRS. SAROJA SINNETHAMBY, (37) Navatkadu, Varani.

My late husband Sinnethamby while returning home at about 9.00 P.M. in the night on 16.12.87 after attending a ceremony in a relative's house closeby, was fired at by the IPKF patrolling the road.

He received gun shot injuries on the upper right arm and chest below his left-arm pit, the bullet making its exit from the right side.

I walked a few yards and then entered a house where he lay, as he could not walk any further.

He was only taken for medical attention on the following morning to the Manthigai hospital as Indian Forces wouldn't permit the transport of the patient. **Two persons who went to the Indian army camp at Varani to obtain permission for the despatch of the injured to hospital were not only refused permission but were detained at the camp.**

He was warded at Manthigai Govt. Hospital at about 8 A.M. on 17.12.87.

He succumbed to his injuries at the hospital at about 5 A.M. in the morning on 18.12.87.

My husband was the Manager of the M.P.C.S. Stores at Kodikamam and was receipt of a monthly salary of Rs. 1000/-.

Since the death of my husband I and my five depandent children, three of whom are school-going are left with no support or maintenance for our living.

I have no financial resources to fall back upon and may be granted relief and assistance to bring up my children who are young and school going.

MATHAN SELLATHURAI (53) Urelu East, Urelu.

The deceased Sellathurai Sinnammah aged 45 years was my wife

On 17.12.87 at about 12.00 noon we heard gun shots and explosions in our neighbourhood.

Although I remained at home. My wife fled in fear.

Later I went to the nearby Muthumaramman Temple for safety.

At 5.30 p.m I was informed that my wife was shot and killed by the army.

I went to the scene of incident and found her body which bore a single gaping wound caused by a bullet on her back.

Her cremation took place on a nearby field on 18.12.87



MARKANDU KULAKANDU (63) "Ambikaivaram", Myliddy.

The deceased person Markandu Vijayananthan, aged 22 years was my son.

He was a Fisherman.

On 19.12.87 at about 3.00 p.m. my son left for fishing in a boat.

As he did not return home I became highly worried.

Later I was informed that he was shot and killed by the Navy while he was engaged in fishing.

His body was cremated at the Myliddy Cemetery.

I have a daughter Raguneswary (24).

My husband died two months after my son's death due to shock.

I do not have any income.

SENATHIRAJAH NAGAMMAH (72) widow, Kovilady, Chulipuram.

The deceased person Senathirajah Thiagarajah aged 51 years was my son (Bachelor).

He was a Businessman.

On 19.12.1987 at about 6.00 a.m. my son left home saying that he is going to Pandaterrippu market to purchase food provisions.

At about 7.0ı a.m. I was informed that my son was killed in a shell blast while he was on his way to Pandaterrippu market.

On hearing the news my nephew Apputhurai Subramaniam rushed to the scene of incident and brought my son's body to our house in a bullock cart.

The cremation took place on 18.12.87 at Thiruvadinilayam Hindu Cemetery.

My late son was my only child and after his death I do not have any income or support.

MURUGESAPILLAI RASALINGAM (62) Iyahar Kovil Veethy, Sandilipay.

The deceased Rasalingam Sritharan, aged 19 years was my son.

He was engaged in selling cinnamon at the time of his death.

On 20.12.87 around 10.30 A.M. when my deceased son R. Sritharan was returning home from the Co-operative stores after purchasing provision was shot dead by IPKF personnel who were lying in ambush near Sandilipay junction.

The dead body of my son was cremated at Vilaveli cemetery the same day at 4.30 P.M.

He sustained severe bullet injuries on both his thighs.






YOU TOO INDIA?

.....

நடுத்தெருவில் சுட்டெரித்து
நாய்கள் நிணம் புசிக்கச்
செம்மணியில் வீசுதற்கா
திருமலையில் தொட்டிலிட்டு
உன்னை சமமகள்
பெற்றெடுத்தாள்?

காலனது காலடிகள்
காற்றதிரப் பதிவதற்கா
காலமகள் நீரெடுத்துக்
கோலமிட்டாள் மணற்பரப்பில்?

நெற்கதிரே,
நீள்விசும்பே,
நெஞ்சு இரங்காச் சூரியனே,
புல்லின் இதழ் நுனியில்
பூத்திருக்கும் பனித்துளியே

நீங்கள் அறிவீர்களா
எம் நெஞ்சுறையும் சோகத்தை?
எம் செந்நீரின் சரித்திரங்கள்
திசை எங்கும் சேதி சொல்ல
காற்றில் கலந்துவிட்ட
சாம்பல் துகள்களிலே
பயணம் தொடர்ந்த கதை
யார்தான் அறியவில்லை.....?

.....

.....

புழுதி பறந்த வீதிகள் எங்கும்
குருதி தோய்ந்து புலையின் சுவடுகள்

.....

இன்னும் காற்றிலேறிய அந்தப்
படபடப்பும் பதகளிப்பும் அடங்கவேயில்லை.

எழும்பிய அவலக்குரல்களின் எதிரொலி
காற்றிலேறிக் கலந்தெங்கும்
ஏன்? ஏன்? இக்கொடுமை என்றறைகிறதே!

SRI LANKA CONFLICT

WHO IS TO BLAME?



T-72 tanks on the move towards the airport in Madras for being air-lifted to Sri Lanka

COMMENT

"In an intra-state conflict, it is worth repeating that force and counterforce, violence and counter-violence, do tend to exacerbate and prolong conflicts rather than to reduce them, and that military action in support of law enforcement, even of a purely policing nature, stiffens rather than overcomes resistance It certainly does not remove the structural causes, the roots of the conflict, which remain and are nurtured for a later day when history will repeat itself."

— JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

THE above remark of independent India's first prime minister was made in the context of the involvement of the United Nations in the Korean war (1950-53), caused by North Korea' attack on the South. India did not participate in the UN peace-keeping operations then, as Nehru thought—"it is extraordinary that we should seek to help our friends in ways which kill or destroy them....We should look to our own actions and learn again the ancient lesson that wrongdoing cannot be countered by further wrongdoing." But Nehru's wisdom has been ignored by his grandson. In fact, by signing the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement on July 29, Rajiv Gandhi created history whereby, for the first time in diplomatic

practice, one Third World country has invited the armed forces of another to diffuse its internal turmoil. And now, the Indian peace-keeping force (IPKF) is encountering in Sri Lanka the island's minority Tamil extremists, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who have been fighting to carve out a separate and independent Tamil state (Eelam).

When the agreement was signed, it was thought to be the only achievement of the Indian prime minister in 1987 that bore the stamp of statesmanship. Barring a few opposition leaders from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and some anti-Establishment academicians, most people in the country hailed the accord as "timely" and "just" and felt that it would go a long way in establishing a durable peace in Sri Lanka. Even usual Gandhi-baiters like Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister N.T. Rama Rao, Karnataka Chief Minister R.K. Hegde and Lok Dal(A) General Secretary Subramaniam Swamy congratulated Gandhi on his having persuaded the Jayawardene regime in Sri Lanka to see reason and yield to the long warranted but genuine demands of the Tamils in that country. It was also thought that Indian primacy in the South Asian region had been firmly established, for India extracted from Sri Lanka the "unimaginable" concession that the latter would never have any alliance or special relationship with any international power if New Delhi disapproved.

The euphoria, however, has not lasted long. The accord has fallen far short of expectations and its admirers have now turned critics. Says Lt-General J.S. Aurora, MP, who had successfully commanded the Indian operation in Bangladesh in 1971: "It is not that our decision to send forces to Sri Lanka was wrong. But, subsequently, the Indian government handled the situation miserably. As a result, the IPKF rather than the Sri Lankan army is facing the brunt of the Tamil, terrorists for whose cause the Indian forces have gone to Sri Lanka." There is much to what the General says. For, despite the Indian government's endeavour to suppress the exact number of casualties among the Indian soldiers—who for the first time, have been placed under the control of a foreign government on foreign soil—the figure, going by the reports of Western journalists visiting Jaffna, has already exceeded 1,000, though Indian newsmen put it at only 300.

According to reliable sources, more than two Indian divisions, comprising 30,000 troops, backed by tanks, personnel carriers, fieldguns and commandos, are engaged in Sri Lanka. The Indian Air Force is using its transport fleet not only within Sri Lanka but also between that country and India for giving support to the ground forces. Similarly, there are at least two Leader-class Indian frigates in the Palk Straits, besides other small naval boats. The estimated cost of the operations in Sri Lanka, says A.P. Venkateswaran, the former foreign secretary, is nearly Rs 3 crore a day, all of it coming from the Indian exchequer. "This additional expenditure to our already inflated defence budget will soon have very bad repercussions on our ailing economy, especially given the severe drought in the country," Venkateswaran warns. However, points out Gen Aurora, "when a country fights a war, money ceases to be a factor. More important are the country's stakes—and this is where I visualise a gloomy picture, for we are in a no-win situation in Sri Lanka."

Gen Aurora feels it will be very difficult to eliminate or silence the LTTE cadres, who are adept at guerilla warfare. "The main problem in such wars is the fact that you can never differentiate between the friends and the foes," he says. Indeed, the LTTE does have a strong base amongst the local populace. And recent events make it clear that the Tigers' dangerous antics in the Jaffna peninsula are aimed at regaining the emotional support of the Tamils and pressuring India into conceding to them a monopoly in the island's Tamil areas.

INDIA is now in a precarious position. If it gives in to the pressures of the LTTE and its leader, Prabhakaran, the entire accord with President Jayawardene will be jeopardised and Sri Lanka's Sinhalese majority alienated. However, if India continues its present tough stand against the LTTE, "our whole purpose of going to Sri Lanka will be defeated," says Aurora. "Let us not forget that India's future strategic interests in the island can only be served if the Tamils there remain friendly to us." All this raises the question, at least from New Delhi's point of view, whether anything could have been more damaging than stationing Indian troops in Sri Lanka. And here the critics challenge the very wisdom of India having signed the accord with Sri Lanka.

"It was an instant accord, devoid of any serious thinking and discussion behind it. In fact, the swiftness with which it was concluded seemed to be a Sai Baba miracle. No wonder the accord has now become a discord," remarks Justice Krishna Ayiar, the former judge of the Supreme Court who unsuccessfully contested the presidential election this year. As a result, he adds, "it takes more than transcendental meditation to understand what this so-called accord is all about." Says a highly pessimistic Venkateswaran: "It is a monstrous hope that the accord will work." Congress(S) leader K.P. Unnikrishnan goes a step further. "The accord was a non-starter even before the ink dried on the paper on which it was signed," he avers.

Such harsh comments may be highly exaggerated. But the fact remains that from the very beginning, the accord had a serious flaw: It was signed between the governments of India and Sri Lanka only, and left out the most important party to the whole dispute: the LTTE. "It should have been a trilateral agreement," says Urmila Phadnis of Delhi's Jawaharlal Nehru University India's best-known expert on Sri Lanka. "But knowing as well as realising the intricacies of international politics, I will not blame the Indian government for this," she adds, giving three reasons for her point of view.

First, she says, India increasingly realised that "the LTTE was becoming too big for its boots," in the sense that its leadership was demanding something which could never be accepted—because an independent Eelam off our southern coast would have hampered rather than promoted Indian strategic interests, "for, another small neighbour could be easily vulnerable to the great powers' pressure, as in the case of Bangladesh." Secondly, partition of Sri Lanka with New Delhi's connivance would have given India a bad image and affected its nonaligned status, particularly when "we have never had any serious adversary relations with this neighbour." In this context, the parallel with the Bangladesh situation in 1971, which many in this country cite, is not valid, for there is a fundamental difference between the two situations. In 1971, India did not play any mediatory role in Bangladesh, then a part of Pakistan. It clearly sided with the "Mukti Bahini," fought the Pakistani forces alongside it, and won.

Finally, according to Prof Phadnis, knowing Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran's close proximity to the LTTE cadres in general and Prabhakaran in particular, Rajiv Gandhi must have counted on MGR influencing the Tamil extremists in favour of the accord. That is why MGR was taken into compelete confidence by the prime minister at every step prior to the finalisation of the accord. This ensured the

BE that as it may, the LTTE did not completely reject the accord, despite having many reservations about it. Nearly two months passed before its stand toughened till, eventually, the extremists openly defied and attacked the IPKF. "For this unfortunate state of affairs, the Indian government is squarely responsible," asserts Venkateswaran. He cites three developments which made the LTTE back out of the accord. First, he says, the IPKF, which was supposed to play an impartial role, took clear sides in favour of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation and the People's Liberation of Tamil Eelam, the two main rivals of the LTTE. It is alleged that the IPKF was not seizing arms from them while insisting rigidly on surrender of arms by the LTTE. Even in the subsequent fratricide among these extremist organisations, the LTTE was said to have been roughly handled by the IPKF. "This was highly partisan," says Venkateswaran.

Secondly, in Batticoloa district of the eastern province, the Sri Lankan government, according to the LTTE, started Sinhalese "colonisation" so that, in the proposed referendum to determine whether both the eastern and northern provinces would merge —in accordance with the provisions of the accord—there would be a Sinhalese majority to outvote the local Tamils. Thus, the most important goal of the Tamils, the merger of the two provinces, would have been eluded. Naturally, the LTTE protested against this.

In the process, some Sinhalese were also killed. "The IPKF should have understood the circumstances. But it did not. Instead, it arrested LTTE members and thus got alienated from the organisation," points out the former foreign secretary. In fact, he reveals, the Sri Lankan government retreated from its earlier position that the Sinhalese-majority Ampari district would not be a part of the united province. "By this step, Jayawardene more or less ensured that there would be no merger, as with Ampari being a part (of the referendum), the Tamils would not get the required majority in the eastern province to carry through the merger demand. Venkateswaran finds it surprising how the Indian government remained silent on this important issue. "This naturally fuelled the LTTE anger," he says.

The flashpoint, according to Venkateswaran, was reached on October 3, when 17 LTTE personnel were detained by the Sri Lankan navy off point Pedro. The Sri Lankan government wanted them to be brought to Colombo for trial, ignoring the IPKF's protests. Strangely, New Delhi instructed the IPKF to allow the transfer, with the result that the 17 men swallowed cyanide capsules and 12 of them died. "This inexplicable folly on the part of the Indian government led to a surge of anger among the LTTE cadres which no Prabhakaran could control," says Venkateswaran. However, Justice Krishna Iyer thinks that the situation would not have gone out of control had the wording of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord been chosen carefully. According to him, at least on two areas, there should not have been any ambiguities whatsoever. Rajiv Gandhi should have obtained a categorical assurance from Jayawardene about the merger of the two provinces, and there should have been absolute clarity on the extent of the devolution of constitutional power—legislative, executive and judiciary—to the proposed united province.

True, the accord did mention certain provisions in this regard, but the wording was so vague that now, even moderate Tamil groups like the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) find the Bill on the devolution of power passed recently in the Sri Lankan parliament highly inadequate. There are at least three provisions in the Bill that do not come up to the expectations of TULF. The first is a clause which envisages that every provincial council will have a "board of ministers" whose strength will not exceed five members, including the chief minister. The second is a provision which leaves the question of land settlements with the central government rather than the provincial one. And the third—which is the most important from the point of view of the Tamils—is the article on the merger.

According to the Article 37 of the Bill, the Sri Lankan president may, "by a proclamation," bring about the merger of any two provinces, provided the people of these provinces approve of it within a year. But in the case of the northern and eastern provinces, it is stipulated that the president cannot exercise this power unless there is complete cessation of conflict—which, in other words, means complete disarmament of the Tamil extremists.

CREDIT must be given to the drafting skill of Jayawardene. For nowhere does the Bill contain anything that can be said to be against the provisions of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord. "India cannot accuse the president of blocking the path of the merger of the eastern and northern provinces—for Jayawardene can easily counter by asking Gandhi to disarm the LTTE so that he can issue the notification of the merger," says Prof Phadnis. And here lies the problem: How to bring about the disarmament?

All the Indian parties, including MGR's All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, have urged the government to order a ceasefire in Sri Lanka for at least 48 hours to give the LTTE time to surrender. Even a Congress(I) MP (who wishes not to be identified) says: "A ceasefire would demonstrate to the world that India dispenses justice tempered with mercy." Adds Venkateswaran: "Nothing is lost by enabling an adversary to save face. In fact, if provided an opportunity to return to the path of reason, it is quite likely that the LTTE would grasp the chance offered to it."

The Indian government, however, is not in favour of such a course of action unless some conditions are met by the LTTE. Asserts K. Natwar Singh, minister of state for external affairs: "There should be no difficulty about ordering a ceasefire if India receives a clear understanding that the LTTE is for the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement of July 29, and that its cadres will lay down their arms and join in implementing the agreement." This rigidity in the Indian stand, sources say, is because of the fact that the anti-LTTE Tamil groups are happy about the present state of affairs, and are even helping the IPKF in "cleaning up" the Jaffna peninsula.

Meanwhile, fresh apprehensions have cropped up regarding the sincerity of Jayawardene in bringing about an enduring peace in Sri Lanka. Alleges Venkateswaran: "Jayawardene invited the Indian force not to implement the accord but to save his life as well as his government, which was facing an imminent coup by the Sri Lankan army and some rightist elements." Both Venkateswaran and Gen Aurora apprehend that "once Jayawardene feels safe—which is a matter of, at best, three months—he will ask the Indian troops to withdraw. And if by that time the LTTE is disarmed, it will be much easier for his government to unleash again a reign of terror on the Tamils."

However, such a scenario, according to defence ministry sources, is too farfetched. Says a high official: "If one goes by the logic that Jayawardene is facing a rebellion, then it is all the more reason why he should want the IPKF to stay longer. Therefore, I do not see any possibility of an early homecoming for our boys. They will be there till their noble mission is accomplished." In fact, both the ministries of defence and external affairs consider Jayawardene to be quite sincere—particularly after his latest offer of a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation with India.

Once such a treaty comes into force, both the nations will be committed to the present arrangement, which has taken into consideration the security interests of both the countries. And the continuance of the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka is certainly not conducive to India's security. What is more important, the treaty will remain valid for a particular period, irrespective of which party is in power in either country. Besides, considering the mutual suspicion between the people of both the countries, a treaty seems to be a sound proposition. But then, so did the Indo-Sri Lankan accord when it was first announced.

—PRAKASH NANDA

PROBE INDIA/DECEMBER '87



Chandu,The Hindustan Times, 23.12.87

COMMNT

INDIA'S LORDLY AMATEURS

After Backing The Wrong Horse

SWAPAN DASGUPTA

DECEMBER 12

THE maverick Forward Bloc leader, Mr Bhakti Bhusan Mandal, may be forgiven his inability to comprehend the fuss being made over the fact that he unveiled a portrait of the LTTE leader, Mr V. Pirabhakaran, and suggested that India should negotiate with the Tigers. An impressionable man whose earlier gaffes on China are legendary, Mr Mandal was undoubtedly swayed by the revelation that Mr Pirabhakaran hero-worshipped the founder of the Forward Bloc, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, a fact which Mr Krishnakumar "Kittu"—now in charge of the LTTE's Indira Nagar office in Madras—highlighted when rejecting New Delhi's pathetic attempt to buy over the Tigers' rank and file.

But Mr Mandal may not be the only person to be genuinely puzzled as to how a self-confessed follower of Netaji and someone who was virtually a state guest of the Central Government and of Mr M. G. Ramachandran can now be regarded as a national enemy. Ordinary people—and not merely in Tamil Nadu—may also be forgiven for their total bewilderment as to what exactly is going on in Sri Lanka and why more than 300 Indian soldiers have died in a battle against those very people on whose behalf the Government roused chauvinistic passions for the last four years.

COMPLEX

Admittedly, the matter has become more complex since responsible Ministers such as Mr P. Chidambaram are claiming that the IPKF is doing a "humanitarian service" across the Palk Straits and when it is realized that a head of state who compared Mr Rajiv Gandhi to Hitler a few months ago is now going to be honoured as the chief guest during the Republic Day celebrations in New Delhi. And, as if this were not enough, the Defence Minister, Mr K. C. Pant, had the temerity to tell the All-India News Editors Conference that India has "no desire to hurt" the LTTE or the Tamil people whose interests are "dear to our heart".

In a sense, the Government's past sins of disinformation have finally caught up with them. On November 22, the spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry declared self-righteously that 'Mr Pirabhakaran's assertion that the LTTE laid down a majority of its arms is not only astonishing, but a blatant falsehood. The fact is that the LTTE only laid down a small proportion of its arms". If South Block had a system of cross-checking, it would have realized that it was, in effect, calling the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo a liar. For Mr Pirabhakaran was merely repeating what Mr J. N. Dixit had stated publicly in September to the effect that the IPKF had recovered 70 per cent of the weapons of the Tamil militants.

Not that the Government is in any way apologetic about its disinformation. The Press, which often claims to be the "real Opposition" or at least a corrective, has no reason to be proud of its own dismal record of backing the Tamil Nadu Government when it showered a largesse of four crores of rupees on the LTTE-EROS combine after the brutal Colombo and Trincomalee massacres (nearly 300 people killed) in April, and for informing those who advised greater circumspection that "True, the Sinhalese may be angry but we have elected Rajiv Gandhi to protect and preserve the interests of the Tamils and Indians". As for the Opposition parties who now call the present Lanka policy an unmitigated disaster, let it not be forgotten that it is they who recommended greater "firmness" by New Delhi, including, direct intervention.

Actually, there is little point raking up such uncomfortable evidence of political ineptitude for the truth is that the country bears a collective responsibility for allowing its foreign policy to be determined by a motley collection of—to use one of Harold Wilson's phrases—lordly amateurs.

In his very revealing autobiography, Asok Mitra, the distinguished civil servant, admits that few Indians "properly appraised" the "cataclysmic developments in Europe" in the 1930s: "When the civil war broke out in Spain in July 1936, I was astonished how many of our leaders found themselves in a quandary with misplaced sympathies and were at a loss to perceive that it was the first stage rehearsal of an impending tragic drama". I cite Mr Mitra's account because blind prejudice may lead far too many people to dismiss Nirad C. Chaudhuri's disturbing account of the extent of closet Fascism in Bengal during World War II.

It was this lordly amateurism that prompted Netaji to suggest an ideological synthesis of Communism and Fascism and, later, attempt to ride piggyback on Hitler and Tojo to Independence. And, if the Indian Left imagines that its monopoly of the "correct line" is intact, it may be recalled that it took only a letter from Harry Pollit in 1941 for the slogan of "imper-

ialist war" to be transformed into a specious "people's war" with unfortunate consequences

Actually, had it not been for Jawaharlal Nehru—one of the only leaders with a sense of history and an international perspective—it is likely that post-Independence foreign policy would have been variants of those pursued by neighbouring lordly amateurs like Sir John Kotelawala and Field Marshal Ayub Khan. But even then, Nehru was always the butt of ridicule, and Sardar Patel's quip, "Indonesia? Ah, Indonesia! Where is it now? Ask Jawaharlal" was fairly indicative of the general impatience with happenings foreign.

Even when the political leadership manages to muster up sufficient concern over happenings outside our borders, as on South Africa it ends up reaching highly simplistic conclusions The manner in which Mr Rajiv Gandhi has reduced the complexities of a protracted war against apartheid to the catch phrase "mandatory economic sanctions" is bewildering.

The Sri Lankan Trotskyist leader, Dr Colvin De Silva, often recounts the occasions when he advised successive UNP and SLFP Governments to resolve the Tamil issue so long as Nehru ruled in New Delhi. "After him you may not be so lucky". It would seem that Dr De Silva miscued somewhere. For, while Jawaharlal Nehru was deeply aware of the ethnic strains in Ceylon, he also realized that its resolution lay within the island. In 1939, at the idyllic hill resort of Nuwara Eliya he advised Mr S. Thondaman that the "Indian" Tamils should not look to India to safeguard their interests, their future lay in their ability to organize themselves and struggle within the local society.

Unfortunately, the logic of this deliberate detachment was failed when Colombo wantonly deprived Indian" Tamils of their rights, whereupon Lal Bahadur Shastri agreed to their selective repatriation in 1964. The damage this singularly shortsighted acquiescence did to the future of ethnic amity in Sri Lanka is incalculable. Mrs Indira Gandhi added a new twist after the creation of Bangladesh. The notion of India as the dominant regional power is, in itself, a practical recognition of reality, but what is repugnant is its bam-handed manifestation and application Both make a mockery of enlightened self-interest.

Arguably, there was some justification for Indian anxiety after the horrible butchery of Tamils in Colombo in the summer of 1983 and for putting pressure on President Jayewardene to concede a measure of regional autonomy to the Tamils in the Northern and Eastern provinces. But it violated all the accepted norms of international conduct when New Delhi deliberately encouraged the reckless Tamil militants to destabilize the Government in Colombo in order to secure a decisive say in the future of Trincomalee harbour. It is not that New Delhi and the others were unaware of Mr Pirabhakaran's perverted ideology, but they supported it because of wider geopolitical imperatives. Equally deplorable were the double standards applied to sustain an untenable demand for the merger of the two "home land" provinces.

Perhaps Mr Gandhi really imagined that the LTTE was a pliant instrument of Indian foreign policy or else he was incapable of grasping the implications of Mr Pirabhakaran's deliberate sabotage of every Indian diplomatic initiative since the Thimphu talks of 1985. Either way, India's strategic interests were pursued on the basis of the improbable assumption that Tamils are the only community in Sri Lanka that matters to us and that the Sinhalese count for very little.

It is one of the most glaring instances of diplomatic ineptness that Mr Dixit met the Sri Lankan Prime Minister, Mr R. Premadasa, after a lapse of 16 months. Some of Mr Premdasa's views may be unpalatable, but the fact is that he does represent an important political strand which we can ignore at our own peril. And, we do not need Mr Premadasa to tell us that IPKF is an unwelcome guest in Sri Lanka

DILEMMA

India's dilemma is that it is getting more and more entangled in the mess in Sri Lanka with little immediate hope of getting out. The much-publicised strategic imperatives appear to have blinded the political leadership to the increasing hostility of Tamils to an army of occupation and the fictitious accounts of a relieved Jaffna populace carry about as much conviction as Henry Cabot Lodge's description of Vietnamese peasants under American occupation being "laughing and happy people enjoying bananas"

The significance of Mr Krishankumar 'Kittu's" claim that 2,000 civilians died and 500 women were raped in the course of the IPKF operations is that it is widely believed in the Jaffna peninsula as is Mr Mahattiya's cheeky, "How can those people who were buying electrical goods and TV sets in Jaffna have the same courage as we have?"

Equally disturbing are suggestions that the Indian military command has overruled the Prime Minister on a number of occasions and let it be known that they are in Sri Lanka to stay. If true, this points to a very dangerous precedent although it is probably premature to read any meaning beyond that at present. In any case, a prolonged stay in Sri Lanka will only destroy a certain national consensus about the armed forces and make it an object of domestic partisan politics On both counts, the developments are unhealthy.

However, some positive by-products of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord and India's military intervention are the belated realization that Eelam is inimical to both Indian and Sri Lankan interests and that there can be no realistic meeting ground between national interest and Tamil interests. This awareness is crucial if the IPKF is to take the first tentative steps towards disengagement and allow President Jayewardene to fight his proxy war directly, albeit with the usual friendly assistance.

But for that to happen the implicit intellectual dishonesty of our policy-makers has to be abandoned and the political leadership must be prepared to admit that befitting the heritage of lordly amateurs, we backed the wrong side for four years.

The Telegraph

COMMENT

Ashok Mitra

Whynot a regional initiative for Lanka?

16 DECEMBER

In the United Nations General Assembly, the delegate of India could not agree more with the representative of Cuba: there ought to be a regional solution to the problem of Nicaragua, let the neighbouring half-a-dozen countries or thereabouts put their heads together and something satisfactory is bound to emerge. Nice, sensible point of view, many would say, nicely, sensibly expressed. But, then, what is sauce for Central American goose should also be sauce for South Asian gander. If the Nicaraguan issue is proposed to be remitted to the neighbouring nations in Central America, why cannot a similar solution be sought for the mess in Sri Lanka?

There is intense uneasiness in the country over the manner the situation in Sri Lanka has been allowed to develop; a euphoria has been transformed, swiftly, into a trauma. It is however matched by a reluctance on the part of political parties to discuss the problem openly. This is partly because few want to admit in public that they had committed a mistake in initially supporting the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement. There are also those who regard it wrong to express their misgivings in explicit language lest this compromises our troops in Sri Lanka. They are, after all, our troops; it is a matter of concern that they have been made to suffer on account of the wrong calculations of their political masters; why add to their misery by saying things which could further complicate matters.

But silence, whether rooted in embarrassment or otherwise, will not make the Sri Lanka problem disappear. Facts, uncomfortable facts, will continue to stare us in the face. It is necessary for the sake of ensuring the nation's long run interests that these facts are listed *seriatim*.

(a) As of this moment, Indian troops in Sri Lanka exceed 35,000 in number, roughly two and a half times the size of the Sri Lankan army. President Jayewardene has thrown a hint a few days ago that he expects this number to go up.

(b) While the Indian troops are in the island ostensibly to enforce the provisions of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, President Jayewardene has not ruled out the possibility of their being used should an insurgency take place in the southern parts of the island: he would for the present only say that the matter has to be discussed further with the Indian authorities.

(c) There is some confusion over the line of authority in regard to these expatriate divisions of the Indian Army. President Jayewardene claims that they are to follow his orders; Major General Harkirat Singh, the officer in overall command, has not the least doubt that he takes his orders from the Government of India.

(d) The Indo-Sri Lanka agreement was signed between the governments of the two countries, and the Government of India took it upon itself to persuade the Sri Lanka Tamils to fall in. Since Indian civil authorities failed to persuade the Tamils to see the virtues of the agreement, Indian troops were ordered to do the needful. Basically, the Indian Army's role has been perceived as terrorising the Tamils into submission.

(e) The Tamils, whether belonging to the LTTE or of other hues, have strong reasons for opposing the agreement, for it does not satisfy either of their two main demands. The unification of the northern and eastern provinces, which the Tamils have been clamouring for, is subject to ratification through a referendum proposed to be held next year. The interim joint administration for the two provinces, proposed in the agreement, is just that. And the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka has gone on record: as long as he is in government, he will see to it that the unification never takes place. Referendum or no referendum, it is open to question whether President Jayewardene's private commitment on the point can be taken at its face value. After all, despite Mr Premadasa's open declaration, he has not been removed from office by the President: the Prime Minister is much too powerful to be removed.

(f) The second principal issue of concern to the Tamils is the nature and extent of the proposed devolution of powers and responsibilities to the provinces The agreement is silent on the details of this most crucial issue, and the discussions between Indian and Sri Lankan officials, subsequent to the signing of the agreement, have been most unsatisfactory from the Tamil point of view. Even according to the most moderate among the various Tamil outfits—the Tamil United Liberation Front—the concessions offered till now by President Jayewardene falls woefully short of their minimum expectations. Launching a full-scale military expedition against the Tamils so as to force them to conform to the terms of the agreement was thus perilously close to the act of a bully. And to suggest at this stage that the LTTE does not represent the majority of the Sri Lanka Tamils is to contradict all that the Government of India has said and done for the past few years, including as recently as in the first week of October last.

(g) Not only that the Tamils do not like the agreement, it is hated, in nearly equal measure, by the Sinhalese too. The leading opposition formation in the island, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, is dead against it. The far-out Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna is opposing it with cocktail bombs and incendiary raids. President Jayewardene's United National Party is itself split down the middle on the issue of supporting the agreement. True, Prime Minister Premadasa and his friends did not vote it down in Parliament. But that is because it is tactically important for them not to effect a formal division in the party at this juncture; they are simply biding their time. Only the Communist Party and the Trotskyite Sama Samaj Party have other views. Their point of view is understandable. As political parties which devoutly believe in Sinhalese-Tamil amity as providing the abiding basis for working class solidarity, they welcomed the agreement since they thought it would pave the way to peace. In view of later developments, they too must be having second and third thoughts.

(h) At the scale guerilla warfare is raging in the northern and eastern parts of the island, other things remaining the same, the Indian Army will have to dig its heels in Sri Lanka, maybe for years, and an additional yearly burden on the Indian exchequer to the extent of around Rs 2,000 crores would appear to be a rather modest estimate. This is not going to be the end of the story either. India will be called upon to help Sri Lanka's economic reconstruction too. Funds needed for the purpose

are currently placed at close to Rs 1,000 crores, but the estimate is likely to go up. With the island continuing to be unquiet, there is little prospect either of early resumption of normal production or of tourist income and exports picking up once more. Sri Lanka is condemned to remain a typical "breadbasket" case for years to come.

(i) For, despite doctored communique daily issued from New Delhi, it does not seem that such heavy involvement on India's part—military, financial and otherwise—is going to see the end of the LTTE defiance. The situation as currently developing is much worse than in Punjab. Arrests and killings only alienate those who effect the arrests or do the killings, and not friends and supporters of those who are killed or arrested. The fact that India's moral case in and around Jaffna is weak, if not non-existent, does not help.

(j) When the Indian Prime Minister signed the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement, he counted heavily on the support extended—or expected to be extended—to him by two gentlemen fairly advanced in years. The first of these individuals, President Jayewardene, is eighty two, and is ruling by emergency decrees. Given the reverberations of discontent within his party and the open hostility of major opposition groups, once he passes on, the prospects are of total confusion in Sri Lanka, and there will be few left on the Sinhalese side to do battle on behalf of the agreement. The Indian Army will then either have to withdraw in ignominy or decide to try to take charge of the entire island. This is not Sunday evening rubber bridge. The domestic implications of the first alternative, and the international ones on the second, are mind boggling.

(k) The second person on whose support New Delhi is heavily banking on is M.G. Ramachandran. No hurt is intended to anyone's sentiment, it is however generally well known that the Tamil Nadu chief minister is living on borrowed kidneys. His party too is sharply divided over the merits of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement, even as, across the political barricade, a much encouraged DMK has begun to flex its muscles. It is a dicey situation. Should M.G. Ramachandran cease to be the chief minister, events could well take an explosive turn in the state. As Tamil casualties rise in Jaffna and Batticaloa following intensified Indian Army action, things can be expected to take a turn for the worse in Tamil Nadu; the presence in the state of more than one hundred thousand Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka will be an aggravating factor.

(l) Those suggesting that, whatever the difficulties, India had no choice but to intervene in Sri Lanka, since both the LTTE and the JVP have been infiltrated by the Central Intelligence Agency and, had we not gone in, President Jayewardene would have been forced to invite the Pakistani troops in, are perhaps barking up the wrong tree. The CIA is of course a great believer in fishing in troubled waters. But why must we ignore certain other signals? About the most vociferous support for the India-Sri Lanka agreement has come from the US administration, and the Government of Pakistan has not made a squeak despite the landing of Indian troops in Sri Lanka.

(m) A final point. Whatever its other unsavoury implications, some patriots would still support the *putsch* in Sri Lanka since it would, they think, stop the Voice of America from broadcasting from the island and prevent the US navy from entering Trincomalee. This is counting the chickens before they are hatched; we do not yet know what will lead to where in Sri Lanka.

Barring one or two odd ones, each of us love our country. Each of us are full of admiration for our troops who are these days being increasingly called upon to retrieve situations which develop because of errors on the part of ruling politicians. It is also awkward to run down an international agreement which the country's Prime Minister, however ill-advised, has already signed. But, as much as in a nation's internal affairs as in its international relations, pragmatism has to have the last word. Even those who swear by ideology will see the point. Occasionally, it is important to sign treaties; occasionally, it is equally important to break away from them. It is little use repeating *ad nauseum* the banality that the Indo-Sri Lanka treaty has to be enforced. It is unenforceable. President Jayewardene cannot enforce it at his end. He has passed a few constitutional amendments, but he will find it impossible to implement decisions which could even minimally satisfy the Tamils; any attempt to do so will make a cauldron of the entire south in Sri Lanka. At the other end, the Indian Prime Minister can continue to inject more and more troops in the island; in the process he may gift himself a graveyard, but he cannot win Tamil acquiescence, history has moved much too fast of late for that to happen.

To argue that Velupillai Pirabhakaran is a fascist, or that none can run away from a personal commitment made to the Prime Minister of a great country such as India and not be made to pay for it, is therefore neither here nor there. By pursuing a course of obstinacy in Sri Lanka, the rulers in New Delhi will not win their objectives; it will only multiply misery, and, in the bargain, run the risk of destabilising our own polity, that is, destabilise it even beyond the stage already reached because of the assorted misadventures of the past few years.

A pertinent question to raise is over the modality of disengagement from Sri Lanka. It is in this context that one comes to think of the Nicaragua analogy. By turning partisans, we have destroyed our role as mediators in Sri Lanka. If we see nothing wrong in the Condatura countries taking the lead in solving the crisis of Nicaragua, we should not now cavil at the suggestion that peace negotiations be resumed in Sri Lanka, and this time under the auspices of, let us say, the SAARC organisation. We should also agree to gradually withdraw our "peacekeeping" troops and have them supplanted by a joint contingent put up by all the SAARC countries. This will mean that, in the composite force, along with the Bangladeshis and the Nepalis, the Pakistanis too will be there. It will be a great blow to our *amour propre*, but the diffusion of the hatred toward India and Indians is more important than salvaging a Prime Minister's ego. And as far as Sri Lanka Tamils are concerned, the harm the presence of Pakistani troops can do to their interests is unlikely to exceed the harm already done by the Government of India.

The Tamils whether belonging to LTTE or other hues, have strong reasons for opposing the agreement.

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The Indian primeminister can continue to inject more and more troops in the island; in the process he may gift himself a graveyard, but he cannot win Tamil acquiescence, history has moved much too fast of late for that to happen.

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THE INDEPENDENT

Thursday 31 December 1987

Tamils hold protest strike in Batticaloa

TAMIL groups organised a *hartal*, or general strike, in the eastern town of Batticaloa yesterday in protest at Sri Lankan police allegedly killing nearly 30 Tamil civilians there last weekend.

Reports reaching Colombo indicated that the *hartal* was observed by almost all of Batticaloa's 100,000 population. The town has also been the centre of considerable tension between the Tamil Tigers and the Indian peacekeeping force (IPKF).

Last Sunday's killings followed a Tamil Tiger attack on three policemen in Batticaloa market. Afterwards, according to eyewitnesses, police fired at random at people in the market in revenge for the attack. A moderate Tamil politician in Batticaloa, who did not want to be named, said the town was still tense and that people were afraid to go out.

From Bruce Palling
in Colombo

He said: "The *hartal* was very, very effective. No vehicles moved on the streets and all the shops remained closed." He added that the Indian High Commisioner to Sri Lanka, Mani Dixit, met community leaders yesterday to discuss the security situation in the town. "He told us he wanted to know what took place in the market, but I think he is just trying to cover up," the politician said.

Yesterdays *hartal* was organised by the Citizens' Committee, a Tamil human rights organisation, and the Mothers' Front, a Tamil women's group which monitors alleged human rights violations by the government.

The Indian High Commission denied government claims that last weekend's market shooting was a joint operation between the security forces and the IPKF. Despite claims from New Delhi that the Tigers can no longer muster any significant force in the country, a western correspondent who recently returned from Batticaloa said the Tigers regularly walk around with their weapons less than a mile from IPKF bases.

The Indian forces are loathe to travel on the main road north of Batticaloa as it has been heavily mined by the Tigers. Last year, the Tigers frequently called *hartals* in Batticaloa by simply exploding three hand grenades in quick succession at dawn in the centre of town. However, they are not thought to have been directly involved in organising the current strike.

The majority of Batticaloa district is of Tamil origin but there is a sizeable Muslim minority which has clashed with the Tigers over recruitment drives in the community. Press reports say the IPKF and the Sri Lankan security forces have been placed on maximum alert in the area following information that the Tigers plan to attack Batticaloa police station.

Udayan. Blitz, 26.12.87

REPORT

High Stakes Gamble

India's role in Sri Lanka has strategic advantages

"I told my commanders that it was a very difficult mission, a very sad mission and also that we would do our utmost to be fair, humane and use minimum force even at the risk of accepting more casualties than we normally would. They were told that they were going in against their own people."

General K. Sundarji, INDIA TODAY, February 1986.

THE first time Krishnaswami Sundarji issued those orders, it was as head of the Indian Army's Western Command. The mission: Operation Bluestar, the June 1984 army action to flush out terrorists from Amritsar's Golden Temple. On October 10, 1987, he found himself repeating exactly the same orders to his commanders, this time as chief of army staff. The mission: Operation Pawan, the Indian Army action to disarm the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka.

Both operations bear traumatic similarities—a battle with unfamiliar constraints; the emotional involvement of the civilian population; a congested, urban battleground; a highly-motivated and heavily-armed foe of the same ethnic identity. But there the similarity abruptly ends. Bluestar was a domestic operation. Pawan has, for the first time, placed Indian troops on foreign soil to tackle the domestic problem of another country, and at considerable cost.

But in the eyes of South Block, Operation Pawan will be worth every paisa—and the life of every Indian soldier lost in Sri Lanka. The immediate objective may be to ensure the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord but there is also a broader diplomatic advantage inherent in the presence of the Indian Army on the island that is designed to finally—and firmly—establish India's pre-eminence as the regional superpower.

That may be a bit premature—the accord has a long way to go before full implementation—but the current air of elation and confidence in South Block has not been in evidence since the aftermath of the 1971 operations in what is now Bangladesh. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka is seen as the cutting edge of the boldest Indian diplomatic initiative undertaken in recent years. Senior diplomats and army strategists refer to it as a "turning point" in its regional and international ambitions.

In army headquarters, be-medalled generals bandy phrases like: "We're living in exciting times." Others claim: "We are in the process of changing the region's history. It is tragic that we are fighting Tamils but we must use it to advantage."

In that sense, Operation Pawan (wind) is aptly named. The change in South Block, which houses the offices of the prime minister, the External Affairs Ministry and the Defence Ministry, is remarkable—and palpable. At no other time has the Indian military and political leadership marched so closely in step and to the same drummer. What diplomats refer to as "a projection of India's power", army generals translate as "the higher direction of war". The loss of lives in Sri Lanka, the financial cost and the fact that the enemy is of Tamil origin is seen as small sacrifice compared to the gains for India's long-term strategic interests. According to army sources, the loss of 266 Indian Army lives (the official toll till last week) is the minimum price they expect to pay for establishing New Delhi's "sphere of influence".

Illustration by AJIT NINAN



There is broader diplomatic advantage inherent in the presence of the Indian Army on the island that is designed to finally establish India's pre-eminence as the regional superpower.

Already, as Indian strategists point out, the effects are in evidence. In one stroke of Rajiv's Parker pen, New Delhi has ensured that the only foreign military presence in Sri Lanka will be Indian. Statements by Sri Lankan ministers like Gamini Dissanayake that the accord does not bar Colombo from having Israeli "experts", are seen as catering to a local constituency and not any climb-down on the accord.

More important, in South Block's view, is that Pakistan's military relationship with Sri Lanka has been permanently severed. Prior to the accord, Sri Lankan security forces were being trained by the Pakistan Army in Sri Lanka as well as in Pakistan. The Indian Army brass has also never forgotten that in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, Islamabad was allowed to use Colombo as a refuelling base for its aircraft. "That situation will never be allowed to happen again," says a senior army officer. "Pakistan's military involvement in Sri Lanka came to an end on July 29, 1987, and we intend to make certain it stays that way." Officials also point to the fact that the strategic harbour of Trincomalee is now effectively in Indian control and no longer capable of becoming another Diego Garcia. "If the Americans had been given Trinco as an R & R

(rest and recreation) base, we would have had no choice but to treble our naval force," says an Indian admiral.

South Block also points to the potential problem of having 1,20,000 refugees from Sri Lanka sitting on Indian soil indefinitely, a figure that confidential military projections say could easily have doubled had India not intervened. "What we are talking about is the prospect of another Bangladesh in Tamil Nadu. We just could not afford that to happen," says a foreign ministry source.

THESE are, of course, the obvious, immediate benefits for India. But in the high-security corner of South Block that houses the army top brass' offices, the growing pile of secret position papers, prime ministerial briefs, tactical reports and long-term strategy papers all indicate the broader diplomatic profits from India's Sri Lankan thrust—and a newly-aggressive policy which recognises the growing role of the army as a key element in that policy. Says a serving general: "The Indian Army is not the same as it was in 1962. It now fits into India's power projection."

One such secret report points out that the primary military advantage is that "you are fighting your battles outside your country" (unlike Bluestar), and this has a limited (Tamil Nadu only) domestic fall-out. Army officials insist that Operation Pawan was part of carefully-crafted, long-term strategic planning which included the possibility of high casualties in the initial stages of the operation. "Admittedly, we expected the LTTE to be less intransigent and more in our control. In that sense we miscalculated. But the prospect of the Indian Army having to take on the LTTE militarily was an option in our projections," says a general. Adds Minister of State for External Affairs K. Natwar Singh: "No government can go into an agreement of this nature without having tied up the obvious loose ends. We examined every possible option. There were no low-cost options available. If anybody can suggest a better alternative, we will gladly examine it."

In fact, the secret army papers compare Operation Pawan with the British involvement in the Falklands and forcefully insist that Sri Lanka can "under no circumstances" become another Vietnam or Afghanistan. In military terms, the Indian Army now believes that the LTTE is no longer a major threat and it is only a matter of time before the organisation, or at least a major part of it, surrenders. South Block also claims that in the event of an unconditional surrender by the LTTE, they will still be ensured accommodation in the subsequent political set-up for the north and east.

Army projections do not, however, discount the prospect of the IPKF being in Sri Lanka indefinitely. In a secret briefing paper sent to Rajiv Gandhi, Sundarji has termed a pull-out by the IPKF as "unacceptable". Says one of his key aides: "We would like to change our nomenclature from IPKF to the Accord Implementation Force. That is our main brief—to ensure that the accord is fully implemented. Pulling out before that will be political and military suicide." In the briefing papers on Operation Pawan, the army has detailed its short-term and long-term intentions which, as one states, "is to leave one unified Sri Lanka in which the Tamils are given their rightful status and Sri Lanka is not an adversary".

The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka is the cutting edge of the boldest Indian diplomatic initiative undertaken in recent years. Senior diplomats and army strategists refer to it as the "turning point".

The short-term plan is, as the paper says, "to bend the LTTE without breaking it". The LTTE still has plenty of arms though they appear to be running short of ammunition. Intelligence sources revealed to INDIA TODAY that they are well funded by expatriate Tamils—the LTTE has recently bought a ship called the *Illyana* in Europe with the intention of loading it with arms and ammunition, sailing it to a port like Singapore and then transferring the cargo to smaller boats to try and slip through the naval blockade of the Palk Straits.

Army intelligence puts the current strength of the LTTE in Sri Lanka at 4,000 men, armed mainly with SLRs (Self-Loading Rifles), AK-47s, G-3 rifles and carbines, heavy machine-guns and RPG rocket launchers. They no longer have the ability to manufacture mines, mortars and grenades as they were doing earlier, except in very small numbers. The IPKF strength is currently 29,633 men. Palaly is the headquarters of the 54th Infantry Division which is responsible for Jaffna city, under the control of the 41st Infantry Brigade while the 91st Infantry Division has been entrusted with protecting the lives of the civilian population. The 18th Infantry Division has been deployed at Navakulli and the 115th Infantry Brigade at Point Pedro. Under the 36th Infantry Division, headquartered at Trincomalee, is the 47th Infantry Brigade at Killinoochuti, 72nd Infantry Brigade at Vavuniya, 340th (Independent) Infantry Brigade at Trincomalee and Muthur and 76th Infantry Brigade at Batticaloa. The IPKF also has one armoured regiment from 63rd Cavalry with T-72 tanks and air support from *Akbar*, the Indian name for Mi-24 helicopter gunships.

The troops involved have been deliberately chosen to represent as wide a cross-section of the Indian Army as possible and includes: the Brigade of Guards; Parachute Regiment; Para Commandos; Punjab Regiment; Grenadiers; Madras Regiment; Maratha Light Infantry; Raj-

putana Rifles: Rajput Regiment; Sikh Regiment; Sikh Light Infantry; Garhwal Rifles; Mahar Regiment and Gorkha Rifles.

ACCORDING to army intelligence assessments of the situation in Sri Lanka, the fly in the LTTE ointment is not so much Pirabhakaran as his number two, Mahattaya, the man who surfaced last fortnight to orchestrate the handing over of the 18 Indian Army prisoners held by the LTTE. "Mahattaya is now more of a hawk than Pirabhakaran who is perhaps still susceptible to influence from someone like (Tamil Nadu Chief Minister) M.G. Ramachandran Mahattaya, and perhaps the more bloodthirsty of his followers, will still carry on the battle," says an army source, adding,

PRAMOD PUSHKARNA

IPKF in Jaffna: consolidating its hold

"that means we may be there for some time in a situation comparable to Punjab today. We think India and the Indian Army is big enough to handle two Punjabs. That is the basis of our motivation."

And of South Block's indirect game plan—to spread the message of the Rajiv Doctrine to the region. South Block points out that the military offensive has been matched by a diplomatic one. Rajiv's visit to the White House, they assert, was essentially to explain India's role in Sri Lanka, and its broader regional contours. The US Administration reportedly accepted that viewpoint and, according to top sources, actually welcomed it. "Washington may value its strategic alliance with Islamabad but it is also in their interests to have stability in the region. Only India can ensure that," says the official.

That confidence is bolstered by the unspoken acceptance that the other superpower, the Soviet Union, will back New Delhi to the hilt. Soviet Premier N.T. Ryzhkov in fact, took a public stance last fortnight in "fully supporting" India's role in Sri Lanka. Obviously, it admirably suits Moscow to have India assert herself as the cock of the regional walk. The Indo-Sri Lankan agreement has also been supported at the recent Commonwealth summit, and by the European Economic Community (EEC).

The loss of lives in Sri Lanka, the financial cost of the operation and the fact that the enemy is of Tamil origin are seen as a small sacrifice compared to the gains for India's overall, long-term strategic interests.

That New Delhi has begun to assert her regional authority diplomatically is increasingly in evidence. During the recent border talks between India and China, New Delhi made it abundantly clear that Beijing's claims to Arunachal Pradesh would have to be discarded before any progress was possible. Indian officials say that the army now has the Chinese Army pinned down in Wandung on the border and will continue to apply military pressure to convince Beijing that New Delhi cannot be trifled with. That message may have gone home. The Chinese side was more accommodating than at any of the earlier border talks. Rajiv has been invited to Beijing by the Chinese leadership and a package border agreement could be on the anvil sooner than most people expect.

India has also let it be known to Nepal that it will no longer tolerate Kathmandu playing sides and has warned Nepal of the consequences of its recent intention to buy anti-aircraft guns from China. Bangladesh leader Ershad's capitulation on the Chakma refugee issue is another indicator. The Indian director-general of military operations recently informed his Pakistani counterpart that the presence of 30,000 Indian troops in Sri Lanka should not tempt Islamabad into any aggressive moves as India was quite capable of handling any military threat from across the border. Says a senior diplomat: "We want to maintain good relations with all our neighbours and respect their unity and territorial integrity. But our size and the legacy of geography has given us a responsibility and a role that we cannot shirk."

In Sri Lanka itself, the Indian Government has launched a new diplomatic offensive to win over, or at least convince of India's good intentions, the most aggressive critics of the accord. High Commissioner J.N. Dixit has, in the past fortnight, met with Sri Lankan Prime Minister Premadasa, the most rabid India-baiter in the Sri Lankan Cabinet. The meeting between the two—the first in almost 18 months—is seen in New Delhi as a major breakthrough. Dixit also met with anti-accord opposition leader and former prime minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike with much more visible success. Bandaranaike's statements after the meeting show a greater appreciation for India's role in the island than at any previous time.

In the eastern part of the island, the IPKF, under a plan called Operation Cachet, is quickly consolidating its hold in the knowledge that the LTTE's writ does not run here as in the north. IPKF sources also say that they have a plan to prevent colonisation by the Sinhalese in the eastern province—one of the main fears of the Tamils. "We are looking at the long-term implications of our involvement. Whichever way the dice falls, we have a contingency plan for it. Every move by the IPKF is approved in New Delhi. Only if there is a 50 per cent chance of success is the green signal given," says one of the officials in charge of monitoring the Sri Lankan situation.

That is perhaps the most credible sign of South Block's intentions to see the accord through to the end—and ensure that India does not suffer in the process. In

South Block, a core group of senior officers from the External Affairs Ministry and the army has been set up to monitor the situation virtually minute-by-minute. "This is a serious issue and we cannot afford to be casual about it. There is pressure on us, there is tremendous pressure on the Sri Lankan Government. But we have the expertise to handle it so that our interests, those of the Sri Lankan Government and of the Tamils in Sri Lanka are met. That is the bottom line," insists Natwar Singh.

Clearly, New Delhi has its sights set on a major diplomatic triumph and is pulling out all the stops to ensure that it is successful. But much will depend on the Sri Lankan Government and Jayewardene himself—and the unwritten agreements that have been hammered out since the accord was signed last July. The LTTE may be on the run and in disarray, but it will take a lot of convincing before the majority Sinhalese cease viewing the Indian Army as an occupation force. For Indian diplomacy, Sri Lanka represents perhaps the biggest challenge since 1971. Success will ensure that its regional status is commensurate with its size and geographical legacy. Failure will circumscribe India's diplomatic and military role for decades to come.

Considering the daunting odds, is India's regional game plan workable? Obviously, like the green signal given in New Delhi for IPKF operations, the strategy, at the present moment, seems to have a 50 per cent success ratio. But New Delhi's new aggressiveness is also obviously corelated to the timing and the new rapport that Sundarji has established with the political high command. Not since the days of Sam Maneckshaw have the armed forces wielded the kind of clout they now do in South Block. The main reason for that is Sundarji himself.

Sundarji wears his flamboyance as a badge of honour, and his powers of persuasion and oratory are legend. The office of the chief of army staff would be unrecognisable to its previous occupants. It bristles with high-tech gadgetry including laser projectors and disks that superimpose images on maps and charts to help plan military strategy and offer alternatives in different operational situations. On major exercises like Brasstacks, similar equipment stored in a special air-conditioned trailer is taken along. His aides in adjoining offices operate on computers and word processors.

The overall effect is spellbinding and Sundarji's command of the language and his strategic thinking have obviously impressed the political leadership and given the military a major say in foreign policy. His critics, and there are many even within the army, see his ambition as a flaw and have branded him a "death and glory boy", determined to secure his place in military history.

However, the army brass views him with something akin to awe and there is no denying that the man has tremendous charisma. Neither is he the maverick, General Patton-like character, his critics paint him to be. Before taking over as chief, Sundarji locked himself away in Goa to compile his personal strategic bible for the Indian Army. His briefs to the prime minister and the Cabinet are military masterpieces, brilliantly written. But there is also no denying that he could be prone to over-confidence. In looking at the regional woods, New Delhi may have missed the trees.

New Delhi's desire to flex muscle is all very well, but to accomplish that effectively also requires widespread public support. India's efforts in Sri Lanka can hardly be said to have that—only because New Delhi's explanations have not been convincing enough. And the reason for that is a crucial one—credibility, or the lack of it. If New Delhi is prepared to face the collective suspicion of the neighbours, handle domestic problems and public opinion, it cannot do so effectively without that vital ingredient. More important perhaps is the need for the image of a strong Indian leadership in the international context. Mrs Gandhi was respected by international leaders for precisely that and there was consequently less resistance to her regional policies. Without a strong leadership, domestic stability and public support, New Delhi will be seriously hampered in its regional efforts. The stakes in Sri Lanka may be high but so is the risk of failure. As one general soberly admits: "If we fail, it will not be Rajiv's Waterloo but India's Waterloo."

—DILIP BOBB

BHAWAN SINGH

Sundarji's command of the language and his strategic thinking have obviously impressed the political leadership and given the military a major role in the foreign policy of the country.

REPORT

TIGERS SITTING PRETTY ON INDIAN T-72 M TANKS

Three weeks ago, the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) in Jaffna launched an all-out action against the Tamil militants to recover two T-72 M **tanks that had been captured by the LTTE.** There is still no confirmation available on how long the operation went on and whether the tanks were recovered. Reputed to be one of the finest in the world today and the best in the armoury of the Indian Army, **these Russian-made tanks were lost** more because of the folly of those manning them than due to any LTTE ambush.

According to informed sources, these tanks were captured by the LTTE after they had been abandoned by the IPKF after having been run over by land mines. While three of the five tanks involved in this particular action were completely destroyed, the other two lost their tracks on contacting the mines. The tracks, like watch straps, are the wheel belts on which these tanks run. Normally, when the tanks are damaged by land mines, they become immobile. But they are capable of firing all their guns and armament. Also, no harm other than psychological accrues to the crew. The crew is provided with complete cooked rations for 72 hours and a full set of spares. The tracks, according to sources, could have been repaired in 90 minutes but in this case, discretion was considered the better part of valour and the tanks were more or less given away as gifts by **the three-man crew who abandoned them and took to their heels.**

In situations like this, the potency of the weapon is utilised to ward off any attack before making an attempt to assess and repair the damage. Unbelievable, however, no such effort was made in this case. The T-72 M has an awesome arsenal - 44 rounds of 125 mm main gun ammunition, 11 x 50 rounds of 7.62 mm machine gun ammo and 7 x 60 rounds of 12.7 mm anti- air-craft ammo. It has a fuel capacity of 1201 litres of diesel which is enough to carry the tank around cross country for 250 km. One round of the 125 mm main gun is enough to destroy one T-72 tank and it is this potency of the abandoned tanks that forced the IPKF to try and recover the tanks. **What made the task more urgent was the fact that the LTTE is said to have repaired the tanks to some extent.**

This, however, is not the only known report of loss of tanks.

Amongst the first to move into Sri Lanka soon after the Accord was signed was the 76 Armoured Regiment of the 54 Infantry Division. Based in Secundrabad, the 76 Armoured Regiment took part in the middle of 1986 in an ambitious programme named "Exercise Trishakti." This encompassed for the first time in the history of the Indian Armed Forces all the three services in an ambitious assault landing operation by sea. This preceded Brass Tacks on Pakistan border by a few months and was supposedly **a dress rehearsal for a possible operation in Sri Lanka.** The 76 Armoured Regiment which has the India-made Vijayanta tanks practised landings at leisure in the Andaman islands as part of Exercise Trishakti.

According to reports, the 76 Armoured regiment suffered serious loss in Sri Lanka.

Informed sources confirm that seven Vijayanta tanks were destroyed by the LTTE by hand-held launchers of the Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPC) - 7 variety. In fact, it was discovered that the Vijayanta were sitting ducks for the hit-and-run marauders of Prabhakaran. Consequently, the T-72 M was rushed to Jaffna since this modern tank is over 90 per cent immune from not only rocket launchers type of weapons but also from the dreaded Tow anti-tank missile. This is because the T-72 M has the Russian version of the Chaubham armour which is a highly secret steel and alloy combine with a mesh of ceramics and can absorb and dissipate large amounts of Kinetic energy attacks. This is unlike the Vijayanta whose armoured plates are thin and can be easily penetrated.

One complete armoured unit, the 65 Armoured Regiment of 31 Armoured Division, was rushed from Jhansi to Sri Lanka. It has two of their tanks that hit the land mines and were 'closed down'. Soon after this episode, it has been learnt that an independent squadron of T-72 M has been rushed from Bhuj in the Rann of Kutch for operations in Sri Lanka.

Tanks have not been the only weapons that the IPKF has lost in Sri Lanka.

In the early stages of their operation against the Tigers, the IPKF lost seven armoured personnel carriers also known as the BMP-1. This vehicle which has a crew of three and stick of seven (in military parlance, seven persons to fire the weapons), were also destroyed by the rock-propelled grenades of the LTTE. The APC is employed to move the infantry component cross country to keep pace with mechanised forces.

The IPKF has also lost valuable helicopters in Jaffna. In the early days of the Peace-keeping mission, three supply-dropping MI-8 helicopters were downed by the LTTE. The result was that the army top brass decided to send in the missile-mounted heavier MI-25 attack helicopter. Not surprisingly, two of these **choppers were shot down.**

According to sources, the Tigers have been using the deadly Stinger missiles which the Americans have been supplying to the Afghan rebels in Pakistan and are available commonly in the arms bazaar of Rawalpindi as also in the infamous arms bazaar in Singapore. What's the strength of the IPKF in Sri Lanka? With the entire 54 division in Jaffna, that would mean about a fighting strength of 20,000. The total would be much more. Besides, a couple of brigades from divisions in central India (Kota), a regiment from Jhansi and an independent squadron from Bhuj are in Sri Lanka. Observers put the IPKF strength at about 50,000 to 60,000.

Earlier this week, it was leaked that the IPKF was thinking of thinning out in Sri Lanka. It was also learnt that about 12,000 troops would be pulled back. Generally, about one-fourth of the fighting strength is pulled out at any given time from any theatre of operation. That would mean the fighting strength is 48,000.

(Organiser,20-12-87)

AFFIDAVIT

IYAMPILLAI KATHIRAVELU (44) 758/A, Araly East, Araly,

On 21.12.87 there was intense shelling and gun fire in our area. We left our house and were running to take shelter in a temple close to our house.

The shellings continued for sometime. My daughter Pavitha, aged 5 years, died of shock.

The body was buried on 22.12.87 at the cemetery at Araly.

ANTONYPILLAI MARIANAYAGAM (62) of "Elilagam", Sillalai, Pandatheruppu.

The deceased person Marianayagam Eustas Senthilkumaran aged 19 years was my son.

He was an advanced level student at St. Anthony's College, Illavalai.

On 22.12.87 while I was in Colombo I received a message that my son was shot and killed by the army on 19.12.87 at Sillalai.

I was also informed that my son's remains were buried at Sillalai burial grounds on 21.12.87.

I have a surviving son named Virgil Kumaran aged 21 years.



PONNAN PASUPATHY (55) Tholpuram Veerawathai.

The deceased Pasupathy Parvathy, aged 50 years was my wife.

She was employed as a farm labourer at the time of her death.

On 23.12.87 morning my wife left home for work.

At around 2 p.m. I was informed that my wife was killed in a shell explosion while she was working in a rice field.

Due to the shelling I could not go to the scene of the tragedy immediately.

Later I secured a permission from the IPKF and removed her body and buried on 24.12.87.

I SEETHEVI wife of Murugan Kiddinan Periyamathavadi, Chavakachcheri Road, Thunnalai South, Karaveddi.

My husband late Murugan Kiddinan was dead due to army attack on 24.12.87. He is 47 years at the time of death. His body was cremated at Verondai.

I have four children under 18 years. They all are attending school.

My husband was only the sole breadwinner in the family. I have no other source of income at all.

I find it very difficult to look after my childrens' need without any income.

PUVANESWARY SHANMUGADASAN (35) Palaly South, Vasavilan.

The deceased Nagamani Shanmugadasan, aged 46 years was my husband.

He was employed as a farm labourer at the time of his death.

On 24.12.87 my husband left home at around 7.00 A.M. saying that he is going to the village Pillayar Temple.

At around 11.00 A.M. I was informed that he was shot by the Army near the Temple.

At around 1.00 P.M. some people brought him some with severe injuries, as they were unable to take him to the Hospital due to the tension prevailed at the time.

He died at around 2.00 P.M. and we cremated his body the same day.

I have a daughter and son.

After his death we do not have any income; as a result we are undergoing untold sufferings both mentally and financially.

RATNASINGHAM THAVAPILLAI (26) Thelpuram West, Veerawathai.

The deceased Kanagan Ratnasingham aged 26 years was my husband.

He was working as a casual labourer at the time of his death.

On 24.12.87 my husband left home for work as usual.

After he left home there was sheavy shelling and firing from helicopter at Ponnalai.

At around 1.00 p.m. I was informed that my husband was killed by a shell fired from a helicopter.

My brother brought my husband body home and we cremated it on the same day.

I have two children

I find it very difficult to survive after my husband's death due to lack of income.

I NAGALINGAM SELLI, (55), Tholpuram West, Chulipuram.

The deceased Kanapathy Nagalingam, aged 55 years was my husband.

He was a fisherman.

On 26.12.87 my husband left home at around 7 a.m. saying that he is going to Ponalai.

At about 2.30 p.m. I was informed that my husband collapsed and died due to shock at Aladi when the nearby Ponnalai bridge was shelled from a helicopter.

His body was brought home on the same day.

I have one unmarried daughter.

I used to suffer from frequent dizziness and unable to withstand travelling.

I do not have any income after my husband's death.

Mrs. KAMALADEVI STEPHEN (33), Konduvil Lane, Chavakachcheri.

My husband Alfred Robert Louise Stephen (29) my two children and I were residing at Kanduvil Lane, Chavakachcheri.

My husband was the owner of a Tea Kiosk situated at the bus stand at Chavakachcheri.

On 27.12.87 he left home at about 5 a.m. and proceeded to his shop.

At about 12.30 p.m. there was an aerial attack on the Chavakachcheri market area in which bombers and helicopter gunships were used by the IPKF.

Suspecting that my husband's tea kiosk too could have been affected in this aerial attack, I ran to the market area when the helicopter and bombers had ceased their attack.

I found my husband's tea kiosk badly damaged and my husband's dead ,body was in the debris.

My husband has gaping injuries on his head and shoulder.

The dead body of my husband was removed to Point-Pedro for burial on 26.10.87.

My two children and I were entirely dependent on the profits derived by my husband from the tea kiosk.

My children aged 4 and 2 and I have been made destitute by the death of my husband.

PONNIAH ANNAPILLAI (42) Tholpuram West, Verrawathai, Chulipuram.

The deceased Marimuthu Ponniah aged 46 yearsw was my husband.

He was employed as a coconut plucker at the time of his death.

On 27.12.87 my husband as usual went out in his bicycle to attend his daily work.

After he left, fierce shelling started and we were highly worried about his safety.

Later some one came and informed us that my husband was killed by shell explosion while crossing the Ponnalai Bridge.

Immediately I went to the scene and removed his shell ridden body and cremated it on the same day.

I have five children

I am unable to feed my children after the sudden demise of my husband.

I was also injured during an earlier offensive and unable to do any meaning-full work.

RATNAM PUVANESWARY (26) Tholagatty, Vasavilan.

The deceased Rasu Ratnam, aged 27 years was my husband.

He was employed as a farm labourer at the time of his death.

On 27.12.87 I was informed that my husband was shot and killed in a crossfire between the army and the rebels while he was on his way home from Jaffna after work.

His body was brought home on 28.12.87 and was cremated on the same day.

I have a son Vijayaroopan (8)

After my husband's tragic death we do not have any income.

VARIVELAN (62) Suthanthirapuram, Vasavilan.

The deceased Velan Janaki aged 32 years was my daughter.

During the last week of December 1987 there were shelling and firing by the army in our neighbour-hood.

A shell fell within our compound and exploded.

My Daughter feel ill due to the intense shock caused by the explosion and died without recovering on 28.12.8·

We could not seek medical assistance due to the situation prevailed during that period.

He cremation took place at Kuttiyapulam cemetry on the same day.

SUBRAMANIAM NAGESWARY (39) Vasavilan South, Vasavilan.

My husband Moothathamby Subramaniam (Aged 49) is suffering from Paralysis for the last four years and he is bed ridden, incapable of doing any work.

The deceased Karthikesu Moothathamby, aged 70, is my Father-in-law. He was a Farmer by profession and he was supporting my family which consists of my bed ridden husband and my three children.

On 28th. of December 1987, at about 8.00 a.m., while we were at our residence there were continuous terrible sound of Mortar shelling. My Father-in-law above named who was living with us suddenly fainted and he died at the spot.

The prevailed tension did not permit us in proceeding the Sudden Death Inquest, as such no Inquest was held in this connection. Cremation took place on the same evening at 3.00 p.m., at Pillayan Hadu Hindu Cemetery, Vasavilan.

The deceased Karthikesu Moothathamby had no other son or daughter except my husband.

The death of my Father-in-law above named has caused irrepairable loss to us. He has left my bed ridden husband, my daughters and me without no source of income.

SELLATHAMBY GNANAMMAH, (46) Katuvan South, Tellipalai.

I am the mother of the deceased Sellathamby Arumainayagam, aged 22 years.

He was employed as a Cigar Roller.

On 29.12.87 at about 8 A.M. my son left home as usual for the work.

At about 5 P.M. I came to know that my son was shot and killed by an army patrol while he was returning home from work near Muniappan Temple Kattuvan.

On hearing the news I rushed to the scene of incident and saw his body which bore several gunshot marks.

His body was cremated at the Tellipalai cemetery on 30.12.87.

My husband is affected with paralysis and unemployed.

It was my dead son who bore the family burden in place my invalid husband

I have three surviving children.

KANAGALINGAM KANTHAVADIVU, (22)
No. 599 3177V, West, Inuvil.

I am the sister of Kanagalingam Nathan who was arrested by the IPKF on 29.12.87 and who died in IPKF custody.

I live with my widowed mother and two sisters and a disabled younger brother of 13 years, at the above address.

My brother who was arrested by the IPKF was 35 years of age. He worked at the Uduvil Village Council and supported my mother and his brother and sisters.

During the October/November 1987 disturbances, my mother and the rest of the family took refuge at the Pararajasekera Pillayar Temple at Invuil.

By December 27th we returned home. It was also announced over the radio that those who surrendered to the IPKF would be well treated.

My said brother Kanagalingam Nathan was earlier arrested by the Lankan Security Forces in August 1981 and released on 15th January, 1982.

On the advice of some neighbours who said that therefore my brother might be re-arrested by the IPKF and that it would be prudent to surrender to the IPKF and announced over the radio my brother voluntarily reported at the IPKF Camp at Inuvil on 29.12.87 at about noon.

The youngest child who is an infant is under the custody maintenance and care of a relation named Sinniah Sivasubramaniam.

I have children and my husband is a poor farmer.

SINNIAH SIVASUBRAMANIAM (42) Madathady, Sirupiddy North, Neervely.

Navaratnam Vasanthy, aged 23 years was my cousin sister.

On 7.12.87 at about 3.30 p.m. there was a confrontation between the army and the militants near my cousin sister's house.

At 5.00 p.m. I came to know that my cousin sister and her husband Selvanayagam Navaratnam were killed after being caught in the cross fire.

I rushed to my cousinsister's house and found her body lying about 75 yards from her house.

My brother-in-law's body was found in the court-yard.

My cousin sister's body bore a gunshot wound on her stomach.

With the permission of the army we cremated their bodies on 8.12.87 at Kinthiciddy cemeterv, Sirupiddy.

The eldest child Yasotha is under the custody, maintenance, and care of Sinnarajah Thangamalar who is a sister of my late brother-in-law.

The infant Ambiga is under my custody maintenance and care.

I am a poor farmer and have four children.

KANAPATHY NAGALINGAM (52)
Kondavil North, Kondavil.

I am a Retired Govt. Servant.

My wife, children and I were living in our hut at the above said address.

My son Nagalingam Sritharan age 27 years was a casual employee in Kachoberi, Jaffna.

On 8.12.87 my son did not go for work as he was ill.

At about 10.30 A.M. the same day firing was heard in our locality and people fled to the temple close to our house and my family and I too fled to the said temple.

When we were in the temple Indian Peace Keeping Force personnel about 30 in number came there.

My son's dead body was found the same day with cut injuries on his abdomen and gun shot wounds.

The dead body of my son was removed to a barren land closely and cremated the same day as the IPKF had imposed 3 days continuous curfew in our village and the dead body could not be removed to the cemetery.

About 4 innocent people were killed on this day, and several injured.

Besides my said son, I have 3 sons and 3 daughters all under 18 years.

THAMBIAH NAVAMANY (55) Shanthathoddam, Puloly East, Puloly.

The deceased Thambiah Karunamathirasa, aged 22 years was my son.

He was a vegetable vendor.

On 10.12.87 about 7.00 a.m. my son went by bicycle to Innuvil to puchase onions.

He did not return that day or the following day.

Later on 13.12.87 at about 10 a.m. I learnt through my nephew that my son was shot dead between Neervely and Kopay north while returning with onions on 10.12.87 at about 3.30 p.m. caught in a cross fire between the army and the militants.

I also learnt that this body was cremated in the adjoining garden on the same day.

No post mortem examination was held.

I have two unmarried daughter and two sons.

After my husband's death it was my late son who supported our family.

After his demise we are without any income or support.

ARIYARAJAH MAHESWARY (38) Maviddapuram West, Tellipalai.

The deceased child Yalini Ariarajah aged 1 year was my daughter.

On 11.12.87 at about 12.00 noon a shell fell inside our house and exploded.

My daughter died instantaneously after being struck by shrapnels.

Her body was buried at Maviddapuram Cemetry on the following day.

I have a son (5)

My eldest son (7) was also killed in the above blast.

I also sustained an injury in the above incident.

GUNARATNAM RANJANA, (35) Tellipalai East, Tellipalai

The deceased Kanapathipillai Punniyamoorthy, aged 65 years was my father-in-law.

On 11.12.87 a shell fell within our compound and exploded.

My father-in-law was struck by shell splinters and died instantaneously.

His body was cremated at Alavetty North cemetery.

My husband is affected with rheumatisim and an invalid.

Mrs. NESAMMAH SELLATHURAI
Kondavil North, Kondavil.

The deceased is my husband Kasy Sellathurai age 45 years.

I am living at the address given above.

My husband was a fishvendor going about on a bicycle.

On 11.12.87 he left home 8 a.m.

He did not return home that evening I searched for him along the road which he usually takes.

Since there was shelling and firing at Konavil on that day I was worried.

After about two days I saw his bicycle in the Nanthavil field and the decomposed body close to that.

The skull was damaged and there was injury in the neck and there was blood marks all over.

The body was removed and cremated by me.

I attach the death Certificate No. 861.

Cause of death -Profuse bleeding from injury caused by gun shot.

I have 7 children the eldest is 18 years and the youngest is 4 years.

I have nobody who could help me.

The bread winner of my family is dead.

I have no means of living.

LETTER

Collective responsibility is a cardinal principle of any working democracy. But in Sri Lanka it appears to be fast running on the political loopline periodically Indian aligned and maligned.

When Parliament debated the much trumpetted Provincial Council Bill our Foreign Minister compared the cabinet to a packet of assorted biscuits.

Ready wittedly the Leader of the Opposition retorted - a packet of rottten biscuits.

The general public are at a loss to understand how any national minded Sri Lankan or the Urban Guerrilla leader Prabakaran would be convinced when the ruling hierachy had taken a surprisingly uncommon stand and perhaps ideologically divided on a crucial bill brought to parliament at the cost of thousands of valuable human lives.

The opposition too fanned the flame instead of dousing the communal fire presumably to quench their power thirst. Added to the misery the state media also stoops to opportunist propaganda with misleading and fabricated interpretations.

This had a direct bearing almost across the Palk Strait and the Indian radio too started to tune against the LTTE in combat by smoke screening the basic cause of dispute.

In fairness to the minority, the Indo-Lanka Accord was thrust on them against their will and particularly in the absence of adequate parliamentary representation of their choice. The last four and a half years, the north and east and to a little extent the south have witnesed a painful ordeal of cold blooded murders on an unprecedented scale by the terorists and counter killing by state forces.

Prior to the Indo-Lanka peace accord India embarked on an anti Lanka propaganda worldwidely based on the following factors:

1. Sri Lankan forces are the most indisciplined.
2. State orders the killing of its own ruling minority even to the extent of deploying air and naval force to help its regular infantry.
3. The combined state force, being given an enhanced pay packet a phenomenon unheard in the annals of any military history to combat terrorism within the country at an alarming cost to the national exchequer.

Charges of vacillation and genocide were levelled against Sri Lanka by no less a person than the Indian Premier Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and his Foreign Minister for the failure of the Sri Lankan government to reach a political solution. The Indian Premier even made use of all international forums to spice his arguments advocating political solution and never any military solution to Sri Lanka's ethnic problem.

Consequent to the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, the Indian army has engaged in inflicting heavy casualties among the Tamil civilians and also does a subtle and spiteful propaganda against the LTTE to camouflage the excesses by its own military units. The undue haste shown by Sri Lanka and India for the re-settlement of the eastern sector and the surrendering of the arms by the LTTE are inadequately reflected in their efforts to implement the peace accord.

R.K. Lakshman, The Times of India



This cannot be achieved by muzzling the regional press, clamping down indefinite curfew, indiscriminate killing of defenceless civilians, shelling of educational institutions and intellectuals and damaging the agricultural and fishing industry of the north and east. Instead the IPKF could negotiate with the LTTE, disband the "THREE STARS" undoubtedly an IPKF's Trojan horse and create a climate conducive to the fearless, secured, healthy and happy living of the minority Tamils.

It has become sine qua non for the LTTE too to take stock of the dire consequences of fighting a losing battle resourcelessly with the Indian army and go to the negotiating table. Indian Gandhism, Lankan Budhism or Hinduism cannot be taught through the mouth of machine guns. The concept of truth and non violence should not be taken for a ride. The leaders concerned must practise what they preach and that too when the writings are on the wall in the simmering south of Sri Lanka.

M. Selvasunderam
Sinnamalai, Thondaimanaru

REPORT

UNI reports from Colombo:

The simmering differences within the Sri Lankan Government over the handling of the Sinhala extremists in the south burst into the open on Thursday with a senior Cabinet Minister declaring that the Government had "no moral right" to remain in power.

Speaking to newsmen at the funeral of the chairman of the ruling United National Party, Harsha Abeywardene, who was shot dead along with three others in the city yesterday by suspected extremists, the Finance Minister, Mr. Ronnie de Mel, called for a truce and dialogue with the proscribed Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) and holding of provincial and parliamentary elections.

"If we don't have elections before next year. there is going to be big trouble," he said.

Mr. De Mel said the Sri Lankan Army could not fight this war and added, "we might have to ask the Pakistan Army to come to the south, and I am not joking."

He said there were only 17 elected members in parliament and the others had come through referendum or were nominated. "I have stopped referring to Sri Lankan as a democracy since 1982 because there is no democracy." It was for the President to decide the time for the elections.

There was a perpetual state of insurrection in the country and "the situation is very bad, getting worse every day," he said. On an average 20 people are daily killed in violence in the island.

Mr. De Mel said the news of Abeywardene's death was received when the Cabinet was discussing the JVP threat. He said he told the Cabinet that this was what would happen if they did not solve the problem now.

Earlier, winding up the budget debate in Parliament, Mr. De mel said that many of the country's present trouble stemmed from the failure to hold elections. Describing the present parliament as "obsolete" Mr. De Mel hoped that elections would be held next year.

PEACE OFFENSIVE: A couple of wary Jaffna Citizens at Mandaitivu on Thursday. *Express*

LETTER

THE RISING NATION

The story on Sri Lanka made an interesting reading. It is, indeed, a tragedy that India has got entangled in Sri Lankan rigmarole. We are doing what the Russians did to Afghanistan. A president does not make a nation. Though we can justify our act by claiming that it was Jayewardene who invited us, the truth is that we have hurt the pride of the Sri Lankans. People are never amiable to alien troops on their land and indications are that the growing intransigence of Sri Lankan ministers is likely to intensify. The ordinary citizens of Sri Lanka are equally dismayed. Can the accord be successful ?

The Sri Lankan debacle has illustrated, once again, the political immaturity of Rajiv Gandhi. Men who forget their past are condemned to repent again, so goes the saying. Rajiv is an example of the recondite statement. The Punjab accord met with an abject failure because the time-framework for solving the problem was only a manifestation of wishful thinking. Such simplistic approach created more problems to the existing ones. The Indo-Sri Lanka accord too was a product of such insights.

We must put the past behind, and should aim to get out of Sri Lanka in the near future. Otherwise we will have to read Sri Lanka for Vietnam and the U.S. for India and the generations to come will condemn us for our folly.

C.V. Kamesh Bangalore

GANDHI'S QUAGMIRE

"Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has bitten off more than he can chew in Sri Lanka (Nov.9), where his peace-keeping forces have become embroiled in a protracted guerrilla war. In Bangladesh, India functioned as a midwife, but in Sri Lanka, it has assumed the role of abortionist. Facing destabilizing attempts by Sinhalese radicals, Sri Lanka's President, Junius Jayewardene, may have to lean more and more on Indian forces to prop himself up. An indefinite stay by Indian troops would eventually make Sri Lanka an Indian protectorate."

Pravin Kumar *(Time,* Dec.7,1987)

LETTER

SRI THURKKA COMMUNITY CENTRE
Punnalaikadduvan North
02, January 1988

The Hon. Prime Minister,
INDIA.

Honoured Sir,

REVIEW OF POSITION AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF I.P.K.FORCE

We, the residents of Punnalaikadduvan North have to bring to your kind attention regarding the atrocities done by your Indian Peace Keeping Force.

(1) The residents of this village were called upon to vacate their house and to go to temples. In response to this call Mr. Sinnadurai Manoharan also went to Pillaiyar Temple at Kupilan as a refugee. The Jawans who entered the temple without giving recognition to the Hindu Culture with boots etc assaulted the youths found inside the temple and ordered the above named sinnadurai Manoharan to enter the ADHIMOOLAM (the extreme interior portion of the Temple), simultaneously ordered to ring the bell of the temple and shot at him through his ears, and he died at the spot. He is an innocent poor, the only breadwinner in his fatherless family. We will produce witnesses if and when called for.

(2) Nearly three Jawans entered the house of Moothathamby Kanageswary, harrassed and molested her, and looted her house too.

(3) Same number of Jawans entered Mr. Nagammuthu Saravanai's house tried to molest his daughters and because of the noise they made the Jawans looted their house and damaged it.

(4) Kasipillai Thevasamy's house was looted by the I.P.K.F. Eye witness could be produced.

(5) Most of the girls in this village were molested and raped. There are people who witness these activities.

(6) Mr. Arumugam and his son-in-law were shot dead. These two were innocent public and they do not belong to LTTE. The FREEDOM FIGHTING GROUP. The details of killings and massacre by the IPKF will be sent to you in due course.

(7) The Library situated beside Thurga Dhevi Temple badly damaged by the I.P.K.F. The books found inside the library and the furnitures were burnt.

(8) The statistics of the House damanged or burnt will be produced it and when necessary.

(9) The residence of the high Priest of the Temple was looted and damaged by the I.P.K.F.

(10) All plantations crops viz. grapes plantains, chillies etc. were damage by the maximum.

The above facts clearly show that the motive of the I.P.F. Force is also to continue the atrocities of the Sri Lankan president to annihilate the Tamil race from Sri Lanka and to spoil the Tamils economy. So we kindly beg of your to put a stop to all these attrocities and save the Tamils.

Yours faithfully

((60 people signed)

RAPED

CIVILIANS □ KILLED (Operation Pawan)

P. Dharmakularaja 1.12.87

Thaiyalmuthu 1.12.87

K. Anandaraja 5.12.87

V. Karthikesu 6.12.87

N. Nagendra Raja 9.12.87

K. Sudarsan 11.12.87

M. Jeevaratnam 14.12.87

V. Anbalagan 16.12.87

Arulambalam 16.12.87

Namachivayam 16.12.87

K. Nallathambi 17.12.87

N. Panneerselvam 18.12.87

M. Sabesan 19.12.87

E. Senthilkumaran 19.12.87

T. Yasodharan 19.12.87

Mrs. V. Manonmani 20.12.87

S. Parameswaran 21.12.87

S. Selladurai 21.12.87

(Operation Pawan) CIVILIANS □ KILLED

URUMPIRAI

R. Prabakaran	S. Chelliah
Kathiran Iyankan	C. Thurairatnam
P. Sinnathamby	K. Navaratnam
Ponnu THarmalingam	K. Vincent
Selliah Ganeshalingam	G. Sinnathangam
Kanthan Thillaiyan	**M. Umathevy**
Nallammah Veeran	**Sinnappu**
K. Gunarasa	S. Elias
S. Jeyarubi	**Sinnathurai**
Ponnan Iyal	Nallathamby
S. Rasanayagam	**Thangammah**
M. Peryasamy	**Ponnammah**
K. Mahinthiran	**Subathirai**
Nagammah	T. Selvanayagam
V. Shanmugalingam	K. Balasubramaniam
V. Sivasaranam	S.Kandiah
K. Ariyaratnam	**S. Pathmanathan**
S. Thambithurai	P. Ainkaran
Jeyaluksmi	S. Santhirapalan
N. Kanagalingam	I. Sithampara
M. Nadarajah	S. Sinnathurai
I. Ponnampalam	**Prema**
S. Panchalingam	S. Suppa
T. Thurairajah	K. Senthuramany
T. Pratheepan	K. Easwaranathan
T. Kaithili	P. Sinnathamby
T. Puvaneswari	K. Rajivan
T. Rasamalar	S. Selvanayagam
A. Thirunavukarasu	**Manoranjitham**
L. Narayanan	**Maheswari**
K. Thambirasa	**Shanthi**
S. Sellathurai	**Rasaledchumy**
N. Velautham	T. Rasaratnam
T. Kanagasabai	**I. Alagammah**

இருப்பின் தேவை

விழிகளில் முள் முளைத்த அக்ரமம்
சூரியன் பாதியாய் சிதறிய கொடூரம்
வானம் பூமியை
அமுக்குகின்றதாய் உள்ளுணர்வு
சாபத்தின் படிமமாய்
எங்களது வாழ்வின் பொருள் சிதறிய
உயிர்க்கவிதைகள்.

எந்தப் பொழுதிலும்
காற்று-
நிணமாய் மாறும்.

இலேசாக
மூக்கினூடேயும்
சில வேளைகளில் வாயினூடாகவும்
சிழ்வாங்கி வெளியாகும் காற்று
மூச்சடைப்பாக நெரிப்பதன் பொருளென்ன?

நகம் வளர்ந்த கொள்கைகளால்
மனிதத்தின் உன்னதங்கள்
பிரண்டப்பட்டன.
எங்களது இருப்பின் தேவையும்
சுதந்திரமும்
ஊரின் ஒவ்வோர் புறமும்
முகாம்களின் முள்வேலிக்குள்
முடிச்சிறுகிக் கிடக்கின்றன.

வாழ்வு அர்த்தமற்றதாய்
என் நினைவுகளில் தெறிக்கிறது.
எனினும்
உயிர்ப்பின் ரகசியம்
உள்மனம் அறியும்.

எஸ். கருணாகரன்

COMMENT

PUBLIC SUPPORT & ARMY

Fall-Out Of Sri Lanka Involvement

23.12.87

S. K. SINHA

WHILE there was no anti-army feeling in India before Independence even though the army was a major instrument of colonial rule, the military's popularity increased immediately afterwards because of its operations in Kashmir, Junagadh, Hyderabad and later, Goa. But Lt-General S. K Sinha, the former Vice-Chief of Army Staff, argues that the public response has changed in the wake of military involvement in Punjab and Sri Lanka. Fearing that the people of Punjab might not extend the same cooperation in the event of a new India-Pakistan conflict, General Sinha also warns that heightened emotions in Tamil Nadu over the IPKF's activities in Sri Lanka might "ignite a combustible combination of linguistic fundamentalism and ethnic chauvinism".

R.K. Lakshman, Times of India, 20.12.87.

IF India has been fortunate in that she is the only major Third World country whose army has always remained apolitical the army has been equally fortunate in always enjoying the esteem and support of the people. Even in the dark days of 1962, there was an upsurge of popular support for the army, despite the humiliating reverses suffered by it. However, of late this relationship between the army and the people or more precisely certain segments of the people, has been under strain. This development needs to be viewed against the backdrop of history.

The present Indian army was a major instrument in the hands of the British who created it to establish their imperial rule over this country. Yet this army did not incur public antipathy. The feeling of nationhood was non-existent among our people in the 18th century, and no odium attached to Indian soldiers fighting for the British against Indian rulers. The army serving a foreign power was no doubt a colonial army but it was not an army of mercenaries. Men enlisted because fighting was their profession and they fought for honour —the honour of their family, their community, their religion and their regiment.

Be that as it may, it was this very army that stirred up national spirit within the country. The Great Uprising of 1857 was essentially an army affair though it inspired successive generations of our countrymen in the struggle for freedom. When Mahatma Gandhi launched his mass movement in the 20th century, the British generally used the police and the British army in India to combat the movement. Notwithstanding the Jallianwala Bagh incident, the Indian army was sparingly used in this rôle.

The refusal of Garhwali soldiers to open fire on non-violent Khudai Khidmatgars at Peshawar in 1930 may have resulted in their being court martialled and punished, but it won them popular admiration. And in World War II, the contribution of the Indian National Army, comprising Indian army soldiers who had been taken prisoner by the Japanese, constituted an important landmark in the history of our freedom struggle. After the war, the mutinies at Bombay, Jabalpur and Karachi sounded alarm bells for the imperial power heavily influencing its decision to quit.

The past has been recounted in some detail to bring out the fact that there was no anti-army feeling in the country before Independence, even though it had constituted a major element upholding British imperial rule. Comparisons may be odious but it may be mentioned that, for a variety of reasons which need not be discussed here, there was a strong anti-police feeling when we became independent. Unfortunately, this outlook has persisted even after Independence. On the other hand, in the decades following Independence, the army has been able to carve out a special place for itself in the hearts of the people.

Within weeks of Independence it was called upon to fight a war in Kashmir and in the process gained considerable popular support. Operations in Junagadh, Hyderabad and Goa further endeared it to the people. During the 1962, 1965 and 1971 wars, neither ideological nor religious considerations came in the way of the nation remaining completely united in support of the army. The people in Punjab, particularly the Sikhs, willingly exposed themselves to risk and on their own carried food for the soldiers in forward trenches.

The army's disciplined and impartial conduct during communal disturbances has enhanced popular esteem for it. Thus, whether at Bhiwandi, Meerut, Moradabad or Ahmedabad, the minority community has demanded and welcomed the deployment of the army to restore order.

With mounting external threats and increasing internal dangers, the eighties have been a period of worsening security. Concurrently a new phenomenon has surfaced, first in Punjab and now in Tamil Nadu. After Ope-

ration Bluestar the Sikhs felt alienated leading to an anti-army feeling among many of them. In the event of another Indo-Pakistani war, it is doubtful if the army will get the same sort of cooperation from people in Punjab as it did in 1965 and 1971. And now in the wake of operations in Sri Lanka some Tamils in Tamil Nadu are becoming alienated, explaining Mr Prabhakaran's reported brithday celebrations in Madras, and demonstrations against the Indian peace keeping force which has even been dubbed the Innocent Peoples Killing Force!

Virulent propaganda has been unleashed against our troops, an MP even accusing them of genocide in Sri Lanka. Having lost the military battle in Jaffna, the LTTE has launched a smear campaign to win the propaganda war. Prolonged operations in Sri Lanka can make matters worse. While trying to douse a bush fire in Sri Lanka, we may find sparks falling over Tamil Nadu which may ignite a combustible combination of linguistic fundamentalism and ethnic chauvinism.

The Defence Minister stated recently that there could be no talks with the LTTE till they surrendered their weapons, implying that if they did not do so, military operations would continue till such time as all weapons had been recovered. It is well known that guerrilla war is always a long-drawn-out affair. It lasted for about 30 years in Vietnam and we have been embroiled in an insurgency in Nagaland for over 30 years. In Sri Lanka the strength of insurgents and the weapons with them are much more than in Nagaland.

Our insistence on all arms being surrendered before talks with the LTTE is reminiscent of the Allied insistence in World War II on Germany's unconditional surrender before any dialogue could take place. We know too well what that insistence led to. The iron curtain descended on a large part of East Europe, and the Cold War set in. This insistence on unconditional surrender did not serve the West's long-term interests. Similarly we may find that our insistence on the surrender of all weapons with the LTTE before any talks with them may not serve our long-term interests. Wisdom demands that all methods, both political and military, should be tried to bring the LTTE in line with the mainstream so that Tamil autonomy and Sri Lankan sovereignty can both be ensured.

Another point that needs to be considered is the extent to which it may be advisable to crush the ability of Tamil militants to resist any onslaught against them by the Sri Lankan forces after the IPKF's withdrawal. Within the ruling party in Sri Lanka, many including the Prime Minister hold different views on the accord with India. Even assuming that the octogenarian Mr Jayewardene can keep these elements under control, one may well ask how long he will be able to do so. And also, what happens when the JVP (the Sinhalese extremists in the south) and the LTTE manage to forge an alliance?

All this only emphasizes the need for the early and successful implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord and the IPKF's pull-out. As things stand, there is little scope for the accord being made to work without the support of the LTTE. Hence the need to bring it in line soon by a combination of both political and military effort.

The saying that it is easier to ride a tiger than dismount from one is more than true regarding our military involvement in Sri Lanka. We appear to have hastily signed an accord as part of an image building and vote-catching exercise to make up for the Government's tarnished image in the wake of the Bofors and submarine deals, as also repeated electoral defeats. The accord was even proclaimed as the greatest event of the century. This was an infantile claim. Within weeks it was being called a folly in which our immature leadership had been taken for a ride. No matter what one may feel about this military involvement, the requirement now is to cut our losses, rather than insist on complete military victory at all costs.

Of course official apologists will argue that through the "wisdom and foresight" of the Prime Minister a most dangerous situation was averted. If we had not gone to Sri Lanka, the Pakistanis would have gone there and that would have been very dangerous for us. The question is: can Pakistan pose a serious military threat to us via Sri Lanka? Would the Pakistani general staff forget so soon the lesson of geography it learnt during the 1971 war? Even if Pakistan chose to jump into the fray in Sri Lanka, would Pakistan's involvement in combating insurgency and a bleeding war have really hurt us? In fact, such an involvement would only have weakened Pakistanis' military potential on the main front against us.

Another argument being trotted out is that operations in Sri Lanka will help India to establish hegemony over South Asia and the Indian Ocean. India is bigger in population and resources than all the regional countries put together and does not need to flex her military muscle in this manner. Insofar as the Indian Ocean is concerned, the presence of superpowers makes any talk of Indian hegemonism unrealistic. In any case, gunboat diplomacy has now become out of date and establishing hegemony should hardly be our goal.

No doubt we should be accepted as the major regional power between Suez and Singapore, but this position has to be achieved and retained through domestic stability, economic strength and military power without getting involved in a bush war in a foreign country. It has also been argued that if the USA had got base facilities in the excellent Trincomalee harbour, it would have posed a serious military threat to us. Even without this base the USA is in a position to pose a threat to us, but this is kept in check by the possibility of Soviet retaliation, the likely international reaction and, most important, by domestic opinion within the USA.

An army engaged in fighting insurgency generally is locked in a "no-win" situation. Apart from engaging in hit-and-run actions, the insurgents launch a vicious propaganda effort against the Army focussing attention on genocide, atrocities, rape and so on. This is the stock in trade for fighting an unequal war. The Goebbelsian Big Lie repeated over and over again tends to stick. No army engaged in counter-insurgency operations can hope to come out of one with its reputation untarnished. The Americans discovered this in Vietnam, the Russians in Afghanistan and the British in Ireland. Our own experience in Nagaland and Manipur has not been very different.

We have smashed the LTTE's military resistance in Jaffna where they chose to stand and fight, using the innocent Tamil civilian population as a screen. Our military operations have now entered a new phase of guerrilla war. Any organized military opposition that the LTTE puts up at any place has of course to be liquidated. However, we must never lose sight of the fact that the sooner we pull out from Sri Lanka the better it will be from all points of view—political, military and economic. This goal can be achieved by a more flexible and far-sighted policy than a rigid insistence on no talks before the surrender of all weapons.

THE STATESMAN

BETRAYAL IN SRI LANKA?

Myth Of Devolution

ASHOK MITRA

THOUGH the LTTE is being blamed for the political impasse in Sri Lanka, Ashok Mitra, West Bengal's former Finance Minister, says that "in his exuberance to have an agreement" Mr Rajiv Gandhi let down three million Tamils who had reposed their trust in India. Analysing the July 29 agreement, Sri Lanka's 13th Constitutional Amendment and the Provincial Councils Bill, Mr Mitra concludes that the promised devolution of power is a myth and that the Tamil-majority province will enjoy no autonomy since it will be directly under Colombo's financial control.

DEVELOPMENTS across the Palk Straits continue to cause widespread uneasiness in this country. While disturbances are also taking place in the southern parts of Sri Lanka, it is the impasse in the north and the east that is of major concern here.

Much of the blame for this impasse is being pinned on the organization of Sri Lankan Tamils which the Government of India had patronized until recently, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. It is accused of going back on its commitment not to oppose the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement signed on July 29 last between the Indian Prime Minister and the Sri Lankan President. The equivalent of roughly four divisions of the Indian Army are now concentrated in the northern and eastern parts of the island with the object of subduing the LTTE cadres. Our army has met with some success, but, with the Tamils taking recourse to guerrilla warfare, there is little prospect of any early restoration of peace.

Several Indian political parties, while worrying over the way things are going in the island, have castigated the LTTE for having gone back on its pledge. There is of course a technicality involved here: the LTTE might argue that since it was not a signatory to the agreement, it cannot be accused of any breach of commitment; it had merely agreed not to be obstructive as long as Tamil interests were fully protected; subsequent developments convinced it that such was not the case; it had therefore every right to change its mind. If there is any breach of faith, LTTE spokesmen have made the point, it is on the Government of India's part; it has sold Tamil interests down the drain in its anxiety to come to an arrangement with President Jayewardene.

Does the LTTE have a case? It fell back on two principal demands once it became obvious that the grant of "Eelam"—full independence—was not on the cards: (A) the Constitution of an integrated province consisting of the present Eastern and Northern Provinces, where the Tamils would have a clear majority, and (B) a clear-cut devolution of responsibilities and financial powers to the provinces so that the latter would enjoy a reasonable degree of autonomy.

As far as the first stipulation is concerned, the July 29 agreement indicated that an Interim Administrative Council, with jurisdiction over both provinces, would come into existence with immediate effect, but the electorate in the two provinces would have to ratify the unification through a referendum to be organized before the end of 1988. It is over the composition of the Interim Administrative Council—and the choice of the person to preside over it—that the LTTE finally veered away from the path of negotiations and has now taken to guerrilla-type activities.

As regards devolution, the text of the agreement is both vague and terse. It was agreed that "the entries in List II and List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution shall be devolved upon the provincial councils; the details were to be worked out subsequently. The sum and substance of the Government of India's point of view is easily expressed: since Sri Lankan Tamils were being offered a dispensation more or less identical with what is enjoyed by the States in India, the agreement ought to be welcome.

It can of course be argued that the powers enjoyed by the Constituent States in India are not as generous as is being claimed by the Government of India, and the demand for restructuring Centre-State relations, which has gathered force in recent years, is precisely on account of that. But even if that issue is left aside, are we sure that arrangements currently being made in Sri Lanka would actually ensure for the Tamil Province (or provinces) the same prerogatives as are accorded to the States in India?

With the passage of the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution and the Provincial Councils Bill by Parliament in Colombo a fairly clear picture of the proposed devolution has now emerged. The Ninth Schedule of the Provincial Councils Bill enumerates three separate lists. List I is the Provincial List, List II the Central List, while List III is the Concurrent List. These lists do indeed follow the pattern laid down in the Indian Constitution. As in our case, the Concurrent List is a bit of a fake, since the will of the central authority is to prevail over that of the provincial legislature with respect to matters pertaining to items included in this list.

It is, however, the devolution of financial items which is crucial for effective decentralization. The States in India, as is now well recognized, have major grievances against the existing financial arrangements in the Constitution. The matter has been raised from time to time in the National Development Council. It has also been aired before successive Finance Commissions, and must have been a major point of focus in the recently submitted report of the Commission on Centre-State Relations.

But the Provincial Councils Bill passed by the Sri Lankan Parliament intends to pass on to the provinces considerably less financial powers than even what devolves on the constituent States in India. Only in respect of one item, namely, the use of external aid, are Sri Lanka's provinces to have a wider latitude compared to what the States in India enjoy. Unlike in India, where the deployment of foreign loan funds is the exclusive prerogative of the Centre, Section 22 of the Sri Lanka Provincial Councils Bill states that "foreign aid negotiated by the Government for a project in a province should be allocated by the Government to such project or scheme".

In all other fiscal matters, the central authority will call the tune. Public borrowing will remain, as in India, the general preserve of the national admin-

istration; the Bill specifies that the borrowing of money is to take place "to the extent permitted by or under any law made by Parliament." Four-fifths of aggregate public revenue in Sri Lanka, however, comes from taxes. It is the scheme of distribution of taxation powers which reveals that the devolution proposed in Sri Lanka is largely of a symbolic nature, with little of substance in it.

The point is easily proved. There are five principal areas of taxation delineated in the Provincial Councils Bill: (i) the general sales and turnover tax, which is a tax on the turnover of (a) the manufacturing sector, (b) the non-manufacturing sector—that is, trade, industry and professions, (c) imports and (d) wholesale and retail sales; (ii) import duties; (iii) income-tax, including corporate tax; (iv) excise duties on selected items such as liquor, tobacco etc., and finally, (v) taxes on land and buildings, including stamp duty on transfer of property.

The proceeds of all the items under (i) except (i) (a)—the turnover tax on wholesale and retail sales—as well as those from (ii), (iii) and (iv) would, under the Provincial Councils Bill, accrue wholly to the national government. The provinces would have control over only (i) (d) and over the items of taxation listed under (v). There lies the rub. Of the total tax collection in Sri Lanka in 1986, amounting to Rs 3,200 crores, the accretion on account of the items reserved for the provinces was less than Rs 200 crores. This works out to roughly six per cent of the total. In contrast, about 50 per cent of the aggregate tax proceeds in India devolve to the States as per the provisions of the Constitution.

Besides, the Tamil provinces would have to share the proceeds from the items under (i) (d) and (v) with the eight other provinces that are also being established in Sri Lanka in terms of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution. Devolution as such would thus give the Tamil provinces hardly more than two per cent of the total national tax revenue, if even that.

Perhaps the authorities in Sri Lanka are not altogether oblivious of the absurdity of the indicated financial arrangements and the need to allow the provinces a greater share of the nation's over-all financial resources. Section 154 of the amendment to the Constitution passed by Parliament accordingly proposed to establish a permanent Finance Commission which would "allocate to the provinces such additional funds as are adequate for meeting their needs".

The composition of this permanent Finance Commission is, however, rigidly laid down. It would consist of the Governor of the Central Bank, the Secretary to the Treasury (the counterpart of the Secretary to the Union Ministry of Finance in our system), and "three other members to represent the three major communities".

Even a child can perceive that a finance commission, constituted in this manner, would be totally under the influence of the central authority. There is therefore, no doubt that the provinces would have to subsist on the mercy of the national government, and seemingly elaborate powers statutorily granted to them would recede into insignificance, for finances to back up these powers would be denied.

Going purely by the proposed scheme of financial devolution, there is, therefore, a great deal to be said in support of the LTTE's reluctance to embrace the future shaped for the Tamils by the Indian Prime Minister in consultation with the Sri Lankan President. Our Prime Minister's assertion only the other day that "it was for the first time in many centuries that the demands, needs and the rights of the Tamils were about to be recognized and realized" has to be, alas, dismissed as sad hyperbole.

UNNERVING

The matter cannot, however, be allowed simply to rest here. It is somewhat unnerving that the head of our Government took upon himself the onus of signing the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement on behalf of the Tamils when what was promised to them was left undefined and has turned out to be as flimsy as the contents of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution and the Provincial Councils Bill now reveal. Were his advisers that amateurish, or did he, in his exuberance to have an agreement, decide to override what he might have considered as minor details?

It is important that this question be raised and an answer sought, for in attempting to enforce the agreement, our Government has not only bartered away the rights of three million people who had reposed their trust in us; it has also committed our armed forces to the cause, to an extent not yet quite clear, with attendant additional financial and other burdens on the nation. In a democratic system, there must be some accountability for perpetration of follies of this nature.

29.12.87

"This agreement secures everything that the Sri Lankan Tamils have demanded, short of breaking Sri Lanka and infact it goes well beyond the initial demands of the Tamils"

— Rajiv Gandhi

(in a public speech at Madras shortly after the Accord)

Rajiv Gandhi: festive mood

INDIA TODAY

J.R. JAYEWARDENE

INTERVIEW

"India is not our enemy"

SRI Lanka's 81-year-old President, J.R. Jayewardene, has come up the hard way, rising from the post of a municipal corporator to the head of state. Not surprisingly then, he is adept at converting political adversities to his advantage. Till six months ago, Jayewardene was the target of attacks by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an aggressive opposition and even his own ministers. And when he signed the Indo-Sri Lanka accord on July 29, 1987, he was accused of surrendering Sri Lanka's sovereignty to India.

But the shrewd politician is nobody's fool. He has got the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to do what the Sri Lankan Army could not accomplish in four years—crush the LTTE. As one prominent minister put it: "JRJ has silenced his critics by involving Rajiv Gandhi in his fight against the terrorists. We have saved money and manpower."

Jayewardene does not try to hide his satisfaction at having got India to do his work for him. At a meeting last fortnight he said: "But for the IPKF we would have had to fight this war and that would have cost in monetary terms." He pointed out that in the last four years, the Sri Lankan Army had lost an average of one soldier a day, but since the IPKF took over, "not a Sinhala, Tamil or Muslim soldier has died. Their place has been taken by the Indians. I want to stop that also."

But some controversial statements made by few Indian Army generals—where they hint at a permanent stay in Sri Lanka—have troubled Jayewardene. As a result of this, he has now adopted a defiant stance on the implementation of the accord, and has started promoting an Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Treaty, with which he hopes to limit India's influence over Sri Lanka. In his first exclusive interview after the commencement of the IPKF operations, Jayewardene spoke to Senior Editor PRABHU CHAWLA at his residence. Excerpts:

Q. *You have been invited as chief guest to India's Republic Day parade. But a section of the Opposition in India has opposed it. How do you react to this?*

A. Rajiv has invited me. Now it seems he will be in difficulty if I come. I will be the last one to embarrass him by coming there. Probably some of them are trying to work out their feelings because I criticised M.G. Ramachandran (Tamil Nadu chief minister) in my press conference in New Delhi. I did not say any untruth.

Q. *Do you have the same opinion about MGR after the IPKF operations?*

A. Now Rajiv has told me that MGR is working with him in the implementation of the accord. If he is working with us and not helping the terrorists, I admire him and I am also grateful to him. My main criticism against MGR was that he was entertaining a self-confessed murderer, Pirabhakaran, who is the LTTE chief. Pirabhakaran openly admitted that he killed the mayor of Jaffna. But I meant only what MGR did in the past.

Q. *Do you think that the Indo-Sri Lanka accord is being implemented successfully?*

A. As far as we are concerned, we have done everything mentioned in the accord. The only thing left is the election in the provinces. We will do this also. I have to pass the law. After that I have to hold elections. But I can do that only when there is peace in the north and the east.

Q. *Till the elections take place, will you revive the proposal of an Interim Administrative Council?*

A. Not necessarily. If I can have elected people then where is the need for an interim council?

Q. *But earlier you had promised to appoint an Interim Council.*

A. These chaps (the LTTE) are not allowing us to do so.

Q. *Can't you nominate representatives of other Tamil groups to the council?*

A. Why should I do that if I can hold elections? I am willing to hold provincial elections in January or February. I want to choose people who I can talk with. How can I talk with these fellows? Who do they represent? If they surrender arms, let them come forward and fight elections.

Q. *So you will not talk to them now.*

A. No. Let them get elected. We will also fight elections as a political party.

Q. *Do you think the LTTE will be finished before the elections?*

A. Yes. As a terrorist force they will be liquidated. They are withering away.

Q. *If the accord is working well, then why do you want a new Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Treaty? Are you under pressure to delete some provisions of the accord?*

A. That treaty is in connection with annexures attached with the accord. If India wants us to do certain things, we also want India to reciprocate by doing something for us. I am not under any pressure. I want to make it reciprocal.

Q. *What are the provisions in the annexures?*

A. Letters exchanged between Rajiv and me deal with the foreign trainers, use of Trincomalee port and the Voice of America broadcasts from Sri Lanka. We want India to assure us that she will not do anything against our interests.

Q. *But what do you want from India?*

A. If India wants anything to do with our harbour, broadcasting corporations and training facilities, I also want the same thing from them.

Q. *Foreign trainers, like Keeney Meeney and some Israeli security advisors, have not been sent back yet, though this was part of the understanding.*

"If India wants us to do certain things, we also want India to reciprocate.... We want India to assure us that she will not do anything against our interests."

"The IPKF must stay here in Sri Lanka only till the LTTE gives up. They will not be required after that.... They are here for restoring peace."

A. They won't go even now. Somebody must train our people here or abroad. We never said that they will go. We only promised that we will consider it.

Q. *If LTTE cadres surrender arms, will you grant them amnesty?*

A. I have already announced that all those who surrender arms and join democratic forces will be let off. Even Pirabhakaran.

Q. *Don't you think that India could train the Sri Lankan Army for you?*

A. India can't train both terrorists and the army. I told Rajiv that. But that is not the situation now. We will consider India's offer of training our forces.

Q. *Rajiv wants your assurance that Trincomalee port will not be used in any*

way against India's security interests. What do you want from Rajiv?

A. We want him to ensure that no harbour in India is used against Sri Lanka. Why should our ports be used against India? She is not our enemy.

Q. ***Are you saying that foreign trainers and other irritants to India will remain in Sri Lanka till a reciprocal arrangement is worked out?***

A. Yes, certainly. We have started discussions and are preparing a draft treaty.

Q. ***Rajiv Gandhi and the IPKF have paid a heavy price in implementing the accord. How do you propose to reciprocate this?***

PRAMOD PUSHKARNA



A. We will fulfil our part of the accord totally. That is the only way.

Q. ***Don't you think that Rajiv Gandhi has suffered a lot in the process?***

A. So have our people. Look at the refugees in Trincomalee. There were none earlier. There are a few thousand now.

Q. ***Have they become refugees after the IPKF operations?***

A. Yes. They are blaming the Indian troops. They are saying that IPKF personnel are the ones who harass them.

Q. ***Do you believe that?***

A. That is another matter. But they are saying that they left their homes due to the Indians only.

Q. ***Do you also believe the rumours that the IPKF will stay for a longer period than you had in mind?***

A. Statements of some of the Indian Army officials have been quoted in Parliament. But they have been refuted. The IPKF must stay here only till the LTTE gives up.

Q. ***Once the LTTE is eliminated and peace is restored, will you ask the IPKF to pack up?***

A. Yes, they will not be required after that.

Q. ***But under the accord, the IPKF has to stay on to ensure implementation of other clauses like holding the elections.***

A. No. They are here for restoring peace. There are different conditions for holding elections.

Q. ***Will you ask India to help you crush Janata Vimukthi Peramuna's (JVP) terrorism in the south?***

A. No. We are capable of handling them. They will be finished in a month.

Q. ***But they accuse the Government of not withdrawing the Prevention of Terrorism Act and arresting innocent people who raise a voice of dissent.***

A. I will withdraw the Act after the violence is over. They are killing elected people. People who take up arms are not entitled to normal laws in any democracy.

Q. ***Has the opposition from within your Government made it difficult for you to handle serious problems decisively?***

A. There is no opposition to me. The party has fully supported the accord. It is due to this that I have been able to implement our side of the accord. Only two members of Parliament opposed it and they have been expelled. Now the prime minister has moved legislation for conducting the elections.

Q. ***Under the accord, you were supposed to release all Tamils in Sri Lankan jails.***

A. I released 3,000 to 4,000 of them and they went and joined the terrorists.

Q. ***Now that the IPKF has been forced to fight the LTTE, where do you think things went wrong?***

A. Nothing went wrong except that they trusted the LTTE too much. The IPKF thought the LTTE cadres would give in. Instead of putting the blame on others, they should completely eliminate those fellows (the LTTE). Because of them, innocent people are dying.

Q. ***Rajiv Gandhi is being accused of doing your dirty work for you.***

A. We are just implementing an accord and nothing else.

Q. ***Why have some clauses like the return of Tamil refugees from Tamil Nadu not been implemented?***

A. I have not stopped any one. They are not returning because they are frightened. Jaffna is in turmoil now. There is also a problem of sending both Sinhalese and Muslim refugees back to the north and the east. They don't trust some members of the IPKF.

Q. ***What exactly do you want from the IPKF?***

A. They should complete their part of the deal. They have not yet taken away arms from the terrorists. They have to disarm the terrorists.

Q. ***The IPKF is killing them instead of disarming them.***

A. But they are not finished yet. Their primary job is to liquidate the terrorists in the north and the east.

Q. ***Do you perceive any role for the IPKF in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Sri Lanka?***

A. We are capable of doing that ourselves. They can offer us grants.

Q. ***Is the IPKF working under your directions?***

A. Yes, they have to work under my charge. But I don't go into the details of their operations on a daily basis. That is left to their commanders.

Q. ***Do you subscribe to the Opposition belief that the IPKF's presence in Sri Lanka is largely determined by India's designs in the region and that Rajiv Gandhi will not withdraw the IPKF in a hurry?***

A. No. I asked them to come here and I will ask them to go as well.

Q. ***Do you foresee them refusing to leave your country in the near future?***

A. I can't dream of this. I have full trust in Rajiv Gandhi and our ability to look after ourselves.

DECEMBER 31, 1987

CONFRONTATION

1

COLOMBO, Dec 1

Nine soldiers of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) were killed and five injured during the force's search operations in Sri Lanka's northern Jaffna peninsula in the past 24 hours.

In an incident in Trincomalee district, seven members of a Tamil family were shot dead by unidentified men today.

Five IPKF soldiers were killed and three injured when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) militants blew up the truck in which they were travelling. The truck hit a landmine at Peyadikoolankulam, 25 km east of the Vavuniya town, in the northern Sri Lankan province last night, sources in Vavuniya said.

There was an exchange of gunfire between the IPKF and the Tamil militants following the landmine blast, but the LTTE casualties, if any, were not immediately known.

In another incident, four IPKF men were killed and two injured when they came under the LTTE's sniper fire in the Pandatarippu town in the Northern province.

About 40 members of the LTTE also attacked the Batticaloa town police station on Monday evening, injuring one Indian soldier and two women. They fired mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons before a joint team of Sri Lankan police and Indian soldiers forced them to retreat five hours later.

"It's the most brazen attack in the town by the Tigers since the Indo-Sri Lanka pact was signed," according to a local resident. The police said the LTTE men fired from a building where the Government's chief administrator holds office and a bus stand, both about 300 metres from their target. Some residents said firing also came from a nearby lagoon. Mortar shells hit a shop, a nursing home and the police quarters where the three casualties were hit, eye-witnesses claimed.

A 36-hour curfew was ordered from 6 a.m. today and some 40 people were detained yesterday by the IPKF for questioning. Some 30 other suspected LTTE men were arrested in the northern Jaffna peninsula.

According to an External Affairs Ministry spokesman, nine IPKF soldiers and six LTTE men were killed in the last 24 hours of IPKF search operations. Five IPKF personnel were also wounded.

According to intelligence reports the LTTE was forcing its wounded cadres to take cyanide pills. The spokesman said many such incidents were being reported by the militants surrendering to the IPKF.

Two Fishermen were shot dead by the IPKF at Batticoloa.

2

NEW DELHI, Dec 2

In a significant development, 82 hardcore members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, including some senior sector commanders, were apprehended by the Indian Peace Keeping Force in search operations in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka in the last 48 hours.

An External Affairs Ministry spokesman said here today that the LTTE militants offered 'virtually little or no resistance and later questioning revealed that 'the bulk of them were waiting to surrender. Some of them had weapons and others had thrown away their arms at the time of capture.

The spokesman said although the militants were apprehended the IPKF had agreed to extend the package of facilities offered to those who surrendered. They have been promised full safety and security, food, stipend, and training or education to enable them to join the mainstream of political life in Sri Lanka as law abiding citizens. In all 108 LTTE members, including the hardcore cadres, have given themselves up.

Senior militants

Among the senior LTTE militants now in the custody of the IPKF are Nandakumar alias Selvan responsible for LTTE operations in Jaffna and Nandan, who were captured around the Nallur Kandasamy temple. Two senior leaders, Manmadan and Ramesh Kumar were apprehended in Achchuveli yesterday. Manmadan was in charge of the LTTE operations in the Jaffna peninsula, including its communications network. He was one of the few sector commanders reporting directly to the LTTE deputy leader, Mr. Ajit Mahatiya.

The spokesman said the reason for 'the first ever' mass surrender of the LTTE cadres was the rehabilitation package announced by the IPKF recently. Also, the "cyanide pill treatment' being given to wounded cadres had convinced them of the futility of the armed conflict with the IPKF.

Grenade attack

Intelligence reports had revealed that there was a growing feeling among a section of the LTTE leadership that the "armed struggle was being conducted for the personal glorification" of individual leaders. This had also been confirmed in the testimony of the LTTE militants who had surrendered, the spokesman said.

However, the LTTE had continued acts of intimidation of the local populace. In the second incident of its kind since the IPKF operations began, two hand grenades were lobbed at Tamil civilians collecting rations at Kottadi, near Navatkuli at 9 a.m. yesterday. Unlike the Chavakacheri incident of November 29 when five civilians lost their lives, no casualties had been reported in this incident. "This act would indicate the growing desperation of the LTTE leadership and the continued intimidation of the local people, who are increasingly cooperating with the IPKF," the spokesman said.

As part of its relief activities, the IPKF provided assistance for the conduct of examinations in the Vidyalika Mahavidyala in Trincomalee. Medical help was being provided to all the hospitals in Jaffna town.

In the last 24 hours, the IPKF has lost one soldier and one has been wounded while four LTTE members were killed. In search operations the IPKF seized large quantities of hand grenades, Claymore mines, remote controlled devices, and 4,320 rounds of ammunition. At Mannar, a naval unit of the IPKF captured a boat with four LTTE cadres and 1,600 detonators.

3

It was reported that Indian troops halted a bus and shot dead 11 passengers while other troops attacked a village and killed at least 21 residents in Batticaloa (*3 Dec.*). FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW • 17 DECEMBER 1987

Colombo, Dec. 3 (UNI): At least 43 people, including nine Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) personnel and about ten Tamil militants, were killed and 31 injured in an ambush and exchange of fire in Sri Lanka's eastern Batticaloa district on Wednesday informed sources here said today.

The sources said the incident occurred at Ottamawadi, near Valachenai, about 35 km north of Batticaloa town.

An IPKF convoy, returning to Batticaloa after distributing food to their units in the Valachenai area, was ambushed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) using mortar, grenades and small arms fire from the front and rear of the convoy.

Sources said nine IPKF men, including a major, were killed and ten injured in the ambush. Earlier reports that the dead officer was a colonel was incorrect, they said.

At least ten militants and 24 civilians, including women and children, were killed and 21 injured when the IPKF directed fire at houses from where the LTTE men were firing at them. The battle reportedly continued for over two hours.

Meanwhile, an Indian High Commission spokesman denied the allegation of a Muslim MP from Batticaloa, Mr. Razwi Sinna Lebbe, that 25 Muslims were killed and 200 injured when the IPKF shelled Ottamawadi village following the ambush.

The spokesman said it was possible that "there or four" civilians died in the exchange of fire between the two sides. He said the IPKF was investigating the incident.

People living in villages around the army camps at Mullaitivu have been asked to move out immediately, from yesterday by the IPKF. There was indiscriminate shelling from the Oddusuddan camp between 05.00 hrs and 09.00 hrs yesterday. People have started fleeing into the jungle.

IPKF have looted houses and shops in Mulliyawalai Thaneerootru and Watrapalai in the Mullaitivu district.

The IPKF has destroyed equipments in the Mullaitivu, Mulliyawalai and Puthukudyiruppu government hospital. The people of the Mullaitivu district are suffering without medical facilities. Upto date 7 people have died due to brain fever.

A youth admitted to Mullaitivu hospital with snake bite injury was taken away the IPKF and shot.

2 women were raped in Araiyampathy and Punnanai in the Batticoloa district.

6 civilians were shot dead yesterday by the IPKF at Kiyavedduvan in Batticoloa yesterday.

41 civilians including more than 25 Tamil speaking muslims were shot dead and more than 50 were injured when the IPKF opened fire at Oddamavady in Batticoloa. They also burnt 8 shops.

The Oddamavady bazaar was also burnt.

4 civilians were shot dead by the IPKF at Kallady, Batticaloa.

The IPKF stopped a bus coming from Colombo to Batticoloa at KIRAN at 06.30 hrs and ordered 15 passengers to get down at shot them. 12 people were killed and 3 were injured.

At Kiyavedduvan on 3.12.87 in Batticoloa 6 civilians killed by IPKF.

At Kiran, a civilian bus going from Colombo to Batticoloa stopped by the IPKF.

4

Four women including 3 Tamil speaking Muslim women were raped by the IPKF at Kallady in Batticoloa. One of the Muslim girls committed suicide later.

The IPKF opened fire near petrol shed at Oddamavady in Batticoloa. 3 people were killed and one was injured.

One Mohan was killed due to the indiscriminate shelling by the IPKF at Kallapady Model village at 09.30 hrs.

5

COLOMBO, Dec. 5.

At least seven persons were reported killed today in attacks allegedly by the LTTE.

The militants raided a farm in Mankulam village in Vavunia district and shot dead five members of the rival Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front, official sources said.

The sources said two people were also killed and four wounded in Killinochchi in Vavunia when the Tigers attacked a college building, which had been turned into a refugee camp.

All the seven killed were Tamils, sources said. — AP

COLOMBO, Dec. 5.

The acting Indian High Commissioner of India to Sri Lanka, Mr. Nirupam Sen, explaining the circumstances under which nine members of the IPKF were killed and 10 others injured, said today that the LTTE attacked the IPKF first with mortars and automatic weapons from entrenched positions in houses at Ottamawadi in Batticaloa district on Wednesday.

During a meeting here yesterday with the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister, Mr. A. C. S. Hameed, which was also attended by the Defence Service Adviser to the Indian Mission, Capt. B. K. Gupta, and the Secretary, Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence, Gen. D. S. Attygalle, Mr. Sen made it clear that there were no incidents of arson, looting or damage to any mosque.

Victims of cross-fire: The acting High Commissioner, according to the release, had said that the IPKF had to neutralise the firing from the village and in the cross-fire, 25 persons were killed, 21 others injured and 18 houses damaged.

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

URUMPIRAI

Nirmala Alagammah	Kanthan Vai
S. Navaratnam	Nallammah Rasiah
K. Sirinivasan	K. Appathurai
M. Ehamparam	**Varaledchumy**
E. Dorothy	**S. Komathy**
G. Kirishanthi	**S. Girija**
M. Sivakolunthu	S. Kiritharan
V. Vijayasingam	S. Jeyatharan
Kunchan Muthu	S. Uthayatharan
K. Susiladevi	**Annammah**
A. Mathiaparanam	S. Sabaratnam
Puthiyan Kasiyan	**S. Pakiam**
S. Dharmavathy	Sangarapillai
N. Ponnammah	N. Sivalingarasa
S. Markandu	Arulanantham
Kanthan Ratnam	Rajappah
S. Sellathurai	T. Santhakumar
M. Vigneswaran	K. Thilainadarajah
Oathan Kandiah	**R. Nallammah**
A. Markandu	S. Kandiah
Manuel James	P. Arooran
Subathirai Som	A. Amirtharaja
T. Gunapalasingam	T. Thangaraja
T. Somalingam	E. Sivaraja
L. Somalingam	S. Mohan
S. Poonaratnam	K. Sellappah
P. Rasammah	**V. Virhalaranee**
Leelavathy	S. Thaasan
P. Dharmachandran	**Sahathevan**
Dushantini	S. Nageswaran
Ambika	S. Vanajan
Rasathura	**S. Meenalogini**
Poothar Kanagu	R. Tharmakulathasan
V. Manmatharasa	N. Kathiresu

These are the names of the Tamil speaking Muslims killed by the IPKF at Siaweduwan. Some were shot dead inside the Mosque.

Noor Mohamed Mohamed Ismail	M (55)
Ahamed Lebbey Shaul Hameed	M (14)
Shaul Hameed Mahoonbiva	F (14)
Shaul Hameed Hithaya	F (07)
Shaul Hameed Najeem	M (1 1/2)
Aliyar Raheem Umma	F (35)
Mustapa Lebbey Nusrath Riswin	F (13)
Uduman Lebbey Amanullah	M (13)
Hareem Lebbey Salaika Ummah	F (45)
Mohamed Abdul Quathir Mohameed Ismail	M (37)
Casim Daba Refeek	M (04)
Adak Mohamed Meera Sahiboo	M (35)
Noordeen Asalam	M (35)

Premavathy (16) and Hameed Sadd (60) were shot dead at PIRANTHARA CHENIA in VALAICHENAI by the IPKF.

The business establishments of the following Tamil speaking Muslims were destroyed by the IPKF at Kilaveddu-wan in Batticolao.

K.M. Ibrahim	4 shops burnt
H.L. Adam Baba	2 shops burnt
Meera Saiboo Adam Bawa	Tea shop
A. Adam Bawa	Tea shop
M. Mohamed Saiboo	Ice Factory
M. Adam Bawa	Tyre Shop
H.M. Ahamed	Tailor Shop
Umaroon Lebbey	Groceries
M.L. Buhari	Timber Depot
A.M. Buhari	Betel (Pan) Shop

Valaichenai Kuran School was also burnt by the IPKF.

6

Colombo, Dec. 6 (PTI): Seven people, including five members of a rival Tamil militant group, were killed by the LTTE and at least 25 Tamil tigers were arrested in north Sri Lanka, published reports and the State news agency reported on Sunday.

The five militants were killed when LTTE cadres attacked rival Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) members with grenades and small arms at Mankulam in Vavuniya early on Saturday, State-owned *'Sunday Observer'*, quoting a security forces spokesman, said.

Some LTTE men opened fire at a school, 'Madhya Maha Vidyalaya', in Killinochchi on Saturday morning to disrupt an examination being held there, the *Observer* said.

It said a burst from an automatic weapon fired at the school hit the inmates of a refugee camp adjoining the school.

The national news agency Lankapuvath reported today that during the Indian Peace Keeping Force operations, at least 25 persons were captured and 15,000 rounds of ammunition seized at Urumpirai, Kopay and Kondavil near Jaffna town during the last 48 hours.

Four civilians killed in Kalliwanchikuddy and Vandarumoolai in Batticaloa due to aerial bombardment.

An old man was shot dead by the IPKF near their camp at the 5th Mile post, Araivampathy in Batticoloa.

8

New Delhi, Dec. 8 (UNI): About 50 boats carrying LTTE personnel have been destroyed or captured during joint patrolling by the Indian and Sri Lankan navies in the Palk Straits and off the Lankan east coast.

A 'naval spokesman here said the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was reeling under the near total naval blockade by the naval ships, aircraft, helicopters and commandos on the northern and eastern coasts of the island.

He said naval ships were maintaining continuous surveillance over a length of 450 km in the Palk Bay and the Lankan east coast with a clear mandate to use necessary force when required.

Colombo, Dec. 8 (PTI): The leaders of the militant People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and an associate were killed in a major battle with LTTE men in north Sri Lanka, official sources said here today.

9

COLOMBO, Dec. 9.

At least eight Indian soldiers and three LTTE persons were killed during the past 72 hours in Jaffna peninsula and the north-western district of Mullaitivu in different incidents, as the IPKF continued its search operations recovering substantial quantity of explosives from the fleeing LTTE cadres, authoritative reports said today.

Six IPKF personnel were killed on Sunday at Karachi, Kudirupu in Mullaitivu district, when a mortar launcher they were using in a confrontation with the LTTE "terrorists" allegedly backfired, the English daily *Sun* reported quoting sources.

A senior official of the Indian High Commission, when asked about the incident, said "these things happen at times during operation". He, however, could not immediately confirm the number of casualties.

Three LTTE persons and two members of the IPKF were left dead yesterday in two separate engagements at Kondavil in Jaffna peninsula, the national news agency "Lankapuvath" reported quoting official sources.

In one encounter, the three LTTE cadres were killed and four other militants wouned, while one Indian soldier also lost his life.

In another engagement at Kondavil North, one Indian soldier was killed and another injured.

The Indian High Commission official said that they had information till now about the death of one IPKF man and injury to another at Kondavil yesterday. It might be that another soldier was also killed, he added.

Lankapuvath also reported that two camouflaged trucks and tractors moving along the coastal route in eastern Sri Lanka were destroyed yesterday by naval patrol boats firing from ship to shore.

According to the news agency, one civilian was killed in crossfire when the Sri Lankan security forces repulsed an attack by the LTTE elements at Akkaraipattu in eastern Batticaloa district yesterday.

The LTTE "terrorists" also fired at a police patrol at Srunutara in eastern Trincomalee district yesterday. The police countered the attack and one civilian was wounded in the crossfire.

At Sammanthurai, in Baticaloa district, a bakery manager was gunned down yesterday by a "gang of LTTE terrorists", the news agency added.

Continuous curfew in Vadamarachy from the 5th to the 7th.

3 civilians who had participated in the fast to death campaign supporting Thilagam were arrested by the IPKF at Point Pedro.

17 civilians were shot dead at Kondavil by the IPKF.

10

Four policemen were injured when their jeep exploded after hitting a landmine planted by the LTTE at Walathapitiya in Eastern Amparai district today. All the injured have been removed to hospital.

11

COLOMBO, Dec. 11.

Sixteen Tamil militants were killed and scores wounded seriously in fighting between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the rival Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation, it was reported here today. Government sources in Colombo said the clashes took place in Vavuniya, northern Sri Lanka.

The sources said TELO militants killed 15 LTTE men when they raided a hideout in Vappamkulam in the Vavuniya district last night. One TELO member was killed and there were many injured on both sides.

The fighting continued today and the militants were reportedly using heavy artillery and rocket launchers, the sources said. Before the latest clashes, the LTTE had killed three TELO members close to Vavuniya and three members of the rival Peoples Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOT).

Many houses were burnt by the IPKF at Pallakaduvettai in Vallaicherai. Karaitivukanaki Amman Temple damaged by the Sri Lankan Police Commandos.

2 people shot dead by the IPKF at Katupulam in Thondamannar.

15 civilians were killed by the IPKF Thivukallai in the Amparai District.

20 females were raped by the IPKF at Manipay yesterday.

13

PLOT man killed: The LTTE men killed a member of the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOT) on Saturday after pulling him from a bus, residents in the area said. The LTTE also lost one of its men in a reprisal attack.

A 10-year-old boy was cut down in crossfire between the LTTE and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) in Vavuniya district on Friday. The LTTE spokesman said one TELO fighter had been killed in Friday's fighting and denied reports that his group had suffered any dead.

14

COLOMBO, Dec. 14.

At least 10 Tamil militants died in battles between rebel groups today in northern Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan military officials said.

The officials said LTTE men detonated explosives under an Indian military convoy last night in eastern Sri Lanka resulting in one soldier dead and wounding nine others, besides destroying a jeep. It occurred near Tirukkovil, 60 km south of Batticaloa.

Fighting between LTTE men and the other Tamil groups began yesterday near Mannar. It continued today, the officials said.

The independent *Sun* newspaper said 25 persons were killed in the fighting, but military officials could only confirm ten deaths.

Colombo, Dec. 14 (UNI): One Indian jawan was killed and eight wounded when Liberation Tigers (LTTE) ambushed a foot patrol with a cylinder mine at Akkaraipattu in Lanka's Amparai district on Sunday night, authoritative sources said here on Monday.

Four civilian died due to indiscriminate firing by the IPKF at Eravur.

16

COLOMBO, Dec. 16.

At least 22 people, including seven LTTE cadres, and five Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) soldiers were killed when Tamil militants attacked two villages and ambushed an IPKF patrol in Sri Lanka's North and East overnight, authoritative sources here said today. However, Reuter put the toll at 33.

They said about 30 men of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam attacked two adjoining villages — Sungavila and Devalagodalla on the Trincomalee-Polonnaruwa districts' border in the Eastern Province, killing eight, seven Sinhalese and one Muslim.

The sources said the militants first attacked a Muslim's house at Sungavila and shot him dead when he fired at them with a shotgun. After looting cash and jewellery from the house, they attacked Devalagodalla village, a Buddhist pilgrim centre and shot dead seven persons, including the caretaker of a Buddhist temple. Two women and two children were among those killed. The militants were believed to have come from Muttur in Trincomalee district.

THE SUNDAY TIMES, Sunday December 6, 19

Wednesday's tragedy at Valaichenai

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

URUMPIRAI	
Joseph Newton	P. Mahesan
R. Ganesh	Manickam Sathialingam
A. Manoharan	*VARANI*
V. Sinnavan	V. Sasikaran
S. Yoganathan	Nagan Thavarajah
S. Vallikandan	T. Jeyaratnam
K. Balasivam	*VANNARPANNAI*
S. Ratnam	K. Thangarasa
T. Jeevaratnam	T. Nadarajah
R. Kailanathan	S. Rajeevan
N. Sachithananthan	K. Sivalingam
Sithampari	N. Navanesalingam
S. Lankanathan	P. Nageswary
S. Kavitha	P. Selvaratnam
S. Mahatheva	K. Thanaludchumy
P. Kanthiah	S. Nageswary
P. Nagamuthu	S. Nagammah
S. Pathmanathan	R. Annaludchumy
R. Arumugam	I. Subramaniam
A. Soosimani	*URELU*
V. Sinnavan	S. Kandimathy
K. Murugan	M. Karuppi
T. Kathiry	M.Tharmabalasingam
K. Shanmugam	Parameswary
S. Ratnapal	Kamaleswary
V. Kandiah	Sinthiya
V. Visvapillai	P. Kavitha
A. Annaledchumy	Manicham Ponni
M. Vairavi	M. Kandiah
M. Kanesn	M. Sivanes
VASAVILAN	A. Logeswaran
I.S. Sundarampillai	R. Lalitha
S. Sivapaikiam	S. Thangammah
S. Srikaran	S. Yoganathan

Ambush: Five IPKF men were killed and six wounded when the militants ambushed an IPKF patrol with a landmine at Mullaivali in the north-eastern Mullaitivu district, according to the sources They also said seven LTTE men were killed in the exchange of fire between the two sides.

17

COLOMBO, Dec. 17.

Four Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) personnel were killed and one was injured when Tamil militants blew up their vehicle with a landmine in the northern Killinochchi district today. According to informed sources here, the incident occurred south of Murukandy junction.

Meanwhile, the IPKF had arrested 13 LTTE men in the eastern Batticaloa sector during the last 24 hours.

The sources said the LTTE, which had already been pushed out of the Jaffna peninsula, was under pressure from the IPKF in the rest of the Northern Province and the East.

The recovery of large quantities of arms from hideouts in Jaffna peninsula during the last few days was an indication that the IPKF operations to disarm the militants would soon near completion. All the recoveries were made following information provided by the public, the sources said.

Reports from the eastern Batticaloa town said an attack by the militants on the local police station last night was repulsed by the IPKF and the police.

Batticaloa residents also reported a confrontation between the police and the militants near the Kallady bridge this afternoon. No details were available.

Denied: The Indian High Commission today denied a report in the Government-controlled *Daily News*, quoting official sources, that 20 civilians had been killed in an exchange of fire between the IPKF and the LTTE at Mullaitivu on Tuesday.

The spokesman said both the Sri Lankan Joint Operations Command and the Defence Ministry had said that they were not aware of any civilian casualties in the incident, in which five IPKF soldiers and six LTTE men were killed — UNI

18

TELO man killed: A TELO leader, Kandeepan was killed by the LTTE, after being pulled out of a vehicle in Mannar on Saturday last, according to sources in Madras.

In Trincomalee, 15 ENDLF men were arrested by IPKF for indulging in lawless acts including robbery. Local residents had complained to Indian authorities leading to the arrests.

19

A former president of a citizens' committee in Eastern Batticaloa district, a gram sevaka of Ambalanthurai in the same district, and an IPKF personnel were reported to have been killed on Friday by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Mr. Sugathadasan and Mr. Sundaranayagam were shot dead for allegedly providing information about the movements of the LTTE to the IPKF, authoritative reports reaching here from the Eastern province said today. The two men were dragged out of their homes and shot dead near a school, it was learnt.

In another incident, an IPKF soldier was killed and another wounded in a landmine explosion at Mallakam

20

NEW DELHI, Dec. 20.

Two militants belonging to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were killed and five injured yesterday in a fierce fight with the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) at Cuttumalai in Sri Lanka's Northern province, an official spokesman said here today.

He said the injured threw away their weapons and escaped, indicating that the morale of the LTTE cadres was low. The IPKF seized four AK-47 rifles, two M-16 rifles, one G-3 rifle, 1,421 rounds of ammunition and 13 hand grenades.

The spokesman said 33 LTTE personnel were apprehended in the last 24 hours in the northern province and two LTTE cadres, including one woman, surrendered

21

NEW DELHI, Dec. 21.

Thirteen LTTE militants and two Indian soldiers were killed in intensive combing operations launched by the Indian Peace-Keeping Force in Sri Lanka's Jaffna Peninsula durinfg the past 24 hours, reports from Colombo said.

According to official reports received here today, the militants killed five civilians, including two women, following their refusal to lend assistance.

Fierce fighting was on at Urelu (north of Urumpirai) following detection of a group of 30 to 40 LTTE militants operating in the area.

Thirteen militants were killed and two injured in the operations. Seven AK-47 rifles, one G-3 rifle and four other rifles along with a carbine and some ammunition were recovered in the area. Nineteen were apprehended.

At Nunavil 8 IPKF personnel were caught in landmines set by the LTTE and lost lives.

23

NEW DELHI, Dec. 23.

In a major clash, 10 militants belonging to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were killed and two wounded during search operations in the Urumparai area in the past 24 hours. Giving this information the Foreign Office spokesman said here today that there were no Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) casualties in this incident.

An IPKF patrol was ambushed in Chavakachcheri resulting in three IPKF jawans being killed and four wounded. The IPKF has been patrolling the area intensively in the past week following the discovery there of one of the largest LTTE ammunition dumps in the Jaffna peninsula.

In two other incidents — in Arukulam and in an area north of Kokuvil — the LTTE lost three militants in exchanges with the IPKF.

24

A LTTE Cadre Vikki died in round up by IPKF and 13 of LTTE Cadres also attained Martyrdom in the roundup at Urelivil. Ten LTTE Cadres including Murali and Gandhi were shot dead in an IPKF roundup at Urumpirary Selvapuram. Among them 5 were women fighters. 5 Srilankan soldiers were killed in a shell-attack by LTTE at Kumpirupitti, Trinacomalee

25

Three IPKF personnel were killed and 6 wounded in an attack by LTTE at Thirukkunamadu.

26

New Delhi, Dec. 26 (UNI): Six Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) personnel were killed and eight injured when the Liberation Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) fired mortar bomb at an IPKF post north of Trincomalee last evening.

One LTTE man was killed and 27 members were apprehended or made to surrender during the IPKF operation in the North and Eastern Provinces in the past 24 hours, official sources said today.

The IPKF seized huge cache of arms and ammunition during the 'cordon and search' operation at various places in Jaffna Province.

A naval helicopter attacked and destroyed a suspiciously moving speed boat off Baticaloa on Monday last. Five men were on board.

The IPKF shot dead 4 Civilians at Mavadi Vembu, Vandarumoolai of Batticoloa.

27

COLOMBO, Dec. 27.

At least 26 people including a police official were killed and more than 20 wounded during a shoot-out in the main market area of Batticaloa town in eastern Sri Lanka today, residents and authoritative sources said.

The shoot-out which lasted more than an hour, from 0915 hours, came after suspected members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam fired on a group of Sri Lankan policemen who were shopping in the busy Sunday Bazar area, killing one police official and injuring two.

The injured policemen were flown to Colombo for treatment.

Sources close to the Batticaloa Citizens' Committee said that after the incident there was shooting all around.

Cyclists were asked to alight and shot at point blank range. People scurried for cover from the blazing guns of the security personnel. But many were shot on the run, their bodies slumping to the road, residents alleged.

According to residents, the Sri Lankan policemen were mainly responsible for the "indiscriminate" shootout after gunmen killed the policeman.

Rifle snatched

The residents said a group of militants, believed to be LTTE members, fired at three policemen buying fish in the market killing one of them and injuring the other two. They then snatched the rifle which one of the policemen was carrying and escaped in a waiting car.

Following the incident, a large number of enraged policemen rushed out from the police station, separated from the market by only a boundary wall, and allegedly opened fire on the people. A number of shops were set on fire and at least eight people were trapped in the burning shops.

At least 15 shops were gutted. Another version had it that some electric wires got snapped during the shoot-out and fire broke out due to short-circuit.

According to the residents, some people were shot more than a quarter of a mile away from the market area.

Continuous firing

The Roman Catholic Bishop's house near the market was damaged in the firing. A priest at the bishop's residence said continuous firing was heard from the police station for three hours until noon local time today, suggesting that the militants may have launched an attack on the police station after ambushing the policemen. (Some reports said the militants attacked the Aranthalawa police station on the Batticaloa-Amparai border later in the day. Details were not available.)

The priest said people stayed indoors and shops closed as the latest violence broke out

A church spokesman said windows of a house where priests lived was damaged, as were some shops. Residents on the other side of a lagoon that divides the shopping area were stranded, he said.

"They are hiding inside houses... unable to get on to deserted streets.

A church official said people were dragged out of shops in the market square and shot by the police. "There are at least six bodies lying on the deserted streets," he said.

Hospital sources said three of the dead were children under 14.

According to authoritative sources, 19 bodies were brought to Batticaloa hospital and there might be nine or 10 more in different parts of the bazar area. More than 18 injured were taken to the Batticaloa hospital. Nine of the injured are said to be in a serious condition.

The official Lankapuvath news agency however, said 18 persons including one policeman were killed. Quoting official sources, it said 17 civilians were caught in the "crossfire"

The sources, according to Lankapuvath, said that following the attack by the LTTE, the Sri Lankan police and the Indian Peace-Keeping Force had retaliated and fired "back at the terrorists."

(Operation Pawan)

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

URELU	
Y. Thushiyanthan	T. Mahendran
N. Kamaladevi	K. Thavarajah
S. Nadarajah	M. Suntharam
M. Mathivathani	R. Rassanayakamah
A. Luxmy	K. Vasanthan
T. Ethiramanosingam	P. Rajeswaran
M. Vamadevi	K. Sritharan
T. Saraswathy	Eliayan Ramu
S. Rajalingam	A. Yogeswaran
S. Thaiyalmuthu	**UDUVIL**
V. Maiyvaganam	K. Kumarasamy
V. Anpalakan	Christy Ronald
A. Balasubramanium	Danial Joseph
S. Ariyanayagam	P. Gnanakily
Kasi Valliammai	V.Balasingam
B. Nirmaladevi	A. Jasintha
P. Tharmanayagam	T. Jesaratnam
T. Prabhakaran	Christy Ronald
K. Santhakumar	V. Balasingam
M. Sinniah	D. Joseph
K. Puvanendran	T. Jeyaratnam
S. Pooranam	Jacintha Asservathan
Kandiah	P. Gnanakili
S. Sinnammah	N. THambipillai
S. Vaithiyalingam	M. Arumailingam
K. Suppiah	T. Nanthakopalan
N. Sinnathangam	Vallipuram Sababathy
K. Kannammah	S. Sivakumar
S. Vaithiyalngam	K. Kumarasamy
K. Suppiah	Nagamuthu Manikan
N. Sinnathamby	A. Balasubramaniam
V. Nallammah	K. Varatharajah
K. Sriskandarajah	K.Gopalapillai
N. Seethe[illegible]	K. Kumarasamy

NEW DELHI, Dec. 27.

One of the largest underground arms dump of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was discovered by the Indian Peace-Keeping Force in Manipai in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka in the last 24 hours. According to an official spokesman, a total of six rifles, 11,561 rounds of small arms ammunition, 416 bombs, 497 grenades, 400 kg of explosives, seven mines and two radio sets were recovered from the dump. Underground caches have also been discovered at Navali and Arunakal in the Jaffna peninsula.

The IPKF has of late been discovering a large number of secret arms and ammunition dumps of the LTTE in the Northern Province due to the increasing cooperation of the local populace.

Thirteen LTTE cadres, including a self-styled captain have been killed in clashes between the IPKF and the LTTE. A total of 105 LTTE militants have been apprehended in search and cordon operations in the Northern Province.

In the Vavunia sector of the Eastern Province, a member of the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam was captured with his rifle while in the Batticaloa sector ships of the Eastern Naval Command engaged two boats off the coast. One boat carrying arms was sunk and 12 LTTE cadres killed. Three militants were apprehended.

The spokesman clarified yesterday's report which said that six IPKF soldiers were killed in a mortar attack by the LTTE on December 24. According to detailed information available only one IPKF jawan was killed in that incident.

PTI reports:

In Koddikamam area, an LTTE "Captain" Karunakam was killed in a clash with the IPKF and two LTTE cadres were apprehended.

Two persons were killed in crossfire during two encounters between the IPKF and the LTTE at Kattankudy and Ottamawadi in Batticaloa district yesterday, Lankapuvath said in Colombo, quoting official sources.

In another incident, a reserve police constable was stabbed to death late last night outside a restaurant at Nugegoda on the outskirts of Colombo, according to police.

Bandara's bodyguard (O.I.C.) was shot dead by LTTE at Batticoloa Town. In retaliation Srilankan soldiers wantonly killed 18 Civilians and wounded 13. Many among them were women and children. 12 muslim fishermen were killed by Indian Helicopter attack at Mankeni.

28

At Chenkalady one innocent youth was killed by IPKF.

29

In a shell attack by IPKF on Chenkalady Hospital, three Civilians, including one old man and a boy were killed.

30

Nine Muslims killed: Tamil militants kidnapped nine men in a Muslim-dominated village today and left their bullet-riddled bodies nearby in revenge for the deaths of six Tamils, a military official said.

At least 15 persons died in fighting between Muslims and Tamils in eastern Sri Lanka in 48 hours, the official said.

"A shadowy Muslim movement calling themselves Jihad (Holy War) has killed six known members of the Tamil Tigers during the past two days" said the official, who could not be identified under briefing rules.

He said the six LTTE men were killed near Batticaloa, 230 km northeast of Colombo. The LTTE men on Wednesday raided Kathankudi village, 5 km south of Batticaloa, in retaliation and kidnapped nine men, the official said. Their bodies were found later.

A spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry said that the Tamil "tigers" had been trying to smuggle the arms in the eastern province along the coastline between Trincomalee and Batticaloa. The helicopters operating from the Navy frigate 'Nilgiri' spotted them and took prompt action.

The spokesman said that on Tuesday two boats trying to smuggle arms were located from a helicopter.

At Batticoloa one LTTE Cadre and an Islamic Tamil Youth were killed by Homeguards. This Homeguards setup, 'Jihad' is financed by Sri Lankan Government. In reliatory attacks, the LTTE Killed 30 'Jihad' personnel at Kathankudy.

31

COLOMBO, Dec. 31.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam today claimed to have killed 30 members of Muslim fundamentalist group "Jehad" at Kattankudy near Sri Lanka's eastern Batticaloa town.

An LTTE spokesperson told journalists in Batticaloa that they had captured 20 members of the "Jehad" and were questioning them about the killing of an LTTE member "Nazir", on Tuesday night.

However, the Batticaloa police said they had received reports of only five persons — three Tamils and two Muslims — being killed in Kattankudy.

Aircraft attacked: The LTTE militants today dramatically directed rocket-propelled grenade at a Sri Lanka Air Force avro-748 while it was landing at the eastern Batticaloa airport on its routine flight from Colombo, according to official sources. The aircraft was slightly damaged, Lanka Puvath said.

The security forces, according to the news agency, took up positions and in a retaliatory fire, forced to the militants to withdraw.

Four LTTE boats capsize: Four boats belonging to the LTTE capsized this evening off Kathankudy in the eastern Batticaloa district when IPKF helicopters strafed them, sources said. It was not immediately known how many people were aboard the sunken vessels.

A Sri Lankan Air Force Plane was attacked by LTTE at Batticoloa. Lt. Visu op LTTE attained Martyrdom in the retaliatory fire by another Sri Lankan plane in the same place.

Dhanabal of LTTE was killed and Gadafi wounded in an ambush by IPKF at Kathankudi.

6 IPKF personnel were killed in a land attack by LTTE at 9th mile post hear Mankulam. An Indian Army Truck was completly destroyed.

வீர வணக்கம்

LTTE MARTYRS

Rohan 1.12.87	Thanthom 12.12.87
2nd Lt. Raji 2.12.87	Capt. Gandhi 23.12.87
Vellai 6.12.87	Nidhi 23.12.87
Thiruchelvam 15.12.87	Cheran 24.12.87
Capt. Vikram 16.12.87	Mari 29.12.87
Shakila 20.12.87	Jayacha 1.12.87
Pawan 20.12.87	Sivakumar 22.12.87
Sudhu 24.12.87	Danush 18.12.87
Kandi 24.12.87	Das 21.12.87
Murali 24.12.87	Ravi 21.12.87
Nazeer 30.12.87	Logendram 21.12.87
Dhanabal 31.12.87	Santhan 21.12.87
Kavar 14.12.87	Nila 23.12.87
Mohamed 12.12.87	Lt. Sudhan 15.12.87
Nikintha 23.12.87	Maj. Murali 23.12.87
Bharath 9.12.87	Mavi 31.12.87
Anton 9.12.87	Mohan 31.12.87
Shankar 11.12.87	Visu 31.12.87

வாள், வலந்தர, மறுப் பட்டன
செவ் வானத்து வனப்புப் போன்றன!
தாள், களங்கொளக், கழல் பறைந்தன;
கொல் ஏற்றின் மருப்புப் போன்றன;
தோல், துவைத்து அம்பின் துளைதோன்றுவ,
நிலைக்கு ஒராஅ இலக்கம் போன்றன;
மாவே, எறிபதத்தான் இடங் காட்டக்,
கறுழ்பொருத செவ்வாயான்,
எருத்து வவ்விய புலி போன்றன;
களிறே, கதவு எறியாச், சிவந்து உராஅய்,
நுதிமழுங்கிய வெண்கோட்டான்,
உயிர்உண்ணும் கூற்றுப்போன்றன;
நீயே, அலங்குஉளைப் பரீஇ இவுளிப்
பொலந் தேர்மிசைப் பொலிவு தோன்றி,
மாக்கடல் நிவந்தெழுதரும்

செஞ்ஞாயிற்றுக் கவினைமாதோ!
அனையை ஆகன் மாறே,
தாயில் தூவாக் குழவி போல,
ஓவாது கூஉம், நின் உடற்றியோர் நாடே.

பரணர்

Lt. Sudhan 15.12.87

Vikram 16.12.87

Dhanabal 31.12.87

Mathi 31.12.87

Visu 31.12.87

Mavi

Cap. Gandhi 23.12.87

Shankar 11.12.87

Mohan 31.12.87

Maj. Murali 23.12.87

KILLING FIELD 87 December

claims	IPKF		LTTE		S.L. ARMY		OTHER MILITANTS		CIVILIANS	
	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED
IPKF	9	6	6	30c					7	2
LTTE			1						2	
MEDIA										

2

1	1	4	86c						
		1							

3

9*	10*	10*	31*					35*	21*
								70	53

4

								4	1

5

						5 EN		2	4
								15	

6

			25c*						
		1						5	

8

						2 P*			

9

8*		3*	4*					2*	1*
								17	3c

10

				4*					

11

		15				4T 3P			
								17	

12

13

						1 T		1	
						1 T			

14

1*	9*								
								4	

15

		1							

16

5	6	7						8	
		1							

17

4	1		13c						

18

						1 T	15c EN		

19

1	1							2	

20

		2	35c						
		2							

21

2		13	19c					5	
8									



23

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6	8		27c					4	

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		13	105 c	1*	2*		1c P	27*	18*
						1		30	13

28

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6		2	1					3	

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31

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TOTAL										
	49	46	94	37 34c	1	6	16	16c	102	46
	17	6	12	1	5		2		198	67 33c

* - Sri Lankan Information.c-captured. EP-EPRLF T-TELO, P:PLOTE, EN-ENDLF, E-EROS TNA-Tamil National Army CVF-Citizen s Voluntary Force

CHAPTER 7



1988

the heinous crimes of indian peace keeping

January

13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20
21 IPKF comes under severe criticism in Lankan Parliament.	22	23	24
25	26 JR visits India as a host on its republic day LTTE calls for general strike.	27	28
29	30	31	

THE STATESMAN

EDITORIAL

1.1.88

WARNING BELLS IN LANKA

In the unfortunate murder of Harsha Abeywardene, chairman of Sri Lanka's ruling United National Party, underlined the inherent limitations of confronting the outlawed Janatha Vimukti Peramuna with the counter-violence of the Green Tigers, Mr Ronnie de Mel's outburst has served to expose how very vulnerable President Jayewardene is in political terms. As if the ignominy of being repeatedly reminded that the Indian Peace-Keeping Forces are not under his command were not enough, the Sri Lankan President has now been compelled to stomach the humiliation of one of his closest confidants broadcasting to the world that he "stopped referring to Sri Lanka as a democracy since 1982 because there is no democracy". Certainly, the Sri Lankan Finance Minister's biting indictment of his own Government's unsavoury record cannot be dismissed as only a momentary lapse for he had earlier wound up his budget speech in Parliament with a reminder to MPs that they were "obsolete" and with the revelation that it might be his "last budget". However, while it is curious that Mr de Mel said nothing at the time regarding his misgivings about the 1982 referendum which needlessly prolonged the life of the 1977 Parliament, his carping comments seem to offer an accurate index to the groundswell of Sinhalese resentment against the UNP regime.

To add to the failure to resolve the ethnic conflict, the UNP Government stands charged with compromising the country's sovereignty and for its inability to transform Sri Lanka into the promised "second Singapore". It cannot even be pleaded in mitigation that most of the flak has come from the Opposition SLFP-MEP combine or even from the JVP. On the contrary, the not too-veiled criticism of the Government's record that leaders such as Mr R. Premadasa, Mr Gamini Jayasuriya and Mr Lalith Athulathmudali indulge in would seem to suggest that President Jayewardene is in the unenviable position of being isolated even within his own party and Cabinet. It is not that the octogenarian politician has overnight become a liability and an object of ridicule. While few are willing to discount the President's considerable political acumen, the discomfiture that is growing within the UNP at the general political drift is primarily a result of considerable Sinhalese pressure from below.

These developments in Sri Lanka would not, in the normal course, have deserved too much attention in this country. But with the IPKF directly involved in quelling the LTTE rebellion in the north and east, New Delhi has reason to view President Jayewardene's precarious position with some apprehension. Following Mr de Mel's curious observation that the Government no longer enjoys any "moral right to rule' and Mr Gamini Dissanayake's earlier protests against the violation of national sovereignty, it would seem that the Indo-Sri Lankan accord can count on only the support of President Jayewardene himself. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the accord has also begun to be linked with the far broader question of the suppression of democratic rights since 1982; it would hardly be an exaggeration to suggest that the JVP is one of the biggest beneficiaries of this emerging opposition within the ruling party. The uncomfortable truth which Mr Rajiv Gandhi would do well to bear in mind in the new year is that anti-Indian sentiment among the Sinhalese is now directly tied to patriotism which is a volatile commodity in a relatively insular society. Under the circumstances, it will require considerable political deftness to ensure that President Jayewardene's earlier prophecy of a favourable constellation of stars and planets holds good in the coming year. As for India, discretion may turn out to be more rewarding than mindless valour.

Start talking

● I believe that, in the long run, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran will emerge as a patriot. He is fighting for his people. India should, instead of hunting for his scalp, try to bring him to the negotiating table. Otherwise the Tamils of Sri Lanka will be left leaderless after we win for them the limited autonomy promised under the Indo-Sri Lanka accord. The press, especially in the south, should do its best to bring about an amicable settlement between the IPKF and LTTE and LTTE and the Sri Lankan president ('How long can he hold on?' Dec. 6-12).

R.B. PATIL,
DHARWAR.

● ONE factor that the policy-makers do not understand is that the Tamil-Sinhala problem is centuries old. It will surprise many Indians to learn that when Alexander the Great was invading India 2,000 years ago, the Tamils and Sinhalese were fighting for dominance in Sri Lanka. *Mahawamsa* and *Culawamsa* which chronicle Sri Lankan history describe the battles between the two races.

During the days after Independence it was said by someone that the foreign policy of India would be written by the tears to be shed by the Sri Lankan Tamils. In the early sixties there was a political party in Jaffna led by V. Navaratnam named 'Union with India'!

S. SIVAGURUNATHAN,
MYLADUTHURAI, TN.

REPORT

JANUARY 11, 1988

Caught in the Bloody Middle

Sinhalese radicals emulate the violence of the Tamil Tigers

Sri Lanka's latest nightmare began innocently enough. Two days after Christmas, the market in the east coast town of Batticaloa was crowded with shoppers buying provisions for the festive week ahead. Among the throng were three plainclothes policemen. Suddenly a group of youths rushed up and opened fire on the constables. One of the trio fell dead; the two others, both wounded, scaled the wall of a nearby police compound and sounded the alarm. The assailants picked up the policemen's guns, which had fallen to the ground during the assault, and fled.

Within minutes police reinforcements arrived, and an even greater slaughter began. Guns blazing, the police dragged terrified shopkeepers from their stores and shot them. Other merchants were shot inside their places of business, some of them dispatched by a single bullet to the head. Using grenades and gasoline, the police proceeded to burn down 25 to 30 shops. By the time soldiers of the Indian peacekeeping force arrived—and joined, some witnesses charged, in the shooting—25 people were dead, most of them Tamils. None had been involved in the earlier attack on the police.

A leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the guerrilla organization that has been leading the battle for greater autonomy for the country's Tamil minority, promptly claimed responsibility for the assault on the police. He noted that the attack had been planned so as not to "cause any harm to our people." But while Sri Lankan President Junius Jayewardene has said he is confident that the 35,000 Indian troops brought in under a joint accord with India will soon "finish" the Tigers, the Batticaloa attack seemed to herald a new strategy. Unable to defeat the Indians militarily, the Tigers appear to be launching attacks in crowded areas in an effort to provoke a backlash that would lead to demands for the withdrawal of the peacekeeping forces.

But although the Tamil threat has been considerably diminished in the northern and eastern parts of the country, the south has become increasingly engulfed by terrorism from another sector. The challenge comes from the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna, a Sinhalese extremist group that Jayewardene banned in 1983, which has been leading the opposition against the Indian–Sri Lankan accord signed by Jayewardene last July. Three weeks after the signing, JVP terrorists nearly succeeded in assassinating the President. Since then, the group has struck repeatedly against Jayewardene's United National Party, killing local leaders and workers. Two weeks ago, gunmen assassinated Party Chairman Harsha Abeywardene and three companions as they were driving through Colombo.

The JVP campaign has virtually paralyzed the ruling party, especially in the south, where the JVP is the strongest. To counter the threat, the UNP has formed its own militia. A number of prominent members of Jayewardene's government, including Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa and Finance Minister Ronnie De Mel, have urged that the ban on the JVP be lifted. Said De Mel after Abeywardene's assassination: "I don't think a military step can put a stop to the violence." The Finance Minister also suggested that parliamentary elections, not due until September 1989, be held as soon as possible. Jayewardene, however, gave no indication that he was listening. —*By Marguerite Johnson. Reported by Qadri Ismail/Colombo*

LETTER

Sir, – The Tamil militants have ooviously secured their arms from various sources in the world including from India.

One cannot agree with Pran Chopra when he says, "It should have been clear from the start that in the given circumstances overt intervention of the type required would not be practicable for India, all comparisons with Bangladesh being wholly fallacious". The Sri Lankan Tamils (not the same as Tamils of Indian origin) fought for 30 years for a federal state on Gandhian lines within the framework of a united Sri Lanka. Genocide was the answer given by the Sinhalese. If covert or overt action cannot be taken by India to prevent genocide and to grant autonomy that is at least equivalent to what is available to various linguistic groups in India, then public opinion in Tamil Nadu will certainly veer towards extending overt support for the Sri Lankan Tamils. In other words, the situation in Sri Lanka will create disunity in our own country.

V. R. SRIDHARAN

QUILON

Sir, – The moot question is whether it was politically prudent to have jumped into the fray in the manner we did when we knew that ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka was their internal affair and also that there was strong opposition to the Sri Lankan accord in some recognised quarters there. Instead of burning our fingers unnecessarily we could and should have, as we actually did in the initial stages, confined ourselves to Red Cross assistance regardless of the political fallout of this stand at home.

SHIMLA **D. R. TANWAR**

Indian Express, 3.1.88,

NEWS

TELUGU DESAM SUPPORTS EELAM TAMILS

P.UPENDRA, M.P.

India has erred in becoming a party to the Indo-Sri Lankan accord which should actually have been between the Tamil freedom fighters and the Sri Lankan government, states Mr.P.Upendra. leader of the Telegu Desam Parliamentary Party. He further states that India's involvement should have been not to kill the Tamils but to protect them. But exactly the opposite is taking place. Indian army is weakening the resistance of the Tamil militants built up over the years which the Sri Lankan army could not break. This is not what we have bargained for.

Rs.5 to 6 crores (onr crore=ten millions) are being spent per day by the Indian government to keep the army in Sri Lanka. India should withdraw its forces before any further damage is caused to its image, he added.

The Telegraph

INTERVIEW

4 JANUARY 1988



'Time and again, our men have cheerfully accepted high losses just to protect innocent lives'

Gen. K. Sundarji

Q: But the experience in Jaffna would certainly have been different?

A: No. I am just giving an example of fighting in built-up areas. With this background we went into Jaffna. First of all, we could not—and we did not want to—use all our firepower. Even if we had used all that we had, our impact would have been less than in the plains or open spaces.

It was not urban insurgency for the first 10 days. What we fought was a normal, conventional war in built-up areas. They fought like regular forces. They occupied highly fortified places and we had to physically eject them from there—that is all. What they are now doing is guerrilla warfare. But not in the initial phase. It is, therefore, wrong to say that we were not trained in urban guerrilla warfare and therefore could not do battle in Jaffna. That is a totally uneducated conclusion to draw. What could be a more correct assessment is that the Indian Army, or any other army for that matter, is trained for fighting in built-up areas only on black-board and sketches, as it is virtually impossible to vacate large sections of built-up areas during peacetime just for battle training.

Q: What are your comments on fighting under restrictive rules of engagement?

A: I pay special tribute to the magnificent men—the Indian jawans and our young officers, JCOs and so on. Because I often wonder how many armies there are in the world which can accept this kind of constraint on humanitarian grounds and still go in cheerfully and accept high losses just in order to protect innocent lives and property. And our men have done it time and again. I think they are a magnificent lot of people. More than anything else, they have got a large heart—I don't mean a large heart just out of bravery—a large heart in the sense that they have an instinctive feel for humanity. When you tell them that this is the reason why, they appreciate it because they identify that the tally could well include their wife and children; it could be their home. I can't praise them too highly as far as this is concerned.

I want to make two issues clear. When our men are fighting there, and they are fighting under certain constraints, at that point of time any discussion as to whether they should or should not have gone there, is it necessary or not necessary? About this kind of thing, howsoever legitimate it may be from the political point of view, I am only concerned as to what negative impact it should leave on the morale of the fighting man.

The second issue, that again a simple one, is that while discussion with regard to the state of training and type of functioning are all legitimate, it should be done after the fighting is over and not during the fighting. I am not suggesting that there should not be any critical examination either on standard or state of training, or type of functioning, leadership and planning. Everything should undoubtedly be looked at critically with a view to improving. I am not one of those who believe that everything is okay and that we should not question anything. That is equally wrong.

Q: How does the soldier react to his increasing use in law and order activities? First Operation Bluestar and then the peacekeeping role in Jaffna? Isn't he trained to use maximum force unlike a policeman who is trained to use minimum force?

A: This is not quite correct. The primary role of the Army is to defend the sovereignty and the integrity of the nation and to protect the borders. In performing this role, he has to use the maximum force to the best effect, of this there is no doubt. But the second role is to go to the assistance of civil authorities under two conditions: one, restoration of law and order which is beyond the control of the civil authorities, and two, to go to their assistance in the event of acts of God like floods, famine, drought and earthquakes. These are legitimate duties in-built into the charter of duties, and to that extent, we do train for aiding civil authorities. In that type of training, the use of minimum force is a cardinal principle.

Now you asked how does the Army jawan feel about his use. It has never been one of our favourite duties at any level, if you may say so. Given half a chance, naturally a soldier will not like to be used in the role at all. When it has to be done, and it is his legitimate duty, he does it whether he likes it or not.

RAPED

18.1.88	Mamangam/Batticoloa	4 women
19.1.88	Nainamadu refugee camp	25 women
25.1.88	Kathankudi Colony/Ampalathady	4 women
25.1.88	Kinniadyh	Some women
26.1.88	Batticoloa	10 girls
27.1.88	Kankayan Odai/Batticoloa	7 muslimgirls (one burntalive)
27.1.88	Point pedro	3 girls
31.1.88	Point pedro	3 young girls

The Week

COMMENT

THE GREAT FAILURE

Lankan mistake can still be corrected

BY A.P. VENKATESWARAN DEC. 27—JAN. 2, 1988

CLAUSEWITZ is often quoted imprecisely as having stated that "war is diplomacy carried on by other means". In fact, the correct quotation is: "War is politics carried on by other means". But since wars take place usually between countries and nations and they therefore represent an international phenomenon, regrettable though it may be, the basic concept in this famous statement remains unchanged. Obviously, therefore, wars take place only when diplomacy fails. Diplomacy clearly is preferable to the use of violence to yield the desired results and for realising national objectives.

However unpalatable it may be to us, by this litmus test of the numbers of wars fought, there have been more failures in India's diplomacy than that of any other country one can think of since World War II. India has fought four defensive wars: in 1948 with Pakistan over Kashmir; in 1962 with China on our eastern and western borders; in 1964 with Pakistan over Kutch; and in 1965 again with Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir.

The fifth war in 1971 with Pakistan fell in a slightly different category. Although Pakistan had provided the provocation by suddenly bombing a number of military and civilian airfields in India, the strategic aim of India was to use the opening given by Pakistan, by going to the help of the Mukhti Bahini forces in the then East Pakistan, so as to bring about the birth of Bangladesh as a new state. This achievement is still without any parallel in world history after World War II. The 1971 war had many special characteristics which are to be fully analysed by future historians.

While there was great provocation and pressure at that time on India due to the enormous influx of refugees from the then East Pakistan, with over 10 million men, women and children having to be provided with food, shelter and clothing by an already impoverished India, the Pakistani bombing of our airfields provided the necessary legitimacy for the offensive mounted by us. There was a national purpose served which was understood by and had the support of the entire Indian people.

The latest hidden war which now rages in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, in the guise of a peace-keeping operation by the IPKF, however, falls in a totally different catgeory. Never before in independent India has one heard of a 'peace-keeping force' resorting to full-scale hostilities against citizens of a foreign country to support a tottering regime from collapsing under the weight of its own errors of commission and omission. What is more, for the first time India has placed its armed forces under the overall command of a foreign head of state, reducing our gallant forces to the status of a mercenery contingent. This is indeed a blot on the fair name of our armed forces which have only fought in the defence of our motherland or served proudly in peace-keeping exercises of the United Nations.

> **"By the test of the numbers of wars fought, there have been more failures in India's diplomacy than that of any other country one can think of since World War II."**

The India-Sri Lanka agreement of July 29, 1987 is a unique example of the failure of Indian diplomacy on many fronts. Not because our diplomats were lacking in skill, but because the political leadership could not look beyond its nose. The agreement itself was a hastily put-together patchwork without taking into account India's true national interests, the consequences that could result from such an armed intervention by India, the long-term negative impact this would have on the country's reputation and standing vis-a-vis our neighbours, and last, but not the least, the heavy cost in money, material and men that would have to be borne by the nation as a whole in what is evidently a mindless and counter-productive exercise.

IT is a public secret that the decision to conclude the India-Sri Lanka agreement was taken by a small coterie without consulting others who should have been involved. If the professional diplo-

mats had been consulted, the decision may have been very different.

In this day and age of supercomputers and space exploration, when governments have to look as far into the future as is humanly possible, India's involvement in Sri Lanka has broken the basic ground rules of diplomacy and of defence. The national interest of India, which is often quoted as being served by the intervention of the IPKF, in what is essentially an internal matter of another country, has been jeopardised rather than furthered, with no thought of the repercussions. It has become fashionable to brush aside even constructive criticism and to accuse anyone criticising the armed action in Sri Lanka of being anti-national.

Not so long ago, the same charge of being anti-national had been made, at the highest level, against members of Parliament who had questioned the steeply enhanced defence budget. A strange charge indeed, which adversely affects the entire purpose of having an elected Parliament in a democracy, where its members have the duty under our Constitution to debate all matters affecting the nation, whether internal or external, thereby providing the necessary balance which would help in the formulation by government of mature, carefully thought-out policies.

There is sufficient evidence today to establish that the draft of the India-Sri Lanka agreement sent by Sri Lanka had been cleared within a few days by our leadership for formal signature. No one apparently questioned the sudden change of heart of the president of Sri Lanka who had, till only a few weeks earlier, been adamant that he would not merge the northern and eastern provinces and would not tolerate a unified ethnic Tamil entity to be formed. It may also be noted here that the India-Sri Lanka agreement had not been acceptable either to the Tamil population, or for that matter to the majority Sinhala population of Sri Lanka. The regrettable assault on our Prime Minister by a member of the guard of honour, which could have been fatal but for the deflection of the blow struck with the butt of a rifle, was a demonstration of how strongly the emotions run in the majority Sinhala community.

One may pause and wonder what this could entail for the future of the India-Sri Lanka agreement where it is faced with opposition all round (except for the solitary affirmation by its present head of state) including the openly hostile but forced conformity of the country's prime minister and a host of

"The India-Sri Lanka agreement is an example of the failure of Indian diplomacy on many fronts because the political leadership could not look beyond its nose."

members in the cabinet. If one were to consider this in the light of the fierce resistance put up by the LTTE for the last four years against the Sri Lanka government to protect the Tamil speaking minority community from the wanton excesses of the Sri Lankan army and security personnel, aided by foreign mercenaries, how much more would the problem be aggravated by antagonising the entire Sinhala community who view the presence of the IPKF as an abdication by their president of his responsibility to safeguard the sovereignty and national integrity of their country.

The recent statement made by a lieutenant-general of the IPKF, overseeing its operations in Sri Lanka, that the IPKF took orders only from New Delhi, may appear on the surface to be only a minor pecadillo. However, this statement has already resulted in inflaming Sinhala public opinion to fever pitch,

"Diplomacy is a low-cost option, as against defence. It is anachronistic that we should countenance an expenditure on our armed forces which is more than 60 times the expenditure on the external affairs ministry."

compounding the embarrassment already faced by the IPKF.

The situation is made even more bizarre by India turning a blind eye to the non-fulfilment by the government of Sri Lanka of its solemn commitments under the India-Sri Lanka agreement in regard to the devolution of powers for autonomy of the ethnic Tamil population in the northern and eastern provinces. We have been content to accept the 'assurances' of the president of Sri Lanka who has established a record of going back on such assurances as and when it suits him. Since Annexure C was agreed upon in discussions between India and Sri Lanka in 1983 and quickly reneged upon by the Sri Lankan head of state, there have been a series of similar twists and turns on the part of that government. Sri Lanka is a signatory to the agreement and it should be all the more incumbent on it to observe its commitments both in letter and in spirit. The strident statements made by New Delhi have, alas, been directed at others who have not been party to the agreement.

THE grave situation pertaining today in our relations with Sri Lanka is continuously sought to be obfuscated by self-congratulatory statements by the government and the ruling party which have described the Sri Lanka accord as a great success unparalleled anywhere else over the last 100 years! The same people constantly emphasise that the accord and the action taken by IPKF in its brutal implementation have been welcomed all over the world "from Peru to the Philippines."

It is conveniently overlooked that while a personal congratulatory message from President Reagan was received by our Prime Minister, when he was in Colombo to sign the accord, even before the ink was dry on the document, there had been no such message from General Secretary Gorbachev. This is all the more significant since India does have a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union signed in August 1971, whereas there is no such corresponding document which we have signed with the USA.

The statement by the president of Sri Lanka, explaining to his people the reasons for his concluding the India-Sri Lanka agreement, is even more intriguing. He is on record as having said that he first tried to get help from the USA to contain the insurgency. When that was not forthcoming, he addressed the UK, Pakistan and China for the same pur-

Budgetary provisions	1986-87 (in crores of Rs)	1987-88
Defence	8,728.00	13,438.77
External affairs	383.32	400.43
Education	352.00	1,210.80

pose. He admitted that it was only because he had not received a positive response from any of them that he had been compelled to turn to India for help, since India was "the dominant power in the region" and was "friendly" to Sri Lanka! This statement alone should have set warning bells ringing in the corridors of South Block. But, such is our naivety that this was instead taken as a great compliment to India's status as a regional power. Perhaps no better example exists to illustrate the true meaning of the proverb: "Fools rush in where angels fear to tread".

Let us now turn from this senseless involvement with Sri Lanka and examine the relative priorities given by our government to the areas of defence and diplomacy. As already mentioned, diplomacy is a low-cost option, as against defence, for safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of a country and furthering its national interest vis-a-vis other countries, whether they be located near or far.

The lop-sided emphasis on defence expenditure, now compounded by heavy war expenditure which serves no national purpose except to alienate permanently the people of Sri Lanka, will serve to illustrate the futility of such a policy. For people who are known for their intelligence and capacity to think, it is anachronistic that we should countenance an expenditure on our armed forces which is over 60 times the expenditure on the ministry of external affairs, including all our diplomatic representations abroad. If one were to remove that element in the ministry of external affairs budget relating to grants and loans extended through the ministry to Nepal and Bhutan in particular, and to various Asian, African and Latin American countries in general, the effective budget of the ministry of external affairs would be less than one per cent of the appropriations made for defence purposes.

No one in his senses would prefer to settle through violence what can be settled through negotiations. India which had been advocating a political solution to the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka over the last four years has now turned a complete somersault and is trying to impose a military solution on the people of Sri Lanka.

Either we were correct in our earlier assessment and, therefore, will be seen as being dishonest now by the rest of the world, or we were wrong in our earlier assessment which we now seek to correct by a sudden volte face. In either case, our image cannot be enhanced in the eyes of the world which is watching the unfolding tragedy involving India and Sri Lanka, some with glee and some with mounting concern. It is even sadder and smacks of self-deceit when the government deliberately ignores the way in which statements are being made by the prime minister of Sri Lanka and other senior members of the cabinet, denying the commitments made in the exchange of letters attached to the India-Sri Lanka agreement in regard to Trincomalee, VOA broadcasts from Sri Lanka etc.

WHAT can be a diplomatic alternative to the militarily unpalatable no-win situation which India faces presently in Sri Lanka? One possible way out would be for the IPKF to declare another ceasefire, this time of indefinite duration, and to call simultaneously upon the government of Sri Lanka to fulfil all its remaining commitments under the agreement. Such a move would provide an opening to suspend the ongoing conflict and go a long way to calm down and to regain the confidence of the Tamils in Sri Lanka as well as in Tamil Nadu. It would also demonstrate that the IPKF is even-handed in its approach.

If the Sri Lanka government responds positively, any remaining gaps in regard to the devolution of powers for providing autonomy to the Tamil-speaking provinces can be speedily sorted out. If, on the other hand, the Sri Lanka government does not agree to this course of action (which is more likely), the IPKF would be within its rights to halt all further action and to stay put where it is now, so as to protect the Tamil population there from a possible vendetta that could easily occur otherwise.

"To blame diplomats for the incompetence of the political leadership would be unjust...We have to revise our present priorities."

Our failure so far, in regard to Sri Lanka and especially in regard to our neighbours as a whole, is *not* a reflection on the country's diplomatic service. A professional diplomat can only report and assess the situation and submit possible options to the political leadership, for minimising the damage and maximising the advantage in a given situation. It is for the political leadership then to choose an option which will thereafter be implemented by our diplomatic missions abroad under the overall guidance of the ministry of external affairs. So, to blame the diplomats for what is the result of ignorance and incompetence of the political leadership would be most unjust. In fact, the Indian Foreign Service has won the acclaim of other major foreign services of the world for its competence and effectiveness in projecting our interests abroad.

One also hears from certain quarters of blame being heaped on our diplomatic missions for not projecting a brighter and more positive image of India. One need only refer to the axiom in physics that an image cannot be brighter than the object. In any case, in the long run, we have to set our own house in order and to revise our priorities if we are to make headway in this field.

There is no altruism in international politics and it is mainly the engine of self-interest which propels nations in regard to the decisions which they take. The necessary changes at decision-making levels can be made effective only through a more active involvement of Parliament so as to ensure that right decisions are taken in time and the possibility of errors is minimised.

Professional advice is a categorical imperative in this complex world where man has already landed on the moon and is reaching father into space. In this, there is no place for interdepartmental jealousies and rivalries and there must be an overriding emphasis on national objectives. We go to a tailor to have our clothes stitched and to a barber to have our hair cut. If, perversely, a person goes to the barber to have his clothes stitched and to a tailor to have his hair cut, he will have only himself to blame when he is seen by others to be poorly groomed. ◆

COMMENT

For how long in Sri Lanka and for what?

DEVDUTT

IT IS IN THE VERY NATURE OF THE OVERall situation within Sri Lanka and the overall security environment in the Indian Ocean that if we stick to the present policies India will remain for long in Sri Lanka both out of strategic necessity and political compulsions. Hence there is substantial justification in the observation that India's military action in Sri Lanka will be the longest so far undertaken. It will be India's Vietnam in the sense of its being a costly, bloody and prolonged enterprise in relation to India's limited resources.

The Indian government vehemently rejects the comparison with the Vietnamese war. In a sense it is true. Nevertheless its response is equivocal and vague to the question, "How long will the Indian army remain in Sri Lanka?" Its answer in so many words is, as long as it is necessary to fully implement and Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement because securing the legitimate interests of Sri Lankan Tamils was in India's national interest and India's security. But nobody explains the true import of the vague term "as long as necessary" and nobody spells out the components of the algebric term "India's national interest" and thus it is difficult to assess the duration of India's presence in Sri Lanka.

However, it is not very difficult to decide the terms "as long as necessary" and the terms "national interest" vis-a-vis Sri Lanka. If carefully and critically examined, the tasks which India has undertaken and the broad objective for which the task has been taken up in Sri Lanka, we may be able to assess the time for which India will have to remain in Sri Lanka.

We enumerate below the rationale for the action in Sri Lanka as offered by the official spokesman:—

(1) India has not gone to Sri Lanka only to help solve an internal problem of Sri Lanka. If the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka is preserved and if peace and stability are restored in the region, some of the "important security concerns" of India would also be met. India's primary goal in helping to deal with ethnic strife in the island is to ensure that the situation did not deteriorate in a manner adverse to India's security. In short, India has high security stakes in a contented and peaceful Sri Lanka.

(2) The structure of discriminations against Sri Lankan Tamils—political, social psychological and economic—is four decades old. These cannot be eliminated so soon, even though the Sri Lankan leadership has recently passed a law regarding devolution of power which promises to give Sri Lankan Tamils a place of equality and honour in Sri Lankan polity. There remains a number of "residual matters" of substantial political content which if not properly settled, has all the potential for recrudence of ethnic conflict in the island.

(3) There is also a considerably effective public opinion in Sri Lanka which is opposed to Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement and the new law regarding devolution of powers to Sri Lankan Tamils in North-east Sri Lanka. In fact, Sri Lankan Government faces the serious problem of dealing with large sections of people whose leadership have yet to come to terms with reality and who have yet to cultivate a spirit of accommodation towards Sri Lankan Tamils.

Some political observers fear that as soon as the Indian military presence is withdrawn there will be a backlash of Sinhalese chauvinistic nationalism against Sri Lankan Tamils and India. LTTE leader V Prabhakaran is making a realistic point (though exaggeratingly) when he says that the Indian government should give an assurance that it will provide adequate protection to the Tamils and that their interest is safeguarded on a permanent basis. Consequently, India's commitment will be long term, because Sinhalese chauvinism is not a short-term affair.

(4) If India battled against LTTE, it was not for Sri Lanka's sake but in its own interest. By the logic of it India would have to act in a similar manner against these other elements who sought to undo the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement from the Sinhala side, since that also would mean an attack on India's interests. Further, India will have to see that Sri Lanka did not repeat the tactics of the past, viz., to seek the aid from countries inimical to India. It may be recalled that in its fight against Sri Lankan Tamils, Jayawardene's government had brought in British privateers, Israelis and Pakistanis.

(5) India's defence strategists are very clear about the importance of IPKF intervention in Sri Lanka in the context of heavy militarization of the Indian Ocean by the superpowers. They think that India's primary concern is Trincomalee port in North Sri Lanka. The military action against LTTE is only a cover. We have 35,000 troops in Sri Lanka under this pretext. It would be unwise to withdraw these troops. The troops should remain for one reason or other. So by implication they mean that conditions of residual insurgency are in India's national interest. LTTE as a force should not be weakened beyond a point. This will justify India's military presence in Sri Lanka. Moreover, if LTTE is fully eliminated our national interest demands that India should work for the emergence of such political forces as will replace LTTE and which will be pro-India.

Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is not likely to be a short-term affair; peace and stability will not return to Sri Lanka within a reasonable time. Since it has been shown in the past that India has high stakes in Sri Lankan ethnic harmony and political stability, India cannot forgo or

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weaken the strategic and political advantage and initiative it has come to acquire in Sri Lanka since July 1987. Moreover, the security environment, specially in the Indian Ocean reinforces the need for strengthening and maintaining the advantage India has acquired in Sri Lanka.

It seems that the dominant ruling elite in Sri Lanka has begun to accept the above mentioned facts of life. They are getting reconciled to the inevitability of India's active involvement in Sri Lanka's internal problems. No wonder, in order to make the best of this bad bargain with honour and dignity, Mr Jayawardene has mooted the idea of a Indo-Soviet variety of defence treaty between India and Sri Lanka.

But India has not given a firm positive response to Jayawardene. It is good that it has not done so; because the offer should be examined in a larger perspective. In this context, the following specific issues must be examined.

Firstly, is it in India's real and genuine national interest and is it consistent with the policy of non-alignment (as conceived by Nehru) that India should permanently incorporate in its policy frame, a military approach to deal with the security problems emanating out of internal discussions and conflicts in the neighbouring states in South Asia? Secondly, can India afford the domestic economic financial implications of the resultant politico-military foreign policy? Thirdly, the resultant politico-military approach adopted means that India has decided to proclaim, though informally, its own version of Monroe Doctrine, namely, "Hands off from South Asia". Can India afford this? Should India adopt this hegemonistic doctrine? How will it reconcile it with Nehru's non-alignment and the approach underlying SAARC?

There is a fourth dimension of this new policy. All our neighbours in South Asia have serious ethnic problems and other problems of plural societies attempting to become homogeneous nation-states. And since, like Sri Lanka, these ethnic and related problems have all the potential of becoming a security risk for India, the new politico-military foreign policy based on real-politik is not conducive to our national interest. It is also not in tune with our national ideals and values derived from the national movement under Gandhi. Firstly, it will involve exorbitant military expenditure which we can ill afford. Indian economy will be put under extraordinary strains; it is a step in the direction of bankruptcy and indebtedness. It will compel India to go in for compulsory rapid large-scale armament race. The venture in Sri Lanka, it is estimated, will cost us thousands of crores before it is completed.

Secondly, it will bring about structural changes in the balance of power in favour of "military power" as opposed to "civil power" in our polity and thus distort the democratic structure. Dominance of Military Power means dominance of armed forces and the associated civilian bureaucracy, the industrial establishment in the service of the military, the scientists and engineers so employed, the politicians captured and controlled by the above military-industrial complex. To make matters worse, this dominant military power in India will be compelled to build cooperative relationship with military power in other countries including the super-powers and thus India will be drawn into international structures of military power.

This scenario is wholly against the interest of India's teeming millions. Politically and economically it will be a castastrophe, specially for the poor and the vulnerable sections. It was not without reason that Nehru thought of non-alignment as a correct policy for the poor people of India. No-alignment as a sane non-militaristic political approach enabled India to concentrate its economic resources fully on national economic development. Another approach, specially the militaristic hegemonistic approach would have diverted our limited resources in unproductive direction.

The same has been the experience of West Germany and Japan, though for different reasons. The story of rapid prosperity of these countries are the economic success stories of this century. Those countries turned away from armament or military achievement. Capital was available for civilian industry. The economic miracle of West Germany and Japan is the direct inescapable counterpart of minimal military claims on scarce resources.

Military-power in a country impoverishes and debases a people. As has been correctly put, under military power, "every citizen pays the price first with taxes, then as a potential victim".

Indians so far have thought of power in conventional terms, viz, its socially and politically relevant concepts such as power of politicians, bureaucrats and unions and capitalists. But this concept of power will be rendered irrelevant and obsolete if military power takes a dominant position in India.

The Indian people will have to decide whether they are in favour of military power which is antagonistic to the political culture in the Indian constitution.

We believe we must reject the politico-strategic hegemonistic approach to our neighbours in South Asia, including Sri Lanka. We must take the South Asian region as a plural society of continental dimensions and we must accept that it is one civilization unit within the framework of which the policies of the nation-states have to be adjusted on the basis of long range tolerance and co-existence and pluralism as opposed to hegemony, homogenization and militarization.

India's venture in Sri Lanka should not be seen as an isolated event. It cannot be dismissed as a one time deviation from our general national approach. This is because the ruling party and their hawkish advisers promoted consciously the doctrine of hegemony and real politik to justify their action in Sri Lanka.

Therefore Sri Lankan venture must lead to a national debate. Let us bring the issue of military power and hegemonistic foreign policy into full candid and open discussion. Otherwise in the name of so called national interest and chauvinistic nationalism, the policies of the present rulers will push India in a direction where deprivation, starvation and death as well as unfreedom is the lot of the weak and the vulnerable people. **January 1988**

A collapsed bridge

Tamil sentiments against IPKF may overflow

M.G. Ramachandran was perhaps the only chief minister in India who was also important internationally. He played a key role in saving the Indo-Sri Lanka accord. Now his death has raised doubts about the chances of the accord's survival.

True, MGR was not instrumental in the drafting of the accord. He was away in the United States for a medical check-up when the events leading to the signing of the accord took place. He was still there when it was signed.

Later when things began to go wrong, with the LTTE refusing to surrender and the Indian army moving in to enforce the accord, MGR was still away. Rumblings began to be heard from the people of Tamil Nadu whose sympathies were still largely with the Tamils of Jaffna. DMK leader Karunanidhi jumped at it and began criticising the IPKF action, but that did not cut much ice with the people who would still wait for the leader to decide for them.

But, MGR prolonged his stay in the United States. Doubts were raised whether he had been deliberately prolonging his stay there at the bidding of the Centre. For, once in Madras he would have to make his stand clear, which would be a controversial one either way.

MGR's dilemma was understandable. He had all along supported the LTTE cause morally and with money. He had also supported the accord. Now the LTTE was to be portrayed as the one who did not keep its word. But Tamil feelings being what they are, a blatant censure of LTTE would not be swallowed by the people of Tamil Nadu.

MGR, who earlier had acted as the bridge between New Delhi and the LTTE goading the latter to attend talks with representatives of Delhi and Colombo and giving the Tamils of Jaffna refuge in Tamil Nadu territory, now was forced into silence. He was guarded in his few comments on the IPKF action and always asserted that he was cooperating with Delhi for the benefit of the Jaffna Tamils. At the same time, he never openly came out against the LTTE.

New Delhi was immensely satisfied with that. It appreciated his predicament, and was happy as long as MGR could keep the Indian Tamils' sentiments in check. Which he did admirably. In fact, MGR became Delhi's best bet in the Sri Lanka crisis.

But now with his death, Delhi has been bereft of a strong defender of the accord. It has also lost its only link with the Tigers who, it hoped, could be arm-twisted to honour the accord. One can gauge Delhi's concern from the fact that LTTE leader Kittu was not allowed to place a wreath on the body of MGR. He was reportedly kept under house arrest in Madras.

Staunch ally. *MGR with Rajiv Gandhi*

Delhi has been bereft of a defender of the accord. It has also lost its only link with the Tigers. For the Tigers, too, MGR's death is a big loss.

Delhi knows full well that whoever ultimately succeeds MGR will not be able to support its stand as effectively as MGR. No one can keep Tamil sentiments in check as MGR did, at the face of the DMK leader breathing fire and brimstone. Delhi cannot afford to have a leader in Tamil Nadu who will criticise the IPKF action. At the same time, a leader who blindly tows the Delhi line would be disowned by the people of Tamil Nadu, who may then rally round Karunanidhi.

Unfortunately for the Centre, there is just no leader in AIADMK or the Congress(I) who can play the balancing role that MGR played.

The death of MGR is a big loss for the Tigers too. Even while losing to the superior might of the Indian army, they were hopeful that they would be finally able to get out of the situation without much loss of face through the good offices of MGR. They had been appealing to him to prevail upon Delhi to stop the IPKF drive in Jaffna. They knew that only MGR could convince Delhi to change its stand. "He was one man on whom they could bank on. They needed him at this juncture. Now it will be difficult to have someone who can deal firmly with Delhi", said a Tamil militant in Madras.

It was believed that MGR was trying to find a solution to the Lanka impasse and that something concrete would have taken place in early January.

In short, the death of MGR has put both the government of India and the Tamil militants in a fix. New Delhi was also banking on him to hold the Indian Tamils in check when the IPKF completed its operations and elections to the promised provincial councils were announced by the Jayewardene government.

Delhi also knows that a good number of AIADMK leaders and cadre are against the accord and the IPKF action in Jaffna. But none of them raised his voice as long as MGR was there. Now these elements may even split the party or walk over to Karunanidhi's camp. And Karunanidhi certainly would not look after New Delhi's interests in Tamil Nadu.

JAN. 2—9, 1988 —VINCENT D'SOUZA

Diary from a Doomed Land

COMMENT

Ashok Mitra

January 2-9, 1988

In Sri Lanka everybody is waiting, what for nobody is clear. The killings go on in the north and the east and with each day, much to the sardonic delight of the Sinhalese gentry, the IPKF finds itself sinking into a deeper quagmire. The killings and arson are kept up also in the south. Such being the situation, what can the poor elite of Colombo do? They have somehow to amuse themselves, they flock to the New Year ball parties and keep visiting Vilasita Bipani, the ravishingly dazzling luxury departmental stores.

ONE has returned exactly after a year, and yet, one has not returned to the same country. Colombo looks about the same. But illusion is not reality. The events of the past one year are not reversible, and it is now a no-win situation for anybody and everybody. Sri Lanka is dying.

Earnestly, the civil servant will try to win you over to his point of view regarding when and how things went wrong. The Agreement was signed on July 29; July 30 and 31 were the two days during which the ceasefire was supposed to become effective; the first three days of August were set aside for the Indian troops to disarm the LTTE cadres; on August 4, the troops would be back in India. Nice, neat time table. Instead, five months have gone by, the arms remain with the LTTE boys—and girls; and they forgot to tell the Sri Lanka administration that India would land the equivalent of four army divisions in and around Jaffna. Apart from the other factors, the sheer logistics of servicing four army divisions takes the breath away. The president, unfortunately, is in no position to do anything about it; true, the Indian military personnel are under his overall command; what could he, poor thing, however do if the Indian prime minister chooses not to keep him informed. Mutual trust, the civil servant's earnestness scales a higher peak, is what it is all about, whether the Agreement succeeds or flops depends on. Meanwhile, there is this additional problem. The Indian army wants to be in the eastern province in greater numbers, particularly in Batticoloa. Can one imagine the kind of hell that would let loose should this be allowed to happen? The JVP elements are straining at the leash. The moment the Indian army asserts itself in the east, they will be on the rampage. The young people belonging to the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna do not of course belong to the same league as the LTTE; unlike Velupillai Pirabhakaran, they are no believers in Pol Potism, at least not yet. But savagery, in the present situation, can spread easily. Already some tactical exchange of arms has taken place between the rebels in the north and those in the south. How much one wishes those who take decisions on the Indian side, meaning the Indian prime minister and those close to him, take into account such developments, and restrain the IPKF from romping around Batticoloa in such conspicuous numbers. Besides, the Sri Lanka civil servant rubs in the point, suavely: the presence of Indian troops is now turning out to be increasingly counter-productive in Jaffna too. They have failed to disarm the LTTE insurgents; by their overbearingness they have also made themselves even more unpopular than the Sri Lanka troops ever were. The civil servant is unable to forget the fact that he is, at the same time, a private citizen; he cannot shed his earnestness either. Mutual trust is what the Agreement is about. The Indian prime minister must trust the Sri Lanka president, begin gradually to withdraw the troops, give JRJ just two months, and the latter will see to it that Sri Lanka is restored to tranquillity. Since the Indian military personnel have not been quite up to it, the Sri Lanka troops will resume their responsibility to enforce peace in the Jaffna area. The Indian prime minister must give them two months, and, at the end of it, Sri Lanka will once more belong to the Sri Lankans, Sinhalas as much as Tamils, and won't it be loverly.

The civil servant, despite his conditioned earnestness, knows that what he is propounding is a pipe-dream, or a sales pitch which is bound to fail to sell the line. The Indian troops will not go away; from the look of things, they are there for keeps. The Indian prime minister has made an outlay in Sri Lanka; he is not going to indulge in any disinvestment merely because Sri Lankan public opinion is solidly against the presence of the Indian army on their soil. It is an extraordinary ambivalence of attitudes the Sinhala population are afflicted with. They detest the fact of their president inviting the Indian troops, but there is admiration too for the smart manoeuvres of the president, the wily old fox, who is making the Indians shoulder the entire burden of peace restoration operations in the north, the government and the country would otherwise have gone bust; the money saved on account of the Indians coming in can henceforth be spent on more cosy purposes.

The earnestness of the civil servant bowls one over, he too however speaks according to a script. So is the case with everybody else. The Indian troops, having arrived, are unlikely to go away, ever. Fatalism is spliced with cynicism, easily crystallising into the hatred towards the Big Brother all small countries in any neighbourhood learn to nurse. The history-minded university don, not so earnest as the civil servant, indulges in heavy sarcasm to compensate for the deficiency. The Nazi troops moved into Austria following the *Anschluss*, and stayed. The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, after all, is of a similar historical import; it is fraternal emotions spilling over; the Indian elite have come to the help of their counterparts, in order to save the crumbling class structure in Sri Lanka; precisely on account of that, the Indian army is now destined to play a major role in hastening the process of social revolution in the island. Just consider China or Vietnam or Cambodia; in all Asian countries, social revolution is either preceded by, or accompanies, a patriotic upsurge caused by external imposition of a particularly exacerbating sort. The presence of the Indian army is thus the answer to the Sri Lanka would-be-revolutionaries' prayer. Cutting across barriers of erstwhile party affiliations, it is uniting the Sinhalese in a common resolve. In each of the university campuses, students have gone over *en masse* to the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna; does it not remind one of the fifties and sixties when they had, with almost equal fervour, proclaimed allegiance to the Communist Party, or alternately, to the Sama Samaj Party? The Sinhalese don is no less confident on the other point either: the arrival of the Indian army, and the manner in which they have gone about in search of LTTE cadres and arms, will convince the Sri Lanka Tamils too that their long-range interests lie in rediscovering roots within the island; it is not an MGR across the Palk Strait, but the JVP down south, or a surrogate yet to make its appearance, who will underwrite their security and future prosperity. Echoing the earnest government servant, the history don too considers it a logical outcome that the JVP and the LTTE will soon discover themselves in each other's company, in case they have not already done so.

Meanwhile, the battle is on for Batticoloa, the battle between the Indian prime minister's intent to move more of his troops into the eastern province and the Sri Lanka president's determination not to let that happen for dear life. The Indian prime minister has to keep up a brave front; he cannot openly admit that if the LTTE, a non-signatory and all along a sceptic, has refused to adhere to the

terms of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, president Jayewardene, his co-signatory and joint architect of the Agreement, has also equally failed to honour its spirit. The substance of the constitutional amendment passed by the Sri Lanka parliament deviates from the commitments entered into by Junius Jayewardene, at the time of the signing of the Agreement, on issues vitally affecting Tamil interests. The president could not push his party too much, prime minister Premadasa's dead body would have stood in the way. The Tamils over here are fully cognisant of the fact that the enacted constitutional amendment concedes them little, very little; the Tamils in Tamil Nadu are also slowly becoming aware of this trump card which has been handed over to the LTTE in their war against the rampaging Indian divisions. Should the Sri Lanka army now succeed in resettling, or settling for the first time, large groups of Sinhalese in the towns and villages of Trincomalee and Batticoloa, the Indian goose would be even more comprehensively cooked. Which is why the battle of Batticoloa, unreported in the press, represents the most crucial phase of the war in Sri Lanka, the Indians wanting to move in in much greater numbers, the Sri Lanka ministry of security will have none of it. President Jayewardene—the earnest civil servant will let you know in confidence—is sad, very sad at the trucculence being displayed by his young friend, Indira Gandhi's offspring. He, the Sri Lanka president, had the choice, after all, of handing over Trincomalee to the Americans and calling in the Israelis and the Pakistanis; didn't he? Instead, he chose India. There must be mutual trust, and consideration shown towards the problems confronting either party. The president's position will be rendered hopeless once Batticoloa is gobbled up by the Indian army. Four divisions today, maybe eight divisions will move in tomorrow; they are no doubt under the president's nominal command, but nobody bothers to inform him how many of them have come and why.

The civil servant is not exactly dissembling, but it is still an instance of compartmentalised vision. Bravado gets mixed up with manifestations of hoping against hope. President Jayewardene's partymen, including those who endorse the Agreement, would like the IPKF now to go away, it has accomplished what they wanted it in the main to accomplish, smashing the LTTE base in Jaffna. The rest of the job is for the Sinhalese themselves to complete. With no Indian army in the way, the UNP's anti-insurgency outfit, the Green Tigers, will be able—so the calculations go—to annihilate the Tamils in the north and the east in no time, even if that process assumes a form dangerously close to genocide. But perhaps president Jayewardene himself would in fact want the Indian army to stay; it is his greatest insurance against insurgency in the south, and there is also the grim possibility of his own partymen attempting a coup against him once the Indian army departs, which is why he is so anxious to have a defence treaty with India, let it be the army of all seasons and for all contingencies.

The left parties in Sri Lanka have their own reasons for preferring the IPKF. Having lost their erstwhile constituencies, on their own they are no match for the brute power which the JVP is in the south and even the emasculated LTTE is in the north. Never mind the latent irony of it, the army of the alien bourgeois state has to save them from the onslaught of anarchical ultra-nationalism. And yet, the left parties too are equally acutely aware that every extra day the Indian troops stay on on Sri Lanka soil, they succeed in creating even greater hostility towards India and its government amongst the people, and particularly amongst the Tamils. The latter, more so those in and around Jaffna, are now in a position to compose tracts on the comparative virtues and vices of the Indian and Sri Lankan armies. The Sri Lankan army men, when they were around, dared not interfere with the daily tempo of civilian living. The IPKF, in contrast, is just like any ordinary army of occupation: curfew for hours on end, public transport suspended for little rhyme or reason, civilians not even allowed to ride on bicycles, markets and food supply disrupted for days on end, total censorship clamped on the press, and searches, unending searches, day and night, night and day. Beyond a point, the Indian army personnel, like army personnel anywhere else in the world, are bereft of manners. While stories of widespread rape are exaggerations, molestation of young girls is indeed taking place; what, after all, can the *jawans* do, it will be stated on their behalf, if young girls hide under their clothings, detonators and grenades? It therefore hardly causes any astonishment that, in the circumstances, his Pol Potism notwithstanding, Velupillai Pirabhakaran has emerged as the symbol of Tamil pride and Tamil resistance. So if it is a matter of their getting rid of LTTE insurgency in the north and the east first and then departing for home, there is going to be no early departure for the IPKF. The LTTE snipers will continue to call the shots, even if four expatriate divisions grow into fourteen and India's fisc reaches near-exhaustion.

Other, much more disturbing questions will keep nagging . The government of India, the Indian left, the Sri Lankan left are all vehement in their view that the Indian army personnel have a sacred obligation to make the Tamils agree to fall in with the terms of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. Have the Indian opposition at least looked into the details of the Agreement, do they know what kind of arcadia it promises for the Tamils? The Thirteenth Constitutional Amendment and the Provincial Councils Bill, which are supposed to translate the terms of the Agreement into legal reality, have now been passed by the Sri Lankan parliament. They depict a frightening picture. The devolution of powers and responsibilities is of much less substance than what even India's blatantly centrally biased constitution concedes to the constituent states. What is even more grotesque, not even five per cent of the nation's overall resources, including tax resources, is intended to be passed on to the provinces, and the two Tamil provinces cannot hope to get more than one-fourth of this insignificant slice. Should they need additional funds, the matter is to be decided by a permanent finance commission in which the central authority will have a permanent majority. It is therefore difficult to determine the real villains in the drama which has been unfolding—Pirabhakaran and his comrades who refuse to be party to this charade of transfer of power, or the bureaucrats and advisers surrounding India's prime minister who perhaps could not care less whether the Sri Lankan Tamils lived or perished.

This sham restructuring of the Sri Lankan polity is also unlikely to take place in the near future. There is seemingly no hurry on New Delhi's part, let Pirabhakaran be first hunted down and shot in cold blood by the IPKF, the political issues could then be sorted out in leisurely manner. The Sri Lankan administration could not agree more. According to the terms of the Agreement, the process of elections to the provincial councils should have been completed before the end of December. Even legislation to settle the modalities of these elections is yet to be passed by parliament.

Everybody is waiting, for what nobody is clear about. The killings go on in the north and the east, and with each day, much to the sardonic delight of the Sinhalese gentry, the IPKF finds itself sinking into a deeper quagmire. The killings and arson are also kept up in the south, but few reports are permitted to appear in the press. And about everybody takes it for granted that the country will soon cease to be. Such being the situation, what can the poor elite of Colombo do? The economy languishes, the general prospects for the polity are grim, so what, they have somehow to amuse themselves, they flock to the New Year ball parties, and keep visiting Vilasita Bipani, the ravishingly dazzling luxury departmental stores. In Sri Lanka, it is not so difficult to discover serendipity, even if doom is round the corner.

Far Eastern Economic REVIEW

REPORT

Militants and ministers

Rebels and cabinet members snipe at the government

By Manik de Silva in Colombo

President Junius Jayewardene is facing the toughest period of his presidency. Divisions within his cabinet have resurfaced, compounding the problems of the minority Tamil insurgency in the north and east. Majority Sinhalese subversives in the south have continued to demonstrate their ability to strike at will, despite the president's public pronouncements that he would finish them off in weeks.

An Indian peace-keeping force (IPKF), now more than 35,000 strong, has not yet been able to break the back of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the dominant Tamil separatist group. The IPKF took control of the northern Jaffna peninsula after a major offensive in October. But in recent weeks, the LTTE has shifted its base to the eastern Batticoloa district and shown that it has not been crushed, even in Jaffna. Recent LTTE bombings in Jaffna have delayed the return of normalcy in the north.

There is little doubt that the IPKF has made progress in disarming the LTTE in Jaffna. The Indians have unearthed large caches of rebel arms in the peninsula. Since the beginning of the month, five rebel boats ferrying arms from the north to the east have been sunk by the Indian Navy.

Despite these reverses, the LTTE has been attempting to pressure Jaffna civilians not to allow Colombo to restart its civilian administration. Posters are prominently displayed and handbills have been distributed demanding that public servants stay away from their offices. Cooperation with the IPKF, the posters threaten, will mean death.

In a counter-propaganda drive, the IPKF has been displaying its own posters promising the citizens of Jaffna that they will be protected. But to the people of Jaffna, the repetition of recent events in Batticoloa — where the LTTE clashed with both the Sri Lankan police and the IPKF in heavily populated areas, resulting in dozens of civilian deaths — is a dangerous possibility.

In the east, the rebels have been following a strategy of exposing Muslim civilians to crossfire in an effort to alienate Muslims from the IPKF. Problems in Batticoloa, the eastern provincial capital, have been compounded by police reprisals in the local bazaar following the killing of an off-duty policeman and the wounding of two other constables soon after Christmas. A sniper fired at the policemen, provoking the reprisal in which at least 19 civilians were killed and dozens of shops gutted.

The IPKF too has been having its own problems with the Muslims of the east. IPKF activities triggered by the LTTE have cost several Muslim lives. Colombo, as well as the Indians, has played down these incidents which attracted international attention. The Muslims themselves decided to take on the LTTE at Kattankudy, a Muslim town of 50,000 people on the outskirts of Batticoloa, between 29 December and 1 January, resulting in the killings of some LTTE district leaders and 30 Muslims.

The IPKF is confident that if the public would cooperate in helping arrest LTTE followers, the problems in the east could be quickly eliminated. Maj.-Gen. Jameel Mahmood, the IPKF's eastern commander, told Transport Minister M. H. Mohamed, whom Jayewardene sent to the east to sort out what appeared to be a deteriorating situation, that it was essential the public should keep the IPKF informed of LTTE activities. If the Indians had the necessary information, they could act against the LTTE, he said.

Indian official with Jayewardene : cabinet divisions.

Reports in the Indian press have expressed concern that the IPKF has been slow in dealing with the LTTE in the east. These criticisms have not taken into account India's reluctance to expose the east to a Jaffna-style operation which caused a lot of civilian deaths.

In the south, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP — people's liberation front) and other subversive groups have continued to make sporadic strikes after the 23 December assassination of Harsha Abeywardene, chairman of the ruling United National Party (UNP). Abeywardene's killing came three days after Jayewardene had toured the troubled southern districts and made several hardline speeches vowing to liquidate the subversives within two weeks.

While some of Jayewardene's opponents chose to regard the Abeywardene killing as a response to his speeches, investigations suggest that the assassination plan had been in place for some time. "The speeches may have influenced the timing, but the people who did it could not have mapped it out in three days," an investigator said.

An attack on a police station in the Ratnapura district, southeast of Colombo, a week after the UNP chairman was killed, seriously disturbed the authorities. An armed group raided the police station, locked up the policemen and escaped with arms and explosives. The inspector-general of police conceded that there had been security lapses at the police outpost.

The opposition has accused the UNP of organising its own "Green Tigers" militia to counter the southern subversives who have made UNP supporters their special targets. Asked about this group recently, Jayewardene said that his party's MPs were asking for protection. It was not possible for the government to cover the large number at risk, and some auxiliaries were being used to provide protection to MPs and some others. These people had to work with the police, Jayewardene said.

Local press reports said about 500 auxiliaries, including some former JVP members, have been given small-arms training and are available in areas where UNP members are under threat. The government has neither confirmed nor denied the reports.

Adding to Jayewardene's problems are speeches by some of his ministers demonstrating dissension within the ranks of government. Winding up the recent budget debate, Finance Minister Ronnie de Mel told parliament that a 1982 referendum, which extended the incumbent legislature's term by six years, was the cause of many of the country's problems. Shortly after de Mel's controversial speech, Mohamed said there would be no general elections this year, despite demands for a poll by de Mel, among others.

Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa made a speech which analysts believe was loaded with innuendoes. It indicated clearly that Premadasa was pushing for a reappraisal of policies on Tamil separatists, as well as on the southern subversives. 14 JANUARY 1988

'IPKF should save Tamils against Sinhala aggression'

NEWS

From Our Staff Reporter

MADURAI, Jan. 14.

Mr. V. R. Krishna Iyer, former Judge of the Supreme Court, says that the IPKF has become a war-waging force. It should save Tamils against Sinhala aggression, he said addressing a seminar held under the auspices of the Indo-Sri Lanka Friendship Society here last night. Mr. Krishna Iyer said that not only had LTTE men but also a number of civilians had died.

Mr. Krishna Iyer said the people of India and Sri Krishna should come together and a meaningful ceasefire, with the condition that no individual should carry arms, should be attempted and something positive should be done during the ceasefire. He felt that all people, both Tamils including the LTTE and the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka should be included in negotiations to bring about a solution. Without the LTTE, he said, there would be no solution for the problem.

Alleging that the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardane, was unreliable, Mr. Krishna Iyer said that all the clauses in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement had been violated and the Tamils as an ethnic minority were being liquidated. Devolution of powers and the fusion of the North and the Eastern region as one province were the major planks over which the Tamils were struggling.

Mr. P. Nedumaran, president of the Tamil Nadu Kamaraj Congress stated that the accord had not even reached a take off stage.

Mr. R. Parthasarathy, president, Madurai Kamaraj University Teachers Association, Dr. Thamizh Kudimagan, Mr. H. N. Fernando and a number of others presented their views on the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. Miss Maheswari Velayutham presided.

Plea for phased withdrawal of IPKF

MADRAS, Jan. 14.

Mr. V. R. Krishna Iyer, former Supreme Court Judge, and Congress (I) leaders from Tamil Nadu today demanded an immediate ceasefire in Sri Lanka. While Mr. Krishna Iyer demanded a "phased withdrawal" of the IPKF from Sri Lanka, the Karnataka Fisheries Minister, Mr. M. Raghupathy, and the TNCC(I) leaders wanted it to be total and immediate. They were speaking at a meeting organised by the Forum for National Integration on the "Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and its after-effects."

Mr. Krishna Iyer, who traced the history of the Tamils' struggle, said the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was being proclaimed as the greatest event of this century. "This is the greatest folly of the century .... The accord has only produced discord," he said. The agreement was to fulfil certain obligations between two parties, which were the Tamil groups and the Sri Lankan Government. But by a "gross misunderstanding of the law of contract, there is an agreement between one party, namely, the Sri Lankan Government and a non-party, which is India."

Mr. Krishna Iyer said the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, should tell the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, on January 26 (when the latter will be in Delhi for witnessing the Republic Day parade) that he (Mr. Jayewardene) should provide devolution of power to the Tamils and fuse the Northern and Eastern provinces. "The Indian people must tell the Sri Lankan Government: Have the charity to give devolution .... We have not been able to get Mr. Jayewardene that the word he gave here on the accord is fulfilled."

He said the Opposition parties must together demand in Parliament that there should be ceasefire and the IPKF should observe ceasefire. The ceasefire should be until further orders" and not for "24 hours or 48 hours". The ceasefire should also apply to the JVP. Besides, there should be a phased withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka. A devolution package for the Tamils must be prepared and there should be fusion of the Northern and Eastern provinces. The devolution of powers to the united Northern and Eastern provinces should be akin to List 2 of the Indian Constitution, Mr. Krishna Iyer said.

The Karnataka Fisheries Minister, Mr. M. Raghupathy, said the IPKF should withdraw and allow Mr. Jayewardene and the Tamil militant organisations to settle the issue.

Mr. Raghupathy alleged that the agreement was entered into to divert attention from the Bofors scandal.

The AICC(I) member, Mr. M. Arumugaswamy, alleged that the TNCC(I) was inviting "mercenary speakers and writers" to speak in favour of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. "They are performing a drama. Is this the fate of the Congress in Tamil Nadu?" he asked.

Mr. K. Jegaveerapandian, TNCC(I) member, said the TNCC(I) claimed that it had collected 50 lakh signatures in support of the agreement. If the TNCC(I) had the strength to collect 50 lakh signatures in the State, nobody else would be ruling Tamil Nadu. He said it was announced in Delhi that any Congressman opposing the agreement was a traitor. "As we are patriots and we do not want the IPKF to lose its dignity, we have convened this meeting," Mr. Jegaveerapandian said.

Mr. G. Bhuvaraghan, former Congress Minister of Tamil Nadu, said everything had gone wrong with the agreement right from the beginning.

Mr. I. Lawrence of the Forum for National Integration, welcomed the gathering. Mr. Sheikh proposed a vote of thanks.

THE HINDU, Tuesday, January 12, 1988.

Venkateswaran criticises Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement

MADRAS, Jan. 11.

The former Foreign Secretary, Mr. A. P. Venkateswaran, today said the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement was an "object-lesson of how an accord should not be signed" and the manner in which the Agreement was signed was tantamount to "putting the cart before the horse."

Mr. Venkateswaran made this observation while speaking on "India's Foreign Policy" at the annual day celebrations of the Tamil Nadu Intellectuals' Forum.

He said the Government of India, instead of first resolving the question of devolution of power to the Tamils, decided it would sign the Agreement first and then resolve the problem of devolution of power. "Why should the Sri Lankan Government implement devolution? They are not fools. No devolution will ever take place under the Agreement. We will have to leave Sri Lanka in circumstances worse than we went in, "the former Foreign Secretary said. The Government of India had successfully alienated not only the Sinhalese but also the Tamils. The way things were happening, it was clear that "it is a grievous injustice to the people of Tamil origin," he added.

"Never before in history has a Peace-Keeping Force been sent to fight one side of the conflict; never before has it been sent to be placed under a foreign head of State. We have jeopardised and insulted our sovereignty "

Not only were LTTE men getting killed but also the IPKF soldiers. There were certain terms in the Agreement which were not being fulfilled. Statements had been made in Parliament that the Government was sorry that those terms were not being implemented but it was assured that they would be implemented. If the terms were not being implemented, the Tamils should not be killed at least.

"While the LTTE is being asked to lay down arms and give cooperation to the accord when it was never a signatory to the accord, Mr. Jayewardene, who is a signatory, is not being asked to implement the accord. Why pick on the former," Mr. Venkateswaran asked.

Replying to a question from the audience, he said Tamil Eelam was not an answer to the ethnic problem. The answer lay in equal treatment of all citizens in Sri Lanka and constitutional guarantees for that equality.

ASIAWEEK

Now, Terror in the South

Dominic Sansoni

Colombo checkpoint: Executions.

Greg Girard — Asiaweek

Security forces in Eastern Province: Fresh violence

REPORT

Barely three weeks after the accord, the JVP struck. On Aug. 18, the terrorists tried to assassinate President Junius Jayewardene inside the high-security Parliament building in Kotte city on the outskirts of Colombo. While the Sri Lankan leader was spared, the grenade attack killed two people and shocked the ruling party. Riding on anti-government sentiments, the JVP spread further south, temporarily seizing control of several villages. Any resistance was brutally snuffed out: street vendors who defied their orders not to sell government newspapers were killed; UNP supporters were executed.

By the time a stunned Colombo set up a special military front in the south, the JVP was already well-entrenched. The arrival of government soldiers has merely slowed its sweep across Southern Province. Even as villages and towns teem with army and police patrols, the executions of JVP enemies continue — only now they are carried out after dark. In towns such as Kataragama, the army has been forced to take over the distribution of newspapers because the local people are too frightened to do it themselves.

A chilling response to the vicious anti-UNP backlash has been the emergence of armed pro-government goon squads. Dubbed the Green Tigers (the UNP's colour is green), they have begun prowling the south, striking at those who oppose the accord. Most are small-time thugs affiliated with the ruling party. The government has allocated 600 of these "home guards" to each electorate and 150 to each ruling party parliamentarian. The MPs are responsible for arming and training them as private armies.

The village militias have outraged many Sri Lankans. Thunders ex-MP Tennyson Edirisooriya: "Jayewardene is using fear of the JVP to set up a paramilitary state."

Vijender Tyagi — Asiaweek

Jayewardene: "We'll win"

Analysts say the JVP has skilfully exploited the suffering of the common people to further its own cause. Professing Marxist beliefs, it has attracted many recruits among the poor and oppressed. Says Edirisooriya: "In supporting the JVP, the peasants feel they are making use of these violent elements for their own purposes. They have no other means of opposing the government, so they feel the JVP is the only answer."

Dr. Henry Pathirane, a father of two, is one example. He grew up amid deprivation. By the time he left medical school, he was committed to Marxism. The malnourished villagers who flocked to his Kolonne clinic only strengthened his belief that revolution alone could rectify the imbalances in Sri Lankan society. Says Pathirane, who is now in army custody: "I saw that nothing had changed since the days when my family went hungry and I decided that the JVP was the only alternative."

For his part, Jayewardene plainly feels he is justified in fighting fire with fire. The president has ordered security forces to "annihilate the JVP in two months' time." He has also ignored repeated appeals by Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa, a vocal critic of the July 29 accord, to lift an on-again, off-again ban on the leftist group.

But Jayewardene's determination to exterminate the JVP grows from a certain irony. After a bloody insurrection in 1971, the extremists were virtually wiped out by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party government. The group was banned and its fiery leader, Rohana Wijeweera, was sentenced to life imprisonment. During campaigning for the 1977 national elections, however, the UNP, then the opposition, made political capital of alleged government atrocities.

On coming to power, it set all JVP members free and even formed an alliance with the radical group. The UNP-JVP honeymoon ended in August 1983 when evidence surfaced that the Sinhalese extremists had fuelled bloody ethnic rioting a month earlier in the hope that the unrest would topple the government. The leaders of the JVP, which had earlier been outlawed again, went underground.

Five years later, the JVP is still a force to reckon with. What is worrisome, however, is that in their bid to stamp out the extremists, frustrated government troops may "kill thousands of innocent civilians in a repetition of what happened in the north and east," says political analyst Sarath Gunawardene. Already, the army is making mass arrests in the south, identifying JVP members with the help of UNP informants.

Col. Lakshman Algama, military coordinating officer for the southwestern front, insists the counter-terrorist campaigns are not comparable. Says he: "In the north and east, we could not get any information [about the Tamil separatists] from the public because they did not trust us. In the case of the JVP, we will eventually get the information from the local people, because we can communicate with them. We will win."

Many Sri Lankans believe, however, that the answer to the JVP problem is political, not military. There have been no parliamentary elections since the UNP came to power in 1977. Some observers reckon disgruntled Sri Lankans have turned to the rebels only because they have no other means of protest. As Edirisooriya puts it: "The government has to realise that this uprising can be put down only by the ballot, not the bullet."

JANUARY 22, 1988 ■

25.1.88,

WHEN FRIENDS SAY NO

For those ruling party loyalists for whom the least criticism of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord is tantamount to the betrayal of national interests, as well as for well-meaning individuals such as General Sundarji to whom every expression of doubt over the IPKF's role amounts to "a negative impact on our soldiers' morale", the resignation of Mr Ronnie de Mel should pose certain awkward questions regarding the viability of New Delhi's policy in Sri Lanka. Unlike Mr R. Premadasa who is readily dismissed in this country as a mindless bigot, or Mr Lalit Athulathmudali who has been hysterically accused of being a pawn in the hands of the American-Israeli lobby, Mr de Mel cannot easily be cast in the rôle of a sinister ogre making a political living out of anti-Indianism. True, the disturbed conditions in his parliamentary constituency in Mattara district, and the severe repression of the JVP's alleged supporters, may have influenced the former Finance Minister's decision to quit, but it would be gross folly to interpret the action as part of the Sinhalese backlash.

Even a cursory glance at Mr de Mel's record as Finance Minister indicates that far from being a hardliner who believes in a scorched earth military offensive against the recalcitrant Tamil militants, he was in the front line arguing for a negotiated settlement on the grounds that Sri Lanka could not afford a civil war. In fact, when the Indo-Sri Lankan accord was signed on July 29, Mr de Mel and Mr Gamini Dissanayake were the only Ministers whom President Jayewardene took into his confidence. That even someone who risked the wrath of the Sinhalese hardliners by urging moderation when Colombo clearly thought it unfashionable to do so has now said farewell to the Government is a pointer to the growing perceptions of disaster and to President Jayewardene's complete isolation. It matters very little that rather than directly attack the accord and the Indian intervention in the Northern and Eastern provinces, Mr de Mel has chosen to focus on the present UNP Government's lack of political legitimacy and its deliberate suppression of democracy. For the truth is that President Jayewardene's attempted solution of the ethnic conflict and misgivings about the Indo-Sri Lankan accord cannot be separated from the broader issue of democracy in the island.

It does not really need the outlawed JVP to remind the Sinhalese people that the Parliament which is legislating to establish the provincial councils and the enforced merger of the two "Tamil" provinces received its mandate as long ago as in 1977; Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike is repeatedly telling them so, and she is hardly to be dismissed as "anti-Indian". Indeed, with the JVP growing in popularity in the south, and the ruling UNP plagued by the internal dissensions resulting from a growing distance between President Jayewardene and the rest, the portents for political stability are not encouraging It may well be argued that the IPKF is doing a tremendous job under difficult and trying conditions and fulfilling the terms of its brief, but New Delhi has chosen to be blissfully impervious to the fact that the brief itself is flawed. Now that Mr de Mel has also said so, and acted in accordance with his conscience and poiltical instincts, it should set the warning bells ringing for Mr Rajiv Gandhi. Unless, of course, the Prime Minister is deluded enough to believe that the IPKF should again bail out the beleaguered Sri Lankan President, this time by going to the assistance of his troops fighting the JVP

LETTER

CHASING A MYTH IN LANKA

SIR,—While talking to students at Santiniketan during his recent visit, Mr Rajiv Gandhi justified the presence of the IPKF in Sri Lanka by pointing out that Sri Lanka would otherwise have become a base for forces unfriendly to India, and pose a threat to the southern border of the country. It is certain that President Jayewardene will not accept this argument, the Indo-Sri Lankan accord notwithstanding.

When one compares the justifications concerning Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka one discovers a remarkable similarity. All of them are based on imaginary threats. Very few people believe Mr Ronald Reagan when he says that the Leftist forces in Nicaragua pose a threat to Central America and the USA. It is equally clear that the Russian intervention in Afghanistan was based on a wrong reading of the situation and unjustified, a conclusion recognized by almost all countries barring a few like India.

It has been stated that India sent her armed forces into Sri Lanka for two reasons—first, to protect the ethnic Tamils presumably from the Sri Lankan security forces and, secondly to deny bases in Sri Lanka to forces unfriendly to India. Both arguments are flawed. The fact remains there have been considerable Tamil casualties since the arrival of the IPKF in Sri Lanka. Besides, how can the occupation of the northern and eastern parts of the island stop the construction of foreign bases in the rest of the island if Sri Lanka raises no objection. And what happens when we pull out?

—Yours, etc., M. M. BOSE.

Calcutta, January 20.

R.K. Lakshman, Times of India, 28.1.88

ALL THOSE WHO HAVE DIED ARE TRAITORS WHO DESERVED TO DIE

DOCUMENT

Our motherland cannot be rescued from slavery except by overthrowing the illegitimate, reactionary fascist dictatorship of the India-dominated puppet Jayewardene clique and of various traitors in disguise who are supporting him.

The people recognise these as the traitors in service of reaction today: The Vijaya Kumaranatunga clique which split the SLFP at the behest of Jayewardene and then embraced Tamil Eelamist terrorist murderers; the Communist Party, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party and the Nava Sama Samaja Party leaders who supported the betrayal of our motherland; the Independent Students' Union which is the associate of Tamil Eelamist murderers; various social service, human rights, women's artists groups and associations which are the instruments of the Catholic Church. These are the reactionaries and traitors who supported the so-called peace agreements, who betrayed the country, who supported the Indian aggression.

These traitors have now organised themselves to assist the Hitlerite Jayewardene clique against patriotic forces. They have brought to Colombo and are conspiring with Uma Maheswaran, an Indian stooge and a Tamil murderer. They have trained some persons in Batticaloa in one of his camps; armed by him and with the blessings of the Jayewardene clique, they are now set to attack the patriotic forces.....

James Athugala, who was punished recently, was one of these trained persons. Nandana Marasinghe was one of their organisers and a police informer. The activists of the Vijaya Kumaranatunga clique, of the Communist Party, of the Janata Sangamaya located at Devasaranaya which is now part of the reactionary Catholic Church, opponents of so-called chauvinism, are the other parties to this.

Patriots

Do not be deceived by these traitors.....we have correctly recognised the enemy. We shall punish them as they deserve. In the struggle for the liberty of our motherland and our people, no traitor can be forgiven.

Patriots, Unite

Sweep away all traitors and their supporters.

THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR PUNISHING TRAITORS

1988-01-18. (JVP)

PUNISHMENT TO ALL ENEMIES OF THE MOTHERLAND

★ All those who supported the so-called Jayewardene-Gandhi Peace Agreement which betrayed our motherland and our people to the Indian imperialists and the legislation to establish Provincial Councils.

★ All those who are supporters of the traitor Jayewardene fascist clique and its murderous policies.

★ All those who support the presence of the aggressor forces and who attempt to whitewash its destructive actions.

★ All those who attempt to betray the patriotic forces that enter the struggle to protect the motherland from the Indian aggressor forces and their puppet, Jayewardene.

★ All those who kill, torture or harass the patriotic forces in accordance with the illegal repressive laws enacted by this illegitimate government in order to repress the patriotic forces.

★ All those who organise terrorist cliques of various forms and assist the traitor Jayewardene to repress the patriotic peoples organisations (Deshapremi Janata Viyaparaya).

★ All those who engage in activity of any kind against the patriotic forces and who seek to mislead the people on behalf of the enemies of the motherland.....

Patriots

We shall fight against Jayewardene, against his fascist clique, against his fascist killers, against the Green Tigers that he has organised. We shall climb over mountains of corpses; we shall swim across lakes of blood; we shall sacrifice our lives; we shall fight for the independence of our motherland. This we swear to you.

However, allied with this open enemy and fighting against the patriotic forces are many enemies in disguise. These enemies, directed by the traitor Jayewardene and reactionary international organisations, appear before the people as progressives, social workers, human rights activists, artists, peasant leaders, or trade union leaders. Backed by secret funds from the UNP or from suspect organisations of the Catholic Church like SEDEC or Devasaranaya, acting in concert with Eelam terrorist organisations, they have already brought into being terrorist gangs, sometimes armed by the State, in order to terrorise and kill patriotic forces.

We can only protect our motherland by sweeping away not only the foreign aggressor, not only the open traitors but also this third force of traitors in disguise.

Who are these enemies, this third force?

The Lanka Sama Samaja Party which from its birth on December 18, 1935 has misled the working class, has betrayed the working class at every critical juncture, has in effect worked for the UNP in return for privileges, honours, etc. for the reactionaries.

The Ceylon Communist Party which from its inception on July 3, 1948 has fed itself from the World Socialist Movement but has acted as stooges of the UNP, betrayers of the entire working class movement in 1980 and has in effect betrayed the revolutionary movement in Sri Lanka.

Vijaya Kumaranatunga who entered the SLFP through marriage only in order to split what was then the principal anti-UNP force in the country, who spawned a bogus Naxalite conspiracy in order to allow Jayewardene to postpone the general election of 1983, who has now embraced Eelam terrorist murderers and is acting in all respects as the obedient acolyte of Jayewardene.

Vasudeva Nanayakkara who has acted in a similar fashion and a number of so-called trade union leaders who fatten themselves on the movement but refuse to lift a finger against the repression of the working class by Jayewardene.

The Janata Sangamaya which battens on support from SEDEC and Devasaranaya and other suspect foreign organisations and is a reactionary tiger in the disguise of a peasant organisation.

A clique of various human rights and women's activists who receive assistance from reactionary international organisations and are active in disseminating leaflets and pamphlets.

The Indpendent Students' Union which is only a catspaw of the Eelamist terrorist organisations.

These are the enemies of those who are true enemies of Jayewardene, of the real opposition to him.

At this critical juncture, all those have taken a stand on behalf of Jayewardene, on behalf of reaction.

All these are the enemies of the motherland and therefore deserve to be punished. Independence for the motherland and peace and liberty to the people requires that all these should be swept away.

Death to all enemies of the motherland.

Liberty and Peace to the People.

JOINT HEADQUARTERS OF PATRIOTIC ARMED FORCES.

January 25, 1988. (JVP)

THE LTTE LEADER APPEALS TO THE U.N.

the text of the letter addressed to The Secretary General, U.N.O. by Mr. Prabhakaran

"Your Excellency, We wish to refer to our letter of 16.11.87 addressed to you. We acknowledge your reply stating that the matter was referred to the Human Rights Commission of United Nations. The so-called "IPKF" (Indian Peace Keeping Force) continues relentlessly its atrocities on the people of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The Indian Government intervened in the internal problem of Sri Lanka to mediate between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. Now they are trying to gain foothold in our land. Indian Civil Administrators have been brought here and they are being engaged in civil administration. The police duties are being done by the Indian police. Military camps and sentry posts have been set up within the distance of every kilometre. Military camps have been opened in the following Educational Institutions:

Jaffna College - Vaddukkoddai.
Hindu College - Karainagar.
St.John's College - Jaffna.
Central College - Jaffna.
Ladies' Convent - Pandatharippu.
Union College - Tellippalai.
Ramanathan College - Maruthanamadam
Ladies' College - Uduvil.
Arumugam Vidhyasalai - Mallakam.
Maha Vidhyalayam - Sandilipai.
Murugamoorthy Vidhyalayam - Suthumalai.
Ramakrishna Vidhyalayam - Kondavil.
Saivaprakasa Vidhyasalai - Sithankerni.
Maha Vidhyalayam - Thiruvadinilai; and many other centres unknown to us in the Peninsula.

Curfew has been continuously imposed for more than one and a half months apart from occasional relaxation of a few hours in specified areas in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Jaffna Peninsula is in darkness because of the power cut imposed by the Indian Army. Consequently, all the industries are at a standstill. Drinking water supply is at a standstill. Transport is curtailed to the minimum and a few vehicles are allowed to ply with passes issued by the Indian army. The Peninsula is suffering from severe food shortages and 800,000 people are on the verge of starvation. Fishing and agriculture are at a standstill. This has brought about an economic depression. Most of the hospitals and nursing homes remain closed, and infectious diseases are on the increase owing to lack of medical facilities. Indiscriminate artillery and cannon shellings on residential areas continue unabated consistently and consequently several people get killed or wounded. Nearly two thousand innocent civilians have been already killed as a result of the military offensive undertaken by the Indian Government. For example - on 9.11.87 four civilians were injured by shellings at Sandilipai and they were taken to Jaffna General Hospital in a car bearing a white flag. The car was shot at by the Indian army at Navaly; the four injured and the two who were taking them were killed, and the car was burnt.

Raping has become a daily occurrence. When the people brought these incidents to the notice of the Indian army officers, the reply given by them was that such things are quite common during war time. At Uduvil, four girls were raped by the Indian army personnel. When the parents reported this to Major Parameshwaran and Captain Sharma, Major Parameshwaran admitted that such incidents had taken place and apologised for what had happened. On 5.11.87, The Indian army broke open a store at Urumpirai and asked the people around to remove the things they wanted. When the people got into the store, all the males were ordered out and the women who were inside the store were brutally raped. One of those raped was a two-month preg nant woman and the other is a small girl who had not attained age.

There is a systematic destruction of all schools, houses and business establishments. The business centres at Urumpirai, Thirunelvely and Jaffna Bus-stand areas where businesses were manned, were the places where burglaries were committed by the Indian army.

It could be proved by the secret message sent by a person named Chopra to the Palaly Army Commander, intercepted by us, that the 48 hour cease-fire announced by the Indian Government on 21.11.87 was not observed by the Indian armed forces. In Trincomalee, seven innocent civilians were shot and two of them died on the spot during the period of cease-fire. They carried out many search-and-destroy missions in that period, and many people were arrested.

There is no truth in the Indian propaganda that food is being distributed, relief being given and the situation is returning to normal. This is being done to deceive the world community at large.

They have silenced all local news, and are not allowing the foreign correspondents to enter this area. There are no telephone links. Every possible way has been blocked to the outside world not to get to know the truth.

We appeal to you to send a team of investigators from the Human Rights Commission to inquire into the violation of human rights and the army atrocities. You may also request the Indian Government to stop the military offensive operation, and to start negotiations to solve all related matters. It would allow our people to live peacefully without any form of persecution by the armed forces. No time should be lost as our people can no longer endure the sufferings."



11.1.88	Parangimadu	One girl
11.1.88	Eravur	2 young Muslim girls.
11.1.88	Thandiyadi/Batticoloa	3 Tamil girls.
12.1.88	Thandiyadi/Batticoloa	Thilakavathy (missing).
14.1.88	Arayampathy	2 girls.
16.1.88	Nedunkeni, Ayappankovil	11 women (Among them one pregnant one aged)
	S. Maheswari (36)	Thannirutru
	V. Alagamma (33)	Thannirutru
	C. Kamatchi (26)	Munniavalai
	K. Nageswari (33)	Munniavalai
	M. Mangaleswari (37)	Thannirutru
	K. Santhadevi (23)	Kadanvayal
	S. Smithra (24)	Kadanvayal
	T. Vijayalakshmi (37)	Tannmurippu
	V. Annamma (42)	Kodarikal
	P. Meenakshiamma (41)	Kumulamunai
	Sothilakshmi (33)	Kumulamunai

REPORT

Colombo's policies strike a chord

JANUARY 1

India's foreign policy hawks are crowing over what they see as their diplomatic coup in Sri Lanka. Sinhalese hawks call New Delhi's intervention a sell-out by President Junius Jayewardene. Tamil hawks in both countries call it betrayal of Tamils by India. All three are misperceptions, but each will add friction to Indo-Sri Lankan relations.

Each group refers to compromises in Sri Lanka's foreign policy, which Jayewardene promised Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at the end of July last year. If carried out, these revisions will reduce a slant towards the West which the President has given Sri Lankan foreign policy, eliminate the possibility of a foreign military base in the excellent harbour at Trincomalee, and disengage Sri Lanka from certain aspects of recent deals with the Voice of America, Pakistan's army and Israel's Mossad intelligence agency.

But this is no coup. During the 20 years it was in power, Sirima Bandaranaike's opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) had followed a foreign policy similar to – and supportive of – India's.

Nor are the revisions a sell-out since all they would do is to revert foreign policy to that of the SLFP. But the Sinhalese hawks – including the SLFP – have denounced Jayewardene's agreement because it has allowed the Indian army on to the island.

■ *Pax Sri Lanka: how* The Hindu *(Madras) saw last July's peace agreement*

Tamils condemn the agreement as betrayal because India settled for much less than Tamil militants could have won through battle – if New Delhi had not intervened.

The longer Indian troops stay, the more Sinhalese pride will be hurt. The Indian troops came at Jayewardene's request, and because they are under his authority he can order them out at his discretion. He has already sent back two Indian warships which had been lurking on Colombo's horizon.

The Indian army is disarming Tamil militants faster than Sri Lankan troops could have managed. Success in flushing out the Tamil Tigers will sufficiently strengthen Jayewardene to enable him to stand by his promises of regional autonomy for Tamils. It would be unwise for the SLFP to encourage the right-wing Sinhalese Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (People's Liberation Front – JVP) to embarrass Jayewardene or to scuttle the accord with India.

The SLFP's sympathies towards the Indian position may influence changes in the accord but not its annulment.

The worst scenario for Indo-Sri Lankan relations in 1988 is friction. There is no likelihood of a major rupture or discord. ■

Pran Chopra in New Delhi



Mahil, Sunday Times, 10.1.88

THE STATESMAN

REPORT

Lanka Parliament criticizes IPKF

Lankans want IPKF to go back

COLOMBO Jan 22 —The continued and increasing Indian presence in Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern Provinces nearly six months after the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord came in for sharp criticism from both Government and Opposition Benches in Parliament yesterday during the debate to extend the Emergency for another month.

Leading the attack from the Government Benches was the Prime Minister Mr Ranasinghe Premadasa followed by the National Security Minister Mr Lalith Athulathmudali, speaking in Parliament for the first time in several months. From the Opposition Benches the Opposition leader Mr Anura Bandaranaike accused the Indian forces of "deliberately prolonging the agony in order to ensure permanent Indian presence in the two provinces.

As if that were not enough India-bashing for one day, the Chief Government Whip's Office in an official Press release yesterday quoted President Jayewardene as telling his Parliamentary group that his visit to India next week was to have "a direct dialogue with the Indian Prime Minister and Government as some information does not reach Mr Rajiv Gandhi."

That statement is seen here as a serious indictment of the Indian diplomatic mission in Colombo as a whole and was tantamount to accusing the Indian envoy here of withholding from his Prime Minister vital information on developments relating to the ethnic conflict and the operations of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force here.

Many alleged excesses of the Indian forces against the civilian population in the two provinces were mentioned on the floor of the House yesterday with the Prime Minister referring specifically to a 79-year old woman being raped by a member of the IPKF. Said the Prime Minister: "I don't know what kind of word can be used to describe that We will have to invent new word."

Mr Premadasa who has all along been critical of the Indian role in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict taunted India with the observation that the fourth largest Army in the world had failed to contain terrorism in the North and East of Sri Lanka, and recalled that when the Sri Lankan Army captured the Vadamarachchi area in the North, "India told us that she would teach us a lesson if our Army was allowed to invade Jaffna We were accused of genocide" following the excesses of the Indian Army the people of the North and East were now asking for the return of the Sri Lankan Army, he said "Having experienced the treatment given by the step-father, the people are asking for return of the father" Mr Premadasa observed

Mr Athulathmudali, told the House that the people throughout Sri Lanka wanted the Indian forces to leave as early as possible, and the same feeling was being expressed in India itself. Noting that the Opposition had said various things about the Indian forces here, he said there were several stories in circulation but he recalled only one of them for the lesson it offers

A Tamil friend of his in Vavuniya was in the habit of calling the Sri Lankan Army as the Sinhalese Army Recently his friend has admitted that the Indian forces were not like our forces. Asked by the Minister to explain, his friend had said that when the Sri Lankan forces searched houses, they caused little or no problem and at the end of the search they always had a word of apology. But when the Indian troops came for investigation they turned the house upside down and did not even have a word of apology. At the end of the search the Indians would inquire" Are there any goats and any females?"

Mr Athulathmudali told House that the people of all communities were of one mind on that the foreign Army should depart, and that during his visit to India with President Jayewardene he would discuss with the Indian authorities the process of withdrawing the IPKF from Sri Lanka He said "The democratic people want the IPKF sent away. The terrorists want the IPKF out so that they could take command once again. Therefore we must act carefully. The experience all over the world is that external forces come to a country for their own end. It is only a bankrupt political party such as Tulf which is unaware of that position."

Mr Anura Bandaranaike said that people of all communities had suffered at the hands of the Indian forces and the three cardinal promises in signing the peace accord had not been fulfilled first that the terrorists would lay down arms second that the IPKF would withdraw by the end of September or by October 1987 third, that peace would return to the North and East. "Thousands of Sinhalese were driven out of their homes and some 400,000 Tamils have been rendered homeless. The Tamil community has suffered more than any other at the hand of the IPKF who were brought to protect them. A number of Tamils have been butchered. The sister and brother-in-law of the Chief Justice of Sri Lanka were also butchered by the IPKF in Jaffna Mr Samuel, an old teacher of Royal College who was running a tuitory in Jaffna was also butchered. What could that 85-year-old teacher have done? A large number of people were butchered. That seems to be the only fundamental achievement of the IPKF" Mr Bandaranaike said.

The Opposition leader told the House that a Buddhist priest from Pollonaruwa had said that the IPKF personnel had tea in a boutique run by a Sinhalese, then grabbed the cassette-recorder that was there and left after firing shots in the air. People hid when they heard Indian vehicles approaching. All this shows that people have been reduced to the level of dogs The Sinhalese now hide when they hear Indian vehicles This is in Pollonaruwa not in the North or East. The accord has reduced the country to this sad state" he said

Meanwhile Sirimavo Bandaranike Leader of the main Sinhala opposition party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party today issued a special message to the people of India on the eve of Republic Day and called on the Indian Government and Parliament to face the reality and understand that continued Indian support for the Jayewardene Government would mean nothing less than propping up a tottering puppet regime.

In a hastily summoned Press conference for representatives of the Indian media at her Colombo residence Mrs Bandaranike explained that she was releasing that statement in view of Mr Jayewardene's visit to India on January 25 and the likelihood that a draft treaty pertaining to defence and security would be signed.

She said the people of Sri Lanka of all communities were not opposed to peace "they are opposed to a peace accord hatched in secrecy and signed in undignified haste, without the slightest effort at genuine consultation, let alone consensus and consent."

COMMENT

INDIA'S MESS IN LANKA—I

Rushing Where Others Feared To Tread

By G. C. KATOCH

AFTER criticizing the various arguments that have been put forward to explain India's involvement in Sri Lanka, G. C. Katoch, a former Defence Ministry official, says that "something obviously went wrong" with the "breezy expectation" that Operation Pawan would be quickly over. Given the kind of bungling that seems to have taken place, and the high Indian casualties the writer feels that there is need for a "quick and impartial inquiry" into the entire affair, especially in view of the political uncertainties in Tamil Nadu after M. G. Ramachandran's death.

In the concluding part tomorrow, Mr Katoch argues in favour of negotiations with the LTTE not only because it still remains popular with the Sri Lanka Tamils but also because weakening the Tigers beyond a point would expose the Tamils to future oppression.

In any other civilized country with a professional army peace-time casualties in such large numbers, on foreign soil, would have resulted in a public uproar, followed by a military enquiry and swift punishment to those responsible for it. Here in India we seem to be more interested in Hershman, Bofors, garish weddings and the like than in the mauling received by our soldiers in Sri Lanka.

THE Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka can claim many firsts. This is the first time since Independence that our armed forces are fighting not for India's defence but to maintain the territorial integrity of another country. The first time ever that the army has been called upon to tackle urban insurgency on a massive scale. And the first time that there is utter confusion about what our soldiers are dying for.

Whatever may have been the original justification, or political compulsion, for signing the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement, the standard arguments now being put forward to justify the military operations are as follows. First, if we did not go in there, some other foreign power would have. Secondly, we had to ensure that Trincomalee does not become an American base. Third, India must assert its regional power status by flexing its military muscle. And finally, the LTTE must be destroyed if the agreement is to be fully implemented in order to safeguard Tamil interests. Each one of these arguments can be stood on its head with ease.

REASONING

Take, first, the reasoning that but for us some other country would have sent troops to Sri Lanka. It is known that President Jayewardene did approach the USA and the U.K. but neither country was willing to be militarily involved. Even Pakistan seems to have cold-shouldered the idea. If they had indeed sent troops, surely a gleeful Indian military establishment would have watched the fun from the ringside; now the Pakistanis have the last laugh. But, of course, we had to rush in where wiser leadership feared to tread.

Again, it is preposterous to suggest that the best way of helping Sri Lankan Tamils is to liquidate their leadership and crush their armed strength which is their only insurance for survival; but more of this later. The Trincomalee argument is likewise inane. It is true that Trinco is one of the finest and largest natural harbours in the world, and is strategically located. But the U.S. navy cannot really want to build a base there unless it loses Subic Bay in the Philippines, which is unlikely.

Besides, the Pentagon would be wary of investing in long-term commitments in the Tamil-dominated areas of an unstable Sri Lanka regime. The Pentagon may also be inhibited by the fear that a piqued India could well react by offering an east coast naval base to the Soviets. And if the Americans did need Trincomalee badly enough, one does not see either the Sri Lanka Goverment or the Indian forces in that country stopping them. Accord or no accord, a few bill on dollars' aid would do the trick.

Lastly, not many thinking persons would be inclined to take the flexing-our-military-muscle argument seriously but for the fact that it is being heard in the highest echelons, civil and military, in this country. It is also being said that the IPKF's casualties are a small price to pay for asserting our dominance as a regional power. In the first place our power status is determined not only by military capability, which is no secret, or by posturing, but also by economic and political strength, which could do with building up.

Physical intervention in the domestic problems of a tiny neighbour can hardly add to our stature as a regional power. As for the 1,400-odd dead and wounded soldiers being a modest price for advertising India's regional power status, some people bitterly ask: how many of the callous policy-makers in South Block would be willing to contribute to the "small" price tag by sending their sons and close relatives to be killed or maimed in Sri Lanka?

Going by the official figures (which are correct, though what prevents army Headquarters from publishing casualty lists is not clear) the number of casualties in an operation of this kind has been clearly excessive. In particular, the losses were distressingly heavy during the initial phase. It is a pity that people in large parts of the country are not sufficiently aware of this. The concern

The Primeminister must have been badly briefed when he called the LTTE a small unrepresentative group. Contrary to the official claims the LTTE still enjoys much popular support. The Tamils know that it was the LTTE that protected them from Sinhalese oppression and the Sinhalese army for years and will continue to do so after the Indian forces withdraw.

R.K. Lakshman, Times of India, 26.1.88

shown by defence analysts and the media generally has also, sadly, been rather muted.

Let it be remembered that Operation Pawan, as it is named and as the name signifies, was thought to be a pint-sized task planned to be completed in just 48 or 72 hours. Something obviously went wrong with that breezy expectation as the army began the first fortnight by burning a finger or two. After three months the troops are still fighting, and still incurring some casualties every day.

If, therefore, the impression gains ground that there has been serious bungling somewhere, it wouldn't do to ridicule it. In any other civilized country with a professional army, peace-time casualties in such large numbers, on foreign soil, would have resulted in a public uproar, followed by a military inquiry and swift punishment to those responsible for it. One has only to recall the 1987 USS Stark incident in the USA and the sacking of air defence generals in the USSR after Rust's landing on the Red Square in Moscow.

Here in India we seem to be more interested in Michael Hershman, Bofors, garish weddings and the like than in the mauling received by our soldiers in Sri Lanka. What is seen to be professional incompetence or worse is not something to bother about. One general, after being virtually sacked, has been reinstated. (Was it South Block's special way of proving the BBC wrong?)

It is high time that a proper, quick and impartial inquiry is ordered into the reasons for these abnormally heavy casualties. To be credible, such an inquiry must be headed by a retired army commander of acknowledged professional ability and integrity. No serving officer, whatever his seniority or standing, will be able in the present environment to pinpoint lapses on the part of politico-military decision makers, intelligence agencies, and civil and military bureaucracies, all of whom could have been at fault. Nor will he be in a position, without risk to his career, without risk of serious harassment, to identify and name any guilty ones at senior levels.

Certainly no High Court or Supreme Court judge, past or present would do. Not so much because some judges who have recently headed special inquiries have, in the public mind, blotted their copy book, but more because the probe suggested will need military background and a professional rather than a purely judicial approach so as to get at the truth and thwart any attempt to sweep muck under the carpet.

Fortunately, we do not have to look too hard for suitable retired generals who should fit the slot: Jagjit Singh Aurora, M. L. Chibber and I. S. Gill are among the names that readily come to mind. If conducted well, the inquiry cannot bring a bad name to the army. It will only enhance its professional image.

There are now two factors to foul up the messy situation we were already in. One, the uncertainties of Tamil Nadu politics in the post-MGR era. His personal charisma and domination of the State scene apart, M. G. Ramachandran also provided a useful link with the LTTE. Whichever of the AIADMK leaders finally succeeds in establishing herself or himself at the top, she or he will not have the kind of acceptability that MGR had; and none dare take up an anti-LTTE stance and get away with it. Mr M. Karunanidhi will almost certainly want to use the anti-IPKF platform to convert chauvinist Tamil sentiment into votes.

Then there is the Jayewardene factor. The Foreign Office mandarins seem to cling to the belief that he has a big stake in the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement and, therefore, his survival is necessary for its "successful" implementation. The view that the wily old man is using Indian forces to do his dirty work is not the less valid for being widely aired. We went in to help the Sri Lanka Tamils, to keep peace there, and ended up by waging war against them on behalf of the Sinhalese.

PURPOSE

Let no one doubt that when President Jayewardene's purpose is served, he will want to throw out the IPKF. He has publicly said so in so many words. And notwithstanding what this or that general may say, one does not see in the Indian leadership the sort of finesse and guts needed to hold on against the wishes of Junius Richard Jayewardene. When he asks you to quit, you quit.

Maybe in your magnanimity you will leave behind much of the arms and equipment you have taken to Sri Lanka. Perhaps also offer "aid" of a few hundred crore rupees to repair the damage done by IPKF operations. And leave the Tamils to the mercy of the Sinhalese. It is not hard to guess how kind the Sinhalese will be. The scenario can be no different should President Jayewardene disappear from the scene. Only the IPKF will be back in India earlier.

(To be concluded) 30.1.88,

INDIA'S MESS IN LANKA—II

TIME TO STRIKE A DEAL WITH LTTE

By G. C. KATOCH

AN answer to the Sri Lankan problem calls for an unblinkered look at realities, as well as a reminder of why we are there at all. No one disputes that India got involved in Sri Lanka to help the Tamils realize their legitimate aspirations without allowing the country to be dismembered. We are not there to perpetuate Sinhalese domination or to implement an accord per se. But understandably, the Sinhalese are, and will remain, hostile to the IPKF presence on Sri Lanka soil. The Tamils, who had welcomed the IPKF as saviours, are now sulking and feel—all three million of them—that we have let them down. Indeed, if some of them hate our guts we can hardly fault them.

There may have been provocation enough from the LTTE for the Indian troops to hit back but this is no longer relevant. The fact is that our forces have been killing Tamils, destroying their homes, driving them away: a nice way to win their trust and get them justice. The only "achievement" we can claim since the July 29 accord was signed is the passage of the Provincial Councils Bill and the 13th amendment to the Sri Lanka Constitution. These fall far short of the main Tamil demands after Eelam was implicitly given up.

ILLUSORY

As Ashok Mitra's lucid analysis in these columns (December 29-30) showed, the devolutions proposed are largely illusory. Dr Mitra could also have mentioned another major demand relating to the vesting of State lands in the Provincial Councils which has also been ignored. The Colombo government is accused of using its ownership of land to bring in Sinhalese settlers and try to change the ethnic balance. So, less than fair legislation and wide spread damage to life and property—this sums up the Tamil gains from our diplomatic and military efforts.

The Prime Minister must have been badly briefed when he called the LTTE a small unrepresentative group. Actually, the LTTE is by far the largest group of Tamil militants which totally dominates the Northern Province and a good part of the Eastern Province. In the Jaffna peninsula it has for long been running a parallel, effective administration. Contrary to official claims, the LTTE still enjoys much popular support. The Tamils know that it was the LTTE that protected them from Sinhalese oppression and the Sinhalese army for years and will continue to do so after the Indian forces withdraw.

Despite the LTTE's ruthlessness—perhaps partly because of it—its writ still runs. It is idle to imagine that any election to the Provincial Council can successfully be held without the LTTE's support, no matter how many additional troops are iducted for the occasion. The moderate TULF appeals to no one, and other militant groups like TELO, PLOTE or EPRLF do not have anything like the absolute hold on Tamils that the LTTE has.

By all accounts the LTTE cadres were as well organized and, except for heavy weaponry, as well equipped as any infantry components of the Indian army. They are certainly better motivated. But they are also realist enough to realize that they are no match for the IPKF's 8-10 brigades. At the same time, the IPKF may crush the LTTE but can never hope to annihilate it, if counter-insurgency operations in our own north-eastern sector for decades are any guide. In a no-win situation, all that is needed is a face-saving formula (both sides have much more than face to lose) for starting a dialogue.

The unconditional surrender approach that the Indian Government has adopted towards the LTTE ignores the complexities of the situation on the ground and leaves no room for give-and take. Such an approach has rarely worked at any time in history, and will not work now. Moreover, on a long-term view it would be foolish to decimate the LTTE beyond a point. It is the only organized armed body that can hold on the Sinhalese onslaught after the IPKF pulls out, as it has to some day.

A country staggering under the economic effects of an unprecedented drought that spends more than Rs 3 crores a day on the operations in Sri Lanka hardly deserves a pat on the back. A stage has been reached when we are in danger of continuing to fight the LTTE for the sake of fighting or to satisfy our military ego. With a strange perversity, we will go on killing Tamils, and go on sacrificing precious Indian lives.

In fairness to ourselves, as to the Lanka Tamils, we must earnestly strive towards a ceasefire and a settlement to restore normalcy. And the time seems ripe for such an effort. There are reports that the LTTE's main conditions now are to lift the ban on their party in Sri Lanka, remove the price placed on Mr Pirabhakaran's head, and allow arms to be laid down in phases the minimum to be retained for personal protection. It appears they are no longer pressing the outrageous demand for Indian forces to withdraw to October 10 positions.

HERO WORSHIP

In Sri Lanka and in Tamil Nadu the Tamils have shown a strong trait of fierce hero worship, Dravidian culture apparently being fertile ground for the personality cult. In Mr Pirabhakaran today there is a single leader whom Sri Lanka Tamils need and obey. With the snapping of the MGR-Pirabhakaran link and the split in the AIADMK, Mr Pirabhakaran's role becomes crucial. Presumably he is at the top of the IPKF's hit list. But his death could plunge Tamil Sri Lanka into a chaotic situation resulting from intra-militant rivalries.

A negotiated solution can then be ruled out. There is risk also of the violence spreading in Tamil Nadu. Therefore, it would be wise to settle with the LTTE while Mr Pirabhakaran is still there. Then we could get on with the job we set out to do in the first instance—that of securing for the Sri Lankan Tamils a fair deal in their homeland.

R.K. Lakshman, Times of India, 17.1.88

The issue is human

OPINION

Kuldip Nayar

PERHAPS it happens to all issues that a state generally takes up: somewhere along the way the real purpose gets lost. We began in Sri Lanka as a party which was horrified over the treatment meted out to the Tamils there. Mrs Gandhi sent Narasimha Rao, the then foreign minister, after the riots in Colombo where Tamils were killed. Rajiv Gandhi air-dropped food in Jaffna even at the risk of staking international support.

For sometime now, the human aspect appears to have been pushed into the background and other factors, geo-political and regional, have come to the fore. The Prime Minister has justified the sending of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka on the ground that "foreign elements" had to be prevented from threatening India's security.

It is well known by now that Trincomalee was sought to be pawned to America and there is no doubt that such a development would have posed a threat to India's security. Understandably, the Indo-Sri Lanka accord prohibits Colombo from inducting a third power in the harbour and the Sri Lanka waters. But the real purpose of the accord was neither to neutralise Trincomalee nor to keep away foreign elements like Pakistan and Israel which were helping Sri Lanka to suppress the Tamil aspirations.

The accord was meant to ensure, within Sri Lanka, a self-government to the Tamils in their majority areas so that they would escape the discrimination and dictation which had dogged them for many years. It was not a state-like status in India but the Tamils, by and large, accepted it to end the hostilities and lead a peaceful life. The question that New Delhi has to ask itself is how far its action has helped that process.

True, the situation would have been different if the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had gone along with the Indian government in implementing the accord. But is LTTE alone to blame? The detention and the tragic death of two of LTTE's regional commanders and 10 senior members after general amnesty must have come as a rude shock to the LTTE. Thileepan, a LTTE leader, had to sacrifice his life, fasting to death, to get some concrete proposals for the setting up of an interim administration, which is still nowhere near implementation. President Jayewardene is a slippery customer and New Delhi must have known it by this time. He may be the best moderate India has in Sri Lanka but he is also a person who runs with the hare and hunts with the hound at the same time.

Unfortunately, New Delhi considers the ceasefire proposal as a "ploy" on the part of the LTTE to regroup its forces for subsequent operations. Presuming it is true, the risk has to be taken.

I picked up lot of evidence from the Sri Lankan Tamil groups in Madras about the Jayewardene government's contacts with the LTTE. There are about 200 LTTE activists in Colombo itself but the government has not touched them. Reports are that the LTTE has shifted its operations from Jaffna to Batticaloa, because the latter has a common border with the Sinhalese area. The LTTE men, after an ambush or a surprise attack, go over to the Sinhalese side to seek shelter.

On the other hand, the Sri Lanka government has already modified the accord unilaterally. The imposition of the emergency, whereby Colombo can take over the administration in Jaffna and other Tamil areas, has to follow the norms laid down in the Indian Constitution, that is, outside aggression, etc. The Jayewardene government has added "breakdown of essential services" as an additional ground for declaration of the emergency.

Residuary powers, after delinetating central and state subjects, have already been appropriated by Colombo. Those powers were to be vested in the proposed provincial council. Another point on which the accord has been altered is land, which has worried the Tamils most. The Sinhala colonisation in traditional Tamil majority areas in the guise of resettling Sinhala refugees has not stopped.

"We have pointed out to the Government of India that the accord has been violated both in letter and spirit even before the Tamils have been given any set up of their own," Amirthalingam, chief of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) told me in Madras. "I have written a personal letter to Rajiv Gandhi so that the matter could be discussed when Jayewardene is in Delhi."

In the face of steps to dilute the accord, the basic problem of clothing the proposed provincial council with more powers has become difficult. The Sri Lanka Supreme Court has already said in a judgement that there will have to be a referendum to get the people's assent if additional powers are contemplated for the provincial council. The most important part financial decentralisation, was left for further discussions. New Delhi is now so dependent on Jayewardene that it may not make an issues of such things as may not be to his liking.

On the other hand, Jayewardene's authority to implement the accord, much less to go beyond it, is now a question mark. After the resignation of Ronnie de. Mel, the Sri Lankan finance minister, it is evident that the ruling United National Party (UNP) is not fully behind Jayewardene. De Mel's argument that the government, which has not gone in for elections for the past 10 years has no right to stay in power, has validity.

The demand for new elections is bound to get wider support from the Sinhalese, particularly when they have not relished the accord. Mrs Bandaranaike, who is waiting in the wings, has not only denounced the accord but has also joined hands with militant monks to pull down the UNP government and all that it has committed to do. Even JVC, a militant Sinhalese organisation, is soft towards her. Were elections to be held now, Mrs Bandaranaike's return to power is said to be more or less certain.

What strategy New Delhi will adopt in that eventuality is difficult to say. The accord will be as dead as a dodo if Jayewardene's successor is not in its favour. By then, the IPKF would

have destroyed most of LTTE's force and its hideouts.

Whom would the Tamils turn to for protection if the Sinhalese do not accept the calls of a pluralistic society, which Sri Lanka is? Surely, New Delhi does not intend to keep the IPKF in Jaffna, Batticaloa and other Tamil areas indefinitely. However, Amirthalingam says: "If Indian soldiers leave, it will be a betrayal of Tamils."

The best way out is still the accord, but its implementation has to be to the satisfaction of the Tamils. Even in his recent letter to Rajiv Gandhi, LTTE chief V. Prabhakaran, has reiterated the acceptance of "a regional Tamil state" and all that he wants is a "satisfactory devolution of power" to the proposed state. In other words, a state-like status within Sri Lanka is the goal of the militants and other Tamils. This is what New Delhi is also working for.

But if the hostilities continue, the negotiating parties will be distracted from the real purpose; how to implement the accord and transfer substantial powers to the proposed provincial council. Against this background, the proposal for a ceasefire should have top priority.

Prabhakaran's repeated requests for it — he sent a personal letter to Rajiv Gandhi early this month — have some merit. Unfortunately, New Delhi considers the ceasefire proposal as a "ploy" on the part of the LTTE to regroup its forces for subsequent operations. Presuming it is true, the risk has to be taken, keeping in view the situation where the LTTE has substantial sympathy among the Tamils.

The LTTE forces are not so powerful as to pose a challenge to the IPKF, which is already three-division strong. And all the overground Tamil groups ! met in Madras are unanimously behind the demand for a ceasefire.

It is peace which the Tamils in Sri Lanka have wanted and it is the peace which has eluded them again. The confrontation between the IPKF and the LTTE is distressing for them. In Madras I heard many stories which bring no credit to India. However exaggerated, most people in Tamil Nadu believe in them. Now there is no MGR to put a lid on Tamil's volatile feelings. There may be an outburst; the Tamils are known for their emotional reactions.

The issue is not whether the IPKF has succeeded in curbing the LTTE but whether the Sri Lanka Tamils have regained confidence to live in their traditional areas. It appears while totalling the number of LTTE militants killed and arms surrendered, New Delhi has forgotten the human side of the problem. Was not this the real issue when we started helping the Tamils? ■

30.1.88



Ravi Shankar, Sunday.

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

G. Rajadurai 1.1.88

S. Nagamani 21.1.88

V. Harishankar 2.2.88

Suthakaran 8.1.88

Y. Thanoeswari 24.1.88

K.C. Jayendran 12.2.88

Viswanathan 7.1.88

T. Yoganathan 24.1.88

C. Raghunathan 12.2.88

Mrs. S. Annapillai 10.1.88

Panjalingam 25.1.88

Miss. Kalpana 20.2.88

Julian 14.1.88

S. Jayaratnam 26.1.88

K. Thillairajan 27.2.88

A. Thavamani 19.1.88

Sivapadasundaram 27.1.88

A. Antony 28.2.88

EDITORIAL

AN UNHOLY WAR

Whom are the Indian armed forces fighting against and dying for in Sri Lanka, and for what? Why are the Tamils getting killed and tormented? Is this a war to establish a moral right or stake a principle? By whom? On whom ? On all accounts this is an unholy war. By taking on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam without heed to Tamil feelings, their anxieties and fears, and with callous disregard to their safety and security, India today has waged a war against Tamils, not only of Sri Lanka but the world over.

By unleashing enormous brutality on the Tamil civilian population, India has forsaken its role as a protector of Tamils and guarantor of peace. Above all, the psychological trauma that has been inflicted on the Tamil population is so grave that its impact will endure for several years, if not for generations, to come.

A sense of deep shock and betrayal permeates through the minds of Tamils. Having suffered for many years under the repression of the Sinhalese Sri Lankan state and its armed forces, they stand condemned to suffer further deaths and destructions. Indians are today killing the same people whom they came to protect. A tragedy of immense proportions has fallen on a hapless people.

Until now New Delhi has rather deftly massaged and managed Tamil Nadu. Indian government, both by keeping the national and international media away from the Tamil areas and through its state-controlled radio and television network has so far with some measure of success orchestrated a propaganda of misinformation and disinformation.However, the truth is slowly emerging through various independent sources and numerous testimonies of eye-witnesses.

The political management of New Delhi and the operation of the Indian "peace-keeping" forces and their conduct in Sri Lanka have considerably tarnished India's image and standing in the world forum. The condemnation of India's military offensive at the recently held conference on Tamil refugees at Assemblee Nationale in Paris, attended by representatives of thirty two non-governmental organisations from Europe, Canada and USA is indicative of this. Many governments, too, have expressed concern privately.

The Sri Lankan state by its indifference to the happenings in the Northern and Eastern provinces, despite several appeals made even by its own civil administrators over there, has abdicated its own responsibility, forfeited its right to govern the Tamil areas in Sri Lanka and conceded its sovereignty over them.

Why is this war still continued ?; a war where there can be no victors and glory to none. Then, is this to preserve the faltering prestige of a politician or a lost pride of a General? It is said that war is a serious matter to be left to the Generals alone. This equally applies to politics and politicians. New Delhi may have designs to set up "stooges and puppets." There are Tamil quislings and hirelings who will very readily render their services. Such measures will never bring lasting solutions to deep rooted political conflicts. India must cease its military offensive against the Tamil Tigers, and work out a political arrangement with their participation to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Tamils, in line with what the Tamils unanimously insisted on in Bhutan.

Sri Lanka may be Rajiv Gandhi's waterloo, but it should not be India's Vietnam. A war that has no justification should be soon brought to an end.A peoples' wish to live in freedom with dignity and honour should be respected. Truth and justice would ultimately prevail. India and Indians must re-awake before it is too late to preserve the image and integrity of modern India, so assiduously nurtured over the decades by her founding fathers and their successors.


YOU TOO INDIA?



நிச்சயமற்றுப் போயின
நம் இரவுகள்,
அன்பே!
படுக்கைக்குப் போகுமுன்
இறுதி அர்த்தங்களுடன்
பார்த்துக்கொள்வோம்!

குழந்தைகளின் கண்ணங்களில்
அழுத்தமாக உன் உதடுகளை
ஒரு முறை பதித்து வை.

அப்புறமாய்,
நம் உறவுகளை
ஒரு முறை நினைத்துக் கொள்வோம்!

இறுதியாக
மாறி, மாறி
நம் கண்ணீர்த்துளிகளை
நாமே துடைத்துக் கொள்வோம்!

இந்த இரவில்
நாம் எரியாதிருந்தால்
விடியலில்.....





மூடப்பட்ட கதவு முகப்பில்,
இருளில்,
திசை தெரியாது
மோதி மோதிச் செட்டையடிக்கிற
புழுக்களை,

தாங்கும் வலுவை என்
இதயம் இழந்தது.

OPERATION PAWAN

In a Rush to Vanquish

COMMENT

If there had been less political haste, victory could have been easier

FOR the victorious Indian battalions that captured Jaffna in October, it is now time to write the war diaries and draw lessons. To compile its own diary of what became the country's longest war, INDIA TODAY *assigned Special Correspondent* SHEKHAR GUPTA *to visit the battlefields and interview scores of Indian soldiers, from generals in Delhi to the jawans who fought in Jaffna's jungle of concrete and who now, with their morale high, are policing the peace. His report:*

THE Indian Army had never seen a war like this: in an alien land, against a foreign enemy that wore no uniforms, knew no Geneva Convention on ethics of war, yet carried deadly modern weapons and fought routinely from behind the cover of women and children. And the war itself was a sudden turnaround to fight an enemy who, regarded as friend till recently, was set on the fratricidal course, forced by its folly and bloodthirst.

Tensions between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) had been mounting since early September. First the LTTE accused India of failing to retrieve from Sri Lankan custody 17 of its men who swallowed cyanide rather than go to Colombo. The LTTE responded with frenzied killings of Sinhalas and political opponents. The IPKF reacted in a limited way, but events gathered momentum on their own. On October 8, the LTTE kidnapped five unsuspecting paracommandos on their way to collect provisions and killed them insanely, putting burning tyres round their necks in public. Next they ambushed a CRPF patrol. New Delhi wanted a quick end to the trouble and on October 11, the army launched a five-pronged offensive to wrest Jaffna.*(see sketch).*

On the positive side, the jawans showed an awesome ability to advance despite heavy casualties.

If the strategic gains in the operation were considerable (INDIA TODAY, December 15, 1987) the casualties were high: over 350 killed and 1,100 wounded which, at nearly 7 per cent of the men who fought, is almost twice as high as the rate in the wars against Pakistan. On the positive side, the jawans showed an awesome ability to advance despite heavy casualties.

The army says it fought with hopeless intelligence on the LTTE's manpower, firepower and motivation. "And tactical intelligence on LTTE hideouts was a cipher," says a senior general. Many officers feel that if the Government had given them 48 hours more, the passage to Jaffna may have been much smoother. The haste of decision makers in the

Map by B.K. SHARMA



Photographs by SHEKHAR GUPTA

IPKF patrols Jaffna: costly victory

capital that resulted in the embarrassing spectacle of four brigades being pinned down on their way to Jaffna. And if the politicians were in a rush, the army brass also acquiesced. Consequently, most of the units launched on October 11 were understaffed, underequipped, underbriefed and tired even before the first shot was fired. Consider the following:

Most of the units launched on October 11 were understaffed, underequipped, underbriefed and tired.

► Many units had been moved to Sri Lanka on October 11 itself and launched into battle within hours. Two of the battalions, 4/5 Gorkhas and 13 Sikh Light Infantry (LI)—which suffered more than 110 casualties between them—had landed only hours before being sent to Jaffna. In August, the 13 Sikh LI troops were airlifted to Bangalore for the onward move to Jaffna. But on October 7 they were sent back to Gwalior. The next day they were again asked to pack up. Finally, they landed at Jaffna on October 11 after a tiring journey, several transit halts and sleepless nights, to be flung into a strange war on foreign soil. Similarly, the 41 Brigade was airlifted on October 17 and launched straight on the coastal road axis leading to Jaffna Fort (*see sketch*). The brigade had 272 casualties, nearly 17 per cent of its strength in Sri Lanka.

► When the battle began, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) had just six artillery guns and three T-72 tanks in Jaffna. Says an officer: "Normally one battalion is backed by 200 guns to soften the enemy. Here we had only six for 20." In fact, while the tactical headquarters of the 54th Infantry Division—specially designated for air and amphibious assault—had moved to Palaly, the heavy weapons were left behind as unnecessary. And after the action began the firepower was built up painfully: each giant Il-76 jet landed with one T-72 tank or two BMP armoured fighting vehicles. The jetty at Kankesanthurai port was too weak for the armour to land by ships. Thus for the first few days the Indian firepower was about the same as the LTTE's.

Temple destroyed in fighting: battle-scarred city

► Troops often ran short of ammunition because when they were launched into assault, they never expected to fight for so many days at a stretch. Due to ambushes, it was difficult to send ammunition by road and helicopters braved machine-gun fire to resupply the troops. Near Navatkuli, a Mahar battalion had the mortification of seeing its ammunition dropped outside the area it controlled. They had to fight their way out of the LTTE encirclement to retrieve it. Helicopters had also to drop cooked food packets for them.

► Ammunition for tanks and attack helicopters was also short. Besides, many lives were lost due to the delay in using helicopter gunships. What should have been a tactical decision awaited political approval for 16 hours. Once cleared, the choppers proved a point. Chavakachheri was taken by two Madras Regiment battalions at the cost of only three lives, after helicopters fired just 32 rockets. "But for the helicopters, we were resigned to at least 100 casualties in the heavily defended town," says an officer.

Moreover, the units fell short of officers as LTTE snipers picked them out. And once the officer was killed or wounded, the junior commissioned officers and other ranks often lost initiative. The agony of just one battalion illustrates this.

The 4/5 Gorkhas are a legend. They collected battle honours in Jammu's Rajouri sector in 1965, capturing the strategic Topa post with less than 30 casualties. In 1971 they did better, with battle honours for Ghazipur, Atgram and Sylhet where they were landed by helicopters and fought for eight days on their own. They collected two Mahavir Chakras, two Vir Chakras and other decorations. The total casualties then were 28. But the tally in Jaffna is a disastrous 70.

As a part of the 72 Brigade, the battalion was supposed to move towards Jaffna and link up with the troops landed by helicopters in the university campus. From the campus, it followed the convoy of tanks with the paracommandos they had rescued (*see box*). But while the tanks had safe passage, the Gorkhas bringing up the rear came under sudden fire from four temples dominating the main road-crossing in Urumparai. The battalion adjutant, a tough Manipuri, Major N.J.D. Singh was hit on the head and he died instantly. Another company commander, Major Anil Deepak Gardner, had the entire flesh from his leg blown off by a Claymore mine. Major A.A. Verghese, the other company commander and the only Tamil speaker in the unit, went into a house full of crying women and children to comfort them, but was shot in the back by an old woman.

Then disaster struck when the commandant, Lt-Colonel I.B.S. Bawa, was shot just under his heart. He was removed along with the other wounded to a dried-up well—the battalion's only cover—where a lone doctor struggled to save him.

COMMANDO ASSAULT

The Lost Offensive

A look down from the glazed cockpit of the IAF's *Chetak* helicopter tells more than the hundreds of rumours about what happened to the commando operation to capture the LTTE leadership on the evening of October 11 that brought, instead of quick, surgical success, a bloody disaster.

On a cityscape packed with the red and green of palm trees and tiled roofs, two open patches, an oval football field and a smaller playground, stand out. No commander could have ignored them. Particularly since the IPKF had often picked up LTTE leaders for talks from buildings in the same area.

The football pitch offered a larger opening with fewer built-up areas around it and was selected as the drop zone. The troops were to land by Mi-8 helicopters for a lightning operation to prise out the LTTE headquarters. No parachutes were to be used.

A company (about 70 men) of the 10 Paracommando battalion was to land first and secure the pitch. A second wave of choppers was to follow, with a company of 13 Sikh Light Infantry (LI), flown in just a few hours earlier from Gwalior, to build on the paracommandos' foothold. If things had gone right, the main bodies of troops would then have linked up by land with these heliborne pioneers and finished the LTTE.

But the choppers had just begun to disgorge the paracommandos when they came under fire, some of it from high calibre (up to .5 inch) machine-guns. "They had everything right: range, position, and above all their appreciation of the situation. They knew this was their most crucial battle," said an officer.

For two months now, analysts are trying to figure out how the LTTE was able to pre-empt effectively what was meant to be a surprise attack. It is now believed that the Tigers intercepted the army's radio communication on the plans for the night. "Till then our estimation of their communication equipment was even poorer than our appreciation of their firepower and motivation," says a senior officer.

For the commandos it was a baptism by fire as they searched the nearby buildings for the LTTE leaders who had already escaped. Six commandos were killed and nine were wounded.

Worse followed and that is the most painful untold story of the battle of Jaffna. In the dark of the night and under heavy machine-gun fire, the helicopters bringing the 30-strong platoon of Sikh LI landed in the other, smaller playground. This area was barely a few hundred yards away but was separated by several lanes of buildings, each a booby-trapped snakepit of the Tamil Tigers' defenders *(see sketch)*.

The doughty *mazhabi* Sikhs found

While the doctor survived with a grazing wound, helicopters, deterred by machine-gun fire, failed to pick up Bawa. He died at 4.30 p.m., just as rescue came with tanks, six hours after he was hit. Second-in-command Randhir Singh, the only surviving major, took over the battalion which was unfit to fight till new officers could be flown in from India.

Elsewhere too the LTTE systematically picked out officers. A mine blew to bits the BMP that the deputy commander of the 72 Brigade, Colonel D.S. Saraon was riding, killing him and the entire complement of nine men. Snipers also shot dead Major A.K. Chaturvedi of 5 Rajput and Lieutenant R.S. Nagar, whose ambitions of following in a proud tradition—his father too had commanded the 16th Sikh battalion—were cut short. Major R.S. Kanwa, an artillery regiment's doctor, was also shot down by snipers.

Often, the officer's death held up the troops. Top sources in South Block confirm that the ratio of officers to the men of other ranks killed in Sri Lanka is an all-time high. In the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan, the ratio was 1:9.3 and 1:9.8 respectively. Here it is 1:7.5. This was partly because the officers led from the front and partly because the LTTE snipers, hidden behind windows or on the Chinese-made sniper chairs strung on palm trees, always looked for the officers, often through telescopic gunsights. A vital lesson the army has learnt now is to mix its officers with troops by avoiding pips of rank, wearing slouch hats and carrying oversized back-packs.

Jaffna raises other vital questions. Why, for example, were whole battalions pinned down by snipers? Officers confess it was often because they forgot the basic exercise of "moving on one leg". Routinely, advancing units make a section

Photographs by SHEKHAR GUPTA

Bits of Sikh LI uniforms at the battlefield: trapped

something was amiss as they landed right on top of the LTTE battlements. Bullets rained on them and three helicopters were hit. The pilots barely managed to nurse their limping machines back to Palaly and brought the grim news: the platoon was likely to be wiped out, as would reinforcements. The commanders made the devil's choice: leaving the platoon to its own fate.

But for the platoon and its young commander, Major Birendra Singh, the scion of a well-known political family in Bharatpur and a relative of Minister of State for External Affairs K. Natwar Singh, fate was hopelessly cruel. It seems that his radioman was one of the first to be hit, breaking his contact with Palaly. He could reach the paracommandos only on short-range walkie-talkies.

But while the commandos asked him to join he, like a good infantryman, waited for the rest of his company. He did not know it was not coming. And by the time he did, he was encircled.

The first assault came at dawn. And though the troops fought valiantly, each assault left them with less men and bullets. At 11.30 a.m. on October 12, with the last bullet fired, the troops led a bayonet charge. They were cut down to the last man but one, Sepoy Gora Singh: he was taken prisoner and later released by the LTTE. It is his account that details the story of one of the most poignant battles in the history of the Indian Army.

For the LTTE, besides a morale-boosting success, this also brought all the platoon's weapons, uniforms and equipment. The bare bodies of the troops were left on public display in the nearby Nagaraja Vihar temple and then burnt with just a barrel of oil poured over the whole heap. The evidence of the crazy plunder still lies scattered in a nearby building, a former LTTE stronghold. Pieces of the Sikh LI's battle-fatigues, cross-belts, boots, water-bottles and epaulettes still lie mixed with thousands of empty .50-inch machine-gun shells.

Even as the Sikh LI fought their last battle, a major rescue operation was on to retrieve the commandos. Lieutenant Colonel Dalbir Singh, commandant of the paracommando battalion, led the mission himself with the help of three T-72 tanks which, at that time, were all the tanks the IPKF had in Sri Lanka. The roads were hopelessly booby-trapped. So the commander of the tank troupe, Major Anil Kaul, whose father had first raised the regiment (65 Cavalry) decided on an innovation: to drive tanks on the Palaly-Jaffna railway line which passed right next to the campus. Kaul himself was hit by machine-gun fire in his eye and right arm as he merely peeped out to find his way to the railway line.

But his men put him on morphine and fought their way to the campus. And by the time the tanks and paracommandos broke out of the encirclement, two other infantry battalions, the 4/5 Gorkhas and the main body of 13 Sikh LI, had linked up as well.

The paracommandos perhaps survived total disaster thanks to their better training. They conserved ammunition, took cover in the buildings and even succeeded in picking up all of their dead, wounded and the weapons. But even now they talk about the operation with palpable pain. "For those 18 hours we just prayed and fought. Everything hung by a slender thread," said an officer. How grave the situation was is evident from the fact that directing the rescue operation was none other than Major General Harkirat Singh himself. He was aboard a *Chetak* helicopter that flew so low as to have a machine-gun bullet go clean through the three-inch space between the seats to which the pilot and the general were harnessed.

The night is now an inseparable part of military history. It has also left painful memories for the desperate men close to the action, particularly the remaining men of 13 Sikh LI, who will now hold special *ardas* and *akhand path* on October 12 every year, to remember their 30 lonely and gutsy comrades on the killing fields of Jaffna University.

—SHEKHAR GUPTA in Jaffna

(about 10 to 15 men) move forward while another gives it cover. When the advancing section reaches the limit of its protectors' firing range, it takes cover and gives protection to the first one which then advances. In Jaffna this wasn't always done. Instead, as the units got bogged down and Delhi pressed for results, more troops were flung into the furnace.

Another lesson was the ineffectiveness of armour in built-up, mined areas. The LTTE used their Chinese rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGS) effectively at close range. "They even attacked tanks with burning jerry cans full of petrol," says the division commander, Major General Harkirat Singh.

The LTTE learnt from wherever it could. The army recovered, besides arms and cyanide jars, video-cassettes of the Anthony Quinn classic, *Omar Mokhtar: The Lion of the Desert*, in which Libyan guerrillas hold up Italian tanks using mines and burning benzene cans. The LTTE had even defaced the milestones around the city, to confuse the army. Further, the army learnt that its heavier 7.62 mm rifle is no match for the Kalashnikov AK-47s in close quarter battle. It fires a shot at a time, not bursts.

For the future, however, the army has to learn the most from the Tigers' expertise in mine warfare which accounted for more than 60 per cent of all Indian casualties. For many years while they awaited the Sri Lankan offensive, the LTTE had been laying a network of ingenious mines on approaches to Jaffna. Unlike conventional metallic mines these were heaps of explosive filled in plastic jerry cans. Says a general: "They used anything non-metallic, even the hollow coconut tree trunks as casing for explosives." These were connected with wires that could be hanging innocuously in any house up to a kilometre away. The Tigers kept a map of the mines and joined the wires whenever a good target passed by. "Some mines had up to 200 kg of explosives which is a kiloton of explosive power," says an officer, underlining the fact that Hiroshima had been obliterated by a 20-kiloton nuclear bomb.

The impact of these mines was devastating. Along the roads even now one finds twisted bits of metal that once belonged to army vehicles. Bodies were rarely found after a mine blast. A 45-tonne T-72 literally exploded into pieces as the mine set off a concussion that blasted the ammunition inside the tank. Its turret, weighing more than 12 tonnes, jumped 15 ft. Colonel Saraon's BMP, weighing 20 tonnes, jumped 30 ft and its doors, weighing more than 250 kg each, were found more than a hundred yards away. Harassed, the army stopped power supply in the peninsula to counter the mine-menace. And when power was restored on December 24, a truck of 5 Paras was promptly blown up along with six jawans near Chavakachcheri.

The LTTE had a few surprises in its bag, from sniper chairs to the defacing of milestones to confuse any advancing army.

But now that the army has paid its price it is also wiser. If it needs to stop tanks in a war with Pakistan some of the approaches will indeed be protected with such undetectable mines. "No one has learnt more from Jaffna than us. This was our first real lesson in FIBUA (Fighting in built-up areas)," says a senior officer. A team of experts led by Brigadier Ravi Eipe from the College of Combat at Mhow is already in Jaffna to analyse the battle.

The army is also experimenting. Jaffna has given them an ideal opportunity to try out tactics. And almost the entire range of modern equipment is on trial—electronic warfare to attack helicopters, and from T-72 tanks to the Maruti Gypsy jeep, a trial model of which Major General Harkirat Singh rides.

As Singh points out, the campaign has had many firsts. It was the first time that the army, navy and air force launched joint operations; the first time India used helicopter gunships in actual combat; and also the first time that guns from a navy ship were fired in support of land operations—to blast the LTTE bunkers that held up a paracommandos squad on the causeway linking Jaffna with Karaitivu island (*see sketch*). This was also the first use of the naval Landing Ship Transports to put armour directly in combat. And vitally for India, the T-72 tank, which is its mainstay against Pakistan, was exposed to RPG fire. "Now we know where the tank is strong and where weak," says a general.

Also on the positive side, the Indian Air Force (IAF) displayed an awesome airlift capability in managing what is now considered the largest post-World War II airborne operation. The IAF and Indian Airlines flew a total of 4,100 transport sorties in just a fortnight to maintain the Jaffna-Madras air bridge. The taxi tracks at Jaffna and the air strip at Vavuniya caved in under the weight of the effort.

Now that the pace in Sri Lanka has relaxed other experiments are on. Electronic aids are being used to bug LTTE communication and Jaguars have been used on photo-reconnaissance missions. But more than anything else, the Indian defence machinery is learning the all-important lesson of not taking any motivated and reasonably well-armed adversary lightly. For, as the soldiers themselves say, if God made men, Kalashnikov made them equal.

JANUARY 31, 1988

AFFIDAVIT

Mrs. THANAPAKIYALECHUMY RASATHURAI (46) Vavini Lane, Valvettiturai.

On 1.1.88 my husband left home on his push cycle at about 10.00 a.m. to purchase food provisions.

While he was returning home, a batch of Indian soldiers numbering over 50 came in the opposite direction leading a militant arrested by them.

The moving soldiers kept on firing in the air.

My husband who was riding his push cycle was hit by a bullet on his left chest, making its exit from his right back.

He fell dead on the spot.

The soldiers went their way without paying any heed or attention on the deceased who was lying on the road.

On receipt of information my relatives went to the spot and brought the dead body home.

The funeral took place on the same day and his body was cremated at the Oorani Crematorium at Valvettiturai at about 4.00 p.m. on 1.1.88.

My husband was 46 years old and was a Government Clerk wh was on interdiction from service.

All my three children are school-going.



Mrs. THIRULOGANAYAGI POOLOGARAJAH (27) Kadduvan-South, Tellippallai.

My husband Mr. Poologasingam Poologarajah, aged 29 years Trader, was staying just in front of my house on 01.01.1988.

On 01.01.1988 at about 6.00 p.m. some IPKF personnel were moving and passing by the road, just in front of our house at Kadduvan-South, Tellippallai.

At that time, that is at 6.00 p.m. my husband was shot dead by the IPKF army personnel.

I have 2 small children and my husband was the sole breadwinner to our family.

Due to his death, we all are now living in utter poverty; and there is no one to support us.



Mrs. KANTHASAMY ALAKESWARI Verapatherar Kovilady, Alvai North, Alvai.

During the Army Operation at Puthukudierappu Area on 4.1.1988. My husband Sinnathamby Kanthasamy, (51) died by the result of gun shot injury by the IPKF and died at the spot.

I am the wife of Late Sinnathampy Kanthasamy. I am with a son in the age of 12 and my husband was the sole bread winner of my family.

Without the earning of my husband now we are without any income

RAJESWARY, Urany, Kankesanturai, (53)

I am the wife of the late, Augustine Pakkiyanathar of Urany, Kankesanturai.

My husband was a deep-sea fisherman.

My husband set out fishing in his boat, fitted with an outboard motor.

While fishing, my husband had been assaulted by the naval personnels, with rifle butts, cut of 15 pieces of "Soodai" nets and removed away the outboard motor.

My husband returned home, with the help of an oar with severe injuries.

My husband succumbed to the injuries on the following day 04.01.88

Due to abnormal condition in the area, neither a complaint to the Police nor an inquest held.



SHUDAMANY KATPUKKARASI the widow of Sellan Shudamany, Udupiddy Road, Thondaimanaru.

I am the legal wife of Sellan Shudamany of Udupiddy Road, Thondaimanaru.

My husband died of shelling on 5th January 1988 at Veemankamam while he was returning home from the School.

My husband was a teacher and he was the bread winner of my family comprises two members. By the untimely death of my husband my nine year old son and I are undergoing unbearable hardships and agony.

MURUGESU NAGARATNAM (50) Urumpirai North, Urumpirai.

The deceased Villavarajah Vimalarani, aged 30 years, widow was my daughter.

On 6.1.88 at about 11.45 a.m. I heard gun shot outside my house.

I went out and found my daughter's dead body lying outside my house.

There was a gunshot wound on her head.

Her body was cremated at Urumpirai cemetery on the same day.

My daughter's husband died five years ago.

My daughter orphaned three children.

My husband is an invalid and I do not have any income to look after my daughter's orphaned children.



SUNTHARALINGAM KANMANY (32) 4, Mandaithevu.

The deceased Kanapathipillai Suntharalingam (32) was my husband.

He was a fisherman.

On 5.1.88 my husband left for Mannar where he hoped to engage in fishing.

On 15.1.88 I was informed that my husband was killed on 8.1.88 when his boat was sunk by the Navy gun boats.

On hearing the news I went to Mannar.

His body was not recovered and I do not know what happened to it afterwards.

I have five children.

After my husband's death we do not have any income and undergoing untold hardships.



CONFRONTATION

1

COLOMBO, Jan. 1

The New Year dawned in Sri Lanka with bomb blasts, communal killings, and violence by southern subversive elements, leaving at least 41 people dead and over 80 injured in eastern Trincomalee and Batticaloa as well as in the central town of Kandy, according to authoritative sources.

Unconfirmed reports, however, put the toll at over 70 and more than 170 wounded during the past two days.

In a grisly midnight attack on a Sinhalese settlement in the remote Mahadivulwewa village under Morawewa police station in Trincomalee, LTTE militants shot dead 10 persons while they were asleep. Nine others were injured and 15 houses State set ablaze. The dead included three boys, one girl and a woman besides four men.

An Indian High Commission source put the toll at 25 in the clashes between the LTTE and a Muslim fundamentalist group in Kattankudy village, in Batticaloa town.

The source said Indian troops sent to the village yesterday to quell the fighting had found 25 bodies up to noon today.

The LTTE had claimed in a statement on Thursday that it had killed 30 members of the Muslim fundamentalist group, 'Jehad'.

In an encounter with the IPKF, an LTTE cadre Mathi was killed. While fishing in the Mankeni sea, a father and son were shot by Indian Navy. The boat drowned; they managed to swim to shore with bleeding wounds. The son succumbed to his wounds.

2

At Navalady IPKF ambushed LTTE men. In the ensuing battle two IPKF soliders were killed.

An IPKF Truck ran into a landmine set by LTTE. 5 lost their lives and many injured.

Indian helicopters strafed a civilians lorry going towards Oddusuddan last night. 6 died in the lorry. Ironically two of the dead were IPKF infantry men having a lift in the lorry.

3

COLOMBO, Jan. 3.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force is seeking the cooperation of Muslims in its campaign against LTTE militants in Eastern Sri Lanka where clashes between the militants and Muslim fundamentalists have left at least 25 dead, a Sri Lankan Government spokesperson said here today.

Five Sinhalese killed: Five more civilians, stated to be Sinhalese, were gunned down by alleged "Tamil militants" at Kuriniyakulam in Eastern Trincomalee district on Saturday, reports here said today. The victims were said to have been "dragged out of their homes and shot in front of other members of their families."

This followed the murder of 10 Sinhalese people by LTTE militants at Madiwulwewa village in Trincomalee at Thursday night. Nine were injured during the massacre at Madiwulwewa where over 15 shops were set ablaze.

The national news agency Lankapuvath, reporting on the Kuriniyakulam incident, however, said three Sinhalese civilians were shot dead and two wounded, when the LTTE militants raided the village. Three houses were burnt, it added.

The published reports said additional Indian troops were rushed to more areas of the Eastern Province to prevent such attacks.

Meanwhile, the independent English daily *'Island'* reported that 40 civilians had so far been killed and 10,000 rendered homeless or badly affected at Kattankudy in Eastern Batticaloa district in three days of armed clashes since Wednesday between the LTTE and the fundamentalist Muslim group "Jehad".

• Quoting the Government agent (District Magistrate) of Batticaloa, Mr. K. Selvaratnam, the daily said of the killed, 34 were reported to be Muslims and the remaining Tamils.

In a land mine explosion near Kilavankulam 9 IPKF men in a jeep were killed on the spot. In the evening at Pudukudiyiruppu 5 IPKF men were killed and 5 injured in an encounter.

4

Colombo, Jan. 4 (PTI): The Indian Navy patrol craft fired at and sank three more vessels of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), carrying arms eastward from Jaffna peninsula on Saturday night, the state-owned *Daily News* said today.

The daily said the LTTE vessels, whose crew ignored Indian Navy signals to halt and identify themselves, attempted to slip out. They were sunk with all on board, it added.

According to official sources, each boat was manned by at least seven armed men. Bodies found later left no doubt that the dead were "hard core terrorists," the newspaper said.

The destination of the vessels, which appeared to be leaving the western coast of the peninsula, could have been either the northern or northeastern coasts, or the Eastern province, the daily said quoting officials.

This was the second sinking of LTTE boats by the Indian Navy in the past four days. Three days ago, five vessels belonging to the militants were fired upon the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) helicopters off the coast at Kathankudy in eastern Batticaloa, causing them to capsize with all the crew on board.

Meanwhile, the LTTE "terrorists" on Saturday burnt seven government buses at Kankesanthurai town in Jaffna peninsula.

THEY CAME WITH FOOD IN ONE HAND AND A GUN IN THE OTHER

LETTER

SIVA MUTTULINGASAMY, Surrey:

Contrary to the popular belief that the Indians were caught up in an unexpected fight with the TIGERS and during the conflict thousands of civilians were killed and many more displaced from their homes, it is now very evident that the Indians were out to destroy the Tigers and everything and everyone that came in between, from the very beginning. This so called peace accord was put together by two of the world's most desperate men, one senile and the other wet behind the ears. The Indians came as friends but for the slightest provocation they turned their guns on the very people they came to protect. India had accepted the Tigers as the sole representatives of the Eelam Tamil people on many occasions. They now call the Tigers the enemy of the Tamils and of the Indians.

This betrays an opportunistic mentality, not that of a regional superpower. It is no wonder why the North of India has always been invaded by foreigners when they so effortlessly betray their friends.

India has no right, morally or legally, to even touch one civilian Tamil. In Northern Ireland the British troops do not go on the rampage killing Irish civilians every time a soldier is killed by the IRA. This is how a superpower should behave, with tact and restraint and showing regard to civilian lives. Some may say this is too much to ask from a country like India with 80 percent illiteracy. I would say to India, 'Do not try to assume a superpower role in this region or anywhere for that matter till you have put your own house in order — in the Punjab, Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram, Tripura etc'.

LTTE □ STATEMENT

Mr Prabhakaran,the LTTE leader in his appeal to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi dated January 13 states:

'In view of the continuing violence, disruption of peace in Tamil areas and the immense sufferings placed on our people, I appeal to you once again to call off the military offensive operation and initiate peace negotiations to end all hostilities and to establish peace and normalcy.

It is our considered opinion, and that of the people of Tamil Eelam, that a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Peace Keeping forces to pre-offensive position will facilitate the return of peace and normalcy in the Tamil areas. As a preliminary measure towards peace we urge you to prevail upon Sri Lanka to grant amnesty to LTTE and to release our members and supporters who are presently in custody with the IPKF.

As previously agreed in the minutes of the agreement reached between the Government of India and the LTTE, we pledge to surrender our arms as soon as an Interim Administration is formed with a majority role for our organisation. As we have repeatedly assured you, the LTTE will co-operate with the Government of India with the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord if Tamils' interests are promoted and Tamil people are protected. We hold the view that the Provincial Council proposal in the present form falls short of Tamils' aspirations and the LTTE should be allowed a crucial role in future nego tiations to work out an adequate frame work with satisfactory devolution of power for a regional Tamil state. I sincerely hope that you will give serious and urgent consideration to our suggestion and initiate immediate measures for ceasefire and negotiations to establish peace and alleviate the sufferings of our people.'

when the vehicles were returning to the depot, published reports quoting official sources said.

6

Express News Service

Colombo, Jan. 6: Eight LTTE cadres were killed and four IPKF men critically injured in a confrontation in Jaffna today.

According to reports reaching here, an eight-member gang of LTTE men went to a leading girls' school in Jaffna, advised the girls to go home and threw two smoke grenades at the school. While returning, the LTTE cadres met **with an IPKF patrol and in the confrontation eight of them were killed.**

Eight LTTE cadres were drowned when their boat was shot at and sunk by Indian helicopters in Batticaloa lagoon today.

7

COLOMBO, Jan. 7.

An Indian soldier was killed and five others, including an officer, were wounded in a mine blast at Ellakulam in Sri Lanka's Eastern Province, according to a spokesman of the Indian High Commission here today.

The national news agency, "Lankapuvath", quoting another report from Trincomalee said an IPKF man was killed and six others were wounded by an "LTTE terrorist and land mine explosion" at Kumburupidi, north Trincomalee on Tuesday night. One of the wounded was reported to have been blinded by the explosion, the news agency said.

About 400 suspected LTTE militants were apprehended by the IPKF in a two-day operation at Kattankudy and neighbouring areas in Eastern Batticaloa District, reports here said today.

LTTE boats intercepted: Meanwhile, the Indian naval ship *INS Nilgiri* intercepted two LTTE high-speed boats with ten occupants near Trincomalee in the past 24 hours, an official spokesman said in New Delhi on Thursday.

He said the occupants were being interrogated as the boats were suspected of smuggling arms.

In another, incident, Indian naval helicopters attacked two LTTE boats, sinking one and destroying the other. The occupants of the boats managed to swim ashore.

Informed sources said "Mahila' (women) central reserve police personnel were being deployed at major checkpoints in the Jaffna peninsula and they had already taken up duties at the Elephant Pass barrier.

The sources said the IPKF seized a large quantity of bombs, grenades and ammunition during search operations in the peninsula on Wednesday.

8

COLOMBO, Jan. 8.

At least eight persons — seven Sri Lankan and Indian soldiers and a Buddhist monk — were killed in separate incidents of extremist violence in Sri Lanka during the past 36 hours, official sources said.

Three Sri Lankan soldiers and a civilian driver were killed when suspected LTTE militants ambushed a mobile patrol near Padaiya in the

Vavuniya sector in northeastern Sri Lanka last evening, official sources here said.

In another incident three IPKF soldiers were killed in a blast at Trincomalee yesterday, a spokesman of the Indian High Commission here said. Elsewhere in the southern Sri Lanka suspected extremists of Janatha Vimukti Peramuna gunned down a Buddhist monk, said to be close to the ruling United National Party. The monk was pulled out of the temple in Dickwela and shot from a point blank range, sources said.

Second battalion leaving today: A battalion of IPKF would be leaving for home from the Kankesanturai port in northeastern Sri Lanka tomorrow morning, the spokesman said. The battalion was originally scheduled to leave today. Another battalion was withdrawn last week. — PTI

At 117th mile post from Vavuniya of Jaffna, an IPKF jeep was blown up in a land mine blast. 5 dead, some wounded.

IPKF Copters started indiscriminately around Thangavelayuthapuram, Amparai dt.

9

Six IPKF soldiers were killed in a land mine attack on the Train heading towards Mattakalapu at Kiran.

500 IPKF men from Thirukovil – Puttammai army camp rounded up Thangavelayuthapuram (Amparai Dt.); burnt down 20 huts and killed 4 innocent civilians.

10

COLOMBO, Jan. 10

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) last night killed three members of rival Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) in an attack on their camp at Puliyankulam, 200 km north of Vavuniya.

An Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) detachment from a nearby camp rushed to the spot on hearing the exchange of fire and engaged the LTTE men, who withdrew into the jungles. It was not known whether the LTTE suffered any casualties.

Meanwhile, the LTTE issued notices in Vavuniya and the Eastern Batticaloa asking the people not to cooperate with the civil administration from January 15. Those who cooperated would be considered "traitors", it said. — UNI

NEW DELHI, Jan. 10.

Twenty-three LTTE cadre surrendered to the Indian Peace Keeping Force during the past 24 hours in the Jaffna peninsula and 17 were apprehended in different areas of the Northern Provinces.

One LTTE cadre was killed in an exchange of fire with IPKF jawans.

According to official sources here today, despite threats from LTTE, schools were functioning regularly in the Jaffna peninsula. — UNI

11

Two LTTE cadres Ajit and Rasulan were killed by IPKF in an encounter at Alavetty Jaffna.

While boarding a Train, 3 IPKF soldiers were killed on the spot by LTTE at Mattakalapu station.

Mr. Sewarajah, father of 3 children, an employee of Valachenai papermill at Batticaloa Dt., was beaten severely to death by IPKF.

12

NEW DELHI, Jan. 12.

In search operations for arms and ammunition in the Jaffna peninsula, the IPKF captured a significant quantity of arms belonging to the LTTE in the Northern sector in the past 24 hours. The External Affairs spokesman said here today that the discovery of the arms dump was possible because of the support of the local populace.

The arms haul yielded 20,531 rounds of ammunition, 564 grenades and 210 bombs and other explosives. One rocket launcher and 23 anti-tank rockets were also captured. Arms dumps at Koppai North, Chavakacheri and near the Clock Tower area in Jaffna were also discovered.

Marine commandos of the IPKF launched a raid in Kayts Island , off Jaffna , and captured 29 LTTE militants and a large quantity of arms. One of the two LTTE suspects apprehended from the Coastal road reportedly consumed cyanide and died.

3 TELO men killed: In a bid to terrorise rival groups, the LTTE launched a major attack yesterday against the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) in the Vavuniya sector killing three and injuring one person. The LTTE militants used AK-47s, machine guns, hand grenades and rocket launchers and also attacked a nearby IPKF outpost. It is reported that the LTTE group leader, Mr. Dalip was injured in the exchange of fire.

In the Batticaloa sector the LTTE tried to disrupt train traffic by firing at a train running from Batticaloa to Vellichennai. The IPKF rounded up 34 suspects in search operations in Arrapatti.

13

COLOMBO, Jan. 13.

Nine persons including an Indian soldier and an area leader of the LTTE, were killed in continuing violence by Tamil militants and Sinhala extremists in Sri Lanka, official sources said today.

They said a jawan of the IPKF and the LTTE's area commander, 'Jessy', along with his bodyguard were killed in a fierce gun-battle on the Vavuniya-Mannar Road in the North.

In a separate incident, Mr. K. Yogasankari, a founder member of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) escaped unhurt when a suspected LTTE gunman fired at his vehicle near a school in the northern Jaffna town.

Colombo, Jan. 13 (UNI): Mr. A. Ratnam, president of the citizen's committee of Kondavil, in the northern Jaffna peninsula, was today brutally murdered by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for allegedly cooperating with the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), informed sources here said.

They said three LTTE men had

NEW DELHI INTRANSIGENT

The LTTE leader, Mr. Prabhaharan's suggestion to pull back the IPKF to their October 9th position is not acceptable to the Indian Government, according to official sources in New Delhi. Commenting further, the sources said that the Government had no intention to allow the LTTE which is an 'unelected and unrepresentative' organisation to wield armed control over the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.



'JIHAD' LTTE STATEMENT

A press statement was issued on 2.1.88 by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Batticaloa, the eastern city in Sri Lanka.

'LTTE was compelled to take a strong action against a group of armed Muslim homeguards called "Jihad" which was formed and sponsored by the fascist Sri Lankan regime, to create tensions and divisions among the Tamil-speaking Muslims and Tamils in the Eastern Province.

This homeguards group was responsible for the murders of the Asst.Govt.Agent of Muthur, Mr.Asique Mohammed, in October 87 and the former M.P.(S.L.F.P) for Muthur, Mr.Abdul Majid, during Nov.87, while on 30th Dec.87 at Kaththankudy four innocent Tamils and an LTTE cadre Nazir were killed by this unholy group of Muslim homeguards going by the name of "Jihad". This unacceptable and deplorable behaviour earned the anger and displeasure of the Muslim people in the area. Even though the people urged action to be taken against this group of homeguards, LTTE showed great restraint, to minimise any further development of tension. The Muslim people clearly understood the LTTE's position and supported us. Increasingly large numbers of Muslim youths joined our liberation organisation, on whose representation, insistence and active participation the LTTE was compelled to launch attacks on this armed Muslim homeguards group, killing 30 of them on 30th Dec.87 at Kaththankudi and another 9 of the same homeguards group at Oaddamavadi in Nov.87.

LTTE has also banned PLOTE, EPRLF and TELO as these groups are also engaged in barbaric attacks on the Tamil-speaking Muslim people and are engaged in treacherous activities to create ten- sion and division among the people, for their own ends.'

called at Mr. Ratnam's house in the morning and asked him to come for an "inquiry". His bullet-riddled body was found near the Kondavil railway station. Mr. Ratnam, who was a lecturer at the Kokkuvil technical college, was formerly a journalist in a Colombo Tamil daily.

14

At Paranthan of Kilinochi dt in a clash with IPKF, two LTTE cadres Prasath and Karan lost their lives.

15

3 IPKF soldiers were killed in a landmine attack by LTTE at Karuvelankandal.

16

In an attack on the IPKF checkpost of Vainavapuliankulam of Vavuniya dt. an IPKF soldier was shot dead; many wounded.

There more IPKF men were shot dead at an encounter with LTTE at Nedunkeni. Again near Pamdarakulam LTTE attacked IPKF, leaving 12 more IPKF men dead.

17

NEW DELHI, Jan. 17.

Three liberation tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) militants were killed and four others injured in clash with the Indian peace-keeping forces in the northern and eastern province of Sri Lanka during the past 24 hours.

An official spokesman here said more than 12,000 rounds of ammunition was recovered in the search operations.

Despite the LTTE threat to kill Government employees and teachers after Pongal, all offices, banks and educational institutions functioned normally, he added. — UNI

18

In Batticoloa, LTTE attacked Jail and released 72 detenus.

19

COLOMBO, Jan 19.—The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in a daring jail-break today released all 54 inmates of the Batticaloa prison in eastern Sri Lanka, reports UNI.

They announced that it was part of their programme to disrupt the functioning of the Government.

Batticaloa residents said 10 armed LTTE men went to the prison located in the heart of the town at 9.45 a.m. and forced the prison guards to open the gates. They then ordered the inmates—15 convicts and 39 prisoners—to flee When the prisoners hesitated the LTTE men warned them that they would be shot dead if they stayed The prisoners and the LTTE men then escaped into the crowded locality outside

LTTE killed 3 IPKF soldiers at Uppodai during Cordon and search operation by IPKF.

20

Colombo, Jan. 20 (PTI): Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) militants attacked the Pottuvil police station in the eastern Amparai district in the early hours of Wednesday partly damaging the building.

There was exchange of fire for some time before the Sri Lankan police repulsed the attack by the militants some 50 in number. No casualty was, however, reported.

The LTTE militants, now on the run both in the north and eastern provinces, have been launching sniper attacks on police stations to boost the sagging morale of their cadre, according to official sources.

Express News Service adds: About 15 of the prisoners set free by the LTTE on Tuesday morning from the Batticaloa jail are reported to have surrendered by Wednesday morning according to reports from Batticaloa.

Following Tuesday's jailbreak, the IPKF has now set up camp outside the jail. Some of the prisoners had surrendered to the hospital police post on Tuesday evening itself. Most of them had been afraid to venture out since they had no identity cards with them and knew they could easily be apprehended.

Mastermind: "Mathan" a member of the LTTE who undertook a fast in Batticaloa at the time LTTE member Thileepan started his fast unto death at the Nallur temple in Jaffna, has been seen in Batticaloa. Mathan was not killed in the Jaffna operation as was generally believed. It was he who is believed to have masterminded Tuesday's jailbreak.

In Trincomalee, an LTTE cadre lost life, while at Valaichenai an IPKF soldier was shot dead by LTTE in a confrontation.

In a grenade charge by LTTE on the IPKF check post near Chavakachcheri 4 IPKF men were killed.

21

In an attack with mortars on IPKF camp at Kumpurupitti, LTTE killed 4 IPKF soldiers.

In Surakalli of Mattakalappu and in Chavakacheri of Jaffna dt. 4 IPKF men were shot dead by Tigers. Also in Ottamavadi an Indian soldier lost life in a skirmish with LTTE.

22

Colombo, Jan. 22 (UNI): Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) guerillas on Friday shot dead the senior-most ci8vil administrator of Sri Lanka's north western Mannar district for allegedly "cooperating" with the Indian Peacekeeping Force.

Official sources here said, Mr. M.M. Makbool, government agent (equivalent to District Collector in India) was returning from Talaimannar to Mannar in his car when LTTE gunmen stopped the vehicle at Parappukadanthan and shot him dead after pulling him out of the car. They said two other officials who were in the car, were not harmed.

23

The IPKF burnt down some 15 houses at Kalpitti. Some people were wounded in firings. An IPKF soldier was killed by LTTE attack and at Omanthai two Indian Army personnel lost their lives.

24

A top LTTE commander 'Castro' died after consuming cyanide in Batticaloa yesterday. Reports say that he threw a hand grenade at an IPKF patrol and when the grenade failed to explode and he was about to be apprehended, he took a cyanide capsule. In Velvettiturai in the Jaffna peninsula, two top-level LTTE cadres, Pavalasingham alias Jagan and Kathiranathan alias Josef surrendered. An interesting development in the Jaffna area has been the recovery of a number of walkie-talkie radio sets abandoned by the LTTE, indicating a breakdown of the command and communication structure.

COLOMBO, Jan. 24.

Nine LTTE militants surrendered to the Indian Peace keeping force at Karaveddy in Jaffna peninsula on Saturday while one militant was killed and another captured in an encounter with the IPKF, according to an Information Department press release, which quoted the Joint Operations Command (JOC).

It said the IPKF recovered 772 rounds of ammunition, 45 kg of explosives and 26 rounds of 16mm mortars at Achuvely, Milady and Karanavai.

Refugees back home: Meanwhile, a fourth batch of 356 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees, comprising 85 families, returned to Talaimannar in north western Mannar district in an Indian naval ship. As many as 1200 refugees have returned so far.

Detained without charge: More than 2,000 suspected Tamil and Sinhala militants have been detained without charge because of the growing political and ethnic unrest, according to official sources. "Both categories of detainees can be regarded as political prisoners," one source said, speaking on the condition of anonymity. "They are not held in ordinary jails but in police stations and military camps."

In a confrontation in Amparai dt. 3 Indian soldiers were killed and in Adampan of Mannar dt. 2 soldiers were shot dead by the LTTE.

In Thirukovil of Amparai dt. 11 innocent Tamil Civilians were shot dead by IPKF. 5 houses were burnt. 2 children with their parents were victimised to the IPKF firings.

25

5 IPKF personnel were killed in a confrontation with LTTE in Kinniyadi.

26

The body of an LTTE member is said to have been found in the vicinity of where the IPKF was ambushed by the LTTE around 10 this morning, according to High Commission sources. It is believed there was more than one LTTE casualty. Two IPKF personnel were also reported killed in a landmine explosion in Uruthapuram, ten miles from Kilinochchi this morning. Meanwhile, two IPKF personnel were killed near the Batticaloa airstrip this afternoon when LTTE cadres fired from across the lagoon. In the exchange of fire, ten LTTE cadres are reported to have been killed, according to unconfirmed reports.

IPKF killed two civilians at Batticoloa and 5 at Kodikamam. LTTE encountered IPKF at various places and inflicted heavy losses on IPKF while it lost one of its cadres Maran at Kodikamam. IPKF losses:

Udayarkaddu – 8
Batticaloa – 6, Jaffna – 6,
Kalkadu – 2, Kallappadu – 1,
Chavakachchery – 3, Kankam – 10,
Puliyadi – 3, Kodikamam –9,
Vavunativu – 5. And 9 more were severely wounded.

On 26th, January hartal was observed all over Tamil Eelam successfully to protest against the Govt. of India inviting J.R. Jayavardene as a host on its Republic day.

27

Colombo, Jan. 27 (UNI): At least 35 persons, including 14 Indian peacekeeping Force (IPKF) personnel and 16 militants were killed as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) launched a series of attacks on the IPKF in

HARTAL A SUCCESS

Tamil Tigers in the north and east of Sri Lanka demonstrated their contempt for the 40,000 Indian troops in their midst, and their continuing hold over the local population, by organising an almost completely successful hartal, or total strike, in protest against the Indian presence.

The protest was inevitably marked by violent clashes between the Tamil Tigers and the so-called Indian Peace-keeping Force.

At least The main fighting was in and near the eastern coastal town of Batticaloa, where the Indian forces are awaiting reinforcements.

The day's events dismally underlined the tenuous nature of Indian control of Tamil areas. Although vastly out-numbered, the Tigers were able to mobilise the population of the north and east into a highly effective protest marking India's Republic Day.

In Batticaloa and other Tamil areas, the faint semblance of normality restored by the arrival of Indian troops last summer was swept aside by the hartal.

Government offices, shops, and other businesses closed and transport services ground to a halt.

R.K. Lakshman, Times of India, 25.1.88

Sri Lanka's North and East during the past 48 hours, according to authoritative sources and published reports.

The attacks came in the wake of the LTTE's call for a general strike in the two provinces on India's Republic Day to protest against alleged Indian support to the Sri Lankan government to suppress what it called the "aspirations" of the island's Tamil community. The strike had paralysed normal life throughout the provinces on Tuesday.

Authoritative sources said a 36-hour curfew was imposed the eastern Batticaloa town on Tuesday evening after the LTTE ambushed an IPKF patrol near the railway station, killing two jawans.

They said eight militants were killed in the exchange of fire that followed, while about 15 civilians were injured and two shops damaged in the "crossfire."

Tamil sources in Batticaloa alleged that five civilians, including a child, were killed in what they called "indiscriminate" firing by the IPKF and the Sri Lankan police following the LTTE attack. They said the child was killed at a place about three kilometres away from the railway station.

The Batticaloa police said the LTTE launched a mortar attack on the town police station following the ambush on the IPKF patrol. But the attack was repulsed jointly by the police and the IPKF. The attack lasted nearly four hours.

The sources said one militant was killed and two IPKF men were injured when the LTTE ambushed an IPKF patrol at Navatkuli in the northern Jaffna peninsula on Tuesday. Later, the LTTE exploded a landmine, killing one IPKF jawan, when reinforcements were being sent to Navatkuli.

The whole area had been cordoned off and a search for the militants was under way.

A city daily, *'Sun'* quoted the LTTE as having claimed that eight IPKF men were killed in an ambush in the north-eastern Mullaitivu district. A 24-hour curfew had been imposed in the whole district following the incident. The report did not say where the ambush took place. Indian sources here could not confirm the report.

29

COLOMBO, Jan. 29

Three boats carrying Tamil militants were shot at and destroyed and more than 40 captured during the last two days, as the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) continued its operations to disarm them, authoritative sources said here today.

The three boats were destroyed off the eastern coast near Nawaladi on Wednesday. All the occupants were believed killed.

Among the militants arrested were some hardcore members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) including the group's "chief signal man" for the northern Jaffna town, the sources said. Thirty militants were arrested during a combing operation in Valvettithurai and Point Pedro in the Jaffna peninsula.

Three jawans and two civilians were wounded in sniper fire or attacks on IPKF patrols by the militants at Pungankulam, Aliwalai and Killinochchi in the North and Vandaramoolai in the East.

The sources said three hardcore LTTE men were shot dead by the IPKF at Rattalatti and Thiruvilan in the North and Araipattu in the east. They said one of the three killed was a prisoner who tried to escape while leading an IPKF party to an LTTE arms dump.

The IPKF continued to seize caches of arms hidden by the militants, during a search operation west of Manipay, near Jaffna. They seized 30,000 rounds of assorted ammunition, anti-personnel mines and detonators. A Belgium-made medium machine gun and one light machine gun and a Chinese made rocket launcher were recovered from Nawali, also in the peninsula.

Burnt Red Cross jeep recovered: The IPKF also recovered a burnt Red Cross jeep from the jungles of Chenakanai in the North. But it was not known since when the jeep was missing and whether any Red Cross personnel were in it.

The LTTE launched a mortar and rocket attack on a Sri Lankan army camp at Gemunupura in Trincomalee district last night. The attack was repulsed and the army did not suffer any casualties, Sri Lankan sources said.

The LTTE, however, killed two Muslim homeguards of the area in the course of the attack, they added.

30

COLOMBO, Jan. 30. (AFP) — Tamil rebels blew up a Sri Lankan army patrol in northeastern Trincomalee district today killing an officer and wounding four soldiers.

Military sources said fighters of the dominant Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ambushed the patrol by exploding a landmine under their vehicle near a Sinhalese village.

The incident came two days after LTTE gunmen launched a rocket and mortar attack on Thursday on a Sri Lankan army camp in Trincomalee marking the second week of the rebels' forced civil disobedience campaign.

P.K. Bhatlekar, Weekly 31.1.88

Residents in the eastern Batticaloa district said the LTTE had said it will not allow offices to reopen until the Government announced an interim administration for the Tamil areas giving greater share of power to the rebels.

Officials said Indian soldiers and Sri Lankan police were on maximum alert since Monday to prevent outbreak of fresh violence.

At least 35 people died in clashes involving the LTTE in the first two days of the week.

Meanwhile, the IPKF has taken into custody 79 LTTE members, the largest-ever to fall into its hands in one single operation, from Vadamarchchi area from where the Tigers supremo Velupillai Pirabhakaran hails.

While 42 of these LTTE members surrendered to the IPKF, the rest were apprehended after identification at Karaveddi in the last 24 hours.

31

COLOMBO, Jan. 31.

Two Sri Lankan Army personnel and six Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) men were killed in a landmine blast and exchange of fire in Sri Lanka's Northern Mannar district today, taking the toll in weekend clashes in the island's North and East to 13, official sources here said.

They said the armymen were killed when they were leading an Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) convoy on a road-cleaning patrol at Uvilankulam on the outskirts of Mannar town. The militants blew up their lead vehicle with a landmine and opened fire at the IPKF convoy behind. The IPKF returned the fire, killing six militants, the sources said.

3 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed and 7 injured by mine attacks from LTTE at Vilankulam in Mannar dt.

வீரவணக்கம்

LTTE MARTYRS

Lt. Sindhu 1.1.88

Mathi 1.1.88

2nd. Lt. Chandru 2.1.88

Arul 5.1.88

Dinesh 5.1.88

Ajith 11.1.88

[illegible]dan 11.1.88

Rahu[illegible]

Gnanam [illegible] 14.1.88

Prasad 14.1.[illegible]8

Karunan 14.1.88

Prakash 16.1.88

Maran 16.1.88

2nd.Lt. Puvi 21.1.88

Sriharan 9.1.88

2nd Lt. Sivam 2.1.88

Vincent 3.1.88

Suresh master 4.1.88

Ranjan 5.1.88

Easan 6.1.88

Ramesh 8.1.88

Jayanthan 12.1.88

Azeez 17.1.88

கிண்கிணி கழந்தகால் ஒண்கழல் தொட்டுக்,
குடுமி கழந்த நுதல்வேம்பின் ஒண்தளிர்
நெடுங்கொடி உழிஞைப் பவரொடு மிலைந்து,
குறுந்தொடி கழித்தகைச் சாபம் பற்றி
நெடுந்தேர்க் கொடிஞ்சி பொலிய நின்ரோன்
யார்கொல்? வாழ்க, அவன் கண்ணி! தார்பூண்டு,
தாலி கழந்தன்றும் இலனே; பால்விட்டு
'அயினியும்' இன்று அயின் றனனே; வயின்வயின்
உடன்றுமேல் வந்த வம்ப மள்ளரை
வியந்தன்றும், இழிந்தன்றும் இலனே; அவரை
அழுங்கப் பற்றி, அகல்விசும்பு ஆர்ப்புஎழக்;
கவிழ்ந்து நிலம்சேர அட்டதை
மகிழ்ந்தன்றும், இகழ்ந்தன்றும், அதனினும் இலனே.

இடைக்குன்றூர் கிழார்.

2nd Lt. Chandru 2.1.88

Easan

Sriharan 9.1.88

Maj. Asok

Capt. Sabesan

KILLING □ FIELD

88 January

claims	IPKF		LTTE		S.L. ARMY		OTHER MILITANTS		CIVILIANS	
	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED
IPKF									35	9
LTTE			2						31	
MEDIA										

2

9		1						4	

3

								25*	9*
14	5								

4

		7*							

5

1		11						5	
		2							

6

4		8							

7

1	5								

8

3				3				2	
5									
								1	

9

6								4	

10

		1	17c			1T			

11

3		2						1	

12

			29c			3T			

13

1		2						1	

14

			3						

15

3									

16

16		2							
								1	

17

			3	4					

19

3									

20

5		1							

21

9		1							

22

								1	

23

3									

24

		2	12c						
5								13	

25

5									

26

4		11							
53	9							7	

27

14		16						5	15

28

29

		3	40c					2	

30

			79c	1	4				

31

		6		2					
				3	7				

TOTAL											
	28	5	70	4 1774	6	4	4		76	33
	169	14	14		3	7			60	

* - Sri Lankan Information.c-captured. EP-EPRLF T-TELO, P-PLOTE, EN-ENDLF, E-EROS TNA-Tamil National Army CVF-Citizen s Voluntary Force

CHAPTER 6

1988

the heinous crimes of indian peace keeping

February

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LANKA GUARDIAN

COMMENT

Miscalculation in Sri Lanka

Nikhil Chakravarthy

This week the President of Sri Lanka will be our state guest. The idea of inviting him, despite strong feelings about his government's policy towards some of the issues in which this country is deeply interested, is known to be our Prime Minister's very own: and therefore one may legitimately infer that he sets much store by it.

However, if one were to go by the mood of the public instead of the Prime Minister's predilections, there is no gainsaying that there have surfaced perceptive reservations about Rajiv Gandhi's Sri Lanka policy. The euphoria that was whipped up in the wake of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement of July 29 has, by all accounts, gone: and the six months since then have unfolded events which were not anticipated at all at that time. It would indeed be supremely fatuous for anybody in government to claim today that all the twists and turns in the developments since July 29, were expected at the time.

When the agreement was drawn up, it was known that the Prime Minister was in a hurry to sign it. Subsequent events made it abundantly clear that no severely objective assessment preceded the signing of the agreement. Subjective factors superseded careful appraisal. The Prime Minister signed the agreement by which he virtually assured that the Tamil militant groups would surrender all arms within 120 hours: but at that time, he had not received any firm assurance from the LTTE leadership that they would lay down arms at his behest.

In fact, at the press conference in Colombo following the signing of the accord, Rajiv Gandhi only conceded that talks were going on with Prabhakaran, not that he had agreed to surrender arms. Granting that the LTTE leaders went back on their word, how was it that India's intelligence agencies had no idea about the goings-on in the militants' camp nor about their military strength and capability? Nobody would be convinced by any bragging that the strong resistance put up by the LTTE against the Indian army had been anticipated. Had it been so, then there is legitimate ground for questioning the wisdom of pushing our armed forces into a misadventure about whose culmination there had been no perspective thinking.

Our chief of army staff has called for "a national consensus" on the role of the Indian armed forces in Sri Lanka. Such a consensus can emerge only if one were clear about the policy behind the operation. In contrast to what happened in 1971 — when at every stage of the fast-growing crisis, the Prime Minister kept all political parties informed both officially and informally — Rajiv Gandhi has only cared to have a few casual meetings with the opposition leaders. And these too were given up with the July 29 aggreement. No consultation has taken place at subsequent crucial stages of development.

Does the government have a clear idea about its Sri Lanka policy today? The government is claiming that our armed forces had to fight the LTTE to enforce the Sri Lanka agreement. But is the government satisfied that the other party to the agreement — that is, the Sri Lanka government — has been faithfully carrying out is obligations under the accord? New Delhi has done its best to sell President Jayawardene's legislative measures but even the moderate Tamil opinion represented by the TULF cannot accept these. Now it is being said that President Jayewardene has given his "personal assurances" that he would concede more reforms for the north. It is strange that our government should be gullible enough to take his words seriously when no party in Sri Lanka — not even his own — takes him at his word. This is not meant as a slur on his reputation but as a measure of his remarkable capacity to shift his position. With two of his ministers dead set against the agreement; with the knowledge that his security forces have been infiltrated on a large scale by the JVP; with large-scale violence being perpetrated by the Sinhala fanatics in the south, Rajiv Gandhi trusts that the commitment of July 29 would be honoured by President Jayewardene. Uptil now, there has been no firm guarantee that he would hold the promised elections in the north and east. Instead, it is now common knowledge that two of President Jayewardene's ministers were engaged at the beginning of this month in secret talks with LTTE leaders striking a deal after which the Indian army would have been asked to quit.

All this was done with President Jayewardene's knowledge and consent at the last moment he seemed to have got cold feet about clinching the secret deal. But this does not mean that more such moves would not be forthcoming in the near future.

There is also the danger that in view of the worsening situation in the Sinhala areas of the south, President Jayewardene might ask the Indian army to help him keep the peace there. Is the Rajiv government prepared to go in for such a commitment since this is also possible under the July 29 accord? Have we worked out the implications of such a situation in which India might annoy other political forces in Sri Lanka, while trying to pull President JRJ's chestnuts out of the fire?

It is now being given out that India moved its troops to Sri Lanka to pre-empt any other power taking over the island: presumbly the the reference is to Pakistan. If that were so, why was this not publicised widely at the time? New Delhi could not possibly have had any inhibitions about exposing Pakistani mischief. The point to note is that in the public eye this latest explanation sounds like an afterthought. It is time that the government undertook a serious review of its involvement in Sri Lanka and come to a clear understanding of the prospects ahead. To admit a miscalculation is a sign of greater strength for a government to try to cover it up. The move to have a treaty with President Jayawardene should await such a review of the entire policy towards Sri Lanka. The Prime Minister would be wise to take the nation into confidence insted of putting his trust in President Jayewardene.

1.2.88

"THEY LOVED US WHEN WE FIRST WENT THERE"

"We thought it would be a banda (stick) fight. It was only when our men began to die that we realised - arre this is battle! When we went there we didn't know who the enemy was - who we were to protect and who we are to fight."

Indian Peace Keeping Force personnel, limping back to India from the streets of Sri Lanka after battles that have reached dimensions undreamt of seven months ago,are a bruised, battered, but not broken lot. Scattered over the Army's Southern Command's hospitals, their limbs broken, ugly wounds healing on once-strong legs, IPKF soldiers and officers reminisce about the events of the past few months. What has being posted in Sri Lanka meant to them?

Major R C S Negi of the Fourth Battalion, Mahar regiment, was injured on October 11, only four days after he reached Sri Lanka. Three companies of the battalion had gone to Navatkuli and then North Kopay for an attack on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), but Major Negi and a few others were delayed at Kilinochi for lack of transport.The LTTE had got wise to its movements. The LTTE concealed an innocuous 'mine'(actually 20 litre jerrycan filled with gunpowder) against a culvert that the convey was to pass. Its intelligence sources apparently relayed a message saying that the only officer in the convoy was in the second transport. The mine was electronically detonated, from no more than 900 metres away, just as Major Negi's three tonner passed the culvert. It flew, he was told later, at least 15 feet into the air, thudded down and disintegrated.

The Fourth battalion has not always been fortunate enough to escape with injuries. "About ten of its men have died in Sri Lanka." Official figures state that 350 IPKF personnel have died and 1,100 have been injured since the Peace Keeping Force was first sent to enforce the Accord. The actual figures are said to be much higher, though casualties have been decreasing in recent months, "now that we have mastered insurgency-fighting", says Negi.

Two hundred and twelve of the wounded are still in the hospitals of the Headquarters of Southern Command in Pune. Two wards of the 26 ward Command Hospital are reserved for IPKF soldiers who require reconstructive surgery; 323 of them have filled the wards since IPKF operations began.

In the Intensive Care Unit of the hospital, Lance Naik Pratap Singh of the Signals regiment sits propped up in bed 'collar' round neck, so that all he can move are his eyes and lips. Twenty-seven year old Pratap Singh was injured two days after he landed in Sri Lanka while he was on his way to fetch the commanding officer in a jeep. When Rajiv Gandhi visited the hospital, he asked them how they were progressing. "What else could he ask? What has happened has happened... and what can I ask him now?"

Chief of the Army Staff, General K Sundarji, need have no fear that press reports are lowering the morale of the Force personnel. All soldiers interviewed were only too anxious to hurry back to Jaffna. Freshly recruited 18 year old Sepoy Machindra Mohite of the First Maratha Light Infantry saw 13 of his platoon die and seven get wounded during the LTTE ambush that injured him, but " I will be happy to go back." he gasps out, his eyes clouded with pain and his brow wet with perspiration. Early reports stated that IPKF personnel were confused about the role they were to play in Jaffna, a fact corroborated by one who confesses *"We didn't know whose side we were on." Most, quite simply, didn't know what they were in for. "We thought it would be a banda (stick) fight. "Didn't your commanding officer tell you it was more than that? " we asked. "Oh, he didn't know either." comes the blithe reply.*

The army has had to face criticism

Major Negi



Pratap Singh

Sepoy Machindra Mohite

that the IPKF has indiscriminately killed and harassed civilians. It recently admitted that four soldiers had been court-martialled on charge of raping women. But the wounded are cautious in their response to queries. "Some civilians have died in the crossfire," says Major Negi. "When the Tigers shoot at you from people's houses, you shoot back..." "The public was very nice," says Subedar Rana. "They loved us when we first went there." Rana was stationed at the 16th century Nallur Kandaswamy temple in which 20,000 Tamils had taken refuge. "We played with their children; when they had nothing to eat, we gave them our rations. Sometimes, our rations would not come. Then we would grasp chicken, a goat, kill it and eat," he laughs, joyfully enacting the vignette for us. "But later, when they started shooting us, khoon garam ho gaya (our blood boiled). Then the trouble started."

Now, with the numbers stationed at Jaffna having risen from 4,000 to at least 50,000, with Rs 4 crores being spent, per day, on keeping them there and with Sri Lankan politics in a state of flux, the IPKF has a tough, still undefined, task ahead of it. But ask a soldier whether he has any doubts and he will say, "This is my work. I have to do it."

(Excerpts from "The price of peace keeping" Indian Express, Feb 7, 1988- emphasis ours)

GENERAL STRIKE HITS BATTICALOA

The strike was called by the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS) and supported by the LTTE. Residents from Batticaloa said streets were deserted and the situation was tense. The Strike, second in six days, was called to protest at the arrest of four leading members of EROS, including its Batticaloa commander, by the Sri Lankan special task force commandos (STF) a few days ago. All the arrested were flown into Colombo by the Sri Lankan police detectives for further investigations into a bomb explosion incident in the city in 1986. Meanwhile, reports in Colombo said that at least 13 Sri Lankan soldiers were wounded when an army vehicle carrying them from Trincomalee to Habarana in the eastern province hit a landmine laid by the LTTE. Four of the 13 wounded soldiers were admitted to hospital in serious condition, the sources added. This was the third consecutive day the Sri Lankan army came under the LTTE-laid landmine explosions in the north and east (Trincomalee), which have left four troops, including a Sri Lankan army officer, dead and 19 injured.

Five Tamil political prisoners at the New Magazine Prison at Welikade in Colombo began a fast unto death demanding the release of all political prisoners detained without trial.

The five who commenced the fast on 17 March are Sebamalai Francis Perera (22), Kandiah Amarasingham (31), Ramasamy Raman (21), Visvalingam Jeevaratnam (21) and Thangavel Ramadas (22).

Before undertaking the fast, over 800 Tamil political prisoners detained at the Boosa army camp and the Welikade prison had written to President Jayawardene requesting him to grant them an amnesty in terms of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord. The text of the letter sent to President Jayawardene by 763 detainees at Boosa and 129 from Welikade is as follows:

'This request is in response to Your Excellency's address to Parliament on the occasion of the opening of its Eighth Session on Thursday, the 25th of February 1988.

'Your Excellency was pleased to say that Your Excellency will grant an amnesty to those who accept the Peace Accord, lay down arms and accept the democratic process.

'I wish to state by this letter that I am one who accepts the peace accord. I am incarcerated. Therefore, Your Excellency's request to lay down arms will not be applicable in my case. Nevertheless, I wish to state that I eschew violence, and I am committed to the democratic process in this country in which I would like to participate at the earliest possible opportunity.

'I, therefore request Your Excellency to consider favourably my immediate release consonant with Your Excellency's address to Parliament.'

LIVE AND LET LIVE

Thirumalai Nathan

Tamils as a race, without exception, are not against India, and its people. . It is this feeling of his people that Mr.Prabhaharan, the Leader and Supreme Military Commander of the LTTE, eloquently proclaimed at the famous Suthumalai Meeting last August when he said "we love India...". Why then is 'Mother India' fighting a bloody and costly war with its children?

The Indian forces have killed over 1400 innocent civilians and injured thousands. They were killed and injured every where - on the road, in their homes, inside temples, in the schools, even in refugee camps; killed and injured by mortar shells, from bombers and helicopter gunships. Their possessions, gold, jewelleries, electronic equipments, TV, radios clocks, furniture, etc. were all plundered. Their homes were destroyed, several razed to the ground. More than half the population in Jaffna were made homeless; they became refugees in their own land, unable to stay even in refugee camps without fear of being bombed or shelled. Worst of all, hundreds of young girls and mothers, including a grand mother of 79 years, were brutally raped and some of them done to death.

Why were all these atrocities committed, that too on its own people, by India ? Is this Hindu culture ? Is this what India inherited from the great saints and sages ? Is this what the great Mahatma Gandhi preached, to be practised by his country and its people for whom he gave his life ? Is this democracy ? Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, has destroyed completely the name of India and the fame great souls like his own grandfather, Jawaharlal Nehru have earned for India. He has committed crimes comparable only to those committed by Hitler and he has overtaken even Mr Jayewardene within a few months. How will he be remembered in history ? The Butcher of Jaffna? And now of Batticaloa?

Political power may now blind him. He should not continue to commit atrocities on a helpless nation of two million. What we are struggling for is a desire to live with safety and dignity in our own homeland.

We now face not the communalism of the Sinhalese but the imperialism of India under Rajiv. Rajiv should change direction before the Tamils are permanently alienated.

COMMENT

IPKF Must Be Withdrawn Forthwith

Which way is the wind blowing in Sri Lanka? Is it time to withdraw the IPKF? Does the accord have any relevance left? Is there more to India's considerations than meets the eye? ··· In our last issue we had carried the views of a Sri Lankan revolutionary on these and several other related questions. Here is a different point of view by ***B. Sivaraman.***

A major event like the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, in its wake, inevitably props up a whole crop of apologists. And understandably the dominant sections of the Indian left, the CPI(M) and CPI lived up to their traditions. But it seems they have their comrades-in-arms across the Palk Straits too. The same arguments, the same premises and, in effect, the same apologies. Only the crude logic of the Indian left is replaced by the refined pragmatism of their Sir Lankan counterparts. This is evident from the views of the Sri Lankan revolutionary whose interview has appeared in the January issue of **Voice of Alternative.** Best possible justifications for the IPKF's presence, no doubt, which are strikingly parallel to the very edifice on which India's Sri Lanka policy is anchored.

The Sri Lankan revolutionary starts with an assessment of LTTE, "The LTTE has always demonstrated its incapacity to distinguish antagonistic contradictions from non-antagonistic ones ....., its proclivity for violent resolution even of contradictions among the people", "By killing fellow militants it has broken up its own support base", "The war had begun to assume the characteristics of a reactionary war. A war between two reactionary forces, not equal though, one wielding state power, the other narrow nationalist". Sounds quite like an innocuous, angry statement. But on this premise is based an unasked question: What is wrong if IPKF destroyed LTTE, "a reactionary force"?

Well, a dialogue on the character of LTTE is very much needed and has to be kept open in future also. But before jumping to any conclusion one has to answer a few questions. If LTTE represents national chauvinism and hence is reactionary, then who represents progressive nationalism? Is the Tamil struggle similar to the classical national liberation struggles? Is the main internal issue of the Tamil struggle now that of class divisions and a corresponding political division along national chauvinism and progressive nationalism? If internal killings is the main criterion for dubbing it a reactionary outfit then do we extend the same logic to dub, say, PLO also as a reactionary outfit, the internal killings in whose case are unparalle'ed? How does one explain LTTE's attitude towards EROS, a formidable left group, whose name however is curiously omitted by our Sri Lankan revolutionary? If the LTTE has lost its "support base" as the Sri Lankan revolutionary would have us believe, how could they wage a war against IPKF that has sent shock-waves to Delhi? Does the sequence of events that led to the IPKF offensive against LTTE put the onus solely on LTTE? Of course, all this is not to give a clean chit to LTTE. I'm not holding a brief for LTTE and nor am I oblivious of the chauvinistic traits it has exhibited. All I am saying is that while assessing this organisation, which came up as a shock brigade of the moderate TULF and evolved as a purely military outfit when all other channels of activity were either choked or proved fruitless, and which subsequently was propelled on to the centrestage of Tamil resistance with lot of external help, without however, losing its internal roots, all the while facing constant war conditions under successive Sri Lankan offensives, one has to be cautious but one can surely say that the time to say the final word has not yet come.

And how to assess the July 29 accord? According to the Sri Lankan revolutionary, "this is the way the accord has been implemented so far: no peace, no peace in the North and East, no peace in the South, no devolution, no amnesty, no electoral process in the North and East or in the South, no interim administration. That is how the accord has worked: to the unilateral benefit of the government in Colombo." However in the same breath he goes on to add, "but unless I can present

a better alternative given the current correlation of forces, I am not going to oppose the accord....", "We are saying, implement the accord. The accord talks about a single council, about substantial devolution, about interim administration, about peace and about a multi-ethnic society — that is a conceptual breakthrough", he says. He also adds, "Of course, it should have been a tripartite accord... it was a kind of quickfix, there was no real drawing together (of the two forces pulling apart).... So the accord was fatally flawed, but our tragedy is that it was the last best chance".



Blown up : an IPKF tank blown up by LTTE

The accord was bad but it also contains something good; the accord was alright but only its implementation was bad — if one goes on stretching arguments like this there is going to be no end in sliding further and further into the morass of pragmatism. In fact the circumstances and the manner of signing the accord, the accord itself, its skewed implementation, the internal dynamics that the accord has unfolded in the island and its bleak future are not separable from each other. Nor can they be compartmentalised. The accord finds itself in such a paradoxical position that the more one tries to implement it the more irrelevant it gets, the more grows the danger of its collapse. How can you expect the LTTE to disarm until their demands are fulfilled in reality, especially when they are no signatories to the accord? How can there be an amnesty to the prisoners when their comrades are waging a guerrilla war against IPKF? How can there be an interim administration or elections under conditions of occupation and war? How can there be a real devolution when the first concrete step towards that would result in the toppling of the Colombo government and entry of IPKF into the South? IPKF presence has only complicated the problem further. It has not only failed to bring about the reconciliation but short-circuited the whole process and has made the situation highly explosive. Only an immediate ceasefire by IPKF and initiation of tripartite political process combined with the withdrawal of IPKF is the last best chance. So you see your tragedy was not that the accord was your last best chance, rather following the accord, your "last best chance", is a tragedy, and a colossal one at that.

"The IPKF should stay.... otherwise what material force will stand there between the Tamils and the Sri Lankan army", asks the revolutionary. And he is quite off the mark. The point at issue now is what material force stands between IPKF, the "peace force" which has killed and continues to kill thousands of people and renders lakhs of people refugees, and Tamils, the garrisoned, captive population. "IPKF is killing Tamills, no doubt, it is utterly reprehensible, but the Sinhala army killing Tamils is a qualitatively different proposition. Even if they kill fewer Tamils that is national oppression", he argues. Is stepping into the shoes of the Sri Lankan army perpetrating such national oppression, especially when one is looked upon by Tamils as a saviour, and delegitimising and decimating the LTTE, the best organised force of Tamil resistance any lesser propostion? Perhaps it is, if one assumes that for the Tamils there is no escape from killings.

In a complete reversal of sequence, the Sri Lankan revolutionary says that the IPKF should remain there till the political component of the accord is implemented. And till then what?

Ceasefire? Withdrawal to the October 9 position? No, nothing of that kind as far as our revolutionary is concerned. He just confines himself to saying that the IPKF's behaviour has to change: "I mean if they are checking women they should send women personnel to do the checking (sic!)". What a shame if Marxists cannot come up even to the level of numerous citizens' committees in opposing the presence of Indian troops. "The demand for the withdrawl of IPKF is difficult to support at this point of time. But the IPKF should not stay beyond 1988, i.e., after the referendum has taken place", he says. And he really sounds like a foreigner to Sri Lankan conditions who is totally ignorant of the ground realities there. A referendum, about which even the moderate TULF has expressed grave reservations owing to the forcible changes in the demographic pattern there in the East - where a Lebanon-type situation is already emerging — can take place only under the point of a gun, an IPKF gun. That, if anything, will only pin down the IPKF.

The accord finds itself in such a paradoxical position that the more one tries to implement it the more irrelevant it gets, the more grows the danger of its collapse.

"Theoretically this IPKF are bad guys, Indian bourgeoisie has expansionist ambitions, all these are correct, but practically, on the ground, who else is going to do this (i.e., containing both the LTTE and Sri Lankan army)", he asks. It is strange that when there is no discrepancy between the theory and practice of Indian bourgeoisie there should be such a glaring discrepancy betwen the theoretical and practical positions of a Sri Lankan Marxist. But this discrepancy is not accidental rather it is rooted in the following premise: "I don't see any other kind of danger like India being able to establish some kind of a neo-colonical hold over Sri Lanka. The IPKF doesn't have any anchorage in the island, it's hanging in the mid air". Well it is nobody's case that India is trying to establish such a hold of the classical type over Sri Lanka and nobody opposes India's role in Sri Lanka on this basis. But at the same time it is also naive to believe that the Indian bourgeoisie's power will not translate itself into hegemonistic influence in this region and it is precisely to consolidate this influence events were made to take this peculiar turn in Sri Lanka. And what better anchorage does the Indian government need other than a prolongation of the conflict there? Further he also says, "the role of the Indian state is very much like the role of a Bonapartist state. It is a regional Bonapartism. Once it tilts to the Tamils, equips them, then it tilts to the Sinhalase and raps the Tamils, now it's trying to get some more concessions". Leaving aside the silly obfuscation of the class character of the Indian state, these lines also reveal that he is readily buying the theory of "regional policemen" dished out by the liberals and fails to see in full measure the regional hegemonism that finds expression in the so-called "Rajiv's Monroe doctrine", in "the global recognition as a regional power" as put by Indian external affairs minister Mr. Natwar Singh and in all the talk about India's "strategic interests" and "regional preeminence". And tilting hither and thither is precisely how India got herself entrenched in Sri Lanka.

A solidarity between the progressive and left forces of India and Sri Lanka, as desired by the Sri Lankan revolutionaery can and must be forged and the one possible common basis is to promote co-operation between the two peoples against the regional designs of the Indian government.

We fully understand the complex and difficult conditions in which the Sri Lankan left finds itself. Whether a Khomeinist putsch is on the cards or not, Sinhala fundamentalism, we do feel, is a major threat. But we are afraid any reliance on India, if only as a lesser evil taking on a biogger evil, at a time when the entire Sri Lankan popular opinion has veered around, and quite rightly so, to an anti-IPKF position will only lead to further peripheralisation of the left. Incidentally this is one of the rare occasions when one finds the Sinhala and Tamil opinions objectively converging. And the Sri Lankan left committed to the vision of a multi-ethnic yet unified Sri Lanka can certainly build on this favourable objective factor. But instead of this if they choose to endorse India's actions, disregarding the overwhelming popular will, it will only snowball into a blunder of the dimension that the Indian communists had committed in 1942, something for which they are still paying a price.

February '88

REPORT

IPKF men see Vietnam in Lanka

By R.S. Venkatesh

BOMBAY, Feb 2

The officers and men of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) who have returned from Sri Lanka are already speaking of the war with the LTTE as India's Vietnam.

After 100 days of bloody fighting, the Lankan situation, in their view, continues to be as grim as it was on October 10 when they first joined battle with the Tamil militants. And now, several months after they set foot in Sri Lanka, it appears to them that the Army is there to stay.

The tales of Jaffna told by those who have returned — they have requested anonymity — reflect the tenacity, motivation, and desperation of the Tamils, and the consequent inevitability of a long and tortuous war ahead.

Among the tales is the one about an Indian officer who saw a familiar face in the Northern Province and confronted the *lungi*-clad Tamil militant. "I called out to him, seeking to verify his identity," the officer said, "only to learn that he was one of those I had trained in infantry combat in an Indian camp."

Such conflict is not only ludicrous but almost unimaginably dangerous, say the Jaffna-returned officers. "Scores of Tamils who spent several months training under Indian superiors are now aiming their crossfire unhesitatingly at the same officers — that too with our equipment."

Not that all the arms seized from Tamils are Indian. The best testimony to the LTTE's resourcefulness in acquiring armaments from diverse sources is a photograph depicting a senior Indian infantry officer holding four seized grenades in his palms. One of them is of Pakistani make, one Chinese, the third of local manufacture, and the fourth an Indian product.

What has stunned the IPKF much more is the LTTE's amazing stock of mines of all kinds. About 70 per cent of the Indian men killed or maimed in Lanka have been victims of mine blasts. The Tamils have what our Army calls 'Improvised Explosive Devices', distinct from the assorted ready-made mines of known capabilities.

"In Jaffna, the mines are crude, and most often comprise a drum topped with 100 kg of explosive, which is detonated by a civilian sympathiser from a few hundred metres away," a senior infantry officer of the IPKF said. And since about half the mines use liquid explosive, they escape the best mine-detectors.

A couple of scenarios from the recent past: Indian armoured personnel carriers are negotiating a narrow bend on the periphery of a town. An ageing woman innocently seated 300 metres away holds two ends of wire. She watches the first carrier go past, and then, as instructed, makes the wire ends meet. And up goes several hundred kg of explosive under the combat vehicles. Or, Indian soldiers are making a house-to-house search after capturing a town. Two jawans enter a block and rummage a box. And 100 kg of explosives blows up in their faces.

"Block their mine supplies, and half our job is done," an officer said. The Tamils have used every hour to dig six-foot-deep trenches all over the Northern Province to cache explosives. Very worrying is the thought

POGO

DAVID LEVINE/New York Review of Books

that even the LTTE has lost track of some of the hideouts. "When several top LTTE personnel were killed in battle, they took the memorised maps of the mine caches with them," an officer said, adding that even if all the Tigers were to lay down arms, the unfound explosives would still be a big hazard.

A major victory the LTTE scored was the destruction of the Army's latest infantry combat vehicles, acquired barely a year ago.

The BMP-2s, as they are called, were purchased from the Soviet Union for Rs one crore each, and were displayed for the first time on Republic Day this year. Their special features include a night vision device, an automatic fire-fighting system, portability by air, and limited protection against nuclear-biological-chemical warfare (NBC). The Tamils have blown up five of them so far.

The Army has reasons to consider this loss worthwhile. The Lankan conflagration has provided the Indian Army an opportunity to test its latest vehicles and armament. Most of the types of machinery acquired since the war in 1971 were sent into Jaffna, partly to test their battle-worthiness.

"In that respect, the amphibious BMP-2s have proved remarkably effective. These combat vehicles traversed two km of ocean to the Sri Lankan shore after their offloading from Indian ships," remarked a junior officer who used the vehicle in the successful rescue of captured IPKF men. Its mobility, communication facilities and firepower, witnessed in Lanka, are being noted with satisfaction by the Indian Army.

Some of a group of officers who recently studied the Lankan situation from close quarters admit discreetly that their main folly, initially, was greatly underestimating of the tenacity of the militants. One of them said grimly, "They are driven by great motivation, and just won't give up."

And how is the morale of the IPKF? "It's good at the moment. But one can't say if the confrontation becomes long and arduous. The worst part is that the Sri Lankan Army is right there in front of us — playing volleyball every morning."

3.2.88

EDITORIAL

9.2.88

A tricky situation

THE REPORTED MOVE to despatch more troops to Sri Lanka to raise the strength of the Indian peace-keeping force from about 55,000 to 75,000 belies the official attempts to paint a rosy picture of the situation in the troubled island. Six months after the IPKF embarked upon a massive military operation its task remains far from complete, despite the heavy casualties which it has inflicted as well as suffered. While hundreds of cadres of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have been liquidated, its recalcitrant leadership is still at large and retains the ability to regroup and strike. The LTTE's apparent ability to obtain replacements for men and material lost in action points to significant popular support for it. Use of terror is only a part of the explanation for the success of its civil disobedience campaign which has crippled the civil administration restored by the Indian army when it established its sway over the Tamil areas. The other part is that at least a section of the populace views the LTTE as a patriotic force defending the homeland against an alien army brought in by rulers in Colombo. At this stage it is imperative for the Government of India to pause to consider whether the objectives which have eluded it so far can be achieved by beefing up its military presence in the island further. Since a major consideration which weighed with it in assuming a military role was the need to prevent hostile forces from getting a foothold in the island, it must ask itself whether its entanglement in a prolonged operation will not in fact provide such forces a tempting opportunity to tie it down indefinitely by pumping arms to the Tamil militants ranged against it.

The most disconcerting aspect of the Sri Lankan situation is the scant attention paid by the leadership in New Delhi and Colombo to the political aspects of the ethnic crisis. After many months of neglect, the question of resuming the political processes received attention during President J.R. Jayewardene's visit to New Delhi for the Republic Day festivities. The wisdom of going ahead with the proposed provincial council elections when even moderate Tamil opinion has serious reservations about the formulations agreed upon by the two Governments is open to question. In any event, the new target date of April for the elections appears to be no more realistic than the December 1987 deadline set in the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement. At home, Mr. Jayewardene stands isolated, with the entire opposition barring the Communist Party setting its face against the agreement. While he has been able to push through the enabling legislative measures, it remains to be seen whether he can go ahead with the elections in the teeth of opposition from powerful elements within his own United National Party and the murderous campaign launched by the proscribed Janata Vimukti Peramuna. Meanwhile, Mr. Jayewardene's popular mandate, such as it is, is running out. As things stand, the chances of his successor standing by his commitments must be rated low. Should he perpetuate himself in power through a manipulative process, the legitimacy of the Indian military presence will be as much in question as that of his administration. Prudence demands that New Delhi should chalk out a course of action keeping in view all aspects of the emerging scenario.

COMMENT

INDIA'S VIETNAM WAR; DOES RAJIV HAVE A WAY OUT?

Unverifiable parallels are the deadliest of self-deceptions. We will list the more important of these for those who have the sense of realpolitik:

1. India, it is said, cannot permit an independent Tamil Eelam because the 'infection' will spread to Tamil Nadu. Why then did India launch an independent Bangladesh? Tamil Nadu has accommodated itself to the prohibition of parties calling for a separate state. New Delhi does not treat the citizens of Tamil Nadu as if they are second class.

2. Sri Lanka, despite all the denials, has lost its sovereignty. The island state is partitioned with Indian troops in the Northern and Eastern provinces. Indian civil administrators are manning the bureaucratic apparatus in the Jaffna peninsula. The Indian army commander declared recently that he would take orders only from New Delhi, not from Sri Lanka's Commander-in-Chief, President J.R.Jayawardene. The Indian Commander received the fullest backing from India's High Commissioner in Colombo, J.N.Dixit. In addition, India has made it clear that it will not withdraw its troops until President Jayawardene's government honours its part of the Gandhi — Jayawardene Peace Accord of July 1987. This means that President Jayawardene has to legislate for regional autonomy and implement this in the correct spirit, as agreed in the Chidambaram proposals of December 1986, though the proposals are unsatisfactory.

Legislation has been enacted. It does not meet Tamil aspirations. But will the Jayawardene government or its successor government implement the provisions in the way intended — that the Tamil areas, the Northern and Eastern provinces, will enjoy de facto federal powers? What if these provisions are violated as they surely will be? The obvious result is a return to civil war and Indian intervention. The other possibility is of Indian forces remaining in the Northern and Eastern provinces in definitely. We will bet on the latter. India has come to stay, and will station itself as in Kashmir. Still another reason for a continuing Indian presence is that the Jayawardene government has yet to enact legislation for Tamil to be recognised as an official language, with Sinhala and English. **The Grand Old Man of South Asia is caught in a nutcracker. He cannot slip out as in the past.**

3. The Accord of June 1987 was doomed from the very beginning, for two vital reasons. There were no provisions for (1) non- discrimination in admissions to Universities and Higher Institutes of learning, and (2) merit to be the criterion for employment in the public and private sectors. The war will continue without mitigation as long as these two problems remain unresolved.

4. The Sinhala leadership has failed to understand the realities of the Tamil situation. The vicious Sinhala Buddhist state compelled the Tamils to abandon the social contract and the civil polity. As a result there is both a social revolution and a war of independence. Jayawardene and Gandhi have tried to stop a revolutionary situation in its tracks. This cannot happen. It did not in the French, Soviet and Maoist revolutions. Either a revolution succeeds or fails. But it marches on to its inexorable goal. An immature Minister of Education, Ranil Wickremasinghe, meanwhile talks of 'rehabilitation classes' for Tamil youth; and the Minister of National Security, the unforgettable Lalith Athulathmudali, states that there must be a great deal of 'give and take', and that the Sinhala majority cannot have a permanently dissatisfied Tamil minority. The Minister has missed the point.

The Tamils no longer think of themselves as a minority.They are now a nation in their own right.They want political statehood.

5. What of India's position? Having entered as peacekeepers, they are now involved as participants in a war that can never end. The hope is that the Tamil militants will be killed or forced to the negotiating table once they have exhausted their firepower. There are three factors in the Indian intervention that are incapable of resolution. Firstly, as the Indian army officers have stated, their men cannot distinguish a Tamil guerilla from a Tamil civilian (fish dissolve in the ocean). And, in the Tamil Eastern province with its Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese population, Indian soldiers will not be able to differentiate between Tamil militants, Tamil civilians, Sinhalese and Muslims. Secondly, the war will take an irreversible turn, when as already reported, Tamil militants move to the hill country plantations and mingle with the Tamil speaking plantation workers. Thirdly, the answer to the problem is not as simple as High Commissioner Dixit stated. Dixit thinks that if the Tamil militants refuse to negotiate, they will become 'irrevelant'. More to the point is whether Tamil militancy will permit a return to the civil polity of prerevolutionary times. As long as there is an unresolved political problem compounded by a social revolution, no political party can hope to compete in or work a political process rendered all the more hopeless by the failure of Gandhi and Jayawardene to consult with the parties to the dis- pute. None of these outcomes was envisaged by Prime Minister Gandhi or President Jayawardene. This will be an interminable war of attrition. India now counts Sinhalese and Tamils as its enemies, where previously the Tamils looked upon on India as their friend. India's passive and indifferent politicalised class believes that the massive Indian military strength can suppress andor eliminate Tamil militancy in a short time, that peace will return and the so-called peacekeepers can return to their Indian encampments.

'The best laid plans of mice and men go awry'.

SCRUTATOR.

Ms.Karen Parker, Attorney-at-Law and UN Representative for Disabled Peoples' International and Human Rights Advocates, handed over this letter addressed to the U N Secretary General at the end of a well-attended peaceful demonstration march through the streets of New York on 29.1.88. The full text of her letter is published below.

I address you in my personal capacity and as Chair of the Emergency Meeting on the situation in Sri Lanka and the status of Sri Lankan refugees held in Paris, 18-19 December 1987. This session was attended by more than fifty (50) persons representing thirty-four (34) non-governmental organizations. I also address you as Chair of the Special Committee formed at that meeting. As you are aware, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights addressed the situation in Sri Lanka in its resolution 1987/61 of 12 March 1987. Unfortunately, **the situation in Sri Lanka has deteriorated dramatically since that time, and now, regrettably, involves the Government of India.**

At our Paris session we heard eyewitness accounts from, inter alia, a European parliamentarian, two doctors from European humanitarian organizations, European journalists, and several clergy of the Roman Catholic Church. These accounts have been and continue to be buttressed by hundreds of direct communications from Tamil and non-Tamil Sri Lankan victims, including refugee groups, local governmental bodies and local Church groups. The accounts provide not only irrefutable corroboration of the facts that we know have been presented to you by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (hereinafter LTTE), but indicate that **violations of humanitarian law by the Indian Peace Keeping Force are even more widespread and grave.**

The gravity of the situation has been further compounded because the International Committee of the Red Cross has still not been able to fulfil its functions as authorised by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and as urged in the above-mentioned Commission resolution 1987/61.

The purpose of this communication is not, however, to submit documenta tion of these tragic events, as we expect that you are fully apprised of them. Rather, we seek your attention and guidance to find an immediate end to the intolerable situation.

We are aware that the **LTTE have addressed you seeking your good offices - an initiative we heartily endorse.** While we are sensitive to the numerous demands made on your time by other serious situations in the world today, we would like to believe that the Governments of India and Sri Lanka would cooperate with you to seek a just and lasting solution to this long-standing problem with only minimum encouragement on your part. In particular, the Government of India has in the past shown leadership in addressing a number of pressing human rights and disarmament issues in the world, and must now find itself somewhat at odds with its previous laudable endeavours. I am personally convinced that the Government of India did not intend to become the persecutor of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka when it achieved the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 29 July 1987, and that it too, finds the current situation as intolerable for itself as it is for the Tamil people of Sri Lanka (and, indeed, for all the people of Sri Lanka). Because it saw itself, in good faith, the protector of the Tamil people under the 29 July Accord, I anticipate that India will act in good faith to restore that position.

We are also in possession of a communication from Mr.Veluppillai Prabhakaran, leader of the LTTE, to Mr.Rajiv Gandhi in which he indicates yet again that the **LTTE pledges to surrender their arms** and to "co-operate with the Government of India with the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord if Tamil interests are promoted and the Tamil people are protected." **I do not find this communication either intransigent or ingenuine. Its open and sincere call for a cease-fire encourages me personally that the exercise of your good offices could yield fruitful results forthwith.**

In the event that a cease-fire is not immediately possible, we ask you to encourage the Governments in question to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations to fulfil their missions to relieve the suffering of the civilian population and to tend to sick or wounded combatants or civilians. We also urge you to call on all Governments who have Tamil and other Sri Lankan refugees to not return (refouler) these persons to Sri Lanka until the cessation of hostilities and until their personal safety can be assured.

Excellency, I trust you will accept our interest and concerns in good faith. We are willing to submit to you documentation we have of the events in Sri Lanka. We know you share our grief over the loss of life, injuries and damage to property suffered by all involved in the conflict in Sri Lanka. Excellency, please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

REPORT

Hello, Goodbye

A brisk visit to New Delhi

By past standards, the official welcome was low key. As soon as his plane touched down last week at New Delhi's Indira Gandhi International Airport, Sri Lankan President Junius R. Jayewardene was driven to the pink-and-beige Rashtrapati Bhavan (President's House), where Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and about 50 government and diplomatic officials awaited his arrival. A 21-gun salute was fired, but there were no formal speeches. Jayewardene shook hands with his hosts and walked briskly toward his private suite to begin a five-day stay.

Indian officials said the truncated reception reflected recent changes in protocol, but the businesslike tone seemed fitting for Jayewardene's arrival. The Sri Lankan leader had several potentially disagreeable issues to take up with Gandhi. Chief among them was the slow progress made by Indian troops against the island republic's separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The continuing bloodshed and increasing military commitment have put pressure on Jayewardene to push for a withdrawal of Indian troops, some of which have been in Sri Lanka since the two countries signed an accord last July 29 aimed at ending the insurgency. Also high on the President's list was a proposed Indian-Sri Lankan friendship treaty that would, in Colombo's view, redress some of the inequities in the peace pact.

After two rounds of talks with Gandhi, Jayewardene flew home last weekend with mixed results. On one hand, the leaders agreed to work out ways that would allow some 800,000 refugees of the conflict to return home. On the other, Gandhi gave Jayewardene no assurances that India would pull out its troops anytime soon.

Far from planning to withdraw, the Indian military in recent weeks has moved an additional division into eastern Sri Lanka. That brings Indian strength on the island to over 40,000 combat troops—more than ten times the number initially dispatched last summer. The buildup bolsters New Delhi's hopes that the Tigers, masters of disruptive hit-and-run tactics who are now concentrated in the Tamil-dominated east, can be subdued long enough to permit the provincial council elections that are mandated by the peace agreement. Last week Jayewardene announced that as a result of his talks with Gandhi, he would call for council elections beginning in March or April.

But that only fanned tensions on the island, where the Sinhalese majority opposes another feature of the accord, a provision that the country's two Tamil-dominated provinces must be merged before elections can be held. On yet another sensitive voting issue—when general elections for Sri Lanka's 196-seat parliament might occur—Jayewardene remained mute. The President has postponed national balloting since 1983 because of the Tamil insurgency. Now, despite mounting pressure in Colombo, he has refused to advance the prospective election date of September 1989.

BALDEV—SYGMA

India's Gandhi greets Sri Lankan President Jayewardene

An agenda of potentially disagreeable issues, and few results.

Jayewardene also failed to make much progress in New Delhi on the proposed friendship treaty. Among other things, India wants assurances that Sri Lanka will not offer its ports to any third country for military use. That condition is aimed primarily at embargoing Pakistani, Israeli or U.S. forces. Sri Lanka made such a promise in connection with the July 29 accord, but Jayewardene left the pledge out of the proposed friendship treaty. The omission led India to suspect that the President wanted to dilute other commitments made in the original pact. As a result, the treaty debate promises to be prolonged.

More trouble awaited Jayewardene upon his return. While he was meeting with Gandhi in New Delhi, the Tigers launched a surprise attack on an Indian patrol in the eastern city of Batticaloa, a raid that left eleven dead. The killings brought fatalities in the almost five-year-old civil war to roughly 8,000, most of them civilians. ***—By Susan Tifft. Reported by Qadri Ismail/Colombo and K.K. Sharma/New Delhi***

FEBRUARY 8, 1988

Recall IPKF: V. P. Singh

NEWS

Express News Service

Madras, Feb. 18: Jan Morcha leader V. P. Singh said here on Thursday that recalling the Indian army from Sri Lanka and promoting talks between LTTE leader Prabhakaran and President Jayewardene would pave the way for a solution to the Lankan ethnic issue.

However, he refused to commit himself on the specifics of such a solution. The Lankan people themselves had to find an honourable solution, he said. He was speaking at a news conference here.

Earlier, he cited the handling of the Sri Lanka issue by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to claim that Mr. Gandhi and the Centre had lost their "sense of direction" in handling issues. It reflected "confused thinking", hurry and haste, Mr. Singh said.

The initial mistake was the signing of the accord with the Sri Lankan President. "It should be between Prabhakaran (LTTE leader) and President Jayewardene"

The result of this mistake was that the Indian army was asked to shower bullets at the same place (Jaffna) where they had dropped food packets earlier. "We are proud of the Indian army," he said but added that those who had given the orders to the army should be held responsible.

He said no national purpose had been served by committing the Indian army in Sri Lanka, spending crores of rupees every day and sacrificing the lives of soldiers. Mr. Gandhi gave out the reason that it was to prevent Israeli and Pakistani forces getting involved in Sri Lanka, but this was refuted by Sri Lanka Prime Minister Premadasa.

The accord provided for a referendum in the East for merger with the North but would it be acceptable to India if a similar demand was made in respect of Kashmir, he asked.

REPORT

Treaty in the making

Jayewardene hopes a treaty with India will help in elections

Manik de Silva in Colombo

Sri Lankan President Junius Jayewardene ended a state visit to India on 30 January describing his tour as "very successful." Largely due to the negotiations during the trip, New Delhi will further bolster the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka. The aim is to break the back of the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which has regrouped in the Eastern Province since suffering heavily at the hands of the IPKF in the Northern Province.

Indian commanders expect to mop up the remaining LTTE resistance in the north within a month and bring the east under control by the end of April, which could pave the way for provincial council elections by June. Back in Colombo, Jayewardene faces formidable problems, including Sinhalese terrorism in the south and dissension within his United National Party (UNP).

Jayewardene, whose tenure as president ends early next year, took along to New Delhi two key ministers, Gamini Dissanayake and Lalith Athulathmudali who, with Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa, are the front runners for the UNP ticket at next year's presidential election. Dissanayake, who played a key role in negotiating the July Indo–Sri Lankan peace accord, is a particular favourite of the Indian Government.

Athulathmudali, on the other hand, has been lukewarm about the accord, cautiously treading a tightrope in seeking to retain his popularity among the Sri Lankan armed forces and majority Sinhalese, while at the same time not appearing to rebel against government policy. As deputy defence minister, he as well as Gen. Cyril Ranatunge — the joint operations commander who was also on the delegation — had an important role to play in discussions with the Indian defence establishment.

Analysts in Colombo have noted that while there appeared to be complete trust between Jayewardene and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the Sri Lankan and Indian bureaucracies are suspicious of each other. One of the main objectives of the Jayewardene visit was to ensure that bureaucrats did not undermine the relationship between the two leaders. The Colombo delegation was keen on impressing on the Indian prime minister that Jayewardene had a greater stake than Gandhi in the success of the peace accord.

The accod itself has not been working as it should. The Indians underestimated the strength of the Tamil Tigers and the process of disarming them has been a costly exercise for the IPKF, resulting in more than 350 soldiers killed and more than 1,000 wounded. Civilian casualties in the Indian operations and the hostility of the Sri Lankan Tamils, who had once regarded Indian troops as protectors, have added to New Delhi's problems.

Jayewardene has to contend with growing domestic fear that Indian troops intend to remain much longer than they should and that the peace-keeping force will eventually become an army of occupation. He knows very well that the Indian presence will be a key issue at the elections and would very much like the IPKF to complete its task and pull out before the parliamentary and presidential elections expected within the next 12 months. During his stay in New Delhi, Gandhi told Sri Lankan national TV that it was up to Jayewardene alone to decide when Indian troops should pull out. This, from the point of view of the Colombo government, was a most positive statement and has been widely publicised in Sri Lanka.



Gandhi and Jayewardene: complete trust. AP

Colombo was anxious to sign with New Delhi a treaty of friendship and co-operation modelled on the Indo-Soviet treaty, which would include reciprocal obligations. The intention, from Jayewardene's point of view, was to get rid of what many Sri Lankans perceive to be inequities in the July accord. Although the Indian External Affairs Ministry has been cool on the idea of a treaty, Gandhi himself has said that he had no reservations about signing such an agreement with Sri Lanka.

At the conclusion of the visit, Jayewardene told reporters that the draft submitted by Colombo will be discussed at length during the coming months and the next round of treaty talks would be held before the June elections for the Sri Lankan provincial councils. Having the treaty signed before parliamentary elections, which most observers believe would precede the presidential election, would be a useful campaign plank for Jayewardene.

At home the president has rapped Premadasa — whose recent public speeches have not been entirely to Jayewardene's liking — by dropping two strong Premadasa supporters from the UNP working committee. He also obtained finance minister Ronnie de Mel's resignation for what he regarded as a lack of "loyalty" to a five-year-old cabinet decision to hold a referendum in December 1982 to extend the term of the incumbent parliament. De Mel said in parliament in December that he had been opposed to the referendum to which he attributed many of the country's present problems. Despite the fact that replacing de Mel, a gifted technocrat, was a major problem, Jayewardene clearly felt that cabinet and party discipline was more important.

Obviously, the president intends to show the country that he will be calling the shots in the remaining months of his tenure. He has reiterated that it is his constitutional prerogative to decide when to hold a parliamentary election and, despite pressure from the opposition as well as a public demand by de Mel, he has chosen not to reveal his hand on election timing.

Before leaving New Delhi he told the press that the presidential election will be held by the end of this year or early January 1989. When to hold a parliamentary election, he said, is "my decision" and he had not made up his mind on whether to schedule it before or after the presidential election, he said. But most observers agree that Jayewardene will hold the parliamentary polls while he is still in office so that he can appoint the next cabinet. Jayewardene, who will turn 82 in September, has declared that he will not seek another term, but he has not indicated which of the UNP aspirants he will support as his successor.

11 FEBRUARY 1988

RAPED

19.2.88	Vakaneri/Batticoloa	One young girl
20.2.88	Nedunkeni Camp	7 girls (Among them Bhagyam and Vijayalatha were feared dead. Vasanthi who was brutally raped was a mother of 3 months old baby).
25.2.88	Mullaithivu – Nedunkeni	5 girls

INDIA AS MAJOR REGIONAL POWER

COMMENT

Castrated sovereignty. That is all that Sri Lanka is left with under President J.R.Jayewardene. The former Minister of Finance claims that 'Finlandization' of the island is a small price to pay for India's intervention. We argue that, far from "Finlandization" (in Finland the Soviets cannot go too far because NATO watches developments), India has "Sikkimized" Sri Lanka; and Gandhi tries to make of Jayewardene a "Chogyal" (the ruler of Sikkim), a ruler who does the bidding of his Imperial master with canine docility. Meanwhile, the castrated sovereign like the castaway pig is fattened for the slaughter. That is the significance of the recent durbar in New Delhi when President Jayewardene was chief guest on India's Republic Day. Sri Lanka today is in the grip of an Oriental despotism, one of whose features, to quote Suzanne Hoeber Rudolph, is a genre of "Sultanism" where "the servile subject" is "dependent, infantilized, obedient, without public voice or identity." So Sri Lanka has no V.O.A (Voice Of America), no right to let her ports be used by foreign powers and must send back all her foreign military training advisors.

BALANCE OF POWER

This Indian Accord is heralded as a triumph of regional hegemonial stability by Moscow and Washington. Some politicalised Indians and Indian newspapers hail Gandhi for his diplomatic triumph. But let us be the proverbial Cassandra, the bringer of bad tidings. In World politics, no single power has for long been permitted to hold unchallenged sway. The manoeuvring to bring such a power within the international state system begins on the day it claims regional superiority. We have forgotten too early and too soon, the British concept of "balance of power." Whenever Spain, France or Germany sought hegemony over Europe, British statesmen ensured a return to a balance of power so that Europe will remain in equilibrium.

TYRO AND NOVICE IN POLITICS

This we boldly predict is what will happen to India in Gandhi's dalliance with the Grand Old Man of South Asia. **Our prediction is that President Jayewardene will win against the tyro and novice in politics, Rajiv Gandhi.** Soon Jayewardene will have Gandhi tied in knots over his so-called Accord. Indian troops will have increasing problems in Sri Lanka. And who will restore the balance of power in the sub-continent?

Britain ensured that Philip's Spain (the defeat of the Armada), Napoleon Bonaparte's France and Hitler's Germany were cut to size when they sought regional hegemony. The United States, the super power that it is, is under the surveillance of Fidel Castro, Nicaragua and other potential anti-U.S. rulers in Latin and Central America. How can India be provided unrestricted freedom to impose her hegemony over a South Asia of states antipathetic to Delhi's pretentions to imperialism?

CORRUPT CLIQUE

The signals are all too clear. It is unstable for the world system to have a currupt clique in New Delhi (Bofors and all that) to remain unchallenged. It has never before happened in world politics. The U.S. has given its sanction because its hands are full with the Afghan mess and the Gulf war. **Pakistan remains an angry onlooker. And every neighbour of India - Nepal, Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and most importantly, the People's Republic of China, are observing events as Gandhi's intervention in the domestic affairs of a neighbour becomes plainly evident.**

India, according to our reading of the situation, will sooner than later be brought in line. In effect a balance of power will be restored in the region. The U.S. will soon be freed of the Afghan problem. Pakistan will invent its nuclear device. The People's Republic has still to settle border

ILLUSTRATION BY RAMAKRISHNA SALVI

problems with Imperial India. Khalistan, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura have to be pacified. What are 100,000 Indian troops playing around in Sri Lanka? The people of Sri Lanka, Sinhalese and Tamils, abhor the Indian presence. President Jayewardene is reportedly conducting talks with the LTTE leadership. He has already made contact with Mahatiya, Deputy leader of the Tigers. Our forecast is that President Jayewardene will succeed in outflanking Gandhi. Gandhi's skit on the world stage is only a brief interlude. He will have to beat a hasty retreat from the shores of Sri Lanka. We Tamils and our traditional enemies, the Sinhalese, can then fight it out and come to a settlement. Gandhi should read Neville Maxwell's INDIA'S CHINA WAR, that is, if ever he stops reading the signals that he used to when he was a commercial pilot.

The Week

REPORT

Medals and memories

Enemy not identified while giving gallantry awards



Highest honour. *Bana Singh and Ramaswamy Parameshwaran (posthumous), the Param Vir Chakra recipients*

"WE started from the outskirts of Jaffna outside the municipal limits and cleared the Tigers from the entire stretch of the coastal road. We linked up with the garrison holed up in the Jaffna fort, on October 19," said Brig. Manjit Singh to a group of newsmen visiting Jaffna, recalling the bitter battle which earned him a Maha Vir Chakra on Republic Day.

The brigadier's achievement is all the more impressive if one takes into account that the 41 brigade which he led, which was part of the five-column thrust launched by the IPKF, had been airlifted only on October 17 and was pushed straight into battle. The fighting was quite vicious—there were 272 casualties. The citation of the award mentions that Manjit Singh led from the front regardless of personal safety, displayed conspicuous gallantry in the face of the enemy, and inspired his men to advance through a cordon, thrown by the LTTE, which sprung from virtually every other house.

Eight soldiers have been awarded the Maha Vir Chakra, and the Param Vir Chakra, the highest gallantry award, has been won by two—Maj. Ramaswamy Parameswaran who laid down his life in Sri Lanka, and Naik Subedar Bana Singh for clearing an intrusion in Siachen, at an altitude of 21,000 feet. Another 37 persons have been awarded the Vir Chakra. This is the first time after the 1971 war that soldiers have been decorated for gallantry in battle.

There were no doubts that the awards were well deserved. What, however, created a sense of uneasiness was the fact that the government was caught in the web of its own contradiction. In Siachen, the soldiers were fighting an old enemy. But now with these awards the government has admitted that LTTE in Sri Lanka is an 'enemy'.

> The 4/5 Gorkhas which won four Maha Vir Chakras and six Vir Chakras has lost 70 men in Sri Lanka. Whereas in the 1965 war it lost 30 men and in 1971 its casualties were 28.

Notwithstanding that, there is no gainsaying the gallantry of our soldiers. Maj. Ramaswamy Parameshwaran of 8 Mahar was returning on the night of November 25 after search operations when his column was ambushed by the Tamil rebels. Despite being shot in the chest, he rallied his men, stood his ground, cleared the ambush and breathed his last. Five militants also died in the fighting. The Indian soldiers seized three rifles and two rocket launchers.

In fact it is these acts of gallantry that have saved the Indian army from a loss of reputation. It is also to be borne in mind that our soldiers were fighting an enemy on the latter's terrain.

The column led by Brig. Manjit Singh, for instance, came to the rescue of the beleaguered Maratha light infantry troops, led by Col. T.P.S. Brar, holed up in Jaffna fort. "The hostilities began on October 10. At 14.30 hrs, 60 to 70 Tigers descended from buses, started firing and advanced towards us. We returned the fire and tried to break the cordon. In the process we suffered heavy casualties and had to retreat into the fort. The exchange of fire carried on till 8 p.m.," said Col. Brar. From then on, till December 19 when the 41 brigade linked up with Brar's men the Tamil Tigers mounted a series of attacks every morning and every evening. Soldiers in the fort told this reporter in October that when they tried to advance from the fort, they came under fire from the Tigers entrenched in well-defended positions all around the fort. The Dutch-built Jaffna fort is surrounded by Regal cinema, a public library, a stadium, and other public buildings.

While Brig. Manjit Singh was honoured for leading the fastest charge through Jaffna, Brig. T.S. Dhillon, who

headed the 18 brigade, was given the Yudh Seva medal, introduced recently for distinguished service during war, conflict or hostilities. Dhillon told visiting newsmen at Navarkully, the well-fortified LTTE training camp from where the army seized a huge arms dump: "We surprised the Tigers. If they had succeeded in blowing up the arms dump, it would have led to a colossal loss of human lives in the civilian areas surrounding the camp." The brigade had begun its march from Kopai north, some seven kilometres from Navarkully, to seal a crucial exit point on the seaside, often made use of by LTTE. Initially its progress was slow because of fierce resistance. Navarkully was finally taken on the night of October 22.

The largest number of Maha Vir Chakras—four out of a total eight—were claimed by the men of 4/5 Gorkha Rifles. As part of 72 brigade, they had started their march from Palaly base where the 54 division, the core of the IPKF, had set up tactical headquarters. The battalion moved towards Jaffna, and, after fierce resistance, linked up with the troops brought in by helicopters to hold the university campus. Advancing behind three tanks, the battalion came under fire at Arumparai and lost their commanding officer, Lt.-Col. Inderpal Singh Bawa. He has been awarded the Maha Vir Chakra posthumously. "The Gorkhas went berserk when they found that their commanding officer had fallen," said an army officer in Jaffna.

Others of the Gorkha Rifles who won the Maha Vir Chakra are Maj. Krishna Gopal Chatterjee, Lance Havildar Nar Bahadur Ale and Naik Prem Bahadur Gurung (the last two posthumously).

Six Vir Chakras were won by the Gorkha Rifles—Maj. Anil Deepak Gardner, who had the flesh of his leg blown off by a Claymore mine, Maj. Nud Singh who died instantly after being hit in the head, Lance Naik Hira Bahadur Thapa (posthumous), Naik Hom Bahadur Thapa, Naik Subedar Bhim Bahadur Thapa and Subedar Prem Bahadur Thapa.

Among the medal winners men of the 8 Mahar came next to the Gorkhas—apart from Maj. Ramaswamy Parameshwaran's Param Vir Chakra, the 8 Mahar won a Maha Vir Chakra (Maj. P.S. Ganapathy) and two Vir Chakras (Cap. Sunil Chander and Havildar Pandurang Kakpale).

Gallant deeds. *Ganapathy, Manjit Singh and Chatterjee (all Maha Vir Chakras)*

Honour in death. *Prem Bahadur, Singh Bawa and Nar Bahadur*

While winning the four Maha Vir Chakras and six Vir Chakras the 4/5 Gorkhas have lost 70 men in Sri Lanka. Their performance during 1965 and 1971 full-scale wars was only a shade less gallant. While capturing the strategic Topa post in Jammu's Rajouri sector in 1965, the 4/5 Gorkhas had suffered only 30 casualties. In 1971, deployed in Sylhet, their casualties were 28, but they collected two Maha Vir Chakras and two Vir Chakras besides other battle honours.

> That the armed forces have to go about choosing their words carefully, while honouring their men, is symptomatic of the political quagmire the government has created for itself.

In the undeclared war in Siachen and Sri Lanka, two Param Vir Chakras were awarded—about the same number as in 1965. In the 1971 war which led to the creation of Bangladesh, four Param Vir Chakras, 76 Maha Vir Chakras and 493 Vir Chakras were awarded. In the 1965 war 18 Maha Vir Chakras and 58 Vir Chakras were awarded.

In the citation of the current series of awards, the enemy is not identified but referred to as 'militants' in Sri Lanka and 'adversary' in Siachen. That the armed forces have to go about choosing their words carefully, even while giving their men the well-deserved honours, is symptomatic of the political quagmire the government has created for itself.

FEB. 7—13, 1988 —G.K. SINGH

INDIA TODAY

REPORT

Attacking the Accord

Anti-IPKF sentiment scales a new high

THERE could have been no greater irony than Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene's presence as chief guest at India's Republic Day parade last fortnight. With internal opposition to the Indo-Sri Lankan accord snowballing alarmingly in recent weeks, New Delhi now has the added worry of the political survival of the ageing leader.

The contretemps plaguing the accord has regenerated the anti-accord lobby in Sri Lanka. Now, as Jayewardene enters the final year of his presidency, the pastiche of forces ranged against him is pushing him to the penumbra of isolation. As the venerable pro-accord, leftist leader of Sri Lanka, Dr Colvin de Silva remarked: "Jayewardene now stands more isolated than he ever was since he came to power 10 years ago."

A manifestation of this alienation was the resignation of the high-profile finance minister, Ronnie de Mel, from the Cabinet on January 18. De Mel was both a loyal lieutenant of Jayewardene and an ardent supporter of the accord. Yet, he deliberately invited presidential penal action with his outcry in Parliament: "We must hold elections before the people get up and say, 'in God's name, go'." Leader of the Opposition Anura Bandaranaike said: "Ronnie is the most intelligent weathercock in the politics of Sri Lanka. He knows which way the wind is blowing." Significantly, in 1976, de Mel quit the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) to join Jayewardene's United National Party (UNP). The elections that followed immediately after saw the routing of the SLFP.

Said de Mel after his resignation: "The faltering of the accord since September brought about a loss of face for those of us who supported the accord and provided grist to those who were opposed to it." Indeed, in the last few months, despite Jayewardene's absolute control over the party, cabinet ministers have become increasingly strident in their criticism. On December 31, in a public speech riddled with anti-Jayewardene innuendo, Prime Minister R. Premadasa asked: "Why should the neighbour be brought to scold our quarrelling children?" And, in Parliament, National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali declared: "The people want the IPKF (the Indian Peace Keeping Force) to go."

The swelling numbers of the IPKF and its prolonged stay have created a grave psychosis in Sri Lanka. Nobody buys the line that India came to protect the Tamils. Said the ebullient Athulathmudali: "Let's face it. The experience all over the world is that external forces come to a country to pursue their own ends." This view was endorsed by the Tamils and Sinhalese alike. Cocktail and diplomatic circles in Colombo are abuzz with rumours of the IPKF's intended five-year stay—fuelled by reports that the IPKF has been leasing houses in Jaffna for five years.

Ironically, the presence of the IPKF has brought a new unity in Sri Lankan society, cutting through political, ethnic, social, and economic barriers. Said Premadasa: "From Jaffna to Sangamanthuduwa, people want the IPKF to leave."

But despite the sudden change in the scenario, there is no immediate danger of the Jayewardene Government collapsing. Gamini Jayasuriya, who resigned from the Cabinet on the issue of the accord observed: "Ninety-five per cent of the MPs are unhappy. But they will stay with Jayewardene because they shrink out of power."

There is also no denying Jayewardene's alarming alienation from the public. The general feeling is one of betrayal and the President is blamed for the feeling of insecurity that exists. The accord now serves as a catalyst for the people's desire for change—they want elections. Sensing this mood, many ministers have chosen to go with the public. In fact, resentment over the accord, corruption, and the overdue elections have triggered off a realignment of forces in Sri Lankan politics. The most visible manifestation of this is the attempt by such diverse elements as the SLFP, Ronnie de Mel, and Premadasa to win over the outlawed Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) that has created a wave of terror in the south. So strong is public opinion against the President, that a senior minister admitted: "If elections are held now, the UNP would undoubtedly be defeated."

Jayewardene's only chance of sur-

PRASHANT PANJIAR

The *leitmotiv* of Jayewardene's visit was to assuage Sinhala fears by negotiating for the IPKF's withdrawal and for a treaty to ensure reciprocal relations between the two nations.

vival is to make the accord work. Like Rajiv Gandhi, he has a personal stake in the accord: it is the only way he can hope to salvage his credibility and defuse public hostility. Rajiv and Jayewardene need each other's cooperation more than ever before. The *leitmotiv* of Jayewardene's six-day sojourn in New Delhi last week was to assuage Sinhala fears on two scores: one, to evolve a time frame for the early return of the IPKF—an obsession with all Sri Lankans; the second issue was to arrive closer to a treaty so that Sri Lankans feel there is reciprocity in the relations between the two countries.

The President has come in for sharp criticism due to the public perception that while he is committed to Sri Lankan ports not being used for anti-Indian activity, he has not succeeded in getting India to reciprocate. This is seen as an unpardonable presidential lapse in view of the fact that Tamil Nadu has in the past been used as a training ground and supply base for the Tamil militants.

But even the signing of a treaty will not obfuscate the fact that the accord is in trouble. The peace process was to have been crowned with elections to the provincial councils, slated to be held before December 1987. The ground reality is that the IPKF is yet to disarm the Tigers who have regrouped themselves effectively in the east, particularly in Batticaloa. While the stranglehold of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Jaffna has been broken, the IPKF has a long way to go to declaw the Tigers in the northern and eastern provinces.

The east in fact, now increasingly holds the key to the future of the accord—and Sri Lanka. Says Dew Gunasekhara, a communist MP: "The real hot-spot is the eastern province and not Jaffna." Adds Athulathmudali: "My fear is that the accord will leave the east in a shambles."

Unlike the north which is Tamil-dominated, the east is far more complex—in terms of area, terrain and demographic composition—it is inhabited by Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese. Admits Dr Nissanka Wijeyeratna, minister for justice: "It will take a long time to complete the work of peace and restore normalcy in the east." Already there are Tamil, Sinhalese and, in the post-accord phase, Muslim refugees in the east.

The Tamils consider the east as part of their homeland. However, due to Sinhala colonisation by successive governments, it is likely that the proposed referendum in the east will go against a merger as the Sinhalese view it as the first step to Eelam. On the eve of signing the accord, the Tamils' fears about a referendum were allayed by Indian officials who referred to another clause in the accord wherein the referendum could be postponed at the discretion of the President. The behind-the-scene assurance was that India could persuade Jayewardene to postpone the referendum indefinitely.

Such assurances may seem ingenious but they rarely work. Jayewardene, whose political acumen and cunning are legendary, is unlikely to remain content as a pawn in India's hands. He would like to hold the referendum and wrap up the ethnic problem before he leaves the political stage.

As far as long-term peace is concerned, it is a no-win situation, even if a referendum is held. If it goes against a merger, the LTTE will continue its armed struggle to regain "lost territory". If it is for a merger, the Muslims and Sinhalese will agitate, as most of them do not want to be ruled by the Jaffna Tamils. Already a Sinhala riot group is active in Trincomalee. And the Muslims of the east—who form 30 per cent of the Muslim population in the entire country—have formed a congress that projects an eastern outlook. According to a senior minister in the Cabinet: "This new Muslim organisation is establishing contacts with Libya and Iran for support." As Anura Bandaranaike said: "You bring the north and east together with the accord. Then you separate them with a referendum. This is going to bring about total chaos."

The resignation of high-profile finance minister Ronnie de Mel, an ardent supporter of the accord, has exposed Jayewardene's growing isolation from his cabinet and the public.

Since mid-January, civil administration in the northern and eastern provinces has come to a standstill. Public servants have been killed (M.M. Maqbul, the government agent of Mannar, was shot dead on January 22 while he was going to Talaimannar to make arrangements for the resettlement of refugees arriving from Rameshwaram). The LTTE is holding Tamil civilians hostage to terror. The secretariat, courts and administration offices have no attendance. Threats are issued on handbills, posters and often personally.

Meanwhile, Jayewardene has kept his part of the agreement by passing the Provincial Councils' Election Bill in Parliament. As a South Block official admitted: "At the risk of his life, Jayewardene stuck to his end of the bargain. It is India that has failed to deliver."

Surreptitious moves for direct talks between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE are now being made. Said G.G. Ponnambalam, leader of the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress who tried to arrange a meeting between the LTTE and Gamini

Dissanayake in Madras on January 12: "Avenues through India have dried up, so fresh avenues have to be opened." Indian officials confirm that the Sri Lankan Government was trying to initiate talks with the LTTE through Dissanayake as well as through Lalith Athulathmudali. Said Ponnambalam: "Gamini, an LTTE leader and I met on January 5 at the Mahaweli office in Colombo and we decided to meet a week later at Madras. Gamini in fact, secured presidential assent for this meeting. But the Indian High Commission here sabotaged it." Predictably, India feels that direct talks would be detrimental to its interests. Athulathmudali is open about his involvement in direct talks. He asked: "Why can't I talk to my citizens?" Another ruling party MP added: "They shouldn't discourage direct talks because it is the people of this country who should ultimately find the solution to the problem."

(From left) Athulathmudali, Premadasa, Dissanayake: main contenders

The Sri Lankan Government hopes to offer the LTTE control of the Jaffna peninsula with the Sri Lankan Army taking up their July 28 position in the east. There is a section in the Government that feels this offer could be buttressed by greater devolution, but without a merger. The east would have its province which would in turn, devolve greater powers to three separate Pradeshiya Sabhas for the Tamils, Muslims, and Sinhalese.

The structural flaw of this line of thinking is that even if the LTTE agrees to this proposal for tactical reasons, it will still continue its armed struggle in the east. Sri Lankan authorities are fully aware of this but are confident of tackling and bringing under control the situation. For, in such a scenario, India having burnt her fingers badly, would not support the Tamil Tigers.

If the accord fails to yield results, the move for direct talks will gather momentum. The immediate task before New Delhi is to restore normalcy so that provincial elections can be held. While the IPKF has broken the LTTE's stranglehold in Jaffna, the Tigers continue to have the men, muscle and firepower to disrupt life in the northern and eastern provinces.

To crush the LTTE in the east, India is now going to opt for a saturation exercise. There are currently 37,000 Indian troops on Sri Lankan soil. They intend to raise it to 60,000 so that by April, LTTE resistance in the northern and eastern provinces can be neutralised. The thinking now is that elections to the provincial councils can be held in May which would necessarily have to be policed by the IPKF. A phased withdrawal of the IPKF could begin the following month so that finally, only a token presence is left. Jayewardene wants the withdrawal of the IPKF before the parliamentary elections. For, as Sweerasinghe Mallimarachchi, a ruling party MP pointed out: "The IPKF presence is a political embarrassment for the UNP."

Bandaranaike: fresh challenge

With parliamentary and presidential elections slated to be held later this year, the stirrings of a succession struggle can already be seen in the UNP. Premadasa, who is number two in the party, would seem to be the natural choice. But the inscrutable Jayewardene, who still wields absolute control over the party, is keeping the principal contenders—Premadasa, Athulathmudali and Dissanayake—on tenterhooks. Rumours are already circulating that he might eventually pave the way for his son Ravi, or brother, Hector to succeed him.

Meanwhile, the SLFP has already declared Sirimavo Bandaranaike as its presidential candidate. "As far as the accord is concerned, India should not depend too much on Jayewardene. He is old and he is unpopular," says Anura Bandaranaike. So confident are SLFP members of coming to power on an anti-government wave, that they no longer talk in terms of "if" but of "when" they come to power.

The key question, however, is what happens to the accord in the context of a change of guard, particularly in view of the anti-accord stand of the SLFP and Jayewardene's own possible successors? As an Indian official put it: "If the SLFP comes to power, we'll do business with them. Jayewardene is a natural ally because he is the signatory, but the events of the last four years cannot cloud the fact that India has traditionally had close ties with the SLFP." In characteristic opposition bravura, Anura Bandaranaike declared publicly: "If we come to power, we will send the IPKF packing in 24 hours." He later admitted that total withdrawal of the IPKF may not be possible but that the SLFP would definitely strive to reduce its number.

Despite public posturings, even seemingly virulent anti-Indian Sinhala politicians concede: "Friendship with India has to be the cornerstone of Sri Lanka's foreign policy." India is recognised, though grudgingly, as the regional superpower. A hostile India can easily foment trouble in the north and east through the Tamil guerrillas. An anti-Indian Sri Lankan Government could be inextricably trapped between the anvil of Tamil insurgency in the north and the hammer of JVP terrorism in the south. No government can hope to survive the resulting turbulence and anarchy. As an Indian official put it: "If the Government doesn't honour the package and insists on the premature withdrawal of the IPKF, Sri Lanka will be divided. Only this accord can keep the country together." That conclusion is, right now, the only hope the accord has of success.

—ANITA PRATAP in Colombo
FEBRUARY 15, 1988

OPINION

An old soldier on Sri Lanka

Jaswant Singh

OUR home is some distance removed from the village, a collection of huts, seemingly grown out of the soil, and that too because the seed of need would not be defeated by the chimerical hope of waiting for a better year. In our parts, such habitations are not unusual, people move off and relocate themselves, for convenience, directly on the land that they till. It is a practical way of coping with the distances involved. The desert is so spatial. We have neither electricity nor

DISTRICT DIARY

running water, both of which absences I find blissfully restful, to the great chagrin of my folk, who consider such an attitude as their principal obstacle in the path of 'progress' — whenever they learn that I have arrived, from wherever, they drop in, as fancy pleases them, from dawn till sunset, to exchange greetings, to get news of the 'outside', to share difficulties, to complain, occasionally to request for intervention against the gelatinous insensitivity of our state.

Risaldar Major (hony capt) Khangar Singh, I.O.M. Vr. C. — to give an old friend of this column his full due — came one such morning to visit me. The distance from the village being almost four miles, most elderly gents ride out but this doughty had chosen to walk. He is now in his eighties, had campaigned his famous 'Risala' all through the North African campaign, with four Indian division, then into Italy and the grim battle for Monte Casino, won his first award for gallantary there. Again in 1948 in J and K, and then in 1965 in the Punjab. The village has none other to match his service record, but many more have also proudly served the colours. This, in any case, is one of the principal recruiting grounds, of sturdy, self-reliant yeomanry, Khangar Singh, erect of body and undaunted in spirit, it became fairly apparent to me, was troubled in mind that morning. Courtesy, in our rural society, demands that one does not abruptly blurt out what is uppermost on one's mind, you arrive upon it gradually, at the convenience of the host. This is not evasion, nor lack of forthrightness. On the contrary, it is reticence born only out of consideration.

To put him at his ease, I took him into the sunnier part of the open courtyard, where spreading an old goat hair durrie, I offered him tea and opium. He had only lately taken to opium. "It steadies me up and gives me a good sleep," he said. He admired the intricate weave of the durrie, then ritually rued the loss of craftsmen to towns and to government jobs ("because they do not have to work in them") and fell into the ruminant silence of the troubled.

"What' news of Dalpat," I asked tentatively, his only son, educated after considerable sacrifice on the old man's part, is now a commissioned officer in his old regiment, on whom both parents dote. "Very well," he informed me proudly, immediately brightening up," doing his duty to his regiment and to the 'mulk'. The 'Risaldarni.' As mothers would, frets about him now and then, but I tell her off. He is doing only that which every soldier must thrill upon being asked to: to fight the country's enemies."

Here he fell silent, sipped his tea and let the opiate spread soothingly through his veins. Then, hesitantly: "but tell me, saheb, who actually is our enemy in Sri Lanka?" I was not entirely unprepared, so went through the usual, elaborate spiel on the complexity of the situation, and how vital it was that Sri Lanka remained a united country, which they could not, not without our assistance. Also that if we had not, the Prime Minister says Pakistan would have sent their forces there. Khangar Singh listened with extreme care to what I was saying, but even as I went through my piece, I realised that I had lost him somewhere. So I stopped. He immediately countered. "If Lanka cannot remain united but for the assistance of our *'fauj'* then they cannot be kept united by us.

Deeply troubled

A life time of soldiering makes it impossible for him to make lengthy statements, or to argue. But obviously, he was troubled deeply, for he continued: "You know, saheb, I am either a soldier or nothing. Now I cannot be anything but an old 'fauji'. I have always trusted and obeyed the word of my superior officer and of my 'sarkar'. Now I am troubled, because no one settles my doubts. You too, you lecture me, but do not answer a simple question — who is our enemy in Sri Lanka? Who is that 'Ravana'? Do you know why that is so important? Because at night, quite, often, I wonder what today's young commanding officers are telling their men when asking them to go into battle?"

I did my best: all about how after initially going in support of the Tamils, we were forced to take up arms against them, how we were now clearing guerilla elements etc. "This is criminal of our sarkar," said the old man. "Why did they at first give arms and training to this gang and create a potential enemy?" I remained silent, for there was really nothing that I could say. Khangar Singh realised he had scored a point, so he pressed home his advantage, but gently. "You know much more about such things than I do, but even then I can say that all this talk about Pakistani troops to Lanka is not a military man talking. They could do so only at the cost of leaving Sind or Punjab empty. Which one would they chose — and for Lanka? Then to supply Lanka from Karachi. How? No, I am not convinced. I might be just an old JCO, but I have fought three wars and I do know something about military matters."

No way out

I emphasised that at times great countries, in exercise of the responsibility of their greatness, have to undertake tasks which draw deeply upon their resources of nationhood. He assented immediately but added a practical and wise caveat. "Greatness does not come by demanding, by boasting, it is conferred by others. And great countries never leave themselves without a clear withdrawal route, any tank commander will tell you that." After a pause, "Dalpat writes and says that our *fauj* under command of the Lanka 'sarkar.' Is that so?" Yet again, I attempted to explain the complexities, but his soldier's mind would not grasp them, for he was used to seeing things in stark colours, not in the confused hues of diplomatic compromise. "Well, that may be so, but I am sure, our chief saheb could not be entirely happy."

The finality of the statement had really no counter, so again, I kept quiet. "Going to battle, saheb, is my earliest memory. Always, in every operation, we were made much of, feted, and our troop trains acclaimed wherever we went: sharbat, khana — everything. Even Shankar Seth, with whom you know my relations, garlanded me. Our *fauj* has been in Sri Lanka now for four months, no one in the village praises them. But what disturbs me more is that none understands what we are doing there either. Already between us and Shergarh district, there are eleven killed. That is as it will be, they have obtained *vergatti*, but why are there no *Jalsas, Fauji-darbars* and public acclamation of *Jangi inams?* I know from personal experience that you cannot fight in a foreign country unless at least some from amongst those *log* stand by you. It alarms me that our *fauj* today has got no friends in Lanka."

Nothing worse

I had to, in all honesty, again accept what Khangar Singh said whereupon somewhat emboldened, he said. "I remain troubled: tell me, truthfully, are today's *faujis* actually asking questions about the operations?"

I tried to explain to him that the army to which he had belonged was of the past. It no longer existed, and for soldiers to raise valid queries is not, after all, such a bad thing. He had got his answer in my evasion itself, so he responded with some finality: "You 'netas' have failed our 'mulk' very badly, yet again. You have not just let the *fauj* down, you have done much worse — but I cannot sully my mouth with those words. Tell them in your *Dilli*, that being rendered a casualty or dying is of no great consequence to a soldier, it is his 'moksha'. But if you are unhappy, then you do not die willingly. And for a soldier to die unwillingly, is a fate worse than being thrown in *narka.*"

Indian Express 2.2.88

LANKA GUARDIAN

DELHI TALKS

COMMENT

FROM REVIEW TO RE-NEGOTIATION

Mervyn de Silva

July 29 — January 29. Exactly 6 months. Time to review the Gandhi-Jayawardene Peace Accord. How has it worked! How is it working or not working? What are the snags? Who or what is responsible? How best can these impediments be removed to mutual advantage and to improve and speed-up implementation, with the pact running far behind the scheduled December 31 provincial polls date.

Such questions and the ceremony of review and re-appraisal are a natural part of a bilateral inter-state exercise. Mr. Gandhi took the Indian Republic Day as the most obvious occasion on which to conduct that operation, with January 26 offering the additional advantage of honouring his co-signatory, (and fellow Nobel Prize nominee) by making him Chief Guest at the lavish spectacular ceremonies. President JR's hurried 2 day stay in Delhi on the way back from the SAARC summit allowed the two leaders time only to raise questions, not to examine them carefully or find answers. So formal occasion, ceremonial honours and mutual political-diplomatic need meshed perfectly.

Transcending all these natural interests and consideration was each leader's need to cosolidate whatever he had gained from the Accord, and if possible, recover whatever he had lost, or as much of it as possible. In the gain-loss equation, the 'loss factor' was plainly the bigger component in the Sri Lankan part of the July 29 transaction. Not only because Sri Lanka is fundementally the weaker, contracting party but the actual circumstances — the post-Vadamarachi-Air-drop situation — increased this weakness. Thus, the actual terms of the transaction reflected this gross disparity in bargaining power. Indeed if the essentially domestic part of the deal (the devolution deal or the settlement of the ethnic issue) deserves that delightful American expression, a 'shot-gun' wedding, the state-to-state (or foreign policy) part of the transaction was, in Colombo's eyes, pure gun-at-your-head highway-man stuff. So from the Sri Lankan viewpoint, the Delhi talks were more than a review and critical re-assessment of what had happened since July 1987. There was an attempt at re-negotiation.

Logically the approach by both sides was based on what had already happened. For both, the situation on the ground was the starting point. However, there was a changed or changing perception of the entire situation, not just the situation in the north-and-east, the IPKF's area of operation and its exclusive responsibility, but of the South, the JVP challenge, the significance of Ronnie de Mel's resignation and growing divisions in the UNP (**See "Three Frontrunners" from a report in the F. E. E. R. by its Colombo correspondent Manik de Silva, who is editor of Sri Lanka's leading daily, the state-owned 'Daily News'**). But more important than these developments is the general demand for Presidential and parliamentary polls, the rising anti-UNP opinion, and the re-appearance of Mrs. Bandaranaike as a key player in the unfolding Sri Lankan drama.

Symptomatic of this major change in Delhi opinion is chorus of increasingly critical voices in the influential Indian press, many of them authoritative editorial voices, and some generally pro-government. This would certainly be true of the *TIMES OF INDIA*. Secondly, these voices sound like alarm bells. And idealogically, they range from the conservative *STATESMEN* to the leftwing *MAINSTREAM*, edited by the most highly regarded editor in the country, Nikhil Chakravarthy.

Noting the "fragility of the Government in Colombo" as the most disturbing aspect "of the Batticola jail break, the *TIMES OF INDIA* wondered whether "coherent government" is "on the verge of breaking down".

"The Sri Lanka government is already under attack from within, the internal divisions are widening, and the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party is calling for the absorption of members of the outlawed Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) in the political mainstream, in contrast to President Jayewardene who wants to crush that organisation out of existence. Is coherent, government then, on the verge of breaking down in Sri Lanka? It may seem alarmist even to ask the question, but the way things are going on the island gives cause for the outmost concern in India In particular, what is the IPKF's role to be? Will it end up propping up a shaky government under siege from its domestic critics, including many within its own ranks? It is vital that New Delhi reassesses its political strategy in view of the troubles assailing the Jayewardene government."

In other words, the Indian press has awakened not merely to the vital political significance of the 'Southern dimension' but to the central issue of democracy, and the integral connection between coflicts in Sri Lanka and its post-1982 'closed system'. In that sense, it has become suddenly aware of a major flaw in its analysis and understanding of the Sri Lankan conflict. Though the awakening is belated, it is more than pardonable. Our own analysts', preoccupied with the strictly ethnic issue and devolution as the answer to the problem — a preoccupation that may have been a mere byproduct of intellectual conditioning rather than the self-serving imposition which critics of the 'ethnic studies' approach allege — have been guilty of the same error.

Thus, the importance the Indian press attached to Mr. Ronnie de Mel. An editorial in the *Statesman* notes:

"Even a cursory glance at Mr. de Mel's record as Finance Minister that far from being a hardliner who believes in a scorched earth military offensive against the recalcitrant Tamil militants, he was in the front line arguing for a negotiated

settlement on the grounds that Sri Lanka could not afford a civil war. In fact, when the Indo-Sri Lankan accord was signed on July 29, Mr. de Mel and Mr. Gamini Dissanayake were the only Ministers whom President Jayewardene took into his confidence. That even someone who risked the wrath of the Sinhalese hardliners by urging moderation when Colombo clearly thought it unfashionable to do so has now said farewell to the Government is a pointer to the growing perceptions of disaster and to President Jayewardene's complete isolation".

It is not as the region's paramount power but as the world's largest democracy that India faces a painful predicament. It is a peculiarly American one. Does one dump a trusted partner if, by lossing his legitimacy, he can become a liability? Or does one tighten the protective embrace, running the attendant risk of mutual damage. Is discreet distancing the shrewder option? If so, when and how? The questions can be troublesome when the major partner's professed ideal, democracy, and his perceived self-interest coincide to recommend a course hostile to the dependent ally.

The *STATESMAN*, founded in 1818, is an old-fashioned and somewhat staid defender of democratic institutions. It is this perspective it brings to bear on the totality of the Sri Lankan situation, a totality which had eluded the Indian, and more conspicuously, the Tamilnadu press, — the *Hindu*, being the most glaring example. While such partial viewpoints and analytical approaches were quite natural and understandable in the case of the *Hindu*, required reading for the English-educated Sri Lankan, this could hardly be said for the Sri Lankan specialist observers of Indian politics and India's Sri Lanka policy.

Both persist in another error — identifying the 'Southern dimension' wholly with the J. V. P. In equating the two, ideological prejudice, sometimes pathological tends once more to distort judgments. The *Statesman*, resding the de Mel resignation in objective terms, locates and corrects that basic error:

"It does not really need the outlawed JVP to remind the Sinhalese people that the Parliament which is legislating to establish the provincial councils and the enforced merger of the two "Tamil" provinces received its mandate as long ago as in 1977; Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike is repeatedly telling them so, and she is hardly to be dismissed as "anti-Indian".

It is against this background that India's readiness to sign the draft Defence Treaty — and marked lack of enthusiasm to do so — should be seen. It does not want a 'Treaty' to supercede the Accord. Sri Lankan politicians and pundits say that the 'annexure' has no standing under international law. 'A scrap of paper' said one. Indian legal experts disagree. However Mr. Gandhi was not prepared to retreat an inch on the substance of the annexure.

Sri Lanka, having signed it, while Colombo was a beseiged city ringed by marching mobs and by fires, with Indian Commandos in frigates alongside Galle Face green, wants to introduce 'reciprocity or 'mutuality'. In doing so, it can dilute its negative impact on Sinhalese opinion. The F. E. E. R. Colombo correspondent writes:

"Colombo was anxious to sign with New Delhi a treaty of friendship and cooperation modelled on the Indo-Soviet treaty which would include reciprocal obligations. The intention, from Jayewardene's point of view was to get rid of what many Sri Lankans perceive to be inequities in the July accord, Although the Indian External Affairs Ministry has been cool on the idea of a treaty, Gandhi himself has said that he had no reservations about signing such an agreement with Sri Lanka.

At the conclusion of the visit Jayewardene told reporters that the draft submitted by Colombo will be discussed at length during the coming months and the next round of treaty talks would be held before the elections for the Sri Lankan provincial councils. Having the treaty signed before parliamectary elections, which most observers believe would precede the presidential election, would be a useful campaign plank for Jayewardene."

What the correspomdent calls "inequities" was more accurately described by highly placed and knowledgeable Sri Lankan as "structural flaws" or "imbalances" in the annexure. It was its one-sidedness that made the "annexure" appear such an obvious imposition, and an abridgment if not surrender of sovereignty — that anyway was the Opposition line, and the SLFP, with foreign policy as its propagandist ace at the next polls would have played that card to a maximum effect, President JR's move was intended to pre-empt SLFP attack on that front, and gain positive advantage by telling the Sinhala electorate that India has signed a treaty which closes the door finally to Tamilnadu military support for Sri Lankan Tamil rebels.

Again on the purely domestic issue — the situation on the ground — he has pushed India this time more effectively, to pledge peaceful conditions in north-and-east and a meaningful provincial polls. Such a situation would leave President JR with the following advantages vis-a-vis his own national constituency which he must sooner or later face. (a) the "Tigers" have been tamed, with manageable "residual. terrorism" as the only problem left (b) the IPKF can leave or at least follow the polls with a thinning out of forces. A reduction in force-levels, a less "high profile" Indian military presence, now a major irritant will certainly allow him to tell the Sinhalese electorate — I have got the Indians to tame or pull out the LTTE's claws, and restored a semblance of democracy in the north-and-east. When the referendum is held let the East decide.

By getting the IPKF to re-locate its camps in Ampara and the Sri Lankan forces to take tactical control of "designated areas in Trinco district — while the IPKF retains strategic control — he can ease Sinhala-cum-Muslim passions, give the S.L. army a marginal role with a promise of a greater, role later, and allow the return of Sinhala

New Saturday Review

and Muslim refugees in a climate of "security".

While President JR is concentrating on winning back lost ground externally (the "annexure", the foreign policy concessions) and the ground that he has lost to the SLFP-led anti-government forces. Mr Gandhi is suddenly confronted with uncertainly in the key area of his national constituency, (Tamiluadu) and criticism in another less clearly demarcated area of the same constituency — the Indian press, crucial element in the broad consensual support he had initially received for his Accord and his military involvement.

Nikhil Chakavarthy observed:

"The move to have a treaty with President Jayewardene should await such a review of the entire policy towards Sri Lakna. The Prime Minister would be wise to take the nation into confidence instead of putting his trust in President Jayewardene . . . Is the Rajvi Gandhi government prepared to go in for such commitment since this is also possible under the July 29 accord? Have we worked out the implications of such a situation in which India might annoy other political forces in Sri Lanka, while trying to pull President JRJ's chestnuts out of the fire ? "

The *Statesman* editorial concluded: "Unless of course, the Prime Minister is deluded enough to believe that the IPKF should again bail out the beleaguered Sri Lanka President, this time by going to the assistance of his troops fighting the JVP."

Extremely interesting in this connection is remark of an Indian official quoted by Anita Pratap in *India Today*. The correspondent writes "The key question, however, is what happens to the accord in the context of a change of guard, particularly in view of the anti-accord stand of the SLFP and Jayewardene's own possible successors? As an Indian official put it: "If the SLFP comes to power, we'll do business with them. Jayewardene is a natural ally because he is the signatory, but the events of the last four years cannot cloud the fact that India has traditionally had close ties with the SLFP. "In characteristic opposition bravura, Anura Bandaranaike declared publicly: "If we come to power, we will send the IPKF packing in 24 hours. "He later admitted that total withdrawal of the IPKF may not be possible but that the SLFP would definitely strive to reduce its number."

The assumption that "Accord", hailed by Washington and Moscow, conferred India a "regional superpower" status has tempted Indian analysts into tenuous Vietnam and Afghanistan parallels. To the extent that Delhi misread the nature ond complexity of the challenge and overestimated military power, the analogy holds. "Quagmire" and "Imbroglio" too can pass. But no further.

The "Tigers" (LTTE) are neither the Vietcong nor the Mujahdeen. Once military links with Tamilnadu, the southern Indian state, were cut, the LTTE has no steady supply source or rear-base.

What are India's choices? An Aquino aption is out, on the face of it. The Opposition leader, Mrs. Bandaranaike's son threatens to order Indian troops out in "24 hours" if his party assumes office. It is as if Mrs. Aquino had threatened to do the same with the U. S. bases. A more realistic Mrs. Bandaranaike now spoke of "re-negotiating" the Accord. A dutiful son has amended 'withdraw' to 'phased withdrawal'.

The region's superpower and the world's biggest democracy is learning its first chastening lesson on the limits of power. It may not have its Vietnam. Perhaps a Sri Lanka syndrome.

This peculiarly American dilemma is sure to have been of absorbing interest to the many distinguished American visitors to Colombo recently, including former Ambassadors, well known scholar Howard Wriggins and Mr. Robert Peck, of the state department and Mr. Peter Galbraith, senior adviser to the all important Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 15.2.88.

A North-East Diary **COMMENT**

'IPKF Welcomes You to Jaffna'

The IPKF is distributing a questionnaire in the North to find out what the people think about the IPKF and its activities.

Among the questions, all requiring 'yes' or 'no' answers, are: "Do you want the IPKF to quit?" and "Do you think the IPKF has behaved well or badly?"

Meanwhile the IPKF has put up billboards in Jaffna Town which proclaim: 'The IPKF Welcomes You to Jaffna'.

Well, well. Reminds one of that story about the Arab, his camel and his tent!

India's High Commissioner J.N. Dixit told local newspapermen that the Indian Peace Keeping Force, during its recent military operation in Batticaloa, had kept in mind the lessons it had learnt in Jaffna during Operation Pawan in October '87.

What a pity Mr. Dixit wasn't a little more forthcoming and told us what lessons the Jawans (and he himself?) learnt in the North.

The IPKF High Command had in the latter part of October '87 summoned a meeting of refugees at a camp in a Jaffna suburb.

A young man, University educated, had come forward and related how his house had been looted. The next day an IPKF jeep arrived at the camp. The previous day's complainant was blindfolded and taken away. His wife, who watched helplessly, feared she would never see her husband again. But after a few days the young man was brought back to the camp – but minus his wedding ring, wrist watch and some cash. As a bonus, he told his wife, he'd been given a few blows. He also reported that he had not been given any food and had seen at least 20 people, some of them in their 50's or 60's, being given the 'works' by the Jawans.

The young couple are seriously thinking of migrating.

A top medico in the North who is a keen music lover received a rude shock recently. He had just returned to his home after nearly a month at a refugee camp.

The morning after his return, he found IPKF personnel surrounding his house, and he was asked to put his hands up. When he tried to introduce himself, the rifles got shoved even closer to his chest, so he decided it was wiser to shut up.

The raiding party went upstairs and returned with an Identity Card. Once the medico's identity was established, the embarassed Captain explained that they had received information that the house was a 'Tiger' base and they were ordered to blast it.

The Jawans left after a one-and-a-half-hour search, taking with them the medico's precious pre-recorded music cassettes which he had bought while abroad. Also missing were sundry other things, but what he's really sad about is the theft of his music tapes.

Leading the fast are the DMK president, Mr. M. Karunanidhi (centre) and to his right, Mr. Anbhazhagan and Mr. Arcot Veeraswami and to the left of Mr. Karunanidhi are Mr. K. Manoharan and Mr. Arangannal, (below) a section of the participants at the fast.

Fast by DMK on Lanka Tamils' issue

MADRAS, Feb. 20.

The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam today organised a day-long fast all over Tamil Nadu to protest against what it called the Government of India's "military action" in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka.

The fast was also undertaken to condemn the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's "callous attitude" towards the issue and to deplore the Union Government's failure to heed the repeated pleas of the DMK to stop the military action in Sri Lanka and create an atmosphere conducive for talks

In Madras, the DMK president, Mr. M. Karunanidhi, led the fast at Marina.

Madurai: Hundreds of DMK members observed the fast near Thevar statue at Goripalayam here today.

Mr. Kaveri Maniam, Madurai urban district DMK secretary, and Mr. Pon. Muthuramalingam were among others who participated in the fast.

Reports have come in of similar fasts at Sivakasi, Tiruthangal, Sattur, in Kamarajar dis-

Thanjavur: Over 1,000 DMK volunteers headed by Mr. Sultan Mohideen, vice-chairman Thanjavur municipality, observed a fast in front of the municipal bus stand. The fast took place in 40 other centres in the district.

Erode: The DMK members observed the fast here and 38 other places in the Periyar district. At Erode Mr. S. Arangaraja, town DMK secretary, participated in the fast before the head post office. Mr. A. Ganesamurthi, district secretary, Mr. N. K. K. Periasamy, Mrs. Subbulakshmi Jagadeesan, former Minister, took part in the fast in different places in the district.

Cuddalore: Over 3,000 members of the DMK observed the fast at about 40 centres in South Arcot. At Cuddalore Mr. V. Krishnamoorthy, ex-MLA, led the fast. In Neyveli Mr. S. Kuppusamy, State secretary of the DMK-led trade union presided. At Vridhachalam, Villupuram, Panruti, Tindivanam and Chidambaram the fast was observed.

VELLORE: Thousands of DMK members observed a token fast in 62 centres in North Arcot District. In Vellore, about 200 members including Mr. V. M. Devaraj, Chairman of the Vellore Municipality, observed the fast.

TIRUCHI: Over 8,000 members of the DMK in 52 centres all over Tiruchi district participated in the fast. In Tiruchi town Mr. Anbil Dharmalingam led the fast

The DMK president, Mr. M. Karunanidhi, today said his party would fight to the last for the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils and charged the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, with standing on his "ego" despite the LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabhakaran's announcement that he was prepared for talks with the Government of India.

At the end of his party's fast on the Marina, he said the fast was not to demonstrate the strength of the DMK but to show the feelings and anguish of the people of the Tamil Nadu to Mr. Rajiv Gandhi on what was happening in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka.

From October 10, 1987, the Indian Army, which was sent to Sri Lanka to guard peace, was "annihilating" the Tamils and the Indian Peace-Keeping Force was doing it at the behest of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, who received "instructions" from the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, the DMK President alleged.

The DMK was prepared to fight for the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils till the last, he said.

He alleged that more than "a thousand" Indian soldiers had been killed in Sri Lanka and that Mr. Gandhi was responsible for this. Mr. Karunanidhi said his "open allegation" was that the death of Indian soldiers was "an unnecessary event," and that this was "anti-national".

An agreement to resolve the Tamils' issue should have been signed between the Tamils and the Sri Lankan Government and not between the Government of India and Sri Lanka.

The "handmaids" of the Government of India viz. All-India Radio and Doordarshan were being used for propaganda that the IPKF was keeping peace in the Tamil areas in Sri Lanka, he said.

INDIAN EXPRESS

COMMENT

Defence debate

Lt-Gen. S.K. Sinha, PVSM (Retd)

Wrong war, wrong place

The course of events in Sri Lanka has been topsy turvy. The peace accord has resulted in large-scale death, destruction and despair. We sent our troops to the island to protect the Tamils and have ended up fighting the Tamil Tigers. We now have 70,000 troops in Sri Lanka fighting a bleeding war on which we are spending Rs. four crore a day. The rationale behind our military involvement in Sri Lanka is difficult to understand. Initially we flexed our military muscle by violating Sri Lankan air space and dropped 25 tons of relief stores, half of which must have fallen in the lagoons and the jungles. Thus this mercy mission providing a mere 12 tons of relief stores for 200,000 beleagured people, hardly provided any succour. It greatly hurt Sinhalese national pride. Thereafter, as an image building and vote catching exercise, we rushed into an accord, which was almost a copybook repetition of the ill-fated Punjab accord. Notwithstanding the fact that our jawans have been fighting with exemplary gallantry and devotion, it is difficult for them to retrieve a situation arising out of a basically flawed accord. They have thus got engaged in fighting a wrong war at the wrong place and at the wrong time.

Imaginary threats

While talking to the students at Shantiniketan recently, the Prime Minister justified our military presence in Sri Lanka on the plea that Sri Lanka, otherwise, would have become a base for forces unfriendly to India, and that would have posed a threat to our southern borders. When one compares the justifications concerning Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, one discerns a remarkable similarity. All of them are based on imaginary threats. The so-called threat we faced from Sri Lanka needs to be discussed in detail. Being about 50 times smaller than India in population, size and military strength, Sri Lanka by itself is in no position to pose any threat to us. The superpowers can pose a threat even without any base in Sri Lanka, but in the present international scenario, that threat materialising is a very remote possibility. China is most unlikely to venture on such a long-distance operation which may be beyond its capability. Pakistan will not forget in a hurry the lesson of geography she learnt in 1971. Had Pakistan sent her forces to Sri Lanka, that would have provided us an excellent opportunity to beef up the LTTE and embroil it in a long bleeding war on the island. That would have seriously weakened her on the main front in the north. Almost as an afterthought it is now being argued that if our forces had not gone to Sri Lanka, foreign elements inimical to us would have got a foothold there. This gets ruled out by a statement President Jayewardene made at about the time when the accord was concluded. He declared that he had first tried to get help from the US and when this was not forthcoming, he had asked UK, Pakistan and China. But they too did not respond positively. It was only then that he turned to India for help because India is "the dominant power in the region" and is friendly to Sri Lanka.

The army chief has asked us to see these operations "in the correct overall perspective of India's security compulsions." Indeed we must do so. There is likely to be an accretion in Pakistan's deployable strength against us. With the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan, two to three Pakistani divisions earmarked for the Pak-Afghan border would get released from employment on the Indo-Pak border. Some 10,000 Pakistani troops now in Saudi Arabia are returning home by March 1988. Thus there may be a 70,000 increase in Pakistani strength against us while our strength has got depleted by 70,000 due to the Sri Lankan involvement. The other argument put forward by the army chief, "If you do not help extinguish fire in your neighbour's house, it will spread to yours," is not very convincing. There is a large expanse of water between the neighbour and us. Moreover, one does not go to extinguish a fire in a neighbour's house and then get involved in fighting him.

Vietnam situation

The LTTE chose to present an identifiable target at Jaffna and our forces smashed their resistance in a difficult street fighting operation, compounded by the former using the civilian population, as a human shield. Now we are engaged in fighting an insurgency. The LTTE may establish a link with the Sinhalese extremists, the JVP, and insurgency may spread from the northern and eastern provinces to other parts of Sri Lanka. With opposition mounting to the octogenarian President and to the accord in his own ruling party, besides the opposition parties and the extremists, and he being the mainstay of the accord in Sri Lanka, we have all the makings of a Vietnam situation on our hands. Insurgency is always a long-drawn-out affair, sucking in more and more troops. It lasted more than 30 years in Vietnam. We ourselves have been engaged in tackling it for more than 30 years in Nagaland. The IPKF started initially as a 8,000-strong force last year, and now its strength has risen to 70,000. The situation has built up for our getting embroiled in Sri Lanka for a long time.

The political fall-out from our involvement in Sri Lanka can also be counter productive. Our forces in Sri Lanka despite all the excellent work done by them, are getting isolated. The Prime Minister of Sri Lanka and his minister for internal security have not hesitated to castigate the IPKF in the Sri Lankan Parliament. The opposition parties and the extremists have continued their tirade. Even within our country, there has been growing disenchantment in Tamil Nadu. This may be exploited in the coming state elections. No amount of political gimmickry and devaluation of the nation's highest award, the Bharat Ratna, will prevent this. The door for political negotiations with the LTTE appears to have been closed. The Prime Minister and the Defence Minister have been repeatedly asserting that there can be no talks till they have surrendered all their weapons or we have recovered them all. This is reminiscent of the stand taken by the allies towards the end of the second World War about no talks with Germany, unless it surrendered unconditionally. In the event, the western allies found a political map drawn in Europe after the war in a manner adverse to their interests. Further, after we succeed in totally disarming the LTTE, what is the guarantee that on our withdrawal from Sri Lanka, and possibly in a post-Jayewardene era, the Tamils on the island will be treated fairly particularly when their ability to offer resistance would have been neutralised.

26.2.88

REPORT

Running out of Time

Delhi talks focus on a new treaty

IN his latest book, *Windows on India*, Sri Lankan political scientist Ralph Buultjens, a close friend of the late Indira Gandhi, concludes that "India and Sri Lanka are like a husband and wife who can marry or divorce but can never separate." The allegory could not be more apt. With the initial, stormy ardour of their regional matrimony last July having cooled considerably, the pressure is now on for a re-examination of the nuptial contract.

PRASHANT PANJIAR



(From right) Gandhi, Jayewardene, Athulathmudali and Natwar Singh

Sri Lankan President Junius Jayewardene, during the latest round of official talks between the two countries recently, made it abundantly clear that with the July accord under domestic attack, Colombo wants a long-term friendship treaty with New Delhi to salvage prestige at home and counter the charges of a "sell-out".

The timing is crucial: 1988 is going to be an election year in Sri Lanka. Colombo has announced that the all-important Provincial Council elections will take place in March or April. This will be followed by general elections—the first in 10 years—and presidential elections. Jayewardene, under intense pressure from his nervous ruling United National Party colleagues, is thus running out of time in his attempt to convince the electorate that the accord will ultimately bring peace to the troubled island.

For New Delhi, the treaty twist has posed some delicate diplomatic problems though Colombo's desire for additional dowry has been obvious for some time. South Block's official stand has to be seen as one of total support for Jayewardene. But having burnt its fingers somewhat, the Indian Government wants to take its time before entering into a broader and more binding agreement. "We have no objection in principle to the signing of a treaty," says a senior External Affairs Ministry official. "What we are concerned with is that it does not dilute the provisions of the July accord."

That concern is understandable. It is essentially the fine print in the original accord that has forced Colombo to now go in for a friendship treaty with India. The anti-accord forces in Sri Lanka have been harping on the lack of "reciprocity" in the exchange of letters between Rajiv Gandhi and Jayewardene last July which form the annexure to the accord. The key phrase is in Rajiv's letter which reads: "Trincomalee or other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests...." Domestic Sinhalese opinion feels that New Delhi should make an equivalent commitment in return.

South Block's strategy is to stall the treaty discussions till after the crucial Provincial Council elections—a make-or-break issue as far as the accord is concerned. In fact, the success or failure of the elections is more dependent on India than it is on Sri Lanka. The decision to push it through is yet another gamble that rests on whether conditions in the northern and eastern provinces will be conducive to the conduct of a poll.

To ensure that, New Delhi has launched a two-pronged offensive. By the end of the fortnight, the IPKF strength in Sri Lanka is expected to be around 60,000 troops. One additional brigade (over 3,000 men) moved into the eastern province just before Jayewardene arrived in New Delhi. Another is scheduled to be flown into the province—where the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have regrouped and caused considerable insecurity. Once the troops are in place and have been properly briefed, New Delhi hopes to launch a combing operation that will "secure" the province in time for the elections.

At the same time, India's overworked High Commissioner in Colombo, J.N. Dixit, has flown into Jaffna and Batticaloa where he has had discussions with local citizens' committees and prominent people to convince them to participate in the election process.

Of the two, Dixit's is the trickier mission. If the LTTE boycotts the elections, its validity will be in question. Similarly, if the Tigers lie low for now and strike when the elections are on, they still have the capacity to render it inoperable. The Tigers also have the capacity to threaten prospective candidates and prevent them from taking part in the process.

To counter that, New Delhi has used the recent talks to convince Jayewardene that a few additional concessions to the Tamils, in the devolution package agreed upon under the accord, will go a long way to swing Tamil opinion solidly for elections. The Sri Lankans have agreed to look into the matter without making it seem that the Jayewardene Government is giving in to Tamil—or Indian—demands.

There are also feelers being sent to the LTTE for some sort of compromise whereby the LTTE will be given political control of the northern province on the condition that it abandons its claims to the eastern province. Having lost its northern stronghold to the IPKF and under increasing pressure in the east, the LTTE just might be agreeable to the conditions—or so New Delhi and Colombo are hoping. The problem is whether Tigers can change their stripes.

FEBRUARY 29, 1988 —DILIP BOBB

SWEDISH GROUP APPEALS ON EELAM TAMIL PROBLEM

REPORT

Full text of a letter addressed to the Prime Minister of Sweden with copies to all parties concerned by Svenska Multi-Etniska Foreningen for Sri Lanka (SMES) expressing its concern over the Eelam Tamil problem and calling upon Mr.Carlsson to take it up with Mr Rajiv Gandhi.'As a Swedish based voluntary group which is working towards peace, democracy and ethnic harmony in a united Sri Lanka, we are gravely concerned about the continuing unhappy state of affairs in Sri Lanka.

The expectation that the New Delhi government would restore peace and offer protection to the hapless minorities in Sri Lanka has not only failed to materialise but these so called Indian peace keeping forces have themselves taken up arms against the people of Sri Lanka. **They have lost the trust which the different ethnic groups in the Island placed in them**

While condemning these actions of the 'peace-keeping forces' which have led to untold sufferings to the people, we are also painfully aware that a limited presence of these troops, at least for a short period of time, will be necessary for the task of ensuring peace in that country. For this to be accomplished it is necessary to restore the faith of the people and in our view this is only possible with the help of a neutral peace keeping force of international stature, namely a United Nations peace-keeping force.

We envisage that the Indian troops will work together with the UN peace-keeping forces and set about the task of restoring peace and bringing about normalisation.

A pre-requisite for this process, however, would be the immediate withdrawal of a major part of the Indian 'peace- keeping troops'. In its pursuit of the policy of non-alignment India has on several occasions declared itself opposed to the presence of foreign troops on the territory of another sovereign nation. **We urge Mr.Rajiv Gandhi to apply to his own actions this principle to which not only India but also Sweden and all other peace-loving nations in the world subscribe.**

Our association appreciates the endeavours of Sweden in championing the cause of oppressed people without regard to colour, race or religion. We urge upon you to use the occasion of your forthcoming talks in Stockholm with Mr.Rajiv Gandhi to persuade him that:

1. (a) The only way to restore the people's faith in the peace- keeping efforts in Sri Lanka is to remove immediately a major portion of his government's troops.

(b) To request the Secretary General of the UN to send a United Nations peace-keeping force which would then work jointly with the remaining Indian peace-keeping forces to restore peace and harmony and to pave the way for normalisation. That such a request to the UN Secretary General be made jointly by the governments of Sri Lanka and India — the two parties to the 29th July peace accord which was expected to grant the minorities their human rights while preserving ethnic harmony and security for all peoples of Sri Lanka.

2. That he in turn prevail upon the President of Sri Lanka to take action to fulfil the conditions of the 29th July peace accord, namely,

(a) the declaration of a general amnesty and the release of all political prisoners, both Tamil and Sinhalese, now held in camps in the South of Sri Lanka.

(b) to lift the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) brought into effect in 1979, which allows the government of Sri Lanka to arrest and detain people for great lengths of time without any charges being brought against them before a duly constituted court of law.

3. That he further prevails upon the President of Sri Lanka to

(a) permit the International Red Cross to help the refugees who have been exposed to severe physical and mental suffering in the affected areas.

(b) Grant citizenship without delay not only to the so-called 'Indian Tamils' or 'Plantation Tamils' whose applications for citizenship have been accepted, but also to all the other 'Indian Tamils' whose applications have been rejected despite the fact that they and their ancestors have made enormous contributions to the economic life of Sri Lanka for over a century and that they were born and have lived all their life in Sri Lanka and have known no other land including India to which they are threatened with 'repatriation'.

We end this plea with the hope that you will fulfil the faith of an oppressed people who look to independent nations like Sweden to champion their cause and relieve their sufferings.'



BLOOD IS THICKER THAN WATER !

EDITORIAL

'From the rubble and ashes, there can only arise the total alienation of an entire people, more determined militancy,more extreme options. The time to desist from a military occupation of Jaffna is now. Later may be too late.'

No matter who wrote it or in what context it was written, the above is an ever-living assertion in that it transcends the bounds of time and space. It is from that the Americans in Vietnam, and the Russians in Afghanistan learned their lessons, and the Indians in Sri Lanka are in the process of learning their lesson.

Significantly underlying the lesson is the fact that any atrocities, no matter in what measure, by whom or against whom they are perpetrated, cannot succeed against a people's unity and determination to resist them. For more than four years Sri Lankan authorities incessantly indulged in blood-curdling brutalities against the Tamil people, only to know, though belatedly, that nothing could successfully stand before the people's united will. In the past few months, Indian authorities have repeated, following on the Peace Accord, the same atrocities in rather greater measure against the same Tamil people with a view to destroying their legitimate rights and aspirations. They have, however, experienced the same reality, that is, in no way could military measures weaken a people's resolve to oppose at any cost whatsoever was injurious to their interests.

The failure of Inaia's military measures against the Tamil people, and not allowing them to have any serious role in the Peace Accord, is patently manifest in the political manoeuvres they have time and time again employed.

These manoeuvres were for the purpose not only of vindicating their atrocities in the absence of any impartial or neutral organisations such as International Red Cross and Amnesty International but also of splintering the Tamil community into several factions, thereby weakening their determination for resistance. As part of their manoeuvres they created quislings among Tamil people and turned them into armed bandits to inflict as much suffering as possible on the Tamil civilians. They have not scrupled to arbitrarily dump the responsibility for the debacle of the Peace Accord into the lap of the Tamil Tigers in the hope of deflectimg Tamil opinion in their favour; they vainly resorted to various strategies such as unilateral ceasefire and offer of incentives (bribes) to the freedom fighters.

It is by no means out of place to state here that India's package of inducements to the fighting youths points to the fact that Indian authorities, particularly Rajiv Gandhi, have failed to comprehend the true objectives the Tamils are fighting for; they are fighting because they and their people want to live with honour and dignity in their own land.

Nearly six months have lapsed since the Peace Accord was signed to end the conflicts in Sri Lanka. The rhetoric of the Indian authorities, 'We have crushed the Tigers' is reaching its periodic crescendo; but the first phase of the Accord — the disarming of Tamil youths — has not yet been accomplished despite the extravagant presence of more than 50,000 Indian troops. The Tamil Tigers continue to maintain that they will give up arms only in a secure situation for their people. To say that the IPKF has not succeeded in disarming the Tigers is not so much to assert that the force is not competent enough to do so but to emphasise that the Tigers receive unshakeable support from their own people whose interests they are fighting for. It is true that the relentless atrocities by the IPKF against the Tamils have created an implacable hatred in the minds of the Tamil community as a whole against the Indian authorities, thus ensuring its unqualified support for the Tamil Tigers. It is also true that the Tamil people share with their freedom fighters the view that in no way does the Peace Accord guarantee their safety and security to live with honour and dignity. Above all these, the people's determination to throw their weight behind the Tigers at any cost whatsoever stems from the fact that it is the sons and daughters of these ordinary people who are poised to fight for the dignity of their parents and grandparents, as well as of future generations. If anyone says, on the basis of isolated and solitary evidence, that it is the Tamils' turn to accept the IPKF in Sri Lanka, to counter this we can do no more than say that you need a lot to prove that 'water is thicker than blood' but little or nothing to say that blood is thicker than water.

1 February 1988



Sudhir Dar, The Hindustan Times

DOCUMENT A memorandum submitted by LTTE to the U.N. Conference on human righis.

The accord which was said to be a historical achievement in bringing about peace and ethnic reconciliation to the Tamil issue, has miserably failed in its spirit and its objectives. Contrary to everybody's expectations, the Indo - Sri Lankan accord has brought war, violence, death and destruction.

It is a tragic paradox that it is the oppressed people of Tamil Eelam for whom the Accord pledged, to bring peace and justice, suffered immensely with a massive loss of life. What deeply shook the innocent Tamils was that India, who relentlessly championed their legitimate cause, whom they regarded as their guardian and saviour has turned to be their oppressor. The Indian peace keeping force (IPKF), which was sent to Tamil homeland to protect the Tamil people, to maintain peace and to ensure ethnic harmony, has assumed itself as an army of invasion fighting a bloody war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the vanguard movement of the Eelam Tamils which spearheaded an armed resistance campaign for more than ten years to defend the Tamil people against state repression and terror. Apart from the incalculable damage done to Tamil life and property, the Indian military action has further complicated the complex problem and destroyed all hopes of an early settlement of the Issue.

What went wrong with the Accord? Why is that the pledges given to the Tamils by the Indian Prime Minister that the Accord would bring them full-regional autonomy with sufficient devolution of powers for self-rule could not be fulfilled? Why did the Government of India, which has been mediating over the issue for several years for a peaceful negotiated political settlement and was vehemently critical of Sri Lanka's attempt to resolve the problem by military means, launched a ruthless war in callous disregard to civilian life and property seriously violating all norms of human rights? What prompted India to resort to the extreme measure of armed confrontation against a popular liberation organisation to whom she has been providing sanctuary, moral and material assistance, whom she recognised as the dominant political movement of the Tamils? These are some of the pertinent questions raised by those who are genuinely concerned about the present predicament of the people of Tamil Eelam.

The critics of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord would agree that one of the serious mistakes made by the Government of India was the extra-ordinary hurry and haste in which the Accord was signed without eliciting popular discussion and consent both from the Tamil and Sinhalese communities. This gave rise to suspicion, fear and opposition to the Accord among the wider sections of the popular masses in Sri Lanka. The Indian Government which has been mediating on the ethnic problem for years with painstaking tolerance and patience suddenly rushed through the Accord as a miraculous breakthrough to the Tamil issue without giving any credence to the wishes and aspirations of the people who are directly affected by the Agreement. Apart from the President and some of his cabinet colleagues the Accord stands opposed by prominent ministers of the ruling party including the Prime Minister, the main opposition parties and the powerful Buddhist sangha and the Sinhala extremist organisations. The Sinhalese fear that the Accord has infringed upon the sovereignity of the country. The Tamil community too is seriously disappointed since the Provincial council proposals envisaged in the Accord fall short of their political aspirations.

The Prime Minister of India Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, on several occasions, has assured the Tamils that the Accord would bring them full regional autonomy short of an independent state. But in practice this has not taken place. The two enactments passed in Sri Lankan Parliament recently-the Provincial Councils Bill and the 13th Amendment to the Constitution - do not contain necessary provisions to fulfil the basic political demands of the Tamils. Firstly, the crucial question of merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces into a single regional unit is not yet resolved to the satisfaction of the Tamils. There is no constitutional guarantee for the merger of these Tamil Provinces apart from the verbal assurance given by President Jayewardane. Secondly, the powers devolved to the Provincial councils are extremely limited. The Councils have not been given adequate powers on crucial subjects like Land, Agriculture, Fisheries, Education, Employment etc,, which are reserved for the centre. Futhermore, the President and the Parliament are vested with extra-ordinary Powers over and above the legislative and executive authority of the Provincial councils. A Presidential proclamation or an ordinary legislation in Parliament could dissolve the provincial councils. Therefore, contrary to Indian Prime Minister's assurances, the devolution package granted to the Tamils is an empty shell devoid of any political authority. India too agrees that the provincial framework fails to meet Tamil aspirations but has expressed hope that Sri Lankan President would grant more concessions in the course of time. The Tamils do not have such hopes. They feel cheated and betrayed.

The Government of India has to be blamed for this sorry state of affairs. India, which took the active mediatory role on behalf of the Tamils should have pressurised Sri Lanka and secured adequate constitutional guarantees for Tamil rights and sufficient powers of autonomy for Tamil

provinces. What disillusioned the Tamils was that India instead of pursuading Jayewardene to carry-out his obligations and commitments in the Accord, launched a sudden. unexpected war against the LTTE to disarm the organisation by force. This hasty decision on the part of India further complicated the situation and contributed to the consolidation of Jayewardene's intransigence. The decision to launch a full-fledged war against the LTTE in the back-ground of a peace initiative - when the moral obligation on the part of India was to seek the smooth implementation of the Accord - was a grave and serious mistake. What prompted the Indian policy makers to make this controversial decision with its disastrous consequences still remains a mystery. It can only be attributed to the superficial and myopic vision of the Indian Leadership to a very complicated historical problem.

The arguments advanced by India that LTTE's reluctance to accept the Accord unconditionally and its refusal to surrender the arms are the factors that compelled India to resort to military action are unconvincing and untenable. These vague generalisations cannot justify the massive military onslaught with a heavy toll of civilian casualities against a war-torn population who fervently hoped that India would bring them peace and solace.

LTTE's stand on the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord and on the issue of surrendering the arms have been explicitly stated in our several letters to the Indian Prime Minister and in our official statements and documents. The LTTE did not oppose the Accord nor it refused to surrender the arms. We have serious reservations on the Accord particularly on the provincial Council proposals set-out in the Agreement to resolve the ethnic problem. We are of the opinion that these proposals have serious limitations and fall short of Tamil aspirations. But we are aware that there are other aspects of the Accord that deal with India's strategic interests. Our organisation fully recognises India's pre-eminent role in South Asia and respects her geo-political sensitivities and strategic compulsions. The LTTE also supports India's policy of declaring the Indian ocean as a zone of peace and her opposition to the penetration of international forces of subversion in the region. Therefore we upport the aspects of the Accord which deals with India's bilateral relations with Sri Lanka and her regional policies. In our letters to the Indian Prime Minister we pledged to co-operate with India in the implementation of the Accord if it promotes the interests and protects Tamil live. This is our position in so far as the Accord is concerned. We were under the impression that India fully appreciated our position. Though the LTTE was not a party to the Accord nor was it consulted in the framing of the Agreement, we pledged to co-operate with India with the objective of avoiding any conflict with Indian interests.

In so far as the arms issue is concerned the LTTE never refused to surrender its arms. During his lengthy discussions with the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi in July last year, the LTTE leader Mr. V. Prabhakaran pledged to surrender the arms in stages following certain assurances given by the Indian leader. Accordingly the LTTE surrendered a substantial portion of its arms to the IPKF The rest of the weapons were to be surrendered once an Interim Government is formed with a majority role for the LTTE. The LTTE's pledge to hand over the remaining weapons and the LTTE's role in the proposed Interim Administration are clearly stated in a written Agreement entered between the Government of India and the LTTE on the 28th Sept. 1987.

The crucial question that can be posed now is why did the Government of India choose to wage a disasterous war against the LTTE when our organisation pledged to co-operate with the implementation of the Accord and has been surrendering the arms according to modalities worked-out with India. Any rational thinking person will not accept India's contention that a war was necessary to disarm the LTTE and to implement the Accord. Everybody will agree that the war is counter-productive hence it brought heavy casualities on both sides, caused untold sufferings to ordinary citizens and obstructed the implementation of the Accord.

The war against the LTTE was unwarranted, unjust and unwise. By opting for such ruthless and highhanded action India fell a prey to the shrewd and cunning manipulations of Jayawardene's regime. Sri Lankan diplomacy from the inception was aimed at creating a conflict between India and LTTE. Sri Lanka manipulated the events in such a devious manner that India was finally caught in to that diplomatic trap and was compelled to do Sri Lanka's dirty job of liquidating the Tamil freedom fighters.

It should be noted that following the signing of the Accord, the Sri Lankan Government has neither carried out her obligations nor co-operated with India to implement it. On the contrary, Sri Lanka took certain measures that seriously violated the terms of the Accord.

Though a General Amnesty was proclaimed by the Sri Lankan president for political and other prisoners held in custody under the Prevention of terrorism Act and other Emergency Laws, Sri Lanka did not release all the political prisoners. Sri Lanka also failed to carry-out her obligations of withdrawing Emergency regulations in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and disarming the Home Guards.

What angered the Tamils most was that Sri Lanka, immediately following the signing of the Accord, launched a massive programme of colonising the Tamil areas with Sinhalese settlers under the cover of rehabilitation and re-settlement. Thousands of new Sinhalese settlers were brought to Trincomalee, Mullaitivu and Vavuniya areas and settled in Tamil villages. These villages were deserted by Tamil peasants who were up-rooted from their traditional lands by racial violence and state terrorism. To further provoke the Tamils, Sri Lanka started opening up police stations in Tamil areas with Sinhala personnel. Alarmed over these developments we registered our protest with India but no action was taken.

One of the assurances given by the Indian Prime Minister was the formation of an interim government with LTTE playing a dominant role. It was also assured to us that the problem of re-settlement and rehabilitation of Tamil refugees and the formation of a Tamil police force would be the responsibility of the Interim Administration. But neither Sri Lanka nor India took any concrete steps to form the Interim Government. There was a calculated delay

in this matter and Sri Lanka continued with her colonisation programme and started inducting a Sinhalese police administrative machinery in the North.

What was more disturbing at that time was the arrival of armed Tamil groups from South India who with the patronage of the IPKF, established bases in the North and East and started harrassing the LTTE as well as the public. We were rather shocked and surprised why the Government of India choose to arm these groups and despatched them to Tamil areas at a sensitive time when peace process was introduced and disarming of the LTTE was taking place. This is one of the reasons that led to our disenchantment with Indian policy on the Tamil issue.

Because of these negative developments, the LTTE launched a fast-unto-death campaign spearheaded by our political wing leader Mr. Thileepan seeking redress to our grievances. The campaign soon expanded into a mass non-violent movement with the active participation of the popular masses. At the initial stages the Indian Government ridiculed the non-violent campaign of the LTTE but soon realised that it was turning into a massive national up-rising with mounting anti-Indian feelings. The Indian High Commissioner Mr. Dixit rushed to Jaffna to listen to our grievances on the 9th day of the fasting when Thileepan was reaching the brink of death. Mr. Dixit offered vague assurances which failed to meet our demands. The fast continued and Thileepan died. It is after Thileepan's death and when the mass agitation took a serious turn into a national - out cry. Mr. Dixit came with proposals to set-up an interim administration. If the Government of India had acted without delay Thileepan's life would have been saved.

The proposed interim administration soon ran into serious difficulty when President Jayewardene announced the list of names contrary to the order of preference suggested by the LTTE. Sri Lanka demanded from us a list of names for the chief Administrator as well as the members of the council. The list was given in the order of preference giving larger representation to the people of the Eastern Province. Jayewardene deliberately changed names and rejected LTTE's nominees for the Eastern Province. This gave rise to a controvercy and Jayewardene refused to appoint LTTE's nominee for the chief administrator. Finally, the proposed Interim Government was dropped. Sri Lanka Government deliberately sabotaged it and blamed the LTTE for its 'intransigence'. The Government of India supported Sri Lanka's stand. Once again, the Tamils were betrayed.

It was during this time, a tragic incident occured with far reaching consequences which further added to the estrangement of relations between India and the LTTE. It was the incident in which two LTTE regional commanders and ten senior members were compelled to commit suicide in the custody of the IPKF. Though these LTTE leaders were arrested by the Sri Lankan Navy on the coastal waters of Point Pedro, they were kept in the protective custody of the IPKF at Palaly camp. Sri Lanka demanded that these LTTE men should be taken to Colombo for 'interrogation'. But the Government of India gave us assurance they would be released soon. The arrested Tiger leaders had already warned both Sri Lanka and India that they would swallow cyanide capsules and kill themselves rather than facing torture and possibly death in the hands of Sri Lankan security forces. We argued with the Government of India that the arrest of these LTTE leaders constitutes a serious violation of the Accord since LTTE men were given General Amnesty. We also insisted that the protection of the lives of our members was the responsibility of the IPKF which assumed the role of avoiding conflicts between Sri Lankan Security force and Tamil guerillas. We also warned India of a possible outburst of violence if LTTE men were massacred. Our plea to secure the release of our leaders was a minor concession we demanded from both India and Sri Lanka who have just entered into a major agreement to resolve the ethnic conflict. But Jayewardene was very obstinate. The Indian high commissioner Mr. Dixit, who held lengthy discussions with Sri Lankan President failed in his diplomatic endeavour. The result was a great tragedy. The massacre of twelve prominent LTTE men, who were great heroes of the Tamil liberation war, out-raged the Tamil sentiments. Pulendran, the regional commander of Trincomalee and Kumarappa, the former regional commander of Batticoloa, were highly respected leaders in the Eastern Province who spearheaded a courageous residence campaign against Sri Lankan security forces in defence of the people. The tragic circumstances in which they were killed angered the Tamil population and there was widespread violence and racial clashes in the Eastern Province which resulted in the death of several Sinhalese civilians. Ignoring the out-raged sentiments of an angry people and the provocative circumstances which led to the out-break of spontaneous mass violence, both Sri Lanka and India accused the Tigers of masterminding racial conflict. What followed was a top level conference in Colombo between India and Sri Lanka in which a series of tough measures, including military action against the LTTE were decided upon.

While the LTTE and the people of Tamil Eelam were mourning over their dead heroes the Government of India mobilised its peace keeping force for a bloody war against the Tamils. Neither the Tamil people nor the LTTE anticipated, even in their wildest dreams, a war with India. For the Tamils India was their protector, guardian and saviour and the presence of the Indian troops was looked upon as an instrument of peace and love. For the LTTE, India was their promoter, a friendly power who provided sanctuary and armed assistance, an ally who respected its role in the liberation war and recognised its political importance. Therefore, the Indian decision to launch a war against the LTTE shook the Tamil nation by surprise and anguish.

What horrified the Tamil people was the brutal and ruthless manner the Indian troops conducted the military campaign in callous disregard to human life and property. The war was a nightmare. To break-through the LTTE's stiff resistance and to capture Jaffna town, which took nearly two weeks, the Indian troops used all its available fire-power in a most ruthless manner in the densely populated areas of the peninsula. The most deadly weaponry that caused heavy casualities among the civilian population was the mortar and artillery shells. From all

the military camps mortar and artillery shells were rained on the people from every direction for 24 hours a day continuously for weeks. There was no escape. People were killed everywhere. The civilians who took shelter in temples, schools, and even refugee camps were not spared. Dead bodies were littered everywhere. The injured bled to death. Yet the Indian army kept on shelling irrespective of the mass killing of civilians. Bombers and helicopter gunships continued pounding civilian targets adding to the death and devastation. When the Indian troops advanced interior they brought havoc. Innocent civilians, including women and children were massacred in a most barbaric manner. Houses were destroyed, temples desecrated, and shops looted. The worst crime committed by the Indian troops was the rape of Tamil women. Hundreds of Tamil women were raped brutally and most of them were done to death after sexual violence. This brutality deeply wounded the sentiments of the people and the hate for the Indian army became widespread. The IPKF received the motto as the **Innocent People's Killing Force.** Among the most brutal massacres committed by the IPKF was the mass killing at the Jaffna General Hospital. The Indian troops stormed into the hospital and killed in cold blood over a hundred sick and injured people. Four doctors were senselessly slaughtered and several nurses raped and murdered. In this ruthless military campaign one thousand four hundred innocent Tamil civilians were killed and several thousands injured. Colossal damage was done to Tamil property.

The Indian Government's thesis that the LTTE fighter used women and children as human shields were baseless lies. The IPKF propaganda that old women were armed with pistols, children carried handgrenades and young girls hid their sub-machine guns under their skirts were nothing but fabricated tales concocted to justify the unacceptable rate of civilian casualities. The truth is that the Indian army intelligence miscalculated the LTTE's strength, fire-power and its fierce determination to resist. When pressurised by Delhi policy makers to do a quick job, the IPKF thrust in using maximum fire-power in total disregard to civilian casualties. Apart from the casualties inflicted, the IPKF brought extreme hardships to the civilian population. The electricity was cut-off purposely for more than two months, which plunged the entire Jaffna peninsula into darkness and paralysed all industrial works. Water supply too was cut-off. IPKF banned public and private transport putting a halt to food and medical supplies reaching the Peninsula from southern Sri Lanka. There was a ban on fishing. Such harsh measures drove the civilian population to the brink of the socio-economic life of the people. The other unpopular measure that brought immense suffering to the civilian population was the round the clock curfew imposed on the peninsula which lasted for more than two months. Even today, after three-and-a half months of the declaration of war, dusk-to-dawn curfew continues.

The inhuman brutalities and other cruel crimes committed on our people by the Indian troops could not be brought to notice of the world community because of the total black-out of news by India. International media was prevented from entering the 'war' zone. The occasional press notes released by the LTTE was branded as malicious distortion of truth. On the first day of the war itself the Jaffna local newspapers were forcefully silenced. The Indian troops stormed into these newspaper offices, arrested the Journalists and blasted the printing machinery with explosives. The Tamils were shocked beyond belief to see India, which claimes to be the guardian of democratic liberties, had adopted this high-handed method to muzzle the local media which functioned as the only voice of our people. Having suppressed the local press and blocked the international media, the Government of India effectively utilised the state controlled media to put fabricated stories about the war and to malign the LTTE. We pleaded with India to send a team of observers from Amnesty International and international commission of Jurists to investigate the violations of human rights and extra Judicial killings but our request was turned down.

Today, after nine months of the signing of the Accord the war continues with its violence and destruction of life. The Indian claim that peace and normalcy are returning to Tamil areas is far from truth. The conditions of war prevails and human suffering continues. The IPKF and LTTE guerillas are engaged in violent confrontations. Cordon-off operations, house-to-house searches, search and destroy missions, mass identification parades, arrest, detention and torture of Tamil youth continues unabated by the IPKF. The deployment of several thousand troops has turned the Jaffna Peninsula into a massive military encampment. There are military sentry posts in every junction and main road , where vigorous check-in systems operate. There is no freedom of public mobility. The Tamil areas are placed under a rigid military administration. This situation cannot be categorised as normalcy.

The Government of India assumes that the time is ripe for the induction of a political process and polls in Tamil areas. But the Tamils feel that this artificial normalcy achieved by military occupation and domination is not the congenial atmosphere for democratic political practice.

The LTTE has been pleading with the Government of India, since the beginning of the war, to call-off the military offensive operation to declare a ceasefire, to initiate a dialogue, to bring about peace and normalcy. The LTTE asks for a status- quo-ante, the return of the Indian troops to pre-offensive position and the re-activation of the 28th September agreement which allows the formation of an interim Government. The Government of India has rejected out-right LTTE's suggestions and demands total surrender and unconditional acceptance of the Accord.

The Indian position is unfair, unjust and undemocratic. This intransigent attitude will prolong the conflict and perpetuate the agony of our people.

It is the Tamil people who have the liberty to decide their own political destiny. The Government of India has no right to super-impose a political framework which the Tamil opinion feels totally inadequate and falls short of their legitimate political aspirations. But if the Government of India attempts to do so it will amount to a grave injustice done to our people.

POLITICAL COMMITTEE
LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM



'PEACE CAN'T BE BOUGHT BY SUPPRESSION'

LETTER

Says People's Forum

The PEOPLE'S FORUM of Jaffna in northern Sri Lanka, a body established for the exchange of views and moulding englightened public opinion, with its office at 21/4, Stanley Road, Jaffna, has made a strong plea to the Indian Prime Minister to desist from the course hitherto followed by his government and to 'create the necessary atmosphere for the understanding and acceptance of the Accord by the aggrieved Tamil people'.

In its third letter addressed to the Prime Minister, dated 15 February 1988, the Hony. Secretary of the Forum, Mr. T.S. Kumaresan, has said:

'During the vicious Vadamaradchchi onslaught by Sinhala armed forces, and before that during the past years of violence and atrocities perpetrated on the Tamil people by the Sri Lanka government, they had in your Excellency and the people of India someone to whom they could complain, and through you to the world for redress and justice. Today they have nobody, not even the IPKF that came with the avowed commitment to protect and safeguard them, but has turned against them suddenly transforming itself into an army of aggression. Can the victims complain to the wrong-doer and his minions? The Sinhala chauvinist leaders and other elements opposed to the peace accord are gloating at the misery of the Tamil people. It is a great pity that the arrival of the IPKF was greeted with happiness and relief by an overwhelming section of the Tamil people in the Sinhala provinces. Their hopes and aspirations have been shattered. Their unbearable experience even drove them to think whether the IPKF offensive was the final phase of the 'Operation Liberation' planned by the Sri Lanka government and against which India voiced her protest vehemently and openly indicating that she had reached her limits of patience.

'One can understand the motive of the Sinhala government — genocide of the Tamil people — but not that of the IPKF or India whose avowed commitment was all along for a negotiated political settlement to meet the aspirations of the Tamil people and against the imposition of a military solution in which the tottering fascist regime of President Jayewardene believed. In the IPKF military offensive thousands of houses had been completely destroyed and razed to the ground; temples, churches, schools, hospitals, public institutions, and even the Jaffna University and refugee camps were not exempted. In the panic and fear which ensued a great many civilians (almost the entire population of Jaffna) left their abodes and kept wandering to places of safety, even to places like Colombo. This exodus is continuing. This is the chimera of freedom that the Tamil people in this country are chasing after. Your Excellency's government in dealing with the phantom of violence unleashed in Punjab has not resorted to killing of innocent civilians and destroying their properties.

'In the result, quite apart from the loss of lives and property, many people have been forced to live in conditions of abject squalor and poverty, having lost their means of livelihood. Education, the priceless possession which the Tamil people have always held dear to them, suffered a serious setback during this period. For the last four to five months children had been forcibly kept out of schools. Even now many children refrain from attending their schools in fear. The Courts, government offices and other public institutions remain closed for the last five months. Water and electricity were cut and the entire peninsula was thrust into total darkness. All these only show that the military operation too has failed to meet with the success that was intended. Thus, the vulnerability of the Accord is manifesting itself in all spheres of its implementation. Whether any benefit can flow from this Accord to the Tamil people remains a matter of doubt . . .

'The assumption that the present proposals for a Provincial Council set-up in Sri Lanka is parallel to the State set-up in India is most misleading. The efficacy of the Accord depends entirely on the terms of the solution envisaged to meet the crucial and fundamental issues of the struggle of the Tamil people. Unless such solution is based on real autonomy to a single Tamil region comprising the North and East with powers on matters like law and order, the police, land and land settlement and other features of autonomy it could prove illusory, and the aggrieved Tamil people could feel that their tremendous sacrifice and suffering have been in vain. Their's is a long tale of woe littered with promises, duplicity and deceit followed by violence and genocide. Nationalism feeds on oppression.

'The picture that has emerged calls for a reappraisal of values. Should the Indian government continue with its military operation causing further havoc and disaster to the common people, or should a new approach be made towards rectification of errors already committed? This is the question looming large . . .

'To the Tamil people the events of the last three of four months were full of nightmarish experiences. Never in the wildest dreams would the Tamil people have come by the phenomenon that their Indian saviours turning to be their killers or destroyers. The psychological impact has been tremendous; they never before felt such an intense sense of betrayal. Their tales of woe and suffering are no doubt bound to debilitate the image of India in the eyes of the world. The wounds inflicted may be healed in the passage of time, but the scars will remain as important landmarks in their recorded history. Time has still not run out for doing what should be done to alleviate the sufferings of the Tamil people. This is the challenge facing the Indian government today. How the Government of India will react to meet this challenge, only the future will unfold.

'We conclude with the following passage from the speech made by Your Excellency's mother, the late Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi to the Indian Students' Association of Washington in Washington on November 5, 1971:

> 'We all know through history that men have been killed, men have been wounded, crushed and suppressed, but the spirit of man and the ideas of freedom, of human dignity, have never been crushed in the history of man. We have been through this in India and every country which fought for freedom has been through it. It is this spirit of man which has helped man to progress and to rise to new heights. India certainly cannot be a party to the suppression of this spirit of freedom and human dignity. Nor do we believe that peace can be bought by such suppression. Perhaps you can delay freedom but you cannot prevent it.'

YOU TOO INDIA?



அனையாய் என் அம்மா எங்கிருக்கிறாள்?
காற்றே, நீ தான் அறிவாய், சொல்

எல்லாவற்றையும் இழந்து என் தங்கை
எந்த முகாமில் நடைப்பிணமாய்த் திரிகிறாள்?

வதைக்கூடத்தின் இருட்டறையில் அண்ணனின்
கதறலைக் கேட்டாயோ நீ?

வீடும் வேலியும் சைக்கிளும் எரிய,
பூவரசம்பூ கருகக் கண்டிருந்தாயோ?

உறைந்த ரத்தத்திற்கும் கவிந்த புகைக்கும்
எழுந்த ஓலத்திற்கும் நீயே சாட்சி.

இரும்புக் கழுகுகள் வட்டமிடும் வானம்
நெருப்பில் நடக்கிறது என் காலம்.

துயரத்தின் சுழலில் நீயும் நானும்
புயலாகும் நேரம் வருகிறது.

உறுமியே செல்லும் ராணுவ உந்துகளின்
உள்ளிருந்து இயங்கும் துவக்குகளாலே
எந்தநேரமும் இவர்தலை சிதறலாம்
எந்தச் சமயமும் எம்தலை உருளும்

.....

இப்போதெல்லாம்
எமது நகரத்து வீதிகள்
காவற் கருவிப் பேய்களுக்கென்றே
எழுதப் பட்டதாய்ப் போனதே போலும்.

'எவரையும் சுடலாம் விசாரணையின்றியே
எரிக்கலாம் அன்றிப் புதைக்கலாம்' என்று
இயற்றப்பட்ட புதிய விதிகளால்
குருதியில் தோயும் நிகழ்வுகள் இங்கே.

இருளுக்கும் இருட்புலியர்க்கும் என்றே
விடப்பட்டுப் போன எங்கள் வீதிகளில்
வெளிப்படுவோரெல்லாம்
சுடப்படலாம் தெருநாய்களைப்போல.
எக்கணமேனும் எக்கணமேனும்
எமக்கிது நிகழலாம்.

IT HAPPENED IN JAFFNA

REPORT

3000 CIVILIANS FORCED TO SQUAT UNDER SCORCHING SUN FOR NINE HOURS

We carry below a translation of a special report published in the JUNIOR VIKATAN, a popular Tamil-language weekly of Madras in its issue of 24 February.

'The question whether the military offensive ordered against the Liberation Tigers was justified or not may be left aside for the moment as a debatable issue. There could be pros and cons. Okay, let us even grant for the sake of argument that there were good reasons that motivated the action. But how in the name of humanity could anyone condone or justify the high-handed and brutal way in which the ordinary citizens of Jaffna were treated?' asked a prominent newspaperman speaking to us in Madras. He had just come from Sri Lanka.

He continued: 'Why did Indian newspapers who prattle time and again about freedom and democracy in their own country maintain a monumental silence and callous indifference when in the stupid hope of disarming the Liberation Tigers in a day or two, the Indian forces went about killing innocent peaceful citizens and treating them as a herd of cattle?

'Imagine the plight of the people. Not knowhing when a shell might burst, and take away whose life, at what place, the dazed citizens of Jaffna were running helter-skelter in seach of shelter, and having found it, hiding in fear wondering whether it would be safe enough? The Liberation Tigers were living mingled with the people it was being shouted. So what? Where else could they live? Does that mean that the entire population has to be put to sword and fire because the Indian Army does not understand the concept of a "degree of war"?

'There was this incident in the "Muddasukkadai" junction (a commercial and business area) in the Jaffna town,' he said. 'A Liberation Tiger had taken a pot-shot at an Indian jawan and killed him. Within a short time a whole battalion of Indian soldiers moved into the area, cordoned off all the environs, marched every man, woman and child found in the area and ordered them to squat on the tarred roads in the hot sun. This began around 9 a.m. and very soon they had lined up nearly 3000 persons. There was absolutely no consideration whether they were old folk, elderly men or women or the sick or the young. Until about 6p.m. they were kept there, without food, without drinking water, with not even the facility to ease themselves, until all shops and roads and lanes and nooks and corners were flushed in search of the lone Tiger guerrilla.

'Any young Tamil, irrespective of who he was, and without any questions being asked, was promptly assaulted with rifle butts. In some instances even elderly people were shabbily manhandled.

'One group of soldiers who entered the office of the Tamil daily newspaper, the EELANADU, pushed and dragged all the members of the staff to the road outside. Interestingly, the editor in charge, Mr. Perumal is a person of recent Indian origin from the plantations and one who was closely associated with the elderly and respected one-time editor Mr. Haran (He was an Indian national who passed away later in India — Ed.) Mr Perumal himself was dragged out and when he tried to explain, he was beaten with a belt and a piece of wire.

'Next, Indian soldiers stormed into the well-known Tamil Hindu educational institution, the Vaidheeswara Vidyalayam, also in the same area, and pulled out both the men and women teachers and roughed them up in the presence of their own students. Some of them suffered face injuries as a result of being pushed and hit by rifle butts.

'Humiliated as they were by being forced to sit on the public road like convicted criminals, the suffering people were not even allowed to leave the place to ease themselves, despite several pleas.

'Repeatedly the soldiers went up to the group of squatting people and threatened them: "You should know the fellow who killed our soldier. It could not have happened without someone here knowing the identity of the person. Tell us, tell us ... or else ...", they kept shouting at them.

'Unable to endure the tormenting any longer, an elderly citizen spoke up: "Sirs, we come to the town not to observe what is happening here. We come here on business, urgent business for our living, and once we finish it, we get out of this problematical place as fast as we came in. We don't like to remain here one moment longer than is necessary. We do not have the time (because of the daily evening curfew) nor the mind nor the authority to look with suspicion at everyone else who is here. As for you, you have sentry points here every 50 yards. You should be having at least 100 jawans in this area guarding, watching, questioning, examining all of us. Are you fair in asking us this question that should properly be addressed to your own sentries?"

'The elderly man who spoke up, paid the price for it. He was slapped and kicked.

'Only vehicles, whether buses or cars or two-wheelers, which have been issued IPKF passes could carry people. Even if you have a woman with childbirth pains to be rushed to hospital you have to find a vehicle with a pass. Getting a pass is not that easy anyway. It would be like boring into a mountain to catch a mouse. Many people who have waited vainly in queues for these passes decide that it would be easier to walk the miles.

'On the appeal made by the Liberation Tigers, or maybe because of their threats, government officers have refused to attend offices. As a result essential government business is paralysed. Only the Jaffna General hospital is functioning somewhat.

'Out of the Jaffna newspapers, only the "Eelanadu" has been given permission to come out, since January 15, and that too under a specific condition; that no news relating to happenings in Jaffna could be published without IPKF clearance. The publishers were told that the imposition of this condition itself should not be published. (Since then, the publication had again ceased with the blowing up of the Eelanadu office building by a Tamil militant group on February 29 — Ed.TT).

'On top of all these, the harassment that Tamils undergo at the hands of some supposed Tamil militant group of youths on the Jaffna-Colombo road, at a spot barely 50-100 yards from the IPKF and Sri Lanka army checkpoints has been causing untold misery. When they identify merchants and business people they are promptly abducted from the place and ransom demands are made; apart from this, all travellers are questioned and treated with disrespect. The funny thing is that such high-handed behaviour, extortion and robbery take place in such close proximity to the IPKF camps. One does not know whether a part of this loot goes into the hands of the IPKF personnel. Jaffna businessman V.K.Rajaratnam who deals in radios, Television sets, Tape recorders etc. was recently identified by these youths and a ransom demand of Rs.3 lakhs was made in return for his freedom. Only after a sizeable portion of the ransom money was paid was he released.

'The Jaffna residents are convinced in their own minds that any attempts to hold elections without arriving at a political settlement with the Liberation Tigers would only result in a volcanic eruption of violence in Jaffna. Will the Government of India, and its officials grasp this reality?'

AFFIDAVIT

Mr. KATHIRIPPILLAI SINNATHAMBY (52),
Mason, Vannichchi Amman Kovilady, Valvetty, Valvettiturai.

I was at home on Wednesday, 1st February, 1989. At about 9.30 a.m. some Indian Peace Keeping Force soldiers entered my house and dragged me out. I was taken to a spot near the Vannichchi Amman temple. I was hit all over my body by the soldiers with the fists and kicked on my back with their feet which were wearing boots. I was then pushed to the ground and assaulted on the body, hands and legs with wooden rods. It was alleged that the telephone wire of the IPKF had been cut near my house and therefore the people of the area were punished. I suffered the following injuries:

1. Multiple contusions all over.
2. Swelling of right wrist.
3. Swelling of right knee.

Subsequently it was found that a bone in my right wrist was fractured and I am still taking treatment to heal the wound. Consequently, I am unable to do any work and earn a living for more than 1½ months. I request that some financial assistance be given to me.

SINNATHURAI RASANAYAGAM (47),
Painter, Nedungkanni, Valvetty, Valvettiturai.

I was at home on Wednesday, 1st February 1989. At about 9.30 a.m. some Indian Peace Keeping Force soldiers entered my house, got hold of my shirt and dragged me out of my house. I was taken to a spot near the Vannichchi Amman temple. I was pushed down and then assaulted by about a dozen soldiers. At the same place, there were about 25 persons who were also assaulted by the soldiers. It was alleged that the telephone wire of the IPKF was cut near my house and the people of the area were punished. I suffered bleeding injuries. I was treated for the following injuries:

1. Swelling and tenderness of left arms.
2. Abrasion on right side forehead.
3. Contusion on back.

MRS. SINNIAH SELLAMMAH, Mannanddy, Alvai West, Alvai

I am the wife of late Mr. Konammalai Sinnaba.

During the army operation (IPKF) at Jaffna area my husband who was a farmer went to buy some parts for the water pump was sustained shell blast Injury and died by the result of shock and hemorrhage caused by blasting of shell, on 2.2.88.

I took charge of the body of husband and cremated at Thikam cemetery.

My husband was the sole breadwinner of the family of myself and two daughters and two sons.

MRS. THEVARATNAM DANIEL NEE GNAMA-RAGASAM born 1948-08-29, St James Lane, Illavalai, Sri Lanka.

I am the wife of Vaithy Daniel (49) who was arrested by the IPKF men on 5.2.88 and whose dead body was found the next day.

My said husband was working as a Packer in the Packing Section of the Kankesanthurai Cement Factory of the Sri Lanka Cement Corporation since 1969.

On 5.2.88 he left home for work as usual at 9 a.m.

At about 1.30 p.m. the same day my brother-in-law, Vaithy Massilamany, a native physician came and told me that he had been informed by certain people that my husband had been arrested by the IPKF.

My said brother-in-law and I went to meet Rev Fr Patrick, the priest in charge of St James Parish and told him of the arrest of my husband.

The priest advised me to go to the IPKF camp at Tellipallai and appeal to the Commander there.

I sent my brother-in-law Vaithy Massilamany to the IPKF Camp at Tellipallai that evening.

At the camp my brother-in-law met an officer of the IPKF who gave his designation and name as Major Shantha.

The said officer had told my brother-in-law that my husband would be released the next morning after interrogation.

The next morning my brother-in-law came and told me that he received information that my husband's body was found tied to a lamp post and had gun shot injuries.

I arranged for the body to be removed and the body was buried the same evening.

My husband was in receipt of a salary of Rs 1200/- per month working as a Packer at the Cement Factory.

The dependants are three persons

SUBRAMANIAM THURAISINGAM, (50)
Palliyawatte, Valvetty, Valvettiturai.

I am a mason by profession. On monday, 6.2.89 I was returning from Kamparmalai along with a co-wroker at about 6.30. p.m. Just then some IPKF soldiers were coming from the opposite direction. They asked us from where we were coming. We told them that we were masons and that we were returning after work. We showed them our equipment. Without any reason they assaulted us severely. I was pushed to the ground and the soldiers trampled and kicked me with their boots. I was assaulted with wooden rods while standing and also while fallen on the ground. I lost a tooth in the assault. I also sustained the following injuries :

1. Tenderness over lower abdomen.
2. Difficulty in walking.

3. Multiple contusions all over the body.

I was warded in the Valvettiturai Government Hospital for 5 days - B.H.T. No. 342/56. I am still taking out door treatment. As the injuries sustained by me have still not healed, I am unable to do any manual work and consequently I am unable to earn a living and look after my family.

VELAN RASAN (35) Pathanai, Alaveddi.

I have been living with my wife, children and my father "Thampan Velan"

On 9.2.88, in the evening, my father, "Thampan Velan" was shot dead during the shelling and firing by the IPKF in the course of their searching and dis-arming operations.

His body was brought home and, in turn, removed to the Kernipiddy Crematorium at Alaveddi and was cremated there after a short ceremony of last rites.

Under the prevailing situations, there was no possibility of holding an inquest in to the death of my father or to conduct a post-mortem examination on the body of the deceased.

M. GANNAMAH, Karaveddi North, Karaveddi.

I am the husband of the late Niclean Marian or Selathurail.

During the army Operation at Vadamarachchi on 9.2.88 my husband died by the result of shell attack.

I who have made the cremation at the Keripalli. cemetery.

My husband was the bread winner of the family.

NIRMALADEVY D/O SINNATHURAI BALASINGAM No. 40/4, Ramanathan Road, Jaffna

I am the daughter of late Balasingam Pushpamalar who died under tragic circumstances on 10.2.88.

As there was wide-spread tension with shell attacks etc., all around the place, my late beloved mother and the other members of the family left our home and on the way, an artillary shell fell and one of the splinters struck my mother Pushpamalar, injuring her very seriously, on 14.2.87.

Subsequently on 10.2.88 my beloved mother died owing to the injuries sustained by her.

My late beloved mother, Pushpamalar was providing for the family by working as a dress-maker and earned about Rs 2,000/- per month.

My younger sister, younger brother and I were depending on the earnings of our beloved mother.

Owing to her fatal death we the three children of her are undergoing immense distress for our living now.

We have no other source of living and the three of us are students.

LANKATHEVY W/O, THARMALINGHAM, Moththenry, Karaveddi West, Karaveddi.

I am the wife on late Vyeramuthu Tharmalingham.

During the army operation of the IPKF at Yakkarai area my husband was shot by the army at Karaveddy West on 10th Feburary, 1988, and died at the spot.

My husband was the sole breadwinner of my family of myself two sons age 14,12 and a daughter in the age of 9 years.

I am Pregnant of seven months and have no income to my family.

MRS. SARASWATHY RAJAKULENDRAN (35) Mathoni, Karaveddi West, Karaveddi.

The deceased Sinnadhurai Rajakulendran (43) is my husband. He was a Labourer.

Our house is situated close to the Yakkarai IPKF camp.

On the 12 the of February 1988 my husband who was at home received gun shot injuries when the IPKF opened fire from he camp after certain incidents.

My husband died on the spot.

The dead body of my husband was cremated at Sonappu cemetery on 12.2.88 evening.

My husband leaves behind myself and a daughter Sumithra aged 3 years. I am also expecting my second child in September.

My husband was able to earn about Rs. 40/- per day when work was available.

My child and I have now been deprived of the maintenance and support given by my husband who was the sole breadwinner of the family.

Mrs. RAJEEKA BALENDRARAJAH (18) Thaneerthavlyu, Kadduvan, Tellipalai.

On 13.02.88 my husband who was in vegetable business left home at about 8.00 a.m. on his push cycle for the purchase of vegetables from farms in Erialai.

On the day (13.02.88) the Indian Army was conducting searches in Erlalai for the approaches of terrorists in the area.

At about 12.30 p.m. while my husband was on his way back home some youths ran along the road in seeing the Indian Forces in ambush.

Indian troops opened fire at the youths who were running when my husband was caught up in the range and was hit by bullets.

His body was taken home at about 6.00 p.m. in the evening when the forces had withdrawn from the area.

He dropped dead on the kerb of the road while the bicycle fell on the main road.

His body was taken home at about 6.00 p.m. in the evening when the forces had with drawn from the area.

The funeral took place on the following day and his body was cremated at about 11.00 a.m. in the crematorium at Erialai East.

I find it extremely difficult in bringing up my 6 months old baby as I haven't the means for the purchase of milk foods apart from my own survival.

I do not own a house or lands and I live in a rented house. Besides I do not have any financial resources. to pull back upon.

JACOB THAVATHAS RITAMMAH (38) widow, 19/2, 2nd Cross Street, Passayoor, Jaffina.

The deceased Jacob Thevathas alias Mohan aged 40 years was my husband.

He was a fisherman.

On 14.2.88 at about 11.00 a.m. my late husband left home to go to fishing.

He was accompainied by ten others in an out board motor powered boat.

He did not return home that evening and I thought that he will return home as the following day due to the curfew which was imposed from 7 p.m.

On 15.2.88 three of those who had gone along with my husband came home and informed me that my husband died on the previous day as a result of bombing by the plane near Iranathievu.

His body was not brought home.

I came to know it was recovered after five days and was buried at Valapadu.

I have five children.

My children and I have been deprived of the maintenance and support received from my husband.



Rev. Fr. VEERAVAGU NATHANIEL THARMAKULASINGAM, (47) Jaffna Road, Udupiddy.

I am a Priest. On Wednesday, 15.2.89, I was staying in my house at the above address. My two brothers, two sisters and two nephews were also staying with me on this day. We were all confined to the house the whole day, which was the Parliamentary elections day. None of us went out to exercise our franchise. At about 5.15 p.m. that day, after the closing of polling, ballot boxes were to be taken along that road to Jaffna. IPKF soldiers were stationed along the road for a distance of about 500 metres from Udupiddy junction. Some soldiers were seen going westwards from Udupiddy junction along the rear compounds of the houses. They were making their way cutting the fences and scaling the walls. One of the soldiers while going through the rear compound of my house all of a sudden started shooting at random.

Just then some soldiers entered the house from both the rear and front. Frightened, most of us stood in the corners of the house. But, my brother Balasingam was standing near the door frame carrying his young son in his arms. One of the soldiers who entered the house went near him and told him, "you LTTE, I will shoot you". My two sisters wept and begged the soldier with folded hand telling, "he is our brother, do not do anything to us". But the soldier fired at him. Fortunately the buller went past his head brushing it but slightly injuring his young son whom he was carrying in his arms. He fell down with his son. Then the soldier fired at my two sisters. Both fell down with abdomen injuries. My nephew whom my pregnant sister was carrying was injured in his right thigh. My brother Kanagasingam went near my two fallen sisters and found them dead. He then went towards the soldiers weeping and told them, "you have done this injustice without any provocation. You could have committed these murders if you had recovered any weapons here or if Tigers were found here or if Tigers had done something against you". The soldiers then picked the spent bullet casings and left the place. I took my nephew who was injured in the right thigh to the IPKF camp at Udupiddy junction where he was treated in their hospital post and given some medicines. While I was there, an officer told me to give him a signed written statement to the effect that the Tigers killed my two sisters. I told him, "I am not such a fool. Your IPKF only committed these murders. The Tigers never came to my house. I will never give a distorted version" and walked out of the camp with my nephew.

SATHASIVAM YOGAMMAH (55) 151/J, Santhanamatha Church, Colombogam Road, Colombogam.

The deceased Kanthiah Sathasivam, aged 37 years was my son.

My son was employed as a lorry driver.

On 19.2.88 at about 11 a.m. I was informed that my son was shot and killled by the army at Paranthan while he was going to Kilinochi to unload some cement.

On hearing the news I rushed to Kilinochi Hospital when his body was taken by the army.

On 21.2.88 we brought his body home.

His body was cremated on the same day at Thundi cemetery Colombogam.

I have an unmarried daughter S. Parameswary aged 24 years at home besides my husband.

It was my late son who supported my family.

After his demise we are undergoing untold hardships.



SUBRAMANIAM ANJAMMAALM Andavallavu, Karaveddi West, Karaveddi.

My husband was a coolie who helps the farmers in their farms.

On 24.2.1988 my husband Mr Markandu Subramaniyam when he was coming back from the fields at Karathivu he was shot by the IPKF Armed Forces of Yakkari and died at the spot.

My husband was the sole breadwinner of my family of myself one daughter of age 13, and a son age 09.

MANIKAVALLI VELAYUTHAM (51) Ganavairavar Kovilady, Pathameni Atchuvely.

The deceased Velayutham Ravikanthan, aged 21 years was my son.

He was an advance level student and used to assist my eldest son who was a farmer.

On 25.2.88 at about 10 a.m. my son left home in his bicycle.

At about 2 p.m. army arrived at our area and began a cordon and search operation.

At about 6 p.m. I was informed that my son was shot and killed by the army near Thoppu cemetery.

On hearing the news I rushed to the scene of incident and found his body which bore a gaping wound on the right shoulder.

His body was cremated on 26.2.88 at Thoppu cemetery Navakiri.

My eldest son was also shot and killed by the army twelve days before the latter incident in which I lost my youngest son.

We are undergoing untold mental agony due to these double tragedies.

I have two daughters.

My eldest daughter was rendered a cripple after being affected by Polio while she was a child.

My husband is an invalid.

Mrs. MANUEL VICTORIA (54) Vaalkaipaddankandal, Murunkan in Mannar District.

I have been living at the above village with my paralysed husband and four children.

My oldest daughter 39 year old is disabled as she is lamo.

It was my son Sobamalai Nicholas aged 25 years, a cultivator by profession, who was providing for the entire family.

On 10.01.1988 as usual he went out to the paddyfield to keep watch over the crops from being damaged by wild animals and while he was there, he was shot dead by the security forces who had gone there on a combing out operation.

RATNASINGHAM POOMANI (47) 139, Temple Road, Nallur.

The deceased Thambiyah Nadarajah, aged 39 years a bachelor was my brother.

He was a casual labourer.

I came to know on 2.2.88 that my brother was accidentally shot and killed by the army on 11.1.88 near the Kombayan Manal cemetery while he was on his way to Anaikoddai.

I also came to know that his body was cremated by some persons at the spot when he was killed.

Gramasevaka's letter is also attached herewith.

My late brother used to contribute to our family as my husband died during a tragic accident few years ago.

I have two daughters.

ANBURAJAH GNANARANJITHAM (27) Indu Ilaijar Veethy, Avarangal, Puthur.

I am the bereaved wife of Sellar Anburajah, aged 34 years who died on 14.1.1988.

He was working as a Video Photographer.

On 14.1.88 at about 9 a.m. my husband left home in his bicycle for Neervely on an assignment.

At about 2 p.m. I was informed that my husband was shot and killed by the army at Sirupiddy WEst, Neervely.

His body was brought home by the army and handed over to me.

The cremation took place at Karathadi Avarangal.

I have three children.

After my husband's unexpected death we do not have any other income or support.

We are undergoing untold hardship at present.

GANESHALINGAM DHARSHIKA (20) C/o P. Rasiah, Kalasalai Veethy, Thirunelveli.

The deceased Thambiyah Ganeshalingam, aged 30 years was my husband.

He was employed as a driver.

We were residing at Tellipalai when the incident occurred.

On 19.1.88 at about 6 a.m. my husband was standing outside our gate.

Then I heard sounds of gunfire coming from the direction of the road.

I went outside and found my husband's lifeless body near the gate.

He had two head wounds.

I also saw an army patrol passing along the road.

At the time there was a 48 hours curfew imposed in our area.

His body was cremated at the Tellipalai cemetery on the same day.

I have an infant son named Premadasa, aged 9 months.

My child and I have been deprived of the maintenance and support we received from my husband.

I do not have any income and undergoing untold hardships.

Mrs. PREMALADEVI RATNANANDAN (31) Anivilunthan off Palaly Road, Thirunelvely.

The deceased Miss Velayuthapillai Nirmaladevi, aged 33 years was my sister.

She was residing at 30, Sivan Pannai Road, Koddadi at the time of her death.

Both our parents were killed on 7.1.87 when their house was shelled by the army.

ON 26.1.88 I was informed that my sister died due to drowning on the night of 24.1.88.

I came to know that some informed men entered her house during the night and she ran and fell into the well and drowned.

I immediately rushed to her house and found her body floating in the well.

On the same day her body was removed from the well and postmortem was held at the General Hospital Jaffna.

Her body was cremated at Vilundi Cemetery on 26.1.88

THAMOTHARAMPILLAI ACHCHIPILLAI (51) Palaly, Vasavilan.

The deceased person Sinnappu Thamotharampillai (59) was my husband.

He was a retired Hospital Attendant.

On 30.1.88 at about 8.00 a.m. my husband left home saying that he is going to the Tellipalai Rural Bank to withdraw his pension.

At about 1.30 p.m. I was informed that my husband was knocked down by an army vehicle near the Myliddy Ice Mill while on his way back from the Bank.

Immediately I went to the Palaly Army Camp where I was allowed to see my husband who was admitted in the Army Hospital unit.

He had sustained multiple injuries after being knocked down by an army truck.

At about 5.00 p.m. I accompanied my husband to the Tellipalai Hospital in an army vehicle.

On 31.1.88 morning my husband was taken to the Jaffna General Hospital in an ambulance.

He succumbed to his injuries on 3.2.88 at about 8.00 a.m.

His body was cremated at Palaly cemetery on 5.2.88.

I have two sons.

என்னிடம்
ஒரு துண்டுப் பிரசுரத்தைப் போல்
நம்பிக்கையும் முடிவும் சொல்லக்கூடிய
வார்த்தை இல்லை.
இரவு,
இரவினால் அதிகாரமிடப்பட்ட பகல்
நாளை காலையில்
சூரியன் உதிக்குமா என்பதில் கூட
சந்தேகம் கொண்டுள்ள என்னிடம்
கனவுகள்
தம் அர்த்தத்தை இழந்தவைதான்
இந்தச் சமூகத்தின் தொப்புள் கொடிக்கு
துப்பாக்கி நீட்டப்படும்போது
ஒரு மெல்லிய பூ நுனியில்
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வண்ணத்துப் பூச்சியின் கனவு
எனக்கு சம்பந்தமற்ற
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பூக்களை மரத்துடன் விட்டுவிட விரும்புகிறேன்
எனக்கு பகலால் உருவமைக்கப்பட்ட அழகிய
இரவே
கனவாய் இருக்கிறது.

— சி. சிவரமணி

CONFRONTATION

1

Some 3,000 Indian soldiers in Batticaloa district were being reinforced with troops from Trincomalee district to deal with increasing rebel resistance in the area, officials here said.

Reuter adds: Indian troops detained 134 Tamil separatists in a massive weekend operation in Sri Lanka's northern Jaffna peninsula, security sources said today.

13 soldiers injured: Thirteen Sri Lankan soldiers were wounded, two of them seriously, when Tamil militants blasted their vehicles with a landmine at Moneky bridge on the Trincomalee-Habarana road in the East today, official sources said.

Meanwhile, the IPKF shot dead a member of the LTTE in Jaffna yesterday and seized 80 grenades and some machine guns, the sources said.

A Sri Lankan Army Truck with soldiers was destroyed by mine attacks by LTTE on Kandy road in Trincomalee. All soldiers in the truck were killed.

2

COLOMBO, Feb. 2. (PTI) — The Indian Peace Keeping Force and Sri Lankan police repulsed a four-hour extensive mortar attack by LTTE cadres in Eastern Batticaloa district late last night causing considerable casualties among the militants, official sources said here today.

A police station building was damaged but there were no casualties among the Sri Lankan police or the IPKF.

Police said the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam might have suffered "considerable casualties" but did not give any specific figure as the bodies of those killed or wounded were carried away by the rebels in the jungles nearby under the cover of darkness.

The rebels, who attacked the police station with mortars and other automatic weapons, were forced to beat a retreat shortly after midnight, the sources said.

COLOMBO, Feb. 2. (PTI) — At least three members of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) were killed in a major confrontation yesterday with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in eastern Batticaloa district, the English daily **Island** reported here today.

Quoting security sources, the paper said six members of the EPRLF were abducted by the LTTE during the confrontation.

The two Tamil militant groups have fought many pratricidal battles in both north and east Sri Lanka, and on almost every occasion, the LTTE has inflicted heavy casualties on the EPRLF.

The island said that several EPRLF members had sought protection in Indian Peace Keeping Force camps in Batticaloa.

A landmine attack was carried out by LTTE in Kumpirupiti on IPKF; casualties were not known.

In poratheevu village at Mattakalapu dt. — IPKF personnel who cam in a helicopter were killed by LTTE attack.

The IPKF rounded up the village Pulipainthakal, burnt down more than 60 huts, took around 200 innocents to their camp.

3

COLOMBO, Feb. 3.

An Indian soldier and three Tamil militants were killed in separate incidents since last night in Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern Provinces, according to official sources here today.

An Indian soldier was killed and two others were wounded when an IPKF foot patrol was caught in a "terrorist Claymore mine blast" at Velapanmalai yesterday in Eastern Trincomalee district, the sources said. An LTTE member was killed during an encounter with the IPKF at Pungudutivu in Jaffna Peninsula yesterday.

After the encounter, the IPKF seized some ammunition rounds, Claymore mines, two AK 47 rifles and one 9 mm pistol from Tavadi, Telipillai and Pungudutivu areas.

In another incident at Rugamkulam in Eastern Batticaloa, Indian troops attacked a terrorist hideout and killed a fleeing Tamil rebel identified as "Johnny". One militant committed suicide during the operation, the sources said.

4

In Mannar Erukalampitti 5 IPKF men lost their lives in a confrontation with LTTE and in Vilankulam 2 more IPKF men were killed.

5

COLOMBO, Feb. 5. (UNI) — At least 19 people, including one Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) jawan and 13 militants were killed in continuing IPKF operations to disarm the Tamil militants and inter-group clashes between two rival militant groups in Sri Lanka's northern and eastern provinces during the last 24 hours, official reports said today.

The reports also indicated stepped-up operations by the IPKF in the eastern Batticaloa district against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) with the arrival of additional troops during the past few days.

With the IPKF mounting pressure on the LTTE in the district, the group retaliated today by killing a police

AUSTRALIAN BUREAU CONDEMNS BRUTALITY

In a communique issued last month, the Asian Bureau Australia suggests that pressure should be exerted on India to allow into Sri Lanka, ICRC, Amnesty and foreign fournalists. They must be allowed access to the Northern and Eastern Provinces. India must be condemned for the brutality shown against the civilians in the recent offensive. Efforts should be made to encourage India to lift the censorship and news restrictions in Tamil Nadu. There should also be attempts to communicate with politicians in Tamil Nadu in all the main parties, informing them of the Indian atrocities, and calling them to act.

Tamil refugees should not be returned to Sri Lanka against their will. The situation there is still insecure and uncertain for Tamils.

The International Community must continue to watch the events in Sri Lanka carefully.

constable and an employee attached to the Batticaloa police station for allegedly co-operating with the administration.

The bodies of the two men were found near their village at Thalkudah. A note found near the bodies said they were killed for co-operating with the civil administration in defiance of LTTE's call, the reports said.

The group also killed two alleged informants, a man and a woman, at Kulakkadu and hung their bodies on lamp-posts.

An IPKF team exchanged fire with the LTTE at Karadippoval following the arrest of an LTTE member this morning. One IPKF jawan and an LTTE man were killed in the encounter.

SHOT DEAD: The reports said another LTTE member was shot dead by the IPKF when he tried to hold up a passenger bus at Wellaveli, while a third was killed in an encounter at Chenaikudiyiruppu in the neighbouring Amparai district.

Official sources said seven militants were shot dead when the LTTE and the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOT) clashed at Cheddikulam in the northern Vavuniya district on Thursday.

The clash followed an ambush by the LTTE of a van carrying PLOT members, killing four men. The remaining PLOT members in the van returned the fire, killing three LTTE members.

At Echantivu (Batticoloa), two sections of the IPKF shot at each other in misfire and lost three of them. Out of frustration they wantonly shot dead 9 civilians.

In a confrontaion at Mallagam of Jaffna dt. 30 IPKF men were killed. 3 wounded severely. The defeated IPKF men burnt down 30 houses and killed 7 civilians.

Indian Mirage planes raided Mannar – Iluppaikadavai fishing boats on the sea. Two dead and five wounded. The raid lasted over two days.

7

COLOMBO, Feb. 7. (PTI) — Four persons — two LTTE militants and two civilians — were killed in Sri Lanka's disturbed northern and eastern provinces yesterday.

The national news agency **Lankapuvath** reported today that during IPKF mopping-up operations in the Jaffna sector, one LTTE leader named Prasad was shot dead at Chullipuram. Two pistols, 75 rounds of ammunition and a walkie-talkie were recovered from him.

In an encounter in a jungle in northern Killnochi District, another LTTE militant was killed, while his fellow-activist escaped with injuries. the news agency added. Four "terrorists" were also arrested.

Two civilians were shot dead yesterday by LTTE guerillas at Ganeshpuram in northern Mannar and at Thopur in eastern Trincomalee District. One of them, K.G. Sivalingam, was a teacher, the news agency said.

From RITA SEBASTIAN

Colombo, Feb. 7: Elayathamby Seelamanickam, 54, Assistant Government Agent of Potuvil in Batticaloa district, was killed on Sunday, allegedly by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

According to reports from Batticaloa, Mr. Seelamanickam was shot dead around 12.30 p.m. at Kallady junction, three kilometres from Batticaloa town, while he was cycling home to Navatkudah.

Landmine blast claims 9 IPKF men: According to informed sources, nine IPKF soldiers were killed in Malawi, in Mankulam, about 40 km from Vavuniya on Friday in a landmine explosion. In retaliation 25 houses are reported to have been burnt down in the vicinity of the explosion by the soldiers.

COLOMBO, Feb. 7.

Four civilians were killed and three were wounded by crossfire in clashes between Tamil rebels and the Indian Peace Keeping Force soldiers in Eastern Sri Lanka, police said today.

Four civilians injured in clashes on Friday died in hospital on Saturday, police in Batticaloa town said.

The crossfire wounded three persons when gunmen of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ambushed an Indian military jeep at Kalmunai in Batticaloa district on Saturday, police said. A 40-minute gunbattle ensued. — Reuter

8

COLOMBO. Feb 8.—Three Indian soldiers, including a JCO were injured in a landmine explosion at Juvelli in Sri Lanka's Northern sector yesterday, as the IPKF carried on search and combing operations against the Liberation Tigers guerrillas, reports PTI quoting Indian High Commission sources here today.

The IPKF also recovered one LTTE van and apprehended several militants from the North and East yesterday.

9

In a IPKF attack with mortars on a minibus near Aathicka malai, Batticoloa 2 innocent tamil passengers were killed and 6 wounded.

Two IPKF men were killed by LTTE in Mannar – Tarapuram area. Many soldiers wounded.

In an ambush at Amparai-Thambiluvil 2 IPKF men and 'Nithi' of LTTE lost their lives.

10

COLOMBO, Feb 10—Tamil guerrillas blew up a police truck killing nine constables and three civilians in north-eastern Sri Lanka today, reports AFP.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam exploded three landmines under the vehicle just outside a police post at the coastal village of Kuchchaveli in Trincomalee district.

After the blasts killed eight policemen and two unidentified civilians, two naval ratings from a nearby camp were wounded when rebels set off a surface mine and fired.

Today's 10 killings were the worst single attack against Sri Lankan forces this year. Three landmine explosions have killed four Sri Lankan soldiers and wounded about 15 in the past two weeks.

A SriLanka patrol ran into a landmine set up by LTTE at Kuchaveli in Trincomalee dt, 8 of them were killed along with 2 paramilitary men. 5 navy personnel were seriously wounded in the rescue attempt.

11

MADRAS, Feb. 11.

The Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS) today accused the ENDLF (Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front) of kidnapping three of its members in Kilinochchi district in Sri Lanka and killing them.

According to Mr. Madhavan, a spokesman of EROS here, the three EROS members were kidnapped by the ENDLF men from Paranthan in Kilinochchi in the North on February 4. They were tortured and it was believed they were dead, he added. Two of them — Subramaniam Masilamani and Velupillai Chandran — belonged to Murasumoddai in Paranthan. The third member's name was not known.

Mr. Madhavan said that PLOT (People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam) had already killed four EROS members in Vavuniya in September, 1987 and another two EROS men in January this year

COLOMBO, Feb 11.--The Indian Peace-Keeping Force tonight launched a major operation to flush out and disarm Tamil Tiger rebels, soon after an indefinite curfew was imposed in the eastern Batticaloa district, reports PTI.

The imposition of the curfew from 6 p.m. (local time) was announced tonight over the State-owned Sri Lankan Television, amidst reports of a fresh build up of the IPKF in sufficient strength, for a major search and arrest sweep against members of the LTTE.

12

Official sources today denied that six IPKF men were killed in the search operation. However, they said the deaths as reported in a section of the press, occurred in other areas.

Three IPKF men were killed when their boat met with an accident and the other three lost their lives when they were fired upon in Mulaithevu, they clarified.

Colombo, Feb. 12 (UNI): Indian troops, in massive search operations throughout Sri Lanka's curfew-bound Batticaloa district on Friday, took into custody a large number of suspected LTTE men, informed sources here said.

They said no estimate of the number apprehended was available. But a Sri Lankan police source said 87 were arrested in Batticaloa town alone. House-to-house searches were also conducted at different places for concealed weapons.

In an attack by LTTE on IPKF at a bridge near Pulipainthakkal at Matakalappu IPKF suffered casualties figures not known.

13

New Delhi, Feb. 13: Three senior LTTE leaders surrendered to the IPKF in Batticaloa yesterday during search operations in the eastern province. The three LTTE leaders are Joseph Kingsley, alias Niranjan, Punathurai, alias Vijayan, and Rathnayia Narendra Kumar. The search operations are continuing.

Two LTTE boats were sunk just off the coast near Batticaloa by naval helicopters from INS Udaigiri. The fibreglass boats, carrying LTTE cadres' were damaged and sunk when fired on by the naval helicopters. The occupants of the boat were believed drowned.

An external affairs spokesman described press reports that the LTTE leader, Mr V. Prabhakaran, was being guarded by 150 armed men as "fanciful and speculative." He also denied that Mr Prabhakaran had been arrested.

In the northern province, one EPRLF member was killed in an attack by the LTTE. In another LTTE attack, one PLOT member was injured.

According to agencies reports, over 100 Tamil guerillas have been taken into custody by the IPKF. At least 50 militants, belonging to TELO and EPRLF, have surrendered with their arms.

R.Premadasa (Prime Minister)

"As long as we depend on external assistance and external protection we will be living in a state of mental slavery. If we are not to be subservient we should have faith in our own country; in our own resources; in our own people and in ourselves."

(Daily News - 1st Feb.1988)

Col Ranjan de Silva, southern commander,Sri Lanka army

"If you can only catch a terrorist after killing 20 other people, the whole operation is counter-productive. In 99.9 per cent of operations this is what happens, and now it looks like the Indians are doing the same thing."

(Independent, 13-1-88)

"I've got nothing to hide..!"

Sudhir Dar, The Hindustan Times, 19.2.88

EROS leader injured: A top Sri Lanka militant, Mr. V. Balakumar of the Eelam Revolutionary Organisations (EROS) was injured in an attack yesterday in northern Killinochi district by another smaller group.

A sniper attack on IPKF camp near Pulugunavai, Batticoloa LTTE killed 2 IPKF men and wounded 2 soldiers.

14

According to informed sources, during operations over 3,058 persons had been screened in mobilised mass screening and house-to-house searches. Though no estimate of the number of men apprehended was available, reports said more than 150 suspected Tamil militants had been detained and these include 40 hardcore LTTE men.

Sources made it clear that search operations in which helicopter gunships and large number of troops are taking part would continue in the Batticaloa lagoon area and in nearby jungles where it is believed most of the militants are holed up.

On Friday, an LTTE activist, Kingsley Niranjan, had given himself up along with a second local leader indentified as Vijayan.

BATTICALOA, February 14 (Reuter).

THE IPKF and the LTTE men fought a fierce gunbattle near here today in which 12 rebels were killed, according to residents here.

They said the clash occurred at Eravur, 15 km north of here, while soldiers were searching for rebels. No other details were available.

Unny, The Hindu, 18.2.88

15

FOUR KILLED: Four LTTE men were killed in the past 24 hours in northern Sri Lanka and 55 other LTTE "hardcore" members were apprehended by the IPKF in eastern Batticaloa in the past three days of search operations.

30,000 screened: He said 30,000 men were screened between Friday morning and Sunday evening during the operations which were mainly concentrated in the urban limits. There were no civilian casualties, but nine LTTE men were believed killed when IPKF helicopter gunships destroyed the boats in which they were trying to get away across the lagoon.

Four militants held: Today, four top LTTE leaders were apprehended during a surprise swoop in a Batticaloa suburb. Informed souces said two had been identified as "Francis" and "Zimbo", while the other two were believed to be "Sitta" and "Sabesan". They were in the company of the Batticaloa trade union federation president, Mr. Kingsley Wasanaygam, who was also taken into custody.

"Francis" was the LTTE's political wing leader for Batticaloa till recently. While "Sitta" is commander of the group for Batticaloa town, the positions held by "Zimbo" and "Sabesan" were not known.

However, the latest reports said "Sabesan" committed suicide by swallowing cyanide while being arrested but that the IPKF foiled a similar attempt by "Sitta"

Official sources said three IPKF men and an LTTE activist were killed and five IPKF men wounded in an exchange of fire in the Vanni area in the North yesterday.

Attack beaten off: In another encounter, the IPKF and Sri Lankan forces today repulsed a Tamil militant attack on the Muttur police station in Trincomalee district, authoritative reports here said.

In a landmine attack by LTTE on IPKF jeep near Tanna munai 5 soldiers were killed on the spot. Many wounded.

19

NEW DELHI, Feb. 19 (UNI) — An IPKF gun-ship sank a fast-moving boat 25 nautical miles south of Batticaloa when it failed to respond to warning shots, official reports received here today said.

The boat's four occupants, who were drowned, included LTTE leader Gandivan. Naval patrol vessels had discovered the boat during the IPKF's operations to disarm LTTE in and around Batticaloa in the east during the past 24 hours.

Five local LTTE leaders in the Batticaloa area were arrested and one, identified as Suri, was killed. Those arrested were Vasu, Stanzi, Jaffer, Hero and Bala. The IPKF seized six AK-47 assault rifles and large quantities of arms and ammunition.

In the North, the IPKF, with the help of local civilians, kept up its search for arms and ammunition stashed away in LTTE hideouts and recovered nearly 7,000 rounds during the past 24 hours.

Two Tamil militants and two home guards were killed in separate armed clashes in Anuradhapura and Mannar districts on Thursday, PTI reports from Colombo.

20

Killed: Meanwhile Tamil militants killed a Sinhalese homeguard and unsuccessfully attacked a Sri Lankan army camp in separate incidents on Wednesday, a military spokesman here said.

LTTE militants kidnapped the homeguard during a raid on Awarantalawa village in northern Vavuniya district and later killed him, the spokesman said.

In the pre-dawn raid on an army outpost in the village, the troops did not suffer any casualty

the spokesman said, adding he did not know whether any Tamils were killed or wounded.

In a cylinder landmine attack by LTTE on the IPKF infantry at Palai village, 5 soldiers have lost their lives.

21

COLOMBO, Feb. 21.

Two Indian soldiers, including a major, were killed and four others were wounded in two land mine blasts in eastern Trincomalee and Batticaloa, official sources said here.

Mr. Subramaniam Nadarajan, a former Senator and a representative of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in the Jaffna District Development Council (DDC), was also shot dead yesterday at his home at Mallakam in the peninsula, the official Lankapuvath news agency said.

The two Indian Peace Keeping Force men were left dead when a land mine, reportedly laid by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, exploded at Ambuvellipuram in Trincomalee around 7-30 p.m. yesterday. — PTI

22

COLOMBO, Feb 22 (PTI)

Three fishermen at Welioya in Eastern Trincomalee district were yesterday reported to have been killed by LTTE militants, the national news agency Lanka Puvath said today, quoting officials.

They were killed when a gang of "LTTE terrorists" fired upon a group fishing in the Kokilai lagoon, the agency said. Two of the five fishermen escaped the bullets, reached the security post at Maradankondavil and reported the incident.

The body of Police Sargeant P S Sathasivam, who was abducted allegedly by LTTE militants last week, was found yesterday in a cemetery at Point Pedro in the Vadamarachchi area of Jaffna.

LTTE encountered IPKF at many places and killed more than 12 soldiers.

IPKF losses:

Mullaitheevu – Udayar kattu : 9
Matakalappu – Kathankudi : 1
Trincomalee – Kanya :3
Kilinochi – Udayarkattu : 6
Mannar – 4th mile post : 6
Vavuniya – Tandankulam : 1

In the above skirmishes, one LTTE cadre Mr. Kumaran was killed; Two innocent civilians were want only killed by IPKF. Many soldiers wounded.

23

COLOMBO, Feb. 23.

Eighteen persons, including four Indian Peace-Keeping Force personnel and an equal number of Tamil militants, were killed in separate incidents in Sri Lanka today, reports received here said.

Four IPKF personnel, including an officer, and a Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) militant were killed in an ambush and exchange of fire in Sri Lanka's north eastern Mullaitivu district early today, Indian and Sri Lankan sources said.

They said the incident took place near Pudukudiyiruppu but details were not available Earlier reports had said that 22 LTTE men were killed in the encounter but this could not be confirmed.

Five civilians killed: DPA quoting police sources in Batticaloa, said five civilians including two women were killed in an exchange of fire between IPKF and the Tamil militants at Kathankudy, near Batticaloa town. The report said fighting broke out when the LTTE men exploded a landmine under a IPKF vehicle injuring several soldiers.

Three persons said to be Tamil militants were killed by Peace Keeping Forces in Batticaloa town earlier today when they opened fire on a gang of curfew violators. According to police, three of the dead men had robbed a shop and were haggling over the goods when the IPKF opened fire.

Youths rounded up: During a six-hour curfew imposed in the area, the IPKF also rounded up nearly 100 youths for questioning, as part of a hunt for the elusive LTTE men, sources said.

Meanwhile, two Tamil women from the "Mothers' Front" continued their fast unto death for the fourth day in a temple in Batticaloa. They are demanding an end to military action against the tigers and talks between the LTTE and the Indians.

LTTE killed one IPKF solider at Vavuniya in an encounter out of frustration IPKF indiscriminately killed 5 innocent civilians. At Mannar – Thumpiruvil 6 IPKF – men were killed; one of them was an officer.

24

In a bitter fight between IPKF and LTTE in Pankulam – Trincomalee 3 IPKF men were killed and 3 injured.

The IPKF burnt down two houses at Iluppaikadavai, Mannar dt.

25

In Mudalikulam at Trincomalee 6 Lankan army men were killed by landmines set by LTTE. 3 wounded.

26

17 Indian army men killed in a landmine attack by LTTE. 13 injured at Sukankeni of Batticoloa.

The Indian Post

EDITORIAL

Talk to Prabhakaran

A REPORT in a Colombo based newspaper, the *Daily News*, speaks of apparent fissures in the LTTE. If the report is to be believed then a dissident faction of the Tamil Tigers will not participate in the hartal called on February 4 (Sri Lanka's Independence Day) by the militant group's leader V Prabhakaran. The *Daily News* even suggests that the 'rebel' Tiger group has come to a "tacit understanding" with some Sri Lankan ministers who are agreed with the LTTE that the Indian Peace-Keeping Force's (IPKF) presence in the island is not in the best interests of either the Tamils or the Sinhalese.

The latest news of dissent in the LTTE is bound to gladden the hearts of the IPKF battling the Tigers in Lanka and may also spark optimism in New Delhi which has been taking a lot of flak over the Indian misadventure in Jaffna. The obvious and happy conclusion to jump to is that dissent in the LTTE spells the beginning of the final disintegration of the militant group. Such an inference however may be misleading because we have heard stories of dissent among the militants before. A few months before the signing of the Indo-Lankan Accord there were rumours in Madras that there were "serious differences" between the political wing operating from the relative safety of Tamil Nadu and the guerrillas fighting it out in Jaffna. The rumours as we know had very little basis in truth for when the LTTE leaders took what many observers then felt was a suicidal stand on the Accord their cadres in Lanka backed the political leadership to the full. On that occasion, as in the past, the prophets who predicted doom were proved wrong. The Tigers have always rallied around Prabhakaran and it is likely that the present 'crisis' will also blow over. And as for dissenters we are quite aware of the ruthless manner in which the Tigers have dealt with them – public execution of 'traitors' has often been reported in the press to be repeated here. Suffice to say that the LTTE has in the past belied its critics by proving that they are great survivors. Gen Sundarji will vouch for the fact that the Tigers are not "boys" but are hardened guerrillas.

In the light of past experience it would be wrong for New Delhi to even remotely presume that the latest report of infighting in the LTTE means that the Tigers will tame themselves. No such thing may happen, at least not in the next few months. Meanwhile the Indian peace keeping effort in Lanka which is already involving financial inputs to the tune of reportedly Rs 2 crores a day will have to continue. This is not a burden that the country can shoulder for long.

Peace, we have learnt the hard way, cannot be achieved by force. We also know by now that any bid to bring normalcy in Lanka has to involve Prabhakaran and his Tigers. New Delhi, from the time of the drafting of the Accord, has attempted to side-step Prabhakaran rather than come to a settlement with him. But it is still not too late to reopen talks with the LTTE and the Prime Minister would indeed be doing a great salvaging act if he invites Prabhakaran and other militant leaders to Delhi to talk things out.

In this context, if the *Daily News* report is true (concession has to be made for the fact that it is a state-owned newspaper), and there is dissension in the LTTE, then the time seems ripe to start a dialogue with the militants. It is quite likely that the so-called 'rebels' in the LTTE leadership who feel that the situation in Jaffna is getting out of hand because of the bloodshed may prevail upon Prabhakaran to respond positively to a call for peace talks with New Delhi.

TAMILS PREVENTED FROM SETTLING DOWN

Tamil families which were uprooted from their homes during the recent wave of violence are continuing to roam from place to place as destitutes and vagrants. Hundreds of hill-country Tamil families that went and settled down in Thambalakamam Pier area after the 1977 communal violence were driven away from their homes during the 1983 communal riots. These families tried to get back to their homes after the signing of the peace accord. But they were not allowed to do so.

The lands in which they were living have been vested with the Port Development Authority. These families remain in refugee camps.

27

Two IPKF men killed: Two IPKF personnel were killed and many others wounded when the LTTE blew up their vehicle with a landmine at Muttur in the Eastern Trincomalee district today, the national newsagency Lankapuwath reported.

Quoting official sources, it said in another landmine blast yesterday three IPKF men were wounded when their vehicle, going from Batticaloa to Kiran, ran into a landmine at Ottamavadi.

At Mudur – Pachanur, LTTE attacked IPKF by setting landmines, killing 10 soliders and wounding 14. At Pudukudiyiruppu, the LTTE Leader Mathaiya's house was burnt down by IPKF and another house was blown up.

28

COLOMBO, Feb. 28.

Five IPKF personnel were killed and 16 wounded, four of them seriously, when their vehicle hit a landmine planted by the LTTE at Pachchnur in eastern Trincomalee district yesterday, Sri Lankan military sources said today. Earlier reports had said that three IPKF men were killed and 18 injured in the blast.

The sources said one IPKF officer and two soldiers were seriously wounded when their vehicle ran into a landmine at Chavakacheri, 20 km east of the northern Jaffna town.

In another incident yesterday, an LTTE hardcore member, "Vicky," was arrested during search operations.

The sources also said a local leader of the LTTE at Mullaitivu, who went by the name of "Sri" killed himself by swallowing a cyanide capsule on being apprehended by the IPKF.

In an encounter between LTTE and IPKF at Mallavi, Kilinochi 3 IPKF men were shot dead. One innocent civilian was killed by IPKF.

வீர வணக்கம்

LTTE MARTYRS

	Suresh 5.2.88	Capt. Nathan 18.2.88
Gnani 2..2.88	Nithi 9.2.88	Capt. Thiruchelvam 18.2.88
Prasad 5.2.88	Soori 18.2.88	Capt. Bharath 18.2.88
	Kumaran 18.2.88	Capt. Sabesan 18.2.88
	Lt.Col. Pandian 18.2.88	Capt. Rathish 18.2.88
	Maj. Murali 18.2.88	Capt. Gandhi 18.2.88
	Maj. Ashok 18.2.88	Dharmendra 14.2.88
	Maj. Paseelan 18.2.88	Murali 24.2.88
	Maj. Prasad 18.2.88	Durai 5.2.88

2nd Lt. Gnani

உடைவளை கடுப்ப மலர்ந்த காந்தள்
அடைமல்கு குளவியொடு கமழும் சாரல்
மறப்புலி உடலின், மான்கணம் உளவோ?
மருளின விசும்பின் மாதிரத்து ஈண்டிய
இருளும் உண்டோ, ஞாயிறு சினவின்?
அச்சொடு தாக்கிப் பாருற்று இயங்கிய
பண்டச் சாகாட்டு ஆழ்ச்சி சொல்லிய,
விரிமணல் ஞெமரக், கல்பக நடக்கும்
பெருமிதப் பகட்டுக்குத் துறையும் உண்டோ?
எழுமரம் கடுக்கும் தாள்தோய் தடக்கை
வழுவில் வன்கை, மறவர் பெரும!
இருநில மண்கொண்டு சிலைக்கும்
பொருநரும் உளரோ, நீ களம் புகினே?

ஔவையார்

2nd Lt. Sivam 1.2.88

Maj. Prasad



Lt. Col. Pandian

Durai 5.2.88

Nithi 9.2.88

KILLING FIELD 88 February

claims	IPKF KILLED	IPKF WOUNDED	LTTE KILLED	LTTE WOUNDED	S.L. ARMY KILLED	S.L. ARMY WOUNDED	OTHER MILITANTS KILLED	OTHER MILITANTS WOUNDED	CIVILIANS KILLED	CIVILIANS WOUNDED
IPKF			1	134 c		13				
LTTE										
MEDIA										6 c

2

						3* EP	6c* EP		
		1							

3

1	2	3							
									19 c

4

7									
									15c

5

1		13						5	
32	3	2						18	
								27	

6

									40 c

7

9*		2*						3*	

8

	3								

9

4		1						2	6

10

				9				3	
				10	5				

11

								3c	

12

6				87c*					
			12	32c					

13

				3c			1	100 c	
2	2								

14

			12	40 c				110 c	

15

3		5	55c						
5									

16

								12	20

18

			13						

19

			7	4	2				

20

					1				
5									

21

2	4							1*	

22

				1*				3*	2*
26								2	

23

4	6	23						5	
7								5	

24

3	3								

25

					6	3			

26

7	13								

27

2	3*								
10 14									

28

5*	16*	1*	1c*						
3								1	

29

2	1c	11							

30

31

TOTAL

33	34	67	5 23 2c	100	13	4	219	20	2		
111	35	17		16	8			27	6		
2	1c	23	32 c					39	20 80c		

* - Sri Lankan Information.c-captured. EP-EPRLF T-TELO, P:PLOTE, EN-ENDLF. E-EROS TNA-Tamil National Army CVF-Citizen s Voluntary Force

Data in this columns are based only on the official statements issued by IPKF and LTTE. Media reports based on CRP and Jaffna dailies.

CHAPTER 9

1988

the heinous crimes of indian peace keeping

March



REPORT

The Indians will never be able to win this war

BY CHRIS EAMES

THE lives of Tamil refugees will be placed in jeopardy if they are deported back to Sri Lanka.

This was the finding of Swiss journalist Erich Schmid when he went to Sri Lanka to report for the opposition newspaper 'Die Wochenzeitung' (Woz).

His visit was organised after the Swiss government announced that 1,500 Tamil refugees in the country would be repatriated in April.

He managed to get to the Tamil homeland in the north of the Island, and has produced the first truthful account by a foreign journalist of the atrocities by the Indian army, which invaded in October 1987.

The Indian forces were sent to the north to do the job which the goons of Sri Lankan president Junius Jayewardene failed to do, crush the liberation struggle for Tamil Eelam.

Schmid reports, however, that the Indian forces, who expected their job to be over in a matter of days, 'will never be able to win this war', as the whole Tamil people support the LTTE fighters.

'Since October 1987, at least 5,000 Tamils have lost their lives in the artillery and tanks fights of the dirty war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),' Schmid writes in a report of his visit.

'In January 1988, we from the "Woz" manage to get to Jaffna and to have a look around the capital of the peninsula and its surroundings.

'Before the massive attacks by the Indians, about one million people used to live in that area.

'What we see is in total contrast to all the existing reports, both from Sri Lanka and Indian sources.

'Since October 1987 about half a million Tamils have fled and taken refuge either overseas or with relatives in less dangerous districts of the country.

'Around 20 per cent of all the buildings in Jaffna Town, a place where 200,000 people dwelt once, have been totally destroyed. In the suburbs the percentage may rise up to 80 per cent.

'The people . . . are afraid of the Indian troops behind their sandbags at every street corner, controlling the passers-by and apparently willing to stay on for a long time . . .

'The Sri Lanka police and armed forces have disappeared altogether. People find themselves at the mercy of Indian Special Forces, trained in the riots of the Punjab, Nagaland and Bangladesh.'

Schmid writes that: 'People can neither communicate nor move about freely, with the exception of a few who have got special passports issued by the IPKF.

'So people in general at the best know what is happening in their neighbourhood, in the area between two checkpoints.

'People live in an atmosphere of uncertainty, dread and fear, afraid that it would be their turn again on the very next day.'

'Before the attacks on the LTTE controlled areas on October 10, 1987, the Indian radio stations had ordered the inhabitants of Jaffna to go to the checkpoints. But people had looked for refuge in Hindu temples and schools.

'Those who had a radio set had stayed at home. Those who managed to run away in time were gunned down in the street.

'The reason for this given by the Indians was that from mid-October to the end of November there was a total curfew for 24 hours a day. In those days everything moving in the streets was shot at, even those people fleeing out of their collapsing houses.

'Almost all the people one meets today in the streets of Jaffna could name at least 10 people who died in this way.

'During this one month curfew many people entirely lacked food, water and medicines. In the camps a 'ot of children thus died of diarrhoea.'

Schmid visited Jaffna District Hospital where noone was willing to speak about the events of October.

'Eventually we get a whispered report from a doctor: "While the IPKF artillery grenades hit the surgical department on October 21, all the 400 patients fled to the entrail department, many had to be carried, there was absolute chaos.

' "We had fled there already the other three times before, when the Sri Lanka Armed Forces had shot at the hospital.

' "The patients were lying on the floor and the staircase when the Indian soldiers made an assault at the hospital on October 21. Like mad they shot at the crowd with scattered fire. Ninteen nurses, three doctors and 47 patients died, dozens were injured.

' "The Indians had thought the Tigers had hidden among the patients. As a matter of fact they had only passed by the hospital on their retreat. When the Indians arrived the guerillas had run off long ago".

'Indian Brigadier Manjit, responsible for that district gives us a totally different account of the incident: According to him the Tigers shot at his men; and as the Tigers did not wear any uniforms they looked exactly like, doctors, nurses and patients. "So the soldiers just fired at everybody around".'

'On the second day of our horror-trip through Jaffna, on January 4, 1988, the IPKF — known among the people here as the Innocent Peoples Killing Forces — ordered the reopening of the schools in order to show that everything is back to normal.

'The LTTE, on the other hand, called for a boycost. And so the schools remain empty.'

Schmid reports that 'the IPKF is met by the local Tamils with nothing but hatred, which is hidden, however. No one wants to be alleged of LTTE-sympathies.

Yet, inspite of all the IPKF's repression, arrests, controls and searchings they quite clearly sympathise with the well-organised LTTE, who have never any difficulties in finding hideouts, from where they can launch their next mortar-attacks at IPKF strongholds

'Nowadays it seems as if the Indians will never be able to win this war. The battle has been going on for three and a half months now, without anybody being able to see light at the end of the tunnel.

'Quite clearly peace will only be reached by means of political negotiations with the LTTE-leaders. Prabhakaran has offered them several times — each time they were rejected by Rajiv Gandhi.'

Schmid passed on his information to the Swiss ambassador in Colombo, the Sri Lankan capital in the south of the Island.

He agreed that Schmid's reports were accurate and: 'He utters the opinion that Switzerland would have "exposed itself to severe ridicule" throughout the world if a greater number of Tamils had already been repatriated.

Schmid took a camera crew to Sri Lanka and has brought back a video of what he saw in the north.

He told News Line that he would protest against the decision of British Tory Home Secretary Douglas Hurd to send six Tamil refugees back to Sri Lanka.

'I hope that it is not a test case to send more back' Schmid said. 1.3.88.

SRI LANKAN SITUATION CONCERNS THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

LETTER

THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, DR EMILIO CASTRO HAS SENT SEPARATELY THE FOLLOWING APPEAL TO H. E. AMBASSADOR RODRIGO, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SRI LANKA, GENEVA AND H. E. AMBASSADOR TEJA, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDIA, GENEVA:

"Your Excellency, You may recall the statement issued by the World Council of Churches on 15th October 1987 in which we expressed our concern on the situation in the Jaffna peninsula in Sri Lanka. We have now received the following information from sources which we fully trust. The information was sent on 2nd November but it reached us only the last weekend:

1. The whole of Jaffna peninsula is without electricity for more than three weeks, with all consequences that follow from it.

2. There has been a perpetual 24 hour curfew in the peninsular from the 15th October. It has been relaxed only for a few hours a day for the last few days within the Jaffna Municipal limits. This has meant a serious problem for the wounded. The dead cannot be given a decent burial or cremation. People are unable to obtain their provision. There is a standstill of all transport. All communications have been paralysed.

3. The Indian forces, contrary to all public statements put by the official media, have engaged in indiscriminate shelling and aerial attacks. At least 500 civilians have been killed so far and about 8000 injured. To mention a few instances:

a) The Government hospital was attacked by Indian army and one of the victims who escaped with serious injuries told us that at least 200 were killed in the hospital. This included a few nurses and few doctors.

b) A refugee camp in Kokuvil Hindu College was attacked and about thirty were killed.

c) Passengers at a jetty in Araly travelling to cross over to the island on the other side for safety were attacked by air and about 30 of them were killed.

d) Hospitals including the Government hospital at Tellipalai and private hospital and mission hospitals have been shelled and forced to close down. Mission hospital at Manipay was shelled and one staff member was killed. There were more than 300 refugees at that time, in addition to the patients and staff. The hospital remains closed for the last few weeks.

4. The indiscriminate shelling has led to nearly 400,000 refugees within the peninsula. The homes they fled from have been damaged by shelling and often looted. Because of the curfew the NGOs including the churches which are trying to help are unable to get provisions for the refugee camp.

5. Since banks and post offices are closed, there is an acute problem of money transaction.

All this will convince you that the innocent civilians are the victims of this operation.

We request you to be kind enough to transmit this information to your government, conveying our deep concern about the suffering of the people in the region.

We appeal to your government to take immediate steps for reconciliation and relief and to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations to provide assistance to the people in the area.

We reiterate our appeal to seek ways to end the fighting and to renew efforts for negotiations and political settlement.

We are making a similar letter to the permanent representatives of the Governments of India and Sri Lanka.

Assuring you of our highest consideration."

DECCAN HERALD

EDITORIAL

Sri Lankan imbroglio

THE KILLING OF scores of Sinhalese civilians by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam last week, the 17-day-old fast by a member of the Mothers Front at Batticoloa and the Indian army's resort to extreme measures to foil a hostile demonstration are all grim reminders of the explosive situation that prevails in Sri Lanka. Indian condemnations of the LTTE's senseless acts are beginning to sound hollow. Indeed, the Government of India has virtually forfeited the right to condemn the LTTE's excesses.

It is good that Colombo and New Delhi have dropped the pretence that they are in a position to go through with the provincial council elections in the island. The elaborate charade that began with President J.R. Jayewardene's visit to New Delhi for the Republic Day celebrations was an exercise in self-deception. On his return to Colombo Mr. Jayewardene announced dates for filing of nominations for the provincial councils to create the impression that the stalled process of implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan pact was being revived. The harsh reality of the Sri Lankan situation is that conditions for holding free and fair elections do not exist. While provincial councils are proposed to be set up all over the island, the whole concept was evolved in order to satisfy the Tamil minority's demand for autonomy. Since even the moderate Tamil United Liberation Front found the scheme for devolution of powers unsatisfactory, it was necessary to improve upon it before holding the elections. Moreover, the Tamil-majority Northern and Eastern provinces are now virtually under the occupation of the Indian army. The search-and-destroy operations that are still being conducted, mostly under curfew, belie the official claim that its role is one of peace-keeping. Even in the Sinhala-majority areas genuine elections are well-nigh impossible. The main Opposition, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, has stated that it will not participate in the elections. This leaves the field clear for the ruling United National Party, but it cannot find enough brave men willing to offer themselves as candidates, knowing that the extremist Janata Vimukti Peramuna's gunmen will be looking out for them. This explains why Mr. Jayewardene has decided to hold elections in only four of the nine provinces. It should cause no surprise if he abandons the polls in these provinces too. There is little point in constituting provincial councils for them alone.

The Government of India should give serious thought to the situation in which it finds itself. Some recent statements by responsible individuals, pointing to the heavy casualties suffered by the Indian army as justification for prolonging its stay in the island, are extremely disturbing, for they are predicated on imperial notions which are hard to sustain in today's conditions, as even the world's mightiest powers have discovered at great cost to themselves. Getting Tamils in Jaffna to line up before the television cameras and hail the Indian soldiers as saviours may be passable as an essay in psychological warfare, but we should guard against becoming victims of our own propaganda.

Even after the virtual decimation of its cadres by the Indian army, the LTTE holds the key to the ethnic problem in the island. This is why powerful elements in the Sri Lankan establishment are willing to explore the possibility of a settlement with it. In the circumstances the oft-repeated Indian position that there can be no dialogue with the LTTE until its leadership comes in sackcloth and ashes is untenable. Prudence demands that India should encourage the Sri Lankan Government to set up an interim administration for the Tamil areas which is representative of all sections of opinion so that conditions are created for the return of our troops with honour.

NEWS

A break with custom for IPKF

Express News Service

Madras, March 1: A spurt in the entry of dutiable goods brought from Sri Lanka by some Indian army officers has led to the introduction of unusual Customs check at the military airbase at Tambaram.

Informed sources said the Defence Department requested the Customs to send a team of officers to check the average six military flights a day arriving from Jaffna, mostly carrying middle level IPKF officials.

There is considerable resentment among the defence officers, most of whom land at the Tambaram airbase in normal weather. Defence officials are puzzled by the continued arrival of dutiable goods from Jaffna even after the markets there closed in the wake of armed conflicts with LTTE.

Soon after the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement, many electronic items like VCRs, stereos and television sets of Japanese make were available at throwaway price in the Jaffna markets. Indian army officers were welcomed by the Tamils and even given discounts for purchases they made with Indian rupees. Bringing them to the mainland was not a problem as Tambaram was a 'free' air base.

Since October 1987, however, Jaffna shops have been closed, some even destroyed in the conflict. Even essentials are scarce, and their prices have shot up.

The Tambaram Customs post, however, came into force only recently, "on the invitation of the Defence Department", according to Customs sources. Three officers are posted there. Navy officers who visit foreign ports routinely face Customs check when they return. At Meenambakkam airport, however, senior defence personnel can pass through a special enclosure without Customs check. Indian Express 1.3.88

EDITORIAL

NO TIME FOR POSTURING

The last few weeks have witnessed, even by Sri Lanka's standards, a spectacularly high rise in the killing and counter-killing of civilians in the eastern province, and more so in the Trincomalee district. Defenceless infants, children, men, women and old people have been ruthlessly killed in an orgy of unparalleled savagery. Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese have been killed. Many people have fled from their homes in fear and thousands have been added to the ever-rising refugee population. But the attacks and counter-attacks have continued unabated.

Whatever may be the objective of these killings, they cannot be justified under any circumstances. Whoever may be their perpetrators, they must be condemned unconditionally. Neither the excuse that it is inevitable that in a war some civilians deaths are inevitable, nor the explanation that some members of the present generation have to pay with their lives in the interest of future generations can be accepted in the case of the present wave of killings. The victims have neither died in a cross-fire nor have they died in the course of a struggle for a better future. They have been killed in their homes or in buses while travelling.

These killings have continued to occur despite the presence of thousands of troops belonging to the Indian Peace Keeping Force. Up to now the Sri Lankan troops in the Tamil areas have been confined to their barracks under the terms of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement. However the escalating body count of civilian victims and the high turnout of refugees from the eastern province have created an atmosphere in which the clamour for the deployment of Sri Lankan troops for the protection of the civilian population has become more and more strident. The recent visit by Minister Gamini Dissanayake accompanied by Service Chiefs to New Delhi and their discussions with Indian leaders would appear to have been aimed at urging New Delhi to agree to such deployment of Sri Lankan troops in the eastern province. Although not confirmed in New Delhi, reports in the Sri Lankan media indicate that India has agreed to allow the Sri Lankan troops to play a role in support of the IPKF. In other words, contrary to the Indo-Sri Lankan accord, they are to be permitted to go out and engage in military operations under the guise of protecting the civilians. This constitutes a dangerous development to the people of the eastern province. They have experienced almost four years of death and destruction at the hands of the Sri Lankan troops. Hundreds of villages and thousands of homes were destroyed. People taken into custody disappeared without trace. People were shot in the streets and homes. Such incidents were a daily routine. The people of the eastern province do not deserve a repeat-performance.

Although brought to end under questionable circumstances, the fast unto death by the 58-year old Mrs. Annammah David of the Batticaloa Mothers' Front was poignantly symbolic of the deep desire of the people for a return to peace after years of trauma and tragedy. The Front's two demands, namely that there should be a cease-fire in the fighting between the LTTE and the IPKF and that negotiations between India and the LTTE should restart are an unambiguous manifestation of the people's thirst for peace. The wide support the action of this self-sacrificing woman received, reflected the deep-felt heartache of the people for an end to the fighting and violence. The profound significance of this action and the genuinness of the demands it advanced have not been diminished by the suspicious circumstances in which the fast was brought to an end.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has accepted the Front's demands and in a letter to the Indian Prime Minister has pledged to cooperate in the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord and expressed its readiness for unconditional talks. Indian leaders have repeatedly asserted that they too are seeking political solution. If that is what they want, it is not beyond them to arrange for a cease-fire and recommence negotiations. This is no time for political posturing for propaganda purposes by either party. This is not the time nor the Tamil areas are the place for the IPKF to experiment or gain experience in the art of combating urban guerilla warfare. Nor can the Tamil people endure a prolonged display of the capacity by Tamil militants to wield their AK47s, Kalashnikovs and landmines. The body count of Tamil militants, IPKF personnel and above all of the defenceless unarmed civilians are mounting daily. The tragedy has been played too long. India and the LTTE have a duty to put an end to this ongoing tragedy and give peace and the people a chance.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

Calcutta Diary

COMMENT

Ashok Mitra

ANOTHER economic survey, another budget. Window-dressing with words, window-dressing of figures. The usual comments by economists and financial experts, conventionally so described. The usual discussions will duly take place in parliament, much in the manner of canned music.

The estimates in the budget and the excruciating pressures the economy is being subjected to are related as much to the gory carnival in Punjab as to the expansionary ambitions of our humble great Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka. Our high commissioner in Sri Lanka has showed his fangs: peace will not be allowed to break out in that island, the people of the island, the Tamils and the Sinhalese, cannot reach any private deals unless these are in conformity with our pan-imperial goals. Few amongst our political parties or their representatives in parliament will dare to draw attention to the causality existing between events and events, even if such parties are labelled as the opposition and are at the moment busy organising a nation-wide strike to protest against the government's alleged venality and incompetence. There is a code of behaviour whose transgression Hindu religious formalism will frown upon. You have created a mess within; to cover up for that, create a mess across the Straits of Palk, the cost to the nation is no consideration. A theory is at work. Never mind if you are not in fact strong, you must behave as if you are. This conforms to a hoary old feudal tenet: appearances are all. The distinction between what is affordable and what is not therefore disappears. One-half of this nation may every night go to bed—or to the apology of a bed—hungry and horrendously under-nourished, the nation's military expenditure must nonetheless mount year by year. Defence spending is the pretence of strength; such subsidiary functions as that it helps the lining of private pockets are only incidental. The bravado of those in charge is the deciding factor, and it bleeds the nation to debility. As long as the nation does not learn to protest, defence expenditure will continue to expand, and words and figures will continue to be so woven as to demonstrate to the neighbourhood innocents that retrogression is progress and across-the-border aggression is genteel peace-keeping.

Punjab, which produced some of the greatest heroes and martyrs during the nation's struggle for freedom, has been almost written off. About everybody agrees that she is in agony, about everybody agrees that the policy pursued over the years has proved totally counter-productive, but, since in our end is our beginning, nothing changes, the killings go on, the young people who are bailed out have their bail cancelled, and a minister pompously declares that it is a war which has to be fought to the finish. A war against whom? Against our own young men and women? Will it not then make more sense to declare the war more formally, so that at least some segments of this great nation are made aware that there has been a mix-up, they do not really belong here, the government has declared war on their children, and since their children belong to them and they belong to the children, they are aliens in this country, each one amongst them is a suspect? Some of them bitterly complain in private that they indeed are treated as suspects and criminals at large. Some of them even go the length of wryly suggesting that, yes, it is indeed war, a patriotic war between an external power and their own people, and a quisling from amongst them has been installed as home minister.

The pattern does not vary. The same elements, who have made a hash of things at home, proceed across the Palk Straits to repeat the folly. The hypothesis remains unchanged: the terrorists in Punjab are a bare couple of thousands, the general populace hates them; similarly, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are bereft of any influence amongst the Sri Lanka Tamils; if they still succeed in closing down Jaffna and Batticoloa, that is because they are bullies, and ordinary citizens are mortally afraid of bullies. On a lilliputian scale, but it is still megalomania at work. Messrs Reagan and Gorbachev are both extraordinarily deferential to us, one praises our economic policy, the other goes into raptures over our foreign policy, we have a standing army of over a million, we have tested successfully air to ground missiles as well as sophisticated delivery systems, we are therefore entitled to forget the niceties of international behaviour and treat Sri Lanka as just another Punjab or another Tripura. The possible susceptibilities of other people do not bother us. After all, it is our own backyard, so says Reagan, it is agreed to by Gorbachev, we therefore make our own rules here. Sri Lanka's regular army consists of a bare twelve thousand men; we have already hauled across fifty thousand—or is it seventy thousand?—of our troops to that hapless island, and more are supposed to land soon. The situation is analogous to what it would be should four or five million American or British or French or Chinese army personnel go on the rampage in our country. Whether they did so with the prior approval of our president or prime minister would then be a minor point. If four or five million foreign troops make a habit of settling down in our India, it would be pure, proud patriotism which will impel the countrymen, and display an activism more than simply the catharsis of emotions. But Sri Lankans are not Indians; it is presumptive on their part to claim to be subject to the same metabolism as ours.

They may have their pride, but we have our ego, therefore Sri Lanka has to be destroyed. We, once upon a time, started a certain game in Punjab; gradually, we lost control over it. But, we, the government of the sovereign socialist secular domocratic republic of India, cannot afford to admit this fact even to ourselves. Punjab too therefore has to be bled to death. What implications Punjab's slow bleeding to death will have for the rest of the nation is a matter of conjecture which need not detain us; a government which works faster cannot afford the luxury of philosophising on the consequences of its actions. It has other occupations and preoccupations. Such as, for instance, Tripura. Now that the elections are over and the state has been snatched back from the left infidels, the TNV insurgents have disappeared like magic. The coincidences are truly remarkable. Murder and mayhem herald the prime minister's pre-election visit; the prime minister is incensed, a pall of righteous indignation hangs over his countenance, he returns to New Delhi and orders the army in just two days before the onset of the poll, the army succeeds in restoring law and order, it succeeds in managing the election too. No TNV marauders raid Tripura hamlets any more, no dogs bark either. Made-to-order disturbances follow by made-to-order peace. Who knows whether the Ghising phenomenon up in Darjeeling does not bear the same inspiration, yet another simulation of the original Bhindranwale model? The model did not quite click in Punjab, but one non-swallow does not make a non-summer, it has apparently succeeded in Tripura, and it might yet do the trick in West Bengal. The nation marches on.

The opposition is befuddled. The terrorists in Punjab, it has been decided unanimously, are a threat to the nation's integrity. The opposition must not fall into the trap, they must not, by their act and demeanour, ever provide hostage to the suspicion that they are less patriotic than the government. Barring ritualistic references to the need for a political initiative in addition to what is being currently done, they accordingly keep their silence. Apropos of Sri Lanka too, our troops obviously cannot be let down. A wise decision or a bad one, they are already there in the island, and to criticise their presence could contribute to demoralisation, the sovereign socialist secular democratic republic's loyal opposition cannot be a party to the eventuation of such a possibility. Their uneasiness is therefore confined to raising a few tepid

questions on the floor of parliament, or not even that. As for Tripura, there is an attitude of ambivalence; since the leftists have been brought down a peg or two, whatever the method followed, why not savour the situation for one or two brief moments, consideration of the implications over the long run might as well wait?

The institutions are there, but they reduce themselves to irrelevance. As everybody knows, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission these days concerns itself with the grave issue of distribution of fake degrees. The opposition similarly is there, but it has rendered itself irrelevant. An emboldened government will therefore increasingly take the lawless road, the logo of amorality will be planted as its emblem, adventurers operating under the government's protection, flustered initially by exposes of their shady doings, will vacate their public office, but, having gauged the will and strength of the opposition, will return as all-conquering shahenshahs. Their ethos will in due time capture the imagination of the nation's young; their apparel already has. A school boy, barely sixteen years of age, will murder his class-mate in cold blood for an altogether frivolous reason; he will plead that he has imbibed the lesson of instant justice from the current box office hit of a feature film, and is not the dispenser of instant justice the confidant of the nation's highest? A judge will remonstrate with a police constable who has come to give evidence without bothering to don the proper uniform; the constable will return to the barracks, collect a crowd of his peers and come back to beat up the judge. Somewhere else in this noble land of ours, another batch of policemen, out on a night's romp, will raid a village, drive away the menfolk and rape the women, as if such pastimes belong to the most natural order. Neither scruples nor laws nor rules nor conventions will matter any more. You will be allowed to utter the most outrageous inexactitudes in the economic survey, you will be expected to fudge your figures all the way in your presentation of the annual budget. Characters in the proximity of the government, nearly everybody will agree, have filched hefty sums, either as bribes or as commission; but the pretence has to be kept up, you cannot call the corrupt crowd corrupt, they, do not you know, follow the ideals of Mahatma Gandhi; at long last, Mahatma Gandhi has received his just deserts.

The point has been missed. Even an exasperated Shankar Dayal Sharma only offers to resign. He does not resign. None under the Indian sun dares to leave the lawless road. I belong, you belong, they belong, we will, together, proceed towards our collective doom. Meanwhile, in parliament, there will be a general discussion on the budget, attention will be drawn to its production-stimulating features.

LETTER

UNITARY STATE - A COLONIAL LEGACY

J.Visvanathan, Harrow

President Jayewardene, in that famous BBC World Service Phone-in on February 7, stated, "Sri Lanka has been a Unitary State from time immemorial, from 6th century BC."

I should like to tell him that the **TAMILS had a separate kingdom in the Northern and Eastern parts of Ceylon from about 350 BC, over 2200 years ago.** They held suzerainty over these areas for almost 2000 years until 1591 AD, except for two brief periods from 161 to 137 BC, and 1169 to 1186 AD. Thereafter their suzerainty continued uninterruptedly till the arrival of European powers. Briefly, European involvement lasted 443 years, as follows:-

A.D. 1505 - The Portuguese captured the western maritime provinces from the Sinhalese Kings.

1591 - The Portuguese captured the Tamil Kingdom which was ceded to them by the Nallur Convention.

1638 - The Dutch captured Trincomalee.

1640 -The Dutch captured Negombo and Galle.

1658 - The Dutch captured the Tamil Kingdom after a siege of Jaffna for 3 1/2 months.

1795 - Jaffna, Trincomalee and Kalpitiya surrendered to the British.

1796 - Colombo surrendered to the British.

1802 -British conquest of Ceylon confirmed by the Treaty of Amiens.

1815 - The Kandyan Kingdom surrendered to the British. (The last King of Kandy was a Tamil), Until

1815, Ceylon had between one and four kingdoms at various times, always including a Tamil Kingdom.

1833 - The British commenced ruling the whole island as a single administrative unit instead of two or three separate units as had been thecase up to that time. The "Unitary State" is really a colonial legacy, and the so-called unity of the country was only a union of administrations rather than an integration of two peoples.

R.K. Lakshman, Times of India 24.3.88

TAMILS ADDRESS RAJIV

LETTER

An appeal to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was submitted by a cross-section of Sri Lankan Tamils, calling for, among other things, cease-fire, protection of LTTE cadres and Tamil civilian population, release of political detainees, establishing a unified provincial administration for North and East, early resettlement of refugees, stoppage of Sinhala colonisation of North and East. The signatories include prominent politicians, academics, professionals, clergy and others. The full text is reproduced.

This memorandum comes to you signed by a cross-section of Sri Lankan Tamils, who in the past represented varying shades of Tamil opinion; but in submitting this appeal to you **we are united on certain common ideals, assessments and viewpoints.**

We share the firm conviction that the future of the Tamils is inextricably linked with India's geopolitical interests in the Indian Ocean region. We consider it an article of faith that we the Tamils should help safeguard these interests of a country which from time immemorial has been our emotional motherland and which has nourished our culture and our ethos.

While we appreciate that **the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement provided a basis for the protection and furtherance of Tamil rights, and though the Tamils were not without reservations in regard to the adequacy of certain features,** in the overall context, and particularly in view of your enunciation in Tamil Nadu on the 2nd August, 1987, of the content of the political entitlement of the Tamils under the Agreement, the Tamils felt reassured.

It is in this spirit that the **Tamils indicated a willingness to cooperate in the implementation of the Agreement, the signing of which was in no small measure the consequence of a 30-year old struggle for Tamil rights.** We also believe that the success of the Agreement hinges upon a just resolution of the Tamil question.

While assuring Your Excellency of our deepe respect to you personally, to the mighty nation that you head, and to the Indian people with whom we are linked by religious, ethnic and cultural ties, **we wish to express our profound distress and feelings of anguish over happenings on our soil in recent times.**

The state of confrontation between the LTTE and the IPKF - whatever the chain of circumstances that led to it - has resulted in:-

(a) Death and injury to a considerable number of civilians;

(b) Severe deprivation and suffering to hundreds of thousands of civilians;

(c) A regrettably large destruction of civilian property;

(d) Death and injury to hundreds of IPKF and LTTE cadres;

(e) A traumatic experience for Tamils living in their own soil, as well as thousands of their kith and kin scattered in all parts of the world.

These unfortunate happenings notwithstanding, we assure you, your Excellency, that **our firm faith in the Government and people of India remains unshaken.**

While we hold that the tragic situation in which our people find themselves today has been brought about by a series of acts of bad faith and breaches of the Agreement by the Sri Lankan government, we are also made painfully aware that the present confrontation in the North-East **has provided the Sri Lanka Government the required distraction to further default in the fulfilment of its obligations under the Agreement.**

With a view to ending the present impasse, and to arrest a growing sense of alienation among the Tamil people (a process that will eventually harm our own interests), we fervently make the following appeal to you:-

(1) That the healthy and helpful climate that was brought about by the 48-hour suspension of operations following the handing over of the IPKF personnel be restored We believe that at this point of time, a magnanimous gesture on the part of your government through the declaration of a further suspension of operations, but of a longer duration, could provide the ripe opportunity for efforts towards a peace process to gather momentum, and to help evoke a positive and unequivocal response on the part of the LTTE.

(2) That to facilitate such a response from the LTTE -

(a) **the Government of India guarantee the protection of LTTE cadres, all militants and the civilian population;**

(b) the Government of India guarantee the restoration of the amnesty to LTTE cadres and the revocation of the monetary reward offered for the arrest of the LTTE leader.

(3) That the Government of India ensures that the amnesty provisions are duly observed and **all political and other prisoners held in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other Emergency laws in respect of offences related to the ethnic problem be released.**

(4) That the Government of India ensure that the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and the para-military forces are not deployed for any purpose whatsoever in any part of the Northern-Eastern provinces.

(5) That steps be taken for the establishment of a unified popular administration for the territory comprising the Northern-Eastern provinces, to facilitate early resettlement

and rehabilitation of the refugees and to exercise all other functions related to the needs of the people.

(6) That India ensures that **civil apparatus** such as Committees to monitor Reconstruction work, Refugee resettlement, etc. **be set up or permitted to function except by,** or under the aegis of, **the duly appointed unified popular administration.**

(7) **That the Sinhala colonisation in some parts of the Eastern-Northern Provinces since the signing of the Agreement be dismantled, and that further colonisation** of Sinhalese in traditional Tamil-majority areas in the guise of resettling Sinhalese refugees -who are very much lesser in number than Tamil refugees - be stopped forthwith.

The Tamil people strongly feel that India should ensure that the Sri Lanka Government guarantees, by adequate constitutional provisions, **autonomy to the Tamil people comparable to States in India, in a single territory comprising the Northern and Eastern provinces.** We respectfully submit that this would be the acid test of the Sri Lanka Government's commitment to its obligations under the Agreement.

We are addressing the LTTE on this matter and we annex a copy of that letter. We are also forwarding the LTTE a copy of this letter.

Signed: Rev. Fr. Guy de Fongalland ■ K. Satchidanandan ■ S. Sivanayagam ■ R. Namasivayam ■ A. Sivanandan ■ M.K. Eelaventhan ■ R. Sivalingam ■ S. Kugathasan ■ V. Sittampalam ■ Sis. M. Pushpam Gnanaprakasam ■ Ms. Poongothai Somasundaram ■ S.K. Velayuthapillai ■ R. Thatchanamoorthy ■ Dr. V. Ramakrishnan ■ V. Perambalam ■ S. Ruthiramoorthy ■ Rev. Fr. J. Thiruchelvam ■ Dr. P. Ragupathy ■ R. Sampanthan ■ S. Ganeshalingam ■ Dr. Shanthi Rajasundaram ■ M. Sivasithampuram ■ S.C. Chandrahasan ■ K.S. Kandasamy ■ P. Eelathunathan ■ A. Amirthalingam ■ V. Anandasangaree ■ S. Thirusittampalam ■ R. Padmanathan ■ A. Thangathurai.

EDITORIAL 12.3.88

INDIA IN LANKA

THE fiasco of the elections to Sri Lanka's provincial councils and the abrupt postponement of an important parliamentary by-election are further reminders that President Jayewardene's authority has been effectively immobilized by the dual pressure exerted by Tamil militants and Sinhalese zealots. It is also sufficiently clear that there is no domestic consensus—either Tamil or Sinhalese—behind the Constitutional amendment establishing the provincial councils, and that a large section of the population views the evolution plan as the expedient strategy of a regime that has lost its moral and political right to govern. But whereas President Jayewardene and his Cabinet are fully aware that the "long Parliament"—elected in 1977—has lost all legitimacy and that a fresh mandate is overdue, they are too unsure of the results to risk going to the people.

The situation might arguably have improved if efforts by the Prime Minister, Mr R. Premadasa, and the Minister for National Security, Mr Lalith Athulathmudali, to enter into direct negotiations with the LTTE emissary, Mr Selvakumar, had made some progress. But the manner in which the Government called off the initiative following comments by the Indian High Commissioner, Mr J. N. Dixit, did not exactly enhance its reputation. Indeed, President Jayewardene now suffers from a devastating image problem caused by the popular belief that he is both a puppet and a prisoner of India. Whether New Delhi realizes it or not, the IPKF is now the Sri Lankan President's foremost electoral liability; in fact, India runs the risk of suffering a serious diplomatic setback if it is not seen to be more responsive to Sri Lankan sensibilities. And the defeat may not be confined to diplomacy. The LTTE's adroit move in setting up the Batticaloa Mothers' Front to conduct its proxy war against the IPKF has already yielded impressive propaganda dividends and conveyed the impression of a peace-loving people desperately trying to resist unnecessary interference by an alien power.

In short, a no-win situation has emerged, and the only hope India has of salvaging its credibility is by withdrawing its forces from the island and leaving the Tamils and the Sinhalese to sort out their own differences. Perhaps this is not as far-fetched as may initially appear, for both the Sinhalese hard-liners and the Tamil separatists are now bound by a common antipathy. Moreover, any deal that Mr Premadasa or Mr Athulathmudali strikes with Mr Velupillai Prabhakaran is likely to enjoy much more popular acceptance among all Sri Lankans than any accord under foreign aegis that is forced down the throats of a recalcitrant population. Indeed, Mr Mikhail Gorbachov's bold initiative in Afghanistan which promises to extricate the Soviet Union from a situation that is comparable in some respects should offer valuable lessons to New Delhi. The unilateral announcement of a date for withdrawal coupled with the guarantee of complete non-interference in Colombo's internal affairs so long as India's own interests are not compromised by the entry of a third power may yet salvage Mr Rajiv Gandhi's damaged pride and, more important, bring the warring antagonists together so that they can jointly carve out the common future.

DECCAN HERALD

IPKF: political pawns

Ajit Bhattcharjea

REPORT

"WE don't know who we are here to protect, who to oppose; we don't know who is on our side, who is not; we don't know who tells us the truth, who lies; we don't know how long we must stay here and for what purpose."

The articulate subedar escorting me in Trincomalee put succintly what other jawans hinted. He probably did not know that I was a journalist and took me for one of the civil officers visiting the IPKF for some unstated reason.

Perhaps I should have told him, but it was a relief to hear someone telling me plainly what others presumably felt. Indian army officers were polite and helpful, but none would say a word about their job. Only the PRO, a junior officer with no combat experience, was entitled to spout the banal official hand-outs that I had not come all the way to hear.

Even jawans were reluctant, to be photographed (I had to use a telephoto lens). They believed that to publicise their names could merit a court-martial.

An outsider would have thought that the IPKF had something to hide, that it was engaged in some shady operation that had to be kept secret: as some foreign newsmen have concluded. I might have been tempted to believe the same if I had not seen at first hand the excellent, if unrewarding, job they were doing on the ground.

MUM'S THE WORD

Even Major-General Jameel Mahmoud, who is entrusted with the command of nearly 20,000 men and their equipment, is obviously barred from talking about his mission to newsmen. He was polite and invited me to lunch, and arranged for my safe return to Colombo in the light plane of a Sri Lankan brigadier (who was far less inhibited). As far as the work of the IPKF was concerned, however, he said that I would have to make my assessment from what I heard from civilians.

Fortunately, some of the things told to him in my presence indicated the character and sensitivity of his assignment. At one point, for instance, another officer asked for permission to celebrate a regimental raising day on April 1. He did not turn it down because it was All Fools Day, but because it was Good Friday and a celebration could hurt Christian sentiment.

After lunch, another officer on his staff informed the general that they had been able to pinpoint an LTTE position by getting a fix on a radio transmission. His immediate reaction was to ask what action had been taken. He was reassured that a helicopter force had been despatched to the spot.

CHILD LABOUR

There was no point in my asking for details, or to inquire about the outcome later. He was not authorised to tell me. But I learnt from others that the LTTE operate in groups of three or four and are expert in mining roads with explosives that can immobilise a tank or incapacitate a platoon. Their radio communications are excellent. They ensure against capture by forcing villagers to inform them of approaching IPKF patrols. Children are used to relay warnings to them.

My journey by bus through the countryside had impressed me with the difficulty of locating terrorist hide-outs, and so I could envisage the problems the IPKF faced. But without this experience, it would have been difficult to appreciate why more than 70,000 men (the figure I gathered elsewhere) were unable to eliminate a terrorist group numbered at a few hundred. Had the general and his officers been able to put across their problems, the IPKF's morale would have been much higher.

A previous insight into the Defence Ministry's self-defeating approach to public information, however, had prepared me for such stupidity. An excellent PTI-TV documentary on Sri Lanka had been robbed of its credibility because all references to gaps in information, preliminary mistakes and other problems had been censored. Among the victims was Maj. Gen. Mahmoud.

The Defence Ministry has always preferred news management to truth. But the blanket of secrecy cast over the IPKF's operations is darker than usual. No casualty lists, giving name and unit have been issued, as is usual practice. It did not take too much time to realise why: the men of the IPKF are paying the price in blood for political ambitions and miscalculations, and the unstated and unreal strategic objectives envisaged in New Delhi.

Colombo has made no such mistake. In fact, President Jayewardene has boasted more than once that thanks to the Accord, Indian soldiers are dying instead of Sri Lankan.

The IPKF's mission lacks precise objectives, a calculable time-frame, even a clear idea of whom to protect and whom to punish. Flown in at short notice to protect Tamil interests in the Accord, our best combat units are bogged down in killing, and being killed by, Tamils.

And although the Tamils now want the IPKF to stay on to protect them from Sinhala reprisals, the Indians get little gratitude. Instead they are blamed for liquidating the LTTE who fought Tamil battles earlier, and could protect them later.

Nor do they get many thanks from the Sinhala residents of Trincomalee. The impression that their primary mission is to protect Tamil interests survives. At President Jayewardene's urging, some additional 2,000 Sri Lankan soldiers and policemen — all Sinhalese — were inducted in the last fortnight on the plea of giving Sinhala residents a sense of security. That the IPKF is not regarded as capable of doing so is implicit in the decision, to which New Delhi is party. And that the lower ranks to both sides do not trust each other was told to me by no less an authority than Brigadier Kopekadewa, Commander of Sri Lankan Forces in Trincomalee.

On the ground, the protection of Sri Lanka forces is another burden on the IPKF. At the height of the tension over the Tamil bus killings, I heard the brigade major instructing IPKF units to make sure that Sri Lankan personnel were not harassed or humiliated.

SCRUPULOUS

The IPKF has also been scrupulous in dealing with local officials and civilians. No buildings or facilities have been commandeered or requisitioned. Even Gen. Mahmoud's divisional headquarters is rented. It is located in a deserted angling club. Until a lease was arranged, taking two months, it was under canvas.

When the IPKF was flown into Trincomalee in the beginning of October last year, nearly 100 buildings

were burning and the smoke limited visibility to yards. No civilian ventured into the streets. Hundreds had fled. Most of the damage had been done by the LTTE in reprisal for previous destruction of Tamil dwellings.

The Tigers initially resisted the IPKF, leading to casualties. Order was restored in two days. But it took a month for the bazaar and schools to reopen. Several hundred refugees (mostly Sinhalese) returned. Many are still in camps since their houses were destroyed.

WHOSE DESIGNS?

Some Sri Lankan officials feel that India has long-term designs on Trincomalee, a suspicion strengthened by the known views of New Delhi's many armchair strategists about the strategic value of the port. Initially, it was suggested that India must protect Trincomalee from US designs, even though the United States has spent billions of dollars on preparing Diego Garcia for just such a role. Nobody has seriously argued that the Soviets have their eyes on Trincomalee, but denying it to Pakistan has been mentioned. Yet, the idea of Pakistan spending millions on reconstructing Trincomalee's rusting port facilities within easy bombing range from India, and easier interdiction by India's navy, can only be fancied by non-military theorists.

As for India's own strategic interests in the area, they are amply secured by its own ports and defence installations on the south-east coast and in the Andamans. The need for nearer facilities dates back to World War II, when neither aircraft, naval ships nor submarines had the range, and the long-distance weapons, they have now. But some thinkers in New Delhi still belong to that era.

In any case, the idea of spending so much money to refurbish a port in another country is highly risky. There is little reason to believe that President Jayewardene's successors will honour the Indo-Sri Lankan accord, or even he if it becomes inconvenient. If it is abrogated, is New Delhi prepared to occupy the island indefinitely? It is the poverty of such so-called strategic thinking that has bolstered the vacuous search for instant political solutions that has landed the IPKF in the unenviable position it is in.

18.3.88

Mother on fast gives militants a boost

REPORT

From AJIT BHATTACHARJEA

COLOMBO, March 10. — While casualties from insurgency are now routine, official attention and concern are focussed on the east-coast port of Batticaloa where a Tamil mother lies dying. Mrs. Annamah David has been fasting for 18 days and is in a coma.

Mrs. David's death is regarded as imminent and inevitable and is bound to revive the waning hold of the LTTE and strengthen its position in negotiations with the Indian Peace-Keeping Force and Sri Lankan officials.

Other members of the Mothers Front and their sympathisers are threatening to go on sympathy hunger-strike if she dies and the IPKF fails to cease fire and begin talks. This demand was earlier turned down unless the LTTE surrendered their arms.

About 2,000 women and children are reported to have already begun a sympathy fast in Kalmunai. Others in the north and northeast districts are planning to join them.

The Mothers Front evolved before the IPKF came on the scene to protest against the torture and harassment of Tamil youth by the Sri Lankan army and police. Now the protest is focussed on the IPKF. The Mothers Union split some time ago, when local political influence on the Tamils splintered, but is reuniting under the impact of Mrs. David's prolonged fast.

CONFUSION: Differing details about the insurgency in different papers and the Government-owned television and radio heighten the prevailing confusion in Sri Lanaka.

Fewer casualties are reported from the south, where the neo-fascist Janata Vimukti Peramuna is trying to terrorise the countryside. But, the situation can be judged by the Sri Lankan Government's decision to postpone indefinitely the parliamentary byelection scheduled for March 21 in Homagama, less than 30 km from here. This was after a party activist and a local official were killed.

The postponement casts a shadow on the chain of elections scheduled for this year, beginning with the district council elections which are an essential element of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord.

The Opposition parties interpret the postponement as an admission by the ruling United National Party that it would lose Homagama by a large margin if the byelection is held. This could have domino effect on the later elections.

The time-table for elections allows little room for manoeuvre. The district council, parliamentary and presidential polls are all to be held by the end of 1988.

Since the Constitution debars President J.R. Jayewardene from seeking re-election, he must ensure that all these steps are taken before he quits. The Indo-Sri Lankan accord also hangs in the balance. If the district elections and other measures envisaged in it are not completed while he is in office, they may never be completed.

EXTENSION OF TERM: Mr. Jayewardene's opponents suggest that the "wily fox" may be preparing plans for the eventuality of his being unable to complete the process in time. His recent decision to overlook the claims of the seniormost judge of the Supreme Court and appoint a relative junior to the office of Chief Justice is seen as a move to make sure of judicial approval in case he has to seek an extension of his term by amending the Constitution.

Second only to the President in gaining the attention of the press and of political gossip-mongers is India's High Commissioner J.N. Dixit. Every movement, including his departure for New Delhi last weekend, is front-page news. The new spate of rumours concerning a deal with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam is connected with his consultations in New Delhi.

So much attention in the press is not always welcome. Exception has been taken to his criticism of the reported moves by some Sri Lankan Ministers to work out their own agreement with the LTTE. "Can't Lankans talk to Lankans, Mr. Dixit," is the headline over a column in **The Island.** Belated explanations that Mr. Dixit meant only that any such agreement must conform to the Indo-Sri Lankan accord has not staunched the criticism.

"MR FIXIT:" Mr Dixit is nicknamed "Mr. Fixit" here. A light column in **The Island** says: "Big brothers came here in large numbers to help us settle our dispute with Prabha. Now, at long last Prabha is willing to talk to us and come to terms. Should not our Big Brothers be happy?"

"No, says Mr. Fixit. We must help you solve the problem. How dare you talk to each other without us."

Sri Lankans fortunately have a sense of humour. But, the impact on Indian diplomats, and even more on the Indian Peace-Keeping Force, is far from funny. Seldom has an army been given a mission abroad in which friends and enemies keep changing.

THE HINDU

REPORT

No joint operations with Sri Lankan Army: Natwar Singh

K Natwar Singh

From Our Special Correspondent

NEW DELHI, March 18

The Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. Natwar Singh, has said there was no question of joint operations by the Sri Lankan Army and the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka. Putting at rest speculation on the score, Mr. Singh said that during the visit of the Sri Lankan Minister for Land and Mahaveli Development, Mr. Gamini Dissayanake, the Sri Lankan side had raised the issue of LTTE attacks on Muslims and Sinhalas in the Trincomalee area and the fear created among the many refugees there. The possibility of Sri Lankan forces confined to their barracks under the Agreement being asked to defend against such attacks was raised and it was decided that these were matters that could be gone into by the armed forces of the two countries and a solution arrived at that would be within the ambit of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement.

Strongly defending the Government policy in Sri Lanka, the Minister said that the situation today had not altered since the time the Agreement had been signed. The same geo-political situation obtained with regard to India's security environment as did the concern for Sri Lanka's unity and integrity. He said there had been some slippages with regard to the implementation of the Agreement. But the reasons for that were complex and it could not be forgotten that the LTTE had resiled from an important agreement of September 29 which delayed the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, the Interim Administrative Council and the provincial elections.

'Great job'

Strongly refuting attacks on the functioning of the IPKF the Minister said that the IPKF was doing a 'great job' in difficult and complex circumstances and it had a marvellous record. He said the IPKF members were "soldiers of a great country called India" and not any State or region and the issue had to be looked at from the point of view of the whole country and not any region or State.

Mr. Singh said that many of the views he had heard from members were expressed without any alternative policy being suggested. He said it was easy to criticise. He said the Government was aware of the difficulties of the Sri Lankan Government and of the IPKF, and "surely no one thinks we have sent the army to kill civilians," he added.

Rejecting the contention that the Government had slammed shut the doors of negotiations with the LTTE, the Minister said that at no time had the communication between the Indian authorities and the LTTE broken down. Referring to the March 9 letter of Mr. V. Prabakaran, however, he said "We have studied the letter and it doesn't break any new ground." He reiterated the stand of the Government of India as enunciated by the Prime Minister that an acceptance of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and a surrender of arms were the basic preconditions for any workable solution. He said as yet no clear 'unequivocal signal' had been received from the LTTE that it would be willing to come to the negotiating table after surrendering its arms.

When Mr. V. Gopalasamy and Mr. Aladi Aruna pressed the Minister to show some 'relaxation' and be magnanimous, Mr. Singh responded that at one level there was talk of "unconditional talks and at another, a demand for the pullback of the IPKF to the October 9 positions." "The great Indian Army," he declared, "will not be dictated to by the LTTE."

Earlier, members especially Mr. Gopalasamy, Mr. Aladi Aruna and Mr. G. Swaminathan criticised the handling of the Sri Lanka issue and the role of the IPKF there. Mr. Gopalasamy pleaded with the Government to utilise the offer of unconditional talks made by Mr. Prabakaran through his letter of March 9. He said that the use of Sri Lankan army in the North and East would be very dangerous because according to him, 70 per cent of them were members of the chauvinist JVP. He urged the Government to order an immediate ceasefire and initiate negotiations with the LTTE which had no basic quarrel with India. He warned against any military thrust to liquidate Mr. Prabakaran and said that if he was killed, "the name India would be a curse in the mind of the Tamil people."

Mr. V. Narayanaswamy (Cong-I) seeking clarification on Mr. Natwar Singh's statement yesterday in Rajya Sabha blamed the LTTE for undermining the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement. He said the allegation that Mr. Prabakaran was not consulted before the signing of the agreement was a "mere propaganda." The LTTE had initially agreed to cooperate with the Government.

Mr. Ram Awadesh Singh (LD) asked the Government to come out of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement.

Mr. M. S. Gurupadaswamy (Janata) said that there should not be any precondition for surrender of arms for talks with the LTTE. A parliamentary mission should be asked to talk to the various interested parties to work out a solution to the ethnic problem.

Mr. V. Swaminathan (AIADMK) said if the Sri Lanka military was allowed to enter Tamil majority areas there would be repression and exodus to India.

Mr. Madan Bhatia (Cong-I) said the LTTE was being instigated to destroy the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement by those forces which had been busy in "military encirclement" of India.

Mr. Chitta Basu (FB) said that the Government had failed to force the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene to implement his part of the agreement.

Gen. J. S. Aurora (Akali) said that the IPKF and the Sri Lankan army working together would have an adverse effect on the Tamilians. The final answer to the problem had to be a political solution.

Mr. Pramod Mahajan (BJP) demanded a parliamentary committee to assess the situation in Sri Lanka and to chalk out a common and comprehensive policy with regard to the island nation.

Mr. P. N. Sukul (Cong-I), who had recently been in Geneva, said that the LTTE leaders had met him and expressed the desire that the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi should have direct talks with Mr. Prabhakaran.

Mr. Chaturanan Mishra (CPI) urged the Government to force the Sri Lankan Government to release all the political detenus and declare a unilateral ceasefire. — UNI

The Amnesty International presented the doucments relating to the violation of human rights in Sri Lanka to the Sri Lankan President on the first day of March 1988. Some of these violations are long standing, concerns about grave abuses by the Sri Lankan security forces, reported for several years such as reprisal killings of Tamil civilians by the security forces, torture and disappearances. Over six hundred and eighty Tamils have reportedly disappeared between 1983 and Aug. 1987. No substantive attempts appear to have been made by the Government to establish what happened to them.

Now the situation in Sri Lanka is entirely different. Following the signing of the accord between India and Sri Lanka on the 29th July 1987 there were no further allegations of disappearances in Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka by the Sri Lankan security forces. Now disappearances of Tamils by the Indian army have been reported in the Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka. Other new concerns are an increasing number of allegations that the members of the Indian army have been responsible for rape and other acts of brutality, as well as for the extra judicial killings of unarmed civilians. This report lists eight recommendations for the protection of human rights in Sri Lanka. The main one is that the Government should establish an independent commission tc investigate all classes of torture and disappearances in Sri Lanka impartially that such independent commission should also be established to investigate all complaints of reprisal killings by the IPKF.

The Amnesty International received substantial information from independent reports about the human rights violations, in particular members of the IPKF were accused of raping Tamil women and of the deliberately killing dozens of unarmed Tamil civilians, among them elderly people, women and children. Even though the spokesman of the Government of India said those civilians who have been killed were in cross-fire, the evidence showed in several cases the victims were civilians apparantly shot without provocation or in reprisal for the killing of the IPKF men by the LTTE. For example on the night of 12/13th October, 1987, the Indian Commandos descended by helicopter to capture an LTTE base near the Jaffna University two miles away from the Jaffna Town in the course of the major military operation launched to obtain control of the Jaffna Peninsula from the LTTE. Twenty-nine Indian commandos were shot dead by the LTTE in the course of the fighting while several others fled and allegedly estimated forty non-combatant Tamil civilians living in this area, were shot at point blank range including women and children in their homes at "Pirampadi Lane, Kokuvil" as a reprisal for the death of the Commandos.

On the 27th October, 1987, the Indian Forces launched their first aerial attack on the LTTE strong hold of Chavakachcheri and an Indian Journalist present in the area reported that the IPKF had deliberately struck at civilian target. At least twenty-five civilians were reported killed at the local market.

In the Eastern part of Sri Lanka Tamils and Muslims were alleged to be the victims of such indiscriminate or reprisal killings. In many cases there were conflicting reports about the nature of these killings as to who carried them out. This was so because of denial of access to outsiders by the IPKF. For example, the local Citizen Committee was denied access to the village of 'Kalavanchchikudi', 16 miles South of Batticaloa, to investigate allegations that the civilians had been killed in reprisal by the IPKF after four IPKF soldiers have been killed in a landmine explosion. Although a spokesman of the Government of India claimed that only three people had been killed in fighting not as a measure of reprisal but an independent observer present in the village said that the Indian soldiers had got out of control and the civilians had been killed as a result.

The Government of India assumed responsibility for one of these alleged extra judicial killings. On the 22nd of November, 1987 court martialled soldier on the previous day killed two Muslims and wounded five others when he fired at a crowd near Trincomalee clock tower. In another incident at least twenty-five Muslim Civilians were shot dead in the Eastern Village of "Ottamawadi". On the second of December, 1987, the IPKF maintained that the victims were killed in cross fire, but the residents said villagers were indiscriminately killed after nine Indian soldiers were killed by the LTTE in an ambush. To the knowledge of the Amnesty International this is the only instance of a Sri Lankan Government investigation into the IPKF activities, and in no instance has an impartial body attempted to carry out investigations into these alleged killings by the IPKF.

There have been also an increase in the number of allegations that the lower ranking IPKF personnel had raped Tamil women and some of them who needed hospital treatment have testified on oath that they were raped by the IPKF personnel. For example in "Kondavil" in the North and "Sathurkodanan" and "Morakottanchannai" villages in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka several of these allegations had been investigated by the IPKF although the Government of India continue to deny any such charges. But in December, 1987, a local Magistrtate reportedly found the IPKF responsible for seven cases of rape. In January, 1988, four Indian soldiers were discharged and sentenced by an Indian Court Martial one year's imprisonment for raping women.

1. That the Government undertake a review of the implementation of the Human Rights provision in the July, 1987 Accord to ensure that its provision for an amnesty for all prisoners detained or charged and convicted under the P.T.A. and other emergency Laws are implemented particularly in respect of innocent persons. Amnesty international believes, such a review should be taken because arbitrary arrest had been made under the P.T.A. and innocent men and

women had been detained under its provisions. A High Court Judge has commented that the partial implementation of the Accord has been unfair in that certain groups of detainees had been released but the others in similar situtations remained in detention. Amnesty International also wishes to draw attention to additional protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions relating to non-international armed conflicts which reads in Article 6 section 5.

2. That the Government should make public list of individuals arrested under the emergency regulations and the Prevention of Terrorism Act and immediately inform their relations of the arrest, reason for the arrest and their whereabouts of the arrested person and the Government create Up-to-date centraly maintained registers with the names of arrested and their whereabouts.

3 a. That the Government must amend existing special emergency legislation so that all arrested persons are in future brought before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours of the arrest.

b. That the Government must issue strict instructions that under no circumstances are relatives to be arrested if a wanted person cannot be found.

4. That the Government must create a system of independent supervision of the places of detention by a judicial and other Authoritative body and relatives and Lawyers be allowed prompt and subsequent regular access to all arrested persons. "Incommunicado detention is always dangerous".

5. That the government must revie w the rules of evidence under the prevention of Terrorism Act and bring these in line with the normal values of evidence under the evidence act.

6. That the government must establish an independent commission to investigate impartially all cases of disappearances and torture in Sri Lanka in order for it to work effectively. It recommended that such commission consist of persons known for their impartiality and integrity and representative of the various Sri Lankan communities and should have the power to enforce the attendance of witnesses.

7. That the Government must abolish emergency regulations 55 B-G permitting the disposal of bodies in secret and without a post-mortem examination and to follow the normal rules of inquests laid down in criminal procedure code.

8. That the Government must establish an independent body to investigate all complaints of reprisal killing by the Sri Lankan security forces and the IPKF, the latter having been accused of several such violations in the Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka. The Committee must have powers to carry out such investigations, hear witnesses in confidence, assess allegations and recommend remedies. It is important that the members of such commissions have the confidence of the various communities and parties involved.



DMK president M. Karunanidhi exhorts volunteers to campaign against the IPKF 'hunt for LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran', before flagging off a convoy of 40 vehicles at Periyar statue. The four-day rally to Kanyakumari was organised by the confederation for protection of the rights of Eelam Tamils.

RELENTLESS DEBATE ON THE PEACE ACCORD ROCKS THE INDIAN LOK SABHA

Mr. V. GOPALSAMY, M.P., vehemently confronts Mr. Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, with a volley of questions in the Lok Sabha in response to the latter's comment on the India's outrageously treacherous and precipitate involvement with the Sri Lankan Tamils:

Mr. Gandhi:- It is a matter of great regret that the LTTE threw away all this. They went back on every commitment they had given to us.

Mr. Gopalsamy:- May I ask the Prime Minister to substantiate this charge? What are the instances, one by one, when they went back? What are the commitments they made? You should substantiate because it is a serious charge.

Mr. Gandhi:- The LTTE have set out to wreck the agreement.

Mr. Gopalsamy:- I repeat the same categorical and specific question that I did put to Mr. Natwar Singh on an earlier occasion. Did the LTTE give their consent for the Accord before our Hon. Prime Minister did put his signature in Colombo? Here is the statement the chief of the LTTE stated before a mammoth public gathering of his own people, where more than hundred journalists and pressmen from many parts of the world were present:-

"You are aware that this Agreement, concluded suddenly and with great speed between India and Sri Lanka, without consulting us and without consulting our people's representatives, is being implemented with expedition and urgency. Until I went to Delhi I did not know anything about this Agreement. Saying that the Indian Prime Minister desired to see me, they invited me and took me quickly to Delhi. This Agreement was shown to us after I went there. Accordingly, we made it emphatically clear to the Indian Government that we were unble to accept this Agreement. But the Indian Government stood unbudging on the point that whether we accepted or did not accept the Agreement, it was determined to put it into effect. We firmly objected to the conclusion of this Agreement without consultation with our people and without seeking our views. However, there is no point in our objecting to this. When a great power had decided to determine our political fate in a manner that is essentially beyond our control, what are we to do? ..... This Agreement disarms us suddenly, without giving us time, without getting the consent of our fighters, without working out a guarantee for our people's safety and protection. Therefore we refused to surrender arms. In taking from us our weapons -the only means of protection for Eelam Tamils - the Indian Government takes over from us the big responsibility of protecting our people. The handing over of arms only signifies the handing over, the transfer, of this responsibility. I wish very firmly to emphasise here that by virtue of our handing over our weapons to it, the Indian Government should assume full responsibility for the life and security of every one of the Eelam Tamils.

The time is not very far off when the monster of Sinhala racism will devour this Agreement. Let me make it clear to you here, beyond the shadow of any doubt, that I will continue to fight for the objective of attaining Tamil Eelam."

This, continues Mr. Gopalsamy, is the history of the Accord. It was not between the warring parties, not bet ween the oppressor and the oppressed; but it was between the mediator and aggressor. Therefore, when you say they (the LTTE) went to wreck the Accord, you (the Prime Minister) should substantiate the charge and say in what way they sabotaged the Accord. It was Mr. Jayawardene who gave the first mortal blow to the Agreement, because he, immediately after signing the Agreement, when the minds of the whole Tamilian population were agitated over the issue of the merger of the two Units - that is the North and the East -publicly said, "I myself will go and campaign against the merger of these two Units." So, it is he who tried to sabotage the Agreement, not the LTTE. I would like to know from the honourable Minister whether the Government of India did protest against the statement made by Mr. Jayawardene.

'Protest Journey' to protect Tamils' rights

A contingent of political leaders, intellectuals, cine artistes and students began a 740-km 'Protest Journey' on March 26 from Madras to Kanyakumari, demanding protection of the rights of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and urging that the life of the LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran, be safeguarded.

The journey, which began in a convoy of cars and vans, was organised under the auspices of the Confederation for Protection of the Rights of Eelam Tamils. Led by Mr.V.C. Kuganathan, the journey was inaugurated by the DMK president, Mr.M. Karunanidhi, near the Periyar statue on Anna Salai.

Speaking on the occasion, Mr. Karunanidhi charged that a large number of Tamils were being killed in Sri Lanka daily without any let-up. A fight had been launched against the Tamil race on the island. The various political parties in the State had raised their protest, he said and hoped that the Central Government would pay heed to their feelings.

The participants raised slogans criticising the IPKF's 'hunt' for Mr. Prabakaran, and its role on the island. The participants passed through Tiruchi, Madurai and Tirumangalam before reaching their destination on March 29. Public meetings were held all along the route.

All these years, argues Mr. Gopalsamy, they have been fighting over the question of state-aided colonization. But, immediately after the Agreement was signed, state-aided colonization was speeded up in the Eastern province with the package of the Government. It was pointed out even by such moderates as the TULF. In some parts of the North, too, the colonization went on. Where is the Accord here?

When the Sri Lankan Government itself engineers colonization of the eastern parts - the traditional homeland of the Tamils - where is the Accord?

The Accord was torn to pieces by the Sri Lankan Government itself.

Mr. Gandhi:- All the Tamil demands have been met and they have got more than what they wanted.

When the Sri Lankan Government itself engineers colonization of the eastern parts - the traditional homeland of the Tamils - where is the Accord?

Mr. Gopalsamy:- What are the demands? The basic demand for Eelam? You do not agree on that, all right. Then, where do they stand, including the TULF? They said the traditional homeland should be one Unit, it should be treated as one Unit - that is the north-east. That is their basic demand which the president of Sri Lanka had totally objected to, saying that there is no question of "traditional homeland." If there is no question of traditional homeland, then what has been the demand of the Tamils all these years?

Mr. Chairman, Our Prime Minister says that the demands of the Tamils have been accepted. What happened to their demand for the right of self-determination? This was not accepted. Even the TULF, the moderates, and others have pointed out that these bills already introduced did not meet the aspirations of the Tamils and that the devolution of power which was assured would never satisfy them or any of their groups.

One more point on the question of colonization. Mr. Chairman, 200 army camps were not dismantled as per the Agreement. Police stations were opened in the Tamil areas. So, the situation became very tense.

Mr. Dhileepan, the propaganda secretary of the political wing of the LTTE, started his fast-unto-death. After 12 days he died, at a tender age. Sir, our All India Radio ridiculed the fast-unto-death. Is it a Gandhian attitude? This is the attitude of the Indian Government. Let me ask a simple question. The Government's statement says that Mr. Dixit, the Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, rushed many times in relation to the fast. Did he go to the place where he was fasting? Did he persuade him not to carry on the fast? Did he make any request with an eye to ending the fast? If the demands had been conceded, or had some effective steps been taken to stop the colonization, his precious life would have been saved.

Another unfortunate tragic incident took place that created a turning point in the relationship between the LTTE and the Indian authorities. That is, 17 LTTE men were arrested by the Navy off Point Pedro.

Mr.Gandhi:- They were arrested in the boat when they were having mounted machine guns.

Mr.Gopalsamy:- All right, I accept it. But, let me put this question. They did not care about death. Most of our friends also say that they have become fanatics and they simply welcome death. All right. When they were arrested by the Sri Lankan Navy, why did they not fight? Instead of taking cyanide they could have died by fighting. They didn't fight because they thought that political amnesty had already been given to them by Mr. Jayawardene, that by mistake the Sri Lankan Navy was arresting them, and that the IPKF was there to which the responsibility of protecting them had already been entrusted. It is only with this hope and confidence that they did not fire nor fight.

Mr. Gandhi:- The 17 LTTE men were taken by the Sri Lankan army.

Mr. Gopalsamy:- Here is the Agreement. According to the agreement, the Sri Lankan navy and armed personnel should be confined to their barracks as from July 29, 1987. Then, how were the LTTE men arrested by the Sri Lankan forces? Why did the IPKF allow them to be taken to Colombo? Was it because of the instructions from the Sri Lankan government? This tragic incident triggered off the whole explosion. This is the major cause of the conflict. This is the major cause of the present bloodshed. This is the cause of the killings of the Tamils. This is why I maintain that it is a major question and has created a turning point.

Mr. Gandhi:- You could link the suicide (of the 12 LTTE men) with the repercussions. It might be a deliberate attempt on the part of the LTTE men.

Mr. Gopalsamy:- I never expected such words from our Hon. Prime Minister. I never expected to hear such discourteous words against those who died. Sir, I remember, when Smt. Indra Gandhi was assassinated, there were riots and people were killed. I could understand that was the reaction of the public and I remember the words of the Hon. Prime Minister to the effect "when a big tree falls, the earth is bound to shake." Of course, these LTTE commanders were louded by their people. Mr. Pulendran and Mr. Kumarappa, on many occasions, had protected the Tamils of the Eastern Province from the attack of the Sinhalese army. They had defeated the Sinhalese army in many battles. They were the immortal heroes of their own masses. When people heard the news that their heroes were made to die, there was a spontaneous reaction and the killings were there. I do not justify the killings. But, even two days back, killings were there. 200 people were killed and it is because of the J.V.P's action, I am told. What did you do then? Why didn't your guns turn that side?

(The above is an edited version of the debate)

THE GOVERNMENT SOLUTION - A CRAFTY SUBTERFUGE

by Wakely Paul, B.A.(Law), M.A.(Cambridge, England), L.L.M.(Stanford, California); Attorney-at-law.

The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of last year sought to solve the Island's ethnic problem by granting to the Tamil minority some measure of autonomy in the North and East, through the creation of Provincial Councils with legislative power in those regions. This was intended to free them from the legislative control of the Sinhala-dominated Central Parliament in designated areas. The Sri Lankan government has now obliged with **the Thirteenth amendment to the Constitution creating such Provincial Councils.**

The irony of this Bill is that it proves once again the reluctance, if not refusal, of the Sinhala-dominated government to lose any control over the predominantly Tamil regions, and grant them any degree of genuine autonomy. The Bill permits Tamil Provincial Councils to make statutes (which in the ethnic-charged context of Sri Lanka) can never become law. By encrusting this in the Constitution, it perpetuates Tamil subjugation to Sinhalese will.

In order for a Tamil statute to become law, it has to overcome two vetoes by two sets of Sinhala elected institutions. It must first be agreed by every one of the seven other Sinhala Provincial Councils, and then be submitted to Parliament for their majority approval. If Sinhala elected politicians to regional bodies or the central government were that empathetic to the Tamil exercise of power, they could have made federal concessions many times in the last 40 years. If, in fact, they were that understanding of the Tamil grievances, they could have remedied them in the national Parliament which would have made this Bill moot. The reality of their reluctance to approve of Tamil exercise of autonomy makes the clearance of these two hurdles a virtual impossibility. The other alternative method of turning a statute into law is more bizarre still. If any one Provincial Council disagrees with the Tamil Provincial Bill, it requires a 2/3 majority of Parliament to make it law. With proportional representation governing future elections, not even a Sinhalese Bill benefiting the Sinhalese public could be passed by such a majority, since no party could conjure up such parliamentary control.

This Bill is therefore no more than a crafty subterfuge, tightening Sinhala control over Tamil provincial power under the pretext of a devolution of power.

The controls do not end here. The Provincial Governor (a Presidential appointee who holds power at his pleasure and is directed in certain instances to execute his direct commands) can before assenting to a provincial bill, refer it to the supreme court. He could inter alia contend that this is a matter which should be reserved for nationwide legislation (154-G(10)) as demanded by Parliament. The supreme court in turn could hold that the determination as to what is appropriate for national legislation should be deferred to Parliament being a matter more appropriate for legislative than judicial determination. **This acts as a third possible bar to legislation of a Tamil provincial statute.**

Assuming that by some miracle a Tamil statute overcomes all three hurdles, there is another provision enabling the Governor to refuse to implement the Bill or implement it to suit his mentor's desires if Sinhala mass mood surfaces to show their disapproval of the statute.

The Governor who shall implement statutes in accordance with the advice of the board of ministers of the Council can ignore that and use his discretion (154- F(1)) if the constitution requires him to do so. His exercise of this discretion cannot be challenged in a court of law (154-F(2)). Even if the Governor purports to execute the will of the ministers, he has wide latitude to interpret their intent as he wishes, since the advice tendered by the ministers cannot be adjudicated (154-F(3).

Another serious impediment is the right of the President to proclaim an emergency and reinvest the Central government with Provincial power (154 J, K, L and M); and once again this proclamation remains unchallengeable. In a nation ruled more often than not under emergency regulations, **this hardly augurs well for the exercise of Provincial Power.**

Finally, the last major straw lies in the central control of Provincial Finances unrelated to the Provincial Councils' needs. Their finances are determined by a finance commission on which there is no Provincial representation and to whom they cannot present estimates of need (154-R1). The allocation of funds shall be on considerations quite independent of their legislative program (154.R(4)&(5)) and are not adjudicable (154-R(8)).

To add to these controls is the power of the President to proclaim the nation or region financially unstable, for him to have immediate control of the financial disbursements in the province through his Governor (154-N). This includes the power to reserve the use of provincial funds voted for certain uses and the power to cut provincial salaries, making provincial servants beholden to him rather than the council for their continued existence on secure terms. The question that looms as obvious is how difficult is it to declare a region of a third world nation financially unstable especially when it is unchallengeable.

All of the above comments do not even touch on the controls maintained over supposedly devolved subjects.

Conclusions

We have then a Bill which the government of Sri Lanka will claim was designed to satisfy the demands of the Accord and the Tamil minority. **Tamil refusal to fall into the trap of accepting this pretence of devolution will be interpreted as indicating that the Tamils are extremist fanatics, unwilling to compromise or accept anything short of a separate Tamil homeland - Eelam.** The reality as reflected in this Bill is the Sinhalese refusal to compromise by granting any meaningful federal concessions to the Tamils. It demonstrates once again the unreality of hoping for the relinquishment of the Sinhalese desire to colonise and dominate the Tamil regions. **It gradually convinces one that EELAM is the only solution to escaping Sinhalese discrimination.**

The Week

Force hundred thousand

Another 30,000 are being sent

OPINION

THE ministry of external affairs has, from the start of the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, been understating the number of troops involved. The reasons for this are unclear. They certainly do not involve security, as the deployment there is well known even to the Indian press. Perhaps, the ministry has public relations objectives in mind, but this is foolish because once the units in the IPKF are known, it is a simple matter to count the manpower.

There have been five major inductions of troops into Sri Lanka. First, when the initial IPKF was sent. Second, when Prabhakaran turned against the accord. Third, during Operation Pawan, when additional forces were required. Fourth, when in December the government decided that the militants had to be overawed by a massive show of force. Last, in March when reinforcements were being sent for the elections.

The troop deployment at the end of the fourth induction was estimated depending on how many support troops were assigned for the planned force of 17 brigades and four division HQs. The ministry has been insisting that the total is around 50,000. How do we explain the discrepancy?

It is an insult to the public to pretend that a 17-brigade force can be maintained with 50,000 troops and the ministry is guilty of an outright lie, which it has repeated with unimaginative regularity.

First, consider the force itself. By the end of the fourth induction it included four complete divisions (4, 36, 54 and 57) and five separate brigades which, as best as I can estimate, were the 55 and 340 independent brigades, and one brigade each of the 18, 22 and 24 divisions.

An Indian infantry division has 17,000 men and a mountain division (57) about 15,000 men. All the divisions are without most of their artillery and integral armour. (The one tank regiment there may be integral to a division but we will count it separately.) These omissions allow the reduction of an infantry division to 13,500 men and a mountain division to 12,000. That gives 66,000 men. An independent brigade group has about 4,000 men, leave the artillery out and we get about 3,500 for each. A brigade from an infantry division, with its signal company, brigade HQ, and a few minor attachments, will be 3,000. So the five brigades add up to another 16,000 men, for a total of 82,000 men.

To this add the Provisional Corps HQ in Madras, which is located there only because the infrastructure in Jaffna is inadequate (2,000 men including two signal regiments), and one tank regiment and three mechanised battalions (3,000 plus) for a grand total of 87,000 army men.

This is the easy part. The difficult part is calculating support troops. An infantry corps in the plains, when mobilised for war, counting corps troops, line of communications units, and allocations from command, is about 1,00,000 men. In other words, for every man within three divisions of a standard corps there is one man outside.

Clearly, however, the Sri Lanka ratio is much less because this is a police action, not a combat operation. So extra armour, artillery, engineer, etc. are not needed, and supply, transport, maintenance, ordnance, military police, etc. are not needed to that extent. Conversely, the administration will be heavy. For a rough calculation, give 0.33 men outside the above units per man in the 17 brigades and extra armour battalions. This adds another 27,000 men, for a total of 1,14,000.

Not the last. *Indian armyman*

But not being a wartime situation, units will not be at full or at overstrength. Men will be away on leave, for courses, manning the home bases and so on. To allow for this and for inadvertent exaggeration, reduce the figure by 20 per cent, or 23,000, for an actual realistic total of 91,000.

To this must be added other forces: CRPF (2,500), ITBP (2,000), Railway Protection Force (1,000), National Security Guard (500), air detachments (varying between 1,000 and 2,000), navy, coast guard and marines afloat (varying between 2,000 and 4,000, take 3,000). This gives another 10,000 men.

Put the two figures together, and we get a rounded-off 1,00,000.

At the time I made this estimate in a letter to *The Times of India*, I had explicitly stated that in my view this force was inadequate and that another 50,000 men were required.

Now another two divisions (possibly the rest of 18 and 22 divisions) are in the process of being sent, plus additional paramilitary troops and battalions of the Tamil Nadu Armed Police. The details are not with me yet, but I would provisionally estimate that the overall total in Sri Lanka will cross 1,30,000 troops, inclusive of paramilitary and armed police.

The reasons for this enormous deployment are beyond the ken of this discussion. More to the point should be questions of why the ministry has not realised, after four decades of independence, that it is only a servant of a democratic state, not a master of a colony, and why the ministry is being allowed to get away with its lies.

MAR. 13–19, 1988 —RAVI RIKHYE

YOU TOO INDIA?

இன்றைய இரவை அவனிடம் இழந்தோம்,
இனிவரும் பகலும் எமதென்பதில்லை;
எங்கள் விதியை அவனிடம் இழந்தபின்
எங்கள் முன்றிலும் எமதென்றில்லை.

எங்கள் முன்றிலும் எறித்த நிலவுமாய்
இன்புறு நாட்கள் எங்கோ தொலைந்தன
இருட்டுள் சிவியம் எத்தனை நாட்கள்?



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நாளாந்த நாகரீகத்தின்
ஒளிச்சதுரம் உடைந்து
வீட்டினுள் சிதறுகிறது
சட்டத்தின் கரம் எறிந்த
பெட்ரோல் வெடி.
பிதியின் எல்லை

குழந்தைமை கற்பிழந்து
பயங்கரம் முதிர்கிறது

உலகின் ஊனைச் சட்டங்கள்
விரிட்டு அழும்
பெண் குரலைச் சுற்றி
உதவியற்ற
அமைதிப் பிராந்தியமாகின்றன.
விடிவின் திசையற்று
ஒரு சமூகத்தின்
உயிரைச் சூழ்கிறது
இருபத்துநாலு மணி நேர
இருள்

Sri Lanka : Crisis Deepens

COMMENT

SUMIT CHAKRAVARTTY

GAMINI DISSANAYEKE's sudden visit to New Delhi is learnt to be aimed at conveying to the Government of India the urgency of associating the Sri Lankan security forces with the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in the operations against the Tamil militants in the eastern part of the island-state. This, according to the Minister for Lands and Land Development of Sri Lanka, has become imperative in the context of the IPKF's failure to prevent the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from killing the Sinhala civilians in the eastern province.

Dissanayeke's second objective is to impress upon the authorities in New Delhi the necessity of inducting Indian troops in the southern regions of Sri Lanka as a supporting standby to combat the Sri Lanka Government's operations against terrorism unleashed by Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP). The significance of the presence of Cyril Ranatunge, the Chief of Sri Lankan joint operations command, in Dissanayeke's delegation becomes obvious from these aims.

The whole purpose of the Sri Lankan administration is to draw, more resolutely, the Indian army into the Sri Lankan quagmire. It would be foolhardy on the part of New Delhi to positively respond to these requests at a time when Colombo has yet to call a halt to its policy of colonisation in the Tamil areas.

Is it coincidental that Dissanayeke's visit to New Delhi is taking place just when the Government of India has launched a massive operation against the LTTE? Even without holding any brief for the LTTE, it is essential to raise one's voice against the senselessness of such an effensive if its goal is, as it definitely appears to be at the moment, to exterminate the LTTE leadership. For the short-sighted Rajiv Gandhi administration, despite being fortunate to be guided by such able diplomats as J.N. Dixit, the Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, is unable to realise that Prabhakaran dead would be potentially much more dangerous than Prabhakaran alive. Any development to that effect will doubtless raise the level of hostility of the Sri Lankan Tamils — especially those in the north — to the Government of India to a point of no return, and result in a new round of intractable problems in Tamil Nadu.

In this situation it becomes imperative to demand, more vociferously than before, that the Government of India should call a halt to the IPKF operations and withdraw its troops from Sri Lanka at the earliest (through a phased pull-out in case a sudden withdrawal has debilitating effects for the local Tamils). The Government of India must wash its hands off and allow the Sri Lankans to settle their own future themselves. The consequences cannot be worse than what we have been witness to since the signing of the July 29 Indo-Sri Lankan accord.

The Government of India, it must be admitted on all hands, has miserably failed to force J.R. Jayewardene to implement his part of the accord. For example, there has been no effort by the Sri Lankan Government to fufill the commitments made in the letters that JRJ exchanged with Rajiv Gandhi specifically with regard to the presence of foreign intelligence agencies in Sri Lanka detrimental to India's security interests. The result: there has been a marked increase in the number of Israeli (Mossad) elements in the island since the signing of the accord.

While the LTTE has undoubtedly queered the pitch, the contribution of JRJ towards that end cannot be overlooked either. The Sri Lankan President has done precious little to remove the "undemocratic" odium from his regime, something a liberal like Ronnie de Mel found revolting enough to resign from the JRJ Cabinet. The octagenarian leader's reluctance to go for parliamentary elections that could help divert attention from JVP terrorism and facilitate the "letting off of steam" has been squarely responsible for the current deteriorating conditions in the whole of Sri Lanka adding to the worsening scenario in the north and the east. As for the devolution of powers to the provinces, the Sri Lankan President has declined to take any step in that direction on the plea that such a move would attract displeasure of the Sri Lankan Supreme Court and invite a referendum that would result in the masses scrapping the accord.

But what is the value of the accord today anyway? Has it not been already turned into a scrap of paper?

Rajiv Gandhi must forthwith shed all illusions about JRJ and refuse to back him politically and do his dirty work in the north and the east as he has been doing so far. There could be a rethinking only if JRJ carries out his commitments specified in the accord. There must at least be a threat to call off the IPKF operations.

As for those who want to describe the accord as a document that "smashed the imperialist conspiracy", the less said the better. One is appalled at their naivette, being innocent of the machinations of imperialist forces. These persons are totally blind to the reality that what has happened in effect is that the imperialist conspiracy has been strengthened several folds following the accord. The enhancement of the Mossad strength in Sri Lanka since the conclusion of the agreement does not need any elaboration before those who have eyes to see.

It is time to frankly acknowledge the mistake of the course pursued by India in the last eight months since the end of July 1987 and undertake a candid self-critical introspection. Such an introspection alone can lead to the evoltion of a clearer long-term approach to the ethnic crisis in the island-state, one that precludes direct involvement but guarantees peace and stability in that country while ensuring security for the Sri Lankan Tamils through the use of the enormous political clout that India does enjoy in this region. How effectively such a clout was wielded by Indira Gandhi in her lifetime!

Let us not march blindfold from setback to disaster. □

March 19, 1988

INDIA INDICTED AT UNITED NATIONS

Human Rights Commission -44th Sessions

Our special correspondent in Geneva covering the 44th Session of the U.N Commission on Human Rights, held during February 1 to March 11, reports on proceedings. Extracts from addresses made are reproduced.

International Federation of Human Rights. (F.I.D.H.)

Mme.Fabienne Rousso-Lenoir

"On July 29, 1987, the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, and the President of the Republic of Sri Lanka, Junius Jayewardene, signed an agreement with the intention of bringing the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka to an end. **This agreement was made up of two aspects of the question:** The first concerning the cessation of hostilities between the Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan armed forces; the second concerning the institution of an autonomous administrative regime in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.

We shall concern ourselves here only with the first aspect of the agreement. According to the terms of the agreement, the **Indian Government contracted to send troops, called the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), to Sri Lanka, with a triple mission,** viz.

- to organise and maintain a cease-fire between the Sri Lankan armed forces and the groups of Tamil militants;
- to ensure the protection and security of the Tamils as well as the members of other communities residing in the northern and eastern provinces;
- to ensure the total surrender of arms by the militant Tamil groups.

After a few days of wavering, all the groups making up the Tamil guerilla force accepted to lay down their arms. However, the IPKF authorities, basing their decision on uncorroborated information that one of the groups of the guerilla force, namely, the LTTE, had not observed the terms of the agreement, launched military operations against the members of the latter group, right from the beginning of October 1987. From this date onwards **IPKF repeatedly violated its obligations entered into in the 29 July 1987 agreement.**

And so, since early October 1987, under the pretext of effecting a cease-fire, the Indian troops have undertaken military operations with the aim of bringing under their control the areas held by the LTTE militants. **As far as the civilian population was concerned, the IPKF operations have been extremely lethal, marked by atrocities committed by the Indian military personnel, in no way justified by the needs of maintaining order.**

According to information and corroborated testimony that the International Federation of Human Rights holds at the disposal of the Commission, **the IPKF launched massive air and mortar bombardments, especially at night, indiscriminately aiming at civilian housing where the militants were supposed to be found, particularly public buildings such as schools and temples where the civilian population thought fit to find refuge.** The intensity and the deadly nature of the battles have caused numerous civilians to flee the Jaffna peninsula to seek 'refuge' in the hope of ensuring their safety, in the Vavuniya region. This exodus often took place under extremely difficult conditions. Since the IPKF helicopters shot at sight any moving vehicle by day or by night, the refugees avoided all means of road transport. The civilians also chose to avoid the main thoroughfares for fear of being bombarded. As a result, the journey through jungle, in this period of the year, from Jaffna to Vavuniya took between twenty to forty days.

Moreover, the IPKF has prepared a blockade of the Jaffna peninsula, thus making it impossible to provide the civilian population with fresh supplies which precipitated a situation of dire want. During the period of hostilities, it is to be noted, the **civilian population was deprived of even the basic nutritive elements. Even if the IPKF had subsequently proceeded to distribute food supplies, it was undertaken in such a discriminatory way that the supposed sympathisers of the LTTE were deprived of them.**

In addition, it is an incontrovertible fact today that **the IPKF were guilty of murderous acts committed without any justification.** So it was that under the pretext of regaining control of the Jaffna Hospital, **nurses and doctors were executed cold-bloodedly.** Deserted civil buildings - a direct consequence of the embattled situation - were ransacked. Acts of rape too have been perpetrated. It is therefore clear that the IPKF has not respected one of the terms of the agreement underwriting the security of the civilian population. **The IPKF may not therefore shift the blame on to the LTTE** who, it is presumed, refused to lay down their arms.

First of all, some Westerners who were able to visit Vavuniya in December 1987 witnessed that certain militant groups presumed to have laid down their arms were still armed to the teeth. These militants regrouped under the banner of **"Three Stars" behaved as though they were the militia and summarily executed, rightly or wrongly, suspected individuals thought to be LTTE militants. Citizens' Committees have testified that these groups operated with the backing of the IPKF.** Arrests and disappearances of persons are rife. The families of persons so concerned have no clue whatsoever as to where or why they may have been detained.

One cannot but be skeptical about the Indian Government's declarations since it systematically refuses to let the CICR into Jaffna where it might perform its invested, hum-

anitarian mission. Likewise, no international observer has been authorised entry into the region in order to verify, as the case may be, if there had been human rights violations. The F.I.D.H. is seriously worried about the rapid deterioration of the situation in Sri Lanka and of the state of permanent insecurity that the civilian population is subjected to.

The F.I.D.H. requests the Commission on Human Rights to plead with the Indian and Sri Lankan governments to take the following measures:

- to respect their obligations, taken under the terms of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and to permit without delay and without any limitation the presence of the CICR over there;
- to authorise without condition the right of access of the H.C.R. in all the provinces of Sri Lanka.
- to authorise the entry of non-governmental international observers into the Jaffna peninsula and the eastern provinces in order that they may freely investigate the state of the rights of man in these areas.
- to permit the HCR, the ICRC and other N.G.Os the right to visit detainees and prisoners-of-war.
- to proclaim immediately a cease-fire and to commence at once negotiations with the participation of international observers.
- to abrogate the Prevention of Terrorism Act, a law which enables the security forces, both military and police, to arrest any one, at any time, without the observance of any judi cial procedure, a law which is the cause of numerous disappearances.
- to liberate all Tamil prisoners, whether political or otherwise."

International Indian Treaty Council

Robert Cruz

"Since our leaders visited Sri Lanka in 1979, we have been concerned with the Tamil indigenous population in that country. We welcomed the July 1987 Indo- Sri Lankan Accord as a step forward for peace and justice for Tamils. Tragically, Tamils continue to suffer because of the war against them and the atrocities committed by the Indian Peace Keeping Force. **We ask all to join us in urging India to accept the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) offer of a cease fire that can lead the way to guarantee Tamils all their rights as a People."**

Disabled Peoples' International

Karen Parker

"The Commission, in its resolution 1987/61, requested the parties to the Sri Lanka conflict to comply with humanitarian norms and to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to fulfill humanitarian activities regarding the victims of the armed conflict. Unfortunately, **Sri Lankan civilians now suffer violations of humanitarian law with a devastating effect on life and limb.** In addition, **the International Committee of the Red Cross has not yet been granted the requested access to victims.**



Geneve - Palais Des Nations

Of particular concern to Disabled Peoples' International in any armed conflict situation are armed attacks on hospitals in violation of Article 18 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. In the Sri Lanka conflict, **Manipay Green Hospital, Tellipalai Hospital** and the **Philip Nursing Home were shelled by the Indian Peace Keeping Force in October, 1987. The large government hospital in Jaffna was also attacked,** and an eye-witness who escaped with serious injuries reported that **at least 200 patients died.** Several doctors and nurses were also killed. Eye-witnesses said most wounded bled to death because there was no one to attend on them.

We immediately expressed our concern to representatives of the **Government of India, who in admitting the attack, alleged to us that members of the opposition forces had sought shelter in the hospital.** Our information indicates that several members of the opposition forces may have been at the hospital.

However, Article 19 of the Fourth Geneva Convention is patently clear: **protection of hospitals only ceases if the hospital is used to commit acts harmful to the enemy, and then only after "due warning" and a "reasonable time limit." The mere presence of some opposition combatants is insufficient cause.** The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights agreed with us on this point, when in its decision of 17 April 1986 in our case 9213 (reprinted in the 1986/87 Annual Report of the IACHR), it found admissibility based on prima facia violations of the right to life in spite of Respondent Government's assertion that enemy soldiers were at the hospital in question.

Article 16 of the Fourth Geneva Convention requires the parties to a conflict to search for and attend to killed and wounded persons. The Indian Peace Keeping Force abandoned the sick and wounded in these hospitals, even though they were responsible for their injuries.

Another incident occurred at Punnalai Bridge, where **at least 15 fleeing refugees were killed and 15 injured.** The injured sought aid at Moolai Hospital, subsequently bombed on November 8. Violations at the hands of opposition forces are certain

to have occurred, though verification of responsible parties has been extremely difficult.

The events we describe and many others we could present have been verified to us beyond doubt through direct communication with, inter alia, the highest Church officials in the region, Representatives of European Organisations on the scene, the families of numerous victims (Tamils and Sinhalese), and the foreign press.

We urge the Commission to request the Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and Disability to investigate these and other incidents involving the parties to the conflict in Sri Lanka with an aim of ameliorating suffering. We sincerely regret the loss of life and injuries on all sides - rehabilitation needs will be difficult to meet. **We ask all Members and Observers to urge a cease-fire and peaceful settlement of the disputes between the parties in Sri Lanka and to assist with humanitarian aid for the victims.**

Minority Rights Group

Martin Ennals of International Alert

"I speak on behalf of the Minority Rights Group to recall to the Commission its resolution on 12th March 1987 on the subject of the conflict in Sri Lanka.

In that resolution the Commission unanimously voted to recommend - inter alia - that the International Committee of the Red Cross should be enabled to fulfil its mandated functions of protecting victims of conflict visiting prisoners, and providing relief and rehabilitation without prejudice or discrimination.

In the 12 intervening months there have been many developments in Sri Lanka, but **strife and killings continue, human rights are violated and the ICRC is still unable to visit places of detention, meet the victims and dispense relief.**

There has been however the Peace Accord between Sri Lanka and India which was initially accepted by all parties and which left many of those concerned about Sri Lanka in a state of euphoria believing that the future was secure. The 29th July 1987 was the date on which the Indian Peace Keeping Force was invited to Sri Lanka as an interim instrument towards a constitutional settlement providing regional elections for Provincial Councils. The militant Tamil groups agreed to surrender their arms to the IPKF and peace seemed possible. The hopes were premature. Violence recommenced. Violence attracted violence and the syndrome of conflict was repeated.

Violations of human rights, by the IPKF, by the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) and by Security Forces were reported in abundance. International NGOs, individual observers, newspaper reports and official statements **all acknowledged that extra-judicial killings, murders of civilians, and countless other violations were carried out** by all those involved in the conflict.

The purpose of this intervention, Mr.Chairman, is not to point a finger at any of the parties to the conflict as being specifically responsible. All are probably guilty of excesses which have been documented. Reports have been received from Asdia Watch, the Canadian Churches, International Alert, Amnesty International and many others. The press, both in India and Sri Lanka, and internationally, have all carried stories which justify concern no matter which side of the conflict is being reported.

The purpose of this intervention is to highlight the role which the international community can play - **a responsibility recognised by the Commission in 1987 which cannot be simply ignored or forgotten in 1988.**

There are several elements on international community involvement in the conflicts of Sri Lanka.

1. Refugees; The UNCHR is operating in Sri Lanka and is well placed to understand the situation and to advise both refugees and governments on the problems which confront returnees or those who decide to seek asylum. Refugees have been returned from Europe against their will and despite the advice of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. More European governments are threatening to do the same. The Indian government is encouraging those Tamils who have sought sanctuary in Madras to return and many are confused as to whether their return is required or voluntary. The UN can surely amongst its members agree to respect the right of asylum to which refugees are entitled, and to which governments are committed. Of course, it is essential that people return to their homes so that the Accord can be fulfilled and elections held. But while violence continues so does fear.

The Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law are quite clear that the International Committee of the Red Cross is independent, neutral and charged with the implementation of the conventions. To admit the Red Cross (ICRC) is to fulfil obligations; not to concede criticism. **The Human Rights Commission of the UN in 1987 recognised this and addressed recommendations to the Sri Lanka government with the endorsement of India. The plight of the victims has not changed and the role of the ICRC deserves the same backing in 1988 as in 1987.**

Conflict cannot be resolved without dialogue. Today there are women on hunger strike in Batticaloa to persuade those responsible that dialogue should re- commence. There can be no peace without talk; no settlement without dialogue. **If the alternative to talk is killings, then talk must be the preferred option.** The UN rapporteur, HE Mr.Amos Wako referred to Sri Lanka in his report which was presented on March 1st. A positive response from the Commission would reflect the anxiety and policy reflected by the 1987 resolution and endorse the positive initiatives taken by India and Sri Lanka since 1987, while reflecting an appreciation of the political and physical fears felt by minorities seeking protection of their rights to life and safety."

Joint submission by fifty nine Tamil Organisations

Fifty nine Tamil Organisations representing the International Tamil Community have jointly appealed.

'We are aware that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam made an offer of a cease-fire and peace negotiations on 24 February 1988 to the Prime Minister of India, the Honourable Shri Rajiv Gandhi. We are also aware that the offer for peace talks was made unconditional in a telex statement by the LTTE dated 26 February 1988 in which the fast unto death of Tamil women was raised.

We are Sri Lankan Tamils who, because of the tragic events in our country of birth, have been forced to flee. Our organisations represent thousands of Tamils around the world. These organisations have represented a wide variety of views concerning strategies to improve Tamil rights in Sri Lanka.

We are united now in this appeal to you to assist the Government of India, the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE to achieve a cease-fire and meaningful negotiations regarding what is obviously our fate and the fate of our families and friends in Sri Lanka who remain at great risk."

SWISS FEDERATION OF TAMILS

The Swiss Federation of Tamils organised a demonstration in Geneva which was well attended. At the end of the rally a public meeting was held. A memorandum was submitted to the Chairman of the 44th Session of the Human Rights Commission.

"The whole world now knows that the ***Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord has not led to peace for us but has instead led to more war, death and destruction in our Tamil homeland.*** We appeal to you and to the whole world to consider how we can solve the Tamil situation by peaceful means.

The Sri Lankan Prime Minister, Mr.Premadasa, has himself pointed out that 'genocide is now being enacted by the IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Force) instead of Sinhala army, a tragedy for the Tamils." The government of India which championed the Tamil cause up to the signing of the accord is now committing genocide. We are sure you join our distress over what has taken place since 10th October, 1987:

1. Killing of more than 2,000 innocent civilians, mostly elderly;

2. Injuring thousands of civilians in their houses, places of refuge, etc.;

3. Raping of Tamil women and girls in a mass scale;

4. Destruction of houses, schools, temples to the extent that Tamil homeland had never witnessed in known history;

5. Making 500,000 persons (more than half the population of the North) homeless;

6. Removal of the belongings of the people such as gold, jewelleries, electrical and electronic goods, furniture, etc.

We hand over a copy of a video tape and copies of photographs which may provide at least some account of the situation caused by the IPKF, together with a few documents received from our sister organisation in Paris and a copy of a memo from the LTTE.

We appeal to you to use your good offices to bring about a political solution to save the Tamils. ***We rely on your immediate intervention to save us."***

18 NGOs APPEAL TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

"We appeal to the Members of the Commission to support initiatives for a cease-fire and dialogue between the parties involved in the conflict in Sri Lanka. Additionally, we appeal to the Members to prevail upon the parties to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to fulfill its activities in conformity with Commission resolution 1987/61 "

Athletic Site Provides Gruesome Sight

Chettipalayam MV, the head school in a cluster of schools, in the Batticaloa District in the East Sri Lanka had its athletic annual meet in the school grounds on 18-03-88. The pupils in the area, teachers and the officials and a large gathering of parents and wellwishers of the area were all involved in the festive mood which was moving happily towards the climax when suddenly and least expected a tension engulfed the entire situation. The crowd is restless.

A band of armed youngsters descends swiftly on the grounds, having armed by private mini-omnibuses. A young man who was till then enjoying the sports events and was still absorbed in that particular mood was, in a flash, subjected to beating by short, thick, sticks resembling lathi. The public speaking instrument in the sports field ordered to converge and sit down. The contingent of the IPKF arrived at the scene. The armed youngsters and the Indian soldiers quickly dispersed into the crowd that was seated, pulled out people pointed out by the special identifiers, put them on their stomach and beat them mercilessly with the heavy sticks and butts of rifles. This continued for some time. There is moaning, yelling with pain in agony under this attack. Some students and a teacher were also subjected to inhuman treatment. Some young men brought from a neighbouring house are shouted as 'tigers' and are given gruesome treatment. There is profuse bleeding from some of their heads. The crowd is nonplussed and helpless. There is also some faint wailing from the females there. An armed young ferocious attacker appears on the scene, pointing his gun at the writhing victims. Suddenly as if by an instantaneous impulse throws away his gun, disappears and appears as sudden again with a sword. He alights on the body of the injured victims and deals a few blows on the still arms of the young man under his foot. This attack lasting about one and a half hours, as the sun went down. Ropes are brought now and the victims' hands tied. They are marched to the military truck and forced into them. The unconscious victims carried to a truck by betrayers from tristar. The soldiers and their allies, the tristar march off vociferously after a grand conquest. It was near dark and with a sad darkness of sorrow prevading and tears running down the cheeks the crowd silently disperses. Thus is happened that the athletic site provided a gruesome site.

I was also informed by an eye witness that the Parish Priest after coming back from his order was again questioned and abused. I also got complaints that there was several cases of rape by Jawans when they went into the Tannamunai Colony. I shall gather all their complaints in detail and submit their testimony and if possible bring them before a committee of inquiry in person.

BATTLE □ FOR □ JAFFNA

EYE-WITNESS

An eye-witness account given by a nurse in a hospital in Jaffna during the Indian army's operation to capture Jaffna . Names of people and places have been changed or left blank in order to protect the identity of the writer.

My experience of the events of the post-peace accord period

I was working in Colombo from 1969 and was away in New Delhi from July 1986 to August 1987. At the end of August, exactly a month after the signing of the Peace Accord I returned to Colombo and was told that Jaffna would be the place for my future activities. With the good wishes and blessings from my friends in Colombo I arrived in Jaffna in mid-September. My friends were glad that I was going to Jaffna at the beginning of a new era, blessed with peace and promise of prosperity.

I found Jaffna to possess the same calm, peaceful and friendly nature. But the destruction wrought by the recent military offensive has left a permanent scar in the land as well as in the hearts of the people of Jaffna. As I listened to the tales of woe I felt like an outsider who has not shared with them their pain and sorrow, their courage and fortitude in times of crisis.

The so-called peace lasted only for a week of my coming to Jaffna. There were hartals, demonstrations, hunger-strikes, fast-unto-death etc. The trains stopped operating, there was no postal service, and no newspapers were available at our door.

Following the arrest and violent death of 17 militants, a widespread destruction and wanton killings of Sinhalese in the North and East took place. In this holocaust Mr.Anthonymuthu, the Government Agent of Batticaloa was caught, and the charred remains were brought to Jaffna for interment.

It was 10th October. The funeral of Mr.Anthonymuthu was to take place around 4 p.m. Mary, Kamala and myself were to attend the funeral service. Already by 1-30 p.m. I heard the helicopters droning and the sound of bomb blasts. AT 2-30 p.m. when I was ready to leave the house, I found Kamala busy with six patients injured from shell blasts, and she said that it was not advisable to leave the house as some shells have fallen very close to the Convent. Mary, who was in Jaffna during the worst Sri Lankan offensive assured me that we could safely attend the funeral. As we left our house through the rear gate, we were told that a person had been killed down that lane due to bomb blast. With the helicopters hovering over our heads we reached the funeral house. Around 5-45 p.m. Father Felix Ariam announced that the Holy Mass would not be conducted as programmed earlier. With a very short prayer service, the remains of Mr. Anthonymuthu were removed to the cemetery and laid to rest. When we came back to the house along the Beach Road, we saw crowds of people moving out from Gurunagar and going towards Passaiyoor. There had been some damage in Gurunagar and people who had experienced similar situations during 'Operation Liberation' were fleeing from their homes, carrying their children, bundles of clothes, buckets, utensils, etc. Some were pushing hand-carts loaded with bundles. ***I was reminded of the Exodus of old.*** The difference is that there was no one to lead them and there was no hope of the 'promised land'.

In the evening a 36-hour curfew was announced. ***Sunday 11th October*** remained calm except for a few helicopters hovering in the sky. From our house we could watch the helicopters land and take off from the island just opposite - on the other side of the lagoon - Mandaitivu.

On Monday 12th October, there were shell blasts from morning, and at about 8 am I was called to the out-patients department as there were many casualties from shell blasts. When I went to the O.P.D. I saw two Doctors (one of them Dr.Ganesh who was later shot dead at the General Hospital) and six nurses busy attending on the injured. The sight was terrible. - a girl of 18 with an injury on the abdomen and half her bowels out, was lying on a bench, dead. - a man of 60, had no apparent injuries, but was sweating profusely, died after 15 minutes, probably of a myocardial infarction. - a boy of 8 with a head injury shifted to General Hospital, died later. - another boy of 8, with an injury at the back sustained a pneumothorax. - a woman of 50 had a fracture of the femur. - two brothers aged 7 and 5 were miraculously saved. One had a piece of shell in the neck which had just missed his windpipe by one mm. The other had a wound in the chest wall exposing two of his ribs. In all there were 17 wounded and we had to send six of them to the General Hospital as we could not handle them at our hospital.

The worst tragedy is the relatives, had no place to keep the dead to give a chance for relatives to pay their last respects. The dead man was removed to the cemetery, and the girl was taken to a hut close by and

was kept there till evening. Around 10-30 a.m. on the same day, we received the news that Camillus, the nephew of one of our nurses, was killed in another incident. He was 18 years old. His sister is also a nurse in our hospital and his father is also employed here. Curfew was on and it was not safe for anyone to be on the road, but since we had to get the body from the General Hospital I went with Cutty and on our way we informed Selvam, and he accompanied us. It took more than two hours to go through the formalities in the Gen. Hospital to release the body.

I walked into the mortuary and I regretted for doing so. I will never be able to forget that scene. One corpse was lying without the head; one woman had a big hole in the abdomen; a new-born infant was lying in a corner dead. The whole room was strewn with bodies. When we checked at the police post we found out that there had been 29 deaths that morning. Camillus was the 30th according to the register. There was no one to claim some corpses; the identity of some was not known. I was beginning to understand what the people of Jaffna had been through during the previous 'Operation Liberation'.

Tuesday, 13th October, dawned with one casualty. A man from Ariyalai was brought with a hole in the abdomen through which the loops of intestines were protruding. After doing the necessary treatment we packed him off to the General Hospital without any delay. The funeral of Camillus took place around 9 a.m. The atmosphere seemed to be quiet. But when we were at the cemetery helicopters hovered over us and we were told that the curfew was on from 10 a.m. So we hurried home. We had no electricity from the 12th, Monday.

DEEPAVALI 'FIREWORKS'

From 14th to 20th it was a common sight to see one or two helicopters accompanying a bomber. For me it was something new. But others seemed to be very familiar with the sight. They had their own name for each. The helicopter which accompanies the bomber is known as the 'task bearer', for it instructs the bomber about the places to be bombed. One which hovers alone for sometime is the 'spy'. The sea 'plane is the 'photographer'. When we tune our radio, the FM band, we could clearly hear the instructions. The people were sure that the 'bomber' could not stay for more than 45 minutes. They had listened to the conversation "The stuff is over, I am returning. Follow me to .....". So, it is either the fuel or the explosives that do not last for more than 45 minutes.

It was with horror I watched the bomber dip low, drop something like fire balls and move away with lightning speed. Everyday we had some injured people coming for treatment, and during that week we had four deaths.

The 20th and 21st October are days of feasting for the Hindu majority of Jaffna citizens. Every Hindu celebrates the festival of lights 'Deepavali'. This year these two days saw the worst military offensive. Instead of crackers there were shell blasts. Around 11 a.m. we saw bombs being dropped at a place very close to our house. Several bombs were dropped at the same place, and there was fire and thick black smoke. Later we heard that the target was a five-storeyed building and the jetty. Some thatched huts close by caught fire. A child of five was killed on the spot and five of them were brought to our place for treatment. Around 4 p.m. I was standing at the OPD and I saw a man throwing his bike away and rushing towards us shouting, "He is alive..... He is breathing ...We are bringing him..." As I was wondering what he meant another cyclist came in with a man doubled over his bike soaked in blood. We carried him to the OPD and as we put him on the table he passed away. He was found lying on the road probably injured about half an hour before. There was a wound in his thigh hitting his femoral artery and he had bled to death. No one seemed to know who he was and it took about half an hour to get in touch with his relatives. He was 35 years old, father of two children, and the third baby was due any time then.

We had a few more casualties in the evening and by 8 p.m. we gathered in our hall for an hour of quiet prayer. At 8-40 p.m. all the hospital staff were called out to the OPD. **Two shells had fallen at Girls' High School, Chundukuli, where about 20,000 people had taken shelter.** It was pitch-dark and the people had been running for shelter. **Four had died on the spot and 35 injured. One van was hired to take the injured to the Government Hospital. Three of the injured were brought here, one on a motor- bike, the other two on cycles; and we were asked to be ready to receive the others. Another five arrived after some time. There were no vehicles available to bring the other injured. With the curfew on, no one wanted to take the risk. After an hour, four arrived in a handcart. Can you imagine our feeling at that moment? Did we ever dream that we would be forced to use a handcart to take a seriously injured patient to hospital?** A child of three was carried by his grandfather, dead in his arms. When he learnt that the child was dead he left him there and ran back to see the other children. We just could not see where the injury was.

SHELLING FROM EVERY DIRECTION

Later, after we finished attending on the patients, we examined him closely and found a small wound at the back. A tiny piece of shell had found its way to the heart. He was lying on a bench all alone, so beautiful and peaceful

and I was wondering how his mother would accept his death.

Two of the injured arrived at 11-30 p.m. Since the shelling continued fiercely even at midnight, we removed all the patients to the in-patient section, and even brought all those who were upstairs to the ground floor. Some of them were sitting up and there was no space even to stretch themselves comfortably. All the nurses crowded into an adjoining building which had an upstairs floor, and the people from the neighbourhood took shelter in the verandahs. Mothers and children sat up almost the whole night, kept awake by the onslaughts of the mosquitoes and bomb blasts.

That was the story of the 20th and 21st. There was more in store for us. In the morning everyone in the hospital was kept busy dressing wounds and cleaning up the place. Though the bomb blasts continued we had no casualties that day till 3 pm. We had just gone to our house for prayers and as we started we were called out. **There had been shell blasts at the Ayurvedic Orthopaedic clinic as well as at St.Patrick's College.**

At the Orthopaedic Clinic about 25 people had taken shelter. At about 2-30 p.m. a shell fell near the well killing two girls on the spot and injuring one. As the others ran towards the well to help the injured, another shell alighted almost at the same spot. And another fell near the gate. On the whole there were five deaths and eleven people were injured. Those who sustained serious injuries were packed off to the General Hospital, and others came to our place for dressings. At St.Patrick's College, where over 8,000 people had taken refuge two shells struck around 3 p.m. injuring about 15 people. Some of the injured were taken to the G.H. and four of them were brought by car to our hospital. Among the wounded was Mr.Benjamin, brother of Mr. Jesudason of our hospital. He had taken shelter at St.Patrick's College. He sustained a fractures of his right arm and a deep wound in his abdomen. Another old man had fracture of both the right hand and leg and was bleeding profusely; later he succumbed to his injuries.

There was no way of sending the injured to the G.H. as heavy shelling continued. There was no respite till 5 p.m. We could see shells falling just in front of us into the sea and behind our hospital. One fell in our compound just behind the laundry and two in the temple compound close by. Unlike in the Sri Lankan military offensive, shells were now coming from all directions. The Sri Lankan military was stationed in the Fort and were shelling from there; and people could run away to safer areas. But now the Indian army was coming into Jaffna from all directions and as they were advancing they were shelling. We could clearly see shells coming from at least three directions. We removed all the patients to the ground floor of the in-patients' block.

"LEFT AMMA WITHOUT HER HEAD"

Around 4-30 p.m. Sister Allen came to tell us that there were patients being brought through the rear gate of the hospital. There was such a thick cloud of smoke that I could not see her clearly. As I was watching her coming towards the hospital a shell fell just behind the laundry, and she shook off her slippers and ran towards us. Matron Muthu was in the canteen with the girls getting dinner ready for the patients and we shouted for her to come to the hospital.

About 25 injured people arrived within half an hour. There was hardly any space available and we put them on the floor in the labour room, operating theatre, and in the corridor between. The two to arrive first were shouting at the top of their voices, "I saw her.... I saw her... She is without her head... He is burning..." Moving among them with splints, dressings and bandages was bad enough. We had no time to listen to their tales of woe. At about 5-30 p.m. when the shelling abated we got dinner ready, managed to give a cup of hot tea to all the people, collected water and tried to make the patients as comfortable as possible. I also managed to go back to our house and found all the nurses safe in the hall reciting prayers.

The shelling started again at 7 p.m. and continued till 9-30 p.m. Thank God, there were only two casualties during that time. We neither had the space nor the strength to face another emergency. The shells were falling all around us and those of us in the hospital thought that they were falling on the Trainee Nurses' Hostel; and those in the hostel thought that the hospital was being damaged. **For more than two hours everyone chanted prayers, amid groanings and moanings and screams of pain.** Many of us prepared to face the life hereafter We had no place to sit even on the ground. Moving among the patients to observe bleeding or to adjust the position of broken limbs and accommodating ourselves between them, we also joined them in prayer. During the two hours some of us tried to reach our house as we were worried about the safety of the nurses there, but it was not possible. Around 9-45 p.m. too scared even to flash a torch light, we found our way to the house. Thank God, everyone was safe. **All of them including the trainees and working girls had gathered in the hall and were chanting prayers.** We had a quick dinner and I went back to the hospital to relieve the others.

Around 10-30 p.m. a five-year old girl walked up to me and asked, "Sister, will you let me go home?" Knowing that her father was also injured and in the hospital I told her that she could stay with him. Then she told me the pathetic story of how she had left her mother, and said, **"We have left Amma in the cattle shed. She is lying there without her head. I want to go and see her." She lives just behind our house. Seeing the shells damaging a brick- and-tile house close by they had run to the cattle shed thinking that the damage caused by collapsing mud walls would be minimal. Her mother, who was 8 months pregnant, was holding her to her chest and was lying face downwards.** A shell fell severing her head and the head of her nephew who was lying close to her. Her mother, sister, husband and nephews were all injured. A

little further away her brother-in-law had been killed. Her sister escaped with minor injuries. When everyone was shouting and calling for help the little girl had crawled out from under her mother. She had a superficial injury on her scalp. **She saw her mother lying without her head. Will she ever be able to forget the incident? Forget the scene?**

When I went to see the little girl's aunt, I learned that she was a victim of polio and had a deformity in her left leg and now her right leg had been fractured. She had lost her husband and her elder son of 15, and her second son had been injured badly and might need an amputation. Only her third son had escaped with minor injuries.

22nd morning brought more news of the dead. In our neighbourhood, among the people we knew about 10 had been killed. There was no news of the 14 taken to the G.H. We had so many patients to be sent to the G.H. for further treatment; we had neither the staff nor the equipment to attend on them. But no one was allowed to go to the General Hospital.

The curfew continued indefinitely and the people were starving literally. No one was prepared for such an ordeal. After the signing of the Peace Accord everything had seemed so rosy that the people had not stocked any foodstuffs as they had done during the past four years. On Sunday, 25th, five of us plucked up enough courage to go out during the curfew hours. As we passed the five-storeyed building temporarily occupied by the Indian army, some army officers called us and spoke to us, trying to convince us that they were there to help us.

They were friendly and could speak English; and we found ourselves expressing our views about them and about the present happenings, and even went to the extent of telling them the new version of IPKF (Innocent People Killing Force). They allowed us to move freely within their territory, i.e. the area covering Dr.Philips' Nursing Home to Girls' High School, Chundikuli. So, during the next four days we managed to visit the refugees in Holy Family Convent, St.Patrick's College, Cathedral, St. Charles Mahavidyalayam, Ashram, etc. About 90% of the population were in camps. Others were coming there to spend the night. During these visits I met the Red Cross officials and with them I visited the people in St.Anthony's Church, St. Joseph's Church, St.Joseph Mahavidyalayam, and in the three seminaries. In all there were 20,000 refugees in all these 6 places. Fever, diarrhoea, dysentery and scabies were rampant. Since the Red Cross officials did not know Tamil I worked with them for five days. There were check points at every 100 yards almost and the soldiers did not know Tamil or English and they found it extremely difficult to communicate with us.

On 29th the curfew was lifted for four hours. We visited the Hospital on 29th and 30th. Only on the 29th did we learn about the brutal killings of nearly 100 people including doctors and patients, nurses, attendants, etc. I had the chance to speak to some doctors and patients; and here is an account given by a Doctor:- "On 21st, at about 4 p.m. some Sikh soldiers walked into the Hospital shooting at random. I was trying to get into the doctors' lounge, but was thrown to the ground by the people who were running all over for safety. I remained there for quite a long time, as long as the shooting lasted. When everything was quiet I tried to crawl back to my room; and as I did so I realised that I was crawling over some dead bodies. I remained in the room till morning.

When I heard that Dr. Sivapathasundaram, Consultant Paediatrician, had come to the Hospital I tried to come out of the room. Dr.Sivapathasundaram and two nurses were walking with raised hands and shouting, "We are Doctor and nurses, we are surrendering." They were shot at point blank range. I also learnt that my good friend and colleague, Dr.Ganesh, had been shot dead the previous evening when he came out of the doctors' lounge. Later on we were called and asked to remove the dead bodies. Dr. Parimelalahan was also among the dead. We were given three hours to dispose of the bodies. Dr.Sivapathasundaram lives within a mile and we begged of the Indian officers to hand over the body to his wife, but they refused. We tried to get the identity of those killed by searching their pockets and cutting away pieces of clothing. It was humanly impossible as there was so much of mutilation, disfigurement, blood and smell.

The official count of the dead is less than the number actually killed. According to official number, among the dead were 3 Doctors, one Matron, two nurses, eleven attendants, one driver. In all there were 62 bodies inside the hospital compound, and another 25 outside the hospital gate and along Stanley Road. All the bodies within the hospital compound were burned inside the premises. A shell blast in ward 8 killed one and injured many. Those brought in from outside were not attended to on Wednesday and on Thursday and these died due to haemorrhage and shock.

On Friday we attended on the injured. There were 22 of us including the interns; and we were not allowed to go out as the curfew was on. Even today I am not allowed to go out. I hear my house has been bombed. I am unable to go and see what has happened. I prefer to stay in a refugee camp than in the Hospital which cannot give shelter and safety."

One of the patients who was injured in the shell blast in St.Patrick's College related her experience: "After the shell blast my sister and I were brought here along with other injured people. My brother also accompanied us. Soon after I was admitted to the ward, may be at about 10 p.m. I heard the sound of shooting and it continued for hours. My brother stayed with us. There was no one to attend on us. Even the next day there was no one. Meanwhile my sister succumbed to her injuries. I was given rain water to drink. I heard whispers that many patients had been shot dead in the hospital. My sister's body was burned in the hospital itself along with the others killed in the hospital. After two days I was put in plaster. Since the curfew was on I thought that my parents were safe in the College. But I hear that they had come to see us on 22nd morning. Since my mother cannot walk this distance and my father is unable to bring her on his cycle, one of my cousins accompanied them. They did not reach the hospital and we do not know what has happened to them. Hearing that there were about 15 bodies lying about along Stanley Road, and close to Subhas Hotel and even up to Gnanam's, my brother went to check. But he could not find my parents. Just now someone said that there were three bodies and two cycles lying along Attiady Road. How can I send my brother alone there to check? It is not a safe place to go to. How can we lose both our parents together? Not even to see

their bodies?"

One of the ladies who tried to go to the Hospital on the 22nd. Thursday, related as follows: "After the shell blast in the clinic we put all the injured into the van. There were eleven of them. Two other boys also got in to be of help. So, including the driver there were 14 of them. Since we had no further news of them all morning seven of us, all mothers, walked up to the army camp, each one carrying a white flag. The officer allowed us to go to the hospital. When we went in we saw a lot of bodies lying all over and blood spilled everywhere. When we inquired about our children we were told that none of them had come there. The attendants who knew us scolded us for coming to the hospital. "Even Doctors and nurses are being killed here; have you also come here to be killed?" they asked. We were shouting and crying aloud and the soldiers ordered us out. We were brought to the gate, with guns pointing at our backs, and were directed towards an old church. I stayed there with the refugees for three days and had nothing to eat or drink. Since I wanted to be with my people I jumped over walls and reached home. I did not know what had happened to all our children. I was told that the children were burned with the van."

On the 30th I saw this van in front of one of the hospital gates. I was too scared to go near it. Sisters Renu and Ruby who were with me went up to the van and they saw some skulls and bones lying inside and outside the van. Crows were pecking at the bones and dogs feasting on them. And that was the fate of the 14 taken to the G.H from the Ayuruedic Clinic.

The curfew which was relaxed for four hours was further relaxed to 6 and 8 hours gradually. But no vehicular transport was allowed, including bicycles. No passes were being issued. Since there was no transport no food supplies reached Jaffna. People had to go on foot to find food. Everyday when we walked up to the Main Street to buy food or visit someone or to go to the Kachcheri (Government offices), we saw people on the road searching for places to get rice and vegetables which they could not find anywhere. Even if the prices were very high they could not purchase them. Luckily for us, since we stayed along the Beach Road, we were able to get some prawns and crabs from those who dared to go for shallow-water fishing. The people in the interior could not have even that.

What we had seen for the past 10 days were long queues in front of the Premier Bakery (the only bakery functioning) for bread, in front of grocery shops in the Grand Bazaar for foodstuffs, in front of YMCA building for medicine, in front of the Kachcheri for passes either to go to Colombo, or for a vehicle or get food for the refugees. There was also a queue for free rice. You were lucky if you managed to get 250 grams. of rice after standing in a queue for three hours in the hot sun. Without any distinction everyone was made to walk along the road with a begging bowl. Of course thieves and robbers made the best use of the chance.

St.Patrick's Road had become a mini-market where we could get some food items at exorbitant prices; A Kg. of beet root, the only available vegetable, cost Rs.20; tapioca Rs.12 to 17; onions Rs.15 to 20. The price of rice went up to Rs.35 per Kg. and at the moment it is around Rs.22 to 25. Sugar was not available even for Rs.40. The same was true of flour.

Today, a month after the first shell blast, we are still without electricity, post or transport. A bottle of petrol costs Rs.50; a litre of kerosene Rs.28. an Eveready torch battery Rs.10; a medium-sized candle Rs.3. How can the people who have no jobs, pensions, salaries, who cannot go fishing, driving, etc.; and who cannot walk up to the places where these commodities can be purchased afford to have the luxury of lighting up their homes? We have also learned to walk five miles to Grand Bazaar, stand in queues for an hour or two, buy whatever is available and carry these things home on foot.

This is what I have seen and experienced in the small section of the Peninsula where I live; that is the area in and around Passaiyoor, Koiyathottam, Eachamoddai, Gurunagar and some parts of Chundikuli. If hundreds have perished in this small section we can imagine what has happened in every other part of the Peninsula; the intensity of the suffering of our people; the loss of thousands of lives and property. It will take many days for anyone to compile from all over the Peninsula's statistics on these losses. It will make a formidable volume of the tales of woe of the Northern people.

As the camps are being emptied and the people start normal life, refugees are pouring in from Manipay, Anaicottai, etc. Some of the refugees I have spoken to told me that they had left their homes about a month before and had been going from one camp to another.

The Peace Accord was signed on 29th July; and we still have to get to know what it means to have peace. May the God of Peace - at whose birth the angels brought the good news 'Peace on earth and goodwill to all men' - grant us the taste of what peace really is.

Cartoon by AJIT NINAN

REPORT

Separate Strategy

Colombo tries to cut New Delhi's role

IN diplomacy—as is the case in medicine—extreme complications call for extreme measures. Thus, the Jayewardene Government in Colombo has embarked, since the start of this year, on what can only be termed bypass surgery in its attempts to find a cure for the island's terminal ethnic problem. But as every doctor knows, such operations often create additional complications and, in the context of the Sri Lankan situation, they could be fatal.

For one, Colombo's decision to hold direct and secret talks with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has given the impression that the objective is to sideline New Delhi, its partner in the Indo-Sri Lankan accord, and thus regain the diplomatic advantage. If the operation was a success, it would allow Jayewardene to ask the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to quit the island rather than leave New Delhi with that option.

But the end-result is that Colombo and New Delhi have taken different forks in the ethnic road and are busy trying to trump each other's high cards. Having realised, somewhat belatedly, the game Colombo was playing, New Delhi moved quickly to sabotage it. Its High Commissioner in Colombo, J.N. Dixit, announced that any attempt to keep India out of the picture "can be misunderstood". Simultaneously, New Delhi started holding its own direct, secret talks with the LTTE to broker a political settlement. Admits Minister of State for External Affairs Natwar Singh: "We have been talking to them (the LTTE) almost every day for the past two weeks."

But what that indicates is that the right hand no longer knows what the left hand is doing. It also means that India-baiters like Lalith Athulathmudali, the Sri Lankan minister for national security, are back in positions of influence in Colombo. According to sources in Sri Lanka, Athulathmudali and Sri Lankan Lands Minister Gamini Dissanayake have been negotiating with LTTE chief Pirabhakaran through three key intermediaries—Dr Selvakumar, a Tamil expatriate in the US and a classmate of Pirabhakaran, D.B.S. Jeyaraj, former Colombo correspondent of *The Hindu* who has wide contacts with the Tiger leadership; and Kumar Ponnambalam, general secretary of the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress Party in Jaffna.

Sri Lanka and India have taken different forks in the ethnic road and rather than acting in concert are trumping each other's cards.

What Colombo is offering is a package deal whereby the Tigers will be given control of the northern province through an LTTE-dominated interim administration on condition that they abandon their claims to the eastern province. They have reportedly been promised more devolution of power than that laid down in the accord.

New Delhi, meanwhile, has let the LTTE know that without Indian support, any deal it strikes with Colombo will be doomed. "The LTTE has a Jaffna-based cadre and they might be tempted to accept the deal. But without Indian support, they cannot hope to achieve their political ends. Their mistrust of the Sri Lankan Government has deep psychological roots," says a top External Affairs Ministry official.

New Delhi is thus hoping to strike its own deal with the Tigers by persuading them to participate in the electoral process for the postponed provincial council elections—without LTTE participation, the elections will have no standing. New Delhi's intermediary has been Kittu, the LTTE's Jaffna commander, now recovering from a leg amputation in Madras. He is in radio contact with Mahatiya, the number two man in the Tiger hierarchy.

But New Delhi's bargaining position has been weakened. Despite an estimated IPKF strength of 70,000 in Sri Lanka, the Tigers are far from whipped. Now, with both Colombo and New Delhi desperately wooing Pirabhakaran, the LTTE is in a position to dictate its terms. This is precisely what is happening. The initial Indian stand was that any talks with the LTTE would be unconditional and entail laying down all arms. Now, Pirabhakaran has made it clear that any talks with the Indian Government can take place only if the IPKF withdraws to its "pre-offensive positions" and ensures the establishment of an interim administration in the northern province with majority representation to the Tigers. Pirabhakaran has also refused to hand over all LTTE arms, insisting that a certain amount of weaponry be retained by the Tigers for their protection.

What this really means is that the LTTE is now in a position to play one side against the other. That situation has been made possible by the fact that Colombo and New Delhi have started marching to different drummers. The prospect that the process could end in some sort of an agreement with the Tigers is welcome. But that also means that the much-vaunted Indo-Sri Lankan accord is now becoming increasingly meaningless—as will be the sacrifice of the 400-odd Indian soldiers who have died on Sri Lankan soil.

MARCH 31, 1988 —DILIP BOBB

BY THE INDIAN
PEACE
RAPED
6.3.88
6.3.88
8.3.88
Thambalakamam/Trincomalee
Arigoddai/Batticoloa
Visuvamadu/Killinochchi
4 women
one young girl
10 girls
KEEPING FORC

HE IS AN HONOURABLE MAN !

COMMENT

R.Narendran, Ph.D.

"... I rather choose to wrong the dead, to wrong myself and you, Than I will wrong such honourable men...." **(Marcus Antonius after Caesar's murder)**

It is almost seven months since the much vaunted Peace Agreement, which according to the Honourable Mr.Rajiv Gandhi guaranteed the Sri Lankan Tamil minority "more than what they wanted" was signed.

In these seven months the "Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)" which launched a vigorous campaign to disarm the LTTE accusing that they have set on a course **to wreck the agreement,** have claimed to have killed 1100 **Tigers** and accepted the surrender of scores of others, from an estimated total of 3000 Tigers in the LTTE cadres. The weaponry of all descriptions, ammunition, mines, etc. claimed by the IPKF to have been recovered from the LTTE in the above time span is too mind-boggling to contemplate. The IPKF consisting of only 7000 soldiers at the outset has swelled according to recent reports, to 75,000 soldiers. In addition, other Tamil **Liberation** groups willing to abide by the agreement have been **armed** and allowed to operate among the Tamil population in an exercise meant to introduce them to the **ways of democracy.** The daily expenditure incurred by the Indian government in this exercise to give the Tamils **more than what they wanted** has been estimated to be around, US$ 3,000,000 per day.

If the Tamil population resident in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka is assumed to be around 1.5 million, ***the ratio of the IPKF soldiers to the Tamils would be an incredible 1:20 !!*** The Tamils of Sri Lanka never had this much **protection** in their history. The Indian government is spending U.S.$ 2 per day (equivalent to Indian Rs.26 and Sri Lankan Rs.60) to **protect** every Tamil resident in the north and east of Sri Lanka. This expenditure would ***amount to an incredible sum of U.S.$ 730 per year per Tamil and is definitely almost triple the per capita income in India!*** Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi is indeed an **Honourable Man.** He has definitely given us Tamils **more than we asked for!** It is no wonder that President Jayewardene has expressed so much satisfaction with the efforts of the Indian government on returning from his recent visit to India.

During the recent Independence Day merry making in New Delhi, in which the **Sri Lankan Tamils** were also an item in the agenda, the Honourable Prime Minister of India and Chief guest President Jayewardene, agreed that elections to the Provincial Council for the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka will be held before June 1988. Simultaneously, it was also announced that two additional divisions of Indian troops would be inducted to serve with the IPKF in Sri Lanka. No one can blame any one for perceiving a link between these two decisions. Every 12 Tamils (assuming that 60% of the population is of voting age) resident in the north and east of Sri Lanka will have the **protection** of one soldier from the mighty Indian army, to ensure that they exercise their **'democratic right',** free from thuggery, coercion and fear that have been features of Sri Lankan elections in the recent past! There will definitely not be any opportunities for electoral frauds such as substituting ballot boxes and mass impersonations which were evident in the District Council elections held in the north and east of Sri Lanka a few years back! It would be impossible for such things to happen as ***an IPKF soldier will be right behind each eligible Tamil as he/she casts the ballot!*** We never had it so good! No other people in history have been given so much **protection** by one of the **most disciplined** armies in the world to exercise their franchise! We as a people have to be really thankful to Prime Minister Gandhi for his determination to ensure that we exercise our democratic rights ***correctly*** in a country which in the words of its own Finance Minister has long ceased to be a democracy!

There are also recent reports emanating from Jaffna of Indian soldiers marrying local Tamil girls with the blessings of their superiors. This development too is definitely in our interest. **Honourable** Prime Minister Gandhi should further encourage this trend as we ***Tamils of Sri Lanka are in urgent need of a fresh infusion of genes*** from the superior stock in mainland India to **invigorate** us as a people! Even in the heat of the battle IPKF soldiers apparently did not miss an opportunity to carry out this divine mission and it was really ungrateful of our people to have called it 'Rape'! We ordinary mortals sometimes lack the intuition to perceive the 'benefits' that are being bestowed on us by men ordained by fate to improve our lot.

Those of our near and dear, including my mother, brother and gardener, killed by the IPKF in its drive to provide ***Peace, Security and Protection*** must have been discovered by the IPKF to be part of a sinister plot to deprive us Tamils of our franchise. We have been naive enough not to know who our enemies were and have to be thankful that the IPKF, on the instructions of Mr.Gandhi, was able to swiftly discover and mete out the punishment they justly deserved! To ascribe any other motives to these killings and **other** activities carried out by the IPKF would be the height of ingratitude on our part. ***We never had it so good and we seem not to***

THE STATESMAN

recognise it!.

Honourable ***Prime Minister Gandhi is also an extremely modest man.*** He is a practitioner of the art of ***The right hand not knowing what the left hand does.*** If not, why should he have taken the pains to prevent the international community coming to know the **Goodies** he has bestowed on our people, Santa Claus *style, over the past several months? The* **Honourable** Prime Minister of democratic India -the champion of the rights of the Palestinian people and the South African **blacks** - would not be doing anything dishonourable that the world should not know! It will be heresy on our part to even think so! He has effectively prevented even the 60 million Tamils in Tamil Nadu from learning **details** of his benevolence and has done everything short of prostrating himself at the feet of the leaders in Tamil Nadu in order to prevent them telling their people the **details.** ***This century has definitely not seen a self-effacing person of the calibre of*** **honourable Mr.Gandhi !**

Thus, it is indeed surprising that the **Arab News,** a premier English daily in Saudi Arabia, should have editorialised (on 8th Feb.1988), "But when you talk of Indian external problems, the first thing that springs to mind is the country's stalemated involvement in Sri Lanka. Until India succeeds in extricating itself from its predicament there, Sri Lanka gives the impression of being a quicksand which Gandhi has blundered into." The Arab News surely cannot be right? Hasn't **Honourable** Mr. Gandhi done everything he possibly can to help us Tamils in Sri Lanka? Is it our ingratitude that is creating all the problems for **Honourable** Mr. Gandhi? Unfortunately, despite stupendous efforts to convince myself of Honourable Mr.Gandhi's services to us, the lament of Julius Ceasar, **"Et tu, Brute?"** on being stabbed by Brutus, keeps ringing in my ears.

EDITORIAL

23.3.88

PACT WITH TIGERS?

Mr Natwar Singh may have been sending a veiled signal to the LTTE to begin "unconditional" negotiations with New Delhi when he assured Opposition M.P.s that there were no plans to involve the Sri Lankan army in the "peace-keeping" operations in the Eastern Province, but in the process he has further undermined President Jayewardene's authority. That the Sri Lankan President despatched Mr Gamini Dissanayake to New Delhi last week for unscheduled consultations should have informed Mr Rajiv Gandhi's Government how worried Colombo is at the IPKF's failure to protect Sinhalese civilians from the LTTE in the Eastern Province. But instead of responding sympathetically to this justified anxiety, New Delhi sent Mr Dissanayake back empty-handed, thereby further reinforcing the popular impression that the Sri Lankan Government's sovereignty, even within its own borders, was irrevocably compromised by the July 29 accord. What makes matters worse is evidence that New Delhi is attempting a unilateral deal with the LTTE leader, Mr V. Pirabhakaran, only a month after Mr J. N. Dixit vetoed a not dissimilar effort by a section of the senior UNP leadership to settle directly with the Tigers.

Judging from the manner in which Mr Krishnakumar "Kittu" and his close aide, Mr Rahim, are involved in the secret negotiations, it is also impossible to escape the conclusion that Mr Rajiv Gandhi is desperately anxious to get Mr Pirabhakaran to make a token gesture which will enable the IPKF to declare a ceasefire and thereby enhance the Congress(I)'s political prospects in Tamil Nadu. The suggestion that the LTTE may collude with Indians in staging yet another token surrender of arms is not likely to enhance the prospects of an enduring peace in the island. If anything, it will convince the LTTE leadership that it can get its own way by playing off New Delhi and Colombo against each other. Mr Pirabhakaran may be fortunate that M. G. Ramachandran's death and the resulting instability in Tamil Nadu has whetted the State Congress(I)'s political appetite, and Mr Rajiv Gandhi is, therefore, unlikely to do anything that might suggest that New Delhi is in any way anti-Tamil.

Mr Pirabhakaran is thus in the happy position of being able to dictate the terms of a short-term settlement from both parties. True, the LTTE's bargaining position would not have been so good if the Indian authorities were able to view events in Sri Lanka without an eye to Tamil Nadu, but the chances of this happening are remote. Indeed, New Delhi's latest moves might tempt many Sinhalese into suspecting that Mr Rajiv Gandhi has chosen completely to ignore the pressures on President Jayewardene and to deal with the Tamil problem in a neighbouring republic in a way that almost suggests that the Northern and Eastern provinces are a part of his own electorate and that he is preparing for the forthcoming general election. He might succeed in negotiating a temporary ceasefire which would be to Mr Pirabhakaran's political advantage, but such a deal could have a damaging effect on India's position in the Sinhalese areas and certainly in Sinhalese thinking.

KANIAHPILLAI PUNNIYAMOORTHY (52), Kolavil South, Akkaraipatti. AFFIDAVIT

On 5.3.1988, I received a message from the IPKF Camp asking me to report at their camp at Puttambai on 6.3.88.

As requested I reported at the camp on 6.3.88. The IPKF soldier at the sentry asked me to report in the evening.

When I reported at the camp at 4.00 p.m. I was taken into the camp, before a lean tall IPKF Major, whom I learnt was Major Das. He told me that I had gone abroad and brought arms. He asked me to return all the arms.

I told Major Das, that I did not go anywhere other than India. I left for South India on 29.3.87 with a passport and stayed there as a refugee. I returned to Sri Lanka as a refugee after the Peace accord on 24.9.87. I told Major Das that I did not bring any arms or ammunitions. I am not a militant.

Thereupon Major Das began to beat me up with a batton like very thick stick. I was beaten up from 4.30 p.m. to 7.00 p.m. The blows fell all over my body, the back, the legs, hands, the buttocks and shoulders.

At 7.00 p.m. they connected me to a motor and generated current, I was burnt on both the hands.

After all their tortures of beating, burning and electric treatment they discovered that I was innocent.

I was unable to walk or talk. The IPKF Major Das sent me home in a tractor. I was unable to sit up. I was taken to local physician, who treated me till 8.3.88.

As I was seriously ill, I was taken to Government Hospital, Akkaraipattu and then to Kalmunai.

Dr. M.A.A. Rakeesthy, Medical Officer, Akkaraipattu treated me.

I am now a sick person consequent to the torture in the IPKF Camp.

● ● ●

RANJITHAMALAR, (23) South, Chunnakam;

The deceased Anandarajan was my husband.

He was a labourer. He went for work on 10.03.1988 at about 8.30 a.m. but he did not return home for lunch. At about 3.00 p.m., I was informed that my husband was shot by some armed persons and his body was lying at the culvert at Chunnakam. I immediately rushed to the place and found that my husband's body was lying at Chunnakam near the culvert and bleeding from his head. I checked and found that he was dead.

I brought his body with the help of the neighbours to my house and was later cremated on the same day.

I have two children and my late husband was the sole bread-winner of the family. The parents of my husband too are staying with me and as such they also will have to be maintained by me.

I am undergoing great hardship as I have no other means to support my family and the parents of my late husband.

● ● ●

ERAMPOO POOPALASINGAM (50) Vakaiyadi Lane, Madduvil, South, Chavakachcheri.

The deceased Poopalasingam Sandirakumar, age 22 years was my son.

He was a Bachelor and a Farmer.

On 12.3.88 at 9.00 a.m. my late son left home to Chavakachcheri market to purchase some food items.

He did not return home till noon on that day.

Worrying about his safety I started searching for him.

While searching, a known person of the area informed me that my son was shot dead by the IPKF and his dead body was lying on the Kandy Road at Nunavil.

Immediately I rushed to the spot and found the dead body of my son with gun shot injuries on his shoulder and hip.

The dead body was brought home and was cremated on 13.3.88 morning at Kuchchapiddy crematorium.



● ● ●

SELLAMUTHU widow of the late Sinnappu Vinayagar alias Vinasithamby aged 74 years, at Kalluvembadi.

At about 4 a.m. on 14.3.88 Indian Army personnel came into my house on a search operation when my son Sivakumar fled the house through fear.

Some of the army personnel ran after and fired at him while he was on the bund of a pond about 50 yeards away from my house.

I preceeded to the scene at about 6 a.m. to find my son lying dead on the bund with gun-shot injuries on his head.

The Indian Servicemen present at the site refused permission to take the body of my son home.

Later his body was removed to the Indian Army Camp at Chulipuram by the Servicemen.

At abut 9 a.m. on the day Indian Army men called at my house and told that I could have the body removed from the camp.

I visited the camp and the dead body of my son was released to me after I signed a document given by an Army Officer. I did not know the contents of the documents and it was not even explained to me.

The body of my son was taken home at about 10 a.m. 14.3.88.

The body was cremated at Thiruvadinilayam crematiorium at about 2 p.m. on 14.3.88.

My deceased son aged 36 years was unmarried and was a tractor-driver who earned an average montly income of Rs. 1500/-

He was the bread-winner of the family supporting and maintaining me and my other three children two unmarried daughters and a son who is mentally deranged.

Since my son's death I am left with no financial assistance or any other form of support for our existence.



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KARTHIGESU KANDASAMY (58) Chanthai Walawu, Chunkam, North, Chunakam.

The deceased person Kandasamy Rajitha, aged 17 years my daughter.

She has employed at a Toffee Factory.

On 21.3.1988 at about 11.00 a.m. I returned home from the market.

I found and daughter's lifeless body lying in our verandah with gun shot injuries.



● ● ●

NICHOLAN SEBASTI (51) Pathima Kovilady, Pondaterrippu.

The deceased person Sebasti Hubert aged 21 years my son.

He was employed as a mechanic.

On 25.3.88 at about 7.00 a.m. he left for his cycle repair shop at Illavalai.

At about 7.00 p.m. I was informed that my son's lifeless body was lying near the St. Annes Church at Illavalai.

I rushed to the scene of incident.

My son's body bore gunshot wounds.

The army was present at the scene of incident and they brought my son's body home.

His body was buried at the Roman Catholic burial grounds -Pandatherrippu on 26.3.88.

I have four children.

I am a casual labourer and chiefly depend on my son's income, to maintain my family.



GANESH GNANESWARY (33) Havakiri Puttur West, Puttur.

The deceased person Seenipillai Ganesh, aged 43 years was my husband.

He was a causual labourer.

On 28.3.88 at about 8.00 a.m. my husband left home for Puttur.

I was informed at about 11.30 a.m. that my husband was shot and killed by the army while he was working in a farm.

His body was brought home and cremated at Puttur cemetery on the same day.

I have six children.

My children and I have been deprived of the maintenance and the support we received from my husband.

We are undergoing untold hardships.

LTTE blames Delhi for militant's death

From Our Special Correspondent

MADRAS, March 25. — The LTTE on Wednesday said India was squarely responsible for the death of "Lt. Col." Johnny at the hands of the IPKF in Vavuniya on March 5.

Johnny, who was taken alongwith another LTTE leader Rahim from here to Palaly in Jaffna by an IAF plane and from there to Vavuniya by a helicopter, was killed while he was proceeding to establish contact with LTTE supremo V. Pirabhakaran.

A couple of days ago, an External Affairs Ministry spokesman had said in New Delhi that Johnny was caught in a cross-fire and killed.

In a press release here, the LTTE said that though it had been pleading for a ceasefire and unconditional talks, it reluctantly agreed to the Indian Government's request that Johnny and Rahim be allowed to meet Mr. Pirabhakaran in a bid to break the ice.

The LTTE alleged that the Indian Government did not even give the two men identity cards. On the other hand, they were told that if they encountered any IPKF party on the way, they could ask it to get in touch with the Vavuniya camp.

While Rahim stayed at the camp, Johnny moved out to make contact with Mr. Pirabhakaran. It was during this period that the IPKF launched the operation to hunt down Mr. Pirabhakaran in Vavuniya and Mullaitivu districts.

Mr. Johnny, the LTTE, claimed, was unarmed. He was stopped by an IPKF patrol, and though he revealed his identity, he was shot dead, it added.

The LTTE called it "an act of betrayal," and said it had only strengthened its suspicions about India.

C R P

Torture and Inhuman Treatment of Detenus by IPKF

The IPKF is holding detenus in crowded and ill - ventilated conditions. In one instance an underground air raid shelter serves as a place of confinement. A number of persons arrested by the IPKF are stated to have subsequently died in custody. In a case reported from Chavakachcheri, a youth was arrested by the IPKF on 22.12.87. This youth was beated right through the night of 22.12.87 in full view of other arrested persons. By morning the skin in some parts of the body of this youth had peeled off. A week or so later, he died in IPKF custody. The IPKF is also merciful in that before they disposed of the body, they called the father and allowed him to see only the face of his dead son. The father was also told that his son died by his own hand taking cynaide.

"Disappearances" and Missing Persons

Parents and spouses have reported the 'disappearances' of their children and married partners. In a specific case from Jaffna Town, a man has not been able to trace so far his wife and three daughters taken away by the IPKF in full view of his neighbours on 12.11.87. Another case is that of Mr. Renganathan, Government School Teacher. The IPKF took him away from his Kopay residence on 16.11.87 inspite of the pleas of his weeping wife and children. The wife and children together with relations have paid innumerable visits to IPKF camps without any encouraging news. Seventeen year old Yasotharan Thangarajah a GCE Advanced Level student of Central College, Jaffna and who excelled in studies as evidenced by his GCE O/L results was taken from his jaffna residence by the IPKF on the morning of 17.12.87. His distraught mother, a widow has yet not found him. A married woman with five small children from Vaddukoddai complained about the 'disappearance' of her husband who was arrested by the IPKF on 08.01.88. An IPKF officer gave evasive replies and tried to console her by sending her free rations. Quite a number of persons are reported missing during October 1987.

Harassment of Tamils by frequent search Operations by IPKF and the Lankan Security Forces.

In Batticaloa: Apart from the on-going IPKF operations in the East, a special day and night curfew lasting 84 hours beginning 6 P.M. on 12.02.88 was declared. During this period a house to house search for 'Tiger militants was made. **Nearly 43,000 male residents were required to assemble at a central spot to be screened by the IPKF with the collaboration of cadres from a rival militant group.** Thirty two 'Tiger' militants were picked up it was reported; a further 12 died in a confrontation with the IPKF at Eravur near Batticaloa it was claimed. Indian helicopters sank three boats in the Batticaloa sea.

In North Sri Lanka: Search operations in the north are so frequent that not a day passes without some part of Jaffna peninsula coming under day curfew declared suddenly over loudspeakers. The curfew may last 2 days or even 2 hours depending on the size of the area searched. Young Tamil Males are required to stand in the hot sun ,for hours. On 13.02.88 a part of a very crowded area of Jaffna Town was searched. Only one person was allowed to remain at home. All others, men, women and children were ordered to assemble at a particular open space. The assembled people were paraded before

C R P

IPKF top brass seated in a Truck with some informers hidden from view. Meantime, IPKF lower ranks went searching every house and premises in the area under search. On 25.02.88 two different parts of Jaffna Town came to be searched by the IPKF - one in the morning and the other in the afternoon. In the second search a number of School boys were required to stand in pouring rain.

A Major of the IPKF in Sri Lanka arriving on leave at Chandigarh airport in Punjab was nabbed by police. He was found to be carrying 100 soverigns of gold in broken pieces of jewellery. His explanation was that he bought the jewellery. Police believe he snatched it from Lankan Tamils. The Major had earlier flown from Lanka via Madras. — Reported in *'The Island' of 22.02.88.*

March 1988

'Fides' the International Catholic News Agency reporting from Vatican City states that the IPKF in Sri Lanka lacked sensitivity to occlesiastics and to places of worship. That censorship and travel restrictions were being imposed by the IPKF in Tamil regions especially Jaffna. Foreign journalists were not being allowed into areas under the control of the IPKF. If ever permission was given it was only to Indian journalists. Reported in the *Daily News of 20.02.88*

Torture by IPKF:

The IPKF while interrogating arrested persons was known to torture them. One form of torture was the passing of electric current. Several victims are afraid to report their ordeal. Of three cases recorded, one said that from the electric power point two wires were lead and electric current applied to this body for two to three seconds at a time. This victim was also hung up by his thumbs. He had deep cut wounds on his thumbs caused by the nylon cord by which he was tied and hung up. On being released the medical institution which he entered could not cure one of the thumbs otherwise than by amputating it. Two other victims described how the current was generated to be passed into their bodies. The instrument would appear to be a field telephone which is wound to power it temporarily. This was used with two wire leads. One lead was attached in one case to the genital and the other lead was stroked on his navel. In the other case one lead was stroked on his chest. The victims also described the violent shudder that passed through their bodies when the current was passed through their bodies.

Attack on Civilians:

On 5.3.88 a lorry transporting Sinhalese from the North-Western Province for settlement in the Eastern Province struck a land mine as it was entering the Eastern Province. 27 Sinhalese in the lorry are reported to have died consequently. The Lankan President responded promptly the next day by ordering 10,000 Lankan troops to Trincomalee for the defence of the Sinhalese. On 11.3.88 a bus load of 45 passenges, the majority being Tamils and the rest Muslims were travelling from Vavuniya in the North Trincomalee. While passing Suhandagama, a Sinhala Village town, masked men threw bombs and set the bus alight. Escaping passengers were stabbed to death. The Colombo English and Sinhala newspapers falsely attributed the massacre to the LTTE. Strangely they also failed to mention the ethnic composition of the dead passengers which they are wont to unfailingly when Sinhalese are the victims. There was no response from the President either.

WHO IS TELLING THE TRUTH?

Indian Foreign Affairs Minister Natwar Singh said in the Lok Sabha recently. "There would be no joint operations with the Sri Lankan forces. To agree to that would lead to the charge that the Indian government is conniving with the forces of extreme Sinhala chauvinism in the attempted genocide of the Tamil people."

In contrast, Colonel Wijeratne, when interviewed by a western reporter in Trincomalee , said: "The Sri Lankan army in their joint operation with the Indians killed eight Tigers in a hide-out in Trincomalee."

HARTAL IN JAFFNA

"Please have your shops open, otherwise you will not be allowed to open them for one whole month." This announcement was made over loud-speakers fixed in an open army truck by the IPKF in Jaffna on March 15. Paying scant heed to the implied threat, almost all the shops in the Jaffna Bazaar stood firmly closed for five days continuously in support of the hartal organised by the LTTE.

BLACK-BADGE CAMPAIGN IN VADAMARADCHI

A black-badge campaign is being carried out by students in Vadamaradchi demanding the withdrawal of the IPKF troops and the resumption of talks between India and the LTTE without any preconditions.

C R P

Highway Robbery and Murder :

Since December 1987, bus travellers to and from Colombo have noticed IPKF men almost all along the Jaffna - Vavuniya trunk road. Yet, lorries have been relieved of the entire goods on sections of this road under the control of the IPKF. The latest of such incidents took place within the last fortnight. There are also, close to Vavuniya, check points manned by an unofficial peace keeping force, popularly called 'Three Stars' by travellers. This group stop vehicles, harangue passengers, extort money, take off youths whom they suspect to be sympathisers of rival groups and on occasions have summarily executed the youths so taken off buses.

A business-man from Vavuniya complained last week that he was almost relieved of a large sum of money he had just then withdrawn from the bank by this group. Having failed in the first attempt, the group tried to summon the businessmen to the group's camp. Having failed in that also, the group made arrangements to close the businessman's establishment. All these happened under the very nose of the IPKF. The businessman has sent written complaints to the Indian and Sri Lankan authorities.

The IPKF is seen going about its operations accompanied openly with miltants opposed to the LTTE. The Muslims of Kalmunai in the East have stated that the IPKF came along the EPRLF cadres to search Muslim homes. The EPRLF having taken note of rich Muslim houses, subsequently conducted robberies from such homes.

Killings of Mr A. Velmurugu of Kalmunai & Mr S. Nadarajah of Mallakam.

Mr A. Velmurugu (48) Chairman of the Citizens' Committee of Kalmunai and former Chairman of the District Development Council, Batticaloa was kidnapped from his home at Kalmunai and killed on 20.03.88. Kalmunai is a predominantly Muslim town on the East Coast. The Colombo news media made out that the LTTE killed Mr Velmurugu and added that there was fear of a backlash in Kalmunai. The media's suggestion of a communal backlash was not warranted if in fact Mr Velmurugu was killed by the LTTE. A backlash did take place in the form of business establishments of Muslims being burnt down at Kalmunai. There were also allegations of abductions of Muslims and abductions of Tamils in reprisal. Mr S. Nadarajah TULF stalwart and former Chairman D.D.C. Jaffna was shot and killed allegedly by the LTTE. Mr Nadarajah had been invited by the IPKF for an Indian Republic Day tamasha. Mr Nadarajah delivered a speech on the occasion and that sealed his fate it is stated.

Grenade Attacks in Batticaloa

On 22.03.88 a grenade was lobbed at a passing IPKF vehicle adjacent to the Bishops House at Batticaloa. R.C. Bishop Kingsley Swampillai and about 25 priests and lay workers stood out while the IPKF searched the premises. Three lay workers were arrested. On 23.03.88 a grenade was thrown into the Batticaloa Polic Station premises. The Police and IPKF started firing back into passers-by. The firing went on for nearly 3 hours and 25 persons inclusding school children were injured.

CITIZEN'S COMMITTEE
Trincomalee

Date: 20th March, 1988 Time: 11.00 a.m.

Incident: Shooting Incident at passing vehicle – Private Van plying from hire-from the neighbouring jungle area on the approach from Pankulam, nearing VELVERIKULAM on the Trincomalee-Anuradhapura Road, killing one passenger at the spot and causing injuries to four other passengers, one of whom succumbed later at the Trincomalee Base Hospital on 22.3.1988.

Victims:

(a) Mas. Ponnurasa Jayarajah – 18 years. Student St. Joseph's College, Trincomalee. Shot through the head damaging the brain.

Instantaneous death. Fell on the lap of his mother seated by the side in the vehicle.

(b) Mrs. Manonmany Ponnurasa: 45 years. Mother of 1st victim. Wounded. Gunshot injury on Right Forearm.

(c) Mr. Servas John: 67 years. Wounded. Gun-shot injuries in the abdomen. Two days later succumbed at the Base Hospital, Trincomalee. Cause of Death: C.R. Failure – Laceration of Intestine.

(d) Mr. Bhaskaran: Severely wounded. Transferred to Colombo General Hospital for further treatment.

(e) Another resident of Anbuvalipuram – Details not available.

(Mr. M. Ramachandran, TOT, Anbuvalipuram – Hand amputated).

Description of Incident according to Eye-witness:

The Eye-witness whom the writer met is the elder sister of the 1st victim, vis: Mrs. Poongothai Malar Karunakaran of Pankulam. According to her, the private van plying for hire left Pankulam at about 9.30 a.m. There were 18 passengers in all at that time They passed the Security Check Point of both Sri Lankan and IPKF on the route. Immediately after the last check at the Sri Lankan Security Post at 10th m.p. at Kithuloothu, the engine of the vehicle developed trouble with diesel-block which necessitated the vehicle to be parked on a side. This occurred at a place just outside this check point. There was a delay of about an hour for the vehicle to resume on its journey after repairs. When the journey was resumed and barely within about 10 minutes of the journey and after passing Muthaliyakulam and approaching Velverikulam, the passengers in the van suddenly heard noises like gunshots. At the same time, one of the side glass of the van got splitered which they thought was the result of stones being thrown at the vehicle. The driver of the vehicle who was unhurt swerved the vehicle and proceeded at a faster rate. But at the next moment, they realised that it was the result of gun-shots when they found the boys(Mas. P. Jeyarajah – 1st victim) groaning with the words 'AMMA' and falling on the lap of his mother who herself was injured in her right upper arm. There were splattering of blood stains of the other three wounded persons.

This eye-witness (sister of the 1st victim) who accompanied her brother and her mother on the same journey and who escaped unhurt stated that she clearly saw about 4 to 5 person in uniform running away with arms from the jungle area. The mother (Mrs. P. Manonmany) also confirmed this. They strongly suspect that this atrocious crime was committed by the Sri Lankan Forces of the nearby Checking Point (i.e. the 10th m.p.).The reason for their thinking so seems to be induced by their feeling that the inordinate delay caused during the repairs to the vehicle, at a spot closer to the Sri Lankan check-post, provided the opportunity and time for them to plan out and commit this crime within about 1 1/2 miles distance from the same check-point. They seemed to have been cross-examined by the Police while recording their statement as to whether the 'persons in Uniform' whom they sighted at the scene of the incident could even be IPKF personnel or even Terrorists in Uniform. They seem to believe that nobody else other than Sri Lankan Forces (some of whom they met only just an hour ago at the check point) would have done this. These are matters left to criminal investigators and the arms of the law to trace the culprits.

THE IPKF AND ARBITRARY/ILLEGAL DETENTIONS

The IPKF is known to have a detention camp at Kankesanturai and another at Palaly near the airport. According to a Colombo newspaper, there are 390 detenus, including 6 females at the former camp (the position as was known at the beginning of March).An unspecified but larger number is reliably reported to be held at the Palaly camp. Smaller numbers of detenus are also held in make-shift cubicles or enclosures adjoining many house buildings, popularly called mini-camps, where following the Indian'saturation strategy' the IPKF has billeted some of their men.

Several parents, spouses and close relatives of arrested or missing persons have visited the IPKF Jaffna Town Commandant's office and the many IPKF camps in search of their near and dear ones. Some have made numerous trips to these camps and yet received no information about the whereabouts of the arrested persons. Others have been promised that their arrested relatives would be released early but the releases have not materialised in most cases though the period of detention has exceeded three months.

People interested in the issue of basic human rights are wondering whether the detenus are being held by the IPKF under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and whether the Sri Lanka government has delegated powers to the IPKF under the PTA and regulations framed under it or, whether the IPKF is acting under Indian Laws and Regulations. One of the parents has reported that he had been asked to wait till procedures were completed and papers received back from Rao. (not Mr.Rao but very probably RAW, the Indian Intelligence Service).



1

Tamil militants have forced the closure of the only Tamil newspaper published from Sri Lanka's Northern Jaffna town by blowing-up the printing machinery and partially damaging the office building, official sources said.

Three militants armed with a pistol and 50 kg of explosives walked into the offices of *Eelanadu* yesterday afternoon and blew up the printing machinery and part of the building after ordering 45 employees out.

The sources said one IPKF jawan and a member of the LTTE were killed and another jawan wounded in an exchange of fire between the two sides at Tunukkai in Vavuniya district on Monday. The IPKF apprehended 19 LTTE men during a search operation in the Vadamarachchi area and two of them, Ravindran Ammachari Jegan and Sinnathambi Igneswaran, had been identified as hardcore members.

2

Protest against killing: Shops were closed and private buses went off the road in north-western Mannar town in protest against the killing of two Muslim youths including the area leader of a Muslim fundamentalist group, allegedly by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam yesterday, reports said.

According to reports, "Al Jihad" leader, Mr. Abdul Kadir Ramzeen and a companion, Mr. Sellathurai Ameen, were riding a motorcycle when they were shot dead at the 89th km post on the Talaimannar-Mannar road.

The LTTE militants shot dead a leader of the rival People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOT), Mr. Chandrasekaram at Pettlai in Batticaloa district on Monday and two other PLOT members, Mr. Pakiyarajah and Mr. Mahendran at the same place yesterday, security sources said.

3

COLOMBO, March 3. (PTI & UNI) — At least 21 persons were killed 15 of them massacred by militants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam — since Wednesday in Sri Lanka's disturbed eastern districts, official reports said here today.

The 15 civilians, belonging to five families, were gunned down by LTTE militants wearing army uniforms, in a raid on a hamlet under Morawewa police station, 50 km southwest of Trincomalee town on Wednesday night.

Most of the dead are believed to have been Sinhalese.

Three persons with gunshot wounds were airlifted to Trincomalee hospital. One of them was a Tamil and two were Sinhalese.

Twenty-six persons fled the village following the massacre and took shelter in a nearby Sri Lankan air force camp.

The national news agency Lankapuvath, quoting official sources, said the Indian Peace-Keeping Force killed two militants in a raid on a well-fortified LTTE base in Mailambaveli (Batticaloa).

3 IPKF men were killed in a landmine attack of LTTE in Kathiraveli Batticoloa Dt.

4

COLOMBO, March 4.

Twelve people, including seven Tamil militants were killed, about 50 apprehended and six Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) jawans wounded in separate incidents in Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern provinces during the last 24 hours, Indian and Sri Lankan sources said.

Acting on a tip-off, the IPKF raided a hideout of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) at Urumpirai north, near the northern Jaffna town, and shot dead two militants who lobbed hand grenades at them.

The IPKF also shot dead a third militant while he tried to escape and wounded a fourth, who committed suicide by swallowing a cyanide capsule. Both were armed, sources said. The IPKF recovered four pistols and a large quantity of ammunition from the hideout.

3 TELO men killed: In another incident three members of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) were shot dead by the Sri Lankan police at Malwatte junction in the Vavuniya area. The militants blew up a three tonne IPKF truck carrying provisions at Vakkarai in Trincomalee district with an improvised explosive device, injuring six IPKF jawans.

In the neighbouring Trincomalee district, the manager of a hotel in Trincomalee town was shot dead by unidentified men, sources said.

During cordon and search operations yesterday, the IPFK apprehended 20 suspected militants in Jaffna, 15 in Vavuniya and 12 in Batticaloa.

The body of a former LTTE "helper", Shekar was found at Mallakam, sources said.

The national news agency Lankapuvath reported that two out of three women abducted by the LTTE at Sampathu in Trincomalee district were done to death today while the third escaped.

5

COLOMBO, March 5.

At least 19 civilians were killed and 23 wounded, 15 critically, when a landmine laid by LTTE militants blew up a truck today in Sri Lanka's Eastern Trincomalee district, official reports received here said.

The national news agency Lankapuvath said all the victims were Singalese. They included six women and two children.

The vehicle, returning from a market at Trincomalee to Kanthalai, was ripped apart in the explosion, which occurred at Sitharu on the Ella-Kanthalai road.

Associated Press quoting Sri Lankan military officials and doctors, said 26 were killed in the incident. Col. S. Liyanage who visited the scene told AP that as many as 19 people died on the spot and seven in hospital"

Two Tamils killed: Sri Lankan Air Force personnel allegedly killed two Tamils after rounding up 40 of them following the Thursday "massacre" at Morawewa village.

According to reports, the Sri Lankan Air Force men went to the nearby villages, populated mostly by Tamils, and apprehended 40 of them. They were taken to the nearby Air Force station, where two were killed.

Mudalikulam, Trincomalee dt. IPKF attacked innocent Tamil civilians, one person was killed.

6

COLOMBO, March 6.

Two Indian soldiers were killed, one was injured and another captured, when LTTE militants ambushed an IPKF truck near the second mile post on the Vavuniya-Mannar Road in the northen Vavuniya district today, according to authoritative reports reaching Colombo.

A resident from Vavuniya told PTI over telephone that the four soldiers went to the spot around 10-45 a.m. to dispose of a carcass, when the militants, laying in wait, ambushed the vehicle, killed two soldiers on the spot, and injured another.

The bodies of the dead, it was learnt, were put into the truck, which was set on fire and blasted by the militants.

One more soldier was taken prisoner by the militants, the resident said. This was later corroborated by the authoritative sources.

According to reports from Vavuniya, the IPKF cordoned and searched the area after the ambush. Helicopters were also stated to be used in the operation. Details were not available.

Blast toll rises: With seven wounded persons dying in hospitals, the death toll in Saturday's landmine blast in Sri Lanka's eastern Trincomalee district rose to 26, security sources here said.

While 19 persons died on the spot, two succumbed to their injuries at Kantale hospital and five at Anuradhapura hospital. The condition of three of the 17 others admitted was critical, they added.

The victims of the landmine blast, set off by the LTTE were all Sinhalese, returning by a truck to their settlement at Serunuwara after purchasing goods from Kantale market.

20 LTTE men held: The IPKF, meanwhile, apprehended 20 suspected LTTE militants including some hardcore members in the North and East during the past 24 hours.

They said nine LTTE men, including a hardcore member Bhaskaran, were apprehended at Kopaivettikulam in Batticaloa district on Saturday while another militant, armed with a grenade, was taken into custody from the Central College Students Hostel in Batticaloa town.

A hardcore LTTE member, Sivapadam alias Kattan, was arrested in the Northern Jaffna town, while nine others, including three with a large quantity of money on their persons, were apprehended in Vavuniya, they said.

Five TELO men surrender: The sources said five members of the TELO group led by Rajan surrendered before the IPKF with three G-3 and one AK-47 rifle in Vavuniya.

A Muslim youth, Abu Backer, working as an attendant at the Magistrate's Court in Tricomalee, was shot dead at Muttur by two cycle-borne militants on Saturday.— PTI, UNI

Seven civilians were shot dead by IPKF at Aviaodai, Tricomalee, dt.

In an attack at Nelukulam of Vavuniya, dt. LTTE killed two IPKF personnel and arrested one soldier.

At Manky Bridge in Tricomalle, in landmine attack by LTTE on Sri Lankan army 3 soldiers were killed.

9

COLOMBO, March 9

The Indian Peace Keeping Force has 'killed' 23 Tamil militants during the past 24 hours ending Tuesday noon in Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern provinces, the State-owned *Daily News* said today.

However, Indian High Commission sources here could not confirm it immediately, but said 'by and large' the report of the LTTE casualties might be true as there were numerous encounters in the past 48 hours.

In a front page story, the newspaper said the highest number of casualties suffered by the LTTE was at Iranamadu in Northern Killinochi district where 17 militants were killed in an encounter with IPKF.

It said the LTTE opened fire at an IPKF camp there with mortars and rockets. The Indian soldiers, fanning out of their camp, 'mowed down 17 of the attackers'. The Commander of the LTTE, known as 'Waster' was injured and carried by his men to safety in the 'Viswamadu jungle' in the Killinochi-Mullaitivu area, the daily said quoting reports.

The other LTTE men were killed by the Indian foot patrols, which came under attack at Kalmunai, Samanthurai and Batticaloa (Eastern province) and Jaffna, the paper said quoting officials.

Colombo, March 9 (UNI): Twenty three Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam guerillas were killed and more than 60 apprehended in direct 'fire-fights' and cordon-and-search operations by the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka's North and East during the past 48 hours.

The government controlled *Daily News* reported that the IPKF, under orders to 'shoot to kill' following a radio intercept of a conversation between LTTE chief V. Prabhakaran and an area leader, directing the latter to engage in 'suicidal combat', had been attacked by LTTE at a number of places.

The newspaper said LTTE suffered the highest number of casualties in an attack they made on the IPKF camp at Iranamadu, near Killinochchi on Monday night. It said LTTE opened fire on the camp with mortars and rockets and the IPKF, fanning out of the camp, killed 17 of the attackers.

It said the commander of LTTE's raiding group, identified as 'Waseer' was wounded in the attack.

Mothers Front in custody

The entire leadership of the Batticaloa Mothers Front is under 'protective custody' of the IPKF and held in the Batticaloa Town. Jail, renamed Rehabilitation Centre. The Mothers Front organisers were arrested after the death fast by Mrs.Annammah David was forcibly ended by the Indian authorities last week.

ANOTHER MOTHER RESUMES FASTING

Following the forcible removal of Mother Annammah David by the IPKF from her venue of fasting, another mother has started a Fast-to-Death demanding that Indian Government should see reason and resume negotiations to ameliorate the hardships of the Tamils of Eelam.

Paddy fields in Kilinochchi devastated by the IPKF

The use of napalm by the IPKF in Kilinochchi has resulted in many paddy fields in that area being completely burnt down and devastated. It is reported that this act of utter vandalism and mischief has been embarked upon by the Indian soldiers consequent to a disgraceful defeat they had had earlier on that date at the hands of the Tigers at a village called Kallikkaadu in the Kilinochchi district.

IF LTTE LEADER IS KILLED!

Aaladi Aruna of Tamil Nadu has declared in the Indian Parliament that India will be committing a Himalayan blunder if it, by design or accident, caused the death of Mr. Prabaharan, the LTTE leader. He has warned the Rajiv Government that the majority he wields in Parliament should not blind him to the fact that there are fifty million Tamils in Tamil Nadu watching every step of Raj Gandhi. He has told Parliament that LTTE is a power to be reckoned with and there is no other course open to his Government except to resolve the India- Tamil imbroglio through dialogue.

Indian sources said the *Daily News* report was 'by and large' correct.

The sources said the IPKF had apprehended 31 suspected militants in Batticaloa, 26 in Trincomalee and five in Jaffna. Fifteen of those arrested in Batticaloa had been confirmed as LTTE militants.

Sri Lankan security sources said an LTTE member, Suppiah Kalidasan, was shot dead by the rival People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam at Sammanthurai.

LTTE claimed responsibility for the killing of S. Vijayandan, Secretary of the Communist Party unit of Jaffna district and a politburo member, in Jaffna. In a note found tied to the body, LTTE has said he was killed for his political and other relations with the IPKF.

10

COLOMBO, March 10.—Two LTTE militants swallowed cyanide capsules and one of them died after being caught for throwing hand-grenades at the IPKF at Kokkuvil in Jaffna peninsula during a cordon and search operations yesterday, a spokesman of the Indian High Commission said here today, reports PTI.

The other militant was taken to hospital in a critical condition.

One more LTTE member was killed in an encounter with the IPKF in northern Kilinochchi district yesterday.

Reports from Pankulam in northern Mullaitivu district said that the LTTE militants killed one "Amaldasan", a 16-year-old Tamil, for being a "traitor" His body was found with gun shot injuries, tied to a tree, the spokesman said.

The national news agency, Lankapuvath, said that Amaldasan had earlier been taken for questioning by the IPKF and later released.

In Jaffna, an LTTE political wing leader named "Shri" was apprehended yesterday, while 45 other suspects were detained in Trincomalee district for interrogation by the IPKF.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force also recovered a large cache of arms and ammunition, including three rounds of ammunition of various kinds, bombs and mortars during a cordon and search operation in Batticaloa yesterday.

11

COLOMBO, March 11

Eighteen civilians, including women and children, were killed and 15 injured today when gunmen ambushed a bus at Rotawewa in north central Sri Lanka official sources said. The sources, however, were unable to identify the attackers.

Other sources said the gunmen could either be members of the country's majority Sinhala or the minority Tamil community.

The gunmen hurled bombs and fired on the passengers before setting fire to the bus. The passengers were mostly Tamils and a few Muslims and Sinhalese. Police and troops who reached the spot found 12 charred bodies. Six of the 2 injured died in hospital.

The bus, which came from the town of Horowupotana in north central Sri Lanka, was ambushed 50 km before reaching Morawewa in the Eastern Province.

The ambush took place in the same area where Tamil rebels massacred 15 Sinhala villagers a week ago. Last Saturday 26 persons, mostly Sinhala civilians, were killed in a landmine attack in the area by LTTE rebels.

Independent sources believe that the Sinhala attackers could have carried out the ambush in retaliation for the slayings. But official sources declined to comment on this.

Three IPKF men shot dead and 3 injured at Muthaiankattu of Mullaitheevu dt, in an encounter between LTTE and IPKF.

The IPKF rounded up Muthaiankattu, burnt 15 houses and slaughtered 4 civilians.

12

COLOMBO, March 12.

Two Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) personnel were killed and two others and several men of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) wounded in an exchange of fire between the two sides in Sri Lanka's North and East during the last 24 hours.

According to Indian sources here, one jawan was killed and two were wounded in a confrontation with the LTTE at Karanpurikulam in the northern Vavuniya district yesterday. Eight LTTE men were reportedly wounded in the encounter and their arms recovered by the IPKF.

Five other LTTE men were apprehended, sources said. Another IPKF jawan was killed in a shootout with the LTTE at Sampur in Trincomalee district. Nine LTTE members were apprehended in Batticaloa and four in Jaffna, where one member of the group surrendered.

Armed LTTE men dragged out Mr. Abdul Hakim from his shop at Kalmunaikodi in eastern Ampara district and shot him dead yesterday, reports said.

13

COLOMBO, March 13.

Tamil militants shot dead two Sri Lankan Army officers in the north-west of the country, a newspaper reported today.

The two Lieutenants died when their jeep was ambushed yesterday near an Army camp in Mannar district, the Government-run *Sunday Observer* said.

The attackers were believed to be LTTE members, the report said.

Soldiers who heard the gunfire rushed to the area to find the bodies of the two officers beside their burning vehicle, it added.

LTTE man killed: An LTTE member was kil-

led yesterday in Eastern Batticaloa town, when he, along with two others, chased by the IPKF, tried to escape in a boat across the lagoon. Another LTTE militant was wounded in IPKF firing while the third managed to get away. They were chased after the IPKF found them putting up anti-IPKF posters in the town.

The IPKF apprehended 23 suspected LTTE men in Jaffna, 16 in Vavunia and two in Batticaloa yesterday.

Two Indian Army men were killed in an encounter between LTTE and IPKF at Kallikadu of Mullaitheevu dt. Then the IAF planes raided the area with Napalm bombs. The villagers escaped but the paddy fields caught fire and burnt completely.

14

COLOMBO, March 14. (PTI & AFP) — At least five women cadres of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were among the 14 left dead during the past 24 hours in Sri Lanka's disturbed north, east and southern provinces in encounters with the IPKF and the police. About 16 LTTE militants were also wounded.

The dead also included three hard core subversives, allegedly belonging to the outlawed JVP, who were killed in a confrontation with the public in the early hours of today at Hakmana in southern Matara district, known to be heart-land of the JVP extremists.

A spokesman of the Indian High Commission said the five women cadres of the LTTE were among the 10 LTTE militants killed in a number of encounters with the IPKF in the northern Muillaitivu-Vavuniya sector yesterday, as the Indian army made concerted raids on several hideouts of the rebels.

COLOMBO, March 14.

In a major offensive during the past 72 hours, the Indian Peace Keeping Force smashed the operational command headquarters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the jungles of the Northern Province, in the Oddusuddan area, and put Mr. V. Prabakaran and other party leaders on the run. Some 12 bodyguards covering the retreat of the LTTE leader were killed in the process.

Apart from the 12 bodyguards who were killed, 19 LTTE activists were killed and 15 were apprehended. A large quantity of AK-47 rifles and other arms, ammunition, explosives and also a rocket launcher, were seized.

At Kandy Road – 4th milestone LTTE attacked Sri Lankan Navy force with R.P.G., killed an army officer on the spot and smashed the lorry in which the army personnel travelled.

15

Colombo, March 15 (UNI & AFP): Ten people — seven Sinhalese and three Tamils — were killed in continuing reprisal attacks by extremists of the two communities in Sri Lanka's multi-ethnic Trincomalee district on Tuesday, Sri Lankan security sources and independent reports said

3 IPKF men killed: Three Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) personnel were killed in a series of skirmishes and encounters in Sri Lanka's north and east on Monday, Indian sources said on Tuesday.

They said three IPKF jawans were killed in an encounter in Vavuniya district in which one LTTE member was killed, another captured and a third wounded but escaped.

The IPKF killed two LTTE men and captured two others, while a fifth was wounded but escaped in a separate encounter in the district, they said. The IPKF also destroyed three huts used by the militants and apprehended nine suspected militants in another incident.

REPORT CORRECTED: Thirteen Tamils were attacked, not killed in eastern Sri Lanka today, the Indian High Commission here said, correcting an earlier statement.

A High Commission spokeswoman told reporters that the commission was "correcting itself" following an earlier statement that armed men had dragged 13 Tamils off a bus in Trincomalee district and shot them dead.

A LTTE fighter Vadhavuran was wounded in an encounter with the IPKF. On his way to the hospital, the IPKF tried to capture him alive, but he consumed cyanide. The above attack was at Vavuniya. In another attack at Kandi Road – Tricomalee, a Sri Lankan army officer was killed by LTTE.

16

COLOMBO, March 16. (PTI & UNI) — At least 29 people, including 24 Tamil militants and two Indian soldiers, were killed in the continued violence in Sri Lanka's north and eastern provinces during the past 24 hours, official sources said.

The two Indian army jawans were killed and five others injured in a landmine explosion at Kumburupiddy in the disturbed eastern Trincomalee this morning, a spokesman of the Indian High Commission said.

The national news agency Lankapuvath, quoting official sources, said 11 LTTE men were killed and four injured when the Indian Peace-Keeping Force repulsed a attack at Akkarayankula in the northern Vavuniya district yesterday.

It said the Sri Lanka security forces ambushed a gang of LTTE men at

TORTURE AND INHUMAN TREATMENT

The IPKF is holding detenus in crowded, ill-ventilated conditions. In one instance an underground air raid shelter serves as a place of confinement. A number of persons arrested by the IPKF are stated to have subsequently died in custody. In a case reported from Chavakachcheri, a youth was arrested by the IPKF on 22.12.87. This youth was beaten right through the night of 22.12.87 in full view of other arrested persons. By morning the skin in some parts of the body of this youth had peeled off. A week or so later, he died in IPKF custody. The IPKF is also merciful in that, before they disposed of the body, they called the father and allowed him to see only the face of his dead son. The father was also told that his son died by his own hand taking cyanide.

RANDOM SHOOTING AFTER GRENADE EXPLOSION

At least 25 persons were injured, nine of them seriously, when policemen and IPKF personnel fired indiscriminately after an unidentified person lobbed a hand grenade at the Batticaloa police quarters on 23 March. As tension mounted following civilian casualties, an indefinite curfew was imposed which has since been lifted.

According to Batticaloa Hospital sources, at least three school children were among the nine who were seriously injured.

All activities in the town came to a standstill with government offices, schools and business establishments putting up shutters immediately after the incident. Quite a number of buildings were also damaged due to the indiscriminate firing.

Kuraniankulam in Trincomalee district today, killing eight of them after the villagers alerted the security forces of an impending attack. One Sri Lankan soldier was also killed in the shoot-out between the two sides, the agency said.

In continuing operations to disarm the LTTE, an IPKF patrol yesterday returned fire on being fired upon from a thatched hut at Pudukudiyiruppu on the Trincomalee-Mullaitivu districts border. Later bodies of three militants were found in the hut.

The IPKF immediately launched a search operation, assisted by helicopter gunships, and two fleeing LTTE men were killed, the sources said.

Some arms and a truck belonging to the militants were recovered from the area.

The sources said the IPKF captured an LTTE hardcore member, identified as "Kandipan" at Mallavi. It also captured two other militants, Parameswaran and Selvaraiah, who were said to be brothers of a leading LTTE member of the area, "moorthy."

The IPKF destroyed a deserted mine factory of the militants, the sources said.

While engaging in a cordon and search operation near the bushes at Kumpirupitti of Tricomalee dt, IPKF men ran into the Landmines set by LTTE and 9 of them died.

In Mannar – Vellakulam area, in an encounter with IPKF, 5 soldiers were killed.

Subsequently LTTE attacked with claymore mines. IPKF casualities not known, but two LTTE men Tamaran and Murali have lost their lives.

In an attack on Sri Lankan forces at Triyai LTTE killed one Lankan soldier and wounded 4 personnel.

Two innocent civilians were shot dead and 4 wounded in the IPKF round-up. All the video equipments in a mini theatre were looted by IPKF men.

17

Hideouts smashed: The encounters invariably followed sniper attacks by the LTTE on IPKF search parties. A number of LTTE hideouts in the sector were smashed during the operation and the group was virtually on the run everywhere.

The sources said reports in a section of the press that Mr. Prabakaran barely managed to escape when the IPKF smashed his operational headquarters at Oddusuddan in Vavuniya district were "by and large correct." About 12 of his bodyguards covering his retreat were killed by the IPKF. The encounters with the LTTE were mainly around hamlets hugging the thick jungles.

15 LTTE men held: The Indian High Commission sources said the IPKF apprehended 15 LTTE militants each in Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Jaffna sectors yesterday. It also took into custody two Sinhalese with powerful automatic weapons in Batticaloa. The two were being questioned. With one IPKF jawan dying of injuries in hospital today, the death toll in yesterday's landmine blast at Kumburupiddy in Trincomalee district rose to two, the sources said.

The LTTE's Camp at Triyali was attacked by IPKF but repelled.

18

COLOMBO, March 18.

In an attack last night on two Sinhala settlement colonies in Digavapia village in Sri Lanka's hill Ampara district alleged LTTE militants hacked to death at least 14 civilians and seriously wounded over 15, according to authoratative reports received here today.

The dead, it was learnt, included six men, three women, four girls and a boy. The injured, most of whom sustained deep wounds or had their limbs chopped of were initially taken to Ampara hospital. Three of the serious cases were taken to Candy hospital in the hill district this morning.

Digavapia is a holy Buddhist village having a historical cave.

The national news agency, Lankapuvath, put the number of attacking Tamil militants around 20.

With this about 100 civilians have been killed in the past fortnight in the disturbed eastern province at places in Trincomalee district and adjoining areas of Ampara in renewed violence.

Most of the victims were Sinhalese but there were Tamil civilians also among the victims killed by Sinhala chauvinists.

Sri Lankan army kills militants: Sri Lanka's Army killed 10 people in its first gunbattle with Tamil militants since the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, military officials said today in Trincomalee.

Colonel Lakshman Wijeratne, acting security coordinating officer of this eastern district, told reporters that 10 soldiers fought 20 militants on Wednesday in the militants' hideout at Kilankulam after hunting them for a day.

Eight members of the LTTE and two of four young women cooking for them were killed, he said. He said the militants belonged to a group who shot, hacked and burned alive 15 villagers from the Sinhalese majority on Tuesday.

The battle was fought without consultation with the IPKF. — PTI, UNI, Reuter

Two IPKF men were shot dead and one wounded by LTTE attack on IPKF's camp in Thunkayil at Mullaitheevu.

The IPKF rounded up Kumpurupiddi Village at Trincomalee dt. and arrested 5 innocent civilians.

21

COLOMBO, March 21.

A 20-hour curfew was clamped on Kalmunai today after the president of the Kalmunai Citizens Committee in Amparai district in the Eastern Province, Mr. Kandaiah Velmurugu, was shot dead last night allegedly by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, official reports reaching here said today.

The IPKF patrol headed towards Kudumimalai area in Batticoloa was under attack by LTTE near Taravai. The casual ties of the soldiers in 3 trucks and a jeep were not known.

The IPKF patrol, heading towards Palampasi from Nedunkeni army camp, was ambushed by LTTE. - Guerrillas, with two casualities, they soon took their heels to oddisuddan army camp and fired mortars at civilian lines. A whole family of 7 members fell victims to the shell including a 6 months old child. 3 others were wounded along with a child.

22

Madurai, March 22: Tamil Nadu Congress leader P. Nedumaran claimed on Tuesday that LTTE leader "Jhonny" was actually shot dead by the Indian Peace Keeping Force as he had refused to take them to Prabhakaran's hideout.

(According to Government of India, "Jhonny", who had been escorting "Raheem" to Prabhakaran's hideout, was caught in a crossfire between LTTE and IPKF).

Nedumaran, known to be close to the LTTE, claimed according to information available with him that while the IPKF had first asked "Jhonny" to only escort "Raheem" who was carrying a message for Prabhakaran, one or two armymen had trailed the duo despite protestations from "Jhonny". At one point "Jhonny" had firmly told the IPKF men shadowing him to turn back if they wanted the mission to be completed. Enraged at this, the IPKF men had shot "Jhonny" dead, Mr. Nedumaran alleged.

COLOMBO, March 22.

At least 15 persons, including women and children, were killed in yet another massacre allegedly by armed Tamil militants in the early hours today in two villages, mainly inhabited by Sinhalese in Sri Lanka's northern Vavuniya district, reports received here said. Official sources, however, put the figure of those dead at 13 and the injured at four.

In an encounter with IPKF at Udayarkaddu, Durga, a girl from LTTE guerrilla unit fought bravely and died.

23

Colombo, March 23 (DPA): The Sri Lankan Government on Wednesday clamped a curfew on the eastern district of Batticaloa after clashes between Indian Peace-Keeping Force and Tamil militants left six civilians dead and at least 20 others wounded.

Informed sources in Batticaloa said the fighting erupted in the town centre at about noon when guerillas of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) lobbed hand grenades into a group of Indian soldiers on patrol.

The rebels also attacked a Batticaloa police sentry, the sources said.

Police officials confirmed that fighting continued for well over three hours, and Batticaloa residents said the militants used civilian buildings and shops for cover in the attack.

Police also reported the foiling by IPKF troops of an alleged plan by Tamil militants to assault the Sinhalese refugee camp at Managalagam, near Batticaloa.

The situation in the eastern Sri Lankan town on Wednesday eveningwas described as tense, with Indian forces patrolling the streets.

At Kiran, farther to the east, two Indian soliders were killed and five injured on Wednesday when a landmine exploded.

LTTE guerrillas launched an attack on Batticoloa police station. In retaliation the IPKF along with Sri Lankan STF fired indiscriminately in the streets. 8 civilians were seriously ,wounded. An indefinite curfew clamped on.

24

COLOMBO, March 24.

The Indian Peace-Keeping Force continued intensive search operations in Sri Lanka's Eastern Batticaloa town, which remained under an indefinite curfew for the second day today, while normal life was affected in the northern Vavuniya town due to a strike call by two militant groups.

Residents of Batticaloa said the IPKF had fanned out in various sectors of the town in search of the militants responsible for two grenade attacks during the past two days.

In all, nine people, including a school girl, had been injured in an exchange of fire between the IPKF and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam following a grenade attack on the town police station yesterday. Three IPKF men and a woman had been injured in a grenade attack on an IPKF patrol outside the Bishop's house on Tuesday.

25

An IPKF soldier was killed in an encounter with LTTE at Oluvil of Amparai Dt. Two soldiers were wounded.

26

Colombo, March 26 (PTI): Bodies of six Muslim fishermen believed to have been killed by Tamil militants, were washed ashore on Saturday, and a Muslim youth was reportedly murdered on Friday, in eastern Trincomalee, the national news agency *Lankapuvath* said.

Fresh trouble feared: Meanwhile, seven Tamil civilians including women, were killed in

'WARNING' BY LTTE

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have issued a 'warning' to the public in the northern Jaffna peninsula against having any unwarranted relations with the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).

Headlined 'WARNING', the leaflet which has been widely distributed in Jaffna states:

'The Indian Army, trying to blind the Tamil public from seeing the Army's despicable acts of rape, torture and so on is also indulging in humbugs, such as Indian Soldiers managing Tamil women.'

In this state of affairs, some traitors of our race among us, urged by motives of personal profit, are not only betraying the Tamil race, but are also operating as the paid agents of the Indian Forces of Conquest.

'We would like to have it known, that prompt action ending in death sentence will be taken against those among us engaging especially in the following activities, namely:

a) Persons furnishing information to, acting as paid agents of, or having needless relations or connections with the Indian Army of Conquest.

b) Persons needlessly establishing family-relationships or any other relationships with the Indian Army of Conquest or members of the families of such persons.

c) Persons, who making themselves out as leaders of the people, collaborate with the Indian Army of Conquest.

crossfire when the IPKF repulsed an attack on an Indian army patrol at Nedunkerni, four km off northern Vavuniya on the Vavuniya-Mullaitivu road on Wednesday, delayed reports received here said.

In Vanni area, the LTTE cadres Gracy, Victor and, Anil were killed by unidentified gunmen.

27

In between Iranamadu junction and Telecommunication Centre, LTTE attacked with landmines on IPKF and killed 2 of them and wounded 3. In consequence to the above attack, the IPKF fired indiscriminately on civilians.

Three IPKF personnel were killed and three injured by the LTTE attack in Kutchaveli, Trincomallee.

28

COLOMBO, March 28. (UNI & DPA) — Five people including two Indian soldiers have been killed in fresh violence in Sri Lanka's north and east, officials here said today.

The Indian High Commission here said a soldier died and two others wounded when the LTTE ambushed an Indian convoy in Kilinochchi District yesterday.

A Sri Lankan military spokesman here said a civilian was killed when a landmine planted by the LTTE exploded prematurely between two Indian jeeps passing through Kilinochchi yesterday.

A High Commission spokeswoman said they had no details of the second blast but 20 suspected LTTE militants, including a woman, were captured in Kilinochchi after the first attack.

In Jaffna peninsula, Indian troops detained 17 LTTE suspects, but one of them named Dharmendran, took cyanide and died at Murasunkodal village, the spokeswoman said.

30

COLOMBO, March, 30.

Eleven Tamil militants were killed in an overnight gun battle with members of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force in northern Sri Lanka, a military spokesman said here today.

Indian soldiers backed by helicopter gunships smashed a jungle hideout of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the dominant militant group, in Vavuniya district during a cordon-and-search operation, the spokesman said.

The Indian High Commission here had no details of the operation, but said six LTTE men were arrested during an overnight house-to-house search in northern Jaffna peninsula.

31

COLOMBO, March 31.

Tamil militants raided two villages in eastern Sri Lanka today, storming a mosque, looting homes and killing at least 40 people, police and residents said.

A police official at Kalmunai town, 40 km south of Batticaloa, said the militants burned at least 100 houses in the two-hour attack, one of the worst single incidents in the island's five-year-long Tamil separatist revolt.

Residents said at least 40 people, all Muslims, were killed in Mallaiyakadu and Sainamaruthu villages where 15,000 Muslims live. It was the second raid in a week on the area.

Last Saturday, police said suspected Tamil militants set fire to 25 Muslim-owned shops in Kalmunai which has a mixed Tamil and Muslim population. Kalmunai is five km north of the two villages.

The residents said the militants stormed into a mosque and shot dead a number of worshippers.

Thousands of residents fled in panic as the gunmen rampaged through the villages.

"Over 5,000 people have sought refuge in schools and mosques.

Kidnapped by 'Three-Stars'

The Three-Stars group has kidnapped six Muslim business men in Ninthavoor for allegedly supplying information to the LTTE, police said.

(The Sunday Times of Sri Lanka - 20.3.88)

EPRLF DOES IT AGAIN

According to confirmed news reaching our news desk, a van belonging to a Muslim of Mannar, Alla Pichchai Abbas by name, has been taken away by the EPRLF. It is said that the culprits who went to his house with criminal intention had gagged him and removed all the valuables from his house before scooting away with the van.

Vanguard with AK-47s: the people's warriors *The Guardian*

வீர வணக்கம்

LTTE MARTYRS

கடல்கிளர்ந் தன்ன கட்டூர் நாப்பண்,
வெந்துவாய் மடித்து, வேல்தலைப் பெயரித்,
தோடுஉகைத்து எழுதரூஉத் துரந்துஎறி ஞாட்பின்,
வருபடை போழ்ந்து வாய்ப்பட விலங்கி,
இடைப்படை அழுவத்துச் சிதைந்து வேருகிய,
சிறப்புடை யாளன் மாண்புகண் டருளி,
வாடுமுலை ஊறிச் சுரந்தன
ஓடாப் பூட்கை விடலை தாய்க்கே.

ஔவையார்

Ravi 7.3.88

Lt. Arasan 25.3.88

Suki 13.3.88

Kulam 14.3.88

Rizwan 17.3.88

Deepan 27.3.88

Kaspirin 16.3.88

Sivapathi 1.3.88

Devanandam 1.3.88

Lt. Col. Imran 1.3.88

Lt.Col.Johnny 1.3.88

Lt. Suryakumar 1.3.88

Lt. Ramani 1.3.88

Lt. Ravi 1.3.88

Lt. Yogesh 1.3.88

Lt. Anal 1.3.88

Lt. Gunaseelam 1 3.88

Rosman 13.3.88

Podiyappu 13.3.88

Lt. Imelda 13.3.88

Rosali 13.3.88

Pratheep 13.3.88

Torin 13.3.88

Thusi 13.3.88

Helen 13.3.88

Murali 15.3.88

Thamaran 15.3.88

Murthy 17.3.88

Nidhi 17.3.88

Ramanan 17.3.88

Ramani 17.3.88

13.3.88 to 22.3.88

Kandeepan

Navam

Vincent

Capt. Vathavooran

Durga 22.3.88

22.3.88 to 31.3.88

Sukkan

Nandan

Mariadas

Ravi 7.3.88

Navam 16.3.88

Ramanan

Dorin 13.3.88

Ramani

Lt. Durga 22.3.88



Lt. Col Johnny

Lt. Arasan 25.3.88

KILLING □ FIELD 88 March

claims	IPKF KILLED	IPKF WOUNDED	LTTE KILLED	LTTE WOUNDED	S.L. ARMY KILLED	S.L. ARMY WOUNDED	OTHER MILITANTS KILLED	OTHER MILITANTS WOUNDED	CIVILIANS KILLED	CIVILIANS WOUNDED
IPKF	1	1	1	19 C						
LTTE			10							
MEDIA										

2							3 p *			
3			2 *						15	3
	3									
										19 C
4		6	7	50 C			3 T		2 *	
										15 C
5									21 *	63 *
									1	
									27	
6	2	2		20 C				5 C		
	2	1 C			3				7	
										40 C
7			23 *	60 * C						
10			2	1 C					1 *	45 C

11									18 *	15 *
	3	3							4	
12	1	2		22					1	
13			1	39 C	2 *					
	2		8							
14			31	15 C						
					1					
15	3								10 *	
			2		1					
16	2		24	3 C						
	9	5	2		1	4			2	4
17				15						
			4							
18			10						14	15
	2	1								5 C
19										
20										
									1	
21									1	
	2								7	

22									15 *	
			1							
23	2	5								
										8
										25
24		3								10
25										
	1	2								
26									14 *	
			3							
27										
	5	6								
28	2		1	37 C					3	
29										
									9	20
30			11	6 C						
31									40 *	
TOTAL	13	19	113	43 C 244	2		6	5 C	155	109 45 C
	29	17 C 1	32		6	4			21	12 5 C
									37	45 C 74

* - Sri Lankan Information.c-captured. EP-EPRLF T-TELO, P-PLOTE, EN-ENDLF, E-EROS TNA-Tamil National Army CVF-Citizen s Voluntary Force

LTTE Claims: 13.3.88 to 22.3.88- 4 LTTE killed.

CHAPTER 10

1988

the heinous crimes of indian peace keeping

April

The Week

REPORT APR. 3—9, 1988

The IPKF manhunt

Prabhakaran's death may have fallout in TN

THE denial by the ministry of external affairs notwithstanding, the IPKF seems to have launched an all-out effort to capture LTTE leader Prabhakaran, who is seen by both superpowers as a malevolent presence bent upon subverting their scheme of things in the Indian Ocean.

A division-strong troops assisted by helicopter gunships are engaged in the search for Prabhakaran who, according to the intelligence reaching the IPKF, is hiding in the northeastern Mullaitivu. His deputy Ajit Mahatiya is said to have sought shelter in northern Vavuniya. But combing the vast forest area between the Devil's Point, in Mullaitivu, and Kuchchaveli is by no means proving an easy task. Said a defence ministry official: "We know Prabhakaran is on the run. But the forest tract in which he is supposed to be hiding is an ideal terrain for guerrilla operations. How long is he able to evade capture depends on his luck." He noted, however, that guerrilla leaders in some parts of the world have survived for as long as 20 years, primarily because of local support.

But the IPKF operations have, in a way, paid off. On February 28, LTTE said it was prepared for unconditional talks—with the IPKF stopping military operations for 48 hours—accepting the appeal of the Mothers Front in toto.

While LTTE claimed that it had done so to persuade the two women—Annamma David and Nesamma Vadivelu—in the eastern Batticaloa district to give up their fast unto death, the Indian policy-makers could scarcely ignore the fact that the Tigers had withdrawn the precondition they had insisted upon: that before any negotiations, the IPKF must go back to the position it had occupied before October 10 last year.

Lt-General Depinder Singh, the overall IPKF commander who has now retired, had time and again pointed out that military might could not be relied upon to wipe out an insurgency (for this political initiative was required) but the use of armed forces was meant to send out a message to the insurgent leaders that it was not worth putting up an armed resistance, especially if a way could be found out through negotiations.

There is no doubt that the IPKF has played a considerable role in softening up LTTE. Even if it has not been able to accomplish an outright kill, it has taken the Tigers on its own game to wage a war of attrition. "No doubt some of our soldiers are being killed. But every day we account for an increasing number of LTTE cadre, who are either caught or eliminated. That is bound to tell on their morale," said a senior army officer.

Prabhakaran and Mahatiya have been able to evade the IPKF but the soldiers have struck perilously close to their target. On March 14, the IPKF announced that the operational command headquarters of LTTE, in a jungle near Oddusuddan, had been smashed, even as Prabhakaran fled from the scene. As many as 12 bodyguards covering the retreat of the LTTE supremo died in the fighting.

Left behind in the well-fortified concrete bunkers of LTTE were a large number of AK-47 rifles, explosives and other arms. "Because the bunkers were so well built and outfitted, we had reached the conclusion that they were meant for the LTTE high command. Whether Prabhakaran was really there before the IPKF struck is mere speculation," said a defence ministry official.

The opulence of the bunkers in the jungle surprised Indian army officers. There were plush sofas, TV sets and a large quantity of foodstuff in the bunkers. The LTTE cadres were said to be regularly watching TV programmes of Doordarshan. It must be mentioned here that, according to Indian intelligence assessments, the LTTE leadership is basically an urban-oriented elite force, apparently unsuited to waging a rural insurgency. This is an assessment that has proved wrong.

The spokesman for the external affairs ministry who denied on March 21 that the IPKF was searching for Prabhakaran made it amply clear that, militarily, LTTE was no match to the IPKF in jungle warfare. Troops trained in counterinsurgency operations in India's northeast had been inducted into Sri Lanka.

That the elimination of Prabhakaran could have a dangerous fallout in Tamil Nadu was clear from the statements of AIADMK leader Jayalalitha, who has asked the Indian government to halt its military operations against LTTE and open a dialogue with Prabhakaran.

This is not the first time Prabhakaran has been cornered. In October last year, when the IPKF took over the Navatkulli armed base of LTTE in a surprise attack, the Tigers had feared that his capture was imminent. It was from LTTE communication, intercepted by the IPKF, that the latter reached the conclusion that Prabhakaran had been injured.

Later, on March 1, Prabhakaran's 30-month-old daughter, who died of diarrhoea, was cremated at Vaddakkachchy, near Kilinochi. His wife attended the funeral but he stayed away because of security reasons. Among the 3,000 persons who attended was Ajit Mahatiya. It was only later that the IPKF came to know about Mahatiya's presence at the funeral.

The Tigers have termed the death of 'Lt-Col' Johnny—who had met Prabhakaran in his jungle hideout and was bringing back his message to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi—in crossfire as a breach of faith. He had been flown, along with Balasubramaniam Kanagarathnam alias Raheem, in a helicopter from Madras to Vavuniya on March 5, in response to the LTTE proposal for unconditional talks and a ceasefire by the IPKF.

Apart from the problem Prabhakran presents—the LTTE chief himself carries a cyanide capsule—the IPKF has a difficult task ahead in Trincomalee and Batticaloa. Before the Sri Lankan security forces were sent to the barracks, under the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, the Special Task Force (STF) and air force had wrought havoc in Tamil-dominated areas. When the IPKF moved into action the Tigers struck back with a vengeance on the Sinhalas in Trincomalee. "At present we have nearly 40,000 refugees to look after in Trincomalee," said a defence ministry official. On March 23, top military and civil officials of both the countries met in Trincomalee and decided to carry out rehabilitation in two stages. For the rehabilitation of refugees, IPKF has agreed to make the security arrangements.

Meanwhile Batticaloa, the other trouble-spot, has been placed under a curfew. LTTE has been striking against the IPKF in the east and, in a repeat of its operation in Jaffna city, LTTE has been using houses and shops as cover. It is clear that the war will go on.

—G.K. SINGH

RECOGNISE LTTE

LETTER

Bolton Tamil Association's plea to UNO

The continuing tragic conditions in Sri Lanka are a matter of concern to us. It is disappointing to note that most facets of the peace accord, on whose basis the Indian Army entered Sri Lanka, continue to remain unimplemented.

Of prime importance is the physical safety of the Tamils in the North and East, who till now were afforded some protection by their own military force — the Liberation Tigers. The Indian Army has been on the rampage killing civilians and destroying their protector, the LTTE. We, therefore, appeal to you to use your good offices towards a negotiated settlement between the Indian Government and the LTTE. As you are aware, the LTTE has for the past several months been seeking such negotiations.

One of the centrepieces of the peace accord which has still not been implemented is the formation of an interim administration in the Northn and the East. As an organisation with overwhelming support among the Tamils, the LTTE was to have majority representation in this interim administration (seven out of a total of twelve members). This interim administration was to have been set up in Mid-1987 but so far this has not taken place. We, therefore, request you to intervene and have such administration set up allocating as was originally envisaged to the LTTE the majority of the seats.

Indeed in the last few months the Tamils of Sri Lanka are in far worse shape than were ever before. They have no hospitals, schools, courts of law or any proper civil administration; death is present everywhere and peace is nothing but a mirage. The Peace Accord in the formulation of which the Tamils had no part has brought them anything but peace. The so-called Indian Peace Keeping Force instead of keeping peace is waging war in the Tamil areas against the LTTE.

Even the Indian Commanders on the field have admitted that they have not been able to vanquish the LTTE due to the massive support it commands among the Tamil people.

We suggest, therefore, that **in as much as the P.L.O. is now largely recognised as the sole voice of the Palestinian people, the LTTE be recognised by the United Nations as the sole voice of the Tamil people.** Further, in as much as you have dynamically endeavoured to negotiate a settlement between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, we urge you to try and negotiate an amicable settlement between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, that provides as well for a peaceful Indian withdrawal.

Finally, may we appeal to you for your positive involvement in this matter and the courtesy of a reply at your convenience.

LIES, BLATANT LIES.

N.Murugesu

LETTER

. . . The tigers are fighting for their land but we are fighting for our wages'. — Indian Army Officer.

'To tell the truth, the Indian state radio and television stations should be smashed. We cannot tolerate the lies that are spread daily through these propaganda outlets. This should be stopped at once. Then only the situation will improve.' a member of the Jaffna Citizens Committee told angrily the Indian pressmen in the presence of Indian state and army officers recently. Whether officials in Delhi have heard this member's remarks or not, he has at least shaken the conscience of the Indian pressmen visiting Jaffna. These days, even the Sri Lankan press who followed the same path of deception on the question of Tamils prior to the arrival of the IPKF, exposes the Indian state media by giving prominence to official lies.

The dynamiting of two Tamil daily press offices in Jaffna and the capture of Liberation Tigers' radio and television equipment in Jaffna have had a disastrous effect on Tamils. But, as expected by the Indians, the people of Tamil Eelam did not automatically tune to or were captivated by the Indian press and radio. In contrast they rightly discarded the twisted stories of Indian media as deceitful. The ordinary man or woman of the north and east is aware of the truth which would unconsciously have clouded their minds. Apart from Indian state radio and television, the lady spokeswoman at the Indian High Commission in Sri Lanka and the Chief of the Indian armed forces in Sri Lanka are equally shining examples in this game of dis-information.

At a meeting of his fellow officers held in Bangalore, the chief of the armed forces has vehemently denied using helicopter gun-ships in their attacks in Jaffna. But this officer was caught with his pants down when an Indian reporter from India Today magazine subsequently revealed the truth with photographs.

The Eelam Tamils still have faith in the principles of Mahatma Gandhi who stood for truth. 'Truth is God' he said, on several occasions. But the India where Gandhi was born is now filled with lies, corruption and totalitarianism. The remarks of a high ranking Indian army officer in Jaffna, who is well-known among the Liberation Tigers as an eminent public relations officer, made to the Indian pressmen in a private talk recently are very appropriate. He said, 'I could have easily got round the Liberation Tigers and peacefully settled this problem avoiding bloodshed; but my uniform has prevented me in doing so. We are like slaves in the hands of politicians, carrying out their orders. The Tigers are fighting for their land but we are fighting to earn our wages'.

The truth has survived, however much masked by military uniform, though it took its time.



RAPED

16.4.88

Kilinochchi

6 women

Painter Navjot recreates the anguish of a rape victim.

THE ILLUSTRATED WEEKLY OF INDIA

COMMENT

Indo-Sri Lankan Accord

AN AUTOPSY

The situation across the Palk Straits grows more labyrinthine with each passing day.

One hundred thousand Indian soldiers are already fighting a battle there that is not even their own. Despite their superior military strength, the Indian army has not been able to curb the LTTE's intransigience.

Both the Sri Lankan and Indian governments have been unable to find a political solution either.

In this two part analysis, exclusive to the Weekly, Justice V R Krishna Iyer (retired) conducts a post-mortem on the Jayewardene-Gandhi accord, its consequences and implications.

History, says Engels, is about the most cruel of all goddesses. It has shown itself to be that, visibly, in the fate of the Tamils and invisibly in that of the Sinhalese in the democratic socialist republic of Sri Lanka. Great opportunities beckon to these 15 million people geo-politically bound to a common destiny of harmony and peaceful progress, if only tragic passions fuelling divisive forces do not overpower the culture of compassionate accommodation which is the hardware of ethnic pluralism and socialistic egalitarianism. But politicians—not statesmen—are myopic and act in haste, unaided by the dialectic of social forces at play. So they fail to feel the pulse of rival popular forces and the groundswell of their elemental rage.

An objective audit of the India-Sri Lanka accord alone will unfold whether the processes of national reconciliation, through social justice and ethnic amity, are making headway steadily backwards. The Tamils, our constant friends, broadly welcomed the good offices of India,but the harrowing happenings at the hands, unexpectedly, of the visiting troops, coupled with a deep disenchantment on the front of constitutional reform and administrative restructuring, has reversed their smiling faith into a sombre mood.

Indian statesmanship issuing from distant Delhi has rarely been sufficiently sensitive to the slowly but steadily escalating communal estrangement in the island which surely would, at white heat, affect the stability of the region. Equally short-sighted Sri Lankan power-mongers did not see the sinister seeds of communal hatred sown since 1948 and fertilised by electoral appetites, and woke up too late to control its growth.

Over the past few years, terrible things have taken place. Today, Lanka is all thorns and thistles and jungles, and the poverty of imagination and courage in its statesmen avenges itself.

The Jayewardene-Rajiv Gandhi 'summit meets', resulting in an agreement and assurances, are part of a healing process that Lanka needs. Navigational wisdom is vital if Destination 'Paradise Isle' is the goal of the operation. But the people (of Sri Lanka primarily and of India too) must be involved in the political locomotion; two top men cannot personalise the history of two countries. Nor can bleeding lead to healing. But yet, the pity of it is that killing is on the increase in the name of 'keeping peace'. Nor is there any serious sign of that constitutional reconciliation without which the pathological roots of the dreadful disease will never die.

Certain categorical imperatives must be unreservedly accepted if a durable political solution is to emerge. The first such basic factor is that Sri Lanka has an ethnic pluralism, and elimination of this composition can never happen.

Second, the unity, integrity, sovereignty and democracy of Sri Lanka are non-negotiable and the Tamils must accept this. Secession is therefore out of the question.

Third, the Sinhalese must digest the historic heritage of Sri Lanka, wherein the Tamils must be given equal freedom in the island's political process, and unhindered autonomy reasonably necessary for their self-government within the parameters of the democratic sovereignty of the island. Again, the geographic-demographic integration of the Tamils of the north and the east is an inalienable aspiration of the ethnic minority, and so the island's 'unitary' structure must be flexible enough to accommodate this deep-rooted cultural hunger.

Finally, Sri Lanka and India must mutually accept the implications of their proximity in terms of common security, non-aligned foreign policy and the establishment of a *modus vivendi* which will eliminate irritants, frictions and foreign presences, without India playing any hegemonic role of interfering in the internal affairs of the island republic. This peremptory *panchasheel* must be heeded by the minds that seek to make history.

My thesis is that principled pragmatism geared to human justice for the minorities, and recognition of the demographic reality of the Sinhala majority, is the pharmacopoeia for island peace. The twin goals of the Tamils which started and sustained their struggle must not be lost sight of while negotiating for a truce. They ask for a home, fusing the north and the east, *so that they may matter* as a democratic factor in the island's power process, as the first postulate.

The substantial devolution of

provincial authority, within the inviolable parameters of Sri Lanka's sovereignty, unity and integrity, is the second constitutional fundamental. Integral to this political transformation is the *indivisible guarantee of human rights to Sinhalese and Tamils alike, a process which repels* hyper-concentration of power in a fragile political structure and futile chauvinist culture such as is suspected by many humanist sceptics to prevail in a land like Sri Lanka. A land which has suffered an emergency for a long spell, with breaks of 18 years, state terrorism through anti-terrorist laws which make a joke of the Human Rights Charter, a judiciary which is powerless against executive supremacy as a former chief justice in his retirement speech revealed, and a parliament which says 'aye' or 'nay' at the ukase of a supremo.

In Sri Lanka, general elections have been put to sleep since 1977 and parliamentary longevity is on borrowed time. The principles of a free Constitution are irrevocably lost, says Edward Gibbon, when the legislative power is nominated (or dominated?) by the executive. The phenomenon of novel constitutional incarnations and presidential elections in 1982, after safely disenfranchising the leaders of the rival party, is a bizarre democratic mutation; Tamil presence, including that of the meek TULF, has been almost eliminated from the parliamentary process by the sixth constitutional amendment. In short, a demonetised democracy and the Ku Klux Klan-like Sinhalese groups make for a murky political order. Violence breeds violence and the writ of law runs rarely where disorder is writ large. Tamil retaliation and Sinhalese aggravation feed the politics of hatred, and a return to the halcyon days is an impossibility with sordid alien opportunists gaining a dangerous foothold.

Those who understand the dialectics of historical materialism must post themselves soberly with the post-independence developments in Sri Lanka before they jump with joy at some 'accord' which soon proves an irrelevance or illusion as it blinks at the hard realities behind the upheaval, the eclipse of human rights, the engineered violence, the gross discrimination by the State imperilling the ethnic survival of the largest minority which has deep roots and has invested developmental sweat and toil in the 'Paradise Isle'. Of course, the backward Sinhalese and the exploited Indian Tamils also have old grievances. But the ethnic injustice and the majoritarian menace plus the denial of rights to all the island people are the political essence of the current convulsion.

The upheavals in the island are not a mere matter of law and order but the volcanic eruption of great social forces as a result of the suppression of ethnic minorities and the arrogant assertion by a brute majority, intoxicated by fundamentalist ideology and abetted by the presidency. Within the Tamil fold, the north and the east, not highly homogenous, have a common linguistic-ethnic base and a cultural bond. Beyond these factors are the deep fears generated by successive governments which have operated against a minority that is irrepressible, though unequal. In such a scenario of historic revolution, any solution must be mechanical, not dynamic, not paper-perfect but convincingly guaranteed. India has been trying to deal with Sri Lanka without much success over the decades.

The Tamil millions. and more particularly the militant groups knew, to their cost, how unreliable was the Jayewardene regime. Their hopes had often been belied and unless India was willing to underwrite a degree of autonomy, life would become insufferable, and secession, in order to build a new sovereign State, the only creed.

India is solidly and rightly opposed to the dismemberment of Sri Lanka. Secession is a dangerous slogan and is often the work of imperialist sophisters, calculators and tricksters, and the bulk of the Tamils in Lanka and in India are opposed to this extremism. Today, even the LTTE, save the hard core, virtually abandons the division of the island except when bitten by betrayal.

The seventies and eighties witnessed escalating violence by the Lankan forces directed against Tamil civilians, total breakdown of law and order in the land and a witch-hunt against Tamils wherever they could be located; State terrorism in the north, attacks on Tamils, regardless of age or sex, and on their property in Colombo, ethnic violence in Trincomalee, brutality by the police and the army even in prisons and detention camps, torture and inhuman treatment of Tamil suspects and witnesses.

These and other mounting betrayals of governmental obligations had dashed the faith of the minority of obtaining justice from the majority. Presidential pronouncements of better deals punctuated those dark days. But expectation darkened into anxiety, anxiety into dread, and dread into despair. Amnesty International, Law Asia, the International Commission of Jurists, independent media and other well-known human rights organisations and champions all over the world expressed shock at the macabre state-engineered happenings. Progressive forces inside Sri Lanka, including some leftist elements and the church, protested in vain. Indian Tamils were convulsed with anger.

Admissions to universities were manipulated against Tamils and educational opportunities eclipsed. Likewise, State-operated discrimination in employment and elimination of Tamils from the police and the armed forces went on apace.

This backdrop gives an insight into the birth and growth of Tamil violence and the boat trek to Rameswaram and other parts of the world. Promises made by the President in the national state assembly were unmade as often as convenience suggested. Round table conferences, all-party meets, diplomatic confabulations and other such exercises hardly advanced the cause of peace or justice; instead, they bred mistrust. Pledges made to G Parthasarathy, the seasoned Indian diplomat, understandings reached with P Chidambaram, an able and concerned go-getter and with other special envoys of the prime minister (he amateurishly changed horses midstream) on occasion after occasion and pleasing assurances given to our optimistic prime minister him-

self often floundered and even foundered.

President Jayewardene openly declared war on Jaffna, besieged and starved the civilians, bombed even hospitals and violated rules of humanity, inalienable in a civilised polity. Human rights agencies, outstanding personalities and non-aligned churchmen found the administration grossly guilty. Indeed, the heartless approach to Jaffna Tamils reached the boiling point of betrayal when the Indian prime minister rightly felt so enraged that he took upon himself the responsibility of unusual measures of humanitarian intervention without the assent of the island government.

A clearer example of the past projecting into the present and a broader grasp of the dilatory developments *vis-a-vis* the island's ethnic conflict may be appropriate. Essentially, the escalating ethnic antagonism was due to a scramble for economic opportunities among competing ethnic communities. The Sinhalese constituted 74 per cent of the population. The Tamils, including the more exploited Tamils of Indian origin were of the order of around 20 per cent and Muslims seven per cent. The Muslims also speak Tamil. The indigenous Jaffna Tamils had better education and job opportunities under the British and provided the manpower for the colonial administration. After independence, the vastly numerically superior but competitively inferior Sinhalese made Sinhala the official language, Buddhism a preferred religion, and augmentation of educational and economic opportunities for the Sinhalese a national policy.

The Tamils were also victims of ethnically motivated riots since 1958. But, since 1983, discrimination had escalated into suppression and tolerance of Tamils had deteriorated into chauvinist hostility. From the womb of this socio-economic complex of injustices was born the liberation movement of which the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) was the spearhead. It was moderate in its methods, but militancy took over when repression was intensified. Pirabhakaran's Tigers claimed *eelam* (homeland) of the Tamil-dominated provinces and took over the offensive of mass killing of Sinhalese. The situation worsened with the intrusion of Sinhalese through State-sponsored colonisation schemes calculated to reduce the Tamils to a minority in some regions where they were in a majority.

The aggravation of communal tension continued despite Indira Gandhi's efforts to produce a just solution through G Parthasarthy. President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met under the pressure of a deepening crisis, hoping to give a creative turn to the solution of the vexed problem. The cease-fire of June 1985 was a good omen. Further rounds of talks in July and August were marred by further killings. The second cease-fire of October 10, 1985 did not stop the killings of Tamils.

Although Rajiv Gandhi described the problem as a purely Sri Lankan one, he rightly expressed concern over the mass influx of refugees and the violation of human rights. However, abandoning a political solution to a political problem, Jayewardene sought a military methodology and roped in Pakistan, Britain and Israel in the shape of experts from these countries to wage a mini-war against militant Tamils.

Next came the conference of June 1986 with proposals for provincial councils and other institutions involving devolution of powers. The quantum of devolution was poor and the merger of the north and the east was rejected by the President. So the Tamils fed militarist militancy into their operational pattern.

And then in December 1986 came the new proposals with ministers Natwar Singh and P Chidambaram catalysing the process. The LTTE, dissatisfied with the proposals, persisted in their gory guerrilla tactics, but Jayewardene countered this move by full-scale blockading of Jaffna and starving the people, stopping communications and medical supplies, even bombing them. The world was horrified and India, in a sudden outburst of activity, initiated talks leading to the accord.

June-July, '87 saw a frenetic spell in Colombo-Delhi relations, after a fruitless zig-zag of futile palavers and deepening distrust. The Gandhi government, in a hubristic mood of sudden humanitarianism, and acting almost unilaterally, despatched in June to the starving Tamils of blockaded Jaffna, badly-needed food and medicine. They were peremptorily sent back by the puny Sri Lankan navy. Hurt by this humiliating rebuff, South Block hit back, ignoring international regulations about trespassing on the air space of sovereign states and air-dropping food and medical supplies over the beseiged north. Though Colombo protested, its anger was happily obliterated by the welcome announcement of an agreement between the artful Lankan President and the artless Indian prime minister.

July 29, 1987 surprisingly witnessed a unique ceremony—two statesmen signed a vague accord of sorts in Colombo. A Jaffna cease-fire, a lovely serendipity indeed, was announced. The bilateral agreement was instantly blessed by President Reagan and praised by various other foreign leaders. So far so good.

The gestation and the midwifery of this agreement are a riddle wrapped in a mystery; the cumulative meaning of the ambivalent clauses of this hasty document is an arcane enigma; whom it benefits in the short and the long run is, as yet, difficult to decode. The India-Lanka accord must be tested by measuring its clauses, their viability and credibility, against the triple imperatives of Tamil justice and the restoration of people's political processes for Sinhalese and Moors, Burghers and other living in the 'democratic socialist republic of Sri Lanka'.

There is a sombre realism in the growing feeling that peace is still a pipe-dream and the promised breakthrough is dwindling into a breakdown. Here is a typical sober response to the developments which spell death for Tamil optimism about fulfilment of the agreement. In an interview in *The Hindu*, Padmanabhan, the secretary

general of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front, which obeyed the accord and disarmed itself said: 'We are greatly concerned with the problem arising out of armed hostilities between the peace keeping force and the LTTE.

'It is imperative the Indian government take all steps to ensure that the civilian casualties and the extreme economic and psychological deprivation of our people is kept to an absolute minimum or avoided altogether.'

Does this acid comment implicate the Indian forces in the consciousness of the Tamil people as guilty of military excesses in fighting the LTTE? Armies away from home are not always examples of Newman's definition of a gentleman. Padmanabhan further mourns: 'Although five months have elapsed since the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, the people's expectation that it would pave the way for peace, democracy and devolution of power to the Tamils remains a distant dream.

'In fact, the present reality that faces our people is one of despair, deprivation and death. The EPRLF, which extended its support to the accord, is now finding it difficult to demonstrate to our people, in concrete and tangible terms, the gains of the accord. What our people see is the process through which only those conditions favourable to the Sri Lanka Government are being satisfied.'

All the fanfare and fancy dress about the historic event of July 29, 1987 now boomerangs on India because our prime minister failed to discern the fine distinction between haste and speed. And who pays the penalty? *Mainstream* wrote on November 14:

'It is good that the prime minister paid tribute to the sacrifices of our jawans and officers who had fallen in the Sri Lanka operations, and their number is not inconsiderable. At the same time, it would be pertinent to ask what was the cause for which our soldiers have given their lives. Obviously this was not for the defence of the motherland. Nor have we decided to build an empire beyond our borders for which our troops have had to shed their blood. Nor are we fighting to save the world from the evils of communism as the American GIs were told in Vietnam, nor for the defence of the socialist fatherland as the Soviet soldiers might have been motivated in Afghanistan. What is it for which our jawans are fighting? Is it to keep up the tottering Jayewardene regime? What needs to be questioned is not the role of the Indian armed forces, but the irresponsibility of those at the political level who have ordered our forces to Sri Lanka.'

The corpse of the amnesty clause lies in Sri Lanka, with India looking on, deaf-mute, but continuing its tiger hunt. It looks as if Rajiv Gandhi's only clause in the accord is surrender of arms. Lankan perfidy is beyond his ken or courage. Nor is the liquidation of the blackguardly, blockheaded LTTE the end of the story. The Tigers—or a section of them—may be a malignant manifestation but the *militant fight of the last Tamils will persist until basic justice greets them.*

There is no Left or Right where people are face to face with liberty or death. Every liberation struggle in the world proves this. While Indian official propaganda yells against the savage deeds of the Tamil Tigers and praises the triumph of the Indian troops against half-baked desperadoes—many trained and equipped in the past in Tamil Nadu—as a victory in the 'great' battle for Jaffna, Jayewardene chuckles, pays tongue-in-cheek compliments, and Sinhalese soldiers sigh with relief that their lives are safe and their weapons unstained with their own countrymen's blood.

Should dialectical activists omit to criticise Indian impotence in events that occurred after signing the agreement? Events such as (a) preventing student Thileepan's fast-unto-death for human rights in prison and eventual death (b) the cyanide suicide of 13 Tigers caught and transferred to Colombo to be tortured contrary to the proclaimed amnesty (c) the indifference of the Jayewardene government to the fate of thousands of detenues, innocent Tamil and progressive Sinhalese (d) the blatant violation by the JRJ regime through the twin legislative pretences which stultify the agreement in its very essence, and (e) the murky absurdity of Colombo's claim to be in control of the IPKF which is a slur on our national self-respect and frustrates our country's humane purpose in sacrificing the lives of its jawans. The folly of South Block shall not sink our national resources in quicksand and kill our soldiers in Tiger-infested quagmire.

Rajiv Gandhi brooks no democratic dissent and changes his mind and mood because he has a majority in Parliament and impregnable authority in his party. Inner party or intra-cabinet democracy is a casualty in such a milieu; and the civil services, party echelons and the vast Congress or allied populace enjoy, in Mark Twain's language, 'three unspeakably precious things: freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and the prudence never to practice either of them'. Lacking that intense empathy with Tamil ethnicity and vaccinated against criticism, the shining profile of our prime minister loses its convincing persuasiveness, despite his bona fides. The Tamils perhaps feel that to pin their faith in the JRJ-Rajiv accord as their sole savior is giving the wildest hostage to fortune. They have good grounds to be sceptical.

There were high hopes from the accord, even critics of the Left discovering some good in it. Let us dissect the diplomatic agreement with rationalist reverence.

The very process which produced the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement has genetic defects. When political polemics, emerging from ethnic conflicts and resulting in bitter, bleeding operations dividing the republic are to be resolved through peaceful negotiations and constitutional formulations, natural justice and democratic basics require the active involvement of, or, at least, extensive consultations with, real combatant groups. Therefore, the Tamil political leaders and militant organisations ought to have been vital participants in the very process of discussing the terms. *Ex parte* decisions don't bind.

The militants were fragmented and fighting. The TULF was largely ineffective in a violent climate, though it was a material factor with representative electoral credentials and intellectuals. But the pact was made *de facto* behind the back of the Tamil surrogates. Whatever Delhi may assert, no militant leader, nor the moderate TULF, had an effective voice. The agreement about the future of the Tamils was thus reached by Delhi and Colombo, the parties actually affected being merely informed of the *fait accompli* and directed to say 'amen'.

The process was unjust because Rajiv Gandhi, in his arrogation of paramountcy over the Tamils, whom he helped with arms and training to hit back against Sinhalese violence, acted as the principal and unaccountable plenipotentiary. The TULF's top cadre was formally informed and, though they had reservations, they muted their dissent. The militants were nowhere in the picture. Pirabhakaran, the head of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, an intelligent intransigent with a fascist following, was confronted with an accord which he was given no option to amend. He seemed to assent under coercion, as he explained in Jaffna soon after.

The Sinhalese also had no opportunity. President Jayewardene too behaved smartly by not consulting anyone. In fact, even his ministers, his party, the progressive elements and other parties learnt of the accord rather than shaped it. The twilight of democracy produces the cult of personality. But the products, like the instant accords, meet with rough weather when they set sail.

These fatal procedural drawbacks notwithstanding, the accord is now a reality. It has to be analysed, amended or undone in the light of developments which furnish the best commentary on the covenant and its potential for good or evil. Now to the agreement.

The Preambular part of the India-Sri Lanka accord signed by the tallest executives of the two governments runs on realistic and sublime lines, attaching great importance to strengthening the traditional friendship between the two countries and accepting the urgency and imperative necessity of resolving the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka. There is a frank statement that the violence is *consequent on the ethnic hostility* and that the developmental destiny of all the Lankan communities depends on the resolution of the ethnic hostility. If only this realisation were more than skin deep, if only the political forces grant this goal as the foundation of Indo-Lankan relations, if only an all-out effort by Sri Lanka, ably aided by India, were made on a national scale, it would fulfil the twin aspirations of the Tamils, of the fusion of the northern and eastern provinces and self-government for the minority, of course, within the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the island republic.

There is a further refreshingly frank admission that the Tamil community has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which needs to be carefully nurtured. This is followed by a critical confession (if one may be pardoned for saying so) that the northern and the eastern provinces have been the *historic* home of the Tamil-speaking peoples who have, throughout in the past, lived *together* in this territory, with other ethnic groups. Not stopping with these important truisms, the agreement conscientises the nationalist forces into a mood of strengthening the island's unity through its character as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-religious pluralist polity, with every group having the right to live in *equality, safety* and *harmony* so that they may prosper and fulfil their *aspirations.*

Such is the cornerstone of the compact which may be regarded as historic if only the values so enshrined were taken seriously and implemented in the spirit of equal communal justice and minority aspirations on a democratic basis.

One spinal flaw in the crystallisation of the pact is the omission to involve actively the Tamil political militants and senior statesmen through a trilateral discussion. Whatever the Indian prime minister or his official ventriloquists may assert, the Lankan Tamil participation in the processing of the proposals was next to nothing. Rajiv Gandhi took them for granted, assuming that their struggle would start or stop at India's command, and without arms and training from India, Tamil resistance would wither away. What a moronic misjudgement of a heroic movement! They are not party *bhaktas* but 'do or die' combatants, with burning self-respect and a vial of killer cyanide as the final sacrifice. The faculty to penetrate the soul of a people in revolt against being crushed out of ethnic existence belongs to statesmen with a vision of the future, not those intoxicated with self-importance.

Be that as it may, let us see if something good can be salvaged out of the accord. A few fundamental gains deserve to be highlighted as the spin-off benefits from the accord. First, linguistic justice is done to the Tamil and English official languages of Sri Lanka. Second, in a land of perpetual emergency and where both Tamil and Sinhalese languish in detention the Sri Lankan President, runs the accord, will grant a general amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other Emergency laws. The amnesty also extends to combatants, as well as to those persons accused, charged or convicted under these laws. The Government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate the militant youth with a view to bringing them back into the mainstream of national life. India will cooperate in the process.

Sweet words but brazen baloney, because no one has bothered about those prisoners still behind bars. Even so, as an undertaking, such generosity towards human rights deserves hearty approbation, if it is honestly implemented.

Third, there is a clear understanding that 'residual' issues of importance, not finalised in the earlier negotiations, *shall be resolved* between India and Sri Lanka *within a period of six weeks* of signing the agreement. There is a sly rider here which says that these proposals are also conditional to the Government of India cooperating directly with the Government

of Sri Lanka in their implementation.

While India agrees to prevent militant troops operating in Sri Lanka from using Indian territory as their base, the Lankan government also agrees that nothing prejudicial to India will take place by Sri Lanka being used by foreign interests to the prejudice of Indian security.

There is a promise of polls in three months, in any event, *before* December 31, 1987, with Indian observers to watch over the elections to the provincial councils of the north and east. Likewise, there is a provision for a common administrative unit for the northern and eastern provinces with a tricky condition that while the two provinces join together with one administrative unit, one elected provincial council, one government, one chief minister and one board of ministers, *there will be a referendum* on or before December 31, 1988, *to enable the people of the eastern province to decide whether they would like to be governed together or remain separated* as distinct provinces. The President is given, at his discretion, the power to postpone a referendum in this behalf.

Finally, there is an obscure conditionality fraught with interpretive riddles written into the accord. Clause 2.15 runs:

> 'These proposals are conditional to an acceptance of the proposals negotiated from 4-5-1986 to 19-12-1986. *Residual matters* not finalised during the above negotiations *shall be resolved between India and Sri Lanka within a period of six weeks of signing this agreement.* These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India co-operating directly with the Government of Sri Lanka in their implementation.'

By way of a democratic reinforcement of the accord, there is a clause which assures the people that Sri Lanka will ensure free, full and fair participation of voters from all communities in the northern and eastern provinces in electoral processes envisaged in this agreement. The Government of India will extend full cooperation to the Sri Lanka government in this regard.

With the tragic exit of Tamil Nadu chief minister M G Ramachandran and the mounting deaths of Sri Lankan civilians and Indian jawans, infantile calculations may be problematic. After all, people are unpredictable and react with more uncanny political sanity than the *pro tem* tenants of Janadhipathi Mandiraya or Race Course Road, wish.

All right-thinking persons in our two countries will want that justice be done to the Tamils, that we on both sides of the Palk Strait live in happy amity and peace, that the accord be made an instrument to advance this consummation. But will it work? A closer look at the documents of July 29, will do good.

There are five fundamentals in the accord: The formation of a single administrative unit telescoping the north and the east and setting up of the apparatus of a ministry in that behalf during the 'interim period' between 'the elections to the provincial council' and the referendum for determination of the will of the people of the eastern province to separate or live united with the north (Clause (1) (2)—*not implemented*). The election to the provincial council is agreed to be held within the *next three months* (ie before the end of October) and *in any event before December 31 1987 (not implemented).*

No free and fair election can be held if the Emergency is not lifted, and so there is a condition *to lift the Emergency* in the eastern and northern provinces *by August 15, 1987 (not implemented).* A prelude to peace is the cessation of hostilities and that condition is to come into effect all over the island *within 48 hours of signing the agreement.* The surrender of arms and the confinement of the Sri Lankan security personnel also have a time-bound provision: *the process is to be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities,* coming into effect. All but the LTTE have surrendered and now repent the step as Pathmanabhan of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) has stated.

It is too obvious to need argument that unless there is a general amnesty the hostiles cannot come into the open nor can normalcy be restored. Rightly, therefore, clause 10 of the agreement provides that 'the President of Sri Lanka will grant a general amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other Emergency laws, and to combatants as well as those persons accused, charged and/or convicted under these laws. (*Not implemented*, except as a first instalment gimmick.) Many Sinhalese progressives who support the accord languish in jail still. Many LTTE extremists rot in prison or carry huge sums on their heads.

These clauses form a package and stand or fall together. You cannot ask for surrender of arms, inflicting lethal disablement on the resistance movement which has gathered momentum, but do nothing to enforce the imperative undertakings of Sri Lanka's President. The Indian prime minister, obsessed with his (illusory) authority over the Tamil militants, talks all the time of surrender of arms as the essence of the accord. The soul of the agreement is to hold elections, to lift the Emergency, to grant amnesty and to begin the formation of a joint province. A priority item is the quantum and quality of devolution of powers, so that the reality of autonomy may be brought home constitutionally to the minority consciousness.

There is a pledge in Clause 14 that these matters will be resolved between India and Sri Lanka *within a period of six weeks of signing the agreement*, that is, *before the middle of September.* This has certainly not been carried out. Clearly, there is an implication that all these matters of legislation and constitutional amendment bearing on political normalisation, provincial election and power devolution *will be discussed with India* and also with the concerned parties, that is, the political organisations, militant or other, in the island. This has not been done.

A monitoring body to review the progress of the implementation is provided for, so that failures on both sides may be exposed and complaints in that behalf heard. *No*

such functional watchdog has yet been created.

There is a provision in the new treaty for repatriation of Indian citizens from Sri Lanka, concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu (Article 2-16 (d)). Here again there is victimisation of these unfortunates lingering in Sri Lanka in large numbers. There is no realism in the exchange of populations:

While it is difficult to quantify the cost of the military operations in Sri Lanka, the finance ministry, it is said, estimates it to be around Rs 300 crores and over Rs 5 crores a day. Other estimates place the amount much higher, which means that the Indian taxpayer is being burdened beyond his ability. Besides, our soldiers are being killed or injured in foreign fields.

In contrast, the Sri Lankan economy now looks relaxed and its budget for 1988 shows a great reduction in defence expenditure, of course, at India's expense. This is made further clear by the Sri Lankan President's disclosure that because of the accord Sri Lanka has saved much of its war expenditure and raised the salaries of its employees with such savings. PTI reports (December 12, 1987) Jayewardene as saying: 'If not for the IPKF we would have to fight this war. We have to spend more than what we are spending for the salary increase.'

Our cost is not merely in war expenditure but in war casualties. The Sri Lankan President claimed that while Sri Lankan soldiers died in large numbers *before* the IPKF took over, *after* the latter's arrival *not a single Sri Lankan soldier* had died. Our men died instead.

Both the Sri Lankan President and his Parliament must give to India this authority, agreeing that *pro tanto* Sri Lanka would have parted with sovereignty or final control *vis-a-vis* the Indian forces and their operations. A very clear statement on this point is needed now, if the Tamil people are to feel assured that the Indian army will not desert them but will stand by them until north and east come under one administrative umbrella, and devolution of powers on a par with that enjoyed by an Indian State becomes an accomplished fact. Of course, IPKF excesses, if continued, may make them a hated horde and their withdrawal may well be the demand, first simmering, then boiling and finally bursting. Today Tamil blood tells a gory story. This is a serious caveat.

Limitation on sovereignty for specific purposes and under covenants is nothing new in this integrated world of ours. The European community, with the European Court, European economic policies etc may be construed as an infraction of the sovereignty of Britain or other member nations. All international covenants involve erosion of some part of sovereignty. In the present case, our men have laid down their lives, our scarce re sources have been showered for the benefit of Sri Lanka's citizens and the two republics have taken various measures on the faith of each other's representations. In this view the Indian forces, it must be made unmistakably clear, are there in Sri Lanka in an independent capacity and conditioned by the fulfilment of a task. If this is not acceptable, we should withdraw the army, leaving the Sri Lankans to themselves.

The military misfortune of the 30,000 Indian troops rushed to Jaffna but unprepared for the novel urban guerilla operations, and without sufficient military intelligence about the adversary, was the result of a prime minister's hubris—not a crime but a bad blunder. He has let down the army and, unwittingly, lowered its international reputation. The insensitivity to escalating criticism of this adolescent delinquency, can lead to more deafness and egregiousness. But more casualties, more cries from Jaffna and Batticaloa, may trigger a pathological process of hostility at home. And the reckless LTTE, like a bear at bay, may seek and secure military hardware from unscrupulous agents keen to embarrass India such as Pakistan and Israel and the satanic CIA.

The question then is, are we the friends of the beleaguered Tamils or the rescue auxiliaries of a reeling President guilty of near-genocide? Let the Sri Lankans share the casualties. We, Indians, as our sons die in vain in Sri Lanka, are actually the victims of JRJ's newsspeak with which the July agreement abounds. Either we command the militants into a cease-fire and *pari passu* pressure Janadhipathi Mandiraya into the fusion-devolution pledge or leave both parties to shape their own destinies. Why play the macabre military *mukhtiar* of Sinhalese Jayewardene and yet boast that the accord, as a whole, would be executed?

Two make-believe bills were introduced and passed in Parliament with a small amendment caused by the Supreme Court decision requiring a referendum. Without going into the details of the legislative exercise at this stage, one may confidently assert that they fall far short of the aspirations of the Tamils. Indeed, there is no legislative sanction yet for bringing the north and the east under one umbrella. This is relegated to a later presidential direction. It is all a game of hide-and-seek. Why is it that a straightforward legislation by constitutional provision is avoided in bunching together the two provinces making up the homeland of the Tamils? Premadasa, the prime minister, clearly stated that he was against it. The President is too. Do we not have sufficient omens to suggest that the legislative process in Sri Lanka will defeat this foremost objective of the Sri Lankan Tamils?

The second imperative is about the devolution of powers. What is given is a husk, not the kernel. No effective powers regarding land and other important items covered by the State List in India is distributed under the Sri Lankan bill. More fraudulent is the dubious negation of autonomy. Powers are given to the governor to be exercised at his discretion and the hand which pulls the strings is that of the President.

Thus, instead of State autonomy, what is granted is an illusory triarchy. More than all this, the President and Parliament retain their plenary powers which can effectively nullify State legislation and action. A close scrutiny of the

devolution scheme brings out the ugly fact that what is created is a talking shop with formal authority precariously dependent on the governor, the President and Parliament. Hanging over it is the Damocles sword of the Emergency which can extinguish even what little autonomy there is. Can one find fault with the militants for refusing to be cheated? In fact, the TULF leaders had informed Rajiv Gandhi that the two bills were unacceptable and it was impossible for them to sell the scheme to the Sri Lankan Tamils.

The referendum, what with Sinhalese colonisation subtly engineered by Colombo, the terror the brutal LTTE has generated and the alienation of the Muslims fomented by the politics of religious 'minorityism', may well be a clever ploy to dismantle the *united* province. The myth is that the militants *alone* resist the agreement; the truth is that Sri Lanka's President and Parliament have already mutilated its anatomy.

The Tamil militants are not party bhaktas but 'do or die' combatants, with burning self-respect and a vial of killer cyanide as the final sacrifice.

The Indian prime minister, with no answer for these accusations, now uses a 'cover-up' of 'firm assurances' by the President to reconsider the bills *after* they are passed. It needs credulity beyond breaking point to believe a President who bypassed India before the bills were formulated, asserted before the Sri Lankan Parliament through his prime minister that the common province would never come, and diluted constitutional autonomy to a shadow.

And the major Opposition—the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), 34 other political organisations, the Buddhist clergy and that murderously extremist Sinhalese group the Janata Vimukti Peramuna are opposed to the Tamil minimum. Only the left, a sensible but negligible political factor, supports effective decentralisation of power and minority authority for Tamil-dominant Jaffna and the eastern sector. Even they do not expose the spinal weaknesses of the accord.

Another pathetic feature about Jayewardene, the United National Party and their tardy and ambivalent manoeuvres about the accord is the anxiety to preserve the Sinhalese status quo because Parliament's term expires in 1989 and the President's in 1988 itself. The strategy is, to drag on till then without radical Tamil justice and use the Indian army to kill the truculent LTTE, boasting that not a single Sinhalese soldier has been killed!

Against this background, the Indian establishment's obsessive military dream of killing of the LTTE desperadoes as the only issue is cowardly folly. When more and more Indians die in Sri Lanka—and no defence of the motherland is involved—more and more Indians will demand why? How far will this go? What will be the gains, what the cost and how will it be justified? The ink of history is a string of interrogatories. Our prime minister's attitude *vis-a-vis* the Tamils of Sri Lanka, is a blend of oversized ego, underestimation of others' intelligence plus a wish to achieve instantly high objectives without hard thinking or ideological moorings.

My purpose is to promote a stable solution to the vexed problem of ethnic justice in Sri Lanka and friendly relations between India and Sri Lanka. Whatever the shortcomings in the processes and performance, I must appreciate the creative foreign policy factor implicit in the consummation of an accord between our two countries.

We must adopt dynamic thought to salvage the purposes of the accord and seek methods by which we may strengthen Indo-Sri Lankan friendship and Tamil-Sinhalese relations.

Once we accept the imperative of democracy, that authority cannot be divorced from accountability, our prime minister must answer for the full-scale military operations, including naval and aerial patrols, the diminishing chances of peace and the escalating involvement in war, which has resulted in increasing Indian casualties and the fratricidal Tamil death roll.

The unkindest cut of all is the Sri Lankan ministers virtually dismantling the accord and demanding Pakistani military presence and elections in the current hysterical atmosphere, thereby dealing a death blow to the pact and laying a death trap for our jawans. If by some freak of friction Pakistani forces enter the south and the Indian forces control the north, a conflict between the two may not be a recondite possibility.

The war continues; peace eludes us. The kismet of the accord becomes curiouser and curiouser. Its eventual Indian impact is sure to be a time bomb.

I plead with the prime minister to review the deteriorating situation and boldly speak to his counterparts in power in Sri Lanka to innovate a creative formula which will work without violence and will involve the militants, Tamil and Sinhalese, in the process.

A new confidence has to be created which can never happen so long as the Indian guns use their fire power and continue curfew indefinitely as they do now. Nor is it the business of the Indian forces to make house-to-house searches, shoot anyone with a weapon, and, incidentally, commit those delinquencies which are associated with occupation armies. To keep the peace is a more innocuous operation than engaging on a manhunt for the Tigers. A great effort must be made to win over the Tigers and the JVP into the mainstream of democracy on an ideological basis and to assure that the rights of every Sri Lankan citizen will be guaranteed.

If the India-Sri Lanka agreement is alive, a functional audit is badly needed so that changes may be wrought to make it fulfil its preamble. If the accord is all but dead, an autopsy must be done to understand why it never took off, except for massacres on both sides.

3.4.88.

THE ILLUSTRATED WEEKLY OF INDIA

COMMENT

TIME TO LEAVE

AKBAR KRISHNA

Why are we in Sri Lanka? To hear it from the glib *avatars* of realpolitik on the cocktail circuit of New Delhi, we are pursuing our strategic interests there. India had to decisively end the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka: otherwise Colombo would have been, indeed was, tempted to invite others in to help them do it. We would have had Pakistanis training the Sri Lankan army, American companies exploring for oil off the Lankan coast, and Trincomalee reduced to a western base. 'Indian interests' would have suffered.

So instead we are busy annihilating the Tamil force we had helped create, arm and train, in order to force them by war to make peace with someone else. And in the process of frying this particular omelette we are breaking a number of eggs: reducing much of northern and eastern Sri Lanka to rubble, taking the lives of people our soldiers had gone there to protect, losing the hold we have always had on their hearts and minds. As our own country reels in the grip of one of the worst droughts of the century, our national exchequer rains five crores of rupees a day into the effort to establish a *Pax Indica* on the teardrop island off our shores.

What for? The explanations of the government's critics have ranged from the naive to the cynical. I do not believe our prime minister suffers from a chronic addiction to unworkable accords, as some suggest. Nor am I convinced he was grasping at a foreign straw to pull him out of the domestic quicksand into which he seemed to be sinking. No, I think that New Delhi decided, no doubt reluctantly, to follow Kautilya rather than Rama: our incursion into Lankan affairs reflects South Block's view of the imperatives of statecraft rather than Racecourse Road's of the exigencies of politics.

But for all the cold logic of our position, there is no doubting that, to an increasing minority of thinking Indians, our intervention in pursuit of that position is indefensible. It was arguably time for us to wash our hands off the short-sighted intransigents of the LTTE and to wish Colombo luck and diplomatic support in its attempts to reassert Sri Lankan national unity—but not for Indian jawans to shed their blood to attain this end.

In the pages of the *Weekly*, that fine and insightful observer of our times, O V Vijayan, suggested the Lankan venture was the last thrust of the Aryan incursion into the Dravidian South. But there was nothing Dravidian about the retired general I met in Delhi who bitterly described the IPKF as the Innocent People Killing Force: about the father who spoke to me of the anguish of his son, an army captain, at seeing his comrades hunting down people they had themselves trained: of the retired ambassador who told me he would have been ashamed to be defending this policy in an international forum today. These were all North Indians, scions of Aryavrata, and they were saddened and disillusioned by our hollow victories over Pirabhakaran's *rakshasas*.

Make no mistake: these words are not intended to cast any aspersions on the courage and valour of the Indian soldiers who are so bravely fighting today in Sri Lanka. But they are meant to question the judgement and morality of the policy-makers who sent them there. There was a time, not so long ago, when India's foreign policy spokesmen boasted that our international role emerged from our national values and cultural traditions: that India's foreign policy was a legacy of the Hindu precepts and Buddhist ethics which had given us the ahimsa and satyagraha of our freedom struggle. Nehru even attributed non-alignment to atavism: 'there was no cold war,' he explained, 'in Asoka's heart'.

Of course, all this probably had as much to do with the rhetorical flourishes of new orators of the world stage as with any real policy assumptions. But the assertion of an ethical international position did at least accord with the national self-image of Indians: it gave to the country's often ineffective external policies a moral legitimacy that guaranteed their acceptance. Foreign policy in India was elevated to an historically-sanctified expression of the country's innate genius, and it rapidly acquired an impressive political consensus.

The primary duty of an Indian government is to meet the needs of the Indian people. Instead, our military expenditure on Sri Lanka is soaring at a time when Colombo has cheerfully slashed (for the first time in ten years) its spending on the army by 37 per cent and its overall defence allocations by 13.5 per cent. While anti-Indian vitriol corrodes both Sinhalese and Tamil opinion, President Jayewardene proudly tells his compatriots that Indian soldiers are now dying instead of Sri Lankans.

No Indian government can indefinitely divert resources from development to war unless the broad mass of the people are convinced that the war is vital to their own survival. And this they will not be, because as the death-toll mounts and domestic inflation rises and the government seems to have less and less money and time to devote to the needs of the people, they will begin to question the war. And no amount of slick talk about strategic goals, or about Pakistanis and Americans, will convince them, that India should be expending precious resources, lives and fraternal goodwill by intruding into somebody else's quarrel.

In Bangladesh we at least had the moral argument: we were intervening on behalf of the oppressed, the victims of exploitation and attempted intellectual genocide. In Sri Lanka we have placed expediency above ethics, and defined our national interest without reference to the interests of our nationals.

In the end, such a policy can never succeed. Let us pull out in honour before we are forced to do so in disgrace. 3.4.88

EDITORIAL

4.4.88

Sri Lankan quagmire

LAST WEEK'S BUTCHERY at Kalmunai, south of Batticaloa, is a grim reminder of the explosive situation that prevails in Sri Lanka's Eastern Province. Close on the heels of the clashes involving Tamil and Muslim groups, the Indian troops announced the capture of several top leaders of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the region. Although first accounts suggested that the vicious attack on the Muslim community was launched by "suspected LTTE men," later reports indicated that it was the work of the so-called "Three Star" group. Whoever the perpetrators of the crime, the fact that nine months after the induction of Indian troops a massacre of this magnitude could take place in an area with a mixed population is a sad commentary on the peace-keeping arrangements under the Indo-Sri Lankan accord. In the last several months the Indian army's operations have been directed almost entirely towards elimination of the LTTE cadres. The claims of success emanating from New Delhi in this regard have served to create a false sense of satisfaction over the current Indian role. No less a person than the GOC-in-C of the Indian peace keeping force (IPKF) in Jaffna has acknowledged in a press interview (which has attracted a partial and qualified denial from New Delhi) that 90 per cent of the population in the predominantly Tamil peninsula is pro-LTTE and that there is no sign of the LTTE running out of weapons. It is doubtful if the leadership in New Delhi which has committed the army to hunt for and neutralise the LTTE has taken into account the dangers inherent in the creation of a political vacuum through its misconceived strategy.

The essential justification for the deployment of Indian troops was the need to prevent elements inimical to our national interests from gaining a foothold in Sri Lanka. Yet prolonged Indian military presence in the island can prove counterproductive as such elements will then feel tempted to sponsor and assist local groups with a view to dragging the IPKF deeper and deeper into the quagmire. The report that Pakistan has trained and equipped the Muslim Al Jihad group assumes significance in this context.

The political settlement envisaged under the Indo-Sri Lankan accord is nowhere near realisation. President J.R. Jayewardene's administration says it is determined to hold elections to all but two provincial councils in the next four or five weeks. Even if it succeeds in the effort, there remains the problem of holding elections in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, which can only be done with the co-operation of the LTTE. A new complication is developing with Mr. Jayewardene's cronies plotting to get him a third term as President, which is forbidden under the island's Constitution. If the Government of India does not look ahead and disengage itself in good time it runs the risk of willy-nilly becoming an accessory to the establishment of a banana republic with a self-perpetuating President and a self-perpetuating Parliament.

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

K. Jayabala 5.4.88

Pararajasingam 24.4.88

P. Vijayabaskaran 6.5.88

Sinnarasa 6.4.88

M. Jayakumar 27.4.88

Mrs. Lakshmi 7.5.88

K. Kamaleswaran 8.4.88

I. Ganapathipillai 28.4.88

S. Sivavaradhan 8.5.88

S. Rajasuriyar 11.4.88

V. Udayakumaran 28.4.88

Rasvarajeeva 10.5.88

M. Tharmalingam 14.4.88

U. Vadhyalingam 28.4.88

R. Udhayabalan 12.5.88

Sellaiya 21.4.88

Joseph 29.4.88

Gnanasekaran 13.5.88

THE HINDU

LTTE □ STATEMENT

LTTE denies Prabakaran accepted accord in return for money

Ravi Shankar, Sunday 24.4.88



MADRAS, April 6.

The LTTE today denied the suggestion that its leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran, "accepted the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in return for payment of funds to his organisation."

In a statement, the LTTE, however, said that it was "offered five million rupees monthly" by the Government of India until the formation of an interim administration as "compensation" following discussions on withdrawing "the taxation system which provided the main source of income to our organisation." The Government of India made one payment of five million rupees and "thereafter withdrew its commitments" following the collapse of the proposed interim administration, it said.

The following is the text of the LTTE's statement:

"The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam wishes to issue the following statement, clarifying confusing reports emanating from the Indian High Commission sources in Colombo about funds offered to the LTTE by the Government of India:

"First of all, we wish to deny categorically reports suggesting that the LTTE leader accepted the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord in return for payment of funds to his organisation. This is a malicious distortion of truth, deliberately fabricated to discredit the image of our movement.

"During his talks in Delhi, our leader, Mr. Prabakaran, refused to accept the Accord expressing serious reservations on various issues, particularly on the Provincial Council proposals which fall short of Tamil aspirations. Mr. Prabakaran is firmly convinced that the proposals envisaged in the Accord would not pave the way for permanent settlement of the Tamil question.

"During his discussions with the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, Mr. Prabakaran pledged to surrender the arms in stages following certain clarifications and assurances given by the Indian leader. Mr. Prabakaran also promised to cooperate with the implementation of the Accord if it promoted the interests of his people and protected their lives.

"During these talks, the Indian Prime Minister pledged to set up an interim Government with the LTTE playing a dominant role and offered funds for the rehabilitation and resettlement of Tamil refugees. The LTTE was also offered five million rupees monthly until the formation of an interim Government as compensation following our discussion to withdraw the taxation system, which provided the main source of income to our organisation.

"We wish to confirm that the Government of India made a payment of Rs. five millions and thereafter withdrew its commitments following the collapse of the proposed interim Government. Therefore, the funds offered by the Government of India has nothing to do with the Accord but it is related to the formation of an interim Government and the rehabilitation of our people and maintenance of our cadres. We also wish to point out that the interim Government was also not an item envisaged in the Accord. — Political Committee, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam."

REPORT

MONEY FOR TIGERS: A RAW DEAL

Leak meant to distract attraction from Bofors?

APR. 17–23, 1988

"ONE cannot get anything without paying the price. Sometimes one has to make the supreme sacrifice." That was the comment of Speaker Balram Jakhar when payment of a substantial amount of money to Velupillai Prabhakaran, LTTE supremo, was raised in the Lok Sabha on April 5.

That the payment had been made was divulged by J.N. Dixit, Indian High Commissioner in Colombo. Why India had to make such a payment is one question. But more important in the political context is the motive behind divulging the secret. It was obviously a deliberate leak. A veteran diplomat like Dixit would never shoot his mouth off.

The payment as such was not surprising. India had been helping LTTE, particularly during Indira Gandhi's regime. It was because of the inexperience of Rajiv Gandhi and the personal prejudices of former foreign secretary Romesh Bhandari that India's attitude towards the Tamils changed soon after Rajiv became Prime Minister.

For two days the ministry of external affairs would not comment on Dixit's statement. Then the confirmation came in the form of a statement in the Lok Sabha by Minister of State for External Affairs Natwar Singh. His was a rather poor performance.

Said Natwar Singh: "One of the main problems mentioned by Prabhakaran concerned the fact that LTTE had been collecting funds through 'taxes' levied on the people of Jaffna and some other areas of the northern and eastern provinces. According to Prabhakaran, these collections were being used by them to provide allowances for the upkeep of their cadres. It was made clear to Prabhakaran that once the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement came into effect, such forced collections from the population must cease

"Prabhakaran requested, therefore, that till the interim administration comes into being, and till his cadres are employed, he should be given the financial means to support his cadres as otherwise it would become exceedingly difficult for him to retain their loyalty.

"The Indo-Sri Lankan agreement provides that the government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate the militant youth with a view to bringing them back to the mainstream of national life. India is expected to cooperate in this process.

"In order to help LTTE make the difficult transition from militancy to peaceful democratic politics, it was agreed to extend some interim financial relief. It would only cover the period till the rehabilittion of its cadres."

Members in the Lok Sabha wanted more details. But Natwar Singh did not feel obliged to give details in a suo moto statement. Members of the opposition drew his attention to the first paragraph of his statement which said: "The government has seen newspaper reports about certain payments made to LTTE in connection with Indo-Sri Lankan agreement. Hon'ble members have also raised this issue in the house. I rise to clarify the position." They wanted to know how the statement could be suo moto when the minister admitted that the issue was raised by the members in the house. Natwar Singh, a bit shaken, preferred to keep quiet.

There was no doubt that India had agreed to pay a sizeable amount to LTTE till its cadres were rehabilitated. The matter was raised by Prabhakaran when he met Rajiv Gandhi a day before the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement was signed. He wanted financial assistance to maintain the cadres and Rajiv Gandhi agreed. The first instalment of Lankan Rs 50 lakh (about Indian Rs 25 lakh) was paid through RAW channels. All formalities required for such a payment were completed. When LTTE leadership refused to obey Indian orders, the payment was stopped.

In fact an indirect reference to such a payment was made in the Indo-Sri Lankan accord itself. Soon after Rajiv agreed to the payment a message was sent to add a line to clause 2.11 of the agreement—"The government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate militant youth with a view to bringing them back to the mainstream of national life; India will cooperate in the process."

So far so good. But why did a seasoned diplomat like Dixit choose to leak

Ravi Shankar, Indian Express 7.4.88

the secret agreement? Indications on such a clause were given earlier by Dixit himself and later by Major-General Harkirat Singh and political adviser to LTTE, Dilip Yogi.

Dixit had given the indications while denying reports that LTTE was not consulted on the terms of the accord. Dixit had said: "On July 28, the PM himself received Prabhakaran and, in his presence, Prabhakaran said 'I accept the agreement, I shall cooperate in implementing it; myself and my cadres will join the mainstream of politics.' And the PM said: 'With your background of having advocated the Tamil cause, you have a place in the Sri Lankan politics. And its time you gave up the gun and came back to the democratic process.' For this he was given a number of incentives the details of which I do not wish to give. He took these incentives. That is my answer to this theory that all of them were consulted."

Shrewd move. *Dixit*

The disclosure by Dixit came 48 hours before the Swedish prime minister was to appear before the parliamentary committee of his country. Was the disclosure part of a counter-move?

Later in an interview to Reuters on August 9, 1987, Major-General Harkirat Singh referred to "financial aid to LTTE" and on August 10, LTTE leader Dilip Yogi too referred to India's responsibility to provide financial aid to LTTE. On August 11, *Veerakesari*, a Sri Lankan newspaper, also indirectly referred to the assistance as rehabilitation funds jointly given by Sri Lanka and India. Besides, the Sri Lankan authorities were told about the cash assistance to LTTE cadres.

So the theory is that what Dixit disclosed was not anything new but what had been told repeatedly in a guarded language understood by diplomatic circles.

Yet, the credibility of the government being low, there were few takers to this theory. Many felt that the Government of India was engaged in an exercise to tarnish the image of Prabhakaran, having failed to win over the Tamil population in Sri Lanka. Tamils, who even now look up to LTTE for leadership and guidance, do not feel secure under the protection of Indian peacekeeping forces. The only way now to win them over is by discrediting Prabhakaran.

A few days ago there were reports in Indian papers about some jeans-clad women in the military entourage of Prabhakaran. The Indian media are quite familiar with such "news tips" during briefings on political as well as terrorist forces within India.

Another theory is that the leak was to inform or misinform the Tamils in India on the real character of Prabhakaran. With DMK chief Karunanidhi periodically expressing concern over the fate of Prabhakaran, some adverse information on the Tiger chief's character and lifestyle might benefit some rival political party.

A third theory is purely on the timing of the disclosure. Remember, the Indian Air Force airdropped essential commodities over Jaffna the day on which the Swedish audit bureau report on the Bofors deal was released. The disclosure by Dixit came 48 hours before the Swedish prime minister was to appear before the parliamentary committee of his country. Was the disclosure part of a counter-move? Is there any link between the disclosures in Colombo and the disclosures to come from Stockholm 48 hours later? It may indeed look far-fetched. But credibility not being the strong point of the present government, any wild theory would be lapped up.

A deliberate leak or not, the news was not received well. None talked about the avarice of Prabhakaran or condemned the government for paying money to LTTE. The immediate suspicion was on the politics of the accord. Speculation was rife on the secret deals of Punjab, Assam and Mizoram accords. Were the signatories of these accords won over by such payments? Though in international accords such payments may be a usual feature, would it not have disastrous results if such payments are introduced in accords within the country? Is it not a new version of horse-trading? If payments were made in domestic accords, from which account were they made? Such questions are now heard in the corridors of power in New Delhi.

Another aspect was the propriety of the leakage; even if such payments are usual in international agreements, is it advisable to disclose them? Would any country heareafter trust India to keep secrets? Would not any country shy away from such agreements fearing that at some stage Indian officials might embarrass them?

The news about the secret payments came as another setback to the Indo-Sri Lankan accord. The fact that it came from a seasoned diplomat of India made LTTE and Tamils look at Indian intentions with suspicion. LTTE, obviously, feels that the disclosure was deliberate and intended to tarnish its leaders. Such feelings can only weaken whatever is left of the accord.

On the other hand, when the IPKF is expecting to complete its operations, the Government of India should have made a last-minute attempt to win over the LTTE leaders. Having been cornered from all sides it is quite likely that at least a section of LTTE would have cooperated with India. Instead, the disclosure indirectly paved the way for LTTE to stand united in its fight. Indian interests demand that the remaining Tamil leadership survives. Total suppression of LTTE or any other Tamil group is not in India's interest.

K. GOPALAKRISHNAN

D.B.S. Jayaraj

● Amnesty COMMENT

'If these Sinhalese, Tamils, or Muslims, wherever they may be and whoever they are, give up violence, surrender arms and accept the agreement, I shall grant them an amnesty and remove the proscriptions that prevent them from participating in democratic elections. I invite them to join the other parties in this non-violent and humane democratic process.'

The words referred to above, excerpted from President Jayewardene's address to Parliament last month has given hope to many a political offender behind and outside bars. The Indo-Lanka Accord in terms of Clause 2:11 stipulates 'General amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under the P.T.A. and other emergency laws and to combatants as well as to those persons accused, charged and or convicted under these laws . . .' Several clauses of the hastily drafted Indo-Lanka Accord have been disputed in its implementary stages. One such clause is the one that relates to an amnesty.

New Delhi feels that the amnesty covers all types of offences in all parts of Sri Lanka prior to the accord being signed on July 29th. Colombo's contention however is that the amnesty extends to only offences committed in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The political rationale behind Colombo's view is that (1) it would be politically tenuous to grant amnesty to offenders who have harmed civilians in the seven provinces outside the North and East, (2) it would be politically embarrassing to release Tamils committing offences in the south when Sinhala extremists are under detention for alleged offences in the south.

The end result of all this was that in the aftermath of the accord certain categories of alleged offenders were not being released. The growing disenchantment peaked when 17 Tigers including the Trincomalee Tiger leader, Pulendran alias Amman were arrested in October '87 off Point Pedro. Pulendran was suspected of being the perpetrator of the Habarana massacre where 147 persons were killed. The crime was committed outside the North and East. So there was mounting pressure on bringing the Tigers to Colombo.

It is in that context that President Jayewardene's reiteration of the amnesty offer has to be viewed. Already it has fuelled hopes to the extent of hundreds of detenues writing letters to President Jayewardene. Their basic position is that they eschew violence and that the question of laying down arms does not arise because they are already incarcerated. It is learnt that these detenues are now required to file affidavits to the above effect. The moving force behind this manoeuvre is Mr. Kumar Ponnambalam of the Tamil Congress.

The interpretation of the Amnesty clause by Colombo was particularly harsh on the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS).

The flashpoint of tension for the EROS arose when Niranjan alias Haran along with three others were arrested by the STF at Batticaloa. Haran had earlier been detained by the IPKF on suspicion for nearly two months. The four EROS men were brought to Colombo. The others except Haran were released following intervention of the Indian envoy Mr.J.N. Dixit. The rationale for Haran's continuous detention was the same as that of Pulendran. Haran was suspected of being the man behind the EROS bombing of Oberoi Hotel in 1984. Jyotindra Nath Dixit strained every diplomatic sinew and got Haran released from Sri Lankan custody. He was taken to Palaly and is being kept in IKPF custody. Since Colombo still feels that the amnesty does not apply to Haran, he is being detained to be available for interrogation.

But Haran does not seem to be the kind which is content to be in a state of 'benevolent incarceration'. In a letter dated March 17 he has written to Mr. Dixit for the third time. Stating that keeping him under Indian custody on the orders of the Sri Lankan Government was ridiculous Haran urges his immediate release. He also says that he would commence a fast unto death campaign. He would await Mr. Dixit's reply until March 26 before initiating the campaign.

The views expressed by Sri Lanka at the recent UN Human Rights Commission sessions in Geneva seems to suggest that Colombo still interpret the amnesty as being applicable to the North and East only. Mr. Dixit has already expressed concern over these views to the Sri Lankan Government.

The contradictory interpretations of the amnesty is another indicator of the hasty manner in which the accord was signed. A clear definition of the amnesty would have averted many a tragedy and controversy.

The post-Indo-Lanka Agreement scenario has seen many fast unto death campaigns aimed at focussing attention on crucial issues and winning demands. If and when Haran fasts the issue would be the amnesty. Haran's case is now a test case. His release or continued detention would determine whether the amnesty applies to the entire country or the North and East alone.

● Murders in the East

'Who killed Cock Robin?'

The immediate question in the Amparai district, 'who killed Vel Murugu of Pandiruppu? The previous question in the Batticaloa district, 'who killed Ahamed Lebbe of Kattankudi?' The earlier question of the Trincomalee district, 'who killed Abdul Majeed of Kinniya?

Given the complex nature and peculiar nuances of Eastern Province actualities one would ponder a great deal before venturing out with an answer.

There is a difference in the case of mass killings. The past weeks have seen a series of massacres. The majority of those killed have been from the Sinhalese community interspersed with incidents where the minorities, mainly Tamils have been victims. Yet in the brutal carnage one could detect a method in the madness, motive in the mayhem. Hypersensitivity bordering on xenophobia towards the issue of demographical changes in the province along with the Mosaic tradition of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth has led to genocidal frenzy.

The deaths of ex-Senator Nadarajah, Mannar GA Makbool, Communist Party leader Vijayanandan, Mutur and Sammanturai AGA's and a host of lesser-known personalities it was not difficult to ascertain who the killers were. In some cases the Tigers claimed credit.

One cannot however rush into conclusions about the deaths of former Deputy Minister and ex-MP for Mutur Mr. Abdul Majeed; former DDC member and Citizens' Committee Chairman Mr. Vel Murugu; former T.C. Chairman and Citizens' Committee Chairman Mr. Ahmed Lebbe. Some have openly pointed the accusing finger at the LTTE. The LTTE certainly has to bear its share of the guilt but the objective seeker of truth must be on guard against the common tendency to make a scapegoat of a Tiger. Two of those killed were called off their homes. Abdul Majeed was shot dead in his compound while Vel Murugu was abducted and killed. Ahmed Lebbe was shot while on the pillion of a motorcycle.

There is a common factor among the three. All of them were persons who worked hard in thought, word and deed for Tamil-Muslim unity. Mr. Abdul Majeed was a tower of strength to the TULF during the 1981 DDC elections where despite the Tamils being only a third of the district Trincomalee was won by that party. In recent times he

rendered yeoman service in reducing tensions between the Muslims and the Tamils, the Muslims and the IPKF. After his death a leading Muslim politician remarked publicly that Homeguards were responsible for the killing. A newspaper reported it and was never openly contradicted.

In the case of Mr. Ahmed Lebbe it cannot be forgotten that he helped the LTTE open a branch in Kattankudi at the residence of a close relative. He played a mediator role in the clash between the LTTE and the Jihad. More importantly he was elected Vice-President of a newly-formed Muslim organisation which openly supported the North-East merger. Shortly afterwards he resigned his post allegedly under pressure from a fundamentalist Islamic group. He was killed a few days later. In the ensuing panic eight Tamils were abducted by a Muslim group carrying sophisticated arms.

Contrary to the impression that Mr. Vel Murugu was against the fast knowledgeable circles assert that Mr. Vel Murugu was the motivating force behind the fasts. The fasts were in sympathy of the Mothers' Front fast. Mr. Vel Murugu who helped pour oil on troubled waters during Tamil-Muslim clashes in Kalmunai was instrumental in getting Muslim youths also to fast in support. The IPKF took great umbrage at this and forcibly broke up the fast threatening that 'Muslims should not fast'. They were supported by anti-LTTE groups. Mr. Vel Murugu had then coaxed the fasting persons to call off the fast to avoid violence. Also the car used by the killers was found in Karaitivu which could not be described as a Tiger stronghold.

The Eastern Province cocktail consists of various admixtures like the Police, the STF, the Homeguards, the IPKF, the LTTE, the non-LTTE Tamil groups and the Muslim armed groups. Speaking to a cross-section of sources emanating from Security, Police, Journalist, Citizen and religious circles a broad answer by no means conclusive emerges. All indicators are that:

The Killing of (a) Mutur's Abdul Majeed, (b) Kattankudi's Ahmed Lebbe, (c) Pandiruppu's Vel Murugu is presumed to be the work of (a) Homeguards, (b) Muslim armed group, (c) armed Tamil group other than the LTTE respectively.

● Chasing Prabakaran

'Curiouser and curiouser' the ungrammatical yet quaint phrase from 'Alice in Wonderland' appropriately describes the grand manhunt launched by the Indian Army in search of that elusive Tiger leader Velupillai Prabakaran.

In the good old days of Sri Lankan Army-LTTE clashes Sri Lankans were regaled with 'media-centred tales' of Prabakaran's movements. Seen here, there, everywhere; captured here, wounded there, 'killed' everywhere. Fortified with past experience Sri Lankans react with a casual response to Indian spokespersons, Indian-inspired leaks and Indian newspaper scoops about the adventures of the elusive Tiger.

Holed up in Kokuvil was the first, trapped in Kopay was next. Then he was injured in Chavakachcheri from where he hobbled on one foot to the base hospital in Manthikai, Puloly. He was sighted limping yet he was not captured or killed. A red herring then swam all the way across the Palk Straits. The search was on in Vedaranyam and Rameshwaram. The Tiger leader according to intelligence (Indian) reports found Jaffna made too hot for him and crossed over to India from where the Indian Army came.

The red herring swam back this time to the Islands off Jaffna. The next search was in Vadamaratchi.

The logic (Indian) was that the son of Vadamaratchi soil would prefer to die at the hands of the Indian Army on his native soil. Unfortunately VP did not want to die.

The scene then shifted to the East. Prabakaran could not cope with the superior Indian forces in the North, so he moves on to the East. The Tiger hunt is on, still Tiger No.one eludes his former friends and present foes.

In the meantime Prabakaran found time to send innumerable radio messages to his cadres in Madras, political leaders in India including Rajiv Gandhi. The IPKF was very skilful in 'intercepting' several messages between Prabakaran and his cadres here. Still no capture. While all this was going on Sri Lankans were told at different times that (1) Prabakaran was running from place to place followed closely by the Indian forces who were allowing him neither rest nor respite, (2) Prabakaran's hide-out, a luxurious bunker, has been discovered with couches to recline and television to watch (Rest and Recreation), (3) Prabakaran has surrounded himself with women and children. It was difficult to catch him because the Indian forces did not want to harm the civilians (nothing mentioned about civilian lives lost during Operation Pawan), (4) the Indian Army knows where Prabakaran is; it is only a matter of time before he is caught.

Adding to the confusion were the contradictory statements by Indian politicians, bureaucrats and reports in the Indian media. 'India wants him dead; India does not want him dead; India wants to capture him alive; India does not want to capture him because he would commit suicide, etc. were the confounding themes.

The situation however is now serious. Whatever the Indian political establishment may feel the military has scented blood. Three houses in Shastry Koolankulam in Vavuniya were bombed by helicopter upon receipt of information that Prabakaran was there.

So now the spotlight is on the Wanni. The natural habitat of the Tiger is the jungle. So the Wanni jungles are the 'happy hunting grounds'. Indran the God of the Devas has the 'Vajrayudha' as his weapon. 'Operation Vajra' (Cutting Edge) has been launched in the Wanni. Area of operations comprise the districts of Vavuniya, Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi and Trincomalee, 7,000 troops are in the jungles.

Again comes the confusion caused this time by contending political forces. Karunanidhi of the DMK says Tamils all over the world including Tamil Nadu are shocked that Indian soldiers were making efforts to capture Prabakaran dead or alive. 'The hands of the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi will be stained forever with the blood of the Tamils by the efforts to liquidate the LTTE or Mr. Prabakaran who from the beginning had respect and confidence in India'. Tamil Nadu Congress Committee President Karuppiah Moopanar was quick to respond. 'It was not the intention of the Central Government to'kill' the LTTE leader Mr. V. Prabakaran', he said.

In such a situation one would like to conclude with an excerpt from Sukumar Ray, the Indian version of a Lewis Carrol. Sukumar Ray whose centenary was last year is called the 'Nabab of Nonsense' and is well-known for his comic verse and fantasies. A passage from his fable 'HA-JA-BA-RA-LA' reads as follows.

> 'Who's cousin Treehopper?' I asked. 'Where does he live?'
>
> 'Up in the trees of course,' the cat replied.
>
> 'Where can I find him?' I asked again.
>
> 'Oh you can't do that,' he cried. 'Quite out of the question.'
>
> 'Why?' said I.
>
> 'It's like this you see,' said the cat.

Suppose you're looking for him at Vluberia: you'll hear he's in Motihari. So you go to Motihari only to find he's at Ramkrishnapur. Off you go again, but they tell you there he's left for Cossimbazzar. You just can't run him to earth.

Then how do you manage to meet him at all? I wondered.

YOU TOO INDIA?



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மரணங்களின் செய்தி கூடக்
கிட்டாத தொலைதீவில்,
ஏக்கங்களையும் துக்கங்களையும்
கடலலைகளிடம் சொல்லிவிட்டுக்
காத்திருக்கும் மக்கள்.....

கடலம்மா நீ மலடி
ஏனந்தத் தீவுகளை
அனுதரவாய்த் தனியே விட்டாய்?



இளைய வயதில்
உலகை வெறுத்தா
நிறங்களை உதிர்த்தன,
வண்ணத்துப் பூச்சிகள்?

புழுதி படாது
பொன் இதழ் விரித்த
சூரிய காந்தியாய்,
நீர் தொடச்
சூரிய இதழ்கள் விரியும்
தாமரைக் கதிராய்,
நட்சத்திரங்களாய்
மறுபடி அவைகள் பிறக்கும்.

Peace in Jaffna 'a long way off'

INTERVIEW

JAFFNA, April 1.

A top official of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force has indicated that peace and normality in Sri Lanka's war-torn Jaffna peninsula may still be a long way off because, though weakened, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam is not "down and out yet."

"The peace which has descended on the peninsula is apparent, but we do not deceive ourselves into thinking that we have brought the situation under complete control," Maj. Gen. Sardesh Pande, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the IPKF in the Peninsula, told UNI in an interview at his Palaly headquarters, 20 km north of here, on Wednesday.

Hidden arms: There were no signs of the LTTE running out of weapons. "Either they have a large number of weapons hidden away or they are getting fresh supplies. So we have to continue to recover them," Gen. Pande, who took charge of the IPKF operations in the peninsula, the erstwhile bastion of the LTTE, in January said.

Gen. Pande dismissed the LTTE's overtures for a ceasefire as "unreasonable, clever and manipulated." "You stop firing and we will stop firing," he said and pointed out that the LTTE had, so far, not shown any inclination for a ceasefire.

The LTTE had, in fact, distanced itself from a ceasefire by continuing its attacks on the IPKF. "Everyday they are blowing up vehicles, throwing grenades and killing innocent people. What credibility do they have?"

The LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran was waging a "fullfledged war" against the IPKF which showed no sign of ending as far as the group was concerned. "The only thing the LTTE believes in is the gun and its power. So they simply can't afford to think of laying down the weapon. That will be their end."

Million dollar question: Though the IPKF had estalished military control over the peninsula, when normality would be restored was a "million dollar question," Gen. Pande said. Normalisation of the situation would depend on the people's willingness to assert themselves and convince the militants that "violence is no longer necessary."

Public opinion, which was now "prostrate on the ground" would have to stand up. "It will take some time for us to give it that confidence." With both the political and militant leadership having disappeared from the peninsula, the atmosphere was now characterised by "substantive fear" on the part of the civilian population. The fear was "total" some months ago.

Gen. Pande said the peninsula which was the stronghold of the LTTE would continue to be so because "90 per cent" of the population was "pro-LTTE."

'Social projection': "If the people were not pro-LTTE there would be something wrong with them" because the group was a "social projection" of the accumulated grievances of the island's minority Tamil community for the past 40 years. "The LTTE had fought for their honour and safety and it is part and parcel of society."

The response the civilians had given the IPKF was "tremendous" and the common man was genuinely interested in peace. The people now realised why the IPKF was here and had "seen us paying the price." Of late, they had positively started helping the IPKF, he added. "What they can't stomach is that we have suddenly entered into a conflict with the LTTE."

Asked why the IPKF went into conflict if it felt that the LTTE enjoyed popular support. Gen. Pande countered: "Why don't you ask this question to the political leaders and top military officials."

'Total distrust': Gen. Pande said the biggest impediment to peace in the peninsula was the "total distrust" the people showed towards everything. "The people have lost all faith in everybody. They feel that they are being taken for a ride. They think that we are playing the Sri Lankan game. They think that we are not clever enough to see it through."

One of the constant refrains was that the IPKF was here to protect its strategic interests and that it was keen to gain control of Trincomalee harbour. "We have better places in India from where we can protect our strategic interests," he said.

In this background, it would be very difficult to fix a time-frame to overcome the "deep-seated distrust" of the people to restore peace, he pointed out.

"Difficult proposition": Gen. Pande said the IPKF was in the peninsula only to control the situation and "that has been achieved." But militarily insurgency was a "difficult proposition" to solve as history had shown in several countries. "I am confident in my mind that at this rate, with the application of military and persuasive force, it will be possible to restore peace and normality in the peninsula."

Gen. Pande said the LTTE leadership had disappeared from the peninsula because, confident of the support of the people, they did not want to "waste their efforts here."

"We feel that they still retain their hold on Jaffna. Our aim is to loosen their grip."

Gen. Pande said that with the IPKF relaxing the movement of people in and out of the peninsula, some LTTE men had started coming back. The geography of the peninsula was such that it was impossible to stop the movement of the militants. "The lagoons ar not even porous, they are like bottomless sieves. Anyone can wade across these lagoons or move in a fishing boat."

Asked about allegations by the LTTE that the IPKF was using members of the rival militant groups to spot their men, Gen. Pande said that anybody who helped the IPKF to fight the war would be given "a sympathetic hearing." Many had come to the IPKF because the LTTE had threatened them.

He said the hatred between the other groups and the LTTE had reached such levels that it was going to be their (LTTE's) weakest point in the days to come. — UNI

"90 percent of the population was pro-LTTE. If the people were not pro-LTTE there would be something wrong with them"

– Maj. Gen. Sardesh Pande

Asked why the IPKF went into conflict if it felt that the LTTE enjoyed popular support Maj. Gen. Pande countered: "Why don't you ask this question to the political leaders and top military officials."

DECCAN HERALD

COMMENT

CLEANING UP THE MESS IN SRI LANKA

Accord with LTTE likely

NIKHIL CHAKRAVARTTY

THE inadvertent remarks by our High Commissioner in Colombo about payment of a huge sum of money to the LTTE leader have not only been a stunning revelation but are also turning out to have highly embarrassing repercussions for the Government.

High Commissioner J.N. Dixit is not only a senior member of our Foreign Service but is known for his maturity and competence. He has handled in the past such difficult assignments as Bangladesh immediately after liberation in 1972 when he was the Deputy High Commissioner in Dhaka, and Afghanistan in the early years of Soviet intervention, where his assessment of the difficult situation was always taken with seriousness.

In Sri Lanka too he was adroitly handling the crisis, with single-minded focus on the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement. It was therefore surprising that Mr. Dixit should have made the **faux pas** of talking about the money being paid to Mr. Pirabhakaran in such a casual manner as to suggest that this was the price for the LTTE leader's consent to the agreement.

FANTASTIC

Although the Government statement in Parliament sought to clear up this point, the sensitive nature of the issue has touched off many speculations, some of them wide of the mark and bordering on the fantastic. For instance, a theory is being propounded that Mr. Dixit's leak of the big money being paid to the LTTE leader was deliberate, so that there would be an outcry in Parliament demanding to know where such huge sums came from. At that stage, the Government, having been caught in the Bofors kickback controversy, would calmly try to explain away that the money from the Bofors deal had been secretly spent for winning over the LTTE militants. This sounds almost like a repeat of Washington's Iran-Contra deal. Perhaps the theory itself has been lifted wholesale from that scenario.

There is also another predicament facing the Rajiv Gandhi Government over the Sri Lanka crisis. In Tamil Nadu, the overwhelming body of opinion is now demanding a cease-fire by the Indian Army. This is not only the line of the critics of the Congress (I) like Mr Karunanidhi's DMK, and the Janaki-Veerappan faction of the AIADMK, but even Ms. Jayalalitha and her group of AIADMK, supposed to be the only ally of the Congress (I), have raised the cease-fire demand. More aggressive critics of the Centre outright demand the withdrawal of IPKF from Sri Lanka.

TIED DOWN

The demand for a cease-fire in Sri Lanka has been snowballing in other parts of the country as well. For more than eight months now, the Indian troops have been tied down to one corner of the island, with little prospect of the present military operations bringing about a settlement. The mismanagement and disarray of the Sri Lankan Government has made the insistence of Indian demand for the acceptance of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord by the Tamil militants sound unrealistic, since President Jayewardene has hardly fulfilled his commitments under the accord.

In this context, the Prime Minister's insistence that the Indian Army's continued presence in Sri Lanka depends very much on President Jayewardene is rather confusing. New Delhi need not regard JRJ as is its best bet in Sri Lanka, an assessment which seems to be popular in the Rajiv Gandhi establishment. In his interview to Japanese newsmen on the eve of his Tokyo visit, the Prime Minister said that President Jayewardene wanted the Indian Army, that "we are helping him to implement" certain clauses of the agreement. It needs to be noted that JRJ has not implemented even those clauses which he could have done; and India has not brought home to him effectively his default. The general impression in the country is that Mr. Gandhi is largely engaged in pulling Mr. Jayewardene's chestnuts out of the fire.

SECRET DEALS

From time to time there are also reports of secret negotiations going on between the Tamil militants, including the LTTE, and some of the high-ups of the Sri Lankan Government. Some time ago, two prominent Sri Lankan Ministers were mentioned as trying to strike a deal with LTTE, with the common objective of raising the demand for the exit of the Indian Army from Sri Lanka. Of the two Ministers involved in these secret parleys, one is Lalith Athulathmudali, known to be a severe critic of the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement, but the other, Gamini Dissanayake, has long been known as an ardent supporter. There is also the recent report that President Jayewardene himself has met a Tamil militant leader, though not belonging to LTTE.

Under the circumstances, New Delhi has realised the urgency of finding a way out of a jam. It is significant that Minister of State Natwar Singh, speaking to the press on April 11 during his Oman trip made the point that the Indian Government had never lost contact with the LTTE. This is the actual position today and it is good that the Minister has prepared the ground for some understanding with LTTE so that a cessation of hostilities could be achieved in the immediate future.

BADLY BRUISED

Although New Delhi is naturally tight-lipped and is keeping its fingers crossed until an understanding is actually struck with LTTE, one may safely presume that the cessation of hostilities is not far off. For one thing, the LTTE is badly bruised and in a corner. Besides, the Indian side is also beset with problems and accusations, albeit largely unfair, apart from having to incur an expense of reportedly Rs. 1 crore a day for the Indian Army operations in Sri Lanka.

Mr. Gandhi's aides are well aware of the danger of large-scale demonstrations demanding a cease-fire in Sri Lanka facing him in Tamil Nadu when he goes there for the AICC(I) meeting scheduled in the last week of this month. It would therefore be an intelligent guess that a move for cessation of hostilities based on an understanding with the LTTE might mature before that. An announcement of peace for Tamils in Sri Lanka would have a dramatic impact on Tamil Nadu politics, and that is precisely what the Prime Minister would like to achieve in the first shot in the election game in that State due to go to polls in June.

18.4.88

DECCAN HERALD

28 April

REPORT

India has alienated Sri Lankan Tamils

S. MURARI

SIX months have passed since the Indian Peace-Keeping Force in Sri Lanka got entangled in a bloody war to disarm the LTTE. And now comes the candid assessment from the Jaffna commander of the IPKF that 90 per cent of the population in the peninsula are still with the Tigers.

Obviously in trying to isolate the Tigers politically and militarily, India has alienated an entire population. The euphoria over the accord has long since evaporated. If the Sinhalese have been hostile from the beginning to the presence of Indian troops which are after all fighting their dirty war, the Tamils have become equally unfriendly. The troop strength has swollen from the initial 6,000 to over 70,000, and more are on the way.

The time-table for the implementation of even non-controversial agreement provisions like lifting of emergency, scrapping of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and resettlement of refugees has long since been upset. The Provincial Council Bill does not satisfy even the moderate TULF. And the LTTE is far from subdued, though considerably weakened.

In short India has landed in a mess of its own making and is vigorously pursuing the military option while keeping the door open for talks. There is no way out unless India understands the psyche of the Tamil people.

Militarily, the Indian army has achieved in six months what the Sri Lankan army could not achieve in six years or more. It has ejected the Tigers from Jaffna, the seat of their power and dealt a mortal blow to the ego of LTTE supremo V. Pirabhakaran. It has broken their back and shattered their command structure. So much so, the boys are moving about in small groups and are operating on their own, their links with the leadership cut off. In Batticaloa, another stronghold of the LTTE, almost all top leaders barring commander Karuna are in the IPKF net. With the naval cordon tight and effective, supplies to the rebels have dwindled over the months. So much so, they are now conserving their ammunition and are increasingly using knives and swords to kill Sinhalese civilians and landmines to blast IPKF convoys. In the last few months, there have been very few direct confrontations with the IPKF.

And yet, Pirabhakaran is proving to be as elusive as ever. There is much truth in the IPKF claim that the LTTE is divided on the continuation of the struggle, but it is yet to be reflected in its political approach. All that the LTTE has done is to come down from its original position that the IPKF should pull back to the position it held before it launched the operation disarmament on October 10 last. In the last couple of months, it has expressed its readiness for unconditional talks.

MISCALCULATION

India has used every method, fair and foul, to contain the Tigers and failed. If the guerillas are able to hold out still it is because they continue to enjoy people's support. It was here that India made a grave miscalculation. It got carried away by the initial euphoria generated over the accord and convinced itself that any action against the Tigers would get the local people's support. When Indian soldiers arrived in Jaffna on July 30 last, they were given a hero's welcome much to the chagrin of the Tigers. Now the IPKF is looked upon as an army of occupation. Contrary to general belief, the Tamils' disillusionment with India started long before the war on Tigers began.

After consolidating peace in Tamil areas, India should have addressed itself to the task of resettling refugees, starting with about 40,000 Tamils uprooted from their homes in the East. The war-weary people were eager to get back to their villages. And yet, not a single refugee in the island itself dared go back, though Sri Lankan armed forces were then confined to the barracks and Indian troops were present though not in required strength.

During this period, the Sri Lankan Government got busy with resettling the Sinhalese. Repeated pleas and relay fasts by Citizens' Committees of Mullaitivu and Trincomalee to draw India's attention to fresh colonisation under the garb of resettlement of the Sinhalese failed to evoke any response. The Sri Lankan Government went slow on release of political prisoners, lifting of emergency in Tamil areas and scrapping of the dreaded Prevention of Terrorism Act, preferring to wait until the Tigers turned in all their weapons. The Tigers held on to their arms, hoping to force the Sri Lankan Government to honour its commitments under the accord.

Instead of tackling these issues effectively, India directed all its efforts towards politically isolating the LTTE and militarily containing it by promoting other groups. One month after it claimed to have surrendered all its weapons, the LTTE was able to massacre nearly 100 rival militants right under the nose of the IPKF in Batticaloa. Operating in an alien territory with no clear-cut mission and subjected to contrary pulls and pressures from different agencies of the Government of India, the IPKF has not been able to check killing of Tamils by Tamils, Tamils by Sinhalese or Sinhalese by Tamils since that first massacre in Batticaloa.

Nor has India been able to meet the LTTE's challenge politically. It is easy to put all the blame on the LTTE and accuse it of having gone back on its word. But then, Pirabhakaran never agreed to support the accord. He only gave a public undertaking that he would not obstruct it so long as it safeguarded the interests of Tamils.

Instead of acting firmly at the first sign of trouble when Pirabhakaran went about killing rival groups in Batticaloa, India used that incident to mock at LTTE's sudden love for Gandhian ways when Thileepan undertook a fast unto death to focus attention on issues like colonisation and delay in the release of political prisoners which were agitating the public mind.

DISILLUSIONMENT

It was at this point of time that the Tamils' disillusionment with India started. Subsequent events like Thileepan's death, the collapse of the Interim Government Plan after the LTTE insisted on changing two of its nominees and the suicide by 18 LTTE men, including two commanders, in Sri Lankan army custody completed the process.

INDIAN EXPRESS

The bloody battle for Jaffna has left a deep scar in the hearts of the Tamil people, a scar that will take a long time to heal even if India tries to make amends by pumping in massive aid. During the initial stages of the operation. India maintained that it would not repeat the mistake the Sri Lankan forces made during the Vadamarachi offensive and that the IPKF was fighting with one hand tied behind its back. The report of the Jaffna General Hospital Superintendent, Dr. Nachinarkiniyar, makes nonsense of this. In this battle for the last position of the tigers, 76 patients were killed, says his report.

For the hapless Tamils, the accord has not brought the promised peace. There has been only a change of guards. With each passing day, more and more innocents are getting killed by an army that cannot make out an enemy from a friend in a guerilla war.

The continuing struggle has made the people hostile not towards the Tigers but towards India, according to even pro-Indian moderate as well as militant leaders.

However, having reached the end of their tether, the people are increasingly pressurising the Tigers to realise the futility of fighting a big power like India and to rely more on diplomacy than on the gun to achieve their political goal. The appeals for a ceasefire and resumption of talks issued by various Citizens' Committees and the fasts undertaken by the Mothers' Front of Batticaloa are positive signals of the changing mood of the people.

Even if India prefers to react cautiously to such signals, the least it can do is not to vitiate the atmosphere by allowing diplomats like Mr. Dixit to shoot off their mouths. Mr. Dixit has a tendency to view every agitation as an LTTE-inspired pressure tactic and counter it by stepping up his campaign. Thus, when Mrs. Annamma David's fast gains momentum, the talks about the LTTE's secret talks with the Sri Lankan Government. Her fast is forcibly ended and reports are floated that the LTTE tried to poison her. Now that her place has been taken by another woman, Mr. Dixit lets out the half-truth that the LTTE was paid some money on the eve of the accord. It is left to a minister to tell the whole truth. A sorry state of affairs indeed.

The sooner India ends the impasse, the better for all concerned. The only way out is not to insist on preconditions for talks like acceptance of the accord and surrender of arms. The LTTE has already said it will not oppose the accord. It is also ready for an initial token surrender. Now it is upto India.

12.4.88

COMMENT

What price the Lanka accord?

Seema Chowdry

IN Israel, the death of a soldier, whatever his rank, is treated as a national loss. A soldier killed in action gets an obituary notice in the newspapers with his photograph and a write-up extolling his virtues. Last November six Israeli soldiers were killed by a Palestinian commando who landed in an army camp with a hang-glider. The whole nation mourned their death by holding special condolence meetings. Prayers were held in synagogues, and schools and colleges held special functions to commemorate the 'martyrs'. TV and radio played soul stirring music. Rich tributes were paid by the Cabinet as well as the Knesset (Israeli parliament).

In India there appears to be no sign of mourning for our dead soldiers, in Sri Lanka or anywhere in the country. According to official figures, more than 370 officers and jawans have been killed and another 1,150 wounded in Sri Lanka. Parliament has not observed even two minutes' silence in memory of those who have laid down their lives in the true traditions of the Indian Army.

During the 1962 India-China conflict and the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan, the whole nation voiced its support for the brave soldiers. Unprecedented patriotism was re-kindled. There was national awareness due to the clarion calls given by the national media and various leaders, irrespective of their political affiliations, reminding one of the 'Quit-India movement'. Differences in faith and affiliations were bridged and the nation stood as one to meet the threat.

National indifference

In those emotional moments a number of welfare schemes for the soldiers were mooted. It is appalling to see that in the present fighting against the LTTE, people are apathetic and indifferent. The cause lies in the failure of the government to mobilise public opinion. It is almost a full scale war. Look at the number of casualties, look at the number of troops sent there. The national indifference has seriously eroded the otherwise high morale of our armed forces.

I had occasion to talk to a large number of officers and jawans engaged in the fighting in Sri Lanka. It was surprising to discover that our soldiers feel that they are fighting a 'distant battle' for a cause they are not aware of. Some of them are critical of even the acronym IPKF, since it is not a peace keeping force; its task is to fight an insurgency in a foreign country.

It goes to the credit of Mr. Jayewardene that he has succeeded in his Machiavellian scheme by making the Indian troops fight the Tamil insurgents whom they had trained and armed to fight the Sri Lankan army. It is ironical that the Sri Lankan soldiers are living a comfortable life in their barracks and the Indian soldiers are fighting 'their' battle against their own erstwhile disciples whom they taught the art of guerilla warfare.

The soldiers though not vociferous in giving vent to their feelings, are well aware of the pitfalls of this adventure which might well portend India's 'Vietnam'. Many officers and soldiers I spoke to wondered whether the Sri Lankan adventure has been undertaken to divert the country's attention from the dire mess that the Rajiv government finds itself in.

In this undeclared war against the LTTE, there has been an acrimonious debate about the role of the IPKF, as had happened in USA about its involvement in Vietnam. There has been no homogeneity in our thinking or feeling because the government did not care to take the nation into confidence. Apparently the top brass of the army was not even consulted before signing the Indo-Sri Lanka accord.

The vast majority of the soldiers come from Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan. Their thoughts, naturally, are back home; thanks to the unprecedented drought and famine-like conditions. Adequate relief and remedial measures have not been taken to alleviate the distress of their kith and kin. For instance, Haryana has been allotted a paltry Rs. 30 crore for

drought relief whereas Meghalaya was granted almost Rs. 300 crore for a non-existing drought during the elections. This has not escaped the attention of the troops. They are also wondering at the wisdom of the Government in spending enormous amounts of money, approximating Rs. three crore a day, in the operations in Sri Lanka, plus relief measures for the local population — whereas their own families are not getting even the bare necessities. An officer told me of a conversation he had overheard between two jawans who were unloading relief supplies for Tamilians in Jaffna. "I wish at least a portion of this could be given to my people in Rajasthan", one of them said. The other jawan quickly shot back, "Friend! Our government is meant to solve the problems of foreigners. Our families will be looked after by God"

Doordarshan blamed

The November '87 Palestinian commando raid on an Israeli military camp was given wide coverage on Indian TV. The very next day seven IPKF soldiers were killed in the fighting in Sri Lanka and this hardly got any coverage. The soldiers are very bitter that their acts of bravery are not being given exposure in the media, whereas irrelevant news of no consequence is given prominance. On the other hand, look at the coverage given by the state-controlled media, particularly by Doordarshan, to that unfortunate incident of an Indian soldier who ran amok and killed a few civilians in north Sri Lanka.

The army has had to suffer heavy casualties due to lack of forethought and sense of anticipation at government level. In 'Operation Bluestar' directions were given to the troops not to fire inside the Golden Temple to avoid damage to the shrine. This even as the terrorists themselves were unscrupulous enough to convert the 'Temple' into a 'fortress'. The army was launched with "prayers in their minds and compassion in their hearts", as one of the Generals commented later.

Again, just before the IPKF was hurriedly launched into Sri Lanka, strict instructions were given to avoid casualties among the civilians, in order not to alienate the Tamilians. Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh, the former GOC-in-C Southern Command, said in an interview on TV that troops had to fight with one and a half of their hands tied behind their back. This prompted one officer to tell his colleagues sarcastically, "Boys, in 'Operation Bluestar' we fought with one hand tied behind our backs, while in 'Operation Pawan' (name of the operation in Sri Lanka) we are fighting with one and a half hands tied behind our backs. Now be prepared to fight with both your hands tied behind your backs against GNLF"

The soldiers were given the impression that the role of the IPKF was to 'police' the surrender of arms by the Tamil insurgents. There was no indication of fighting a protracted insurgency. The force which was sent initially in a hurry was neither trained nor equipped to fight the insurgents. No war games were carried out for the impending task, nor were the commanders given any prior information. The IPKF was taken by surprise, resulting in a high rate of avoidable casualties.

Almost blind-folded

It was indeed lack of foresight, political wisdom and maturity. The army was not given any clear-cut aim, which is the first and foremost principle of war. The IPKF was inducted out of the blue and the Sri Lankan troops did not waste time in returning to their barracks without giving any intelligence support and administrative back-up which is vital for counter insurgency operations. The Indian soldiers had to figh. almost blind-folded.

The Government's attitude seems to be that the casualties are natural in the performance of a soldier's duty, that he is being paid adequately and is doing nothing beyond the call of duty. There have been no monetary grants or rehabilitation schemes for the bereaved families. Contrast this with what is done for cricketers. One Test cricketer was given Rs. 20,000 by the Madhya Pradesh government for taking the maximum number of wickets against the West Indies! The families of policemen killed by terrorists are given monetary grants, whereas families of soldiers who have died fighting, have drawn a blank.

One senior Brigadier expressed concern at the disadvantage we are now facing vis-a-vis Pakistan due to our involvement in Sri Lanka. With the signing of the Mizoram accord, and major improvements in the situation in Nagaland and other North Eastern states, combined with the modernisation of the armed forces, India had acquired a distinct edge in its capabilities, and this was acting as a deterrent against any Pakistani mischief. By despatching two and half divisions to Sri Lanka and the move to send thousands of more troops to flush out the insurgents, India has lost this advantage. With the return of more than 30,000 Pakistani troops from Saudi Arabia and the impending withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, we are woefully short of the wherewithal in our strike capability vis-a-vis Pakistan.

There are approximately 100 battalions of para-military forces like the BSF and the CRPF committed in the maintenance of law and order in Punjab, Darjeeling and other trouble-prone areas. The para-military forces are the back-up force for the Army. At certain places on the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, BSF personnel have been withdrawn for internal security duties in Punjab.

Pull-out vital

By making the Sri Lanka accord a prestige issue, the Rajiv Government has ignored strategic considerations of national defence. Pakistan and the Western powers would like to ensure that the Punjab problem is kept alive so that a major portion of our para-military forces are deployed there. It is still not too late to retrieve the situation. This calls for a political settlement of the Punjab and GNLF issues and a pull-out from Sri Lanka.

The army is the ultimate unifying force in the country. With fissiparous and regional tendencies threatening national unity, enlightened public opinion should make the government see the light and force it to take immediate steps to boost the sagging morale of our armed forces. We should not lose sight of the lessons of history: a nation which does not honour its soldiers cannot survive for long.

14.4.88

Cartoon by AJIT NINAN

THE STATESMAN

EDITORIAL 24.4.88

OVERTURES TO EELAM

It is unlikely that Mr J. N. Dixit's denial of Press reports that India is making unilateral overtures to the LTTE leadership without any semblance of consultation with Colombo will remove the mistrust that is growing between the two signatories to the July 29 accord. The impression in Colombo that India is desperately seeking ways of pacifying the recalcitrant Tigers so as to improve the Congress (I)'s electoral prospects in Tamil Nadu does not in any way militate against the return of peace in Sri Lanka. But some members of President Jayewardene's Government might be justified in questioning the motives of a régime that wishes to do all the talking itself, keeping Colombo merely "informed". Certainly, the seemingly imperious manner in which the Indian High Commissioner objected to "any attempt to circumvent India" reinforced the conviction that New Delhi wants a settlement with the Tamil militants on its own terms without too much regard to Colombo's sensitivities. Even Mr Dixit's reported admission of a pay-off to Mr Pirabhakaran coincided with official revelations of disarray in the LTTE ranks in the Eastern Province, a situation which New Delhi is anxious to exploit to its own advantage. It would also seem that President Jayewardene's symbolic meeting with the PLOTE leader, Mr Uma Maheshwaran, was Colombo's feeble reply to Indian unilateralism.

While there can be no denying the fact that all avenues to restoring peace in the island must be explored by Colombo as well as New Delhi, it is also apparent that there can be no settlement without the consent of both the Tamils and the Sinhalese. But the orchestrated campaign by a section of the exiled Tamil leadership in Madras suggesting that the July 29 accord was a non-starter because the devolution package was inadequate only suggests an attempt to blame the Jayewardene Government instead of the intransigence of the LTTE. This may be an expedient card to play for the sake of Tamil Nadu's domestic politics but it is also a gross distortion of what actually happened between July and October last year. A handful of Sinhalese bigots may have a lot to answer for, but New Delhi must make it absolutely clear that it cannot approve of the LTTE's preposterous demand for a one-party Eelam. Neither for that matter can it afford to repeat the virtual surrender of the Provincial Councils to the Tigers which followed the death of a second-ranking militant after a protracted fast. If the LTTE wishes to be rehabilitated in mainstream politics, it must not only agree to eschew secessionism and violence, but also accept the ground rules of competitive politics. It is Mr Pirabhakaran's failure on these counts rather than any imperfection in the devolution proposals that has contributed to Sri Lanka's second civil war. And to break out of this impasse requires the cooperation and agreement of all the concerned parties, not a back-door deal negotiated in a hurry.

Economic and Political Weekly April 16

The Quagmire

M S S Pandian writes:

THE recent confession of Maj-Gen Sardesh Pande, GOC-in-C of the IPKF, that ninety per cent of the people in the Jaffna Peninsula support the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) headed by Velupillai Prabhakaran, proves beyond doubt that no durable solution to the Sri Lankan Tamil question can be sought without the involvement of the LTTE. However, the government of India, drunk with military arrogance and for its own geo-political gains, is pursuing a path which is just the opposite—of physically liquidating the LTTE by means of an expensive armed campaign. The Indian government has deployed one lakh armed soldiers to hunt down an estimated 2,000 LTTE militants.

Not only has the Indian government turned down the repeated offers by the LTTE for unconditional talk, it has also turned a deaf ear to the appeals by citizen groups and political parties, both in Sri Lanka and in India, to declare a cease-fire and open negotiations with the LTTE. On the contrary, the trigger-happy Indian soldiers are turning the life of common people in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka into hell—all in the name of finding a solution to their problems. A report about a recent incident in Jaffna town involving the IPKF, that appeared in a Tamil weekly *Junior Vikadan* (February 24), is a case in point. When a lone LTTE gunman shot dead an Indian soldier at the Muttasi Kadai Theru junction of Jaffna town, the IPKF forced three thousand local residents—men, women and children irrespective of age—onto the nearby street and held them under the blazing sun, without water or food, for full nine hours. Also they raided the *Eelanadu* newspaper office located nearby and beat up its editor with belts and wires.

If the LTTE does not agree to India's condition that it should lay down arms before any negotiation begins, there are rather genuine reasons for it. The Indo-Sri Lankan accord does not offer the Sri Lankan Tamils even the extremely limited autonomy enjoyed by the states in the Indian union. After more than three decades of bitter struggle, this is not what the Tamils have bargained for. Moreover, the government of India has failed to prevail over the Sri Lankan government to execute certain limited benefits the accord has promised to the Tamils. In a recent letter to the Indian prime minister, the leaders of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) has given specific instances of how state-sponsored Sinhala colonisation is going on in the eastern province and how the Sri Lankan armed forces are murdering the Tamil refugees returning to their homes. While the Tamil political prisoners continue to languish in the much dreaded Sri Lankan gaols, contrary to the promise, the notorious Sinhala homeguards are yet to be disbanded. Instead, there is redeployment of Sri Lankan armed forces in the eastern province. In these circumstances, laying down arms by the LTTE will mean mortgaging the future of the Sri Lankan Tamils to India, which is more bothered about its own geo-political gains rather than a solution to the Tamil question in the island nation.

The way out for India from the Sri Lankan quagmire is to redefine its stance as one of just assisting the Tamils in their effort to find a solution on their own, rather than to impose on them an unfair solution. With the passage of time, even those Sri Lankan Tamils, who earlier found the accord acceptable, are getting disillusioned. Note what V Balakumar, leader of Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS) who still supports the IPKF, has to say recently: "We don't want to fight the IPKF. We don't want to treat them as our enemies, at least so far. But if the present situation is allowed to continue without relief for common man, we may be compelled to return to arms." Unless the government of India makes amends for its mistakes in Sri Lanka—that too rather soon—this country will find itself on the wrong side of history.

EDITORIAL

26.4.88

The urgency of talks

THERE CAN no longer be any doubt that India's Sri Lanka policy, which has revolved around the plan to run the LTTE to the ground and force thhe surrender of its leader V. Prabhakaran, needs to be revised and revised urgently at that. There is mounting pressure both in Sri Lanka and closer home in Tamil Nadu too for India to pull its troops out of the island, and India can no longer ignore such pressures as if they were of no consequence.

Tamil Nadu is scheduled to go the polls shortly, and the three main groupings in the fray, viz the Janaki Ramachandran and the Jayalalitha factions of the AIADMK and sections of Congress (I) are certain to make the withdrawal of the IPKF an electoral issue. If peace does not descent in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka shortly, the fall out will be felt more in Tamil Nadu than in Sri Lanka. Ms Jayalalitha has threatened dire consequences if LTTE leader Prabhakaran is captured and killed. But even if this does not happen, given the fact that the liquidation of the LTTE militants is a highly emotive issue in Tamil Nadu currently, one should expect a measure of violence and needless blood shed there if the Sri Lanka issue is not resolved quickly. Foi the first time in months, it is as much in India's interests as it is in Sri Lanka's that a major effort is made to bring peace to Sri Lanka. If this requires rethinking of India's Lanka policy, then let us do so.

There is only one route to peace in Sri Lanka, and that involves talks leading to a negotiated settlement between the Sri Lanka Government, the LTTE and New Delhi. Ever since the IPKF was sent to Sri Lanka, this fact has tended to be forgotten both by President Jayewardene and by New Delhi. But the consequences of such lapses of memory have been high. The IPKF has got bogged down in whatt is clearly an interminable war which is costing the Indian tax payeer an estimated Rs 7 crores every day apart from the heavy cost in lives lost on both sides.

Recognition is drawing slowly and belatedly that the LTTE cannott be eliminated through the use of brute force, however many Indian troops are putt ontto the operation – if 70,000 Indian troops can not crush a militant force of fewer than 3000 people, then the latter can not be crushed. This belated recognition has brought about some softening of India's stand in relation to the LTTE, with theh Government now sending signals to the LTTE that it is willing to accept a token surrender of arms as a precondition for calling off the IPKF offensive, and thereafter resuming talks. But because New Delhi has during these past few months severed most of its links with the LTTE leadership, it has no way of conveying its intentions to Mr. Prabhakara and Co without being subject to suspicion. The hopelessly botched up exercise of sending three LTTE leaders to Sri Lanka, which ended in one of them being shot dead by the IPKF, has not helped matters at all. New Delhi is thus in a peculiar predicament of being unable to reach the LTTE top brass and thence begin the peace process. It has tended, as how now become habitual with it, to cover up this shortcoming with stepping up the tempo of the operation to capture Mr. Prabhakaran. The signals that are sent out in the process are mixed and the Indian Government can not expect either message to be taken seriously. The way out is to open unconditional talks with LTTE. These are the only terms on which the LTTE is likely to talk, and getting them to the negotiating table is a matter of urgency now.

* Bhatlekhar, Weekly

LETTER

Americans in Vietnam, Chinese in Kampuchea, and Russians in Afghanistan have burnt their fingers. Indian political leadership is yet to realise this.

In Tamil Nadu, sentiments are hardening against the Centre. Tamils here cannot reconcile themselves to the fact that India is too eager to liquidate the Tigers. And as you rightly pointed out, Jayewardene would be the ultimate victor—when the Indian army returns from Sri Lanka, the Indian government would have antagonised Tamils in Tamil Nadu, Tamils in Sri Lanka and the Sinhalas, too.

R. GURUMOORTHY,
MADRAS

• 'WHEN can the Indian forces come home?' (March 13-19) has exposed the lies mouthed by the ruling party at the Centre.

Why should our men lay down their lives in Sri Lanka? Certainly, this is not a case of 'loving thy neighbour!' Are our forces engaged in defending our frontier from an enemy attack? If the answer is no, then what is the compulsion?

This commitment is meaningless, bereft of sane thinking, this is going to be a war of attrition.

S. DAVID,
GUNTAKAL, AP.

COMMENT

Bhatlekhar, Weekly

"WAR IS CRUEL, BRUTAL AND TRAGIC"

Syed Shahabuddin, M.P., speaking in the Lok Sabha of the Indian Parliament

The purpose of the Oct 10 operation was to teach the LTTE a lesson. For what? For their intolerable and unpardonable impertinence, for their not responding, like Pavlovian subjects, to Rajiv Gandhi's whistle, for not serving his ego, for not co-operating in implementing his concept of regional co-operation, for flouting his dictates and orders, for questioning his right to decide what is good and what is not good for the Tamils.

Mr.Deputy Speaker, Sir, from the Operation Eagle of June 4 when we dropped relief supplies over Jaffna to the military operation of October 10 when we dropped paratroopers, we have indeed turned a full circle. The act of solidarity has been substituted by an act of hostility. In this House, we seem to be speaking with Orwellian logic and using the euphemism of a Peace Keeping Force. But this does not hide the fact that we have been involved, we are involved in a war, in a wrong war, at the wrong time, at the wrong place and against the wrong people. War is war, it is not peace, war is not negotiation, war is not diplomacy, war is not policing, war is not cricket. **War is cruel, brutal, tragic, a failure of diplomacy and a violation of pious intentions. This war is an absurd war, it is an ironical war, it is an unequal war, it is a bizarre war against a group, against the people whom we supported, we equipped, we nourished, and to whom we extended our moral support. It is against the people with whose aspirations we sympathised.**

This accord, like all the other ill-fated accords is already dead as a dodo. Mr.Rajiv Gandhi may only keep a lonely wake over its lifeless body. He should be forced to recognise the reality and see the truth. Today even a blind man can see that euphoria has evaporated. There is a bad odour in the air, there is the grim outlook of a prolonged war in which we have been sucked in. The Long Night's journey into the day has begun, as Shri Ashok Mitra recently put it.

No provision of this agreement has been implemented in time according to the time schedule and no time schedule shall be kept for the rest of the provisions. Therefore, this accord to my mind was a child of immaturity, of impetuosity, of inexperience, of impatience, and of indecent haste. It was a child conceived hurriedly, nourished scantily and delivered prematurely. Why this haste, hurry and rush? **Why could we not have waited for a week or two and taken the LTTE along with us, whom we accepted as the most important militant group in Sri Lanka?** The heavens would not have fallen. This is the question; and to my mind the answer to this question is that there was a domestic compulsion behind this Agreement; that there was a storm, there was a hammering going on and the government wanted to stop that, through a vision of glory, by diverting the attention, by dazzling the mind of the people

Sir, there was a fatal flaw in this Accord. The fatal flaw was that the Tamil militants were not made a party to this Agreement. The Agreement, therefore, does not bind the LTTE. Therefore, by any juridical standards we cannot accuse the LTTE of violating an Agreement to which it is not a party. Of course, if we

acted on the assumption that the LTTE was our own creation, was our own child, that is a different matter. Are we prepared to own the parentage?

The Tamil agitation or insurgency was basically an internal problem of Sri Lanka. Of course, it has international repercussions. Why could not there be two agreements? **An Agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE on the substantive question, and an Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of Sri Lanka on the possibility of political and military co-operation** as there ought to be between the two neighbouring and friendly countries. If that was done, you would not have fallen into this difficulty.

Sir, then, before the ink was dry, we introduced the armed forces. Sir, have a look at the Agreement. Agreement talks about Clause 2.16 parts (A) & (B), and then we come to part (C). I hope Mr.Natwar Singh will take a note of that. After that comes the Annexure and in the Annexure, after Clause 5 comes Clause 6. Now, before the ink is dry, the Government of Sri Lanka invokes Article 2.16 part (C) read with Clause 6 of the Annexure and the very next day we rush in our troops. Was there a prior Agreement? Was there an understanding that the steps envisaged in parts (A) and (B) were not to be contemplated? If the militants were not forthcoming, we had the option of part (A) and then the option of part (B). Neither of these was implemented. Neither of these was looked at and immediately we went to part (C) and crossed the rubicon. **Thus we allowed Mr. Jayewardene to lead us up the garden path, to trick us into a military intervention.** Now, why did they do so? Why was there a rush? Because they knew the time was not on their side? **There was no Tamil consent, and therefore, the army had to be there in order to coerce the Sri Lankan Tamils into acquiescence. They had to be browbeaten into surrender; they had to be silenced into line; that is why immediately after the Agreement was signed, this part was acted upon and the Indian forces were introduced in Sri Lanka.**

Sir, much has been said about the object of this war. I am talking of the present conflict that is going on. Is it to establish law and order in Sri Lanka? Is that our responsibility? Is it our responsibility to bring an end to civil war and peace to the stricken civilians in Sri Lanka? It may be our desire but it is not our responsibility. Is it to save Jayewardene' regime from collapse, from people's attack? Certainly not. Is it to destroy the Tamil militancy? Look at our own record of the last 3 or 4 years. Was it to liquidate the Tamil resistance to Sinhalese chauvinism? Certainly not. If at all intervention had a purpose, the purpose should have been to win the hearts of the Sri Lanka people, Tamils and Sinhalese. Are we by our present action going to win their hearts? The purpose could have been to defend India's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity. Does the LTTE pose a threat to our sovereignty or to our independence or to our territorial integrity? I must say great experts like Mr. Dinesh Singh and Mr. B.R. Bhagat have tried to give a security perspective, a broad security panorama so as to justify the intervention. I shall come to that a little later when I shall come to the role of the great powers. But, today every Sri Lankan Tamil - militant or civilian - who is falling to our bullets, unfortunately with the greatest possible care that we are having, I admit, whether he belongs to the LTTE or otherwise, **in the eyes of the Sri Lankan Tamils, is a martyr. I repeat that in the eyes of the Sri Lankan Tamils, he becomes a martyr. You can see it from the reports of our own papers. Because, according to them, it is ironical that the supporters have become executioners, defenders have become liquidators, saviours have become destroyers and friends today have turned into foes.** Therefore, what we are reaping by this war, Mr. Deputy Speaker, is not gratitude, but anger, not love but hatred, not joy but bitterness; and in Sri Lanka today, we do not see hope, but we see disillusionment. We do not see trust, we see a sense of betrayal and we see a sense of shock. We have lost the faith and the confidence of the people whom we regard as our own kith and kin. What more could we have lost, tell me Mr. Deputy Speaker?

You have also created new fears and apprehensions in the minds of all our neighbours. Why this war? Prime Minister says, 'peace in Sri Lanka'. Mr.Bhagat says, 'security environment' and of course the 'protection' of the ethnic rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils! No. That was not the reason for this October 10 Operation. **The purpose of the October 10 Operation was to teach the LTTE a lesson. For what? For their intolerable and unpardonable impertinence, for their not responding, like Pavlovian subjects, to Rajiv Gandhi's whistle, for not serving his ego, for not cooperating in implementing his concept of regional co-operation, for flouting his dictates and orders, for questioning his right to decide what is good and what is not good for the Tamils of Sri Lanka, and for violating his commitment to President Jayewardene that LTTE shall surrender all the arms.** I read para

2.9 of the Agreement which says, "All arms presently held by the militant groups will be surrendered." Who authorised you to say that? Who authorised Rajiv Gandhi? Therefore, I would say that punishment was the purpose that it was a case of *lese majesty.*

What is the rationale that you are giving? You call it with characteristic immodesty as the biggest event of the century. That is what Prime Minister called this Accord. And in order to carry friends along, this diplomatic absurdity was being flourished around among our friends and sympathisers who say that unless we had stepped in, Sri Lanka would have invited the USA, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, all the devils in our pantheon.

Prof.N.G.Ranga: *He has invited them already.*

Shri Syed Shahabuddin: *Where have they disappeared. Sir? Have they disappeared into thin air? Have you sent them packing? Have the Government of Sri Lanka sent them packing? I have seen no such news report, so far.*

Then, this was readily gobbled by our leftist friends as a justification for the Accord and of course to our ultra-nationalists this was the great vision of Pax Indica. Sir, Pakistan, Israel and South Africa, at best, ... play a marginal role. The USA has its hands full in the Gulf and could not possibly open another front and I have strong reasons to think, and there are friends in America who tell me, that USA was indeed asked by Sri Lanka and USA refused. JRJ was advised to look towards Rajiv Gandhi. So, JRJ turned his charms on, and Rajiv Gandhi was led up the garden path. And the hard-liner of all times, Jayewardene - every Sri Lankan Tamil tells me so - suddenly turned soft as pulp. He was even prepared to barter a part of his sovereignty. And Rajiv Gandhi fell: **Jayewardene took him for a ride. So, this is the rationale why this Agreement was signed. Now, 30,000 troops are there. Three crores of rupees are being spent per day and there is an indefinite commitment. I do not know what will happen. We shall be sucked into a quagmire. Vietnam, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Cyprus - all these memories come to us. But no two situations in history are absolutely alike.** We do not know what it shall be. May be it turns into something, all such situations rolled into one.

Now, Mr.Deputy Speaker, Sir, the LTTE was kept out of the negotiations and their leaders were practically under house arrest. They had just a last minute meeting with the Prime Minister. **Mr.Prabaharan is on record as having told the Jaffna public meeting that the Indian leaders made it clear to us, 'take it or leave it, whether you support the Agreement or you don't support the Agreement, we are going ahead with it'.** This is what he said publicly. This has not been contradicted so far. Yes, when they found the situation impossible, our forces already in, they made a token surrender at Suthumalai.

After that, what happened in these two months? Sri Lanka continued with its policy of colonisation. It continued to delay disarming, disbanding and sending back to the barracks the Home Guards. It continued to introduce Sinhalese Police personnel in these two provinces. It deferred the return of many Tamil prisoners. It did not agree to the removal of military personnel stationed in such places as schools or homes. **The LTTE launched a Satyagraha. A man died. That did not move us. They committed suicide. That also did not move us. Now, LTTE want to retain their defensive capacity. I am not for them. But they know best what is good for them. But surely to a person or to a group in that situation you cannot insist that they must not maintain their defensive capacity against an enemy whom they know to be perfidious, that is to say the Government of Sri Lanka,** the Government of Jayewardene.

Then came the beginning of the military operations. Do you recall that these operations began when J R J made a very hard-hitting statement? He said, *"If you are not disarming these militants, then out you go."* That meant, disarm or get out. Therefore, **this operation began when we received a threat from Jayewardene. We acted under threat. We did not act in freedom.** This is the point that you must keep in view. But the Government of Sri Lanka has been the biggest gainer of the situation. **What a laugh they must be having at our expense. No loss of life for them. No expenditure of money. We are doing their job for them.**

The Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs (Shri K.Natwar Singh): Fifty people died in a bomb blast, yesterday.

Shri Syed Shahabuddin: That is still much less than what you have done. That is the JVP. The cost, financial, military and political, of pacifying the Northern Province has been very cleverly shifted on to our shoulders. And what has Mr.Jayewardene done as part of his bargain? Even the Prime Minister admitted yesterday that the devolution package as envisaged in these two Bills is inadequate. It is my case that the Government of Sri Lanka has gone behind the December 19, 1986, proposals. I shall not go into the details. But the recent judgement of the Supreme Court makes the passage of even these two Bills very uncertain. So, instead of these Bills envisaging a federal pattern with equal rights for Tamils and Sinhalese, they are talking about something else We are again being forced into a situation where **even if there is peace,**

surely the Tamil battle for autonomy will not cease; because their political objectives have not been taken care of in these Bills.

Mr.Jayewardene today is finding his own throne collapsing. He is offering something which even the TULF - the most moderate of the Tamil groups - does not find it possible to accept. **He is offering a post-dated cheque of a bankrupt company on a failing bank. Why should LTTE accept it?** If Mr. Rajiv Gandhi is prepared to wage a war unto the end against the LTTE because they did not surrender their arms, or unless they surrender their arms, why does not the Government of India take Mr.J R J to task?

Take Mr.J R J to task for offering a moth-eaten Tamil province, for not creating an Interim Council, for not legislating according to schedule, for going behind the Dec.19, 1986, proposals, and for not implementing paragraph 2.15 of the Agreement which says, **"Residual matters not finalised during the above negotiations shall be resolved between India and Sri Lanka."** There is no public record, Mr.Deputy Speaker, that there was any consultation between the Government of India and the Government of Sri Lanka on these residual matters. Mr.J R J is working on those five counts. Why don't we take disciplinary action against him, if we are so keen to punish the LTTE for its supposed wrongs?

Therefore, what is the conclusion? We are in Sri Lanka so long as Mr.J R J finds it convenient for us to be there, till he says, "Get out." I am sure he will say that one day. This is an impossible position; we shall not get out because Government will lose face; and we have to get out when a foreign Government will say that. Never before have we forced our armed forces into such an impossible situation. I admire the heroism and the morale of our army; **but I discount and question the wisdom of the policy-makers.**

Prof.Madhu Dandavate: Servants are good; masters are bad. That is what he is saying.

Shri Syed Shahabuddin: A sordid game is going on. There is a sordid drama in which **we have the Tamil militancy symbolised by the LTTE. It cannot be forced to surrender. It enjoys the support, even according to your intelligence, of a large cross-section of the people.** If young men and women are prepared to commit suicide or fast unto death, they have not been defeated. They enjoy every advantage of the terrain. They may choose to wage a long war of attrition.

And we have the other players, viz. the Sinhalese resistance, sometimes symbolised by a kindly face and sometimes by a macabre face. But it is as much there as the Tamil militancy. And then, there is our armed intervention. Their tragic inter-action may produce exactly the result that you and I, God forbid, do not want to happen! That is to say, **finally, a situation in which Sri Lanka is divided,** something that we would like to avoid, something which we would like to pay anything for avoiding.

But what are the options? I come to the end of my observations. In my view, there are three options: One is, of course, as the Prime Minister said yesterday, **carry on the war to the bitter end,** and hand over a pacified North and East to Mr.J R J on a plate. But under what time schedule, and at what cost? **The second option is total withdrawal,** and leaving Sri Lanka to its fate, to work out its own destiny. To me neither of these options is acceptable. **What I want is an immediate cease fire. This is the third option, to be followed by military disengagement and progressive withdrawal, but with a clear and unmistakable reaffirmation of our mediatory role for finding a solution other than partition, through bilateral, and if necessary trilateral, negotiations, but which must lead to a direct agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil militants.**

I would like to end by saying that if I know the Prime Minister's mind and if I know the way Government functions, Mr.Rajiv Gandhi will not heed this advice. He will carry on, because he has got the USA's pat on the back, he has got the endorsement of the Vancouver Summit, and he has been duly appointed perhaps as the gendarme of the region. The CIA has not been absolved of all charges of destabilisation. Who remembers the Congress (I) resolution of April 18? The World Bank is satisfied about our economic liberalisation. The conditionalities attached by the USA to the supply of a super-computer have been found acceptable. Collaboration is on the way in defence production and we are duly silent over what is happening in the Gulf or over the question of a Star War or over the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. **President Reagan's signed message of congratulation was handed over to the Prime Minister within three hours of the signing of the Agreement,** according to a report. When the Prime Minister talks about universal endorsement, I know what he is really talking about -a pat on the back that he received when he was in Washington.

We have come to a situation where, I am sorry to say and I am using a very strong phrase, we have become vulnerable to international blackmail and mere appeals to emotions of patriotism and sentiments of national glory will not help us. **We are generating hatred and ill-will amongst a people whom we regard as our kith and kin, and suspicion and distrust amongst all our neighbours.** This is Rajiv Gandhi's war; this is Jayewardene's war; this is not India's war; this is not what we voted you for; this not what the Parliament voted funds for. This war must come to an end

Sri Lanka: the truth according to Jayawardene

COMMENT

THE ADDRESS TO THE SRI LANKAN Parliament by President Jayawardene, at the commencement of its new session on 25th February, 1988, has a few intriguing statements which throw new light on the circumstances in which the governments of India and Sri Lanka signed the Agreement in Clolmbo on 29th July, 1987, under which India agreed to send its troops to Sri Lanka to fight Jayawardene's war against the Tamils. Says Mr. Jayawardene:

"On the 29th July, 1987 the Prime Minister of India, Shri Rajiv Ghandhi and I signed in Colombo an Agreement to establish peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka...

"On this day, the 29th July, in some parts of the Island, other than in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, rioting took place. Mobs converged on the city of Colombo from the direction of Kelaniya, Nugegoda and Panadura-Moratuwa. The security forces and the police were able to disperse them at Peliyagoda, Dehiwela Bridge, Kirillapone, Pamankade Bridge and Ayurvedic Hospital Junction, Borella. These mobs had committeed a spate of violence in the outskirts of Colombo, before attempting to enter the city.

"Violence spread to other areas as well The areas most affected were Matara, Galle, Hambantota, Kalutara, Mount Lavinia, Nugegoda, Kandy, Ratnapura and Polonnaruwa."

There are facts that were widely known at the time when these incidents occurred. However, Jayawardene then goes on to give statistics to explain the gravity of the situation that confronted him during this period. He says:

"(a) Total number of incidents in the country between 28.07.1987 and 02.08.1987. — 2,527

(b) Breakdown of incidents —

Murders	—	16
Injured	—	40
Damage to Government/Corporation buildings — (42 Local Govt. and Asst. Government Agent's Offices, 47 Railway Stations/Tracks).		
Culverts damaged	—	529
Damage to Govt./Corporations/Private vehicles (including Ceylon Transport Board buses). (Over 500 Ceylon Transport Board buses damaged)	—	1,005
Damage to telegraph pylons and transformers.	—	189
Robberies	—	561

"The damage caused amounted to over Rs. 200 million."

According to Jayewardene:

"The JVP had clearly designed to unleash violence throughout the country, by exploiting a situation where large numbers from other political groups were to take to the streets, in order to stage demonstrations. They converted such crowds into violent mobs. In fact, the robbery of 311 shotguns by the JVP during this short period, suggests that they had a larger and long-term objective in mind — the eventual capture of state power and destroying the democratic process."

To deal with this situation, Jayawardene says:

"The Government had to withdraw the security forces amounting to about 4500 from the North and East to meet this treat. Over 900 police personnel were also engaged on duty in Kandy on account the Esala Perahera."

And then he goes to make the most significant revelation:

"Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi came to my assistance by sending Indian Forces to the Jaffna Peninsula to relieve Sri Lanka Forces to come down to the South. As a result of this gesture I was able to bring to the troubled areas outside the North and the East sufficient security services to prevent further rioting and causing of damage to persons and property.

"I was advised to permanently strengthen the security services in the South and I did so. This necessitated that they be released from duties in the North and East. This has been done."

This revelation lifts the veil off whatever secrecy there may have been over the behind-the-scenes role played by the United States and Great Britain to rush India and Sri Lanka through the Agreement to deploy Indian troops to fight the Tamils, even as it explains the reasons for not associating the LTTE in the talks preceding the Agreement. India could not have possibly associated the LTTE with the signing of the Agreement and Jayewardene could not have taken Sri Lankan Opposition parties into confidence when both countries were playing the roles of puppets of the western powers.

Jayawardene's statement is also significant for what it seeks to conceal. Jayawardene states that there were 2,527 incidents in the country between July 28 and August 2, i.e. in four days to be precise. These were not ordinary incidents. There was sabotage on a massive scale, with 529 culverts damaged and 189 telegraph pylons and transformers damaged, killings which claimed 16 lives and injured 40, arson on an extensive scale which damaged 1005 buses across the country, and attacks on 42 government offices and buildings and 47 railway stations and railway tracks. It could not be that all this came as a surprise to the Jayewardene's government.

The Sri Lankan Government's Intelligence services as also the intelligence agencies of many friendly foreign powers operating in the island have been keeping track of the going in the JVP camp, and it is more than obvious that they would have known that the JVP was poised to strike in many parts of the country on July 29. In fact, Jayewardene almost lets the cat out of the bag when he says in his Address that "the JVP had clearly designed to unleash violence throughout the country." Given the size and weakness of its armed forces, Jayewardene's government decided, with the advice and consent of the United States and Great Britain and with the knowledge and approval of the Soviet Union that it should rush through with the Agreement with India whose Prime Minister had

already been convinced by the Western powers that he would be in line for the Nobel Peace Prize if he undertook the job of restoring peace in Sri Lanka, which shorn of its embellishments, meant killing that Tamils there. It is thus clear that it is the impending JVP action which made Jayawardene sign the Agreement with India.

So we now have confirmation from no less a person than the Sri Lankan President of what we have been saying from the day the Agreement was signed that the Indian Peace Keeping Force has gone to Sri Lanka to fight Jayawardene's war. But something more sinister is afoot in Sri Lanka. The massive build up of over 1,30,000 Indian troops in that country cannot possibly be to deal only with 2500 LTTE guerillas. The Americans and the British had evidently decided that Indian soldiers be used to fight not only the Tamils but also the Sinhala JVP, which Jayewardene's ragtag army would not have been able to tackle. And sooner than later, Indian soldiers will be called upon to deal with the JVP underground. India has indeed got into its Viet Nam, and will have to pay a heavy price both in terms of its men and money, what to speak of its long-term interests in South Asia, because of the follies and immaturity of R. Gandhi.

All this and more on our tragic involvement in Sri Lanka does not still evoke any response from our Opposition, never mind those occasional inane resolutions passed by a party or two and indignation-filled statements issued once in a while by some political leaders. When the government treats the entire Sri Lankan operation as a closely guarded secret and scrupulously avoids telling the truth on the casualties among Indian troops, the daily burgeoning costs of the expedition which the poor Indian tax-payers has to bear, on its implications to India's security and reactions with neighbours, the Opposition adopts the attitude of the three monkeys which heard no evil, saw no evil and spoke no evil. And that prime joker who is the Prime Minister had the temerity to tell the D M K member of Parliament, Murasoli Maran, that the Sri Lankan operation will go on till he has the head of the LTTE chief, Prabhakaran. Imbecility obviously breeds, among other things, on fantasy. Except that in the case of R. Gandhi he means what he says. Maran was shocked at the way the Prime Minister gesticuiated and pointed to the floor at his feet where he wanted to see the severed head of Prabhakaran.

The communists and the BJP are generally in agreement with the government's, Sri Lanka adventure — though for different reasons. There is at least one person in the Janata Party who not only demanded Indian military action in Sri Lanka, but announced the formation of an army of mercenaries to fight in Sri Lanka. (The Americans must have agreed to meet the cost of such private armies.) The media has also, by and large, chosen to be a part of the conspiracy of silence over the Sri Lankan operation, and is diverting its crusading zeal in investigating Zail Singh, the godmen and other sundry scoundrels. The trade unoins have either no clue about the implications of Sri Lanka or no inclination to do anything. The Hind Mazdoor Kisan Panchayat had organised a demonstration in Bombay on January 21, demanding the withdrawal

And that prime joker who is the Prime Minister had the temerity to tell the DMK M.P. Murasoli Maran, that the Sri Lankan operation will go on till he has the head of the LTTE chief, Prabhakaran. Imbecility obviously breeds, among other things, on fantasy.

of the IPKF, but there are no reports from elsewhere in the country of any such demonstrations.

The DMK president, M. Karunanidhi, has announced his intention to convene a national conference to create public opinion to demand the withdrawal of Indian troops from Sri Lanka, but as of date, the idea does not seem to have travelled far, because the persons sought to be involved in the conference are all busy with their own little parties or their highly personalised politics. The youth and students have either turned wholly apolitical or are embroiled in petty squabbles on the campus or in the streets when not engaged in the search for jobs which are not there. It is now over eight months since Indian troops have been fighting in Sri Lanka, a war that has no meaning for India and a war that, as far as one can see, cannot be won. Young lives are being sacrificed in the swamps and jungles and towns of Sri Lanka to satiate the ambitions of R. Gandhi, ambitions rooted as they are in his idiocy and ignorance of the interplay of global political forces, that have to fail, though at a great cost in men and money to India.

The continuation of the IPKF in Sri Lanka is one more national calamity, of as great a magnitude as the Punjab tragedy created by Mrs. Indira Gandhi and continued by R. Gandhi. It will be foolish for the Opposition to wait till the Congress government is defeated in the next general elections to begin to apply their minds to this problem. The time to get our men back from Sri Lanka is now.

April 1988

Sudhir Dar, The Hindustan Times

DECCAN HERALD

EDITORIAL

30.4.88

One step forward

THE COMPLETION OF council elections in four out of Sri Lanka's nine provinces, despite stray violence which claimed two lives on polling day, is the best piece of news to have come out of the troubled island in a long time. Originally seven provinces were due to go to the polls, but the Janata Vimukti Peramuna's violent campaign compelled the Jayewardene administration to delay the elections in three of them. The voter turnout of 50 per cent in the North-Western, North-Central, Sabaragamuwa and Uva provinces, where polling took place on Thursday, shows that the decision of the main opposition, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, to boycott the elections did not dampen popular enthusiasm to the extent thought likely. If the elections thus became a credible exercise, the credit for it must go primarily to the leftist United Socialist Alliance (USA), which participated in them with full vigour, undeterred by the dastardly murder of its leader, Mr. Vijay Kumaranatunge, by JVP terrorists. The USA, now led by Mrs. Chandrika Kumaranatunge, daughter of Mrs. Bandaranaike, has emerged as a close second to President J. R. Jayewardene's United National Party, winning 64 out of the 155 seats in the four provincial councils, as against the UNP's 88. The newly formed Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, which put up candidates only in the Muslim belts in the North-Western province and Badulla district of Uva province, has taken the remaining three seats.

Hopefully, Thursday's success — the UNP gained control of all the four provincial councils — will give the Government the necessary courage to hold elections in the other Sinhala-majority provinces on June 2, as scheduled, despite the continuing JVP threat. The crucial test will come later when it has to hold elections in the Northern and Eastern provinces. The provincial council scheme was conceived in the first instance to give the Tamil majority in these provinces a measure of autonomy within Sri Lanka's unitary framework. While the Peace-Keeping Force, inducted into the island under the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement last year, has subdued the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, conditions in the two provinces are far from conducive to the holding of free and fair elections. Since any elections held while the Indian army is in virtual occupation will lack credibility in the eyes of the world, serious efforts for a rapprochement with the LTTE must now begin. While insisting on surrender of arms by the LTTE, the Government of India must not overlook its legitimate concerns about the safety of Tamils in general and of its cadres in particular. The widespread feeling about the inadequacy of the provincial council set-up, voiced even by the moderate Tamil groups, also needs to be taken note of. What this means is that the major task now before the Government of India lies in the area of diplomacy, not military action.

LETTER

JAFFNA: HOW NORMAL IS NORMAL?

S P Krishnan, Chavakachcheri

There is much talk, nowadays, about normalcy in the Northern Province. Newspapers and magazines, both foreign and local, try to show that the North is returning to normal. Journalists come to the north, take two or three photographs at the crowded bazaar or at the co-operative stores, interview people at the high levels of society and go back to tell the world that Jaffna is returning to normal. But **there is no normal life in the northern province. How is it possible? How can one say that there is normal life when the IPKF's operation is still on?** Can anyone say that fighting is going on somewhere though normalcy has returned elsewhere?

The government radio and other instruments of the mass media daily give news about incidents in North and East. The same sources announce that normalcy is returning to the North. **The way that the IPKF started on the 10th October last year is still on. They are occupying houses and government offices.** Camps and sentries are found in every nook and corner of the North. Jeeps, trucks and other army vehicles speed along highways, and lanes. Searches, surprise checks and night patrols continue. Sudden curfews are clamped while the arrests of youths continue. **Houses are forced open. Inmates, men, women and children are terrified.** Fences are burnt. Barbed wire fences are cut. All this on the pretext of searching for terrorists.

Any outsider visiting Jaffna should travel along KKS Road, from Kokkuvil to Kankesanturai and Point Pedro and then to Chavakachcheri to

view the war-ravaged houses, buildings, temples and the poor man's huts. Houses damaged by shelling are a terrible sight. They are not repaired yet. They are not in reparable condition. Many of the damaged houses are used as sentry points by the IPKF. Bunkers are made of the concrete blocks from the damaged houses.

Hindu temples were shelled. Their *Koapurams* - beautiful art works - are now a pathetic sight. One wonders, are these army people actually from a land that is famous for ancient Hindu temples? How can there be normalcy, when even a place of worship is denied the common man? Tea boutiques, cycle repair shops and other small business centres of the poor man were burnt to ashes. No one has helped them to rebuild, so far. Some rehabilitation centres are functioning there. People are seen crowded at these places, holding affidavits in their hands, expecting some relief. But no one seems to have received any compensation so far.

What about the government's promises?

The former Finance Minister announced that many millions of dollars of foreign aid would be used to rehabilitate the North and East. This tune is still going on. More aid is coming for this purpose, according to the mass media. But not a single project has been started in the North except for the filling of the holes in the main roads in the heart of Jaffna town. Damage to the Chavakachcheri Drieberg College was repaired by the IPKF. But there are many other schools that lie unrepaired where classes are conducted under no roof.

Where is the normalcy?

Why don't they start work at least on essential services - hospitals, temples, market buildings and roads - if they have the foreign aid in hand? **We have a fine heritage of promises and cheatings; forty years of such experience.** Everyone knows why the Tamil youths turned to violence. **Non-violent democratic methods adopted by Tamil politicians since 1947, to win our rights, were in vain.**

The IPKF is still fighting the terrorists in the North and East. So how can there be normal life in the midst of this war situation? **By hiding the facts no one can find peace!**

(Sunday Times, Colombo)

BAD SOLDIER SINGH

COMMENT

The West Indian Writer V.S. Naipaul - origin, Indian - has been panned by critics for depicting India as one vast backside defecating all over the place.

After what happened in Jaffna when the IPKF launched its operation against the Tigers on 10th October 1987, one wonders.

The Jawans took quite some time go gain control of the Kopay area, where the Tigers' Women's Brigade resisted fiercely.

Ultimately, the Jawans inched forward and gained control of Kopay. They occupied some house in Kopay.

When the owners moved back they found the contents of almirahs and cupboards strewn about and the raiders had defecated on sarees, even koorai sarees and, believe it or not, on paddy stacks stored in the houses.

Retaliation? Or uncontrollable purging?

The University of Jaffna has many wounds of war to show.

Among them, the staircase in the new Arts Block. Every step a toilet.

The District Minister of Jaffna U.B. Wijekoon, had a nice, expensive carpet laid out in his office. But that was before the IPKF moved into the Jaffna kachcheri. In what appears to have been a concerted team effort, the peace-keepers seem to have lined up and perfor med their ablutions on the carpet, rolling it before the next batch of peace-keepers lined up to defecate dutifully, and went on rolling the carpet till no further roll was possible.

Carpet-shitters?

Chickens and goats are having a hard time in Jaffna.

A house quite close to a prominent College in Jaffna Town had a poultry run. IPKF soldiers raided it every day and took away at least 50 birds. The raids stopped, of course, but only when the run ran out of birds.

The price of eggs, if available, has now shot up in Jaffna.

In several villages where the IPKF has established itself, owners of goats prefer to slaughter the animals and auction the flesh rather than have the IPKF take them away - free.

Fowls and goats are the biggest casualties, after civilians, in the Jaffna Peninsula.

'DISAPPEARANCES' AND MISSING PERSONS

Parents and spouses have reported the 'disappearances' of their children and married partners. In a specific case from Jaffna town, a man has not been able to trace so far his wife and three daughters taken away by the IPKF in full view of his neighbours on 12.11.87. Another case is that of Mr. Renganathan, a government school teacher. The IPKF took him away from his Kopay residence on 16.11.87 in spite of the pleas of his weeping wife and children. The wife and children together with relatives have paid innumerable visits to IPKF camps without any encouraging news. Seventeen year old Yasotharan Thangarajah, a GCE Advanced Level student of Jaffna Central College and who excelled in his studies as evidenced by his GCE O/L results, was taken from his Jaffna residence by the IPKF on the morning of 17.12.87. His distraught mother, a widow, has yet to find him (as reported on March 1). A married woman with five small children from Vaddukoddai complained about the 'disappearance' of her husband who was arrested by the IPKF on 08.1.88. An IPKF officer gave evasive replies and tried to console her by sending her free rations.

INDIAN OPPOSITION PARTIES CALL FOR CEASEFIRE

Eleven opposition Members of Parliament said prolonging the Indian Peace-Keeping Force's offensive against Tamil rebels would not improve the situation in Sri Lanka and demanded an immediate ceasefire.

In a statement in Delhi, they said any future political settlement would be jeopardised if Sri Lankan forces were allowed into Tamil areas on any pretext.

They said the Indian Government should act immediately to prevent the Sri Lankan forces from entering the Tamil areas and resume negotiations with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to bring peace to Sri Lanka.

It was 'unfortunate that the Sri Lankan Government had sent its forces to the eastern province' while LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran had come forward with a proposal for unconditional talks with the Indian Government, they said.

The statement said, 'under the pretext of the so-called guerilla war by the LTTE,' the Sri Lankan government was 'reluctant' to implement the main demands of the merger of the northern and eastern provinces as one unit and devolution of power to the provincial council before elections.

The signatories to the statement were M.S.Gurupadaswamy, Madhu Dandavate and Thampan Thomas of the Janata Party, P.Upendra of the Telugu Desam, Aladi Aruna and K.R.Natarajan of the *Janaki* faction of the AIADMK, V.Gopalasamy and N.V.N. Somu of the DMK, L.K.Advani of the BJP, V. Kishore Deo of the Congress-S and Lt.General (Retd) Jagjit Singh Aurora of the Akali Dal (L).

Opposition public meeting in Delhi

more about....

BAD SOLDIER SINGH

COMMENT

Reports allege sexual harassment - and rape - by the IPKF.

The 'Veerakesari' - the Indian-owned Tamil daily - reported some instances in Kokuvil which, it said, had led to the cashiering of IPKF personnel. But a contradiction was later issued - and carried.

But on a recently organised conducted tour of Jaffna, the IPKF big brass candidly admitted to journalists that four Indian soldiers had been court - martialed for rape. The Big Boss was, in effect, pleading for understanding, with the cry that his men "Were only human'. The people of Jaffna have come to know another thing the hard way - that the Indians can only count up to four!

Unimpeachable witnesses testify that they have seen IPKF sentires put a lot of "Feeling" in frisking women, especially girls, at check-points.

On the look-out for bombs - or sex-bombs?

An Army is an Army. The khaki does make the man - and hang ethnicity. When the IPKF launched its Operation Disarm against the Tigers, old women, children and old men got the works.

At Kokuvil, a retired District Agricultural Extension Officer, Mr. Jayasselan, his wife (the sister of the present Chief Justice of Sri Lanka). their youngest son and two others were shot dead in their houses.

At Anaicottai, an elderly sister of the late senator Nadesan and a few others were pulled out of the bunker in which they had taken refuge, lined up and shot.

Of course the Indian media - by now, Lankapuwath and Rupavahini in reverse - blamed the Tigers for the Massacre.

A few days before the 'Eelamurasu' and 'Musasoli' offices were wrecked some IPKF personnel had visited both places on the pretext of finding out their advertisement rates. One of them had even gone to the toilet to ease himself.

A matter of acquainting themselves with the terrain?

IPKF personnel have reportedly told some press workers whom they arrested that they would never allow any newspaper in Jaffna to come out as all the papers there — in the IPKF perception — were anti-Indian and anti-IPKF.

● Northern citizen committees accuse

Alleged rape of six women by Indians

by Shamindra Ferdinando

Six Tamil women were raped by the Indian soldiers at Iranamadu and Visvamadu in the Killinochchi district, last week, citizens committee officials in the northern districts allege. The raped women included a mother of two they say.

A spokesperson for the Indian High Commission in Colombo said they had made inquires from the Indian military stationed in the Killinochchi district and were awaiting a report. According to the Indian sources they will look into the allegations with an "open mind."

The raped women, according to the source, who declined to be identified had been treated at the Jaffna hospital and discharged. The rapes have also been reported to the Killinochchi police by the relatives of the victims. Sources said that the people of the area showed their anger by staying indoors and closing business establishments on April 10 and 11.

However "The Island" was unable to contact the Killinochchi police as the telephones there were out of order, yesterday. A senior police officer in Colombo said that "Tamil women normally do not lodge complaints with police regarding such incidents for fear of social stigma."

Earlier four Indian soldiers (ranks were not divulged were court martialled and sentenced to one years, imprisonment for rape in the Jaffna peninsula during the 'Operation Pawan,' The IPKF commander in the peninsula Brigadier R.I.S. Kahlon revealed the convictions in mid January. 16.4.88

Painting : Bikash Bhattacharjee

LETTER

SITUATION REPORT: JAFFNA DIOCESE IN SRI LANKA

Rev.Fr.M.E.Pius, Director, Jaffna Diocesan Human Development Centre

Normal life has still not returned to the Jaffna Peninsula since the 10th of October 1987, when the IPKF started its role of disarming the LTTE. Little bit of everything is working in the Jaffna town - the hospital, banks, shops, transport, etc. The supply of electricity within the Jaffna Municipal limits has been restored since the 14th December though with limitations like low voltage and unannounced power cuts at times. The 'dailies' and 'weeklies' stopped in October 1987 have not commenced publishing. Post Office has not resumed its full functions.

Reaching the surrounding villages from the Jaffna town is a Herculean task. The presence of the IPKF at the check points almost at every 100 yards and the forced diversions of vehicles at various points call for great ingenuity to reach the intended destinations. Even now many villages cannot be reached because of the sporadic fighting and firings. Hundreds of houses have been demolished or badly damaged and it is estimated that about 40,000 Indian soldiers are in occupation of private properties in the Jaffna Peninsula. The indiscriminate shellings by the IPKF has uprooted thousands of families from many villages. Some villages have to be considered as refugee camps since vehicles, medicines, food and other essential items are beyond their reach still.

The problems of drinking water (pipe-borne water), fuel, transport, food, clothing and medicine have not been solved. A vacuum exists in the administration. Unruly elements unleashed in a few villages have a field day - thefts and robberies are rampant due to lack of law-enforcement officers.

IPKF moves into houses and institutions at any time under the pretext of search for the LTTE. Many people have been beaten beyond recognition after tip-offs due to past rivalry, enmity or jealousy between individuals, families or movements. Many parents spend sleepless nights to prevent the raping of their children - a fear not without firm foundation. Due to the war situation, more than 90% of the people in the Jaffna Peninsula are without any source of income - masons, carpenters, daily wage earners, taxi owners, farmers, fishermen, small industries, the self-employed, etc. The normal ration (food stamps) that is given free to the low income group of people in the South of Sri Lanka does not reach the people in the North (Jaffna) of Sri Lanka.

About 37,500 families are in need of urgent relief measures to tide over their difficulties. Provisions bought in Kilinochchi (35 miles from Jaffna), Vavuniya (90 miles) and Colombo (250 miles) are transported amidst untold hardships and risks to Jaffna by lorries and distributed by us to the accessible 46 villages and towns. It takes two days to travel from Jaffna to Colombo; delays are caused by 43 check-points, curfew and movements of troops.

Malaria, dysentery, and scabies are now very common in our districts. Due to the want of medical facilities we have opened a few medical centres along with the medical mobile unit at our service.

The badly wounded who request assistance are helped with an initial donation of Rs.250 for their medical facilities. Though we estimate more than 25,000 to fall within this category, our local agents experience great difficulties in collecting the necessary data due to the communication gap. Many widows, orphans and the maimed will need further assistance and help for their maintenance. Distribution Centres in villages have asked for assistance by way of clothing.

We fear that our relief programme will have to continue for another three months (minimum) till the people are able to begin their routine of income-generating activities. **There is no apparent end in sight to the confrontation between the IPKF and the LTTE. Problems will have to be solved not by bullets but by dialogue.** Hope and pray that both sides accept this fact.

CIVILIANS KILLED

Seven Tamil civilians, including women and children, were killed when IPKF personnel fired back in response to an attack on one of their patrol party at Nedunkerny, 27 miles off Vavuniya, on 23 March.

According to the Vavuniya District Citizens Committee sources, the seven victims included four members from one family. The mother of this family who could not endure the tragedy committed suicide by taking poison.

According to the Citizens Committee, this was not the first time that civilians have fallen victims of indiscriminate fire by the IPKF.

AFFIDAVIT

ARUDSELVAN PARAMESWARY (22) C/O S. Kamalanathan, Navagiri, Puthur.

The deceased Vadivel Arudselvan, aged 22 years was my husband.

He was a Vegetable Vendor.

On 3.4.88 at about 5.00 a.m. my husband left home as usual to Chavakachcheri market where he used to sell his vegetables.

At about 2.00 p.m. I was informed that my husband's lifeless body lying at Chavakachcheri.

I came to know that he was shot and killed by the army.

His body was brought home on the same day and cremated at Atchuvely Thoppu cemetery on 4.4.88.

I am five months pregnant.

After my husband's death whom I married two years ago I do not have any income or support and undergoing untold hardships.

அ. ஈஸ்வரன்

MANICKAN YOGAMMAH (28) WIDOWED WIFE OF NAGAN MANICKAM, Myliddy North, Soodukadduvan, Vasavilan, Presently displaced at Suthanthirapuram, Vasavilan.

The deceased, Nagan Manickam, aged 31, is my husband. He was the sole bread-winner of my family. He was a daily wage Labourer.

On 5th. of April 1988 at about 10.00 a.m. the IPKF suddenly came in large number to Suthanthirapuran. During this time my late husband, four children and I were in our huts. As soon as the IPKF arrived the neighbours ran out of their house with fear. We also fled our residence through fear and we were running towards Nilavarai side to seek shelter.

While we were running, simultaneously, a unit of army personnel were coming in the opposite direction from Nilavarai side. The army personnel started firing. Through fear my late husband ran towards a bush to hide himself.

At that time a bullet struck on to his chest. Profusely bleeding from the chest he fell down and died at the spot.

At that time I was hiding behind another bush. One hour later when the Army personnel moved away from that place I removed the dead body of my husband with the help of my relatives.

That cremation of the body took place at Kuddiapulau Hindu Cemetery on the same evening at 5.00 p.m..

That the untimely death of my husband has caused unbearable loss to me and my family. He has left me and four children without any source of income.

மனோ. [illegible]

SEBASTIAMPILLAI SEBAMALAR (45) Mareesankoodal, Illavalai.

The deceased Sebastiampillai Thevanayaki aged 19 years was my daughter.

She was a self employed Seamstress.

On 8.4.88 at about 7.30 a.m. my daughter and her cousin left home for the nearby Kaithar church to attend the service.

After they departed we heard sounds of gunfire and became highly worried.

We went outside and found the lifeless bodies of my daughter and her cousin lying in the lane in a pool of blood.

My daughter's body bore multiple gunshot injuries.

CRP

April, 15th – Jaffna – 8 militants arrested.

April, 15th – Odduchuddan – 3 militants killed & 3 arrested.

April, 15th – Batticaloa – 8 militants arrested.

April, 16th – Vavuniya – 30 PLOTE members arrested.

Apirl, 16th – Kilinochchi – 6 women raped allegedly by IPKF. Protest by Citizens Committee.

April 14 – 16 – South East of Elephant Pass – 30 LTTE members killed.

April 14 – 16 – Batticaloa – 30 militants killed; 9 arrested.

April 14 – 16 – Valaichenai – 6 LTTE cadres arrested.,

April 14 – 16 – Vavuniya – 1 militant killed.

April 14 – 16 – Mutur – 6 of LTTE arrested.

April 17th – Mankulam to Puliyankulam – 15 Tamil passengers ordered to quit bus and ride 17 miles on hood endangering their lives. Their places inside the bus were taken by IPKF personnel. An Accountant who rode on hood complained to the Indian envoy in Colombo.

April 20th – Mullaitivu – 8 militants killed.

Apirl 21st – Kilinochchi – IPKF Lt. Col Killed & Capt. injured in encounter with LTTE.

April 27th – Karaveddy – Militant youth taking IPKF soldier on motor cycle shot at; both killed.

27.04.88 – Kilinochchi – Four IPKF soldiers kidnapped. IPKF conduct thorough search of all vehicles plying through Killinochchi.

30.04.88 – Arantalawa near Vavuniya – Government bus ambushed. Of the 9 killed six are Lankan soldiers. Six including one Lankan soldier seriously injured.

IPKF OPERATION IN VADAMARADCHI EAST:

The IPKF imposed a curfew in Vadamaradchi East comprising, Nagarkovil, Thaalaiyadi, Vettillaikerni and Alliyawallai, on the night of 30.04.88. The curfew was continuous until lifted on 13.05.88. During the first few days, the IPKF discovered a cache of arms and a petrol bowser full with petrol buried underground. This led to IPKF men assaulting residents and torturing youth for information about militants. Shops and 20 schools in the area remained closed. The residents were on the point of starvation. People of neighbouring Valvettiturai township outraged by the ill – treatment of people in Vadamaradchi East took out a procession demonstrating against IPKF harassment in Vadamaradchi East. The curfew was finally lifted to enable students to sit the Year – 6 scholarship examination to be held on 14.05.88. Only a few students presented themselves for the examination. Whereas the people of Vadamaradchi suffered untold miseries at the hands of the Lanka Army during 'Operation Liberation' in May 1987, this year in May the IPKF has taken over the function of tormenting the people of Vadamaradchi.

Sittaru in Trincomalee District – On 01.05.88 a Government bus carrying passengers was blasted by a landmine. Twentysix civilians mostly Sinhalese were killed.

TELO called for hartal to be observed on 06.05.88 to commemorate killing of its leader and other members in 1987 by LTTE. TELO members went about Jaffna Town trying to enforce closure of shops. Six of them

I learned that she and her cousin died after being caught in a crossfire between the militants and the army.

My daughters body was buried at the Karthar chutch burial grounds on 9.4.88.

I have three daughters and a son

My husband is a Casual labourer and it way my late daughter who supplemented the meagre income with her income which she derives from sewing.



SAROJINIDEVI SANTHIRASEKERAM (47) 15/3, Potpallai Road, Kokuvil.

The deceased Santhirasekeram Kuhaparan (17) is my 5 th child.

My husband is a sickly person. He was a farmer engaged in paddy cultivation, cultivation of other crop at Ponnaveli.

Due to the illness of my husband my son S. Thayaparan was engaged in paddy cultivation. He died in 1982 due to insectide poisoning after spraying the paddy field.

As there was no one else to look after the paddy field my son Kuhaparan under took to look after the paddy field.

On 11.4.88 S. Kuhaparan who was engaged in threshing the paddy had left for Palavi to collect gunnybags and was shot dead by the IPKF during search operations.

I have two more sons aged 13 and 9 years and 3 daughters aged 21,15 and 12 years.

As my husband is ill we looked forward to S. Kuhaparan to look after our cultivation which was our only source of income.

S. Sarojinidevi

ELAYATHAMBY RAJU, (53) years Mulli Road, Ariyalai.

The deceased person Raju Alex Vijayanathan aged 20 years was my son.

He was a fisherman.

My son left for Batticaloa on 14.4.88 to see my youngest son, Raju Dias.

On 15.5.88 I was informed that my youngest son Raju Dias was shot and killed by the army.

I went to Batticaloa on hearing the news.

While I was staying at my relations house in Karuvepankerni, my eldest son left the place at about 11.00 a.m. on 5.6.88 saying that he is going to visit some of his relatives.

At about 12 noon I was informed that my eldest son was shot and killed by the army at School-road.

I rushed to the scene of incident where I found his body.

His body was buried at the Kalliankadu cemetery on 6.6.88.

I am suffering from Rheumatisim and my late eldest son was our sole breadwinner.

After his death we are undergoing untold hardships.

THAVAMANY NAESARAJAH (45) Widowed wife of Nagamany Naesarajah, Tholakaddy, Vasavilan.

The deceased, Nagamany Naesarajah, aged 51, is my husband. He was the sole breadwinner of the family. He was running a Bicycle Repairing shop at Tholakaddy, Vasavilan.

On 15th. day of April 1988 at about 8.00 a.m. my late husband left out of my house in order to go to Atchuvely to purchase bicycle spares for the above workshop.

After ten minutes I heard the sound of continuous gun firing from the Oddakapulam side. The neighbours revealed me that the army personnel were rounding Oddakapulam and Atchuvely areas.

When the situation returned to normal some of the reliable informants came and informed that my husband above named was gunned down by the army personnel somewhere near the Oddakapulam Church side.

On receiving this information I rushed to the scene and I found the dead body of my husband lying on the ground in a pool of blood with gun shot injuries on his chest.

The prevailed tension did not permit us in proceeding for a sudden death inquest, as such no inquest was held in this connection.

The dead body of my husband was buried at Oddakapulam Roman Catholic Cemetery on the same evening at 5.00 p.m.

The untimely death of my husband has caused unbearable loss to my family. He has left me and four children without no source of income.



SIVANANDA IYER, SELVAMANI (21) years., Selvasannathy, Thondamanaru.

Sivanada Iyer Selvarasa (23 years) is my eldest brother.

On 20.4.88 while my above mentioned brother was returning home on bicycle he was shot to death by the army near Pillaiyar Koviladi, Thondamanaru.

We have no mother and our father after our mother's death – remarried and deserted us.

I have an unmarried elder sister of age 25 years for me to support.

S. Selvamany

RATNAVELU INDRANY (44) years; wife of late Mr. Appasamy Ratnavelu, Pilavodai Lane, Puloly East, Point Pedro, in the A.G.A's Division of Vadamaradchy North & East of Jaffna District.

My beloved Husband Mr. A. Ratnavelu, aged about fiftythree (53) years, was killed by gun shots fired by the IPKF Personnel, on Thursday, 21st. April, 1988 in our house, when my husband, a nephew of ours and I were in a room of the front portion of the house.

On the said date, at about six o' clock in the evening, my late husband was chatting to a nephew of ours, near our main gate.

At that time, I heard gun-shots from the direction of Point Pedro Bazaar area.

Within another ten minutes or so, a vehicle came rushing down our lane, firing indiscriminately.

I saw my late husband and my nephew running into the house.

I too from the well site rushed into the house.

I saw IPKF Personnel came running into our compound and fired into our house through a window in the front side of our house.

At the time of the incident, we three: my late husband, my nephew and I were in the front room of our house.

In this incident a bullet struck my beloved husband, in the abdominal region of his body, and he collapsed instantaneously.

My husband was killed by the IPKF Personnel, for reasons unknown to me.

My late husband was about fiftythree years of age at the time of his untimely death under tragic circumstances; and am fully & honestly aware, that my husband has never got involved in any form or type of Anti-Governmental, Anti-Social and Un-lawful activities.

EHAMPARAM SOMASUNDARAM (65) Kapputhu, Karaveddy.

The deceased Kandavanam Thavakumar (25) is my nephew (my own sister Thangammah's son).

K. Thavakumar was a bachelor.

The parents of my nephew Thavakumar are both old and feeble. They are confined to their homes.

On the 27th of April 1988, Kandavanam Thavakumar was shot dead by the IPKF during search operations. He was in his farm at the time of the incident and must have been mistaken for a militant.

The parents of Thavakumar and his sister Thavamalar (18) were entirely dependant an the earning of Thavakumar who was the sole bread winner of the family.

PONNIAN KATHIRGAMANATHAN (56) Karaveddy West, Karaveddy.

On 27.4.88 my late son Ragavan left home at about 9.00 a.m. to the village of Kappathu for the purchase of dry chillies.

On the day, the IPKF was cordoning off the area. On seeing the servicemen my son ran through fear when he was fired at by the Forces. He fell dead on the spot having received severe chest injuries.

On receipt of information regarding the demise of my son at about 2.00 p.m. I went to the scene and brought home his body.

The funeral took place on 28.4.88 and his body was cremated in the Sonappu Hindu Crematorium at about 12.30 p.m.

My late son was a trader who earned an average monthly income of Rs 1,000/-

I and my family was maintained and looked after by my late son.

I have a son and daughter who are school going.

ARICHANDRAN FONROSE (45) Pathaimeni, Atchuvely

The deceased person Appuge Arichandran aged 43 years was my husband.

He was employed as a Lorry driver.

On 29.4.88 at about 4.30 a.m. my husband left for work.

At about 8.00 p.m. I was informed that my husband was shot and killed after being unfortunately caught in a cross fire between the army and the militants at Pathameni.

His body was brought home and buried at the Vallai Catholic burial grounds on 30.4.88.

I have three children.

CRP

were shot and killed while on this mission. Several others were wounded and hospitalised. IPKF gave protection to hospitalised TELO cadres.

Damages caused to Jaffna University buildings and equipment during IPKF offensive in October/November 1987 is estimated at Rs. 52 million.

Kalmunai Disturbances :

The media interest in the East turned towards Kalmunai during the last fortnight. House and shop buildings were destroyed and nearly 26 died both Muslims and Tamils. Muslim leaders blamed the "Three Star" group for the death and destruction. The Indian High Commissioner also blamed the "Three Star" group and went on to say that the "Three Star" group was backed by a Lankan Minister. At the instance of Muslim M.P.'s the government has appointed a Select Committee of Parliament to inquire into the recent disturbances at Kalmunai. The IPKF has now pitched a camp at Islamabad a village in Kalmunai.

Cordon and Search Operations in Jaffna Peninsula; Military Operations South of Elephant Pass by IPKF :

Not a day passes without some part of the Jaffna Peninsula being subject to cordon and search operations. Jaffna Town, Erlallai, Urumpirai, Vadamarachchi, Atchuvely, Neervely, Kopay, Chavakachcheri, Chulipuram and Pandateruppu areas were searched during the last fortnight. During the search, all young males have to assemble at a Central spot while soldiers go searching the houses. Searches in the above areas and military operations south of Elephant-Pass resulted in the death of 24 LTTE suspects and injuries to 26. A further 400 were arrested with no loss to the IPKF. Nearly a 1000 Tamil detenus are held by the IPKF with nearly 400 among them held for as long as 5 months. Villagers who feared a cordon and search operation, induced a young men of their village to voluntarily surrender to the IPKF as he had earlier been arrested and released by the Lankan Security Forces. In fact the IPKF had made announcements promising no harm to those who voluntarily surrendered. A young man 'X' surrendered accordingly on 29.12.87 to the IPKF. On 16.01.88 the IPKF handed over the dead body to the mother, saying he had died a natural death. The family made the following observations on examining the body :

(a) The left shoulder joint was swollen.
(b) The left arm was dislocated at the shoulder.
(c) There were blackened strips marks the whole length of both arms (people who saw this said these were effects of electric burns).
(d) On both legs there were lacerated wounds.
(e) On the back also there were lacerated wounds.

Fast by Tamil Detenus :

From 26.02.88 a fasting campaign was organised by Tamil detenus at the New Magazine Prison, Colombo to back their demand to release all detenus and prisoners under the terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord. The fast was continued by batches of ten detenus in relay. From 17.03.88 five of the detenus went on a fast unto death. Within one week two were hospitalized. On 27.03.88 on the intervention of Mr Kumar Ponnampalam, Tamil Congress Leader the fast was suspended. Mr Ponnampalam was relying on a promise the Secretary to the Minister of Defence Mr Sepala Attygalle made on behalf of the Government. Now Mr Ponnampalam states that he has been let down by the Government.

CONFRONTATION

1

NEW DELHI, April 1.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka has had some major and significant gains in the past 24 hours. In the first instance in an early morning swoop the IPKF apprehended the Commander of the LTTE group in Batticaloa, Dileep, in the Sunawaledi area. Along with him other top leaders caught were Ramesh, Deputy Commander, and Yogen, political commissar. Another significant catch has been Gurukulsingham alias Vardan, communications chief who was apprehended outside Batticaloa with an AK-47 rifle and 45 rounds of ammunition. According to PTI, Victor, finance secretary, was also arrested.

The Dileep group is the most important of the three LTTE groups operating in the area, the other two are led by Karuna and Newton. Dileep is reported to have told the IPKF that the lower-level cadres of the LTTE were now weary of the conflict and their morale was at the rock-bottom.

Informed sources in New Delhi said that in the Kalmunai incident seven Hindu Tamils had been killed along with 10 Muslims. They stressed that the information was made available only after the massacre had taken place and within 15 minutes of the report of the incident, three platoons from the Rajput regiment and the Guards regiment located nearby arrived at the scene.

2

Three IPKF commandos were killed and many wounded in a landmine attack by LTTE In Kanniya, Trincomalee dt.

3

COLOMBO, April 3.

Twelve Tamil militants surrendered to the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) with their arms in the Eastern Batticaloa district yesterday and 12 other 'hard-core' militants were apprehended, according to official reports.

The surrender of the 12 members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) came close on the heels of the capture of five top leaders of the group on Thursday last by the IPKF in Batticaloa town.

ENDLF men killed in LTTE attack: Some 30 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fighters attacked an Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) camp at Kilinochchi on Saturday, killing two ENDLF men and wounding a third seriously, security sources said here on Sunday.

The raiders, who used hand grenades and opened fire with AK-47 rifles, managed to escape, despite the proximity of a Sri Lankan as well as an Indian Army base, the sources said.

An office of another rival group, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), also near the ENDLF camp, was spared by the LTTE, they said.

4

Colombo, April 4 (PTI): Seven Indian soldiers were wounded, when an improvised explosive device (IED) reportedly laid by the militant Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) went off at Chavakacheri in Jaffna peninsula on Sunday an Indian High Commission spokesman said here on Monday.

Bodies of five Tamil militants, belonging to the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) were found at Periathampanai in northern Vavunjya district, on Sunday reports reaching here said.

The five were abducted on Friday allegedly by the rival People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE).

Names of three of the militants were given by the EPRLF in a press release here as 'Sarangan', 'Ravi' and 'Thanges'.

In another press release, the EPRLF, which is now a recognised political party in Sri Lanka, condemned the recent violence in the two eastern fishing villages of Kalmunai in Amparai district.

The incidents at Sainamarathu and Maliakathu in which innocent Muslims and Tamils were killed, were part of a cynical design to prevent the merger of the northern and eastern provinces to jeopardise the implementation of the (Indo-Sri Lankan accord), the release said.

During a raid on Colombo's commercial pettah area on Saturday, police discovered the body of a 35 year old man suspected to be a 'hard-core LTTE' element. They also found two parcels of heroin and two high-powered walkie-talkie sets near the body.

Thirty young Tamil suspects, residing in the area were taken into custody and five of them served with detention orders under the country's emergency regulations. The others were being interrogated.

5

COLOMBO, April 5.

Tamil militants on Tuesday ambushed and killed five Sri Lankan soldiers bringing breakfast for their comrades, officials said here.

The PLOT which had accepted an Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, killed eight rival militants on Sunday last, also in Vavuniya, the spokesman said.

Also on Sunday, seven IPKF soldiers were wounded when their vehicle ran over a landmine planted by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

TAMILS DIE OF STARVATION

According to reports reaching us from Batticaloa, a number of innocent Tamils have died in the jungles of Pulipaanchakal. The jungle was surrounded by the IPKF and many of the victims could not come out due to the fear that they would be killed. It is reported that those who got trapped in the jungle could not find any food and have died of starvation. Indian media reported this incident with enthusiasm by referring that all those who died were LTTE members.

HALF A MILLION REFUGEES IN JAFFNA

The Ministry of Rehabilitation and Information revealed that at least one out of three persons in the Jaffna peninsula is a refugee, with a majority of them being displaced after the arrival of the IPKF. The number of refugees receiving state assistance in Jaffna is put at 500,000 or 120,000 families reported the Ministry. In addition to the refugees in Jaffna, there were 33,815 refugees in Vavuniya, 41,162 in Mullaitivu, and 16,000 in Kilinochchi.

IPKF OFFICIAL KILLED

Lt.Col.A.S.Sekhon, a senior IPKF official, was killed in action while leading his troops in a raid on an LTTE camp near Paranthan on 21st April, 1988. Another officer, an IPKF captain, was injured. Lt.Col.Sekhon is perhaps the most senior IPKF officer to die since the October operations in Jaffna.

17 Sri Lankan Army men wre killed and two escaped with wounds, in an attack by LTTE near Sri Lankan Army Camp in Kondachi Farm, Mannar Dt.

7

COLOMBO, April 7. (PTI) — One LTTE militant was killed while seven other rebels were apprehended from different areas in Eastern Batticaloa yesterday, as the IPKF continued its concerted search and cordon operation, a spokesman of the Indian High Commission said here today.

The Indian troops also recovered 300 rounds of different kinds of ammunition, 16 hand grenades, one AK 47 and two G3 the spokesman added.

The IPKF rounded up Valvettiturai, Polikandy, Udupiddy at midnight and arrested thousands of men and took them to the Udupiddy army camp. In the guise of identifying Tiger sympathisers, IPKF, along with three star merceneries, beat up and illtreated them throughout the night.

8

COLOMBO, April 8. (PTI) — Eight members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were killed — four of them after taking cyanide — in Sri Lanka since yesterday as the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) closed in on the Tamil rebels.

Six militants also surrendered to the IPKF today.

A junior commissioned officer of the IPKF was injured yesterday at Dharampura in Jaffna peninsula.

A spokesman of the Indian High Commission here said the officer was wounded in an encounter with the LTTE.

SUICIDE: Authoritative sources said three of the four militants who committed suicide were from Batticaloa district.

Another militant killed himself in north Vavuniya district. Yet another "Tiger" was prevented from swallowing a poisonous pill by the IPKF.

IPKF men killed two militants in Batticaloa and the other two in northern Jaffna and Vauvniya.

Six LTTE militants were apprehended from different areas in Jaffna, and Eastern Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts, the spokesman added.

Two LTTE cadres Kamal and Ilayaraja and some villagers were at work in the fields at Mullaithivu. A mini van arrived and within moments three star boys identified the Tigers and the IPKF shot at them. Kamal died on the spot. On fleeing from the scene with wounds Ilayaraja consumed cyanide. A civilian also felt victim.

9

COLOMBO, April 9.

Fourteen Sinhalese villagers, including two women, were gunned down by suspected Tamil militants near Anuradhapura yesterday evening, in one of the most serious attacks to occur in the Sinhala-majority north central province in recent times.

According to a Sri Lankan military spokesman, a group of people were travelling along a road near Meegaswewa village close to Anuradhapura when they were ambushed by armed men. Two of the villagers escaped and informed the security forces. A lorry and a tractor, in which the victims were travelling, was burnt.

The spokesman said there was no definite indication which group was responsible.

In another development, the IPKF arrested over 50 suspected Tamil militants over the last 24 hours in the north as part of its continuing search operations.

The Indian High Commission today also denied reports appearing in the local media that the chief of the LTTE's political wing in Batticaloa and 13 other LTTE cadres had been released from custody by the IPKF

Express News Service

Madras, April 9: In continuing combing operations in Sri Lanka, the IPKF arrested 33 "hardcore" LTTE guerillas and 154 suspected militants on Saturday, besides seizing ration stocks, printing machinery and explosive devices including grenades.

A defence spokesman said here that the LTTE had begun to avoid direct contact with the IPKF, and "there was a noticeable drop in their activity during the past 48 hours".

Nine hideouts of the group were raided in Vavuniya sector, unearthing two document caches. A local leader Kumaraswami, besides 16 hardcore guerillas and 122 suspects were arrested.

A large quantity of grenades, explosive devices and a tractor were also seized.

In Mullaitivu, radio equipments besides rations and documents were seized from a house. Seventeen militants were surrounded by the IPKF at Urumpirai and Karavaddi.

In Trincomalee sector, four militants were apprehended in Muthur area. In Batticaloa, 32 militants were arrested, in areas west of Kalmunai, leading to seizure of grenades and ammunition.

In a round-up by IPKF at Kinniady, the LTTE cadres Johnson and Lt. Sudarsan consumed cyanide sensing the no-escape situation.

10

PTI, UNI report from Colombo:

At least four LTTE militants were left dead in a massive cordon-and-search operation by the IPKF in the northern district of Vavuniya yesterday, an Indian High Commission spokesman said today

MULLAITIVU IS REINFORCED

Realising that all is not well with Mullaitivu, which the Indian forces once claimed has been rid of the Tigers, the IPKF has started to build up its military strength in Mullaitivu. According to reports, Indian helicopters continue to hover over the Mankulam-Mullaitivu area transporting soldiers and ammunitions.

HOMEGUARDS COULD NOT GUARD THEMSELVES

Unconfirmed sources report that a pack of homeguards living in the Sinhalese Colonisation Scheme at Kokkuthoduvai in the district of Trincomalee, who had gone on a robbery spree into a Tamil village at Munthirikai Kulam, were shot at by the Tamil residents of the village. Though none of the homeguards was killed, two were injured while three managed to run away. The injured two who were in possession of hunting guns were arrested and handed over to the Tamil Tigers.

HOSPITAL STAFF ATTACKED

Dr.Mohanathan, a Dental Surgeon, attached to the base hospital in Kalmunai was seriously hurt and four others were also injured in an incident involving Indian army personnel on March 4th.

According to Kalmunai sources, soldiers from the IPKF camp at the Kalmunai rest house had gone to the residential quarters of the Kalmunai medical staff, at about 7-30 p.m. on Friday. The Indian soldiers were looking for another doctor S.Sasendran of the same hospital for questioning regarding a charge that he had been giving treatment to LTTE men. Dr.Sasendran was not in the medical quarters at that time.

Thereafter the Indian soldiers had assaulted Dr.Mohanathan and three others who were playing bridge with him. A fourth was also injured. The others were Messrs. Selvanayagam, Kailasapathy, Mahendran and Nadanalingam.

INNOCENT TAMILS MASSACRED IN HORAWUPOTANA

According to a BBC news report, masked gunmen in Sri Lanka have attacked a bus and killed at least 16 passengers all of them Tamils. Military officials in Colombo have confirmed that the attackers threw bombs and shot the passengers before setting the bus on fire. It is reported that the bus was travelling on the main road in Horawupotana in Anuradhapura district.

An IPKF jawan was also injured.

Reports from sources close to the Vavuniya Citizens' Committee said that there were heavy LTTE casualties in the IPKF operation at a place called Panikkaneeravu, five km from Omanthai in Northern Vavuniya district.

A LTTE camp at Tambalakammam, Trincomallee was under attack by Sri Lankan Forces and in the battle LTTE cadres Archuna, Malanan, Jani and Rajkumar were killed. 8 cadres wounded.

11

COLOMBO, April 11.

Fifteen persons described as "hardcore LTTE" cadres were detained, an LTTE camp was destroyed and 250 rounds of ammunition were recovered by the IPKF during its operations in the Northern Province during the past 24 hours. At least 250 persons have been detained and interrogated.

An Indian High Commission spokeswoman said that Selva Chandran, Dharam and Yogendren were among the senior cadres taken into custody.

An officer and six jawans were injured when an IPKF patrol was fired upon, and at least two militants were killed in the return of fire, the spokeswoman said. The IPKF believes that three more militants may have been killed while they fled. In another incident, an IPKF jawan was injured while trying to defuse a booby trap.

Search operations continued in the Eastern Province, and six persons were detained and a fibreglass boat seized at Muraiguntiveu. A cache of small arms were recovered at Karankudy, the spokeswoman added —Our Special Correspondent.

COLOMBO, April 11. (PTI) — At least ten suspected militants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were killed and several others injured, when the Sri Lankan Army launched a big operation inside jungle hide outs of the rebels at a place, 15 kms East of Meegaswewa in North Central Anuradhapura District on the border of Trincomalee on Sunday, reports reaching here today said.

Meegaswewa was the place where alleged LTTE guerillas were reported to have killed 14 Sinhalese people on Friday last.

According to Joint Operation Command (JOC) sources of the Sri Lankan Army in Colombo, eight bodies of the LTTE elements were found after the operation.

Some of the identity cards of the Sinhalese civilians killed on Friday, were also recovered from the area, they said.

A LTTE Camp at Mulunkavil, Mannar came under IPKF attack and in the ensuing battle a LTTE cadre, Ravi, died.

14

NEW DELHI, April 14.

A total of 27 LTTE militants were killed and 36 injured in the continuing "clearing operations" by the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) in the jungles south of the Elephant Pass in Sri Lanka during the last 24 hours.

Official sources here said this evening that in the operations, code named "Virat" and "Trishul", IPKF destroyed 34 camps and hideouts of the LTTE and captured 112 hardcore LTTE members. — UNI

Two LTTE supporters Eswaran and Sri were arrested at Thalankuda, Batticaloa. The IPKF and three stars tortured and killed them at the camp.

15

Colombo, April 15 (AFP): Fifteen people, including 10 tamil rebels, were killed in violence in Sri Lanka, official said here on Friday.

Indian troops shot dead seven guerillas of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the northern district of Vavuniya on Thursday, the Indian High Commission said.

Three other LTTE rebels were killed by Indian soldiers in north-eastern Mullaitivu district a spokeswoman said.

Twentyone Tamil militants were wounded and three captured during operations in the island's north, she said, adding that three rebel hideouts were destroyed.

In neighbouring Trincomalee district, two Muslims and two Tamils including a woman, were killed in ethnic clashes on Thursday, a Sri Lankan military official said.

In Batticoloa, with the help of the IPKF, the Three Star – mercenaries abducted three LTTE sympathisers, Mohan (Chettipalayam), Amirthalingam (Mangadu) and Kunam (Kathavalai) and tortured them to death.

16

MADRAS, April 16.

The IPKF continued with its operations condenamed 'Virat' and 'Trishul' for the ninth consecutive day today in the northern Vavuniya sector.

While searching a huge area systematically, it destroyed four LTTE camps, liquidating three militants and injuring another two. While six militants were apprehended in the search operations, 32 suspects were nabbed at check points and are being screened by Intelligence personnel.

At Uyilankulam, Mannar in an encounter with the IPKF, the LTTE guerrillas Lt. Murali (Uyilankulam) and Lt. Tanbarin (Kranji) were dead. A LTTE sentry between Pudukudiyiruppu and Viswamadu was attacked by the IPKF. Two cadres died in the ensuing combat.

17

The IPKF rounded up Poonakari Vilalge. LTTE cadres captain Nixon (Vankali), 2nd Lt. Sankar (Poonakari) were encircled. They sensed defeat and preferring death to surrender they shot themselves.

18

The IPKF shot dead two LTTE supporters at Palayadivattai, Batticoloa, One more was victimised at Porativu.

19

At Chettipalayam LTTE cadres Kutti and Kala of Batticoloa Dt. were brutally tortured to death by three stars with the help of the IPKF.

20

COLOMBO, April 20.

Four middle level militants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam surrendered in Batticaloa and six others were apprehended in Trincomalee yesterday, as the Indian Peace Keeping Force continued to maintain its pressure on the LTTE which has now almost collapsed militarily.

Those who surrendered yesterday were Sinnah Thamby Kumar, Sanmuganatham, Selvarajah and Thyagarajah, a spokesman of the Indian High Commission said.

There has been a lot of surrender by the LTTE militants in the North and the East following capture of several top leaders of the LTTE in the Eastern province by the IPKF.

According to Sri Lankan military sources, a militant suspect named Kandiah Mohandas was shot and killed by the IPKF sentries when he attempted to escape at Kalviyankadu in Batticaloa district yesterday. — PTI

21

COLOMBO, April 21.

Thirtyseven militants were killed in clashes between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS) in Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern Provinces in the 48 hours ending yesterday, the Government-controlled *Daily News* reported today.

Without mentioning the source, the daily said that LTTE gunmen on Wednesday raided the house of Mr. Rajaratnam at Pugudutivu in the northern Jaffna Peninsula where EROS had its political office and killed eight men.

The LTTE also attacked the house of Balakumar, leader of EROS Tineveli unit in the Peninsula and murdered his father and brother-in-law. The report said that Balakumar was not the chief of the EROS group who also bears the same name.

The newspaper said that EROS retaliated with the massacre of 20 LTTE members at Muttur junction, in Eastern Trincomalee district. It also abducted two LTTE men at Killinochchi. The report did not give any reason for the clashes.

Sources in Batticaloa said that EROS has called for a hartal tomorrow in protest against talks by LTTE.

IPKF raid confirmed: Meanwhile, an Indian High Commission spokesperson confirmed that the Indian Peace Keeping Force raided a big LTTE camp, north of Vavuniya town yesterday but he said three was no information about the deaths of 27 militants or the capture of 18 as reported.

22

COLOMBO, April 22.

Lt. Col. A. S. Sekhon, a senior IPKF official, was killed in action while leading his troops in a raid on an LTTE camp near Paranthan in the Northern Province, yesterday.

According to a spokeswoman of the Indian High Commission, three LTTE men were also killed in the exchange. Another officer, an IPKF captain, was injured.

COLOMBO, April 22.

An area leader of the LTTE and a soldier were among nine people killed in violence involving Tamil and Sinhalese militants in Sri Lanka, officials said on Saturday.

Military officials said the IPKF shot dead the LTTE leader, who was identified by his codename "Inban", and three other militants during a clash at Chullipuram on the northern Jaffna peninsula.

Also on the peninsula, suspected LTTE activists shot dead a police sergeant at Point Pedro as he was returning home from a police station.

In other developments, Sinhalese militants from the Janata Vimukti Peramuna dragged a soldier from his house in the suburban Maharagama area and beheaded him.

JVP activists also shot dead an official of a State-owned farm at Hinguragoda in the eastern Polonnaruwa district

A LTTE Cadre at a sentry post in Pudukudiviruppu of Mullaithivu forest area, fell victim to the IPKF sniping.

24

Colombo, April 24 (AFP): Indian peace-keeping troops have ended two military operations in eastern Sri Lanka, killing about 50 Tamil militants, informed sources said here on Sunday.

The IPKF operations also led to the arrest of more than 100 men of the LTTE in Batticaloa district, the sources said, adding that more than 100 LTTE men had fled the coastal area and were believed to be in neighbouring Trincomalee.

They included the LTTE's Batticaloa leader, known as Karuna.

Several hundred Indian soldiers were involved in operations "Tulip Bloom" and "Sword Edge" which began about two months ago to neutralise the LTTE in Batticaloa, the sources said.

The IPKF assaulted a LTTE camp at Kommathurai, Batticoloa, LTTE lost one fighter, Sari.

DIALOGUE IN THE OFFING?

(From our Geneva Correspondent)

The leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Mr. V. Prabaharan has sent to the International Committee of the Red Cross a notice of the LTTE's accession to the Geneva Conventions I-IV of 1949 and the Protocols Additional I & II to the Geneva Conventions. Copies of this notice have been sent to UN Secretary General and the Director for Human Rights. It is learnt that certain Non-governmental organisations are endeavouring to bring about a dialogue in Geneva between the delegates of government of India and the LTTE. The LTTE has renewed its appeal for a cease-fire and has pledged to the government of India that they would co-operate with it for the satisfactory implementation of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord to protect the honour, interests and safety of Tamil people if a political solution could be found which will fulfil the legitimate aspirations of the Tamil people. The leader has sought the assistance of the delegates to assist them and the government of India in their mutual quest for peace.

GMOA CONFIRMS HOSPITAL MASSACRES

The IPKF has killed three doctors nd 65 other health workers attached o the Jaffna Hospital according to a eport released by the GMOA. A Dental Surgeon employed at the Kalmunai Hospital has fractured his and as a result of an assault by he IPKF.

PLOT, EPRLF OFFICES SEALED

The IPKF sealed the offices of PLOT and EPRLF in Vavuniya on 18th April. 14 PLOT and 8 EPRLF men were arrested. The EPRLF members were released subsequently. 8 EPRLF members were killed by PLOT.

DISAPPEARANCES CONTINUE IN THE NORTH AND EAST

Disappearances were a common feature in the North and East during the time the Sri Lankan forces were fighting the Tamil freedom fighters. However, disappearances are still continuing under the IPKF. When relatives make inquiries about arrested people the replies given are, "escaped from custody" and "released", etc.

PROTEST AT IPKF ARRESTS

About 500 civilians lodged a protest with the Government Agent, Vavuniya, Mr.K.P.Logeswaran, over the alleged arrest of 25 innocent civilians at Sastri Koolankulam, Vavuniya, by the IPKF.

25

LTTE denial: The LTTE leadership, in Madras dismissed reports that the Tigers were involved in a bloody clash with the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation, for long an ally of the group, adds Express News Service from Madras.

In a statement on Monday, the political committee of the LTTE here blamed the Sri Lankan army for the murder of EROS' Muthur activist Jagan, and for the reports of bloody clashes between the two groups in which many were allegedly killed.

26

The IPKF rounded up an LTTE camp at Tambalakamma, Trinconamalee. No damage incurred.

27

In the LTTE Camp at Pankulam, Trincomalee an attack was carried out by IPKF. 3 LTTE cadres missing.

An IPKF soldier was shot dead by LTTE in Vadamarachi, Nelliyadi. In this attack a three star mercenary man was also killed along with the IPKF soldier.

28

COLOMBO, April 28.

One non-commissioned officer of the Indian Army and at least three LTTE men were killed in an encounter at Neliady in Northern Jaffna Peninsula yesterday, as the IPKF recovered huge cache of arms and apprehended some militants, according to sources.

Among the three LTTE men killed was "Mohan Das", known to be the area leader Sri Lankan official sources said.

A spokesperson of the Indian High Commission here said the IPKF recovered large amount of arms and ammunition, including detonators and cartridges, from LTTE hide-outs during combing and search operations in northern Killinochi district yesterday.

The spokesperson said seven LTTE militants, including four in Baticaloa, and three in Trincomalee were captured yesterday. Two militants of the PLOT group were apprehended from their camp in northern Vavuniya sector, where the IPKF had two armed encounters with the LTTE elements. There was, however, no report of casualty in these encounters, the spokesperson added. — PTI

Two civilians were killed at Pudukudiyiruppu, while they were passing in a jungle way. In another incident the father of LTTE cadre gracy was killed by the IPKF along with two civilians.

29

In an encounter with Sri Lankan Army at First Unit, Vavuniya LTTE killed 5 armymen and wounded 7.

30

COLOMBO, April 30.

Six Sri Lankan soldiers and five civilians were killed when suspected Tamil militants ambushed a bus near Awarantalawa, Vavuniya, today. The soldiers were aboard the bus to provide protection to the villagers. Nine persons died on the spot, and two others died on the way to hospital. The bus was on its way from Anuradhapura to Vavuniya.

In another incident, PLOT sources said, eight of their members were killed in an encounter with the IPKF at Chettikulam in Vavuniya, where the organisation has a camp. The Indian High Commission here could not confirm the incident, but according to PLOT, Kulendran, alias Gaddafi and Kirubakaran alias Jagan were among those killed. The sources said a large number of their cadres had been rounded up by the IPKF yesterday.

At Trincomalee in Kokuvilunthan area, IPKF men were caught in the landmines set by LTTE and one of them killed on the spot.

In a roundup at LTTE Camp, Pankulam by the IPKF, two LTTE cadres Nathan and Mohan have lost their lives.

CRP

EPRLF - PLOTE Clashes :

On 01.04.88 each of the groups reportedly kidnapped 5 members of the other group. Kidnapped members of the EPRLF were said to be killed later on. The area of such activities centered around Vavuniya. Consequent on the clashes between two groups, the IPKF arrested some EPRLF cadres in Vavuniya and Mannar and released them after 24 hours. The IPKF also raided the PLOTE camp and took into custody some PLOTE members and 17 civilians found in the PLOTE camp. The PLOTE cadres and civilians continue to be detained by the IPKF.

Lankan Security Forces in North & East

The Government announced that it was strengthening its security forces in the North and East in order to pave the way for the phased withdrawal of the IPKF. Lankan Security Forces have to be confined to camps in terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord. However, exceptions are being sought now on the ground that Lankan Security Forces were required to protect Sinhala villages in the East. ON 05.04.88 four Lankan soldiers riding in a jeep at Kondachi in the Mannar District in the North were shot and killed by militants. Following the Lankan Rapid Development Force was deployed in Kondachi about 25km South of Mannar the next day.

வீரவணக்கம்

LTTE MARTYRS

- Kala 19.4.88
- Sun 24.4.88
- Lt. Kutti 8.4.88
- Capt. David 17.4.88
- Capt. Rahim 20.4.88
- Patchan 27.4.88
- Charles 30.4.88
- 2nd Lt Anbu 9.4.88
- Kamal 7.4.88
- Radha 14.4.88
- Joseph 8.4.88
- Kuruvi 17.4.88
- Thaya 10.4.88
- Kasan 7.4.88
- 2nd Lt Raghavan 10.4.88
- Lucas 19.4.88
- Nalin 24.4.88
- Lt. Sudarsan 9.4.88
- Johnson 9.4.88
- Sinnaravi 10.4.88
- Arjuna 10.4.88
- Johnny 10.4.88
- Manalan 10.4.88
- Rajkumar 10.4.88
- Ravi 11.4.88
- Bastian 14.4.88
- Sree 14.4.88
- Tanbirin 16.4.88
- Lt. Murali 16.4.88
- Capt. Nixon 17.4.88
- Lt. Shankar 17.4.88
- 2nd. Lt. Arasan 19.4.88
- Capt. Thambukili 21.4.88
- Naren 28.4.88
- Jeevan 29.4.88
- Capt. Nathan 30.4.88
- Mohan 30.4.88

காலனும் காலம் பார்க்கும்; பாராது
வேல்ஈண்டு தானை விழுமியோர் தொலைய,
வேண்டிடத்து அடூஉம் வெல்போர் வேந்தே!
திசைஇரு நான்கும் உற்கம் உற்கவும்,
பெருமரத்து, இலையில் நெடுங்கோடு வற்றல்
பற்றவும்,

வெங்கதிர்க் கனலி துற்றவும், பிறவும்,
அஞ்சுவரத் தகுந புள்ளுக்குரல் இயம்பவும்,
எயிறுநிலத்து வீழவும், எண்ணெய் ஆடவும்,
களிறுமேல் கொள்ளவும், காழகம் நீப்பவும்,
வெள்ளி நோன்படை கட்டிலொடு கவிழவும்,

கனவின் அரியன காணூ, நனவின்
செருச்செய் முன்ப! நின் வருதிறன் நோக்கி,
மையல் கொண்ட ஏமம்இல் இருக்கையர்,
புதல்வர் பூங்கண் முத்தி, மனையோட்கு
எவ்வம் கரக்கும் பைதல் மாக்களொடு

பெருங்கலக் குற்றன்ருல் தானே, காற்ருேடு
எரிநிகழ்ந் தன்ன செலவின்
செருமிகு வளவ! நிற் சினேஇயோர் நாடே.

கோவூர் கிழார்.



Maj. Naren 29.4.88

Lt. Manalan 10.4.88

Mohan 12.4.88

Kala 19.4.88

Arasan 19.4.88

Suri 24.4.88

KILLING □ FIELD

88 April

claims	IPKF		LTTE		S.L. ARMY		OTHER MILITANTS		CIVILIANS	
	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED
IPKF				5 C					17	
LTTE										
MEDIA							5 EP			C 17

2

3

3

C 24 | 2* EN | 1* EN

4

7 | 1 | 5 EP | C 13

5

7 | 5 | 7 | 2 | 4

6

7

1 | 7 C

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C 50 | * 14 | 2

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27 | C 148 | 2 | 30

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10 | 24 | * 5 | 4 | C 19

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3 | C 40 | 2 | 30 | C 21 | C 30

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TOTAL										
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2	1 C 4	73	C 40	21	1	13	30 C	16	6 C 17

* - Sri Lankan Information.c-captured. EP-EPRLF T-TELO, P-PLOTE, EN-ENDLF, E-EROS TNA-Tamil National Army CVF-Citizen s Voluntary Force

CHAPTER 11

1988

the heinous crimes of indian peace keeping

May

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PSYCHOLOGY OF STATE TERRORISM

M. Sreetharan, PhD

COMMENT

During the pre-accord period, driven by the historical emotional attachment to India, an overwhelming majority of Tamils wished and demanded India to intervene militarily in Sri Lanka. **Contrary to our expectations, we have witnessed, as distant observers and with many of us burdened with personal tragedies, the untold suffering and destruction unleashed on the Tamil community and their property by the Indian invasion forces.** It is worthwhile examining some fundamental principles that govern the behaviour of nations in marching forward with their geopolitical agenda. Some material in the following sections has been drawn from the writings of Noam Chomsky

Three different mechanisms can be identified that serve as potential sources of state terrorism (political ideology plays no part in the psychology behind terror, but methods to achieve the ambitions may be different):

1) Superpowers finding ingenious ways to exacerbate local hostilities and inhibit peaceful resolution of local conflicts. e.g., Contras (US) Afghan Govt. (USSR).
2) Regional powers or powerful neighbours attempting to control states that threaten their geopolitical designs for the region. e.g. Indian involvement in Sri Lanka.

3) Nations within a single state with either a 'democratically' elected majority conducting with complete freedom state-sponsored terrorism to subjugate a politically weak minority or an authoritarian regime terrorising its own population. e.g. Majority Sinhalese Government-sponsored pogroms, massacres and planned land settlement policies to make Tamils nonentities in Sri Lankan socio-economic spectrum.

The philosophy and the moral content behind these actions by organised 'legitimate' institutions, short-sighted and corrupted by the power derived from their relative military strength, is common; subjugation by terror motivated by self interest with rudimentary respect for international law. The only difference is in the size of the geographic area the aggressor wishes to have under its influence.

THE FIFTH FREEDOM

Franklin Roosevelt announced that US and its allies must uphold in the conflict with fascism the following four freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want and freedom from fear. The central conclusion that emerges from the historical record of all nations that have engaged in state terrorism is the concept of preservation of the fifth freedom, understood crudely but with fair degree of accuracy as: **"The freedom to rob, to exploit and to dominate, to undertake any course of action to ensure that existing privilege is protected and advanced"** thereby having the freedom to breach the most fundamental tenet in the state system, the sovereign equality. The IPKF's behaviour in the Tamil heartland can be explained in the above context; they were only exercising their fifth freedom. Indiscriminate killing of thousands of civilians (including the old, children, doctors and patients in Jaffna hospital, the documented evidences are embarrassing to the extent that the UN indicted India at the sessions of the human rights commission) and looting of the savings of the Tamils are all valid courses of action under the rules governing the 'fifth freedom'.

MEDIA AND ORWELLISMS

Liberal democratic theorists have long noted that in a society where the voice of the people is heard elite groups must insure that the voice says the right things. In Sri Lanka, the media IS controlled by the state; what people think does not matter too much. (The 'peace keeping' Indian commandos further helped the Sri Lankan regime by blasting the press/buildings of all three Tamil newspapers). In India bulk of the media is state-controlled with a few notable exceptions. The propagandist flirtations of such media even hailed the Sri Lankan involvement as a foreign policy success for India. As vehemently criticised by the former Foreign Secretary Venkateswaran, India does not have a coherent foreign policy; rather they are made at the whims of the politically naive but aristocratically arrogant Prime Minister of India. But the state-controlled media dutifully labours to maintain a positive image of their chief executive. **The constrained dissent exhibited in Tamil Nadu for the Indian atrocities in Jaffna reflects the efficiency of the propaganda machinery of the state.** In contrast, United States is unusual if not unique in the lack of restraints on freedom of expression. Here, the technique is 'manufacturing consent' as is immediately evident to any foreigner; the thinking of the indigenous population except the intellectually bright are already controlled by the media.

In the Indian invasion of Jaffna the Peace-Accord became the focal word. By the history of this accord it is already a form of 'Newspeak' where the term, Peace-Accord, has a technical sense divorced from its ordinary meaning. In its technical sense it refers to the proposals advanced by the Indian government and the Sri Lankan government. The LTTE, the other main party in the conflict, was never a party to the accord. The impact of a headline saying "LTTE breaks the Peace-Accord" is obvious, but as we have seen although this is false, it is true in the world constructed by the media.

The state-controlled media will play down the role of overt state violence, regardless of its indiscriminateness or its intent to hit 'non-combatant targets'. These forms of state-sponsorship are generally treated as falling within the morally neutral and emotionally positive category of 'uses of force' or 'military action' or 'hit guerilla targets'. Manipulation of political language certainly acts as a powerful weapon in perpetuating this fraud.

DAMAGE CONTROL

Once the aggressor nation fails to achieve the objectives as swiftly as originally planned, a project of damage control becomes the next logical step. The state will be forced to deal with the following issues:

a) to conceal the systematic nature of the criminality now being partially exposed;

b) to question the failure of their military machinery against a weak enemy as judged by their intelligence agencies;

c) to reassess the options and continue the offensive or find a way out, without losing face.

Indian involvement in Sri Lanka presents a case-study of underestimating the strength of a 'weak' minority. India currently is in the damage control phase. Simplified explanatory models are being used in paranoid style to establish some kind of justification for their actions. (IPKF is publishing their own newspaper in Jaffna to replace the local papers they demolished). Recently, however, common sense appears to have given way to their hitherto intransigence of not negotiating with the LTTE, the only credible representatives of the Eelam Tamils, hopefully to pave the way for a justified solution in the Tamils point of view.

SUMMARY

The recent period in the history of Sri Lankan Tamils is unique in the story of humanity; a powerless, but morally strong minority undergoing immense sufferings under the hands of undisciplined military of two terrorist regimes in succession, behind the veil of democracy and peace while the world simply observed in silence. What has also been tragic is the fact that 'democracy' in the land that is the proud mother of Mohanadas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru has not been strong enough to play a principled role in the conflict. As a global community, we are still short of a fair international mechanism that safeguards the fundamental rights of minority groups struggling all over the world.

GREETINGS FROM PRABAHARAN

To the International Tamil Conference

I am very delighted to know that the World Federation of Tamils has organised an International Conference in London to focus on the Tamil national liberation struggle and on the implications of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. **Such a convention, participated in by the Tamil patriots all over the world, is most timely and urgent in view of the critical and dangerous situation that has developed in Tamil Eelam since the signing of the Accord.**

You are aware that within a short span of time after the so-called Peace Accord was signed, the Indian troops, which landed on our soil with a peace mission to protect our people, embarked on a ruthless war against our liberation movement, the consequences of which are catastrophic in terms of civil deaths and destruction of property. This war, which was started on the 10th of October last year is continuing, unabated, with ever growing fury, bleeding the Tamil nation profusely. The continuation of this war with its violence and bloodshed clearly demonstrates that the Accord has miserably failed in its acclaimed objectives of bringing peace and harmony to our people. **It is no more a peace agreement. It can only be characterised as a war accord, as an accord of military alliance between India and Sri Lanka, the strategic aim of which is to destroy the Tamil freedom movement and its armed vanguard.**

For the last seven months, we have been fighting to defend ourselves against a formidable military apparatus whose sophistication in war technology and in manpower is far superior to ours. **It is sheer will power, courage and our fierce determination not to surrender in humiliation, and above all, the morale and, the moral support provided by our people, that have contributed to our survival as a fighting force against the military might of a super power. Our capacity to resist in this prolonged war should be a bitter lesson to India that the will of a nation cannot be suppressed by military means, however formidable it may be.**

It is with profound sorrow and pain we took to arms to resist, since India offered to us no alternative other than to defend ourselves or perish. We consider India as our friend and ally and therefore we despise this war. I have made several appeals to the Indian Prime Minister for peace, for negotiations and reconciliation. But to our deep dismay India has turned down our genuine plea for peace. **There seems to be a callous and calculated determination on the part of India to wipe out the Tiger movement and thereafter to induct an electoral process in Tamil Eelam at the point of a gun, to impose upon the Tamil people a deficient political framework.** She has thus chosen to betray the interests of the Eelam Tamils in order to strengthen and consolidate her relationship with Sri Lanka and to secure their geo-political objectives.

As a consequence of India's direct and violent intervention in the Tamil National problem through the medium of this Accord, the future of our people and their socio-political existence have suddenly been thrown into the darkness of uncertainty, confusion and gloom. Our political struggle for self-determination which is a product of a lengthy evolutionary history extending over forty years, a product of national campaigns, of mass agitations, and of revolutionary armed resistance, is faced with the danger of being stamped out. **The ultimate consequence of the Indian intervention is the grave danger of the complete subjugation of our people to the dictatorial dominance of the Sinhala ruling class and the perpetuation of oppression, state terror and genocide.**

In view of this grim situation facing the people of Tamil Eelam, it is the national duty and solemn responsibility of all the Tamil patriots living abroad to organise and mobilise themselves into a powerful international voice of reason to fight for the redemption of their motherland caught in a monumental historical tragedy. **The patriotic Tamil intelligentsia living abroad should lead an effective global campaign to stir the conscience of the civilised world about this tragic human condition of betrayal and oppression. We fervently hope that the international Tamil community will understand and support whole-heartedly, the determined struggle of our liberation movement to fight for the cause of justice for our oppressed people.**

My congratulations and good wishes for the success of the International Tamil Conference.

TAMIL CONFERENCE

An 'International Tamil Conference' was held in London on April 30 and May 1 to discuss the 'Tamil National Struggle and Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord'. The Conference was organised by the 'World Federation of Tamils' and sponsored by the Tamil Voice International which came into circulation recently.

It is understood that the conference was attended by over 200 individuals and delegates from organisations specially invited for the occasion.

Public notifications regarding the conference indicated that several guest speakers addressed the conference. They included V.Gopalasamy, MP belonging to the DMK, Aladi Aruna, MP belonging to the AIADMK, Retired Supreme Court Judge Krishna Iyer, Former Foreign Secretary A.P.Venkateswaran, P.Nedumaran (all from India), Ms.Karen Parker, a human rights lawyer from USA and Prof.A.J.Wilson.

Mr.N.Seevaratnam, the Chairman of the conference Committee, and N.Satyendra, a leading lawyer from Sri Lanka and presently living in the UK.and who participated in the Thimpu Negotiations in 1985 as spokesman for the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), played a prominent role in the conference and its organisation.

The three resolutions adopted at the Conference by acclamation, in brief, (1) called upon the member states of United Nations, including the government of Sri Lanka 'to support the struggle of the Tamils of Ceylon for their basic and fundamental rights, including the right to self determination' and the internationa' community to 'assist in securing a just political settlement of the conflict in Sri Lanka on the basis of an open recognition of the political reality that there exists in Sri Lanka today two nations — the Tamil Nation and the Sinhala Nation'; (2) recognised that V.Prabakaran and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have emerged as the true leaders of the Tamil National Struggle and called upon all member states of the UN to recognise them as such, and also called upon all Tamils to strengthen the LTTE to further the Tamil national struggle; and (3) called for an immediate ceasefire, and to commence negotiations to reach a political settlement within the framework of the four demands made by the Tamil delegations at the Thimpu Negotiations.

Tamil Times

EDITORIAL

UNITY AND UNANIMITY

The International Tamil Conference convened and concluded successfully in London to address the central issues of the Tamil national struggle in the context of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987, and the developments since, is historic in many respects. This Conference is the first of this nature held and attended by a large number of delegates of Tamil associations and organisations from the five continents of the world. In that respect the message of this Conference was not only a representative voice of the Tamils of the world but also an authentic one too.

Having discussed at length the political issues involved, the representative delegates to the Conference took a joint view in acknowledging that the legitimate aspirations of the Tamil people in Ceylon, on the basis of the four cardinal principles declared jointly in Thimpu, have not been met by the Accord. The delegates to the Conference further reaffirmed their commitment to those principles which express the joint and unanimous will of the Tamil people.

The Conference took a united stand in its historic resolution affirming the leadership of Mr Velupillai Prabaharan and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and appealed to the world to recognise this, and urged the Governments of India and Sri Lanka to effect an immediate ceasefire and commence serious negotiations with the LTTE to seek a political resolution to the conflict in Sri Lanka.

Whilst expressing the solidarity of the International Tamil community with their brothers and sisters in Ceylon at this time of trial and tribulation the Conference called on the Tamils of the World to unite in this hour of need, around the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. All Tamil Associations and Organisations and Tamil activists the world over were called to help implement a five-point programme which was endorsed by the delegates.

Apart from the clear stand it took and the various resolutions that were passed the Conference was even more significant to the Tamils of Ceylon, both at home and abroad, in the sense that it brought out the united expression of the will of a people who are denied all avenues of democratic expression in their own homelands in Ceylon, with the presence of well over 100,000 Indian troops in their midst, and without any political representation or say in their governance.

Above all, the Conference recognised that there can be no peace without justice, and that justice cannot be met without securing the rights of Tamils in Ceylon including their inalienable right to self determination as a people, from which flows all other basic and fundamental rights,and it declared that the political reality is that there are two nations in Sri Lanka - The Tamil Nation and the Sinhala Nation - and that two nations may agree to live together **by force of reason** but cannot be compelled to live together **by force of arms.**

All Tamils must rally round this call for unity and duty at this hour. It is now or never.

O.V. Vijayan, The Statesman

EDITORIAL

FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE

IRONY of all ironies! Hardly any Sinhalese prelate or politician asked for devolution or provincial councils. If at all, there was tremendous opposition to any such proposal. However, already elections have been held for four Provincial Councils and by June 9 elections would have been concluded for a further three. By then the island's seven provinces in which the Sinhalese people predominantly live would be enjoying substantial devolution of legislative and executive powers with their own Governor, Chief Minister and Board of Ministers.

It was the Tamil people predominantly living in the northern and eastern provinces who demanded, campaigned, struggled and fought for autonomy which is yet to be achieved. For all the tensions and hostilities engendered during recent years between the two communities resulting from the Tamil demand for autonomy, the first beneficiaries are the Sinhalese people, and they ought at least to thank the Tamil people for this unsolicited gift of extended devolved democracy.

How come that the Sinhalese people who never asked for devolution or provincial councils got them? The answer is not far to seek. The Tamil demand for autonomy could no longer be resisted. It was being urged as a basis for solving the ethnic conflict by India and the rest of the world too which have witnessed the fall-out of the conflict being deeply felt in their own countries. Failing in its repeated military endeavours, urged by India, reluctantly and step by step, the government of Sri Lanka came round to the idea of some form of autonomy to the Tamils. But it did not have the courage or the political honesty to tell the Sinhalese people that the resolution of the conflict demanded the grant of autonomy to the Tamils. Thus we have a situation in which the constitutional and institutional guarantees that the Tamil people required to protect their rights and identity as a people being granted to the Sinhalese too whose rights and identity were never under threat and in fact by the sheer strength of their permanently entrenched numerical majority, they required no such special guarantees. In any civilised society, it is the numerical minority, particularly, when its aspirations are linked to the preservation of its physical and cultural identities, that requires special protection.

The Tamil militant groups and the TULF are still of the view that the arrangements made through the 13th Amendment to the Constitution and the Provincial Council do not provide the safeguards they were expecting. In fact, at the time the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was signed, the Agreement itself provided for 'residual matters', that is, those matters over which the Tamil representatives had expressed reservations, and those matters about which no provision has been made at all, be further discussed. These discussions never took place and they have not taken place yet.

It may be that the breakdown of the time-frame provided for the surrender of arms and the establishment of the interim administration for the north and east, the resurgence of armed violence in these provinces and the eventual outbreak of fighting between the India Peace Keeping Force and the LTTE produced a climate in which the contemplated negotiations on the 'residual matters' could not take place. It may also be that, in view of the tensions that were building up in the south following the signing of the Agreement, the government felt prudent to enact the 13th Amendment to the Constitution and the Provincial Council in the way it did without giving a chance for the opposition to mobilise against such measures.

It is high time that the 'residual matters' be taken up for discussion without any further delay. The dominant Tamil militant group, the LTTE, which accepted the Accord with reservations, has indicated in several letters to the Indian Prime Minister that it is pledged to cooperate with the implementation of the Accord provided it is given the opportunity to negotiate about certain matters in respect which it has expressed concern. The other Tamil Militant groups and the TULF are also not satisfied with the present arrangements that some Sri Lankan Ministers had discussions with some representatives of the LTTE. It is also reported that Indian government officials have been negotiating with the LTTE stalwarts in Tamil Nadu. One leader of a militant group has in fact met and discussed with the President. Under the amnesty provisions of the Accord, some political prisoners are also being released.

In this context, the climate seems to be particularly suitable now for a resumption of negotiations on the 'residual matters' and the issues of concern for the Tamil people with the governments of India and Sri Lanka. And a prerequisite for such negotiations to take place in an amicable atmosphere is a cease-fire between the IPKF and the LTTE for a stated period during which the negotiations should be concluded. The Sri Lanka government, the IPKF and the Tamil Militant groups are said to be 'fighting' for peace and justice. What is required is an end to the fighting and resumption of 'talking' for peace and justice.

Sri Lanka : New Trends

SUMIT CHAKRAVARTTY

THE first phase of the elections to the provincial councils in Sri Lanka, that took place on April 28, has recorded certain striking features that need to be dispassionately analysed by all those who are interested in the return of peace in that strife-torn island republic.

The first and most significant of these is the fairly large turn-out of voters—1.78 million constituting 61.49 per cent of the total electorate—that in the prevailing circumstances, marked by widespread violence and terrorist acts engineered by the outlawed and extremist Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), has come as a pleasant surprise (even if this is of a modest scale in a country where every election in the past has been witness to heavy polling ranging between 70 to 80 per cent). The fact that the electorate exercised its franchise by and large rejecting the call for poll boycott given by both the JVP and the largest opposition party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLEP), is a highly noteworthy and welcome development.

Secondly, the two organisations which have fared exceedingly well in these elections—the ruling United National Party (UNP) and the United Socialist Alliance (USA) of four Left-wing parties (that is, the Sri Lanka Mahajana Party headed till the other day by Vijaya Kumaranatunga, the charismatic popular leader and cine-star slain three months ago by the

JVP; the Communist Party of Sri Lanka; the Lanka Sama Samaj Party ; and the Nava Sama Samaj Party) —are both staunch supporters of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord that has come under heavy fire from the side of Sinhala chauvinists.

Thirdly, the USA did unexpectedly well in these elections and ran a close second to the UNP. This is evident from the following figures: in the Puttalam district of North-Western province the USA polled 70,270 votes and won six seats as against 89,810 votes secured by the UNP which captured eight seats; in the Kurunegala district of North-Western province the USA polled 160,704 votes and won 13 seats as against 257,168 votes secured by the UNP which captured 21 seats; in the Anuradhapura district of North-Central province the USA polled 85,324 votes and won nine seats as against 112,760 votes secured by the UNP which captured 12 seats; in the Polonnaruwa district of North-Central province the USA polled 14,652 votes and won three seats as against 30,081 votes secured by the UNP which won seven seats; in the Badulla district of Uva province the USA polled 78,240 votes and won seven seats as against 118,289 votes secured by the UNP which captured 11 seats; in the Monaragala district of Uva province the USA polled 27,082 votes and won six seats as against 35,463 votes secured by the UNP which captured seven seats; in the Kegalle district of Sabaragamuwa province the USA polled 109,277 votes and won nine seats as against 127,338 votes secured by the UNP which captured 10 seats. Overall, the USA secured 669,975 votes as against 918,211 polled by the UNP. It is all the more revealing that the USA fared remarkably well in the JVP stronghold of Sabaragamuwa province.

The results have been expectedly hailed by the Government of India as reflective of the Sinhala people's general support to the Indo-Sri Lanka accord. While none can take exception to such an interpretation of the poll outcome by New Delhi it would be more correct to underscore that the democratic political culture of the Sri Lankan people (Sri Lanka was the first British colony to be granted universal suffrage way back in 1931) has superseded every other consideration. It has also brought out the validity of the democratic forces' demand for setting in motion the electoral process as a means to isolate the JVP from the masses — a demand which was powerfully aired by Ronnie de Mel, the erstwhile Minister for Finance, who resigned from the Sri Lankan Government on this very issue.

These elections have underlined the Sri Lankan people's desire for peace as manifest in the negative response to the JVP call for boycott and attempts to disrupt the poll. The rejection of the SLFP's contention that the provincial councils would be vested with too much power is also of no mean significance. The SLFP adopted this course as it was opposed to the Tamil areas of the North and East enjoying more powers than they ever had in the past.

At the same time, the USA's amazing success—mostly the result of mass sympathy generated by Vijaya Kumaranatunga's martyrdom but also attributable to the fact that sections of disgruntled followers of both the UNP and the SLFP voted for it—is a signal that the people of Sri Lanka desire a democratic change. This is likely to get more pronounced in the coming days especially when the remaining three Sinhala dominated provinces (that is, Central; Western including Colombo; and Southern provinces) go to the polls for the provincial council elections next month. The USA is known to be relatively more strong in these areas than in other parts of the country.

The mood of the Sri Lankan people is clear from these elections: they want the electoral process to work. Under no condition should J.R. Jayawardene deprive the Sri Lankan citizens of their right to participate in the parliamentary elections (last held eleven years ago, in July 1977, and due in mid-1989) as well as the presidential elections (last held less than six years ago, in October 1982, and due by this year end), The Government of India has the moral responsibility to impress upon JRJ not to put off these elections under one flimsy pretext or the other because the consequences of such a step would be suicidal for the Sri Lankan President.

The outcome of these elections in the four Sri Lankan provinces highlight the necessity for New Delhi to redouble its efforts and ensure the success of political negotiations with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) since that alone would pave the way for the holding of provincial council elections in the North and the East.

Two more positive developments need to be noted in the Sri Lankan scenario. First, the JVP is faced with quite serious inner-party differences with its key organiser Gamanayaka expressing opposition to JVP supremo Vijayavira's call to liquidate all supporters of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, including those of the Left. Gamanayaka is understood to have been against the slaying of Vijaya Kumaranatunga. Sharpening of these differences in the near future can have far-reaching implications for the Sri Lankan polity.

Secondly, quite a few of the democratic elements among the Sinhala people who had supported the accord and yet were languishing in JRJ's prison-house having been denied amnesty have lately been released. They include Pulsara Liyanage, the 28-year old lecturer at Keleniya University (who had been jailed since November 1, 1986 under the Prevention of Terrorism Act) and 12 others of the *Vikalpa Kandayama* group. They were all charged with sedition, although their actual crime was to join hands with a section of the Tamil militants and fight the anti-democratic policies of the JRJ regime. The charges against the 23 accused in this case have yet to be withdrawn, however.

In the light of these positive developments it is necessary for the democratic forces of India and Sri Lanka to act in concert to bring to an early end the ethnic conflict in the island-state. More pressure must be exerted on the respective Governments to hasten this process and thereby strengthen the edifice of peace in the region. In this context the political negotiations between the Government of India and the LTTE with the ultimate objective of ensuring ceasefire and withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka acquire added importance. ☐ *(May 4)*

SRI LANKA - IN A CIVIL WAR SITUATION

COMMENT

Ms Karen Parker, Human Rights Attorney in USA

I would like to begin by discussing why it is that Tamil people have a struggle. I am not a Tamil. I have taken on issues relating to Tamils in the United Nations, before my Government, and before the Government of India. What is it in International Law that underpins this initiative? Quite frankly, it's not because Tamils are Tamil. Tamils are no different from any other group when it comes to International Law. Under International Law principles, all people are equal. Tamils are considered naturally no more peaceful, no more intelligent, no more warm and loving than any other people in the world. Though I must say, given the last six months in the field, **certain members of the Tamil community have shown themselves to be rather unusually courageous, rather unusually brilliant military commanders and, in the face of what appears to be overwhelming odds, dedicated and determined. This is difficult to find in 1988 among any peoples of the world.**

But the struggle in Tamil Eelam is not adopted by the International Community because Tamils are Tamils. **The struggle is discussed in the International Community because Tamils as Tamils have been persecuted and denied their basic rights as people.** And that persecution has led to a series of events, that has led to an armed conflict, that has achieved diplomatic status, that has given a legal right for Tamils to be engaged in the activities they are now engaged in both Internationally and in Sri Lanka.

RECOURSE TO REBELLION

The third preambular paragraph to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads: "Whereas it is essential if man is not to be compelled to have recourse as a last resort to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law." **What occurred in Sri Lanka is that the rule of law for Tamil people ceased to exist. What happened in Sri Lanka is that the government became a racist government, not a national government and the oppressed people of that racist government began to see themselves more as oppressed people rather than citizens of Sri Lanka who happen to be Tamil rather than Sinhalese or anything else.** The *Tamil cause* did not generate in my view because Tamils consider themselves different or better than anyone else but because the government in Sri Lanka was saying that Tamils were less than someone else, especially the ruling party in Sri Lanka.

Now the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is rarely discussed in terms of its establishment of a legal basis for rebellion. But I defy anyone to find another juridical meaning to the words "whereas it is essential if man is not to be compelled to have recourse as a last resort to rebellion against tyranny and oppression." I defy any jurist to find in those words a prohibition to rebellion against tyranny. The only way it can be construed is an acceptance that mankind, a people, will indeed, as their natural right, exercise the right to rebellion against tyranny.

For the most part, the right to engage in armed conflict is usually discussed in terms of the right to self defence. In other words, country A may not invade country B but country B can fight back if invaded and country B has the legal right to use force against oppression. Country A would be considered the aggressor country. When it comes to a people it is normally discussed in terms of a right to self defence. So that a government in an internal setting must appear to be against part of the population in order for that population to say I am exercising my right to self defence. There is also in International Law, an acceptance of the fact that inside countries and purely in a civil war setting there are power struggles and there is no international prohibition to the concept of a power struggle even if the power struggle takes on the force of arms. The International Law regime recognises civil wars, and civil wars may be fought not only from the perspective of an oppressed people against a domineering government but can be a mere power struggle as occurred in my country's civil war and has occurred in other countries' civil wars.

Civil wars can be revolutionary, as is the case right now in El Salvador where the opposition forces want to take over the National Government. Civil wars may be secessionist such as occurred in Pakistan creating Bangladesh or the attempt to create the State of Biafra in Nigeria. And civil wars may be, in the case of Sri Lanka, a war in which one segment of the population wants a homeland with some degree of autonomy if not total self sufficiency but something short of total sovereignty or separatism.

A civil war is found, and this is the International Law rule, *when there is an armed conflict in the territory of a state between Government armed forces and dissident armed forces or other groups who under responsible command exercise sufficient control over territory so as to be able to engage in military operations and implement humanitarian law.*

The International Community recognise that that state existed in Sri Lanka when in 1987, after three years of struggle in the United Nations, **we achieved the adoption of a resolution in which the situation of Sri Lanka was discussed in terms of humanitarian law.** Those are two sacred words to anyone involved in armed struggle. This is not the law of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but the law of the Geneva Conventions, the protocol's addition to the Geneva Convention and what we call **the Laws of Armed Conflict.** They are of course related.

I argued since 1983 that there was by law an armed conflict governed by these rules because in my view at least **the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam had met that test.** Throughout the years constantly looking to see which other of the mili-

tant groups might have met the test, I never found any of the others independently meeting that test; and only in the limited periods when there appeared to be some intrinsic unity between the groups would any of the others groups ever be protected by humanitarian law. But throughout the last several years at least, **the** Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have met that test, they are protected as well as obliged by the Geneva Conventions, and the International Community adopted that concept in the Resolution of the Human Rights Commission 1987.

A VERY GRAVE VIOLATION

That instantly changed by law the status of LTTE from any implication that they might be terrorists. I had to contend with everything possible to prevent the use of the words 'humanitarian law' in the United Nations. Every time I would make a speech going through this test and showing why the LTTE made it or arguing about where are the POW's in this war to point out violations or would expose attacks on a civilian population as violations of the Geneva Conventions, the Government of Sri Lanka would come back and argue, 'there are no POW's in Sri Lanka', pretending that the Geneva Conventions did not apply. **Of course, what they were really doing was admitting a very grave violation of humanitarian law.** But they were constantly trying to defend and the biggest struggle of human rights organisations dealing with the issue year after year was to get recognition that humanitarian law applied.

Then on October 10th, the universe changed. Until that time there had been and was an armed conflict in Sri Lanka between Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Government of Sri Lanka and that both sides were protected by and obliged by the International Humanitarian Law rules. **What happens when another country comes into a civil war? And then who's who?**

What obligations? There are two ways of looking at it. One is, you have an Internationalised civil war or you have a civil war and an international war going on at the same time. I prefer the second characterisation but in a way it does not make any difference, because **whereas the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Government of Sri Lanka in their armed conflict with each other were obliged by the civil war rules of humanitarian law, the Government of India is obliged by the International rules of humanitarian law meaning the entire Geneva Conventions, not just Article 3 which governs civil wars.** So now we have to look at the situation. We have combatants of the LTTE and combatants of the Government of India. Let's look at what we see in a war. It's different to what we look at when there is not a war if we are going to find culpability for human rights or humanitarian law violations.

What we looked at was the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the Emergency Regulations and all those other Acts of the Sinhalese Government directed at the Tamil population and talked about it in terms of human rights. We talked about torture. We talked about disappearances. We talked about summary and arbitrary execution. We talked about the situation in the Boosa camp. We talked about their sweeps into neighbourhoods and the abductions and the arrests of, in particular and almost exclusively, the Tamil youth.

WHAT HAPPENS IN A WAR?

Now that we have a war, what have we talked about. Well when we talk about what's going on, it starts making more sense because what happens in a war? **Bullets fly and people die.** It's not an issue of a little torture here and there, it's an issue of the regrettable and devastating effect of bodies piling up and I am sorry to be graphic that is what happens in war. And we talked about the protection of the civilian population from military operations, not the police coming in, not interrupting a riot with a slightly hefty billiard club. You talk about someone coming into your home and shooting up your relatives, wearing uniforms. Civilians are protected from the dangers of war, hospitals are protected from military attack. I have prepared an outline, it has not been distributed, for those who are interested I am sure we can get a copy, The Basic Rules of Military Operations. In other words, what can an armed force do that's legal and what can an rmed force not do. When we are talking about human rights in Sri Lanka it's not a human rights violation unless it breaks one of these rules.

International Humanitarian Law says you may not attack hospitals even if the other side says 'Yea but there were soldiers in there'. Doesn't matter if there are soldiers in there. A hospital is off limit. You also must take Prisoners of War. That means that you cannot treat the captured enemy as if the war is still going on and you can shoot them. You hold them as a prisoner of war. I notice that in the course of the Indian - LTTE armed conflict, **the LTTE turned over to India some of the captured combatants. I am not yet aware that the Government of India has turned over any captured combatants.** In fact, the International community is rather disturbed that captured combatants may not be alive. **Every captured combatant who is dead represents a war crime on the hands of the Indian Government and that leads into another point.**

INTERNATIONAL ACTION

What happens when you violate human rights? You are a human rights violator. What happens when you violate the rules of war? You are a war criminal. The existence of humanitarian law changes not only the quality but also the culpability of violations and subjects perpetrators to perhaps universal jurisdiction for the rest of their life for the acts carried out. And it is my view that **a number of the Indian Peace Keeping Force have the rest of their lives to wonder if someone isn't going to find them because their relative will identify that that's**

the one that came into my house and killed my mother or my father or my sister or my brother as a war crime and I have just as much right to seek them out the rest of their life as people have been seeking out the Nazis 40 years later. That is the gravity of that kind of violations in International Law. Why is there International Action? Why does Karen Parker get involved in Sri Lanka? Why has the United Nations got involved in Sri Lanka? Is it not intervening in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka?

First of all we don't presume to speak for Tamil, for Sinhalese, or for anyone else but to the degree we are discussing the basic rules of human rights, a humanitarian law, we are not intervening in any country. These areas of law have been internationalised. They are no longer in the internal jurisdiction of countries. South Africa can't say 'Apartheid is internal law therefore Ms Parker when you come over here and talk to us about apartheid you're intervening'. it is not intervening when one involves oneself in violations of human rights or armed conflict law. We call it the Internationalisation of Rights and there is another reason why the International Community gets involved and that is because situations such as are occurring in Sri Lanka, create refugees. So that the problem inevitably, even if we have hard hearts in Washington or Ottawa who actually don't care that Tamils die in Sri Lanka, must deal with Tamils in the United States or in Canada or elsewhere who have fled and **have a legitimate right to flee not simply because of violations of human rights leading to persecution which gives people a right to seek asylum from persecution but because people also have a right to flee flying bullets and they may not be sent to any country where there is an ongoing war or violations of the Geneva Conventions. So the issue in Sri Lanka becomes a key issue in the United Kingdom as to whether or not a Tamil who arrives here is entitled to asylum, or whether or not a Tamil who arrives here may be sent back to Sri Lanka by the British Government without the British Government committing a violation of human rights or armed conflict law.**

GRAVE BREACH OF HUMANITARIAN LAW

Armed conflict law prohibits forcible repatriation of persons who have fled armed conflict and, in particular, repatriation to a country where the Geneva Conventions are not being complied with. **A forcible deportation under those circumstances is considered by Article 147 of the fourth Geneva Convention signed and ratified by the Government of United Kingdom a grave breach of humanitarian law. A grave breach is another word for war crime.** And so it is not just combatants who may commit war crimes in International Law. Governments sending refugees from armed conflict back to armed conflict situations also commit war crimes. That is one of the other reasons why the International Community deals with even internal situations.



What has the International Community done on Sri Lanka? The human rights organisations and groups, myself included, have pushed for a number of years in the United Nations forums for there to be recognition of the serious and grave problems in Sri Lanka and for there to be recognition of the state of war and the classification of the combatants.

INDIA HAS NO DEFENCE

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights did agree with our characterisation of conflict as I said in the Commission on Human Rights Resolution of 1987. Before that there had been a resolution passed in the sub-commission and another in the commission on human rights which were somewhat weaker but still indicated a concern with the problem. We also make sure that the United Nations special rapporteur for torture received all information and allegations of torture in Sri Lanka. That the special rapporteur for summary and arbitrary execution received information about people whose deaths were not a result of a legitimately carried death sentence. Now I certainly hope that members of this community who have known of deaths occurring at the hands of the Indian Peace Keeping Force or the Sri Lankan Army in the last year have submitted details of those deaths to the special rapporteur for summary and arbitrary execution. It would be rather dreadful if the next year's session of human rights reports not one death in Sri Lanka when hundreds of deaths of the civilian population have taken place since October 10th. **Every single one of those cannot be justified by military necessity. India has no defence. Every one of those is a summary and arbitrary execution and should be reported.**

Geopolitical consideration

We sometimes forget that no inter-

national or frequently relatively few internal affairs ever occur without manipulation from inside and out. We are probably in an era in which no international event occurs without some finger in the pot from one or the other or more of the super powers. It is impossible to understand accurately the events in Sri Lanka without looking a little farther than the relationship of Tamils and Sinhalese, without looking a little farther than the relationship of India and Sri Lanka, or the relationship past, present and future between India and say the LTTE. My Government has had a very interesting and interested involvement in the events in Sri Lanka, particularly since the current administration came to power in 1981, and I am quite convinced that some of the events that have occurred in the last six months at least if not more in Sri Lanka have been in part staged at the behest of that government, and certainly the continuation of Mr Jayewardene has to be looked at broader than just his supposed iron fisthold over Sri Lanka.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

What comes out of this conference is extremely important. If this conference falls short of endorsing or supporting the idea of cease-fire and negotiation, or if it falls short of achieving some reasonable unity of the Tamil Community, then it may be an exercise in just vetting of motions but not towards a political solution and I say that because when we sit in the United Nations taking up these cases, if we don't have the sense that we have the people on whose behalf we are speaking behind us, we tend to back off. None of us is arrogant enough to take on anyone else's cause. When we are concerned we raise it. If the affected parties aren't there around putting in their statements, making their presentations and appearances, it starts looking funny. And you can be sure that if the Tamil Community is not visibly out there the Government of India, and the Government of Sri Lanka are going to say 'See the Tamils are all happy, there are not here are they, they are not present are they'.

So I hope what can come out of this meeting is an even stronger sense of the urgency and the need for unity and understanding and that you begin defending your rights under human rights and humanitarian law and recognising that the combatants fighting in your cause do indeed have legal combatant status and deserve all the support for their rights under humanitarian law that we can possibly give them.

Secret talks show LTTE's leverage

MERVYN DE SILVA

ADAPTABILITY

With remarkable resilience, the LTTE has adapted itself quickly to the mounting Indian military and diplomatic pressure. Both the Tiger ambush and the land-mine blast were on lonely, largely unpatrolled jungle roads outside the Jaffna peninsula, once the impregnable Tiger bastion in the Tamil separatist heartland. The LTTE is now compelled to operate outside Jaffna's urban centres and small towns on a terrain unfamiliar to Mr. Pirabhakaran, and in conditions to which his 400 to 500 hardcore guerillas are quite unaccustomed. This is scrubland and thick jungle.

The incidents of the recent past conform to a pattern. Most take place in what may be called "border areas" — where the Northern Province merges into the predominantly Sinhalese North-Central Province or where it merges into the Eastern Province, with Trincomalee, the ethnically mixed (Tamil, Sinhalese, Muslim) port city, standing right where the two provinces meet. The most crucial provision in the India-Sri Lanka peace accord is the merger of the North and the East for a trial period of one year at the end of which the Easterners will decide at a referendum whether the arrangement should continue.

From the Tamil point of view, it is certainly the most important concession by the Jayewardene Government since it acknowledges, however inadequately, the fundamental Tamil concept of a "traditional homeland."

Since no Sri Lankan regime has been suicidal enough to yield on this point, it is also Mr. Gandhi's vital diplomatic victory, and therefore his strongest case for Tamil Nadu's appreciation and support. In the domestic Sinhalese debate, the "merger" is the most abrasive issue. Sinhalese ideologues and the Buddhist clergy regard the conceptual concession as a tacit acquiescence in the sinister notion of a separate Tamil "kingdom."

Dislodged from the north, militarily bruised, arms supplies severely restricted, his command-and-communication structures disrupted, Mr. Pirabhakaran has intuitively grasped the fact that he must now accentuate the "political" in this politico-military conflict.

The political situation in both India and Sri Lanka is ideally suited to the LTTE's new tactic. While Mr. Gandhi is keeping a watchful and perhaps anxious eye on developments in Tamil Nadu, under President's rule, and the balance of forces is still unsettled, President Jayewardene faces provincial council polls, and more importantly presidential and parliamentary elections. For Mr. Jayewardene, the question of power at the centre, the survival of his own regime, will be decided by year's end.

In such complex, potentially explosive conditions, a halt by the LTTE to its current operations, no military challenge to the IPKF but highly damaging to the Jayewardene regime and to the peace accord, is a top priority concern. A negotiated settlement with the LTTE is here vitally important. Hence the Sri Lanka Government (or key Ministers in it) have made secret contacts with the Tigers. The political-diplomatic initiative enhances the leverage of a militarily much weakened LTTE. Mr. Pirabhakaran appears to have understood the relative importance of his agreement in the new equation.

6.5.88

RECENT OMINOUS DEVELOPMENTS

PEASANTS TURNED INTO RELUCTANT INVADERS

Derek Brown in Trincomalee

REPORT

This battered but still lovely place has known many invaders from the sea: Tamils, Portuguese, Dutch and British. Now it is being invaded from the land, by the Government of Sri Lanka itself. **The new invaders are Sinhalese peasants. They are being pushed forward, unarmed, into the front line of savage ethnic conflict. The aim is to thwart the main point of last year's Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, which was to create a secure homeland for the Tamil minority by merging the Northern and Eastern provinces and giving them a measure of self-government.** Whichever community controls Trincomalee district controls the geographical hinge between north and east and it is clear that Colombo is determined that the Sinhalese should dominate in this strategic place.

The result might ultimately be that Sinhalese votes in provincial elections and in the referendum that is supposed to follow could swing the Eastern Province against joining the north or at least provide a pretext for keeping Trincomalee itself out of the new Tamil zone, thus splitting it in two. Whatever happens, people on the ground, as many of them as possible, are a basis for political influence and argument.

The biggest thrust is along the main road from Colombo, beyond the town of Habarana. There, the road enters a no-man's land where Tamil terrorists have for five years fought the Sinhalese without mercy. The road, pockmarked by landmine craters, crudely repaired, winds through thick forest. On either side are the new settlers, encamped in primitive wattle-and-daub huts, some with a vegetable patch scratched from the jungle, a few with access to a water hand-pump and virtually none with electricity. There are thousands of them. They are densely packed near Habarana, and thin out, like a lance, as the road crosses the border of Trincomalee district, in Eastern Province. **As more and more invaders are lured into service by offers of land and money, their colonies stretch towards the ultimate prize: Trincomalee town.**

Last October, Tamil militants fell upon the unarmed Sinhalese minority in the town. They were driven from their homes, which were then looted and burnt. Now there are dismal acres of charred stumps, which once were Sinhalese shops and houses. It takes an expert local guide to distinguish them from the rubble of Tamil property, destroyed in earlier excesses.

Trincomalee has reverted to being an overwhelmingly Tamil town, with a small minority of Muslims and others. So long as it has a Tamil majority, it sustains the dream of separation - either the Eelam nation sought by extremists, or the modest measure of self-government which remains the key provision of the accord. The first is anathema to the Colombo Government; the second only marginally less repugnant.

The Government says it will hold elections for a new joint provincial council, as soon as the troops of the Indian Peace Keeping Force eliminate Tamil Tiger terrorism. The same Government is doing its best to sabotage that prospect of peace, by organising and encouraging a new wave of Sinhalese colonists. There are hundreds of new camps within Trincomalee district. They are heavily guarded by Sri Lankan troops and Home Guards - unsmiling young men armed with shot-guns and Lee Enfield rifles. Sinhalese settlements are also springing up in an arc around Trincomalee town. Some are being put up to rehouse genuine refugees.

But most Tamils are convinced that the Sinhalese influx consists largely of new colonists; desperately poor peasants from the south and centre of the island who can be tempted by a few thousand rupees (the going rate is equivalent to £135) and a patch of land into risking their lives. The risk is horribly real. The Tamil Tigers, smashed as a military force by the Indians, have been driven deep into the jungles of the north and east. Their softest available targets now are the Sinhalese colonists. Last year, on Good Friday, more than 100 Sinhalese bus passengers were killed on the main Colombo-Trincomalee road, near Habarana. Since then, hundreds more, women and children included, have died in landmine blasts, ambushes and village raids.

The civil power has virtually evaporated here. There have been improvements in recent weeks, with restored bus services, more food supplies getting through, and petrol becoming available. The little fleet of venerable Morris Minor taxis is once more earning a precarious living. All of this is due, not to the Sri Lankan Government, but to the Indian Peace Keeping Force. **The Indian soldiers have, on occasion, killed innocent civilians themselves, after their own men had died in landmine blasts and the like.** But they are generally disciplined and they have encouraged the local population of 26,000 to engage in a semblance of economic activity.

The farmers are simply too scared to work in the fields where once the human Tigers roamed. So now there are real wild boar, regiments of black-faced languor monkeys and even occasional destructive forays by wild elephants from the reserves far inland. The farmers are not allowed to own guns, so they cannot scare off the beasts. The land is shaggy with weeds and scrub and the people are hungry for peace. *- The Guardian - 12 May, 1988)*

The Telegraph

Time for a settlement with Tamil militants

Nikhil Chakravarthy

REPORT

The media in our country has not been following carefully the significant developments that have been taking place of late in Sri Lanka. Over-preoccupation in the last nine months has been concentrated largely on the LTTE. But the happenings in the rest of the island-republic have a bearing on the Tamil problem as well. One cannot look at the Tamil area nor solve its problems in isolation from the developments in the rest of Sri Lanka.

One of the myths with which President Jayewardene has assiduously fed the decision-makers in New Delhi has been that he could not speed up the constitutional reforms nor could he institutionalise the devolution of powers to the provinces to the extent envisaged in the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement because of the strong opposition to the accord itself, that he has been fighting a lonesome battle in the interest of Indo-Sri Lanka goodwill. That has been the crux of his explanation why the constitutional reforms enacted so far could not come up to the expectations of the Tamil moderates represented by Amritalingam's TULF, not to speak of meeting the demands of the militants as represented by Prabhakaran and his LTTE. In Rajiv Gandhi's circle, Jayewardene is painted almost as a rider on the white horse, staking his political fortunes to retain India's goodwill.

Recent events in Sri Lanka have punctured this myth. The first phase of the elections to the provincial councils in Sri Lanka took place on April 28. In the elections to the provincial councils in four provinces considered peaceful, the results reveal a significant trend. The largest Opposition party, Sirimavo Bandaranaike's SLFP, boycotted the poll and the outlawed militant JVP threatened to wreck it. Even then, defying the boycott call and the physical threat, as many as 61.49 per cent of the electorate turned up to cast their votes. This is an indicator of the mood of the public in the island today: it would like to have a peaceful and stable situation, anxious to go for orderly political functioning, making full use of whatever devolution of power has come. In other words, the public temper in Sri Lanka today is for peaceful political approach to problems and disfavouring any attempt at military solution.

More importantly, the analysis of the poll results shows that out of a total of 17.8 lakh votes cast, as many as 15.8 lakh came to two leading parties that have strongly committed themselves to the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement. Of the two parties, the largest number of seats was bagged by Jayewardene's UNP, with a total vote score of 918,211. Next to it is the United Socialist Alliance composed of four parties of the Left—Sri Lanka Mahajana Party, recently formed by the noted film star, Vijaya Kumaratunga who was killed three months ago by JVP terrorists, also the CP of Sri Lanka, the Lanka Sama Samaj Party and the NVA Sama Samaj Party. This United Socialist Alliance has been openly campaigning for the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord. What is further significant is that this United Socialist Alliance polled heavily in some of the known strongholds of the JVP.

While it would certainly be a mistake to under-estimate the danger to constitutional process posed by the JVP, it would be correct to take as a major positive development the emergence of the United Socialist Alliance. Along with the ruling UNP, this alliance stands for bettering relations with India. In this context, it was rather strange that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi should send a message of congratulation only to President Jayewardene on the victory of his party in the poll. What could and should be legitimately highlighted by the government of India is that the supporters of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, irrespective of their party affiliations, have

together received a resounding mandate from the electorate. It is necessary for New Delhi to remind itself that India's friends and well-wishers in Sri Lanka are far wider in number than President Jayewardene's following in the island, that the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement is not a private contract between the ruling parties in India and Sri Lanka.

The lesson to draw from the results of the April 28 poll is that the environment is congenial in Sri Lanka for renewed political initiative—instead of resorting to arms—to settle the ethnic question. It is therefore the opportune moment to bring about an understanding with Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE. To create the condition for such a settlement, there has to be a bold initiative on the part of the government of India. The immediate ordering of a ceasefire by the Indian armed forces in the northern and eastern provinces would have an electrifying effect in the Tamil areas as well as in Tamil Nadu. In the favourable condition that will thus be generated, the LTTE leadership itself would have to come forward and abandon its armed operations. This way the road will be cleared for them to join the political process which ultimately will lead to the holding of elections in the combined northern and eastern provinces. To say that the LTTE first has to lay down its arms and swear by the Indo-Sri Lanka accord before a ceasefire could be ordered, would be counter productive at this stage, as it will lead the Indian authorities nowhere since no political group agrees to surrender when put against the wall. It is for the party with the superior forces to bend backwards to win over the other side. After all, the broad objective of India in Sri Lanka is to pave the way for a settlement of the ethnic problem, and not the physical extermination of any group, however obnoxious it may appear to be.

What is needed today in Sri Lanka therefore is not the settling of scores, nor teaching of lessons in the Chinese style towards the Vietnamese, but calling up the courage and conviction for statesmanship. This has to be the agenda of the day for New Delhi.

8.5.88

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

Mrs. Rajeswari 13.5.88

Mrs. Selvarani 20.5.88

Nadaraja 1.6.88

V. Jayachandran 16.5.88

Sridaran 20.5.88

Jothinathan 2.6.88

S. Ravindran 17.5.88

Naguleswaran 24.5.88

Selvi. Jayavani 4.6.88

V. Sivakumar 18.5.88

Subban 25.5.88

Maria Doris 6.6.88

Shanmugarathinam 19.5.88

Selvi. Yasodha 25.5.88

Gunabalasingam 7.6.88

Satyamoorthy 20.5.88

Poonudurai 26.5.88

Rathinasingam 7.6.88

DECCAN HERALD

REPORT

INDIA-LTTE CONTACTS

Prospects bright for Lanka truce

From S. MURARI

JAFFNA, May 10. — Prospects for a cease-fire to facilitate resumption of talks between the LTTE and the Government of India have brightened in the last few days following nearly three months of hectic consultations at various levels in Madras, New Delhi and Jaffna. But neither side is showing undue optimism since there has been many a slip between the cup and the lip in the past.

The LTTE, which refused to respond when India unilaterally ordered a 48-hour cease-fire last February following an appeal by former Jaffna Municipal Commissioner C.V.K. Sivagnanam, is understood to have indicated since then that arms surrender is negotiable and it is ready to discuss it along with other issues if India offers an unconditional truce.

The talks, held in Madras and New Delhi by the Indian intelligence agencies — the RAW and IB — and LTTE's former Jaffna commander Sathasivam Krishnakumar alias Kittu and its representative at the Thimpu talks Anton, during the last 10 weeks, have helped identify areas of agreement and disagreement between the two sides.

The talks have also led to an avoidable delay in ending this conflict since Kittu has found it difficult to keep in constant touch with LTTE leader V. Pirabhakaran and the top echelons as they are believed to be hiding in the Vanni area comprising the jungle track along Vavuniya - Killinochi - Mullaitivu - Mannar stretch and are always on the move. The issue has been further complicated by the difference positions taken by the RAW and IB on sensitive issues like arms surrender.

IPKF ROLE: Now, for the first time, the Defence Ministry has come into the picture in a big way through the IPKF. In the last few days, top IPKF officers like Lt. Gen. Kalkat, IPKF commander Maj. Gen. Shardeshpande and Jaffna town commandant, Brig. R.I.S. Kahlon, have had several rounds of talks with Mr. Sivagnanam who has been authorised by the LTTE to negotiate on its behalf. The IPKF officers have also had discussions with EROS leader V. Balakumar and leading citizens of Jaffna to assess the mood of the people.

The IPKF has forwarded to New Delhi a message from Mr. Pirabhakaran conveyed through Mr. Sivagnanam. New Delhi has asked the LTTE to itemise basic issues. Mr. Sivagnanam is expecting to get from the LTTE a letter in the next few days, spelling out its latest position.

Both sides are hastening slowly since basic differences still persist on how to break the deadlock. India continues to insist, at least as a bargaining ploy, that the LTTE should first declare its unequivocal support for the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement and express its readiness to surrender arms. The LTTE is sticking to its position that the talks should be unconditional and should be preceded by an indefinite cease-fire.

Despite this, there is cautious optimism in LTTE circles about a breakthrough since they feel that the IPKF, which has spread out far and wide and whose activities touch every facet of life, will surely have a better perspective of the Tamil's problem than the intelligence agencies.

COMMUNICATION GAP: The softening of the LTTE's attitude towards the IPKF is attributable to the failure of the RAW-inspired peace mission a month or so ago. At that time, LTTE leaders Rahim and Johnny were taken from Madras to Vavuniya in an IAF plane. While Johnny was proceeding to contact Mr. Pirabhakaran, he was intercepted by an IPKF patrol and shot dead. This incident has brought to the fore the communication gap between the RAW and the IPKF at the ground level.

With the talks continuing in Madras despite this incident and its own position militarily weakened, the LTTE has avoided a head-on confrontation with the IPKF. The IPKF, which has surrounded Vanni area where the LTTE leadership is believed to be holed in, is no longer talking tough about going after Mr. Pirabhakaran lest it should upset negotiations at this delicate stage.

However, neither side is willing to hazard a guess as to whether the current moves will lead to breakthrough. Mr. Sivagnanam, whose call for a 48-hour cease-fire on February 16 was either misunderstood or distorted to mean that the LTTE wanted time to turn in its weapons, has this time made the LTTE position clear at the very outset. He has conveyed the LTTE view that there should be an indefinite cease-fire and immediate resumption of talks on all issues, including arms surrender.

This has been the LTTE's position since the outbreak of hostilities last October. Time and again, LTTE leaders Pirabhakaran and Ajit Mathia have said that the LTTE is not opposed in toto to the agreement or averse to laying down arms. The LTTE has said that it will accept the accord so long as it safeguards Tamil interests. It would lay down arms once conditions of security both for its cadres and the people are guaranteed.

By this, it means the formation of an interim Government and raising of a Tamil police force.

Talks between the RAW and Kittu in Madras have also covered the quantum of arms to be laid down. According to media reports here, Indian authorities have told the LTTE that it should, as proof of its bonafides, surrender at least 1,500 weapons out of the 2,750 it is supposed to have. The LTTE continues to deny that it has so many arms. More-over, it is not possible to make such a huge token surrender since the arms are cached in places widely spread out and the cadres are scattered. It has, however, offered to turn in 500 arms to begin with.

ARMS SURRENDER: Mr. Sivagnanam, who reflects the LTTE's latest thinking on this issue, told me the other day that the talks would be a non-starter if arms surrender was made an issue like this. But the LTTE can be expected to keep its word this time since it is as much subject to the pressure of public opinion as the Government of India is.

The IPKF, which put pressure on Mrs. Annamma David of Batticaloa Mothers' Front to end her fast on the 19th day, has not resorted to any such strong-arm tactics this time in the case of Mrs. Susheela Ganesan of Trincomalee. The Trincomalee Mothers' Front has already written to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that more mothers would join the fast if he did not favourably respond to their request for a cease-fire.

Unlike last time, the LTTE is understood to be demanding compensation for the arms to be turned in. It is also concerned about the Rehabilitation of its cadres for which India once paid Rs. 50 lakh. rehabilitation of all militant groups which support the accord is one of the commitments made by both the Governments under the accord. But this has not been given effect to because of the stalemate over arms surrender. India is understood to have assured the LTTE that it will be pumping in Rs. 156 crore for a massive reconstruction programme in Tamil areas and that rehabilitation of militants would form a part of this.

A more ticklish point is the revival of the interim Government plan which was dropped after the collapse of talks between the LTTE and the Government of India last September. In the aborted interim administrative council, the LTTE was given seven of the 12 seats and the TULF two. The remaining three seats were set apart for representatives of the Sri Lankan Government and Tamil Muslims. The plan was dropped after the LTTE insisted that Mr. Sivagnanam should be replaced by Mr. Padmanathan as council chief and Mr. Kasi Anandan should be included in the place of another member in order to give representation to its cadres in the east.

LIKELY PROBLEMS: India might still agree to giving the LTTE a majority of seats in the council. But problems are bound to crop up if the LTTE insists on the retention of its revised list of nominees because Mr. Padmanathan, an emergency detenu, is not acceptable to Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene while Mr. Kasi Anandan is considered anti-Indian.

Even if the LTTE relents on this issue, it is dead set against the inclusion of any member from groups like PLOT, EPRLF, TELO and ENDLF. It was the promotion of these groups by RAW and the patronage given to them by the IPKF which fuelled the LTTE's worst fears and led to the present imbroglio.

The LTTE wants further discussions on the 13th Amendment and the Provincial Council Bills with a view to improving the devolution package. With elections already held in four southern provinces on the basis of this package and due in one more province in June, India will find it difficult to convince President Jayewardene that the proposed North-Eastern Province should be placed on a different footing though the Tamils have a strong case for greater devolution of powers.

Land colonisation is a very sore point for the Tamils and it has been highlighted not only by the hawkish LTTE but even by the moderate TULF. After the accord, the Sri Lankan Government has given a push to the Veli-Oya scheme involving settlement of Sinhalese along Trincomalee - Vavuniya - Mullaitivu belt to further divide the Tamil province with the long-term objective of defeating the merger of the north and the east when it comes up for review through a referendum in the east to be held a year after the Provincial Council poll. The powers conferred on the Provincial Council regarding land alienation have been held to be far from adequate even by the TULF.

REFUGEES' RETURN: Though 10 months have passed since the signing of the accord, the return of 1.25 lakh refugees from Tamil Nadu and another 40,000 who have been uprooted from the east, has been impeded by the present conflict. India has taken the position that the return and resettlement of refugees can be tackled by the interim Government if and when it comes into being. The massive aid package that India has offered will take care of this problem also.

Considering the complexity and magnitude of the problem, India and the LTTE will have to cover a lot of ground to reach an overall settlement. But unlike in October last when the conflict started, each side seems to recognise the strengths and weaknesses of the other. Though nine months have passed, the IPKF has not been able to completely disarm the LTTE or win over the Tamil people. On the other hand, it has broken the back of LTTE's resistance, scattered its cadres and forced it to go underground and revert to guerilla warfare. Continuation of the present state of unrest will only make matters worse for both. Mr. Sivagnanam touched the crux of the problem when he told me that to a big nation like India, the Tamils might look small but they were a proud people. He has impressed upon Indian authorities that the Tigers cannot be coerced but they can certainly be won over.

With elections to the Tamil Nadu Assembly due in a month or so, this realisation appears to have dawned on India also.

REPORT

Anti-Indian feeling stays in Jaffna

From S. MURARI

JAFFNA, May 15. — Jaffna is like a phoenix: It rises from its ashes. A town which was witness to two brutal military onslaughts within a space of six months and lost a few thousand of its citizens, it has recovered its poise in just under a year, because of the massive reconstruction programme undertaken by the IPKF and the never-say-die spirit of the people.

There are outward signs of normality with banks, schools, colleges and business functioning as usual, shops and hotels doing brisk business and the streets filled with packed mini-buses, quaint old Moris Minor taxis and Indian Army jeeps and trucks. At dusk, the town goes to sleep with night curfew in force for the last 10 months. Even during day, life is on a low key. Beneath the surface calm, there is resentment against an army that is supposedly killing the people it has come to protect, whatever be the circumstances leading to the present situation. All the sins, all the follies of the "tigers" are forgotten. Engraved in memory is the October operation which has benumbed even a people who are used to war.

The anti-Indian feeling is but natural, given the ferocity of the two-week battle between the IPKF and the LTTE. The feeling is not so much because the IPKF is fighting the boys and who had been protecting the people for years. Nor is it entirely because of high civilian casualties caused by the heaviest ever shelling that the people have seen. They do not complain over much about the agony that thousands upon thousands underwent in temples, churches, schools and colleges that served as make-shift refugee camps, for three weeks, without food, water, electricity and basic sanitation. They still recall how parents looked on helplessly as children died of starvation, and could not even be given a decent burial.

All this the people are ready to treat

as part of the game in a war, but what they cannot forget is the attack on the Jaffna General Hospital last October 21 that left 29 hospital staff, 70 patients and visitors and about 30 passersby dead, according to doctors and other leading citizens. The hospital attack is to the Jaffna man what Operation Bluestar was to the Sikhs.

They saw it coming when AIR started reporting at the height of the war that the LTTE was using the hospital as a forward position. With the hospital within shelling range from Jaffna fort, its Director Machinarkiniyar and other leading citizens sought permission from Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit to close it down temporarily. It was refused.

The IPKF maintains that the LTTE fought from the hospital for days to bottle up the Jaffna Fort garrison and to gain time to remove its wounded. A senior officer of the IPKF admits that there were civilian casualties when the Army stormed the hospital. "It was nearly dusk and all that the soldiers could see were panicky movements in dim light, but it is a damn lie to say that here were wanton killings."

Dr. Nachinarkiniyar admits that the "Tigers" also had underwent treatment there along with hundreds of other wounded civilians, but asserts that they were removed well before the army's assault. He also claims that never before in the hospital's history had anyone entered it with arms. Even if the indiscriminate killing of doctors, nurses and patients can be dismissed as at worst an excess, what answer have you for the shooting down of Dr. Sivabalasundaram, head of the paediatrics department, the next morning when he came to the hospital in his uniform and walked in shouting his identity all the way, ask the doctors.

ORDER RESTORED: It is true that the IPKF got the hospital going with Indian staff immediately after the operation "until Dr. Nachinarkiniyar surfaced" a few days later. The IPKF also restored water supply and electricity in the town in a record time. What is more, it extended electricity supply to several islands off the peninsula which had been without power since 1983. It is a fact that civil administration was revived as quickly as possible.

The IPKF attempts to win over the people are nullified by isolated incidents of rape, especially in the countryside. Though the IPKF welcomes complaints, naturally few cases are reported and fewer still proved, but the punishment in such cases is severe.

On the other hand, there have also been one or two love marriages. One romance was nipped in the bud: The girl was found shot, apparently by the Tigers. In another incident, a 30-year-old woman was brought to Jaffna hospital with gun shot wounds.

The next day a Tiger walked into the ward and put a bullet into her head after talking to her for 15 minutes. "And not a single person came forward to give information", an angry officer said. She was killed for her alleged liaison with the IPKF

The IPKF admits that the Tigers have started recruiting schoolboys, but asserts that it is not on as alarming a scale as the local people make out. Residents, however, say the boys are handpicked from wrecked homes.

The other day, TELO called a hartal to commemorate the second death anniversary of its leader Sabaratnam. He was slain along with 100 other TELO boys in May 1986 by the LTTE. The hartal call was an open challenge to the LTTE.

Residents say at least 15 TELO boys were found shot dead on the day of the hartal. The assailants in quite a few cases were schoolboys in the 10-14 age-group, according to eyewitnesses. Two of the TELO boys died in Jaffna General Hospital. Another three, who were undergoing treatment there, were removed within a day to the military hospital by the IPKF. At least eight bodies were found near Wellington in the heart of the town and in Tirunelveli where the LTTE once had its headquarters.

The killings reveal that the Tigers are still present in the town and are very much a force to reckon with. This is despite periodic cordon and search operations by the IPKF. This operation takes the form of collective punishment whenever an incident occurs in an area. At Nelliadi on the Point Pedro Road, an Indian soldier going with an EPRLF boy was shot. There have been also a few incidents of rape, locals allege.

With the local shielding the Tigers, the IPKF is no longer apologetic about using rival militant groups to identify them.

Even during routine cordon and search, residents are dragged out of their houses and made to wait in the hot sun for hours for identification parade.

SECURITY CHECKS: Security checks are felt keenly during long-distance travel. The journey from Colombo to Jaffna, a distance of 250 miles, takes 17 hours. With night curfew on in most Tamil areas, buses take off from Colombo in the night so as to reach these areas during the closing hours of the curfew. Our bus, which reached Madavachi near Vavuniya at 3 a.m., halted there until dawn along with 70 other vehicles to allow curfew hours to pass.

From Vavuniya, the checkings are numerous. At each checkpoint, the passengers are made to get down and walk at least a furlong while the bus is subjected to check. Even my innocent-looking typewriter was forced open and turned upside down at one point.

Surprisingly, people do not fear the Indian Army. This is a plus point for the IPKF. With police force non-existent and judiciary yet to function in most Tamil areas, the people increasingly turn to the IPKF to settle even family disputes, showing that the wounds of war are slowly healing.

The people's conflicting mood is no surprise to the IPKF. As one officer put it, the Jaffna man will keep his feelings to himself and exploit any situation to his advantage. Traders still pay taxes to the LTTE, but pass them off as thefts. The other day two car passes were found forged.

The people are exposed more than ever before to Indian culture. Indian T.V. programmes beamed to the soldiers are popular. Milk, Coffee and Chappathi are slowly coming into vogue in Jaffna restaurants. Indian newspapers and magazines are available in the Jaffna market the same day and are preferred to Colombo papers.

STAYS: Despite all this, the bitterness remains. Any alien force which invades people's privacy and restricts their freedom of movement will naturally be resented, says one Army officer. But, it is something more than that. What people find hard to digest is the fact that India, which they had considered for long as their home away from home, has done this to them. The officer regrets that all the good that is done is taken for granted and the ill-effects of an alien presence are blown out of all proportions. Naturally, says a local businessman, a black dot in a white screen will hit the eye.

The LTTE has succeeded in convincing the people that the IPKF has come more to safeguard India's geopolitical interests than to protect the Tamils. Still, the people do not want the IPKF to go, for they known only too well that it will create a big vacuum and lead to a terrible bloodbath. The consensus among the Tamils is that the IPKF should stay and protect them during the transition period and at the same time the LTTE should be given its due role.

Sri Lanka-India Relations

LETTER

IN recent years relations between India and Sri Lanka have become more close and to a certain extent even more strained. The presence of about 1,00,000 Indian soldiers and other officials is causing much concern among Sri Lankans of all communities.

The recent decades have seen the unfortunate worsening of the relations among the ethnic communities in Sri Lanka. Due to our failure to resolve these problems amicably and in time, the ethnic conflict became intense after July 1983. About 1,25,000 Sri Lankan Tamils went as refugees to Tamil Nadu, and India has looked after them. We admit that we have to blame ourselves for our shortcomings in this matter. Sri Lankans, specially those leading political and military groups, are primarily responsible for our present troubles. It is the responsibility of Sri Lankans to remedy this sad situation.

We cannot, however, fail to see that India too has contributed towards the aggravation of the conflict here. Though the Indian government denied it, it is now common knowledge that India gave refuge to the Tamil militant groups, enabled them to have their military camps there and operate from Indian shores. They had communication facilities for their conflict. It is also generally believed that Indian personnel too had a hand in training and arming them. It is known that the central government and the government of Tamil Nadu gave considerable financial aid to the militant groups. Would our ethnic conflict have got so aggravated and prolonged without such Indian support? India also contributed to the creation of world public opinion in a manner that was unfavourable to Sri Lanka.

Many here fear that India helped to create a situation in Sri Lanka which would legitimise Indian armed intervention. Their interests in this were not merely an understandable concern for the rights of the Tamils, or the preservation of the unity, integrity and independence of Sri Lanka. They were apparently concerned about Indian security, given Sri Lanka's recent foreign policy and alliances. The Indian government exerted military and diplomatic pressure to make the government of Sri Lanka accept *an unequal treaty* specially in the letters exchanged between prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and president Jayewardene.

Today many in Sri Lanka are speculating as to why the Indian Army is unable to complete its responsibility of disarming all the Tamil militant groups. Worse still there are open accusations of the IPKF being partial to some of these groups, and of using them against the LTTE. On the other hand, the IPKF is said to be rather inactive when Sinhala and Muslim civilians are killed by some of the armed groups. There are allegations of misbehaviour by the Indian forces, such as killing of civilians, ill-treatment of persons, taking away people's property, etc. When the IPKF deals thus with Sri Lankans, Indian sources that were quite vociferous against abuses by the Sri Lankan security forces, now seem rather silent. The Sri Lankan Tamils are the worst affected by this.

Many in Sri Lanka are wary of the Indian intentions. Are they incapable of handling a guerilla situation which they themselves helped build up? Or are they unwilling to deal with it; or worse still are they making use of it to prolong their stay and achieve their own military or political objectives? There is a deep-seated fear of Indian hegemony and Indian expansionism. The movement of persons and of goods between India and the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka is presently without any significant checks—not even customs, passports and visas.

The statements of Indian leaders concerning their good intentions are taken with a pinch of salt—given past denials of militant bases, and the actions of the Indian and Tamil Nadu governments since 1983. Can we exclude less altruistic motives at certain levels of the Indian political, diplomatic, intelligence or military hierarchies? The situation is further complicated by the Sri Lankan issue being made a matter of political campaigning and bargaining in Tamil Nadu and even at Indian central government level.

We believe most Indians want Indo-Sri Lanka relations to be one of peace and good neighbourliness. We are in favour of the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord for the settlement of the relationship among the Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims in Sri Lanka. But we think that Sri Lanka should not be subordinate to India. We would welcome reciprocal relationships as between two independent neighbouring countries.

We desire in a special manner that the IPKF too be subject to an impartial monitoring authority. This could be an Indo-Sri Lankan body or an international one like the International Committee of the Red Cross. The fact of the IPKF being not accountable to any such impartial agency is not good for Indo-Sri Lanka relations and even for the fair name of India.

The government of India should hasten the implementation of its responsibility under the Accord. This would enable the IPKF to leave Sri Lanka in a situation in which Sri Lankans could resolve their issues justly and democratically. The longer the IPKF remains here, and that in a somewhat partisan manner, the greater are the risks of India assuming a dominating and even imperialistic role—which we trust would be repugnant to most Indians.

FR TISSA BALASURIYA
BERNADEEN SILVA

Centre for Society and Religion,
Colombo.

இந்திய தொலைக்காட்சியில் காண முடியாத, வானொலியில் கேட்க முடியாத, ஈழத்திலும் கூட உள்ளூர் பத்திரிகைகளால் வெளியிட முடியாத 'வாய்க்கட்டு' போடப்பட்டுள்ள 'அமைதிப்பணிகள்' ஏராளம்.

'அமைதிப்பணி' எப்படி நடக்கிறது என்பதற்கு ஒரு எடுத்துக் காட்டாக வல்வெட்டித்துறையில் வசிக்கும் ஒரு தமிழ்ச்சகோதரி வெளிநாட்டில் வசிக்கும் தோழிக்கு எழுதிய பின்வரும் கடிதத்தைப் படியுங்கள்:

சிவமயம்
வல்வெட்டித்துறை
25-2-89.

அன்பின் மோகனாக்கா மற்றும் யாபேருக்கும் அன்புடன் ..... எழுதுவது.

நாங்கள் நலம். அதுபோல் நீங்களும் நலமே இருக்க ஆண்டவனை வேண்டுகிறோம்.

மேலும் உங்கள் 23/1 கடிதம் 23/2 கிடைத்தது. இன்று சரோ அக்காவுக்குக் கடிதம் எழுதுகிறேன். நீங்கள் அங்கேயே இன்னும் சில காலம் இருப்பது தான் நல்லது. இங்கு இப்போதைக்கு வர நினைக்காதீர்கள். சிலோன் ஆமியை விட இப்போ இங்கு இருக்கும் எங்களை ஆள்பவர்

களும், அமைதியை காக்க வந்தவர் களும் சேர்ந்து மிகவும் சித்ரவதை செய்கிறார்கள்.

22-ம் திகதி கண்ணிவெடியில் சிலர் இறந்ததற்காக பொலிகண்டி யில் இருந்து ஆலடி வரையில் உள்ள ஆண், பெண், சிறுவர், வயோதிகர் எல்லோருக்கும் மிருகத்துக்கு அடிப்பது போல் அடித்தார்கள். இதில் 900 பேர் அளவில் அடி வாங்கினார்கள். உலக்கை, கம்பு, சைக்கிள் செயின் என்பவற்றால் அடித்தார்கள். அன்று ஆஸ்பத்திரியே நிரம்பி வழிந்தது.

அன்று நாங்கள் வீட்டில் தான் இருந்தோம். நாங்கள் சாமி அறையில் பூட்டிக்கொண்டு இருந்து விட்டோம். மற்ற கதவு எல்லாவற்றையும் அடித்து துறந்து விட்டார்கள். ஏதோ எங்கள் நல்ல காலம் எங்களை அவர்கள் காணவில்லை.

இது வரையில் ஒரு நாளும் அனுபவிக்காத அவலக் குரலைக் கேட் டோம். வயது வந்தவர்களும் கதறி னார்கள். பாடசாலைச் சிறுவர்களும் கதறி அழுதார்கள். இவற்றை எல்லாம் கண்ணால் பார்த்த நாங்கள் அழத் தான் முடிந்தது. வேறு ஏதும் செய்ய முடியவில்லை.

ஊரிலிருந்து யாழ்ப்பாணம் போவதற்கு இடையில் 4 காம்ப் இருக்கிறது. வி.வி.டி. அடையாள அட்டை என்றால் (இளைஞர்கள்) அவர்களை இறக்கி ஆடு மாட்டை அடிப்பது போல் அடித்து அனுப்பு கிறார்கள்.

5-ம் திகதி (5-2) ஒரு வானுக்கு சுட்டு அதில் 5 பேர் இறந்து விட் டார்கள். அதில் நெடியகாட்டைச் சேர்ந்த ஒரு குடும்பம் பயணம் செய் தார்கள். தாயும், மகனும் இறந்து விட் டார்கள். தகப்பனும் 2 பெண் பிள்ளைகளும் சூட்டுக் காயத்துடன் யாழ் ஆஸ்பத்திரியில் இருக்கிறார் கள். தாய்க்கு சுழுத்திலிருந்து இடுப்பு வரையும் தூடு (26 குண்டு இருந்தது). இன்னும் ஒருவர் நெடியகாட்டைச் சேர்ந்தவர். அவர் திருமணமாகி ஒரு சில வருடம்தான். ஒரு பெண் குழந்தையின் தந்தை.

முந்தாநாள் பொலிகண்டியில் இருந்து பருத்தித்துறை வரை ஊரடங்கு சட்டம். முதல் நாள் மீன் பிடிக்கச் சென்றவர்களுக்கு தெரியாது. அவர்கள் மீன் பிடித்துக் கொண்டு வரும்போது வள்ளத்துக்கு சுட்டு விட் டார்கள். இதில் தீருவிலைச் சேர்ந்த ஒரு இளைஞர் இறந்து விட்டார். இப் படியே நித்தமும் பயந்து பயந்தே வாழ வேண்டி இருக்கிறது.

நாங்கள் வீட்டில்தான் இருக் கிறோம். சிலோன் ஆமிக்கு உள் ளுக்கு போய் இருக்கலாம். ஆனால் இவர்களோ எந்த இடமும் மிச்சம் இல்லாமல் வந்து போவார்கள். அத னால் வீட்டிலேயே இருக்கிறோம்.

இப்போ நடக்கும் பிரச்சனை எழுதிக் கொண்டு போனால் இடம் பத்தாது. இத்துடன் முடிக்கிறேன். உங்கள் கடிதம் கண்டு மறு கடிதம் எழுதுகிறேன்.

இப்படிக்கு,
அன்பு மறவாத,

தேவி

AT THE HANDS OF THE IPKF

ANOTHER INSTANCE OF BRUTALITY

Sivasamboo Murugesu, a Sri Lankan Tamil presently living in Ontario in Canada, in a letter addressed to Rajiv Gandhi the Indian Prime Minister, has described the manner in which IPKF personnel murdered members of his family and also called for a team of international jurists to be allowed to investigate into the crimes committed by the IPKF.

Pointing out that the Indian Prime Minister's mother too was brutally murdered, Mr.Murugesu's letter states

"In a similar manner your bandit soldiers entered my house, where my widowed junior sister, my senior sister, her husband and their six children, my children and my sister's grand son were staying; and opened fire at them without any provocation. They killed my sister (46 years), her son-inlaw (26 years), my brother-inlaw (58 years) and two other relatives over 50 years old. Many children were badly injured including a 3 years old infant. My brother-inlaw died on the third day due to bleeding and sister's son-inlaw died after six hours of bleeding. All the injured children and my senior sister who were badly injured were taken to the hospital on the third day. Your soldiers wanted them to die out of bleeding whereas your mother was given treatment immediately. Is your mother's life different from the others, because she was a Prime minister? On the judgement day they will be treated as equal before god. It is a privilege and not a right to be a Prime Minister.

"After all these cruelty the dead bodies were put together in front of the entrance to our Hindu Temple and partially burnt there by your soldiers. They have insulted our place of worship and a Holy shrine.

"After this carnage they ordered injured ones to move out of the house and the soldiers (about 25 of them) looted the house. They took more than 600 grams of golden jewellry belonging to four families and other valuable electrical items. They didn't even leave old pots and pans. They made a clean sweep of the house.

"I am sure that you can't see the events that are happening in Jaffna. If you are really honest in bringing these culprits to justice you should allow a team of international jurists to investigate into these crimes. I am prepared to give evidence in front of such a team."

The IPKF and the 'Three Star' Menace

Is organised Robbery, Extortion, Ransom kidnapping and Murder part of the Indian Peace Keeping Force exercise? This question has to be asked and it is time someone on behalf of the Indian Government gives an answer.

Since December 1987, thousands of bus travellers between Jaffna and Colombo have seen for themselves IPKF men almost all along the Jaffna-Vavuniya trunk road. Yet, lorries have been relieved of their entire goods on sections of this road under the control of the IPKF. Vehicles are stopped, passengers are relieved of cash and jewellery, businessmen are kidnapped and youths believed or suspected to be sympathisers of the LTTE are forced out of buses and summarily executed. Passengers speak of a kind of Mafia gang actively operating on this section of the road, right under the eyes of the IPKF, and apparently with their blessings, protection and support. This gang of ruffians continue to be a law unto themselves and they have been enjoying this 'freedom' for over five months now; and they are known as 'Three Stars' — drop-outs from some militant movements.

Sometime in January an elderly lady from the West, a representative of the Red Cross was trying to travel by car from Trincomalee to Jaffna, and had to turn back to Anuradhapura and onwards to Colombo because the driver of the car, harassed by the 'Three Star' men refused to go further. When the car stopped at a petrol bunk in Vavuniya, a few of these ruffians walked up and the first words they addressed to the driver were: 'Why have you brought this old hag here; you could have brought a young woman.' Fortunately the lady did not understand the language and the driver and a local who was in the car avoided translating what the men had said.

In the third week of March, a businessman from Vavuniya complained that he was almost relieved of a large sum of money he had just then withdrawn from the bank. Having failed in the first attempt, the group tried to summon the businessman to the group's camp. Having failed in that also, the group made arrangements to close the businessman's establishment. All these happened under the very nose of the IPKF. The businessman has sent written complaints to the Indian and Sri Lankan authorities.

Vavuniya
Sri Lanka

S.S. Maniam



RAPED

25.5.88 Pavalkulam
5 girls

30.5.88 Muthaiyankattu
Idathukarai
4 women

Tamil TIMES

LETTER

to Rajiv Gandhi

Don't seek the mirage of a cheap Victory.

'We are Tamils from Sri Lanka who have sought refuge in North America, from the injustices heaped upon us by successive government in the land of our birth.

'Some of us left that country as early as 1956, when the "Sinhala Only" legislation was passed, making Sinhala the sole Official Language. We realized then, that no self-respecting member of any minority community had a future there, except as a second class citizen, and that too, on the sufferance of the majority.

'The others are refugees from the five pogoms visited upon Tamils — Tamils only — beginning in 1958, and many other harassments in between, of which you must be aware. It was clear to us, as it is now clear to anyone who is willing to see, that we could have remained there only as hewers of wood and drawers of water, and not as equals in rights or dignity with the majority.

'Some of us left behind parents or other members of our immediate families; others did not ; but we never ceased to look upon the North and East of the Island as our patrimony — the land of our fathers and their fathers. That land will always inspire us as Tamils, and nothing, not even time, will make us surrender it.

'We want to let you know, Mr. Prime Minister, that your policies and your recent action have left us deeply disillusioned. We are disillusioned, not only because you have chosen a course of destroying our hopes of regaining our dignity as a people; but more because we have always associated India with a much greater sense of justice than your recent action can be credited with. You are asking the Tamils to pay an intolerable price — to surrender their dignity, their honour and even their basic rights, to your expediency.

'We are certain, Mr.Prime Minister, that we speak for every generation of Tamils alive today. The values which we have always lived by, and intend to live by, are those we inherited from our forefathers. Our thinking is rooted in the great Indian epics — the Mahabharatha and the Ramayana — and the limitless wealth of religious and literary tradition which can be described only as Indian; Indian, not in any specific religious or linguistic sense, but in the much larger sense of a common cultural and spiritual heritage.

'It is by these standards alone that we measure your actions, and it grieves us deeply that you have failed us as Tamils, you have failed India and all that stood for in the eyes of the world.

'You, Mr.Prime Minister, took upon yourself the role of intermediary between the governmemt of Sri Lanka and the Tamils of Sri Lanka; intermediary between a people stuggling for their basic right and the government which has consistently denied them even their identity. We cannot help seeing a close parallel in the Mahabharatha: Sri Krishna who went to mediate between the Pandavas and the Gauravas.

'Sri Krishna did not make a deal with the Gauravas and bludgeon the Pandavas into accepting a dishonourable peace. That is the path you have chosen, and no amount of sophistry can wash this simple truth away.

'You have sealed off the North and East of Sri Lanka from the inquiring eye of world media. But there is hardly a family among us here which has not received the horrifying details of the ruthless, indiscriminate — and, yes, blood-thirsty — actions of your own armed force, against innocent civilians: our fathers, our mothers, our sisters and brothers. Our villages and our towns are now India's killing fields.

'You cannot re-write history-,Mr.Prime Minister.You cannot impose peace on a people who wanted nothing but peace over half a century, much like the Pandavas, and who chose a separate destiny, only when every avenue of peaceful accommodation was denied them.Two "accords" which were negotiated in good faith by the Tamils were unceremoniously torn up by the Sinhala leaders of the two political parties that have ruled that country since independence. Tamils were burnt alive, and their homes looted and burnt, for the crime of wanting to be equal — nothing more.

'We are also puzzled about your reasons — to be more precise, your motives — for embarking on such an unjust and 'un-Indian' course. We want to be candid, and we cannot help feeling that you have become, wittingly or unwittingly, nothing more than a mercenary commander, serving the designs of a crafty, unscrupulous and morally bankrupt leader of the majority community. Your armed forces are doing what he attempted to do when you protested in the name of justice for Tamils.

'How have things changed ? Is it wrong only when the government of country, whose "integrity" you have now sworn to protect, kills the hapless Tamils,and right when you, as "peace-keeper", kill them ?

'Our expectations of India as the source of our values and beliefs, and of you as heir to Nehru's sense of justice and the Mahatma's commitment to truth, may sound like sloppy sentimentality to your advisers who may quote Chanakya as well as Machiavelli to you. They may have convinced you that there are no permanent friendships, no permanent enmities, only permanent interests. But history has not worked that way, Mr.Prime Minister.

'What happened to Churchill's vision of Britain's permanent interests in India? Or to Napoleon's dreams of France's interests, or Adolph Hitler's version of Germany's destiny? We are quite capable of understanding permanent interests, but we cannot understand how permanent interests can be served by monstrous expediency which is contrary to India's own history, and her destiny. India, we would suggest in our naivette, cannot have permanent interests in hostility to the Tamils, or at their expense.

'There is one more side to this madness, Mr. Prime Minister — madness is what it is, to force a people driven by historical experience to chose a future apart from their tormentors, to embrace the very same people who do not want them except as aliens in their own land. What other conclusion is left to anyone who can see things as they are, from the violent protests by the Sinhalese, against your"Peace Accords"? The Tamils were not a party to this accord; the Sinhalese do not want it; whose peace, then, are you keeping?

'The Tamils are not a violent people, Mr. Prime Minister. We do not condone violence against innocents anywhere. But we have chosen to be free, and you cannot smother that will even if you brought all your armed might to the task; even if you wipe out a whole generation of our youth. Too much water has flowed under the bridge, too many lives sacrificed, too much blood shed in a just cause.

'India has a historic mission. Mr.Prime Minister. History will judge you by your success or failure in carrying that mission forward during your life-time. We want you to succeed. But you cannot succeed if you choose the path of short term expediency, and set out to build India's future on the graves of her real friends, on the ruins of their hopes and their expectation of justice. We can only hope that you will have the courage to understand the resolve of the Tamils to be free and the wisdom to choose India's eternal interests, over the mirage of a cheap victory against a people who trusted you.

Respectfully yours,

N.Vijayanatham

On behalf of The North American Tamil Forum, 50 Whiteleaf Crescent, Scarborough, Ontario CANADA M1V 3G2

YOU TOO INDIA?

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நித்தம் நித்தம்
முள்முடி சூட்டியும் ஆணிகள் அடித்தும்
சிலுவையில் அறைகிறாய்.....?

.....

ஆணிகள் அடித்த சிலுவைதன்னிலும்
கவிழ்ந்து போகுமோ
என்சிரம் என்றும்

என்முகம் சிதைத்து
என்குலம் அழிக்க
எரியும் நெருப்பாய் சூழும் போதெலாம்
புத்தொளி கொண்டு
பீனிக்ஸ் பறவையாய்
மீண்டும் மீண்டும் வானில் பறப்பேன்.

.....

சிலுவையின் கீழ் அவன்
சிந்திய குருதித் துளிகள்
என்றுமே காய்ந்திலது
இதோ
இன்னும் பச்சையாக
இன்றைக்கும் சத்தியமாய்

.....

அவர்களின் கொடுமையில்
சிலுவை தாங்குவோர்
சிந்தும் குருதித் துளிகள்
இன்னும் இந்தப்
பூமியை நனைக்கிறது.
ஒடுக்கு முறைக்குள்ளானோரின்
ஒவ்வொரு கல்லறையிலும்
அவர்கள் தினைப்பது போல்
உதிரம் உறைந்து விடுவதில்லை.
உட்கனன்று கொதிக்கும் அது
புதிய உருவெடுக்கும்.

LTTE-MUSLIM ACCORD

A significant development took place in Madras in the third week of April which passed off without much fanfare or publicity, but which could well prove to be a historic turning point in the Tamil struggle in Sri Lanka. Understanding was reached between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the visiting Muslim delegation on a wide spectrum of issues concerning the two people. The Muslim delegation of the recently formed Muslim United Liberation Front (MULF) was headed by former SLFP Minister Dr. Al Haj Baddudin Mahmud and included the Secretary General of the Front Mr.M.I.M.Mohideen and former M.P. for Kalmunai Mr.M.C.Ahmed.

A joint statement of both parties, signed on behalf of the LTTE by the Madras-based former Jaffna Commander Mr.Krishnakumar (Kittu) and by Mr.Mohideen of the MULF has far-reaching implications, apart from opening the way for a close identity in Tamil-Muslim relation in the Eastern Province. The meetings were spread over three days — the 15th, 16th and 19th April.

LTTE's 'Kittu' & Dr Baddudin Mahmud

The high degree of boldness evidenced by both sides and the spirit of give-and-take that was displayed stand out, in the terms of the joint statement. Following are some of the highlights:

- It is understood that although the Muslim people living in Sri Lanka speak the Tamil language, they are a distinct ethnic group falling within the totality of Tamil nationality.
- The Muslim people recognise that the area composed of the northern and eastern Provinces are as much their traditional homeland as it is of the rest of Tamil-speaking people.
- The Muslim people believe that their interests could be safeguarded only in their homeland, and this could be achieved only thourgh a greater unity between all Tamil-speaking people.
- Since the Muslim people constitute a minority in their homeland, and hence it is important that they should be assured of a life free from fear and insecurity, the LTTE will take all steps to ensure this and extend all co-operation in the future to have the security of the Muslim people guaranteed by law.
- Whatever steps taken to safeguard the interests of the Muslim people and the arriving at a reasonable power-sharing agreement will be done in such a way as not to undermine the territorial integrity of the Tamil homeland.
- While the Muslim people form 33% of the population in the Eastern Province and will comprise 18% in the combined Northern and Eastern Provinces, it is agreed that in order to ensure maximum safeguard for them and enable them to enjoy an equitable power-sharing, they will be entitled to not less than 30% of the representation in the Provincial Council and the Cabinet.
- It is agreed that in all future land distribution, the Muslim people will be entitled to not less than 35% in the Eastern Province, not less than 30% in the Mannar district and not less than 5% in other areas.
- Unless otherwise a Muslim has been appointed Chief Minister of the Northern-Eastern Provincial Council, legal provision should be made to ensure that a Muslim is appointed as the Deputy Chief Minister of said Council.
- A de-colonization policy should be evolved in order to redress the adverse effect caused by planned Government colonization.
- The forthcoming election for the Provincial Council of the Tamil-speaking Province should be based on a voters' list compiled in a manner that is fair and justifiable
- It was agreed that in order to alleviate the sufferings of the vast mass of innocent civilians who are the ones who are truly affected by the military actions, and to enable them to return to normal, peaceful life, there should be an immediate ceasefire.
- Once hostilities cease,it is imperative that there should be an interim administration until such time as people return to normal life and Provincial Council elections are held. The composition of the interim administration should be in accordance with the earlier decision arrived at in this connection.

Some of the major implications that follow from this agreement are: The Muslims in the Eastern and Northern Provinces have decided that their future well-being lies in identifying themselves with the other Tamil-speaking people in these two provinces, and not look for succour outside; that they are no longer prepared to be led by Muslim leaders in the south-west; that they recognise in the LTTE its Tamil representative character; above all, they have decided to support the concept of the Tamil traditional homeland.

On their return to Colombo, the M.U.L.F. has appealed to Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to announce a ceasefire, and urged President Jayewardene to issue a proclamation merging the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

While the M.U.L.F. delegation visit to Madras was by all accounts a big success and its dialogue with the LTTE cordial and fruitful, there were a couple of unpleasant incidents prior to their departure, according to informed sources. They arose out of statements made by the visiting Muslim leaders to Indian journalists that the LTTE had no hand in the recent killings of some Muslims in Kalmunai and that another militant group was the one responsible. This apparently irked some members of two other militant groups in Madras, who on pretext of seeking an interview with the Muslim leaders at the hotel President where they staying tried to browbeat them.'The LTTE was responsible for the killing of 17 Muslims in Kalmunai. How can you cover it up ?', asked one of them heatedly.'You came to Madras to speak only to the LTTE ? You think that only the LTTE has weapons ? We too have arms, you know', said another, adopting an offensive tone.

According to a report in the Tamil weekly, the JUNIOR VIKATAN, the Muslim leaders while being polite, dealt with the discourteous youths very firmly. 'Look here "Thambimare"— we do not issue statements about happenings in the Eastern Provinces while seated in Madras.We are all people who came from there. We have evidence to prove that it was your organisation that was responsible for the killings of Muslims in Kalmunai. If you so desire, we are ready to produce the evidence in public'. The second man who spoke about arms was told: 'Please don't run away with the idea that we are afraid of weapons. We came to talk to the LTTE not because they have arms, but because we consider them the legitimate representatives of the Tamils. If you try to threaten us with arms, we can assure you that we Muslims can get any amount of arms from abroad; and we are not going to take shelter behind third parties and display our might. . .' (in an obvious reference to the group's consorting with the IPKF in the East). The interview ended on that note, with the youths walking out in that same threatening mood!

INDIA TODAY

REPORT

Coming to a Head

The accord gets a boost but the pressure is now on India

THE sudden flurry of developments in Sri Lanka last fortnight is of major significance as far as the Indo-Sri Lankan accord is concerned. More than nine months after it was signed in Colombo, the much-maligned accord looks like it may finally work out after all.

The credit for the new impetus must go to the master strategist, Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene. First came the holding of a round of provincial council (PC) elections in the Sinhala areas that signified a slap in the face of the anti-accord forces. Then came what looked like an agreement between his government and the proscribed ultra-left Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) that had become a major terrorist threat in the southern part of the island.

The Sri Lankan Government said it would remove proscription and release all JVP detenus. Colombo claimed that the JVP had agreed to surrender arms, cease violence and enter the political mainstream.

But the elation was cut short when JVP chief Rohana Wijeweera denied that any such deal had been struck, causing considerable confusion in Colombo. The Sri Lankan Government had obviously jumped the gun in making the announcement—but not without some reason. The covert negotiations by National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali were obviously with the second rung of the JVP leadership which seems inclined to abandon the extremist path.

Despite Wijeweera's denial—and Colombo's embarrassment—the prospects of an agreement with the JVP cannot be ruled out. The results of last fortnight's PC elections were a major blow to their movement. The JVP had issued death threats to all contestants and voters. Though they did murder nine candidates, the surprisingly large turnout (62 per cent of the 2.89 million electorate) came as a rude slap in the JVP's face.

Jayewardene campaigning for PC poll

Courtesy ANCC



By successfully stage-managing last fortnight's Provincial Council elections, Jayewardene has pulled off a major political coup and given new impetus to the accord.

Credit for that must go to Jayewardene who lived up to his reputation as "the old fox". Jayewardene, with a superb sense of timing, announced the PC elections when public antipathy to the JVP was at its peak. The nation was still mourning the death of the charismatic actor-turned-politician, Vijaya Kumaranatunge, at the hands of the JVP.

The results of the elections have come as a rude jolt to the JVP rank and file which is now increasingly aware that public opinion in Sri Lanka is rapidly turning against the movement. More important, the presence of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) in the southern and eastern province has meant that the Sri Lankan security forces are now all concentrated in the south, the JVP's traditional stronghold.

The success of the IPKF in neutralising the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has also caused a negative psychological reaction against the JVP in the public mind—as long as it shared the headlines with the LTTE for acts of violence, public reaction was not so strong.

All this suggests that the JVP rank and file and many of its leaders may be prepared to lay down arms and make their peace with the Sri Lankan Government. Just how much of a hold Wijeweera exerts on the movement is difficult to assess but it is certainly nowhere near the respect that LTTE leader Pirabhakaran commands.

In any event, the chances of an agreement between Colombo and the JVP can no longer be eliminated from New Delhi's calculations. If, in the next few weeks, there is some kind of a lasting and credible agreement between Colombo and the JVP, the pressure on New Delhi to follow suit with the LTTE and begin a phased withdrawal of the IPKF will be much greater. Indian High Commission officials till recently had maintained that "Jayewardene cannot ask for early withdrawal of the IPKF because he needs his redeployed forces from the north and east to handle the JVP problem in the south." If the JVP does come around, India can no longer be complacent about Jayewardene's inability to insist on a firm time schedule for early withdrawal of the IPKF.

But even without such an agreement, the pressure on India to reach an understanding with the LTTE has dramatically increased in the wake of the PC elections. Perhaps realising this, there has been a sudden flurry of parleys with the LTTE in Delhi and Madras for a cease-fire. Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit flew to New

Delhi on May 6 to hasten the momentum from the Indian end.

That is now a crucial necessity. Today, Jayewardene is in an unassailable position both in regard to the accord and in terms of domestic politics. With the PC elections in four Sinhala provinces on April 28, the accord passed its first test. The crux of the accord, which is the devolution of power, blossomed from paper to reality.

As Jayewardene said: "The first political task has been accomplished." Dr Nissanka Wijeratne, minister of justice, added: "In Sri Lankan politics, 1988 marks a watershed. Forty years ago, power was transferred from one colour to another. Now it has been transferred from the Centre to the grassroots."

SHYAM TEKWANI



Athulathmudali: jumping the gun?

The elections—a part of the accord's provisions—were a make-or-break issue as far as the accord was concerned. The main opposition party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), however, boycotted it.

Jayewardene, the wily strategist, decided on a staggered poll. Only four of the nine provinces—traditional strongholds of the ruling United National Party (UNP)—went to the polls in the first round held on April 28. In the four provinces that saw elections—North-central, North-western, Uva, and Sabara-Gamuva—94 per cent of the electorate are rural Sinhalese. The result—in favour of the UNP—and the high voter turn-out, has established that the accord was not an issue with them.

Only two pro-accord groups were in the fray: the UNP and the six-week-old leftist United Socialist Alliance with the incongruous acronym USA, comprising four leftist parties—the Sri Lanka Mahajana Party (Kumaranatunge's), the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, the Nava Sama Samaja Party and the Communist Party.

The UNP won in all the four provinces. "It's better than we expected," admitted Athulathmudali. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, awaiting the outcome of the elections, interpreted it as "proof that the people of Sri Lanka supported the accord". But the ruling party, which had viewed the polls as a one-horse-race, was jolted out of its complacency when the USA won 64 seats against the UNP's 88.

Nevertheless, the elections have strengthened Jayewardene's position vis-a-vis the accord. They proved that:

- he could hold elections despite the boycott and death threats.
- his party may win two of the remaining three Sinhala provinces.
- he now has greater leverage with India: he has more than fulfilled his part of the bargain while India is yet to fully disarm the LTTE.
- he has been able to call the Opposition's bluff that PCs would mean the country's fragmentation. With the swearing-in of governors and chief ministers, the public can see the mendacity of opposition fears.

As yet, however, the ground reality in the north and east does not suggest that the time is right yet for the holding of elections. Said Minister of Mobilisation, Ranil Wickremasinghe: "There is a marked reduction in violence but it has not ended. In the north, normalcy to enable civilian activity has been established. In the east, the IPKF does not claim even that."

The success of the IPKF hitherto has been its ability to reverse LTTE's position from defending its strongholds, to guerrilla warfare to one of individual elimination. Said Athulathmudali: "There is a military factor in tackling guerrilla warfare. But there is no military solution. The only final solution is to get the LTTE to join the political mainstream." Both India and LTTE are fully aware of this, and both are playing their cards accordingly.

Even as military operations to disarm the LTTE continue, India opened up political avenues with it by initiating "informal talks" as early as February 4. The LTTE is now in a conciliatory mood. Said a senior LTTE source: "We have reached a stage where we have two options—continue to fight India as an enemy or see it as a friendly force. We've opted for the latter." The LTTE has now agreed in principle to four hitherto intractable issues—lay down arms, support the accord, prepare for talks and join the political process.

The first goal of the current talks hinges on a convincing surrender of arms. Said an LTTE source: "Policy-wise, we have taken a decision to hand over weapons. It's just a question of numbers." While the LTTE dismisses the importance of numbers, it is believed to have 3,000 pieces of weaponry, including rifles, artillery and rocket launchers. India insists on the surrender of 1,500 rifles. The LTTE claims it has only 500. "The gap is being bridged," said the source.

Athulathmudali reflects popular Sinhala opinion when he says that Colombo has fulfilled its obligations under the accord. It is now up to New Delhi to follow suit.

Asked whether the new conciliatory mood stemmed from a position of weakness in that they are clearly on the run, with a large number of their bases smashed, cadres killed, arrested or surrendered, and ammunition and funds running low, the source replied: "It's true we've lost men and material but that is part of a guerrilla struggle. We derive satisfaction from the fact that we have demonstrated to the world that we are capable of resisting a superpower. Our



IPKF soldiers on patrol in Jaffna district

conciliatory attitude is not from weakness. We have proved our point that we can't be fooled around with. Now we'd like to give peace a chance."

INDIA TODAY learns that the LTTE has conveyed to India two conditions for it to join the political process and contest the PC elections—setting up of an interim administrative council for six months while refugees and other Tamil political groups return to the north and east. The Tigers also want controlling interest as was offered to them soon after the accord.

AUDACIOUS as this may seem, they still have some bargaining clout. First, they still have mass support. Second, unlike in the southern province, there is absolutely no political activity in Tamil areas and without LTTE cooperation, it is virtually impossible to make a start in this direction. Despite IPKF saturation in Jaffna, the Tigers have assassinated 40 informers in the peninsula in the last six months. Third, the Tigers are beaten but not crippled. They remain a guerrilla force with 3,000 members and 1,000 fighters and can tie down the IPKF in Sri Lanka for a prolonged time, even if ammunition is low and supplies remain cut off. The Tigers are primarily 'explosives artistes'. Said an LTTE source: "While we are prepared for peace, we are simultaneously preparing also for a Vietnam-type situation as a back-up measure if we fail to come to an agreement with India."

In the wake of the new developments, New Delhi is running out of time. The IPKF has to put enough pressure on the LTTE to force them into a ceasefire.

But an agreement on an interim council is ruled out. It is learnt that both Jayewardene and Rajiv, at the Delhi meeting in January, came out strongly against the proposal because of their personal resentment of the LTTE. The militants' second demand—that powers devolved to the PCs be renegotiated—has provoked India to say that it should be renegotiated by the Tamils after they win the PC elections.

Both Rajiv and Jayewardene would ideally like elections in the north and east by July. By next week, Jayewardene would have started the procedural formalities that would have his country ready for the parliamentary elections in July. And Jayewardene cannot face the Sinhala electorate unless the IPKF begins at least a token withdrawal—which can happen only after the PCs are set up.

India has to come to an agreement with the Tigers, not out of favour or recognition but out of sheer expediency: their exclusion from the political process would make it a meaningless exercise.

Smarter by experience, the IPKF is launching another major round of military operations in the north and east to reduce LTTE's bargaining clout and to make one last attempt to marginalise the militants.

It is also understood that the IPKF is making an all-out effort to dredge out LTTE supremo V. Pirabhakaran—alive if possible, dead if inevitable. They are convinced that no other leader among the Tigers can command the fierce loyalty of the cadres. In his absence, the force would flounder, which would solve all of India's problems at this juncture. Significantly, when asked whether the IPKF was instructed not to shoot Pirabhakaran if sighted, General Officer Commanding Lt-General A.S. Kalkat remarked: "No instructions have been issued either way."

The fact remains that the primary intent of IPKF's Operations Viraat and Trishul in the northern province was to get Pirabhakaran. So far, the LTTE chief has been able to elude the IPKF because he has been moving constantly in a variety of disguises. Now, with the Sri Lankan Government's successful staging of the PC elections, India has no choice but to put enough military pressure on the LTTE to accept a cease-fire and negotiate a political agreement before the unofficial July deadline for elections in the north and east.

—ANITA PRATAP in Colombo

◆ MAY 31, 1988

REPORT

India dragged by the Tigers' tail

IT is both tragic and ironic that two armies are engaged in fighting extremist groups in Sri Lanka nearly a year after the signing of the so-called peace accord.

Colombo was burning and Jaffna was jubilant when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President J. R. Jayewardene signed the agreement in July last year. Both the towns are now in ferment with the Janata Vimukti Peramuna and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam fighting the accord and the Indian and Sri Lankan Governments nowhere near bringing either of them to the path of peace. The blame for the discord the accord has created should be equally shared by the octogenerian President and the young but inexperienced Prime Minister. Both ignored the lesson of Sri Lankan history that no accord that is not born out of a Sinhala consensus will work. In this case, there was not even a Tamil consensus.

Smarting under the blow of an imposed accord, President Jayewardene cleverly manoeuvred to bring about a confrontation between the LTTE and the Government of India so as to tell the Sinhalese, angry over Indian "armed intervention," that the IPKF has come to fight their battle. He is now reaping the bitter harvest. The strength of the IPKF has swollen to 70,000 and the Tigers are far from disarmed, though subdued, after seven months of conflict. Naturally the JVP, which is violently opposed to the accord, is back in action in a big way to disrupt the provincial councils system flowing from the accord. Criticism of the Jayewardene regime comes not only from Sinhala hardliners but even moderates who have come to regard the President as weak and wavering.

In a desperate move to stem the tide, Mr. Jayewardene hastily lifted the proscription on the JVP early this month through an agreement brought about by self-styled JVP negotiator S. C. Senanayake. The pact, a brainchild of National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali, turned out to be stillborn with the JVP promptly disowning it. As Land Development Minister Gamini Dissanayake, who is Mr. Athulathmudali's rival for presidency, gleefully put it, "There is no agreement, no marriage." Mr. Dissanayake is, however, with Mr. Athulathmudali on the need to placate the JVP to meet the challenge from the Opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). That was why he was keen that Indian Defence Minister K. C. Pant should immediately visit Sri Lanka to finalise dates for elections in the Tamil-dominated provinces and draw up plans for an IPKF pull-out.

Mr. Pant, however, is in no hurry to rush to Colombo's rescue since India is having its own problems in bringing the LTTE round. As a result, the JVP is continuing with the violence. In the last one month, the JVP has killed 18 candidates belonging to the United National Party (UNP) and the United Socialist Alliance (USA) who were in the fray for elections in the Southern, Western and Central provinces due next month. The Sri Lankan Government, which managed to hold elections to four provinces in the south last month in the face of mounting violence by the JVP, is going ahead with the polls in the remaining three provinces, leaving only the Tamil-dominated Northern and Eastern provinces which are to later merge, according to the terms of the accord.

With Colombo falling within the Western province which is going to the polls, the JVP has signalled its determination to carry the campaign of terror to the capital by killing UNP General Secretary Mandalan Fernando in the heart of the city in broad daylight.

Notwithstanding widespread support for the JVP because of mass discontent, there is growing disenchantment with the cult of violence. To that extent, the Government has taken a step in the right direction by lifting the ban on the JVP to give it a chance to come overground.

Apart from the JVP menace, the Government has to contend with opposition to the accord from the SLFP. While boycotting the provincial council poll, the SLFP is planning to contest the forthcoming by-elections to the Parliament in four constituencies to feel the pulse of the people. In the main, it is keeping its powder dry for the presidential elections due in December. Moves are already underway between the SLFP and the USA for an electoral understanding. Mrs. Bandaranaike, who fell out with her daughter Mrs. Chandrika after her marriage to film star-politician Vijaya Kumaranatunge, is reportedly coming closer to her after her husband's death at the hands of the JVP.

The only way the President can contain the JVP threat and meet the combined Opposition challenge is by making the agreement work to the advantage of the Sinhalese majority and coaxing India into signing a friendship treaty to make provisions impinging on Sri Lanka's foreign policy look less obnoxious. With this end in view, he has set his face against a permanent merger of the mixed population in the east with the Tamil majority of the north.

With a view to defeating the merger in the referendum to be held in the east one year after elections, the Sri Lankan Government is reported to have settled 4,000 new Sinhala familes along the Trincomalee- Vavuniya-Mullaitivu stretch under the controversial Veli-Oya scheme. Not only has the Government pushed through the Provincial Council Bill without discussing with India residual matters as required under the agreement, it has also gone ahead with elections in Sinhalese areas. While the agreement stipulates that English and Tamil should also be made official languages along with Sinhalese, the Government has quietely made English the link language, as a sop to the Sinhalese.

The only remaining irritant from the Sinhalese point of view is the continuing presence of the IPKF necessiated by the Tigers' refusal to lay down arms. Here again, the Sri Lankan Government is not prepared to wait any longer and is keen on holding elections to the Tamil province by July-August regardless of whether the LTTE wants to participate or not. It is felt that once a popular Government is installed, the IPKF will no longer have any excuse to stay.

But India, which underestimated the Tigers' capacity for resistance, is not prepared to risk holding elections without the LTTE's participation.

This is hardly surprising since the LTTE's writ still runs in the north and the east though it has considerably weakened militarily. Its call for civil disobedience is heeded not only in Jaffna but also in Batticaloa and Trincomalee. Crude attempts to break

up fasts for a ceasefire by mothers' fronts in Batticaloa and Trincomalee have only further distanced the IPKF from the people. Efforts to promote rival groups to counter-balance the LTTE have also not borne fruit. PLOT is under fire from the IPKF for talking directly to President Jayewardene and TELO has not been able to even gain a toehold in Jaffna. When TELO organised a hartal with IPKF permission to commemorate the second death anniversary of its leader Srisbaratnam, at least 15 of its boys were shot dead in Jaffna.

The talks between the LTTE and the Government of India, going on at various levels since last March, have not made much progress. This is because the LTTE has not budged an inch on basic issues. It has demanded an indefinite ceasefire followed by unconditional talks. It has offered to lay down arms once the security of the Tamil people is guaranteed by India. It has opposed holding of elections in Tamil areas "under the umbrella of Indian military occupation and domination" and said an interim Government should be established to facilitate the rehabilitation and resettlement of Tamil refugees. The LTTE also wants the Government of India to renegotiate with the Sri Lankan Government, with the active participation of Tamil representatives, the framework of devolution of power. It has reiterated that there can be no permanent solution to the problem unless the Tamils are recongnised as a distinct nationality with a homeland comprising the north and east and with the right to self-determination, which includes the right to secede.

The accord rejects the homeland concept and seeks a solution within the unitary structure of Sri Lanka. Even if other Tamil groups do not go as far as the LTTE by demanding the reopening of the agreement, they too are uneasy about provisions in the Provincial Council Bill which gives the President the power to dismiss a popular Government on the perceived threat of war or armed rebellion and vests with the Centre, powers over land alienation.

But neither Government is in a mood to oblige. The Sri Lankan Government has already made it clear that the devolution package cannot be improved any further since it was cleared by the Supreme Court by a narrow five-four majority.

Under the circumstances, an early breakthrough is difficult whatever be the compulsions of the LTTE as well as the two Governments.

— S. Murari after a visit to Sri Lanka

FAST UNTO DEATH BY MOTHER SUSEELA GANESHAN

Mrs. Suseela Ganeshan of the Trincomalee Mothers' Front commenced a fast unto death on 10 April at Sivan Kovil premises in Trincomalee in eastern Sri Lanka demanding that (a) India should declare an unconditional ceasefire, (b) The LTTE should lay down their arms, and (c) India and LTTE should negotiate with a view to arriving at the just solution.

A statement issued by the fasting Suseela Ganeshan said:

'The Annaiar Munnani (Mothers' Front) commenced 24 hours relay fast on March 9th. Up to now, two hundred mothers as well as young boys, young girls and children of both sexes have participated. But the Government of India has remained silent. Under the circumstances, we have no alternative but to start a fast unto death. I, a founder member and a member of the Central Committee of the Annaiar Munnani participated in the Tokan Fast conducted by Trincomalee mothers on 29th Feb. at Pattirakali Ampal Temple in Trincomalee in support of the demands put foward by Batticaloa Annaiar Munnani. On that day I came forward voluntarily and gave my name to serve as a member of the Central Committee that was formed amongst the mothers who participated in that fast. I also informed the Secretary of the Annaiar Munnani that I was prepared to commence a fast unto death in this struggle. Now I thank the Annaiar Munnani for having given me an opportunity to fulfil my desire. I have decided to sacrifice my life on my own willingness for the emancipation of the Tamil speaking people. I publicly announce that no one has the right to prevent or stop my fast or to make me to change my decision. But, only in the event of the Government of India agreeing to the demands of the Annaiar Munnani, I will give up my fast with the consent of the Central Committee of the Annaiar Munnani. I wish that the sacrifice of mine for the Tamil speaking people should be felt not only by the Tamil speaking people living in the Northern and Eastern provinces but also all Tamil people living in every nook and corner of the world. Ceasefire by the Government of India and negotiations with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are essential for elimination of sufferings of the Tamil speaking people.

'In order to pursue this, the mothers should come forward to continue the fast unto death in all places wherever the Tamil speaking people live. Particularly, the mothers who were displaced from this country and living in India, especially in Tamil Nadu as refugees should also continue this struggle.

'My last desire is that **THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WITHOUT WORSENING THE TAMIL PROBLEM, SHOULD DECLARE CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATE WITH THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM AND MAKE THE FUTURE OF THE TAMIL SPEAKING PEOPLE PROSPEROUS TOO'.**

DEATH FAST MOTHER DIES

Forty-eight year old Mrs. Poopathy Kanapathippillai who had undertaken a fast unto death organised by the Batticaloa Mothers' Front died on 19 April after 31 days from the day she commenced her fast at the Mamangeswarar Hindu Temple.

Mrs. Kanapathippillai had undertaken the fast in support of the two demands put forward by the Mothers' Front, namely that there should be an immediate cease-fire between the Indian Peace Keeping Force and the LTTE and the Indian government should resume negotiations with the LTTE.

Mrs.Kanapathippillai commenced her fast on 19 March following the abrupt end to the fast by Mrs.Annammah David. She continued her fast in defiance of the frequent calls to give it up by the IPKF commanders.

Mrs.Kanapathippillai is the mother of five children. One son was killed in operations by the Sri Lanka security forces. Two of her sons and a grandson are presently in detention at the Boosa detention centre. Her husband is a retired railway officer.

Several hundred of Batticaloa residents paid homage to her at the office of the Mothers' Front where her body was kept. Mrs.Kanapathippillai was laid to rest on 21 April with thousands of mourners participating in the funeral procession.

The Mothers' Front announced that, despite Mrs. Kanapathippillai's death, the fasting unto death campaign would continue until the Front's demands are met with favour.

The Trincomalee Mothers' Front, in a letter to Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, has threatened to commence fasts on the streets of Trincomalee if no solution is found to the ethnic conflict.

THE RIGHT OF THE TAMIL NATION TO SELF-DETERMINATION

By Justice Satchi Ponnambalam

A summary of a paper prepared for the International Tamil Conference to be held in London on 30th April and 1st May 1988

"In so far as we can give to each nation the power to express itself as a state..... we liberate a spiritual energy, which beyond discussion, adds to the happiness of mankind..... For one nation to refuse this power of expression to another is to impoverish the spiritual well-being of the world." - *Harold Laski in "Nationalism and the future of civilisation (1939)*

National self-determination as a political principle has evolved over the last 150 years as a by-product of the doctrine of nationalism. The term "peoples", in the UN Charter and Covenants is used as being coincident with "nation." What is a nation?

At the time of World War I, on the basis of Krehbiel's formulation, it was said that **"a nation exists when its component parts believe it to be a nation."** This repeats the much earlier idea of the great French scholar Ernest Renan when he simply referred to the nation as a "corporate soul." While this attempt at defining emphasises the subjective factor, yet it is inadequate in offering no means of distinguishing a nation from a community or tribe. **An indispensable characteristic is the possession of a specified territory by the nation.**

Taking into account the many views expressed, we find the following as indispensable characteristics of a nation:

(1) possession of a specified territory;

(2) a consciousness among the people as a nation; and

(3) cultural integration which binds the people by ties of cultural oneness.

Applying these criteria, the Tamils of Sri Lanka vis-a-vis the Sinhalese are indisputably a nation. However much Jayewardene brothers and their recently recruited pseudo-intellectual cohorts, in their myopia may want it otherwise to carry on their mad programme of Tamil genocide, **the Tamils are a nation, living in a specified territory, possessed of consciousness as a nation and manifesting socio-cultural integration and coherence as one people.**

It is essential to correctly designate the political conflict in Sri Lanka as one between the oppressor Sinhalese government subjugating the Tamil nation in the name of the interests of the Sinhalese nation on the one hand, and the oppressed Tamil nation fighting for freedom, on the other. It is a national question sui generis. That the Tamils of Sri Lanka are an oppressed nation, now subjected to genocidal repression by the very Government which must protect their lives, is put beyond any doubt by what Jayewardene, as President of the country told Ian Ward, a British journalist in July 1983. He said: "I am not worried about the opinion of the Jaffna people...Now we can't think of them. Not about their lives or of their opinion about us." *(Daily Telegraph, London. 11.7.83)*

This Daily Telegraph interview was re-published in the Sunday Observer (Colombo) and all the Sinhala newspapers. The TULF President and M.P. for Nallur referred to the above statement in the 'Sunday Observer', in parliament and said: "I only hope that what was published would be contradicted by the President.... I hope to God that the article which was an interview was wrong as it was stated there that the President did not care for the lives of the people of Jaffna." No contradiction was ever made and the President stood by the correctness of that news report.

A multi-nation State can continue to exist only if the cultural diversity of the separate nations is recognised as the bedrock and the equality of the constituent nations is accepted as axiomatic. The legislature in such a State must devise the structure to prevent the domination of one nation by the other. If domination be pursued, the State will fall apart and destroy itself. In Sri Lanka, domination and subjugation of the Tamils was what the blinkered Sinhalese chauvinist politicians wanted and achieved. Hence, the nation-breaking that is taking place.

The Tamil people have been subjected to and are fighting against the internal colonialism of the Sinhalese. The UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (G.A.Resolution 1514 of 1960) states: "... the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and all people have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty."

Professor Virginia Leary, in her "Ethnic Conflict and Violence" in Sri Lanka (I.C.J.1983, p.69), states: **"The Tamils could be considered to be a 'people'. They have a distinct language, culture, a separate religious identity from the majority population, and to an extent, a defined territory.** Claims to self-determination under international

law, however, must also be balanced against the international law principle of the territorial integrity of states." True and a correctly stated international law principle indeed. But territorial integrity of states is not an end in itself. It is only of instrumental value in furthering the interests of all its citizens and to provide for the peoples comprised in the territory of the State their legitimate right to exercise power for their well-being. In international law, a nation of peoples have rights, viz, right to freedom from oppression, from racial discrimination, human rights, fundamental freedoms, etc.

The UN Declaration on the Principles of Equal Rights (GA Resolution 2625 of 1970) gives the right of self-determination to peoples within existing independent states when governments fail to "conduct themselves in compliance with the principles of equal rights" and when the States do not "represent the whole of the people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour." The Article reads as follows:-

"Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial principle of equal rights and self-determination as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour."

The Sri Lanka Government which does not hide its naked genocidal massacre of the innocent Tamils in their homelands cannot be regarded as conducting itself in compliance with the principle of equal rights. **Nor can that government be regarded as representing the Tamil people when Jayewardene himself has said that he was not worried about the opinion of the Jaffna people and not about their lives.**

What is self-determination in international law? The UN Declaration on the International Status of "Peoples" and their Right of Self-determination (GA Resolution 2625 of 1970) states:-

"The establishment of a sovereign independent state, the free association or integration with an independent state or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self- determination by that people."

The Sri Lankan Government has not simply been against but oppressive of the Tamil people, as a nation and its political, economic, social and ethnocultural interests. **Tamils in Sri Lanka have no state and are seeking to create their own sovereign state of Eelam based on their right of self- determination.** They are a stateless nation oppressed by alien Sinhalese colonialism and domination.

The Tamil freedom fighters today assert and bear arms in exercise of their right to self-determination. In practical terms, what is now necessary is a constitutional formula for secession. In this, the Tamil people need the help of the international community, as the oppressor does not want to recognise its own international obligations. Otherwise, the state of international relations would be seen to be one of paralysis and bankruptcy, the inaction dictated by out-dated cliches of "internal affairs", "territorial integrity", "national unity", etc. To avoid further unnecessary violence, turmoil and loss of innocent lives, on both sides, it is the right and duty of the UN and concerned Member States, to intervene in recognition of the right of the Tamil people to self-determination.

The particular justifiable circumstance of the Tamil people's desire for self- determination by secession is that it developed out of the dynamic of national oppression and has generated its own momentum. It is a national liberation struggle sui generis and in the words of David Selbourne of Oxford University "a true national question, if ever there was one."

There is need for enlightened and progressive realisation that self-determination necessarily involves attack on existing union, territorial unity and state sovereignty. But that is for the higher cause of human liberation, human rights and human dignity. **The existing state cannot be regarded or defended as permanent and unalterable in the face of internal colonialism, genocidal repression, organised pogroms and mass massacre of a nation of people.**

'Subject IPKF to monitoring body'

The Centre for Society and Religion has suggested that the Indian peace keeping forces in Sri Lanka be subject to an impartial monitoring authority, and that the government of India hasten the disharge of its responsability under the Indo Lanka accord.

In an 'open letter to human rights groups and people's movement in India', the centre suggests that this monitoring authority could be an Indo Sri Lankan body or an international one like the International Committee of the Red Cross.

"The fact of the IPKF being not accountable to any such impartial agency is not good for Indo-Sri Lanka accord. But we think that Sri Lanka should not be subordinate to India. We Would welcome reciprocal relationships as between two independent neighbouring countries".

It warns that "the longer the IPKF remains here, and that in a somewhat partisan manner, the greater are the risks of India assuming a dominating and even imperialistic role — which we trust would be repugnant to most Indians".

The letter is signed by Fr. Tissa Balasuriya, Director, and Bernadeen Silva, Asst. Director/secretary.

Why did the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) refuse to accept the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord unconditionally? What are the basic defects and limitations of the Accord? Does the Accord offer a permanent solution to the Tamil national question? Does it fulfill the political aspirations and national interests of our people? Will it create an appropriate political climate so that our people can live in peace, in freedom, with honour, dignity and security?

This paper attempts to answer these crucial questions and clarifies LTTE's position on the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.

The euphoria and high hopes that were displayed when the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was signed in July last year have almost disappeared. What prevails now is gloom and hopelessness since the Accord has brought war, violence and misery, instead of the promised peace, harmony and happiness. Yet the Government of India continues to praise the Accord as a remarkable historical triumph, as a magnificent diplomatic achievement on the part of Rajiv Gandhi and Jayawardane. What amuses the people of Tamil Eelam is the continuous assertion by India that the Accord was signed to promote the interests of the Tamils and to find a permanent solution to the Tamil question. In India's opinion, the Accord provides for all the political demands of the Tamils except the demand for an independent Tamil state. We wish to argue that this interpretation advanced by India is deliberately misleading and far from truth.

It is our considered opinion that the Accord fails to fulfill the political and national aspirations of the people of Tamil Eelam. It fails to grasp the complex dimensions of the Tamil national question. It fails to offer an adequate framework for the resolution of the problem. This failure can only be attributed to the superficial approach toacomplex historical problem, an approach based on entirely false premises, on false perceptions. Let us discuss the issue in more detail.

A NATIONAL QUESTION

The problem of the Eelam Tamils is a national question. It is a problem concerned with the fundamental political rights of a nation of people. It is a problem of the right to national self-determination of a people. The political struggle of the Eelam Tamils is based on this very question of national self-determination.

Our people have all the attributes that constitute them into a unique nationality. We have a homeland, a historical habitation with well defined territory, a unique culture and tradition, a rich language, a distinct history that extends to pre-historic times.

As a nation of people, we have the right to determine our own political destiny. This right to self-determination of people is recognised by international law and by U.N. Charter. This right bestows upon us the freedom to form an independent state of our own.

Our struggle for self-determination arose as a consequence of state repression, terror and genocide, as a consequence of the rejection by the chauvinistic Sinhala regimes of our civilized demand for Federal autonomy, as a consequence of ever growing conflict between Tamil and Sinhala nations which made co-existence under a unitary state intolerable and impossible.

The forms and methods of our struggle for political independence changed on account of the concrete conditions of State oppression. The peaceful, non-violent agitations adopted by our people were ruthlessly crushed by the repressive arms of the racist State. Armed struggle as a mode of political agitation arose when our people were presented with no alternative other than to resort to armed resistance to defend themselves against a savage form of State terrorism.

As the liberation movement of our people, we have been fighting an armed struggle for the last twelve years to gain our right to self-determination. In this long and arduous struggle we fought with dedication and commitment and made supreme sacrifices. Over a thousand of our cadres have laid down their lives for this noble cause. Our people too. have faced immense suffering, the vissicitudes of which cannot be described by words. Over twenty thousands Tamils have lost their lives for the emancipation of their homeland.

Ours is a national liberation struggle, a struggle for freedom to shape our political destiny, a struggle waged with courage, heroism and sacrifice, a struggle soaked in blood and tears, a struggle built on the ashes of several thousands of martyrs.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord fails to identify the essence and mode of our struggle as a liberation struggle, as a struggle for self-determination. Instead, the Accord places our national struggle entirely on a fallacious premise reducing it to a simple problem of a **discriminated minority group in a pluralistic social formation.** The accord acknowledges that "Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic, and a multi-lingual society" and that Tamils are one of the ethnic groups. Such characterisation conveniently buries the truth that there are two major linguistically oriented national formations, the Sinhalese speaking and Tamil speaking people and that the conflictual relations between the two generated by the chauvinism of the big nation, is the cardinal cause of the national strife in Sri Lanka.

This pluralistic theory of multi-ethnic, multi-lingual Sri Lankan social formation was advanced by Hector Jayawardane at

Thimpu talks to reject outright the demands forwarded by LTTE and other political organisations seeking recognition for Tamil homeland, for Tamil nationality, for the Tamils' right to national self-determination. We are dismayed to find that the Government of India has adopted similar theoretical constructs and definitions utilized by Sri Lankan chauvinists to distort the real issues underlying the Tamil problem. Therefore, the Indian position entrenched in the Sri Lankan ideological terrain rejects the very conceptions of nationality and self-determination which are fundamental to our political struggle.

TAMIL HOMELAND

The people of Tamil Eelam have a homeland, a soil of their own upon which they lived and toiled for centuries, a historically constituted territory embracing the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Our people have an inalienable right to this homeland. This homeland is the basis of our national identity and the very foundation of our socio-economic existence. Therefore, the recognition of the Tamil homeland is a crucial element for any rational and permanent resolution of the Tamil question.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord does not recognise the concept of a Tamil homeland. Instead, the Accord contains within itself dangerous clauses that might eventually lead to the bifurcation of our homeland.

The Accord, while recognising that "the Northern and Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking people", it further qualifies the statement by adding, **"who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups."** This qualified statement conveniently ignores the critical problem of the forceful annexation of vast territories of Tamil land by State aided Sinhala colonisation in the last 40 years and to some extent legitimises such illegal encroachment.

The geographical merger of the North and East to form a single Tamil regional State with adequate powers over the land has been the central demand of the Tamils. This demand for the re-unification and reconstitution of our homeland was the major issue figured in the past agreements and pacts. The question of merger was cardinal, since the Tamil people aspired to enhance their national character and identity and determined to protect their historical homeland from being swamped and swallowed by planned sinhala colonisation.

Does the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord meet this longstanding, legitimate demand of the Tamils? We are of the opinion that the Accord fails to meet this demand. Contrary to the Indian claims that the question of merger is resolved, the Accord only provides for a temporary linkage; it proposes a single administrative unit consisting of Northern and Eastern Provinces only for an interim period followed by a referendum in the Eastern Province to enable the people of the Eastern Province to decide whether the province remain linked with the Northern Province.

The LTTE is firmly opposed to the idea of a referendum. We hold the view that the Tamil homeland is one and indivisible and that the geographical contiquity and territorial unity of our homeland should be given unconditional recognition for any meaningful solution to the Tamil question.

The proposal for a referendum for linkage or de-linkage is unacceptable to the Tamils since it has dangerous implications. The Eastern Province is already a seething cauldron of communal tension primarily due to the manipulations of the Sri Lankan government to disrupt the demographic composition of the population. Jayawardane's government is hell bent on devouring the Tamil lands with the objective of reducing the Tamils to a minority in the area. Though a party to the accord, the Sri Lankan government has publicly declared that it was opposed to the merger and would campaign against it. With thousands of Tamils uprooted and driven away from their homes, with thousands of Sinhalese settlers re-allocated in the deserted Tamil villages, one can easily predict the outcome of a referendum, possibly a rigged one.

The people of Tamil Eelam are deeply dismayed that the Government of India, which is fully aware of this sensitive issue, has failed to workout a satisfactory solution. A referendum on this issue questions the legality and validity of our right to homeland which is a historically given reality.

The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord rejects the fundamental political demands of the Eelam Tamils i.e. the demand for the **recognition of our homeland,** for the **recognition of our people as a nationality,** for the **recognition of our people's right to national self-determination.** These demands were proclaimed at the Thimpu talks as a unanimous decision of the Tamils setting out the basis for a permanent resolution of the Tamil national question.

In total disregard to Tamil aspirations, the Accord attempts to impose a settlement within the framework of the unitary constitution of Sri Lanka which is nothing but a legalised embodiment of Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism, thereby subjugating our people to the tyranny of the dictatorship of the majority. The Accord, therefore, fails to take into account the long history of our political struggle, fails to recognise our people's quest for national identity and freedom, fails to realise the significance of the torrents of blood and tears shed in Tamil Eelam for the cause of our liberation struggle. Having completely ignored the aspirations and sentiments of our people the Government of India has entered into this agreement which does not deal with the fundamental issues of our national struggle nor in any way promotes the interests of the Tamil people.

THE PROPOSALS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

Let us now critically examine the set of proposals offered by the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord for the settlement of the Tamil issue. The scope and theme of this document does not permit us a detailed exposition of all the aspects of these proposals. We will confine ourselves to a brief analysis of the important themes.

A collection of incomplete set of proposals negotiated between the Government of India, Sri Lanka and the TULF from **4.5.1986 to 19.12.1986** were recommended in the Accord as the basis for the resolution of the issue. These set of proposals, called the December 19th framework, at that time, were presented to us for consideration by the Government of India in January 1987. Our leader Mr.Pirabakaran, submitted a written response to the Government of India through Hon.M.G.Ramachandran, then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. Mr.Pirabakaran rejected the framework outright pointing out the inadequacies of the proposals. Mr.Pirabakaran argued that the proposed devolution of powers set-out in the proposals were extremely limited and failed to meet the legitimate political aspirations of the Tamil people.

This same set of proposals are now presented to us again in the Accord with a commitment that, "the residual matters not finalised during the negotiations shall be resolved between India and Sri Lanka". But to the disappointment and dismay of the Tamils, these residual matters were not taken up for discussions. In blatant violation of the commitment given in

the Accord, Jayawardane's regime refused to consider the residual matters, but rather rushed through the Parliament two Bills - **THE 13th AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PROVINCIAL COUNCILS BILL** - which contains most of the unresolved, incomplete collection of proposals.

A critical elucidation of the provisions of these Bills brings one important truth to light. That is, the Provincial Council framework envisaged in these Bills is not specifically addressed to the specific grievances of the Tamil people with the specific objective of resolving the Tamil question. Rather, these laws propose the creation of an island wide administrative structure rigidly controlled by the Centre with limited distribution of political authority to all the provinces of Sri Lanka. Provincial Councils are thus reduced to local administrative bodies serving to the dictates of the State. They do not enjoy any autonomous powers of their own. The institutions of the Centre - the Presidency, the office of the Governor and Parliament - are invested with sweeping powers to interfere and control the functions of the Provincial Councils. In essence, the provisions of these Bills, instead of delegating powers from the centre to periphery allows absolute concentration of power to the Centre.

DICTATORIAL POWERS

The 13th Amendment confers on the President totalitarian emergency powers to dissolve or to make redundant any Provincial Council at his whim and fancy. The President can make a proclamation of Emergency on the ground that the maintenance of essential supplies and services is threatened or that the security of Sri Lanka is threatened by war or external aggression or armed rebellion or **in the President's view there is immenent danger of such happenings.** Having declared Emergency, the President can give directions to the Governor on the course of action and that the presidential direction cannot be questioned by any court of law.

The Governor, who will function as the Agent of the President will not be a ceremonial puppet but rather endowed with far-reaching executive powers. Acting on the directions of the President, the Governor's role is to supervise the functions of the Provincial Councils and super-impose the authority of the Centre over them.

By bestowing extra-ordinary powers to the President and to his appointee, the Governor, the architects of these proposals have deliberately thwarted de-centralisation of power to the Provinces and extended the Presidential authority to grass-root level, subjugating the entire Provincial administration of the island to the dictates of the Centre.

It is well-known that President Jayawardane has been abusing emergency powers for the last 10 years to continue his regime of racist repression. With additional emergency powers conferred on him by these laws one can safely assume that Jayawardane will not hesitate to use his power to stifle and suffocate any attempts on the part of the Tamils to assume political power.

With Presidential authority exerting rigid control over the functions of the Provincial Councils, the powers accorded to Parliament to amend or repeal the chapter pertaining to the P.C's make this 'devolution package' a mockery. The legislative powers devolved to the Councils become meaningless and impotent since Parliament retains the power to legislate even on matters alloted to Provincial Councils. In brief, the provisions of these Bills, having effectively constrained devolutional power,allow the perpetuation of the tyranny of the Parliamentary majority which has been the medium of repressive racist policies against the Tamil people.

CENTRAL CONTROL OVER VITAL SUBJECTS

The severe limitations of the functional authority of the Provincial Councils can be best ascertained by the list of subjects that are alloted to the Provinces. While all the crucial subjects that are vital for the social and economic development of the regions are brought under the Central Government (under Reserved and Concurrent lists) only a limited number of unimportant subjects fall within the Provincial administration.

Important subjects like agriculture, industries, fisheries, land development, colonisation, higher education, reconstruction, rehabilitation, local government and several others are excluded from provincial authority.

The powers of the Provincial Councils are extremely limited over the issue of land and land settlement which is an important and sensitive matter to the Tamils. The Provincial Councils are denied the right to utilise lands which fall within their regions. The right of alienation of what is described as 'state lands' is vested with the Centre and the President is given power over alienation and disposition of such lands. Furthermore, the State is empowered to allot or acquire lands, or initiate colonisation projects under the cover of inter-provincial irrigation and land development schemes. In brief, the proposals governing land settlement deprive the Tamils their right over their own lands, their right to develop their own soil for their own economic well-being, and their right to protect their own homeland against Sinhala encroachments.

In terms of the limitation of subjects and powers delegated to the Provinces one can safely conclude that Rajiv - JR peace Accord falls short of Bandaranayake-Chelvanayagam Pact of 1957. In the B.C. Pact, "It was agreed that Regional Councils should have powers over specified subjects including agriculture, co-operatives, lands and land development, colonisation, education, health, industries and fisheries, housing and social services, electricity, water schemes and roads". Did not the B.C. Pact offer more to the Tamils 31 years ago than the present agreement?

The proposals concerning law and order, a subject of grave concern to the Tamil people, is the most defective. The proposals fail to meet the demand for a Tamil police service independant of the Centre's interference and domination. Rather, it proposes the creation of a duel police system - National and Provincial - with more powers to the national division to appoint senior positions to the Provincial police and even to interfere directly in the affairs of law and order of a province under the cover of emergency. This police system fails to provide adequate security to our people but rather it will allow the perpetuation of Sinhala police tyranny in Tamil areas.

OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: A MYTH

The supporters of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord argue that one of the positive elements of the Agreement is the elevation of Tamil language to the status of an official language on a par with Sinhala. But a close scrutiny of this matter will dispel this myth.

The Sri Lanka constitution accords to sinhala language the full status of the official language, **'to be the sole official language'** and provides for the manner of its use.

The status of the Tamil language or its usage is not guaranteed by constitutional provisions. Instead, the 13th Amendment states the Parliament, shall by law, provide for the use of Tamil as an official language. By bestowing such power to the Sinhala majority Parliament the status of the Tamil language as an official language is negated and its use is severely undermined.

FORCEFUL REPATRIATION

A deliberate attempt by both India and Sri Lanka to de-link the burning issue of the plantation Tamils with 'the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka' is the most serious defect of the Accord. The LTTE and other Tamil organisations, at Thimpu talks, insisted on the inclusion of the problem of plantation Tamils in any meaningful attempt to find a permanent political solution to the Tamil issue and demanded that citizenship and other civil rights should be granted to plantation Tamils who consider the Island as their mother country.

The Accord offers nothing to resolve the plight of this section of the Tamil population. Instead, the Government of India's pledges "to expedite repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian citizens to India concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu". The Accord, allows for forceful repatriation of plantation Tamils, thereby violating the right of human beings to choose their own country.

TAMIL INTERESTS BETRAYED

In total perspective, the provincial council framework fails to meet the legitimate and reasonable demands of the Tamils; it fails to recognise their political and national aspirations; it fails to promote their socio-economic interests; it fails to guarantee their security concerns. The proposed devolution plan is not designed to redress the longstanding grievances of our people. On the contrary, it allows the perpetuation of the domination, oppression and exploitation of the Tamil masses by the racist Sinhala state. Thus, the Indo-Sri Lankan accord offers an inadequate, insubstantial and impotent set of proposals for the resolution of the Tamil issue. This is the offer given as an alternative to a politically concious nation of people who have been waging an armed struggle for more than a decade to establish an independant sovereign state. This total desregard shown to Tamil political sentiments and aspirations by both India and Sri Lanka brings to surface one important political truth. That is, **the signatories of the Accord have little or no concern about the interests of the Tamil people.** The Accord was hurriedly signed not with the acknowledgement of "the imperative of resolving the ethnic problem" as proclaimed in the preamble to the Agreement. The impelling and compelling imperative was something else. As far as India is concerned, the imperative is her geo-political interests and the Accord secures such national interests. What shocks the Tamil nation is that the Government of India, in persuasion of her geo-political interests has betrayed the Tamils by totally disregarding their political aspirations and interests.

Indisputably India has given primacy to her national and geo-political interests over and above Tamil concerns. But the manner in which the Government of India chose to secure her interests at the cost of Tamil aspirations is what has deeply disillusioned the Tamil people. Utilizing the Tamil struggle to interfere in the conflict, encouraging the Tamil resistance movement to bring pressure on Jayawardane, taking the responsibility upon itself to mediate on behalf of the Tamils, the Government of India has finally achieved her strategic interests but the Tamils are left alienated, helpless, defenceless, with their fundamental political problems unresolved.

INDIA'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS

Let us now examine the aspects of the Accord that secures India's strategic interests.

Sri Lanka, since the assumption to power of the right-wing UNP regime under Jayawardane, has been drifting away from India's sphere of influence and was moving towards the power axis of western imperialism. Sri Lanka's open economic policy, her desperation to crush the Tamil freedom movement, her fear of India's hegemonic dominance in the region, propelled Jayawardane to drift closer to western imperialism. Such a drift of a neighbouring country, whose strategic importance is considerable, has irritated India. Furthermore, the subversive activities of Israeli intelligence personnel, the induction of foreign mercenary forces in the war against Tamil guerrillas, the military assistance and training facilities provided by Pakistan, the clandestine operations of the American and West German broadcasting stations, the U.S. bid to take over the oil farms in Trincomalee — all these factors posed a serious threat to peace and stability in the region. Therefore, an Accord of peace and friendship with Sri Lanka, to bring the Island back into India's sphere of influence and to put an end to the penetration of the international forces of subversion became an imperative need for India. The precise objective of the Accord is to secure these strategic interests of India.

First of all, the Accord binds Sri Lanka to India's strategic sphere of influence in the region.

Secondly, it puts an end to the employment of foreign mercenary forces in Sri Lanka.

Thirdly, it stops the activities of Israeli Intelligence agencies in Sri Lanka.

Fourthly, it prevents foreign broadcasting organisations in Sri Lanka to use their facilities for military and intelligence purposes.

Fifthly, it allows India to undertake the task of restoring and operating the Trincomalee oil tank farm.

Sixthly, it prevents the use of Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka for military purposes by any country 'in a manner prejudicial to India's interest'.

Thus, the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord secures India's geo-political interests and strategic objectives. The LTTE is sincerely pleased that the Government of India was able to put an end, through the Agreement, to the dangerous activities of the international subversive elements who operated in Sri Lanka as agents of imperialism. **As a revolutionary liberation movement committed to anti-imperialist policy we recognise India's security concerns in the region and support her cardinal foreign policy of making the Indian ocean as a zone of peace free from interference of extra-territorial powers.** In this context, we wish to point out that it was the LTTE fighters who put up a heroic and relentless fight against foreign mercenaries. It was the LTTE fighters who shed their blood to contain these evil forces. Our liberation movement is not opposed to India's interests. **We have no objection whatsoever to India's strategic aspirations to establish her status as the regional super-power in South Asia.** We always functioned and will continue to function as a friendly force to India. We would have extended our unconditional support to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord if the Agreement is only confined to Indo-Sri Lanka relations aimed to secure India's geo-political interests. But the Accord intereferes in the Tamil issue, betrays the Tamil interests. It is here the contradiction of interests between the LTTE and India emerges.

The Accord posed a serious threat to the role and function of our liberation organisation, to our armed revolutionary struggle, to our political objectives. The military structure of our organisation, which was built by blood and tears, by the supreme sacrifices of our heroic fighters, by relentless toil of our cadres for the last 15 years was ordered to be dismantled within 72 hours. The Accord stipulated such stringent conditions on our organisation without providing an acceptable solution

to the Tamil issue, without providing adequate guarantees for the protection of our people.

The Accord proscribes the armed resistance movement and the political struggle for self-determination. The armed struggle is depicted as terrorist activity, while the demand for the right to self-determination is characterised as 'separatism or secessionism'. These activities are considered "prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka" and would not be permitted to be practised on the Indian soil. Those who practice such activity in India would face deportation. The Indian territorial waters will also be closed for 'militant activities' The Accord also threatens Indian military action against any Tamil organisation that rejects the Agreement and refuses to lay down arms.

Thus, the Government of India, suddenly and mercilessly, closed her doors for the Tamil freedom movement and imposed upon the Tamils, at the point of a gun, a framework of proposals that fell very short of their legitimate demands. Tamil interests are the price paid by India to Jayawardane's regime to secure its consent for the Accord. By subordinating the Island to India's regional supremacy, Jayawardane has secured from India what his imperialist masters couldn't provide, that is the total suppression of the Tamil liberation movement and the permanent subjugation of the Tamils under Sinhala hegemony.

WHY WE DECIDE TO CO-OPERATE

The Accord posed an unprecedented challenge to our liberation movement; it signalled a monumental turn of events. As our leader Mr.Pirabakaran has put it aptly at the Suthumalai convention, "Today there has taken place a tremendous turn in our liberation struggle. This turn has come suddenly, in a way that has stunned us, and as if it were beyond our power to influence events".

We had no alternative other than to co-operative with India on the implementation of the Accord or to face the full might of the Indian armed forces.

We were taken unawares by the haste and hurry in which the diplomatic carpet was pulled under our feet. The Accord was framed secretly between the Government of India and Sri Lanka without our knowledge. Our leader Mr.Pirabakaran was rushed to Delhi in a hurry on the pretext of a meeting with the Indian Prime Minister. There, in Delhi, the Agreement was read out to him. He was told that the Accord has been finalised and there cannot be any alterations.

Pirabakaran refused to accept the Accord expressing serious reservations on the Provincial Council proposals. He was firm in his conviction that the proposals envisaged in the Accord would not pave the way for the permanent settlement of the Tamil question. At this stage, the Indian Prime Minister Mr.Rajiv Gandhi met the LTTE leader and had a lengthy dialogue. The Indian leader gave a patient hearing to Mr.Pirabakaran's concerns and misgivings, particularly to his anxiety about the security of his cadres and his people. The Indian Prime Minister assured the following:

* The problems and limitations of the proposed framework would be resolved to the satisfaction of the Tamil people.
* The LTTE would be given its due recognition. An interim Government would be formed with LTTE playing a dominant role.
* A Tamil regional police service would be set up under the Interim Government.
* The Government of India would pay compensation for the LTTE for the maintainance of the organisation following the decision of the LTTE to withdraw the system of taxation in Jaffna. This relief fund would be ¡paid ! on monthly basis until the formation of the Interim Government.
* The Government of India also promised funds to the Interim Government for the rehabilitation and resettlement of Tamil refugees.
* The Indian Peace Keeping Force would take over the responsibility of protecting the Tamils in the North and East until an adequate Tamil security system is created.

Following the assurances given by the Indian Prime Minister we decided to lay down our arms. We also pledged to co-operate with the Government of India on the implementation of the Accord if the Tamil interests are promoted and the Tamil people are protected.

As pledged, we handed over a substantial portion of our arms to the Indian Peace Keeping Force. We parted with our arms as a gesture of goodwill towards India and as a symbolic act signalling our willingness to co-operate with India in her efforts to implement the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. We also pledged that the rest of the arms would be handed over once the Interim Government is established. While we handed over our arms, we also handed over to the Government of India the responsibility of the protection of our cadres and people. Our leader Mr.Pirabakaran declared at the Suthumalai Convention: "What ardent, immeasurable sacrifices we have made for the safety and protection of our people. There is no need to elaborate on this theme. You, our beloved people, are fully aware of the character of our passion for our cause and our feelings of sacrifice. The weapons that we took up and deployed for your safety and protection, for your liberation, for your emanicipation, we now entrust to the Indian Government.

In taking from us our weapons - the only means of protection for Eelam Tamils - the Indian Government takes over from us the great responsibility of protecting our people. The handing over of arms only signifies the transfer of this responsibility...

The soldiers of the Indian army are taking up the responsibility of safeguarding and protecting us against our enemy. I wish to emphasise very firmly here that by the virtue of our handing over our weapons to it, the Indian Government should assume full responsibility for the life and security of every one of the Eelam Tamils"

On his part, Pirabakaran fulfilled his pledges. He showed his goodwill towards India. In the hope that the lives of his people would be protected he laid down his arms, co-operating with the implementation of the Accord.

We need not elaborate or discuss in detail how the Government of India carried out its responsibility of protecting our people. It has now become the knowledge of the entire world how the Indian army unleashed terror in Tamil Eelam, turning our homelnd into a killing field, how the promises and pledges given to us were betrayed, how the terms of the Accord were violated.

The LTTE did not violate any provisions of the Accord. But it was the signatories of the Accord who chose to violate the Agreement. Let us document here, very briefly, the breaches of the Accord made by both Sri Lanka and India.

VIOLATIONS OF THE ACCORD

Sri Lanka Government violated the Accord by:

* Failing to release the Tamil political prisioners.
* Failing to withdraw the Emergency rule in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

* Failing to disband the Sinhalese homeguards in the Eastern Province.
* Failing to confine the armed forces in the barracks.
* Intensifying Sinhala colonisation in Tamil areas.
* Opening up Sinhala police stations in the North and East.
* Arresting LTTE regional commanders and cadres and attempted to take them to Colombo for interrogation and execution.
* Refusing to merge the North and East.
* Rejecting talks on residual matters concerning Provincial Councils.

The Indian Government withdrew its commitments and pledges by:

* Failing to set up an Interim Government for the North and East.
* Failing to set up a Tamil police system.
* Arming the other Tamil groups while disarming the LTTE.
* Allowing these armed groups to hunt down LTTE cadres.
* Allowing our political wing leader Thileepan to die from fasting.
* Allowing the LTTE regional commanders and cadres who were in the custody of the IPKF to die.
* Declaring an unjust war against the LTTE.
* Being responsible for the senseless slaughter of thousands of innocent Tamil civilians.

These are the remarkable achievements made by both Sri Lanka and India since the signing of the Accord to promote the well-being of the Tamil people and to establish peace and normalcy in Tamil areas. From this impressive list of achievements it is easy to assume who is responsible for the present chaotic state of affairs in Tamil Eelam, whether it is the LTTE or the signatories of the Accord.

In theory and practice, the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord is a monumental failure. It is a disastrous failure in so far as its acclaimed objective of resolving the Tamil problem is concerned. The Accord has miserably failed to bring about peace and normalcy in Tamil areas, nor has it promoted "the safety, well-being and prosperity" of our people. Instead, it brought war, violence, death and destruction; it brought a holocaust to the Tamil nation; it brought a colossal human tragedy.

The Accord is a failure because the parties who entered into this diplomatic contract paid no attention to the pathetic plight of the Eelam Tamils, to their profound suffering and anguish, to their complex problems and grievances.

The Government of India is only concerned with securing and consolidating her national interests and geo-political gains. Whereas, Sri Lanka is only concerned with the liquidation of the Tiger movement and the destruction of the Tamil freedom struggle. The people of Tamil Eelam have become the unfortunate victims of these different designs of a regional super-power and a racist state.

It is our liberation movement which is sincerely concerned with the interests of our people. It is because of our earnest and genuine commitment to the cause of our people we stand in conflictual relations with India and Sri Lanka. It is this conflict of interests that has exploded into a war.

This war undertaken by India with its full military might against our liberation movement has been continuing for the last seven months causing unprecedented suffering to our people. The reason advanced by India to legitimise her military misadventure is that the Tamil Tiger are opposed to the Accord and that they have to be disarmed as a necessary condition for the implementation of the Accord. This argument is untenable and far from truth. **The real objective of this massive military exercise is to terrorise the Tamil population and to impose upon them against their will - a defective political arrangement.**

Why India, the ardent advocate of global peace, of non-violence and non-alignment, the master of the world's largest democratic system, a crusader against oppression who intervened in Bangladesh, a champion for the world liberation movements and struggles for self-determination, chose to adopt an unpopular method of military repression and domination against a nation of people who are its ally and friend, who are culturally and ethnically bound to its blood and history, is the most perpelexing question that torments our people. We do not think that the interests and aspirations of the Eelam Tamils, which are articulated in the political goals of the LTTE, are necessarily incompatible with India's national and strategic interests. What we demand is freedom from fear, from oppression, from genocidal annihilation; what we demand is justice, peace and security; what we demand is the recognition of our inalienable rights, our birth rights, our fundamental human rights; what we demand is liberty to shape our own destiny, to shape our own social, economic and political life; what we demand is a rational political system that could ensure our rights and liberties so that we could live like civilized humans with freedom, honour and dignity.

These demands are fair, reasonable, and legitimate and are not incompatible with democratic political thought and practice. If there had been an earnest and sincere effort on the part of India to resolve the national conflict, a political model could have been evolved to accommodate the aspirations of the oppressed Tamil masses without prejudicial to India's geo-political interests. But the policy makers in Delhi chose to ignore completely the concerns of the Tamil people.

We hope that the Government of India will give up its militaristic approach and opt for a path of peace and negotiations. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord can only succeed if Tamil aspirations are recognised and the deep, complex, historical problems of the Tamils are resolved to the satisfaction of the Tamil people.

INDIAN MILITARY STRATEGY

Morally and spiritually we are opposed to this war. We do not want a conflictual relationship with India. This war is imposed on us against our will. We are only fighting to defend ourselves, to protect ourselves, against a formidable military machine far superior in manpower and fire power which is determined to wipe us out. While fighting a defensive war against severe odds, against extreme conditions, we are trying to impress upon the Government of India that the will and determination of a people cannot be subjugated or crushed by military means however formidable it may be.

Since the beginning of this war, we have been pleading with the Government of India to call off the military offensive operations and to resume negotiations to settle the issues by peaceful dialogue. We have indicated our willingness to lay down our arms and co-operate with the implementation of the Accord. At the same time we continue to insist that the interests of our people should be secured and their lives protected. In several communications to the Indian Prime Minister our leader Mr. Pirabakaran has expressed his desire for peace and reconciliation. But to our great disappointment India's response was negative. There is no indication whatsoever on the part of India to bring about peace and normality in Tamil areas. It is easy to discern from the belligerent and the intransigent attitude shown to us and from the malicious propaganda carried out to malign our movement that the Government of India

aims none other than the total destruction of the LTTE. In otherwords, the strategic objective of this war is the 'total immobilisation' - to use the current Indian military jargon - of the armed resistance movement of the Eelam Tamils, and to put an end to the struggle for national emancipation. Therefore, there is no doubt that this war is conducted, in such a callous and ruthless manner, for such a prolonged period of time, against all pleadings from the Tamil people, to serve the chauvinistic designs of the Sinhala regime. There is no doubt that India is playing into the evil hands of Jayawardane. This is the most dangerous aspect of the present Indian policy. By destroying the Tamil resistance movement which has been the protective shield of the Tamils against Sinhala state terrorism and the only bargaining card for political negotiations, India is commiting a grave political blunder and also doing a grave injustice to the Tamils. The Indian Government will realise the folly of the present policy when it finds that Jayawardane regime going back on its commitments of the Accord once the Indian army succeeds in its strategy of totally immobilising the Tiger movement. It is unfortunate that the Government of India has embarked on this disastrous policy at this critical juncture when Jayawardane has already violated the terms of the Accord, when a political process in Tamil Eelam is not instituted, when Tamil concerns particularly their security is not guaranteed, when the immense problems of the uprooted Tamil refugees are not resolved.

Another aspect of the Indian policy that causes serious concern among the Tamil people is the plan to hold Provincial Council elections in Tamil areas under the unbrella of Indian military occupation and domination. This plan to induct an electoral process under the conditions of war and violence without creating conditions of peace and normalcy constitutes a serious breach of democratic practice. The people of Tamil Eelam want peace; they want the restoration of normal life; they want the creation of an appropriate atmosphere where free, unhindered expression of political will is possible. The prevailing conditions in Tamil Eelam is not conducive for the induction of a political process. The IPKF which has been behaving as an army of occupation has destroyed the free press, banned public meetings and assembly, and imposed rigid control over political expression. Our people are denied all democratic rights and freedoms which are fundamental to free political expression, therefore, this Indian plan to hold elections under these circumstances is nothing but a travesty of democracy, a mockery of democracy.

In view of these dangerous policies and plans envisioned by India in collision with Sri Lanka, it is of utmost importance that the international Tamil community should campaign effectively to bring maximum pressure on the Government of India to abandon its militaristic, authoritarian approach and to seek peace and reconciliation with the LTTE.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE

We do not want a protracted war with India. We want to put an end to this unfortunate conflict as early as possible. As our leader Mr.Pirabakaran has declared at Suthumalai, our organisation is prepared to co-operate with India in her effort to implement the Accord. As he said, we have no alternative but to offer India an opportunity to find a political settlement to the Tamil question. We are also prepared to face a democratically constituted electoral process to convince the world that the wider sections of the popular masses are behind our liberation movement.

It is the consensus opinion of all Tamil political organisations that the Provincial Council framework in the present form is defective, has serious limitations and falls very short of Tamil aspirations. Therefore this framework cannot be the basis for a permanent political settlement of the Tamil issue.

We are of the opinion that the Government of India should re-negotiate with Sri Lanka with the active participation of the Tamil representatives to work out an adequate framework with satisfactory devolution of power for a regional Tamil State. The LTTE holds the view that the principles enunciated at Thimpu demanding the recognition of Tamil people as a nation, the recognition of Tamil homeland, the recognition of the right to self-determination of the Tamils. The recognition of the right to citizenship of the plantation Tamils - should be the basis for a permanent solution to the Tamil national question.

The urgent and immediate task facing India today is to restore peace and normalcy in Tamil Eelam. The establishment of a congenial atmosphere of peace in the war torn territory is a necessary condition to initiate a political process. To create the conditions for peace, the Government of India should call for a ceasefire and withdraw its offensive military operations against the LTTE. Laying down of arms by the LTTE is not the stumbling block for a reconciliation. What the LTTE demands from India for the handing over of arms is appropriate guarantees and safeguards for the protection of life of the Tamil people.

It is the considered opinion of the LTTE and of the Eelam Tamils that an Interim Government should be established until appropriate conditions are created for the induction of an electoral process. This would facilitate, apart from other matters, the rehabilitation and resettlement of the Tamil refugees which is of utmost importance to alleviate the suffering of our people and to create conditions of normalcy in Tamil areas.

The future direction of our struggle is contingent upon actions and responses of the Government of India to our fair and reasonable suggestions which are predicated upon the interests of our people. But we can assure you that the LTTE will continue the struggle in the forms and modes that are suited to concrete conditions and historical necessities to advance the cause of our people.

At this critical historical juncture, when the Eelam freedom struggle is facing a grave crisis, it is the duty and responsibility of all patriotic Tamils living abroad to unite into a single force, into a single voice to articulate and campaign for their beleaguered brethren in their homeland. We suggest that an international forum of expatriate Tamils should be formed to organise an international lobby: to,

1. Bring to book the human rights violations and other atrocities committed by the Indian troops in Tamil Eelam.
2. Expose the undemocratic, totolitarian methods adopted by the Indian government to terrorise the Tamil civilian masses and to impose upon them, against their will a political formula that is totally unacceptable to them.
3. Campaign for immediate cessation of hostilities and negotiations with the LTTE without pre-conditions.
4. Campaign for the establishment of an Interim Government as pledged by India.
5. Campaign for a political settlement based on the cardinal principles enunciated at Thimpu **giving primacy to our struggle for national self-determination.**

We hope that the international Tamil community will provide unrelented support to the LTTE in its determined struggle to advance the cause of the Eelam Tamils. The LTTE is fighting for a right cause, a legitimate cause, a noble cause and righteousness and truth will eventually be victorious.

CRP

IPKF Offensive in Mullaitivu

On 23.05.88 three IPKF men were killed and 15 injured in a landmine blast at Alampil near Mullaitivu. Following this incident 6000 IPKF men converged on Alampil and surrounding villages of Semmalai, Nedunkerni, Kumulamunai, Mulliyavallai and Aandankulam. Some residents started fleeing; others were prevented from fleeing. Area was bombarded and intensive fighting continued for the next three days. The IPKF claimed to have killed 36 LTTE cadres and injured 45. Unconfirmed reports say civilians suffered hardships and some of them died.

In Brief

Ponnudurai News agent for "The Hindu" an influential Indian daily, air lifted everyday to Jaffna was shot dead. LTTE claimed responsibility and stated Ponnudurai was also agent for RAW, Indian Intelligence Agency.

Karunaiswaran (25) a Tamil youth walking along Manning Place Wellawatte, Colombo was shot dead on 25.5.88 Assilant escaped.

Jaffna Commercial Banks and Municipal Offices to work only on three days of the week. Jaffna Government Secretariat to work only during last week of every month- LTTE Writ being faithfully carried out.

Parents of 194 youths held by IPKF at Vavuniya protest to IPKF and District Citizens Committee. All youths being held without being charged for over 6 months. President of District Citizens Committee Dr. Pararajasingham threatened to resign if no response by 15.6.88.

Anura Bandaranaike, Leader of the Opposition and leader of S.L.F.P. spoke at a Seminar in Gampola held on 21.5.88. he said that when SLFP came to power it would abrogate Indo-Lanka Pact and with help of Armed Forces raise the lion flag in the North.

Nadarajah Palaninathan Grama Sevaka (Village Headman) of Pokarippu in Vadamaradchi East was arrested along with his father and brother by IPKF on 16.5.88. Father and brother were released on 17.5.88. When inquiries were made about Palaninathan on 19.5.88, IPKF stated Palaninathan released on 17.5.88. No trace of Palaninathan.

On 18.5.88 IPKF men entered the Jaffna General Hospital premises. Hooded men who accompanied the IPKF pointed out youths who were arrested.

On 18.5.88 on Puliyankulam-Nedunkerni road IPKF officer and soldier were killed in Landmine blast.

Lorry from Jaffna carrying Cement was stopped at Madawachchi on night of 19.5.88. Lorry burnt. Two skeletons found in burnt portion of the cab of the lorry.

Law Courts in Trincomalee have ceased functioning from 19.5.88.

Mankaanai near Valvettiturai was searched by IPKF from 8.45 p.m. on 20.5.88 till 5.00 a.m. next day. Two youths in a house committed suicide to avoid arrest. Owner of house, Mrs. Kandasamy was arrested by IPKF. During the course of the same search, Mrs. Selvarani Sambasivam was injured by gunfire. Husband who tried to remove her to Hospital was assaulted by IPKF. Both husband and wife removed to IPKF Camp at Udupiddy. Next morning, husband was released in presence of the Assistant Government Agent of the area and the body of Mrs. Sambasivam handed over to husband.

AFFIDAVIT

Mr. PONNUTHURAI YOGENDRAN (35)
Secretary to the Valvettiturai Fishing Community Development Organization.

On the 9th day of May, 1989 at about 6.20 a.m., while I was waiting at the gate of my house at the above address, one of the IPKF Personnel who was standing at the Main Street in front of the Market Building signalled me to come to him. When I went near to him, he ordered me to proceed to the Junction at Valvettiturai.

I carried out his order and proceeded to the said Junction. There, I noticed that the drivers and conductors of the Mini-Buses were seated on the middle of the road at the Junction.

At that time, I saw that one of the Conductor had been badly assaulted by one of the soldiers. The Commander of the "Para Troops" of the IPKF was also present there.

When the abovesaid Commander saw me, he asked me whether I am a member of the Citizen Committee. Following that he asked me that the CTB Bus at Udupiddy had been burnt down at the request made by us. When I denied to this effect, the said Commander started assaulting at my cheeks and chest.

While assaulting, he asked me to resign immediately from the Citizen Committee and that advertisement should be published in Newspapers. He threatened me that, if I do not comply to this he will shoot and kill me.

Following this, three IPKF soldiers surrounded me and attacked heavily. Due to this, blood started oozing from my ears. Then I had been asked to sit on the road at the Junction.

After the Forces leaving the Junction, I was admitted to the Govt. Hospital, at Valvettiturai.

In the evening of the same day, the members of the Citizen Committee went to the IPKF Camp at Udupiddy and complained about this incident to the Officer-in-Charge COLONEL BEDI.

On the following day, I came to know that the "Para Troops" went to the abovesaid Hospital and inquired about me, as I feared. The following morning the Colonel Bedi of Udupiddy Camp and Major Sutharsan, Officer-in-Charge of Valvettiturai Camp visited me and tendered apologies to the incident took place.

On honour, I wish to state that the particulars furnished above by me are true and correct.

SELLAN PUTHIAL (49) Puttur East, Puttur.

The deceased person Sellan Rasvarajeeva aged 25 years was my son.

He was a farmer.

On 10.5.88 my son left home saying that he is going to Nelliday to purchase onions.

He did not return home afterwards.

When my eldest son went in search of him on the following day he came to know that my sons lifeless body was lying at the Point Pedro Base Hospital with gunshot wounds.

We came to know that he was shot and killed by the army.

I have a son named Mathirasuvaran aged 28 years.

VISWASAM RASIAH (53) Urumpirai East, Urumpirai.

The deceased person Rasiah Udhayapalan aged 20 years was my son.

He was a casual labourer

On 12.5.1988 at about 3.00 p.m. my son left in his bicycle saying that he is going to Jaffna Town.

At about 4.30 p.m. I was informed that my son v as shot and killed by the army abuot half mile distance from out house.

His body was buried at the Roman Catholic burial grounds North Urumpirai.

I have five children all of them being students.

My son a was hardworking labourer and used to supplement my income which is not sufficient for maintaining our large family.



Mr. SINNAVAN BALASINGAM
Punnalaikattuvan.

On 17.5.1989 at about 2 p.m., about fifteen Indian Peace Keeping Force jawans came in trucks and on foot and as they turned into Punnalaikkadduvan-Neerveli Road started firing at all directions and proceeded towards Neerveli. They entered all the houses and started beating people irrespective of sex or age with rifle butts, rods etc. At the place called Mathalodai, they walked into houses and fired indiscriminately. In the firing Muththar Sinnakuddy (40) and Ratnam Lalitha (18) died on the spot and above ten persons were wounded, some of them seriously.

In this area iron rods and axes were used to assault people. Some of these persons had to be hospitalised for long periods.

ILAYAVI SAMBASIVAM, (33) Driver by occupation,
Sinnakathavarayar Kovil Lane, Manankanai, Valvettiturai.

On 20th May 1988 at about 8.30 p.m. I returned home with my whole family, after attending the special (Friday) Pooja at the Sinnakathavarayar Temple, situated within about 50 yards from my said residence.

After about 5 minutes, I noticed some IPKF personnel passing along our lane and our gate. A short-while later I heard few reports of gun followed by bomb blasts.

Out of shock, fear and excitment, my children who are all of tender age started screaming. The people in my neighbourhood too got panicky, raised cries and started running hither and thither.

Although I did not know the cause for the pandemonium, I decided to get out of that area for safety, asked my wife and children to follow me and rushed towards our entrance door, carrying our youngest child - the baby girl. Whilst we were getting out of the house in an excited disposition, it was indeed a most pathetic sight, my wife was shot at and fell down pathetically in pangs. As result, the disc of her right knee got totally smashed.

I had no other alternative, but carry my wife on my shoulder leaving all my young children in the lurch and rushed to the Government Hospital (Peripheral unit) which is about 200 metres from the scene of incident.

We were again confronted by the IPKF personnel. We were assaulted mercilessly to such an extent, that we were forced to go into the house of Late Mr. Appusundaram located close by.

We were again manhandled by another batch of army personnel who gained entrance to the above-mentioned house about one hour later by breaking open the cadjan fence. Our begging and pleadings fell on deaf ears. Later, both my hands were tied behind my back. They assaulted me with hands, legs and even clubs I received injuries near my right eye, lips, legs and hands.

Subsequently we were shoved into a truck and taken to the IPKF camp at Udupiddy. Until we reached Udupiddy I was continued to be tortured.

Soon after, I was locked up in a room from where I was shedding tears recalling the memory of my children left alone and considering the plight of my sinking wife.

On the day following (21st May 1988), at dawn, I was taken out of the room to be shown my wife as a corpse. It was only at this stage my hands were untied.

Later on, I was brought to Valvettiturai Nediyakadu Pillayar Temple outside courtyard along with my wife's corpse. I was then in a most inhuman manner asked to unload the corpse without anybody's assistance.

Then some of the soliders, went to the house of Mr. V. Velummylum, the Assistant Government Agent, Point Pedro and got him down to the spot. He was aksed to take charge of the corpse. He consented to do so, but requested the IPKF to have the body taken in one of their vehicles and delivered at my door step. Unfortunately, there was no response.

I took my wife's corpse on my shoulders and walked towards my house. Due to the continued presence of the IPKF, my villagers were not able to come to my assistance until I covered about 200 yards.

Later I got to know that my eldest son Srikanth (aged 13 yr) too received gun-shot injuries in the course of the same incident and was warded in the Government Hospital, Valvettiturai and iater was transferred to the Base Hospital, Point Pedro. As a bullet was embedded in his knee he has to undergo a surgical operation there. He is still warded there.

Two other boys from our neighbourhood by the names of Selvarajah (12 years) and Chandrakumar (8 years) also sustained injuries in the above-said incident.



SIVAYOGARAJAH SARASWATHY (38) years, widow, Kachchai South, Kodikamam.

The deceased person Sivayogarajah Gunarajah aged 17 years was my son.

He was working as a labourer.

On 27.5.88 at about 5.00 a.m. my son left home.

At about 9.00 a.m. I learned that my son was shot and killed by the army during a cordon and search operation at Appachi mavadi, Chavakachcheri.

His body was recovered and cremated at Kachchai Cemetery

I have five children.



SUBRAMANIAM THIAGAMOORTHY, (45) Navalarmadam, Karaveddy.

The deceased person Thiagamoorthy Krishnamoorthy, aged 17 years was my son.

He was a student at Vigneswara College Karaveddy.

On 28.5.88 during the Operation Liberation our area was subjected to intensive military offensive.

At about 2.30 p.m. some soldiers came to our residence and arrested me along with my son and my two nephews.

After taking us, little distance from our home, they shot and killed my son and two nephews in front of my eyes.

After shooting them dead, they put their bodies in an aircraft bunker and cremated them.

I was released on the following day.



IPKF OPERATION IN VADAMARADCHI

The I.P.K.F. imposed a curfew in Vadamaradchi East comprising, Nagarkovil, Thaalaiyadi, Vettillaikerni and Alliyawallai, on the night of 30.4.88.

The curfew was continuous until lifted on 13.5.88. During the first few days, the IPKF discovered a cache of arms and a petrol bowser full with petrol buried underground. This led to IPKF men assaulting residents and torturing youth for information about miltants. Shops and 20 schools in the area remained closed. The residents were on the point of starvation. People of neighbouring Valvettiturai township outraged by the ill-treatment of people in Vadamaradchi East took out a procession demonstrating against IPKF harassment in Vadamaradchi East.

The curfew was finally lifted to enable students to sit the Year-6 scholarship examination to be held on 14.5.88. Only a few students presented themselves for the examination. Whereas the people of Vadamaradchi suffered untold miseries at the hands of the Lanka Army during 'Operation Liberation' in May, 1987, this year in May the IPKF has taken over the function of tormenting the people of Vadamaradchi.

1

COLOMBO, May 1.

At least 26 persons, including women and children, were killed and 32 wounded when a bus was blown up in a landmine explosion at Sitaru in the eastern Trincomalee district of Sri Lanka today.

Official sources said the landmine was planted by members of the militant Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The bus belonged to the Government-owned Sri Lanka Transport Board.

Among the dead were five women and two children. Seven bodies were mutilated beyond recognition.

One LTTE militant was shot dead and three were wounded yesterday in exchanges of fire between the IPKF and the militants in the Northern Vavuniya sector, Lankapuvath said today.

Four Indian soldiers suffered minor injuries in one of these encounters, the Sri Lankan military sources said. A cyanide capsule was recovered from the body of a killed militant.

The news agency said 30 LTTE militants, including a hardcore activist named Puttu, were caught yesterday from the northern district by the IPKF.

Quoting reports from Jaffna, Lankapuvath said five improvised explosive devices were recovered by the IPKF during a search operation at Karaveddi. — PTI, Reuter

2

COLOMBO, May 2.

A big time-bomb explosion in a building in the heart of Sri Lanka's eastern Batticaloa town today left about 15 people, including several women, seriously injured, reports reaching here said.

The two-storeyed building, which housed some department stores and textile shops, collapsed completely under the impact of the deafening explosion which took place at 0920 hours. Terrified people ran helter-skelter as the explosion raised strong vibrations in the vicinity.

According to authoritative reports from Batticaloa, the building, about 200 metres from the police station, was located next to a three-storeyed building where the IPKF had a sentry post.

4 killed in violence: Delayed reports received here said one Indian soldier and three suspected Tamil militants were killed in a number of incidents in the North and East Provinces on Saturday.

The official news agency, Lankapuvath, quoting the reports said one IPKF soldier was killed and another injured when a patrol walked into a boobytrap laid by the LTTE at Bamankulam in eastern Trincomalee. It said one LTTE element swallowed cyanide and died at a place near Mannar in the northern Vavunia sector during an exchange with the IPKF. Three other militants were captured after the encounter.

The IPKF also shot dead two suspected LTTE militants as they tried to escape on cycles when challenged.

3

COLOMBO, May 3.

Nine men of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were killed in separate encounters with the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka's North and East yesterday, a spokesperson for the Indian High Commission said today.

Two militants each were killed in Jaffna and Pankulam, in Trincomalee district, while five were killed in the northern Vavuniya sector.

She said the IPKF also captured four militants at Palaly in the Jaffna peninsula and recovered arms and ammunition from militant hideouts in Trincomalee, Vavuniya and Batticaloa.

Ten militants captured: The national news agency Lankapuwath reported that the IPKF captured ten militants from Akkaraipattu, Palai, Atchuveli, and Championpattu. — UNI

4

While passing by a street at Akkaraipattu, Amparai a LTTE cadre and 2 supporters came across the IPKF patrol. The three star boys in the patrol identified them. In the encounter three IPKF jawans lost their lives to LTTE grenade. Being in a no-win situation the LTTE fighter consumed cyanide. The IPKF shot dead the supporters.

In Vantharumoolai of Batticoloa Dt. a LTTE cadre Vikki consumed cyanide in a round up IPKF.

6

COLOMBO, May 6.

One Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) soldier and three LTTE militants were killed, a number of rebels surrendered and a regional telecommunication engineer, along with several other militants, were apprehended during the past 24 hours in Sri Lanka's North and Eastern provinces, official sources said.

The regional engineer, described as Mr. Ambiraj, was arrested yesterday at Kopai South in Jaffna peninsula, suspected of being a "terrorist," the national news agency 'Lanka Puvath' reported today.

The IPKF jawan was killed in an improvised explosive device at Urumpirai in Jaffna yesterday.

Of the three Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam militants killed in encounters with the IPKF, one was 'Chokan,' area leader of Akkaraipattu in Eastern Batticaloa district.

Another militant, whose name was given as 'Michael' and known to be a communication expert of the LTTE, committed suicide by swallowing a cyanide capsule in a confrontation with the IPKF at Akkaraipattu. In the same engagement, one more rebel Ramanathan was killed.

While an LTTE militant named Papa was apprehended in eastern Batticaloa town, three more, including one Sinnavan, of the rebel group's political wing, and two other cadres, Vimal and Vijayakaruna surrendered to the IPKF in Batticaloa district yesterday.

IPKF toll 400: With the yesterday's death, 400 IPKF personnel have been killed — PTI.

7

COLOMBO, May 7. (UNI) — One man was killed when militants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation clashed in Kokkuvil (Jaffna peninsula) on Friday, security sources said today.

The clash took place as a number of towns in the north and east observed a hartal in response to a call by the TELO to mark the second death anniversary of group leader Sri Sabaratnam and 300 members in clashes with the LTTE.

The sources said one Indian Peace Keeping Force jawan was killed and another wounded in a Claymore-mine explosion, set off by the LTTE, at Elaveli in the peninsula.

In another incident, an IPKF patrol was fired upon by unidentified men in the northern Vavuniya sector. The IPKF returned fire and arrested three home guards armed with shotguns.

The sources said the LTTE shot dead two women, at Mullaitivu on suspicion that they were IPKF informants.

8

LTTE man killed: One member of the LTTE was killed when the IPKF returned fire in Amparai district this morning, Indian sources said The incident occurred during a search operation at Kovilpuraititu village near Akkaraipattu. The IPKF recovered one AK-47 rifle and a walkie-talkie from the dead man.

The sources said four suspected LTTE men were captured and two carbines of nine mm calibre and 15 rounds of ammunition recovered during search operations at Vakaneri village in the Batticaloa sector yesterday.

9

IPKF jawan killed: Sources said one IPKF jawan was killed by a Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) sniper in the Northern Vavuniya sector, while another was wounded in Trincomalee, also in the same sector.

Sources said two LTTE men were killed by the IPKF during an operation in the Batticaloa sector, while LTTE gunmen killed two of their former colleagues on suspicion of being IPKF informers in Trincomalee district.

TELO's charge: A spokesman for the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) alleged that six of their members' were shot dead by the LTTE in Jaffna.

26 militants held: Twentysix militants were apprehended yesterday in the North and Eastern provinces in various incidents, according to official sources here.

COLOMBO, May 9.

At least 14 persons, including two provincial council candidates and one Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) jawan, have been killed in Sri Lanka, security sources said today.

The sources said two candidates of the United Socialist Alliance (USA), which had finished a close second to the ruling United National Party (UNP) in the just-concluded elections to four provincial councils, were killed in the southern and western provinces yesterday by suspected members of the outlawed Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP). The two provinces are scheduled to go to the poll on June 2.

Mr. Amara Wellapili, the USA candidate for the Southern provincial council election and his brother-in-law, Mr. Pathinayake were shot dead by suspected JVP elements. Mr. Wellapili, who was to contest from the Hambantota district in the Southern province and Mr. Pathinayake were gunned down around 4 p.m. yesterday while returning after electioneering. His security guard was critically wounded and taken to hospital.

Two gunmen riding a motorcycle fired at Mr. A. Amaradasa of the USA at Minuwangoda, 32 km north of Colombo on Sunday, a military spokesman said.

Nithi, a 2nd Lt. from LTTE was shot by an IPKF sniper on his way to Jaffna.

10

Two LTTE fighters Venkatesh and Ravas encountered the IPKF patrol on their way to Valvettithurai from Point Pedro. As they ran out of ammunition in the combat Venkatesh shot himself. Ravas threw his lost grenade before consuming cyanide.

12

COLOMBO, May 12.

Six Indian Peace Keeping soldiers were killed in a landmine explosion at Velverikulam on the Trincomalee-Anuradhapura road in Sri Lanka's Eastern Province today, according to official sources. The landmine was believed to be laid by the Liberation tigers guerillas.

The IPKF launched a massive "Cordon and search operation" to trace the "terrorists" responsible for the explosion, the national agency 'Lankapuvath' said. — PTI

13

The IPKF entered Vetrilaikeni and Kattaikadu, Jaffna areas for search and destroy operaiton. A LTTE cadre Surendran faced them and lost his life. The IPKF then stormed the village and burnt down 3 two storeyed buildings.

A LTTE fighter Tabin was killed by three star men in Kayankeni, Batticolao.

In Thangavelayuthapuram, Panichageni areas, IPKF launched shell attack casualties not known.

14

COLOMBO, May 14.

Nine persons, including two Indian Peace-Keeping Force soldiers, have died in Sri Lanka, officials said here today.

The two soldiers were killed and another wounded in a landmine blast in Eastern Trincomalee district on Friday, a military spokesman said. The mine was believed to have been laid by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Indian troops shot dead an LTTE gunman after militants ambushed an Indian patrol in Eastern Batticaloa yesterday, the spokesman said. The body of a Tamil civilian, abducted by unknown men, was found with gunshot wounds in Batticaloa. — AFP

16

COLOMBO, May 16.

At least four militants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were killed, three Indian soldiers wounded and 12 other Tamil militants apprehended in a number of encounters between the Indian Peace-Keeping Force and the LTTE in Sri Lanka's Northern and Eastern provinces on Sunday.

The Indian soldiers were wounded when the militants ambushed an IPKF patrol at Jaffna. The IPKF countered the attack and left one LTTE element dead. A hand grenade, one AK-47 rifle and a cyanide capsule were recovered from the body of the militant, according to Sri Lankan military sources.

In three other encounters in the eastern Batticaloa and northern Jaffna sectors, the IPKF killed three more LTTE militants yesterday. The names of two of the killed guerrillas were given as "Chavi" and "Attoman", known to be hardcore elements.

The 12 "terrorists" were apprehended during the course of intensive cordon and search operations by the IPKF in the north and east, the news agency Lankapuvath said.

Bharathan and Alex the LTTE cadres, took cyanide in the IPKF roundup at Santhiveli. The Indian soldiers carried the dead bodies to their homes and demanded Rs. 400/- for each one and got away with it.

18

COLOMBO, May 18. (AFP) — The Indian Peace-Keeping Force has sealed the office of a Tamil rebel group in Northern Sri Lanka and arrested 25 of its members, a rebel spokesman said today.

The Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) office in Mannar town was sealed and the members arrested on Tuesday, according to a TELO spokesman. He gave no reason for the action.

The Indian High Commission here could not confirm the report.

Meanwhile, sources said two members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) committed suicide by swallowing cyanide capsules during search operations by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) at Karativu and Kattankudy in eastern Sri Lanka yesterday.

The sources said the IPKF also captured 28 militants in the north and east including a member of the Muslim fundamentalist group "jihad" at Kattankudy. They said a 12 bore shot-gun and nine cartridges were found in the possession of the man, identified as Salim Anver.

A LTTE guerrilla Kingsley died in an encounter with the IPKF at Kutchaveli, Trinconamalee, some boys were arrested by IPKF.

19

In Kumpurupitti, Trinconamalee area LTTE killed two IPKF men, wounded 3 including an IPKF topbrass.

20

IPKF shot and wounded a civilian N. Yogarathinam at Manankanai.

21

Colombo, May 21: Eight persons were reported killed in incidents in the north, east and south of the island in the last 24 hours.

According to Indian High Commission sources, two LTTE members, Jaya and Sivam were killed in an encounter with the IPKF. Two fleeing militants were killed in Trincomalee and Batticaloa in the east. According to independent sources two members of TELO were killed by PLOT cadres who fired at them as they drove past in a vehicle.

The closing of PLOT as well as TELO offices in the north is seen by the observers as a move to placate the LTTE who have accused the IPKF of arming other militant groups as well as turning a blind eye to their harassment of the civilian population in the north.

The IPKF also apprehened LTTE helper Punyamoorthy, a brother of an LTTE area leader in Jaffna and apprehened six more militants in Vavuniya. According to the same sources an Indian aircraft spotted a boat with 10 persons in Pooneryn Vavuniya and fired warning shots. The persons believed to be militants, abandoned the boat.

At Valvettithurai the IPKF rounded up a house. Three LTTE cadres who mere trapped in the house faced the attack with stiff resistance. Soon they went out of ammunition. Captain Ramesh consumed cyanide. Jay and

22

COLOMBO, May 22.

At least eight Tamil militants and one officer of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force in Sri Lanka were killed in a number of encounters in the North and East of the island during the last 36 hours.

Official sources here said three Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam cadres and an IPKF officer were killed in an encounter near Polykandy in Jaffna peninsula on Saturday. One sub machinegun and 79 rounds of nine mm ammunition were recovered from the person of the militants.

In another encounter, also in Jaffna, one Tamil militant was killed while he was trying to flee on being challenged. One nine mm pistol and a few rounds of ammunition were recovered from him.

In another incident in Puthukkudirippu in Mullaitivu district one LTTE cadre was killed yesterday and one AK 47 rifle, one grenade and a few rounds of ammunition seized.

At least five IPKF men were injured in two different encounters in Batticaloa and Trincomalee on Friday, the news agency Lanka Puvath, reported.

At Kondavil, Jaffna in a combat, a LTTE guerrilla Edrik tried to break up the IPKF round up and got fatal wounds. He shot himself.

23

In Cilani at Jaffna, an IPKF military jeep was destroyed, 4 soldiers and a lieutenant were killed by the landmines set off by LTTE.

In a three day pitched battle between IPKF and LTTE in Alampil of Mullaithivu Dt. 23 IPKF personnel were killed and 20 wounded. Not a single casualty at LTTE side.

24

The high commission spokesperson said one IPKF officer and five soldiers were killed yesterday when they came under heavy fire from a well-entrenched LTTE hideout south of Alampil, in the northeastern Mullativu sector. She said about 25 militants were believed killed or wounded when the IPKF returned fire.

While heading towards Eluthumadduval, three LTTE cadres came under the IPKF sniping. Captain Nakulan and Niresh were dead and Thavam was captured with fractured leg. Two IPKF Soldiers were killed in a battle with LTTE, and many wounded at 6th mile post in Nedunkeni area, Mullaithivu Dt.

26

Van explodes: The sources said two of the IPKF personnel were killed during the past 24 hours, raising the number of IPKF men killed i the operations to 10. Besides, 21 sustained injuries. A van loaded with ammunition exploded during the raid. The Sri Lankan National News Agency, Lankapuwath reported that the IPFK recoverd one van, two jeeps and one tractor from the base. The sources said 11 other IPFK personnel including an officer were wounded in three incidents in the northern Vavuniya sector yesterday.

Four IPKF men were wounded in a landmine blast. Four others including an officer sustained injuries while defusing a booby trap. They said three others were wounded when an LTTE sniper fired at them.

The sources said the IPKF shot dead an LTTE militant, who tried to escape after being apprehended in Jaffna, while seven others were taken into custody.

In the Eastern Batticaloa sector, one LTTE member was captured at Eravur and two at Mamgam, the sources added.

27

Militant boat destroyed: The sources said one of the LTTE men killed in the operation was identified as "Jeyam", a group leader. They said in separate operations, a naval helicopter of the IPKF engaged a militant boat off the Devils Point on the north-western coast and destroyed it. The fate of the occupants of the boat and their number were not known.

Informed sources in Colombo said that an unknown number of LTTE men had been trapped by the IPKF in the Mullaitivu jungles.

In the long battle between LTTE and IPKF In Mullaithivu Dt, 35 IPKF soldiers lost their lives. Many wounded. No one died in LTTE.

The IPKF rounded up Kachay area near Chavakachcheri and shot at random. While withdrawing from the scene, Pirappar, a LTTE cadre got svere wounds and consumed cyanide.

Hari, a LTTE fighter died in a combat with IPKF at Tambalakamam, Trincomalee.

The IPKF damped curfew over Kumpurupiddy and 3rd post. They entered each and every house, arrested almost all the people and took them to the army camps. People stood under hot sun throughout the day without food and water. Then the three star boys separated some sixty people from the rest as LTTE supporters and arrested them. Most of them were muslims.

Appar, a LTTE cadre consumed cyanide in the IPKF round up at Elalai, Jaffna.

29

MADRAS, May 29.—Fifteen Indian troops and 11 others, including two Provincial Council members, were killed in continued violence in Sri Lanka during the past 24 hours, report UNI and PTI.

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE SPREADS TO THE EAST

As a further step in the civil disobedience campaign now being observed in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka, the LTTE has appealed to the public in the Batticaloa and Amparai districts to boycott the banks for two days in a week. At present all banks in the Jaffna peninsula are closed on Mondays and Fridays.

PROTEST MARCH IN VADAMARADCHI

Recent press reports from Sri Lanka state that the people of Valvettiturai, including school children, took out a massive procession on Sunday, May 15, 1988, protesting against what they claimed the cruelty ot the IPKF against the general public of Vadamaradchi East. The reports further state that the IPKF's search operations had been intensified in the Vadamaradchi area during recent weeks.

The troops were killed when the tractor in which they were travelling on a "search and destroy" mission at Vattakkachhi in the northern Kilinochchi district was blown up by a landmine planted by LTTE guerrillas this morning.

Nine of the bodies were captured by the guerrillas, an LTTE release heer said.

15 IPKF Soldiers on a tractor ran into landmines set by LTTE and died on the spot in Vadakachi of Kilinochi Dt.

In retaliation to the above ambush, an IAF helicopter strafed indiscriminately at Vadakachi area. Several houses were damaged and some civilians wounded.

A LTTE guerrilla, Roshan die din an encounter with IPKF in Ninthavur at Amparai.

At Alampil, Mullaithivu Dt. 7 IPKF soldiers were killed in LTTE's landmine attack. Many wounded.

31

NEW DELHI, May 31.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) continued its operations against militants in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, it was officially stated here today.

In the Northern province, the IPKF seized a shotgun and two explosive devices from the Vavuniya sector. Intensive search operations are in progress in the area.

The IPKF killed an LTTE militant during an encounter in the Muttur sector in the Eastern province.

In the bitter battle on the 8th day at Mullaithivu many IPKF soldiers were killed and wounded. At Karchilaimadu in the encounter 6 IPKF persons shot dead and many wounded. No casualties on the LTTE side.

CRP

Five Tamil youths held for the last five months by the IPKF at Thanniyoothu near Mullaitivu are on hunger strike since 22.5.88.

Nearly 700 Tamil detenus are still held in Boosa Detention Camp and in prisons in Colombo and Negombo. Of those held, eight are females, one a boy under fifteen years of age and five of unsound mind.

Mr. Kamalanathan, a teacher of St. John's College, Jaffna was arrested and detained by the IPKF. The Students and Teachers' Guild of St. John's threatened to take out procession protesting arrest/detention. IPKF threatened to impose curfew if procession taken out. Later Mr. Kamalanathan was released after IPKF obtained statement that Kamalanathan was treated well. On being released Kamalanathan had to be taken to hospital as he could not even walk. Kamalanathan is still in hospital.

Vattakadchi 5 miles off Kilinochchi landmine blast on 29.5.88 near Vavuniya, IPKF forced farmer on night watch in his field to take them to IPKF hideout. As farm went ahead, LTTE fired at IPKF. Farmer tried to escape from IPKF was shot at by IPKF and injured. IPKF lost three men in the confrontation with LTTE.

IPKF OPERATION IN VADAMARADCHI EAST:

The IPKF imposed a curfew in Vadamaradchi East comprising, Nagarkovil, Thaalaiyadi, Vettillaikerni and Alliyawallai, on the night of 30.04.88. The curfew was continuous until lifted on 13.05.88. During the first few days, the IPKF discovered a cache of arms and a petrol bowser full with petrol buried underground. This led to IPKF men assaulting residents and torturing youth for information about militants. Shops and 20 schools in the area remained closed. The residents were on the point of starvation. People of neighbouring Valvettiturai township outraged by the ill – treatment of people in Vadamaradchi East took out a procession demonstrating against IPKF harassment in Vadamaradchi East. The curfew was finally lifted to enable students to sit the Year – 6 scholarship examination to be held on 14.05.88. Only a few students presented themselves for the examination. Whereas the people of Vadamaradchi suffered untold misereis at the hands of the Lanka Army during 'Operation Liberation' in May 1987, this year in May the IPKF has taken over the function of tormenting the peopel of Vadamaradchi.

Ramamoorthy, Deccan Herald, 17.5.88

வீர வணக்கம்

LTTE MARTYRS

'மீன்உண் கொக்கின் தூவிஅன்ன
வால்நரைக் கூந்தல் முதியோள் சிறுவன்
களிறுஎறிந்து பட்டனன்' என்னும் உவகை
ஈன்ற ஞான்றினும் பெரிதே; கண்ணீர்
நோன்கழை துயல்வரும் வெதிரத்து
வான்பெயத் தூங்கிய சிதரினும் பலவே.

பூங்கணுத்திரையார்.

Prince 15.5.88

Ramesh Master 20.5.88

Mathi 1.5.88
Karnan 2.5.88
2nd. Lt. Simon 2.5.88
Vikki 4.5.88
Michael 4.5.88
Lt. Suresh 4.5.88
Ramanathan 4.5.88
2nd. Lt. Sarath 4.5.88
Venkatesh 10.5.88
Ralass 10.5.88

20.2.88 to 10.5.88

Prasanna
David
Raheem
Arun
Charles
Sugandan
Patcham
Sekar
Rome
Vijayan
Bhaskaran
Umakanthan
Lingam
Saleem Rahman
Anbu
Radha
Anandan

Kennedy
Ravi
Rizwan
Joseph
Dhanendran 13.5.88
Kamal 13.5.88
Lt. Prince 15.5.88
Thabir 16.5.88
Bharathan 16.5.88
Alex 16.5.88
Khaleel 17.5.88
Kingsley 18.5.88
Ramesh Master 21.5.88
Jeyam 21.5.88
Jeeva 21.5.88
Edrich 22.5.88
Capt. Nakulan 24.5.88
Suresh 24.5.88
Thavam 24.5.88
Purapunar 27.5.88
Razack 27.5.88
Mahesh 27.5.88
Viji 27.5.88

May 88

2nd. Lt. Gandhi
Nidhi
Yasodharan
Charles
Anandan
Rohan
Vamadevan
Suman
Ruban
Dias
Kutti
Nagavel
Rosan

Karnan 2.5.88

Magesh

Lt. Michael 4.5.88

Roshan 27.5.88

Hari 30.5.88

KILLING ☐ FIELD

88 May

claims	IPKF KILLED	IPKF WOUNDED	LTTE KILLED	LTTE WOUNDED	S.L. ARMY KILLED	S.L. ARMY WOUNDED	OTHER MILITANTS KILLED	OTHER MILITANTS WOUNDED	CIVILIANS KILLED	CIVILIANS WOUNDED
IPKF	*4	*1	C 33						*26	*32
LTTE			1							
MEDIA									26	

2
1		5							15
		2							
									C 12

3
		9	C *10						
3	4	1						2	

4
3	5								
								1	



6
1*		3*							
						6 T			

7
1*	1*							3*	

8
		1	C 4						

9
1*	1*	2*	*C 26			2*			

10
		2							

12
6*									

13
		2							

14
2		1						1	

15
		1							

16
	3	4	C 12						
		3							

17
		1							

18
		2	C 28						
		1							
2								C 25	

19
2	3								
								2	

20
									1
		3						3	

21
		4							
		3							

22
1*	5*	8*							
		1							

23
28	20								
3	15							1	

24
6		25							
2		3	1 C						

25

26
2	21	1	C 10						
								2	

27
		1							
35		4							
6									

28
1								1	

29
15								11	
22									
3		1						2	5

31
		1							
6									
		1							

TOTAL
36	35	68	C 123			2		41	47
98	32	63	1 C						1
18	19	6				6	C 25	40	5 C 12

* - Sri Lankan Information.c-captured. EP-EPRLF T-TELO, P:PLOTE, EN-ENDLF, E-EROS TNA-Tamil National Army CVF-Citizen s Voluntary Force

LTTE claims 20.2.88 to 10.5.88- 21 LTTE killed & May'88: 13 LTTE killed.

CHAPTER 12

1988

June

the heinous crimes of indian peace keeping

1	2	3	4
5	6	7 India withdraw 3000 IPKF soldiers.	8
9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28
29	30	31	

Tamil TIMES

IS OPPRESSION INFECTIOUS?

Arjuna

COMMENT

If anyone likes to know the answer as to how this vast democracy called India with its swarming population of 800 millions nearly half of which live below the poverty line keeps ticking, a part of the answer was provided by the distinguished economist and former U.S. envoy to India, John Kenneth Galbraith. He described the country as 'a functioning anarchy'! But that of course is not an explanation; it is only an accurate description. So how does this 'anarchy' 'function'? One way it does is through a huge, mindless, thoughtless, insensate bureaucracy that has an octopus-like grip on the lives of the people and keeps the country going. Someone on the top, in Delhi, presses a policy button, and a clumsy set of officials take over the entire works. An inanimate machinery is set in motion, which mows down everything on the way – democratic rights, fundamental rights, human rights of every description, and ultimately when the damage is done, both to the system and the image of the country, no one becomes responsible, and not many seem to care.

Why these profound thoughts about India, you might ask? It is because the Sri Lankan Tamils who have sought refuge in this country, and who thought they were escaping from governmental oppression in their own country, are now getting a taste of it here. Various pinpricks, pressure moves and acts of open discrimination are being employed to ensure that they get back to Sri Lanka. The latest of these is an order made by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Internal Security New Delhi, dated 22.3.88, which shuts out educational opportunities to a vast section of Sri Lankan Tamil students in Indian schools, colleges, polytechnics and universities. Under this order – (1) All students in schools below Class XI should get back. (2) Those in Class XI will be allowed to continue for one more year until they complete XII. (3) Those who have completed XII will not be given admission to colleges, universities and polytechnics. (4) There will be no new admissions to Sri Lankan Tamil students in colleges, schools or universities. (5) Those who are already in colleges and universities will be allowed to complete their courses. As if to rub salt into the wound, the order goes further to say – 'However, the extension of the student visas would be subject to the condition that the parents of such children would not insist on staying back in India *on the pretext of completion of the respective courses of their wards*'. (emphasis ours)!

The implications of this order are many: (1) For the first time, India is denying facilities for higher education to Sri Lankan Tamil students, and thereby ending a tradition that existed for over a hundred years. The first graduate of the Madras University was a Jaffna Tamil – Carol Viswanathapillai. (2) India is probably the first country and only country in the world to shut out Sri Lankan Tamil students. (3) The order specifically shuts out only Sri Lankan *Tamil* students. For example, the Sinhalese naval rating who publicly humiliated the Indian Prime Minister by attempting to bash his neck with a rifle butt is free to admit his child (if he has any and if he is interested) to an Indian school or university! (4) If all these are a consequence of the Indo-Sri lanka Agreement, one wonders how India can claim that the Agreement was meant to benefit the Tamils!

The order addressed to the Tamil Nadu state government states in the concluding para: 'I shall be grateful if you could please let us know the total number of students who are studying in various schools/colleges/technical institutions in the states, giving detailed break-up thereof. For obtaining due recognition for the certificates/degrees obtained by these students in the educational institutions in India, the matter is being taken up by the Ministry of External Affairs with the Government of Sri Lanka. We shall let you know as and when a decision is taken'. A classic example of putting the cart before the horse! One would have thought the sensible step would be to first obtain due recognition to Indian pass certificates with the Sri Lanka government and thereafter call upon the Tamil students to get back.

Several protests and appeals have been made over this order, by various organisations and individuals, but until the first week of June there has been no official response. The Jawaharlal Nehru University Students' Union in New Delhi has also joined in the appeals. But an Indian politician who took up the matter personally with officials concerned had an amazing experience – they appeared to be only vaguely aware of the order itself, and ignorant of its implications!

Meanwhile, visas have yet to be extended beyond June. But the pressures countinue. Late last year all Sri Lankan Tamils living outside camps were called upon to register themselves (under the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement). These included those on tourist visas. There was no talk of repatriation, only registration. The deadline fixed was December 31, 1987. Very few responded. The deadline was extended to February 29, 1988. Knowing how the Indian official mind works, and rightly suspecting that it was a trap to send them back, the majority did not respond even then. Veiled threats were made by some busybodies at certain official levels and the deadline was further extended to May 31. We are informed that up to now, only a quarter of the expected numbers have their names and addresses on the refugee register, not more than 15,000 out of a possible 60,000. The ones who thought that they would abide by the rules and registered themselves now regret their 'foolishness'; they are being summoned through Radio and Television to report at the Mandapam camp – to be repatriated to Sri Lanka. The 45,000 who decided to defy the order are under no pressure whatever; privately, they chuckle and say that in India it is foolish to try to be upright. Greasing palms is the accepted method of solving problems!

Talking of pressure, on the night of May 25, the Tamil news reader over the country's TV came out with a rude announcement. All Sri Lankan Tamils who had registered themselves *should* report at Mandapam camp before May 28, the announcement said, failing which *stern* action will be taken against them! Now imagine families in Madras with school and college going children, living in rented houses and flats, having paid advance deposits ranging from Rs.5000/- to Rs.10,000/- which advances will not be returned except with a minimum of one month's notice, abandoning home, advance, furniture, education and setting forth on a 12-hour journey to Mandapam camp! And onwards to Jaffna where they might not have a house to move into! If that announcement was not an example of crass insensitivity on the part of some bureaucrat, what else was it? Was it a show of hostility?

What are the facts relating to the Sri Lankan Tamil refugee presence in Tamil Nadu in India? The influx began soon after the July-August 1983 massacres, the then government of India under Mrs.Indira Gandhi opened both doors to the fleeting Tamils – the front door via the airport and the back door via illegal country boats. The total number of refugees amounted to no more than one lakh and thirty thousand – in a State that has a population of over 55 million. The camp refugees were in a minority, a mere 30,000, housed in about 160 camps, mostly cyclone shelters meant for temporary use. The majority of one lakh persons were mostly those permitted to

remain in the country on periodically extended tourist visas and a smaller number who came across the Palk Strait either in the then functioning Talaimannar-Rameswaram ferry boat or in hired boats, but living outside the camps and self-supporting.

Practically all the middle class families renting out houses and flats, and sending their children to Indian schools, colleges, universities and technical institutes in Madras, Madurai, Trichy, Coimbatore and other places are foreign exchange earners. They were not only *not* a burden on the Indian government; every paise of the money they received went to enrich at segment of society of which they ecame a part – the high-fee levying schools, the Postal Department, the banks, the house and flat owners, the grocer, the vegetable seller, the house broker, the autorickshaw man, many of whom even learnt to exploit the 'Ceylon people'. A family in search of a house, having to overcome local prejudices against letting out houses to Ceylonese, and with no local contacts, is thrown at the mercy of unscrupulous house brokers who jack the rates to their own benefit (a month's rent as brokerage) and the benefit of the owner. The Sri Lankan Tamil refugees did not mind all these, and anyway they had no choice. They were prepared to buy PEACE in their lives with money, buy an education for their children, and freedom from bombing and shelling and tensions.

Today, as in early June 1988, the position is: there are no refugee camps except two, the main one at Mandapam and the other at Kottapattu in the Trichy district. All Mannar refugees have left; in fact about 10,000 of them left on their own, between the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and the IPKF operations in October. Only about 7500 camp refugees remain, those from Trincomalee, Vavuniya, Batticaloa and elsewhere.

Outside the camps, over 20,000 appear to have left on their own during the 10 weeks of peace in the north-east following the Accord, some of them leaving for foreign countries. Between December '87 and now, the Indian authorities have sent back either to Talaimannar or to Kankesanturai, about 15,000 persons, among whom were about 2000 non-camp Jaffna residents. Every Saturday a ship is scheduled to leave for Kankesanturai and every Wednesday another one to Talaimannar. The KKS ship has a capacity to take 1500, but the authorities are prepared to run it if given a minimum of 300 passengers. But alas, the last one scheduled for Saturday the 4th June did not leave, because there weren't sufficient numbers of passengers.

So what does the Sri Lankan Tamil refugee presence in India mean? Less than 70,000, as compared to over 25,000 in the Federal Republic of Germany, over 20,000 in France, over 4000 in Switzerland, and probably another 10,000 in other Western countries, such as Holland, Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom etc. While a government like the Canadian had openly shown a human heart, it cannot be said that the German or French governments had shown the kind of hostility towards the Tamil refugees as what 'Mother India' does now!

Perhaps there is a moral in this. The last straw that led to the growth of youth militancy in Sri Lanka was the restrictions imposed on Tamil students in the field of higher education. It is happening in India now. Are governments imitative? Or is it that the Indian government having taken on the role of the Jayewardene government in suppressing Tamil nationalism (under the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement) now feels impelled to carry on the discriminatory policies that the Sri Lanka governments practised? Governments develop an itch to oppress; as innumerable examples in history have shown, leading to tragic chains of events – Tsarist Russia began oppressing Jews, Hitler continued the pogroms, which ultimately led to the growth of a militant Zionism and the establishment of a Jewish homeland, which itself has become a threat to peace in the region. Oppression anywhere is a threat to people everywhere, because unlike small pox and cholera, oppression is a virulent virus that infects nations!

JUNE 1988

OFFENSIVE & 'TALKS' CONTINUE

'NO AGREEMENT YET' SAYS LTTE

The seven week offensive against the LTTE, in which an estimated 15,000 troops of the IPKF have been involved, in the Vavuniya and Mullaitivu districts in northern Sri Lanka is reported to be continuing with casualties on both sides.

Newspaper reports about the LTTE leader, V. Prabhakaran, and his deputy, Mahendrarajah (Mahathaya) being surrounded and trapped and their imminent capture by the IPKF would appear to have been exaggerated. Some accounts said that, although trapped at one stage, Prabhakaran known to be moving around freely under several disguises has given the slip to the IPKF.

The offensive and the reported attempt to capture the LTTE leader sparked off many demonstrations in Tamil Nadu where posters appeared saying, 'If Prabhakaran is killed, Tamil Nadu will erupt like a volcano'.

Even as the IPKF offensive was continuing, there was confirmation about continuing negotiations between officials of the Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the LTTE leaders in Madras. The previous talks came to an abrupt end two months ago when one of LTTE's members, Johnny, was shot dead by the IPKF in northern Vavuniya where he had gone on a mission initiated by Indian officials to establish contact with Prabhakaran. Anand Narain, RAW chief, has reportedly made several trips to Tamil Nadu last month to oversee the ong oing negotiations.

A Reuter report datelined 16 June stated that, 'India and the LTTE are close to an agreement to end the five year conflict... and only two important points remained to be decided after lengthy talks with Indian officials'.

In a press release, the LTTE said that the Indian government had not reached an agreement with the LTTE on the issue of a ceasefire though informal talks have been going on between its representatives led by Krishnakumar (Kittu) and Indian officials. The statement further alleged that the story of an agreement had been purposely released by the Indian and Sri Lankan governments to divert the peaceful agitation launched by the Tamil people against the IPKF offensive and also to appease aroused sentiments of the people of Tamil Nadu.

The LTTE statement added that it had made an open commitment to hand over weapons and co-operate in the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement, but India was continuing the war refusing pleas for a ceasefsire.

JUNE 1988

The Indian Post

When General K.Sundarji retired as Chief of Army Staff on April 30 he must have ended his term of office as one of the most controversial army chiefs the country has ever had. Sundarji, who has been described as India's first soldier-intellectual, fell out of favour with the Prime Minister and officials in the Defence Ministry following three mismanaged operations -Operation Brasstacks, the 'forward policy' on the Indo-China border and the Indian peace-keeping action in Sri Lanka. The last men tioned offensive against the Tamil Tigers has been roundly criticised and Sundarji's detractors point out that the Indian Peace Keeping Force's (IPKF's) action in Lanka has had a demoralising effect on the entire Indian army.....

But can Sundarji be castigated for the so-called lapses on his part? And is he alone to be blamed for the debacle in Sri Lanka?.... It is quite likely that the disastrous result of the lack of co-ordination between the Defence Ministry and the External Affairs Ministry was palmed off on to the former army chief.

Another reason why the Centre may not have been very happy with Sundarji was the fact that the General was known to be vocal in expressing

General K. Sundarji

his disagreement with any government strategy involving the army which he found unfeasible. **Thus the former army chief was the first to criticise, and future events have proved him right, the hurriedly drawn up Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Indeed the General even questioned the wisdom of deploying Indian troops on the island and expressed his displeasure at the extensive combing operations to flush out the Tamil Tigers.** Sundarji's reservations on the Lanka operations reportedly did not go down well with the Prime Minister and differences between Rajiv Gandhi and his army chief became evident. *(The Indian Post (Bombay) May 3, 1988*

● Ponnudurai News agent for 'The Hindu' an influential Indian daily, air lifted everyday to Jaffna was shot dead. LTTE claimed responsibility and stated that Ponnudurai was also agent for RAW, Indian Intelligence Agency.

● Karunaiswaran (25) a Tamil youth walking along Manning Place Wellawatte, Colombo was shot dead on 25.5.88. The Assailant escaped.

● Jaffna Commercial Banks and Municipal Offices work only three days of the week. Jaffna Government Secretariat works only during last week of every month. LTTE Writ is being faithfully carried out.

● Parents of 194 youths held by IPKF at Vavuniya have protested to IPKF and District Citizens Committee. All youths are being held without being charged for over 6 months. President of District Citizens Committee Dr. Pararajasingham threatened to resign if there was no response by 15.6.88.

● Anura Banadaranaike, Leader of the Opposition and leader of S.L.F.P. spoke at a Seminar in Gampola held on 21.5.88. He said that when the SLFP comes to power it would abrogate the Indo-Lanka Pact and with the help of Armed Forces raise the lion flag in the North.

● Nadarajah Palanınathan, Grama Sevaka (Village Headman) of Pokarippu in Vadamaradchi East was arrested along with his father and brother by IPKF on 16.5.88. The father and brother were released on 17.5.88. When inquiries were made about Palaninathan on 19.5.88, IPKF stated Palaninathan was released on 17.5.88. There is no trace of Palaninathan.

● On 18.5.88 IPKF men entered the Jaffna General Hospital premises. Hooded men who accompanied the IPKF pointed out youths who were arrested.

● On 18.5.88 on Puliyankulam-Nedunkerni road an IPKF officer and soldier were killed in a landmine blast.

● A lorry from Jaffna carrying Cement was stopped at Madawachchi on the night of 19.5.88. The lorry was burnt. Two skeletons were found in the burnt portion of the cab of the lorry.

● Law Courts in Trincomalee have ceased functioning from 19.5.88.

COMMENT

INDIA'S INFLUENCE AS A MAJOR REGIONAL POWER

Dr A. Jeyaratnam Wilson,

In the first place,I would refer to India as the major super power in South Asia, not as a major regional power. Dismembered Pakistan, heavily militarised by U.S. weaponry is also a major regional power. But India has command over larger resources and has the world's fourth largest standing army. India as a major super power is in a category of one, there being no such regional super power in the globe, neither China, nor South Africa nor Israel, nor any one of the West European states or of South America. One reason is India's overwhelming dominance among powers that are less strong. Another is that India's policy makers have deliberately sought to create such a position for the Indian subcontinent.

INDIAN HEGEMONY

Two factors must be taken into account in what I would call Indian hegemony over the subcontinent. One is the cultural imperative. Therefore India regards her immediate neighbours, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Pakistan, as the cultural expressions of Indian unity. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru himself in one of his prison musings described India as a cultural unity. In unstable domestic situations when foreign adventure may provide some distraction to India's politicised class which sustains India's political structures, and in unstable international conditions where the Indian ruling class is uncertain of foreign policy objectives of neighbours sensitive to foreign penetration, the idea that the

subcontintent is one cultural entity could provide the rationale for aggressive assertions of India's dominace over the region.

Together with this cultural impetus for action, post-independent India is very much influenced by the imperative of one of the sternest of British Viceroys that India had, Lord Curzon, who always held to the opinion that the Indian subcontinent is one strategic unity.

Britain's heirs,India, being the dominant successor, the men of the Indian National Congress and their bureaucratic functionaries took into consideration the cultural and strategic imperatives in the pursuit of foreign policy. In March-April 1947, Nehru complaining at the Asian Relations Conference at New Delhi stated that "the neighbouring countries, even culturally, look towards Europe and not to their own friends and neighbours (Nehru meant India) from whom they had derived so much in the past." Within a short time, the Indian Prime Minister for all his neutralism and non-alignment,brought India's weakest neighbours under Indian suzerainty. In August 1949, **India signed a Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship with Bhutan.**India guaranteed non-interference in the internal affairs of Bhutan. Bhutan in turn pledged to be guided by India's advice in external relations.

Sikkim suffered a worse fate. On 5th December 1950, **India signed a Treaty of Perpetuity with Sikkim which made Sikkim an Indian protectorate.** I would say that the cultural, and more importantly, Lord Curzon's strategic imperative, had determined India's interventionary role.

Under Mrs Indira Gandhi, India took several steps beyond what her father, Mr Nehru,had accomplished. These were deliberately intended to establish India's hegemonistic, not merely dominant role, in the subcontinent. Mrs Gandhi set the stage for implementing her policies when, while in opposition during 1977-79, she accused Morarji Desai's Janata government (1977-79) of appeasing India's neighbours "so much, that even tiny countries like Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh are showing eyes at us." Earlier in 1972, not so much in pursuit of cultural or Lord Curzon's strategic imperative, **Mrs Gandhi freed Bangladesh from Pakistan President Yahya Khan's tyranny.** In this case she had no alternative since 10 million refugees from Bangladesh crossed into India. A year before, in August 1971, **Mrs Gandhi signed her Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union** in which the high contracting parties agreed to come to each other's assistance if the other is attacked.The agreement, however, was at that point of time not a step towards the cultural-strategic nexus.

MONROE DOCTRINE

When Mrs Gandhi was firmly ensconced in office(1972-77) after winning a victory in the aftermath of the Bangladesh war and after defeating the Janata Party government (when she again became Prime Minister, 1979-84) the firm outlines of the hegemonistic role of a regional superpower were drawn. Firstly, she indicated her version of a Monroe Doctrine for South Asia. There were three aspects, two of which Mr Rajiv Gandhi applied to the Sri Lanka situation:

1. The doctrine held that South Asia was a troubled region emphasising that in the context "Indian interests must be protected."
2. If law and order breaks down in a neighbouring state, India's assistance should be sought to arrest the destabilizing process; help could be solicited from within the region but not to the exclusion of India.
3. Mrs Gandhi stated that a national consensus had been obtained between her Congress(I) party and other political parties. India, the contention was, could not be excluded in regional developments which involved regional security. Indian concerns relating to U.S. military assistance to Pakistan were thus spelled out.

To provide meaning to this new doctrine, **Mrs Gandhi shifted India from the non-aligned state of Mr Nehru to a national security state.** The chief features of the national security state were:

(a) high defence spending at the expense of developmental needs;

(b) high mobilisation of national energies against an external threat, often imaginary;

(c) an atmosphere of beleaguered-ness, and therefore an expansionist foreign policy, supposedly to break out from the encirclement.

The three pillars of India's hegemonistic stature as a regional superpower therefore stand on

(1) the cultural and strategic imperative,

(2) Mrs Gandhi's Monroe doctrine and

(3) Mrs Gandhi's inauguration of the national security state. Thus the ghost of Lord Curzon walks the corridors of the South Block in New Delhi!

OBSTACLES

It is now an Indian supposition that Mr Gandhi's policies relating to Sri Lanka are a continuation of Mrs Gandhi's policies. But even with Mrs Gandhi there were obstacles from the major powers in the region (especially Pakistan and China) and at least one of the superpowers, the USA; these powers did not concede India this status. India's Sri Lanka exercise cannot therefore be taken as absolute proof that Washington, Moscow or for that matter Beijing and the rest of the Western world had accepted New Delhi as the major regional power, leave alone superpower. At best these states expected India to settle the Sri Lankan dispute amicably.

ACCORD

I have secondly been asked to explain to you the reasons for the Accord of July 1987. I can, in the absence of evidence other than the document itself,only draw inferences. In the first place, President Jayewardene has in his interview with S. Venkat Narayan (*Island International, 23rd December 1987*) stated that **the letters of exchange between the Indian Prime Minister and him are only intentions.** These, he stated, need to be translated into a treaty. The President said that he wanted to sign a treaty of peace and friendship with India and that the

treaty was in connection with the annexures (that is, the letters) attached to the Accord of July 1987. And he added rather ominously: "if India wants us to do certain things, we also want India to reciprocate by doing something for us."

What are these things and what things will the President not do? He said that the question of Trincomalee is a *quid pro quo* and will depend on the terms of the treaty. He added that foreign trainers in his country (the Israelis, Keeny Meeny Services and the Pakistanis) will remain until a treaty is concluded. The same applies to the Voice of America broadcasts. The negotiation of such a treaty cannot be accomplished before the President's term ends in November this year and officially on 4th February 1989. Two of his possible successors, the Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa and the Minister of National Security, Lalith Athulathmudali, are opposed to the treaty.

NOT THE RIGHT ADVICE

Then what were the reasons for Mr Gandhi over committing his prestige on this Sri Lanka operation? My first answer is that the Indian Prime Minister did not receive the right advice from those who counselled him. In a military venture of this kind, Mr Gandhi should have obtained bipartisan agreement between the main parties in his own country. On the other hand, Indian opinion is divided on the wisdom of continuing the war. The major parties of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and V P Singh's organisation, question the wisdom of the military adventure. War some times it is said is a reflection or extension of domestic policy. But elections in distant Haryana state were not intended to give Mr Gandhi leverage on what went on in Tamil Ceylon. The forthcoming elections in Tamil Nadu might bring the role of the IPKF to the fore; it certainly will be one of the issues. But Mr Gandhi is not likely to obtain much credit. The reasons are that **Mr Gandhi and the IPKF have committed three errors:**

1.Mr Gandhi over committed his enormous reputation as a leader of the world's largest democracy in undertaking an open-ended military operation which has cost the Indian Army severely. It has given him little return.

2. The IPKF did not use, what in nuclear warfare is called the ladder of escalation to warn the militant groups and the Ceylon Tamil civilian population of the dangers that lay ahead at the stages when the Indian Army would step on to the next phase of its campaign. Instead, the Indian Army went for all-out victory. In this connection, I have a serious accusation against the Indian army which I feel must be thoroughly investigated by a body of international military experts. **My information is that the Indian Army tested some of its new weapons on the innocent Tamil people of Jaffna and that they continue to do so now in the Eastern Province.** This is, if true, a terrible indictment against a Government and an Army which claimed to be entering the Tamil areas to provide the Tamil people protection. I repeat this charge. My information is reasonably authentic. An international body of military experts can give us the facts or reject the views that have come to me.

3. Before a politicised military operation is set in motion, the parties to the dispute must be consulted. The Indian Government has acted hastily and thoughtlessly. There is no evidence that the Sinhalese Opposition parties were asked for their views nor was any attempt made to negotiate with their leaders. Thus the Sinhalese people are generally hostile to the Indian presence.In an operation of this kind, at the least, one friend might be helpful. The only people, the Tamils, who first welcomed the Indian Army are now not with them. This leaves Mr Gandhi with only President Jayewardene. Can President Jayewardene run a viable political system even if he wins a third term? Mr Gandhi might find himself in an unenviable situation. Already a coalition, comprising Sinhalese groups and two of the Tamil militant groups, the EPRLF AND PLOTE, have joined a United Socialist Alliance which was once headed by the assassinated Vijaya Kumaranatunge. Although the Alliance supported the Accord, a political coalition that needs further support to form a government, if at all, will have to seek the backing of other oppositional elements opposed to the Accord.

4. To add to the confused picture, members of President Jayewardene's government are reported to be in touch,if not negotiating, with some of the Tamil militant groups. Where does this multidiplomatic activity (Indians and the President's ministers) leave the Indian government? The Indian High Commissioner in Colombo has made known his displeasure.

GEO-NATIONAL INTERESTS

The principal objective of this agreement, from a reading of it, was to secure India's geo-national interests. This was apparent from the approaches of G Parthasarathi, Romesh Bhandari and P Chidambaram. But these geo-national interests have yet to be secured in a treaty where there is certain to be hard bargaining on the Sri Lanka side. My view is that **India probably panicked at the future prospect of Trincomalee, and the outlet for the Voice of America. The Voice of America broadcasts will, according to Sri Lanka's Minister for Foreign Affairs, continue. The station, it has been agreed, will not be used for sending messages to U.S. submarines in the North Indian Ocean. But who is to know? Trincomalee is according to U.S. sources of no use to them. The logistics alone, a distance of 10,000 odd miles from the U.S.A., do not make it a viable proposition. India has therefore nothing to fear from a hostile power attacking her on her most vulnerable southern flanks from Trincomalee.**

Provincial councils and the merger are dubious matters. The Indians are not tuned into the political culture of the Sinhalese political elites. The latter will not implement the bill in the proper spirit. The powers conceded do not resolve the most important question,the distribution of land. **The arrangements appear half done and ill conceived.** The only way is to start anew, further negotiations with the principal militant group and others concerned. The alternative is a continuing state of disequilibrium, a hopeless outlook for all the people of Sri Lanka.

the satanic force

R A P E



27.6.88 Panichchankeni — 1 young girl (The IPKF officer who raped this girl was then stab ed to death by the girl and she got escaped)

27.6.88 Chambur-Trincomalee Eastern prorince

Parameswari (19)
Sakunthala devi (21)
Vellachchi (32) Married
Kannaki (28) Married
Sinnappillai (26) Married
Yogeswari (28) Married
Saroja (22) Married
Annalakshmi (30) Married
Thangamalar (25) Married

THE STATESMAN

EDITORIAL

7.6.88

TIMING THE PULL-OUT

THE cryptic announcement by the Indian High Commission in Colombo that "some excess (IPKF) troops and military hardware will be taken back very soon, probably beginning June 7" may well have been a token response to the growing fear of Sri Lankans that the Indian military presence in the island is now a permanent fixture. The statement that Mr Gamini Dissanayake made in New Delhi last month regarding a phased withdrawal of the IPKF was believed to have set the stage for an announcement by the Defence Minister, Mr K. C. Pant, on a time-table for departure, but last week's confabulations in Colombo resulted in only a vague assurance that surplus troops would return home "in the near future" and that the IPKF's presence was imperative to oversee election arrangements in the Northern and Eastern provinces in July. Understandably, there was considerable disappointment in ruling party circles in Colombo at being deprived of the means of countering anti-accord propaganda by the opposition SLFP and the JVP, although it is impossible to dismiss New Delhi's own hesitation in the matter.

Notwithstanding President Jayewardene's optimism after the first round of provincial council elections earlier last month, the poor turn-out and the violence that marked the second round of polls suggest that far from having been tamed, the JVP has, in fact, made alarming inroads among educated Sinhalese youth. Indeed, had Mr S. Thondaman's supporters not ensured a substantial turn-out by the Indian Tamils in Nuwara Eliya, last weekend's elections may have been reduced to a mockery. To compound this disturbing trend there is no guarantee that the IPKF's offensive against the recalcitrant LTTE cadres in Batticaloa will be an unqualified success resulting in the liquidation of the Tigers' strength. With elections in Tamil Nadu round the corner, and New Delhi's anxiety for a quick settlement, a high price will undoubtedly have to be paid for winning over Mr Pirabhakaran. At the same time, the knowledge that President Jayewardene's hold over the Sinhalese heartland is at best tenuous inhibits New Delhi from agreeing to anything more than a token gesture.

This is not to suggest that even the anti-accord elements in the UNP are in too much of a hurry to get rid of the IPKF. Since India has been conducting its anti-insurgency operations quite efficiently, even Mr R. Premadasa and Mr Lalith Athulathmudali have grudgingly let the battle go on to its logical conclusion. Moreover, the political benefits of an imminent withdrawal would accrue mainly to Mr Gamini Dissanayake, which is one reason why New Delhi went out of its way to offer him a face-saving sop. Ideally, both New Delhi and Colombo would like the announcement of a substantial IPKF withdrawal to be timed to yield the maximum political dividends. But, unfortunately there is no sign yet of a date that suits both governments which may be why Mr Pant's keenly awaited visit resulted in no firm annoucement of any significance, and why last Saturday's pull-out promise may not be more than eyewash to conceal the high level of uncertainty.

Jawans waving from the *m.v. Kokansevak* at Madras harbour after arriving as part of the first IPKF contingent withdrawn from Sri Lanka.

THE TIMES

88 June

Little sign of Tamil compromise

Indian troops set for long stay

REPORT

Michael Hamlyn, Colombo

There's a sour joke doing the rounds in Colombo. An Indian soldier – known as a *jawan*, a young man – tells his colleague who asks how long the Indian peacekeeping force will stay in Sri Lanka: "We will stay at least until my son goes to school."

The implication is that the *jawan* has fathered a child with a local Tamil girl in the north or east of the country, and that there is no chance of a troop withdrawal by the Indians for the next five years.

There was, it is true, a token withdrawal last week to help the electoral chances of the ruling United National Party, and it may have helped. But in reality no one believed that very many troops were going, and the party won the election by a comfortable margin anyway.

But as General Nalin Senaviratne, the commander of the Sri Lankan Army, told *The Times*, it would need the recruitment and training of another two divisions of troops before his men could hope to take over from the Indians, and that would take two to three years to achieve.

The Sri Lankan armed forces number around 32,000, and are fairly stretched dealing with a terrorist campaign by a Sinhalese chauvinist left-wing group, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in the south and west of the country. The Indians, by most recent counts, have around 52,000 troops here.

Moreover, Mr Ronnie de Mel managed – before being compelled to resign as Finance Minister after falling out with his party over the calling of elections – to cut one billion rupees (about £20 million) from the defence budget.

There is a belief among certain Indians that world opinion will impel Mr Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, to bring his *jawans* home. But Western diplomats here scoff at the idea, insisting that no foreign government will do anything on this matter to annoy the Indians.

There is also a belief that domestic pressure might persuade Mr Gandhi to withdraw. But again, there is no indication of such pressure except among a few opposition politicians, and there is no real sign of any groundswell of public opinion objecting to the continuing loss of life among the Indian Army's *jawans*.

The *jawans*, then, are only likely to leave if some agreement can be reached with the principal Tamil separatist group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, under which it would surrender its guns and join the mainstream of politics. But there seems to be precious little sign of that either.

Surreptitious negotiations are reported to have been going on between the Indian authorities and the Tamil Tigers in Madras, where the former commander of Jaffna, Mr Sadasivan Krishnakumar, alias Kittu, is in exile.

However, many people here are sure that the negotiations will come to nothing. The Tigers' leadership is likely to repudiate any agreeement reached by Kittu, and in any case are said not seriously to be interested in any settlement falling short of the establishment of an independent Tamil homeland.

There is also a feeling that they will not wish to participate in any election in which they stand a chance of losing. Caste and other factors are all likely to operate against them in a democratic poll.

Elections have just been held to seven provincial councils established in the rest of the country under the devolution of powers forced on the Government by the Indo-Sri Lankan accord. They were boycotted by the principal opposition party and violently opposed by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna gunmen. Now they must be held in the north and east to elect a joint council for the predominantly Tamil area.

A senior Indian diplomat last week assured me that elections will be held and that the Tamil Tigers are sufficiently cowed not to be able to interfere. Such optimism is derided by other observers, who forecast that the Tigers will threaten with death anyone who takes part.

"If they do not reject the LTTE now and take part in these elections," said another senior Indian, "then I fear it will be the end for the Tamils."

The situation is equally fraught for the ruling party. Elections are due soon, and such is the unpopularity of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord that the party is in danger of losing them. President Jayewardene, who will be 82 in December, is technically not allowed to succeed himself, but a committee has reported that a minor change in the Constitution could change that. Diplomats believe firmly that he will run again. 13.6.88



MR.V.GOPALSAMY IN INDIAN PARLIAMENT

Mr.Vice-Chairman, Sir, On the 28th April, Shri Upendra put a question to the Government as to how much money had been spent in respect of the IPKF operations in Sri Lanka so far. But the Hon.Minister stated that the Government is not in a position to inform Parliament about the actual expenditure. **Such is the arrogant attitude, irresponsible attitude, which the Government is persisting in.**

When a pointed question was put to the President of Sri Lanka by the pressmen, he stated, it has appeared in India Today also, *'I am in charge of the Indian forces'*. So, we are spending money on the forces of India, whereas the supreme commander happens to be the President of another country.

Sir, **a memorandum was given by the Association of Tamil Refugees in Tamil Nadu to the hon.Prime minister of this country.** The office-bearers of that Association started a fast unto death at the Marina sands. I put a question whether any memorandum was received by the Government. I was shocked to receive the reply that there was no such memorandum from any association. I got a copy of the memorandum also. **That memorandum was sent to the Prime Minister. But this Government dares to say, "there is no such memorandum." Even Goebbels would become a pygmy before this Government. It is a very serious matter, Sir.** Governments of the Western countries are pressurising those refugees to go back. Where should they go? Death is awaiting them there. It is hell there. They cannot go back. **But our armed forces are hunting and hounding not only the youths but also the girls. Under the Geneva Conventions, the crimes committed by any army are crimes against humanity. Now this crime of genocide, this atrocious crime, is committed by the Indian forces against our brothers and sisters in the island of Sri Lanka. There are sanctuaries in that island for wild animals, but there is no sanctuary for the Tamils where they can live in peace and harmony.**

Sir, Lt.Gen.Pande of the Indian Army has given a press statement, which has appeared in all the national dailies and the magazines, and there he says, **"90 per cent of the population in the Tamil areas totally support the LTTE." If somebody is not supporting the LTTE, he says, then something is wrong with him. It is the statement of an Indian General.**

In the Conference held day before yesterday in London the speech made by the **LTTE representative impressed even Justice Krishna Iyer who said,** *I had a misconceived notion about the LTTE.* But now he has changed it after listening to this speech. In the speech he said: *We love India; we love the people of India; we are for the Government of India. Even now, in the Indian Ocean we wish India should be the leading power. We are against the role of imperialist forces, but not against India.* In times of crisis in the past, the Tamils have stood by you in the past. But, you are crushing their backbone which is the only shield for the Tamils. If you crush that movement which has been all along protecting the Tamils there against the Sri Lankan forces, when you are crushing them, the only shield for the Tamils, then one day Mr.Jayewardene or somebody will say, *Your dirty job is over. You quit.* **Then, what will happen? Will the Tamil people be thrown before the wolves? So, this is a mad war pursued by the egoism of a particular individual.**

Sir, when they are prepared even for talks, unconditional talks, everyday you are launching your troops in all the areas. It is a very wrong policy. For every drop of blood being shed by the jawans of the Indian army, also the cadres of the LTTE, this Government is responsible.

Sir, after the accord, 10,000 Sinhalese families have been brought to settle in the traditional home areas of the Tamils. Even our Minister in his statement has admitted to a certain extent that the traditional home areas have been colonised by the Sinhalese. It was done by the Israelis in the West Bank and the Gaza strip. Sir, have we got the audacity to tell the Palestinians not to have their homeland? Have we the guts to tell the Blacks of South Africa not to have their homeland?

When Indra Gandhi was shot dead, the Tamils in the North and the East came on the streets with black flags. What happened? Eleven Tamils were shot dead by the Sinhalese army. Now you are pursuing the same policy. Instead of the army of the Sri Lankan Government, you have sent your army. **You are doing the dirty job of Jayewardene. You are playing the role of mercenary there.**

Only one thing I would like to ask before I conclude: whether this Government is prepared to permit the international press and the International Red Cross in the North and East of Sri Lanka. Why are international press and the International Red Cross not permitted there?

Southern PC Elections — a Political Defeat

COMMENT

THE recent round of provincial council elections in Sri Lanka, except in the north and east of the country, came to a close on 9 June when voters in the southern province went to the polls which were marked and marred by violence, intimidation and allegations of electoral malpractice including vote-rigging. The elections for the other six provinces had been completed, on 28 April and 2 June.

The JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera and his staunch henchmen hail from the southern province which, from JVP's inception, has been regarded as its strongest base. The elections in this province provided the setting for the test between the determination of the government to go ahead with its plans for establishing the Provincial Council system and the decision of the JVP to sabotage it.

The orgy of violence unleashed by the JVP prior to and during the 9 June elections ensured the lowest poll ever recorded in the island's history — a mere 27.9 per cent in the whole province. An abysmal 7.5 per cent voter turnout was reached in the Hambantota district. When counting began, it was noted that not a single vote was cast in ten ballot boxes and 16 ballot boxes were counted in just under 23 minutes.

Although the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) had called for a boycott of the elections, it cannot be doubted that the crucial factor contributing to the unprecedented low vote recorded was the campaign of violence unleashed by the JVP on election day and before. Candidates and supporters of the ruling United National Party (UNP) and the opposition United Socialist Alliance (USA) were ruthlessly gunned down in surprise attacks in their homes or as they went about campaigning. Government and security officials were shot. In some areas huge trees had been felled to ensure obstruction of roads. Buses belonging to the state transport board and private vehicles used for campaigning were set ablaze. Party offices and buildings earmarked for polling stations were attacked. Electrical installations were set on fire resulting in a cut to power supply in certain areas. On election day polling booths were stormed and polling officers attacked. Land mines exploded in certain public places striking terror to the hearts of many.

The scene in substantial areas of the southern province was as if a total curfew had been clamped down — shops and restaurants remained closed, vehicles were missing from the roads and very few people ventured out of their homes. One after another, polling booths manned by terror-stricken officials were seen completely deserted.

Neither the SLFP nor the JVP can legitimately claim that the thousands who failed to vote supported their cause. Besides the generalised violence and individual attacks it had launched, the JVP had put up posters threatening to kill the first five persons who appeared at polling stations to vote. Worse was that this threat applied not only to those who actually voted but also extended to all the members of their families. Not that the people love the vote less but they feared the gun more.

The government had mobilised all the security services at its disposal, including the army, navy, air force and paramilitary outfits, in an attempt to prevent the disruption of the poll and ensure a reasonable voter turnout. Although the government's security efforts prevented a complete abandonment of the elections, they did not prove adequate to avoid substantial disruption or ensure a respectable showing in terms of voter turnout. Of the 1,289,000 registered voters, approximately 940,000 did not vote.

As Kendall Hopman of the 'Sunday Times' (Colombo, 12 June 1988) put it, 'a military victory, a political defeat, is perhaps the most fitting epitaph for Thursday's provincial council elections in southern Sri Lanka. From a military perspective, the fact that the election was not disrupted was a victory for the government forces. Politically the under 30 per cent voter turnout was an ignominious show of democracy versus the T-56'.

JUNE 1988

LETTER

TAMIL RESILIENCE

An important meeting was held last week at Vaddukoddai, the home town of the Secretary General of the TULF, Mr Amirthalingam.

Though this meeting was connected with the Church of South India, most of the speeches highlighted the present political and military actions of the North and East of Sri Lanka.

This was a function organised to receive three dignitaries who arrived from South India in Jaffna last week.

The IPKF's actions, other activities and excesses were brought to focus by four speakers and some other participants.

An important question posed before the South Indian dignitaries was, 'Is India for a political solution or a military solution to the Sri Lanka Tamils Problem?'

The Bishop for the church of South India Rev. Fr. Ambalavanar posed the question before the assembly.

'Our guest nation, India, since July 1983 told the Sri Lankan Government, there can never be a military solution to this problem.

The way lies clearly in a political solution. But within a mere eight weeks of their arrival in this country, they lost their patience and their preaching and started fighting. What is the meaning of this? is the first question raised by Bishop Ambalavanar.

His second question was; Is India really interested in Sri Lanka's peace or have they any other interest?

Lastly he told the South Indian guests that the IPKF soldiers did not know what they were doing! And why they were here!

At their function the Archbishop of Jaffna Rev. Fr. B. Deogupillai briefly and lucidly explained the Tamils' problems since 1958.

At one point the Archbishop said that 'The general Tamil public will not say this. But I say that they are all with the militants. Foreign countries do not know what's going on here. We are the abandoned people.'

A noteworthy speech was by the Jaffna Municipal Commissioner Mr C.V.K. Sivagnanam.

'The Indian Govt. claims that had they not intervened soon after the Vadamarachchi Operation Liberation, the entire Jaffna peninsula would have been annihilated. I am not prepared to accept it.

'I would rather say, Vadamarachchi Operation Liberation did not destroy the entirety of the Vadamarachchi, and did not kill the entire population of the area.

'So, it follows even if there had been a repetition of the Sri Lankan forces operation over the rest of the peninsula, these areas too would not have been totally destroyed nor would the entire population have been killed.'

Mr. Sivagnanam went on to remark 'One character of the Tamil race is resilience. They may suffer terribly; but undaunted they should come back for more.'

– Letter from Jaffna, The Sunday Times, 26.6.88

INDIA TODAY

REPORT

Political Acrobatics

State leaders equivocate on the Sri Lankan issue

RAJIV Gandhi's biggest achievement on the tortuous Sri Lankan Tamil ethnic issue was winning over the late Tamil Nadu chief minister M.G. Ramachandran to his side. And as long as "Puratchi Thalaivar (revolutionary leader)" was alive and backing the Indo-Sri Lankan accord, Tamil Nadu remained relatively quiet despite the fierce battle that broke out between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).

But with MGR's death—and the subsequent turmoil in the state—the Sri Lankan Tamil issue has again revealed the dark side of Tamil politicians. Most of the prominent leaders have done a dizzying volte-face. The prospect of imminent elections has exposed an array of political carpet-baggers, all equivocating on the Tamil issue. As L. Ketheeswaran, spokesman of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front says: "The Sri Lankan conflict has become a football, kicked around by Tamil Nadu politicians to score points in the electoral arena."

The sudden reversals of policy can be attributed to three factors. First, the local politicians need to project themselves as the true custodians of Tamil interests. Second, the desire to capture a part of the halo of LTTE supremo V. Pirabhakaran, who is still seen by many Tamils, particularly the youth, as a hero. Third and most crucial, the regional parties' temptation to hit the Congress(I) exactly where it hurts. Says A. Amrithalingam, leader of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF): "Their (local parties) attitude to the conflict seems to depend on their relationship with the Congress(I). If they want to oppose it, they criticise the IPKF." Tamil Nadu Congress(I) Committee (TNCC-I) President G.K. Moopanar argues: "None of the Dravida parties has a clear-cut stand on this issue. There's no commitment; only sheer opportunism."

The Janaki faction of the AIADMK illustrates this point. To persuade the Congress(I) into continuing its support, Janaki Ramachandran as chief minister openly supported the accord. On January 25, she declared: "We firmly believe that the implementation of the agreement will go a long way in finding a permanent solution to the ethnic problems in Sri Lanka." Yet, precisely three days after her ministry was dismissed on February 3, Janaki asked the Centre to "restrain the IPKF from attacking innocent Tamils".

Overnight, the IPKF became "an army of murderous rapists" for the Janaki faction. Asked to explain this turnabout, Janaki insists: "We're following MGR's policies." That's not quite true. MGR had, in fact, disowned his MP, Aladi Aruna's description of the IPKF as a 'killing force' in Parliament late last year. "Our strategy now is different," says Aruna blithely.

Jayalalitha has been little different. All these years, nobody had heard the eloquent Jayalalitha plead for the Sri Lankan Tamils. After the dissolution of her rival Janaki's ministry following the Congress(I)'s withdrawal of support to it, a grateful Jayalalitha had even backed the accord. But this March, after her relationship with the Congress(I) soured, she exploded: "If Pirabhakaran is harmed, there will be a bloodbath in Tamil Nadu." Veiled references were made suggesting that she was in touch with LTTE leaders. Says satirist Cho Ramaswamy: "Jayalalitha's sudden love for Pirabhakaran is stunning." Like Janaki, Jayalalitha denies any change in stand and states imperiously: "We're following in MGR's footsteps." But the timing of her outburst reveals her motives. Points out A. Nallasivam, CPI(M) secretary of the state unit: "It's a pressure tactic aimed at impressing the Congress(I) that if it doesn't accept her demands on seat adjustments, she could stir trouble on the sensitive issue."

Local LTTE leaders confirmed that they had not been in touch with Jayalalitha. Evidently, she is creating a myth to suit her political interests. Says Rangarajan Kumaramangalam, a Congress(I) MP: "Jayalalitha is indulging in silly pressure ploys that will only harm her cause."

Matinee idol Sivaji Ganesan has also

gone through political acrobatics. His love for the Sri Lankan Tamils remained a secret while he was a Congressman. The minute he walked out to form his own Tamil Welfare Front on February 10, Ganesan changed his tune. Now he says: "The barbarous IPKF is doing exactly what Jayewardene wants to do—liquidate Tamils." Claiming he could not criticise the accord earlier being a "disciplined Congressman", he now vows to "expose the mistakes of the Congress(I)"—mistakes which he had been a party to. Last December, for instance, Ganesan had participated in a public function in Madras in which the TNCC(I) handed over gunny bags containing 50 lakh signatures supporting the accord to the prime minister. "Bogus signatures," fumes Ganesan now.

FOR the matinee idol, the Sri Lankan problem is a stick to beat the Congress(I) with. And it fits in with the Tamil chauvinism he's whipping up. His signature tune is "*Vadakku Vazhgirathu, theku theigirathu*" (the north flourishes while the south languishes). Says M. Shankar of the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation: "We haven't heard him speak for us before."

It is only DMK President M. Karunanidhi who has shown a certain amount of consistency in his stand. But he too is guilty of ambivalence in his attitude to Pirabhakaran. MGR, when he supported the LTTE, had only one condition—that it must avoid the DMK at all costs. Pirabhakaran agreed as a chief minister's friendship was more important. Karunanidhi then supported the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO). When the LTTE liquidated TELO in the summer of 1986, the furious DMK supremo called Pirabhakaran a *paavi* (sinner). Posters appeared everywhere describing him as a *kolaikaran* (murderer). The LTTE fuelled Karunanidhi's anger by spurning the Rs 50,000 he had collected for it in September 1986.

However, after MGR's death, an orphaned Pirabhakaran wrote to Karunanidhi: "At a time when death is stalking the north and east, you alone are the Tamils' *Nambikai Nakshatram* (trustworthy star)." Karunanidhi soon hailed Pirabhakaran as a hero. Since February, a rash of red, green and white posters has appeared all over the state showing Karunanidhi and Pirabhakaran as godfather and protege. Unlike the AIADMK faction leaders, Karunanidhi doesn't prevaricate. He admits: "I don't deny (the change). Now I must support Pirabhakaran because he's the only person in the field."

Jayalalitha supporters, who see Karunanidhi as their main foe, charge that he is only trying to reap political dividends. AIADMK leader S. Thirunavukkarasu points out that when Karunanidhi was chief minister (between 1969 and 1976) he was responsible for the extradition of TELO leader Kuttimani who was later murdered in Colombo's Welikade prison in July 1983. There is another shift in Karunanidhi's line. He is no longer particularly vocal about Eelam, as his electoral allies, the two communist parties, don't support the concept.

What is clear in the cacophony is that most parties in Tamil Nadu will use the Sri Lankan problem to attack the Congress(I) during the polls. And sanctimonious Congressmen chide the Dravida parties for stooping low to exploit this sensitive issue. But that doesn't mean the Congress(I) is itself above scheming. Popular belief is that polls in Tamil Nadu are linked to a solution in Sri Lanka. Says Karunanidhi: "Till things are sorted out there, they won't hold elections."

But political chicanery on such a sensitive issue bristles with dangers. These include:

- Needless whipping up of Tamil chauvinism which can become uncontrollable and harm national unity. (One of the earliest calls of secessionism was made by the DMK in the early '60s.)
- Spread of the cult of violence. Due to their close ties with the militants, the local parties may assimilate the country-bomb politics of the Tamil separatist organisations and thus graduate from the use of soda water bottles and cycle chains. This was demonstrated during the 1986 DMK stir when a series of bomb blasts ripped the state. Ultra-left chauvinistic groups like the Tamil Liberation Army that masterminded the Ariyalur train bomb blast last March have also cropped up. This group, involved in two other bombing incidents this year, is believed to have acquired explosives from the LTTE and PLOTE.
- Relegation of the real issues in Tamil Nadu to the background.
- Resurgence of anti-Sinhalese sentiments that will jeopardise healthy relations with Sri Lanka.
- Erosion of public respect for the defence forces and damage to the morale of the army since the political attacks on the IPKF have been vituperative.
- A cynical public, made more so by the legerdemains of political parties which have exposed their bankruptcy of values.

But so obsessed have the local parties become in their craving to extract political mileage out of the Sri Lankan Tamils that they have forgotten the human tragedy. Though they make lofty proclamations about their concern for the suffering Tamils, none of them—be it MGR or Karunanidhi, Janaki or Jayalalitha, Moopanar or Ganesan—has ever visited a Sri Lankan Tamil refugee camp. The refugees, after all, have no votes.

—ANITA PRATAP in Madras

JUNE 15, 1988

The Week

JUNE 19—25, 1988

REPORT

Arms and the LTTE

COLOMBO House in Singapore is a well-known landmark. This building houses many an office of maritime companies. And in this building, under an innocuous name functions an organisation that has been a 'front-office' of LTTE.

No doubt, the Indian army was surprised by LTTE when there was a head-on confrontation. But if there is one thing that surprised New Delhi more than the determination and fighting quality of LTTE, it is a near-magical feat that the Tigers performed: they could get arms at will.

Where did all these arms come from? The search ultimately led them to Singapore. The Colombo House.

The original and the main supplier of arms to LTTE had been—and there is no reason to hide this any more—India itself. India provided training as well. By 1986, India had 39 training camps for the Lankan militants. The Tigers had modern arms, training and latest communication equipment. They had and still have an office in Madras as well. They also had speed boats and the ramshackle Sri Lankan Navy could not stop them. They travelled back and forth at will.

And at one point of time, LTTE had even some anti-aircraft weapons.

The Tigers did not surrender their arms after the treaty between Jayewardene and Rajiv Gandhi. On August 4, a week after the treaty, Prabhakaran appeared in public at a temple in Jaffna. He addressed the gathering. (Incidentally, photographs show that he did not wear the cyanide capsule that day.

He said: "We had no choice. We are not prepared to go into battle against Indian army." However, he made it clear that the treaty was no solution.

Next day, at the IPKF headquarters at the Palaly airbase, Dilip Yogi, chief of the LTTE political wing, handed over his 9 mm Beretta pistol. The other LTTE men threw in their weapons.

They included AK-47s, heavy machineguns, rocket-propelled granade launchers, 150-mm mortars and some rusty World War II rifles.

IPKF knew that the Tigers had not surrendered all their weapons. The Sri Lankan intelligence had informed India that the Tigers had 6,000 weapons. They surrendered only 200.

But what surprised the Indian army was not what the Tigers had hoarded: they had been quietly adding to the arsenal. Where were they getting the arms? They could not have come from the air, nor by land. The only way was by sea.

Later, when LTTE and Indian army went into real battle, this problem became acute. The army had to stop the supply of arms to LTTE.

The search by the Indian intelligence led to some interesting findings. And that is where the shipping company in Singapore figures.

Indian intelligence traced a ship. In fact, this carrier was not unknown to India. When relationship between India and LTTE was smooth, this ship was a frequent visitor to Madras.

By mid-1987 the company added one more sea-going vessel to its fleet—a trawler.

The Indian authorities guessed the reason: the arms were being transferred from the ship to the trawler.

The effort was to stop this supply. But the Indian authorities faced a difficult task. The Singapore company was, for all practical purposes, above board. It violated no law of that land or of the high seas. The Indian sleuths knew what has happening. But they could do nothing about it. The arms came not from Singapore, though the money for the arms was very much there.

So the only way was to patrol the seas around the northern part of Sri Lanka. And that is precisely what the Indian Navy did.

Of course, it was 'leaked' to the press that the navy was patrolling the seas to prevent Tigers from escaping from Jaffna.

Reality was different. The idea was to stop arms reaching LTTE.

The foreign operators were given "friendly warnings" that they should not indulge in gun-running.

This worked. It is said that after the signing of the treaty, LTTE received some 48 boatloads of weapons. But slowly this tapered off.

But Prabhakaran and company did not give up so easily. They tried two other methods to get arms. The first one was an old trick: getting the arms to India and smuggling them to Jaffna.

That required some guts. Both India and Sri Lanka were on guard. Yet, come to think of it, such an operation was the most natural. For one thing, the Tigers knew every inch of the coastline. Also both countries in their overconfidence might not have expected such a step from the Tigers.

In fact, they almost did. By an accident—details of which have not still been revealed—India came to know about this. Soon India moved and stopped it.

But the LTTE effort to get arms from the enemy was the most adventurous. At one point the Tigers sought arms from the JVP, the militant Sinhala organisation, and from the disgruntled elements in Sri Lankan army.

Indian intelligence has in its possession certain radio communications to this effect. Of course, it is not yet known how far LTTE succeeded in it.

Yet, there is some evidence. The arms captured from LTTE are a clue. In the first phase, they were of Russian make. But some of the arms recently captured match with those used by the JVP and the Sinhala army. But one can prove nothing. After all in the free market all types of arms are available.

The Indian Navy has succeeded in almost crippling the maritime supply of arms. The speed launches have been either sunk or captured.

The Tigers today face an arms shortage. Most of their arsenals have been captured. Of their 4,500 men, at least half have been immobilised—dead, injured, captured or missing. They do not have enough material to create large-scale violence. But their single largest handicap is lack of weapons or, to be precise, the realisation that what they have got is limited.

But they are not friendless. In the recent world Tamil conference in London, £ 50,000 was collected from Sri Lankan Tamils in a matter of minutes. However, there is little chance of this money reaching LTTE in the form of arms.

The Singapore-based ship still sails. But there is no evidence that it carries anything for LTTE.

—SRV

'We're close to restoring normalcy'

A successful operation. *Lt. Gen. Kalkat (right) GOC, IPKF watching the return of first batch of troops.*

LIEUTENANT-General Amarjit Singh Kalkat, GOC of the IPKF, was at the scene of action in the Alampil jungles in northern Sri Lanka, said to be the last of the Tiger strongholds. Kalkat believes that disarming the Tigers and restoration of normalcy are at hand. He told THE WEEK in Madras: "As you come to the finish (of the operations), the process becomes very slow. We are very close to normalcy. Very close to having a situation where the democratic process can start." Excerpts:

On the recent IPKF pullout.

It has not been a pullout, really. The troops that are not required for operations now have come back. We have a continuous reappraisal of operational requirements. This time the combat troops were not required. Also equipment like APCs were sent back. Coming in or going back all depends on the ground situation.

On the Alampil operation.

This was not an extraordinary operation. It was part of the operations to disarm the militants that is on in the north and the east of Sri Lanka. One of our units came across this camp with about 150 to 200 Tigers. We flew in more troops to isolate the area, since it was of importance to the Tigers. The operations were a success. Some militants were killed, some rounded up, some might have slipped away. Now, the Tigers may be in very small groups. They avoid a straight fight with the IPKF. We will have to search the villages and locate them. It's a very slow process.

On the present strength of LTTE.

With the Alampil operation, the Tigers have disintegrated. We have broken the cohesiveness of their military force.

On the military power of LTTE on the ground.

I can talk only from what is visible on the ground. They do not contest our operations. They avoid engagements. A fair amount of weapons are being buried away. They are now resorting to acts of sabotage. Setting off explosive devices at public places.

On the state of normalcy in the north and east of the island.

We are coming to a situation of very near normalcy but in some areas there is trouble, like in the east. People wanted schools and colleges to open. Shops and banks are functioning. Mail is delivered and we provide security for cash transactions at banks. Our engineers have rebuilt public places. People come to us for assistance. We will carry on our operations to create normalcy. We are fast achieving it.

On the future role of the IPKF, once normalcy is restored.

I will not venutre an opinion on that question. The Indian government has clearly said that the genuine, legitimate fears of the Tamils will be taken care of in the democratic process. The IPKF will get back when the government is sure that all aspects of the agreement are honoured.

On the Tamil fears of a Sri Lankan backlash and on elections.

If the groups join the political process and we have a government with the Tamils in the majority, they will be there to take care of everything. We are there as catalysts in this process. We will ensure that there is no coercion, no threats in the conduct of polls. We will provide full security. We are very close to restoring normalcy. Those people with arms and who have evaded us are few in number. And there will be no let up in the operations. The refugees are coming back and we have resettled many Tamils who stayed on on the island. You will be surprised by the rehabilitation work that we have done.

JUNE 19–25, 1988 —VINCENT D'SOUZA

Troop Pullout Is Symbolic

June 17, 1988

By MOHAN RAM
Special to India Abroad

COMMENT NEW DELHI

There is no time frame yet for an end to India's military involvement in Sri Lanka, which began at the end of July 1987. The token pullout of an assault brigade of 400 men with heavy equipment on June 7, as India has hastened to clarify, is not the commencement of the final withdrawal.

The June 7 spectacle at Trincomalee harbor was timed unmistakably for the June 9 elections to the Council in the sensitive and crucial Southern Province, a stronghold of the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna.

The token withdrawal was meant to help President J.R. Jayewardene and his United National Party blunt opposition criticism that the continued presence of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force, though limited to the Tamil majority Northern and Eastern Provinces, compromised the island republic's sovereignty.



Turnout Only 25%

And as expected, the voter turnout in the Southern Province was a chillingly low 25 percent. Sri Lanka's tradition of Adult Franchise elections dates to 1933 (when no third world country had perhaps known this political luxury). Sri Lanka is known for a 75 percent voting turnout.

The Southern Province was the seventh to elect a provincial Council in the plan for devolution of power under the India-Sri Lanka agreement of last July 29. All seven Sinhala-majority provinces have now elected councils, the UNP having a majority in all.

The United Socialist Alliance of four leftist parties, dominated by the Sri Lanka Mahajana Party and including the Communist Party, emerged as a close contender in some provinces and is the main opposition in all.

Like the UNP, the USP supports the India-Sri Lanka agreement, so that was not the issue. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party of Sirimavo Bandaranaike, which is the mainstream Sinhala opposition party, boycotted the elections because it opposed the 1987 agreement.

Regarded as Sellout

The Sinhala youth radical Janatha Vimukti Peramuna, which regards the agreement as a sellout to India (rather than to the island's ethnic Tamils) tried to enforce the boycott through a campaign of terror.

Voter turnout has varied in the provinces from 56.35 percent to 25. But then there have also been charges of rigging and "state violence" to increase the chances of the UNP.

Overall, the poor turnout in the Southern Province was a setback as much to Jayewardene as to India, whose token withdrawal was seen by the voters as an election gimmick.

The withdrawal of 400 personnel, declared a "surplus," means little when the admitted combat strength of the peace-keeping force is 52,000, against a few hundred guerrillas. It is more than the combined strength of Sri Lanka's military and paramilitary forces.

Strength Misleading

Further, the IPKF's presence is limited to the Tamil majority Northern and Eastern Provinces, which geographically account for only a third of Sri Lanka's territory.

The officially admitted strength of the IPKF is misleading because it does not include the auxiliary forces and paramilitary forces. Together, the Indian force is closer to 100,000. It began 10 months ago with 6,000.

India's position is that the entire IPKF is not engaged in operations, with most personnel just stand-by. But Sri Lanka's perception is different. It seems convinced that India has deployed more troops than necessary.

Sri Lanka's Land Development Minister, Gamini Dissanayake, aired the difference with India on this point early last month in New Delhi when he hinted at the possibility of a phased withdrawal.

Reports from Colombo had said about 3,000 Indian troops were withdrawn, but Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit said the exact number could not be divulged for operational reasons.

When Defense Minister K.C. Pant visited Colombo at the end of May, it was widely speculated that all that needed to be announced was a timetable for withdrawal. But at the end of his visit, it was clear that nothing dramatic was in the cards. All that the world was told was that forces not required would return to India in the "near future."

But it is significant that Pant also announced that the IPKF would be able to insure the physical conditions to begin the process of holding elections to the councils in the Northern and Eastern Provinces by the end of July.

The councils were contrived essentially to enable devolution of power to the Tamils, but paradoxically all the Sinhala majority provinces have elected the councils but not the Tamil provinces.

Pant promised only physical conditions for holding the elections. It is not the same as insuring the people's participation in them.

The best construction now is that the IPKF is confident of restoring normalcy in the Northern and Eastern Provinces by the end of July. But then India has also been hedging its desire to withdraw its force early with the condition that the 1987 agreement be implemented in full. So the IPKF withdrawal is contingent on India's subjective satisfaction that the accord has been implemented.

Outside the Indian government there are weird arguments favoring a prolonged

stay of the IPKF. One is that Jayewardene's hold on the Sinhala provinces is tenuous, thanks to the JVP challenge. And such a challenge is a threat to the 1987 accord. The obvious suggestion is that the political challenges Jayewardene faces at home is India's concern. This smacks of hegemonism.

The IPKF went to Sri Lanka with a limited brief. It was to demilitarize the ethnic conflict by getting the Sri Lankan forces to stop the operations and return to barracks and the guerrilla groups to lay down arms. The first goal has been achieved but not the second, though the IPKF launched an all-out war against the rebels beginning last October.

There is no let-up in the war, and the prolonged IPKF presence has raised doubts among the Sinhalas about India's intentions. For instance, Father Tissa Balasurya and Bernadeen Silva of the Center for Society and Religion in Colombo say

"Many in Sri Lanka are wary of Indian intentions. Are they incapable of handling the guerrilla situation which they themselves helped build up? Or are they unwilling to deal with it? Or worse still, are they making use of it to prolong their stay and achieve their own military or political objectives."

The longer the IPKF stays in Sri Lanka, the more unpopular it will be with the Sinhalas and the Tamils. It will be a counterproductive mission.

But a new-fangled argument has been endorsed in India by quarters as diverse as the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Janata Party: The Tamils in the Northern and Eastern Provinces would face brutal Sinhala reprisals the moment the IPKF left.

First, the IPKF, by virtually liquidating the military wing of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, has eliminated the buffer between the Tamil people and the predominantly-Sinhala Sri Lankan armed forces. The vacuum thus created is now cited as the alibi for the prolonged IPKF presence in Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka, in theory, might have established the point that it has the say on the IPKF because the latter's presence is at Colombo's invitation. India has maintained that the Indian force-level is a matter to be jointly determined by it and Sri Lanka. But in reality India seems to think that the present level must be maintained for some time, the withdrawals being token.

However, Sri Lankan apprehension that India has objectives other than the Tamil rights behind its presence in the island is too well-founded to be wished away.

MURDER OF FR. CHANDRA FERNANDO

D.B.S. Jayaraj

The funeral of Rev. Fr. Chandra Fernando was a moving event. The people of Batticaloa attended in large numbers. The pamphlet distributed by the EROS titled 'Are you a Brutus' was well received. The death of the priest is the first of its kind to occur after the Accord. Earlier during the conflict between the Sri Lankan forces and the Tamil groups Catholic priests like Fr. Mary Bastian of Vankalai and Bro. Wenceslaus of Tholakatty have been killed. Priests like Frs. Singarayer and Sinnarasa have been arrested. The killing of Fr. Chandra was the first murder of a Catholic priest in the internecine warfare among the Tamil groups.

Fr. Chandra did yeoman service to the people of Batticaloa in his capacity as Joint Secretary of the Citizens Committee, earlier as Joint Secretary and later as President. Of the many incidents that occurred people recall with gratitude and admiration his performance during the ceasefire-monitoring panel sittings in Batticaloa, the Kokkaticholai massacre, and the Indian army killings in Valaichanai and Kumburumoolai. The man who had the courage to stand up to the might of the Sri Lankan and Indian states in the interests of his people has been gunned down by a section of his own people.

Various reasons are adduced for the killing. The chief one is the allegation spread by interested parties that Fr. Chandra was a Tiger supporter. Earlier his brother, the president of a Batticaloa trade union federation, was detained by the Indian Army for a long time.

When elections to the Batticaloa Citizens Committee occurred last time, the LTTE allegedly interfered and saw to it that the new administration comprised people who were not hostile to the LTTE. Fr. Chandra was among those re-elected. Later when the Indian army had flushed the Tigers away from Batticaloa, other Tamil groups re-emerged. The TELO, EPRLF and ENDLF began functioning openly in Batticaloa. Thanks to the benevolent patronage of the Indian forces in return for services rendered by 'singing' information about LTTE, those groups walked freely in the land of the singing fish.

The EPRLF put pressure on the Citizens Committee to dissolve itself. When asked the reason, the EPRLF said that the Citizens Committee was not truely representative of the people and was a Tiger appendage. They had no objection to a genuinely independent people oriented Citizens Committee, the EPRLF said. Fr. Chandra resisted pressures and continued to function until his death.

Before that rumours were spread that 'Tigers' were being kept hidden in the Bishop's House by Fr. Chandra and another priest. When a Colombo-based foreign correspondent innocently revealed the 'source' who was planting the stories to Bishop Kingsley Swampillai, the angry prelate had allegedly rung up the source and berated him.

So now Fr. Chandra is dead. The EPRLF has issued a public statement condemning the killing. Whoever was responsible for the killing has proven one point. 'When in' 'power' do as the Tigers, which in effect means eliminating all those who disagree with you. In practice, people who get killed usually are not ordinary people but those who have some stature, those who are of service to the community etc. For these are the people who can shape public opinion and are therefore potentially dangerous. What is saddening is that when this process goes on the community will be deprived of its leaders, the men with a social commitment and independnt spirit.

In this context one also recalls the plight of Mr. Sam Thambimuttu who was Joint Secretary of the Citizens Committee with Fr. Chandra earlier, an abortive attempt on his life was made by 'Pottu' of the LTTE. Mr. Thambimuttu had to come down to Colombo for sometime. Today 'Pottu' has left the LTTE and gone abroad, but Mr. Thambinmuttu continues to live in Batticaloa.

The killing of Fr. Chandra also reminds one of the LTTE action against the TELO. When remonstrating with the then Jaffna leader 'Kittu' about the massacre of TELO cadres. Kittu's defence was a standard one. 'It was a preemptive strike. They were planning to wipe us out. We were quicker. Otherwise you would be remonstrating with Sri Sabaratnam about my death'. Today it seems that 'Kittu' was right after all. Despite all the glib talk and professed ideals, the group that killed Fr. Chandra has shown that basically there is no difference between them and the Tigers.

The complacent Colombo-types who casually dismiss the LTTE and JVP as 'Ethno Populists' and 'Neo-Fascists', and hail the pro-Indian groups as progressives would do well to take note of this killing. The vendetta against Tiger supporters goes on unabated in the East. Many people have died. To use a Churchillian phrase 'the War of the Giants is over, the war of the pygmies has started'.

JUNE 1988

WHITHER HUMAN RIGHTS?

EDITORIAL

It cannot be doubted that the action taken by the Indian government at various times before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights played a crucial role in turning the spotlight on the human rights abuses committed by the Sri Lankan government and its security forces against the island's Tamil community. The Indian government's forthright condemnation of Sri Lanka's massive military attacks on Tamil civilian areas and its eventual decision to send its planes to drop 'humanitarian assistance' to the beleaguered Tamils went a long way towards preventing the Sri Lankan government from seeking the final military solution it was seeking.

With the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement came the India Peace Keeping Force. The agreement and the arrival of the IPKF were portrayed and projected as favours done by India for the Tamils. The Tamils welcomed the IPKF and thought there would be no more atrocities, no more civilian killings and no more human rights violations. But events have proved otherwise. The recent report of Amnesty International (see page 5) highlights, even though to a lesser extent than actually is the case, the violations to which the Tamil people are continuing to be subjected. It is ironic but true that, India which quoted AI reports in the past to support its denunciations of the Sri Lankan government for human rights violations against the Tamils now finds itself indicted on the same count by the same AI.

The AI report also draws attention to the dramatic increase in violations of human rights against members of the Sinhala community in Sri Lanka. In the past we warned the Sinhala people that the draconian and authoritarian structures — the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the Emergency Regulations, the para-military outfits like the Special Task Force, Counter-Subversion Unit, the Home Guards etc. — that were being constructed and increasingly employed against members of the Tamil community, would, sooner than later be deployed against members of the Sinhala community. That is exactly what has been happening in the recent past. When AI spotlighted the abuses committed against the Tamils, there were many in the Sinhala community who labelled and denounced AI as a 'Tamil lobby' trying its utmost to tarnish the image of Sri Lanka. But today it is the sam AI which has come forward to focus attention on the abuses which members of the Sinhala community are being made to suffer.

The Tamils of Sri Lanka had a just cause against a government which was denying the basic and fundamental rights to which they were entitled. And to win back these rights, they launched a struggle, peaceful first and then armed. It is the human rights abuses which accompanied the attempt by the government to suppress that struggle by arbitrary and military means that attracted a measure of international legitimacy to the struggle of the Tamil people. The Tamil struggle for the restoration of their fundamental rights was fought on an international programme of human rights. And this platform was made possible and stronger not through the power that flowed through the barrel of an AK-47 or a T-56, but by the sheer hard and dedicated work of individual human rights activists. At great risk and cost to themselves, they collected, collated and documented volumes upon volumes of human rights abuses in Sri Lanka. Some constituted themselves into Citizens Committees which became the only body to which the suffering and helpless ordinary people could turn to complain and seek assistance. It is to this rare category of individuals that Rev.Fr. Chandra Fernando belonged until he was brutally and callously gunned down reportedly by two Tamil gunmen within the precincts of his own church. The enduring testimony to this priest's contribution was the many thousand people who came to pay their last respects at his funeral. Their presence also constituted a testimony of condemnation and disgust with which they viewed this cowardly murder.

Now comes the tragic news of the abduction of another committed human rights activist and a dedicated rehabilitation social worker, Mr. K.Kanthasamy. The selfless and self-effacing Kanthasamy has carried on his work for the last 25 years or so without seeking publicity or position. Having earned the status of persona non grata with the government of Sri Lanka, he arrived in London to become the live wire and backbone of the Tamil Information Centre. Although he shunned publicity, he was well known among members of the international human rights and humanitarian community. Kanthasamy returned to the island after the Indo-Sri Lanka accord to continue working for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the lives and livelihood of the Tamil people. But he was seen abducted by a group of Tamil men in Jaffna on 19 June and has not been seen since. His abductors have not yet had the courage to admit responsibility.

The senseless murder of Rev. Fr.Chandra Fernando and the abduction and disappearance of Mr. Kanthasamy (there have been other cases too) compel the Tamil people to ask themselves some fundamental questions: can the platform of human rights that enabled the Tamil cause to be advanced remain firm or valid when individual Tamils, dedicated human rights activists at that, are deprived of their most precious of human right , the right to life.

Fr. Chandra Fernando

Mr. Kandasamy

DETENTION, TORTURE & DISAPPEARANCES CONTINUE IN SRI LANKA

Human rights abuses, including arbitrary detentions, disappearances and torture continue to be reported in Sri Lanka, the world-wide human rights body, the Amnesty International said in a report released on 21 June.

While the report notes that there was a reduction in the scale of human rights abuses in the north and east of the country following the July 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, Amnesty International states that, since the beginning of hostilities between the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) stationed in the Tamil areas and the LTTE, it has received reports alleging that members of the IPKF have been responsible for rape and other acts of brutality including killing of unarmed civilians in reprisal. It also received reports of 'disappearance' of persons belonging to the Tamil community after having been taken into custody by the IPKF.

The AI report further reflects a dramatic increase in human rights abuses in the south of the island where hundreds of men and women belonging to the Sinhalese community have been arrested and detained for alleged connection with the Peoples Liberation Front (JVP) — the proscription of which was recently lifted — which has been accused of acts of violence including the killing of government officials and others who support the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. There have been disturbing reports of many 'disappearances' among those taken into custody from this group.

Amnesty International has expressed concern at the refusal of the Sri Lankan government to permit an AI mission to visit the island although its President had previously given an assurance that such a mission would be permitted in the course of an interview with the BBC broadcast in February this year.

685 DISAPPEARANCES

The AI report states that the Sri Lankan security forces were responsible for the 'disappearance' of 685 persons belonging to the island's Tamil community between 1983 and July 1987 and, having listed the names and other details of all 685 cases, states that none of the victims have been accounted for by the government despite the fact that the United Nations Working Group on 'disappearances' had called for explanation from the government of Sri Lanka.

The AI states that there is evidence that many of the 'disappeared' had been tortured while they were held incommunicado and others had been shot dead and their bodies disposed of in secret.

Among the many thousands of prisoners released in an amnesty following the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, Amnesty International has also documented a number of cases in which the victims had been subjected to prolonged torture by the security forces. Some of the released detainees have submitted sworn testimony that they had also witnessed the deaths of other detainees following torture. Several released prisoners have testified that they had been forced to bury bodies of detainees shot by the Special Task Force (STF) and that they had been present when tortured prisoners died in custody.

DEATHS IN CUSTODY

One released detainee described how, in June, he was in the STF camp at Tirukovil when another detainee was brought in with multiple injuries on his face, chest and thighs; he was unable to walk or eat food. He told other detainees that he had been hit with clubs and pickaxes, had been buried in hot sand and had had his genitals pricked with needles. His mother visited the camp in late June, but was not allowed to see him. On 28 June, fellow detainees were ordered to dig a pit to which firewood and tyres were brought. Several detainees saw the body of the tortured man being taken to the pit by police commandos. Gunshots were heard and the men who had dug the pit were told that 'three had been shot'.

Another detainee released under the provisions of the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement swore that during the first seven months of 1987 he had burnt the dead bodies of 25 youths whom STF men brought as suspects to their camp at Akkairaipattu. One of them was a man arrested in June whose arrest and detention were denied by the officer-in-charge of the STF camp where relatives and fellow detainees saw him. In June fellow detainees saw how this man was taken to a place nicknamed 'the slaughter house' where he was apparently tortured, after which he was kept separate from other detainees in a cell with two others. On the night of 2 July, detainees in the camp heard shots being fired from the backyard. After this, one detainee, who had previously taken food to the three detainees in their cell stated that he had been told to take food for only two. This detainee also said he assisted the next day in taking the fingerprints of four bodies, one of whom he identified as that of the detainee who had previously been held in the separate cell. All four bodies bore gunshot wounds. That evening, detainees were ordered to carry firewood, coconut husks and tyres to a place where after dark the four bodies were seen carried for burning.

TORTURE, A ROUTINE

The sworn testimony, the photographic and medical evidence produced by AI establishes beyond doubt that detainees were subjected to torture as a matter of routine. Nearly all those who testified after release gave detailed accounts of repeated prolonged torture by security service personnel, especially the STF in the eastern province which confirmed evidence previously received by AI. Many of them bore marks of torture. One of them had marks all over the body of severe burns consistent with his allegations that melted foam rubber was made to drip on his body. Another released detainee described how he had been beaten while being suspended from his thumbs tied behind his back, and was made to inhale fumes from a pot of burning coal which was later placed on various sensitive parts of his body. This man, who, to Amnesty International's knowledge, was never charged with any offence, suffered severe burns and said that he was unable to walk and work effectively, complaining of frequent headaches and an inability to concentrate. Many others complained of after-effects and physical and mental disabilities, resulting in their inability to work.

The AI report also notes that, despite the fact that the July 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka agreement provided for release of detainees, over 800 Tamils continue to remain in detention without trial under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the country's Public Security Emergency Regulations.

VIOLATIONS IN THE SOUTH

The AI report states that during 1987 hundreds of members belonging to the Sinhalese community were reported to have been arrested and detained without charge or trial under Emergency Regulations which provide for indefinite detention.

In May 1987, according to the police, 500 members of the proscribed JVP were arrested and held under the Emergency Regulations. Many were arrested for putting up posters or painting slogans. That same month, the

Chief Justice granted compensation to three men whom the Supreme Court ruled had been illegally detained by the police in connection with the alleged distribution of pamphlets (Emergency Regulation 28 requires that prior permission must be obtained from the Inspector General of Police to display posters or distribute leaflets.) The Court observed that ER 28 'gives the Police absolute discretionary power to control the right of citizens to exercise their right of expression . . It is unconstitutionally overbroad. It strikes at the foundation of the fundamental rights of speech and expression by subjecting it to prior permission. Hence that Regulation is invalid and cannot form the basis of an offence in law'. But arrests continued to be made under these and other provisions of the ER. (ER 28 has since been amended: although the prohibition to publish or distribute posters considered to be prejudicial to public security interests remains, prior permission from the Inspector General of Police is no longer required for publication).

After the signing of the July accord, many more arrests were made under the ER, especially among people alleged to be members or supporters of the JVP and the Deshapremi Janata Viyaparaya (People's Patriotic Movement (DJV), with which the JVP is closely linked. Both parties strongly opposed the peace accord. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the Communist Party issued a statement saying some of their supporters had been arrested and denying that they were involved in the violence which occurred after the signing of the accord. By mid-August 2,000 arrests had reportedly been made, apparently under the ER, in the south since the signing of the accord, and although many detainees were later released, hundreds of alleged JVP supporters continued to be held on suspicion of opposing the accord, giving classes about the JVP, possessing explosives or participating in acts of violence. In October the government announced that persons held under the ER without positive evidence of the commission of any offence would be released, but added that this would not apply to members of 'proscribed organizations' such as the JVP. The President was reported to have stated in December that members of the JVP had to be eliminated and offered the security forces immunity from prosecution for any action taken in combat.

DISAPPEARANCES IN THE SOUTH

Arrests in the south were made by the police and after July, by the Special Task Force, a paramilitary group earlier based in eastern Sri Lanka where it had been accused of serious human rights violations. After the July accord many STF members were stationed in the south, especially in areas where the JVP is believed to be active. Many of those arrested were reportedly held in police stations for months without being brought before a magistrate. Family members, including wives and aged parents, were reportedly arrested if the police could not find the wanted person; relatives were often not informed about arrests or places of detention and were often unable to establish detainees' whereabouts, at least during the initial detention period.

'Scores of Sinhalese men arrested have 'disappeared' while the security forces either denied knowledge of their arrest or whereabouts or said they had been released. The three instances cited in the AI report are typical of the many cases of disappearances: (1) Ariyasena, aged 30, son of B.G.Siothis of Kahawatte village in south Sri Lanka was taken into custody in November 1987 at Beliatte. His brother, Dayaratne aged 24 who went in search of his arrested brother was also taken into custody shortly afterwards. The security forces have denied any knowledge of their whereabouts; (2) Leslie Ranasinghe, aged 30, of Ruhuna University was arrested at Talawa on 21 October 1987 around 4.30 pm. His father visited him twice while in detention, but on the third occasion he was told that he had been released but never returned home and his whereabouts are still not known; (3) S.Wannigama, a lecturer at the Ruhuna University and reportedly a sympathiser of the JVP was arrested by the Mideniya police in the Hambantota district on 13 November 1987, but his whereabouts remain a mystery as the security forces deny that he was ever arrested.

VIOLATIONS BY THE IPKF

After its forces had entered Sri Lanka the IPKF faced increasing charges of human rights violations, notably after it started its military offensive to disarm the LTTE. Many of these allegations were made by the LTTE itself and most could not be substantiated, being hard to have corroborated by independent observers. Nevertheless, several first hand and independent reports became available of such violations. In particular, members of the IPKF were accused of raping Tamil women and of deliberately killing dozens of unarmed Tamil civilians, among them elderly people, women and children. Even though Indian Government spokesmen said that those killed were members of the LTTE or civilians who had been killed in 'crossfire', evidence mounted that in several cases the victims were non-combatant civilians apparently shot without provocation or in repraisal for the killing of IPKF men by the LTTE. No such complaints were made against the IPKF, however, during their most recent military operation in February, when they conducted a major search operation for LTTE members in Batticaloa.

For example, on the night of 12/13 October Indian commandos descended by helicopter to capture an LTTE base near Jaffna University campus at Kokuvil, two miles from Jaffna, in the course of a major Indian military operation launched to obtain control of the Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE. Twenty-nine Indian commandoes were reported shot dead by the LTTE, but several others fled and allegedly killed an estimated 40 non-combatant Tamil civilians living in the area. Relatives of the victims said that several IPKF soldiers took refuge in nearby houses and shot inhabitants at point blank range, including women, children and an elderly couple, shot on 13 October in their homes at Pirampaday Lane, Kokuvil.

Allegations that Indian forces deliberately killed non-combatant civilians were also made in the Indian press. On 27 October, for example, Indian forces launched their first aerial attack on the LTTE stronghold of Chavakachcheri. An Indian journalist present in the area reported that the IPKF had deliberately struck at civilian targets. At least 20 civilians were reported killed and witnesses were reported as saying that many of the victims were non-combatant civilians shot at the local market.

In eastern Sri Lanka Tamils as well as Muslims were alleged to be victims of such indiscriminate or repraisal killings. In many cases, there were conflicting reports about the nature of these killings and who carried them out and specific allegations were difficult to confirm because of denial of access to outsiders. For example, the local citizens committee was denied access to the village of Kaluwanchikudy, 16 miles south of Batticaloa, to investigate allegations that 14 civilians had been killed in reprisal by the IPKF after four IPKF solidiers had been killed on 23 October in a landmine explosion. An Indian Government spokesmen claimed that only three people had been killed, and in fighting, not as a measure of reprisal. But an independent observer present in the village said that Indian soldiers had got out of control, and that civilians had been killed as a result.

The Indian Government assumed responsibility for one of these alleged extrajudicial killings: on 22 November it court-martialled a soldier who had the previous day killed two Muslims and wounded five others when he fired

on a crowd near the Trincomalee clock-tower. The Sri Lanka Government has been investigating conflicting reports of another incident in which at least 25 Muslim civilians were shot dead in the eastern village of Ottamawadi on 2 December. The IPKF maintained that victims were killed in crossfire, but residents said villagers were indiscriminately killed after nine Indian soldiers had been killed in an LTTE ambush. To Amnesty International's knowledge, this is the only instance of a Sri Lankan Government investigation into IPKF activities. And in no instance, it seems, has an impartial body attempted to carry out investigations into these and other alleged IPKF killings.

WOMEN RAPED

There have also been an increasing number of allegations that lower ranking IPKF personnel had raped Tamil women. Several dozen Tamil women, some of whom needed hospital treatment, have testified on oath that they were raped by IPKF personnel, for example in Kondavil East in the north and in Sathurkodanan and Morakkadanchenai villages in eastern Sri Lanka. Several of these allegations have been investigated by the IPKF itself, although the Indian Government continued to deny any such charges. But in December 1987 a local magistrate reportedly found the IPKF responsible for seven cases of rape. In January 1988, moreover, four Indian soldiers were discharged and sentenced by an Indian court martial to one year's imprisonment for raping Tamil women.

Amnesty International also has been receiving reports of 'disappearances' of some Tamils taken into custody by the IPKF. AI has documented four such typical cases, all occurring in the northern Jaffna district in which young Tamil men reportedly arrested by the IPKF between November 1987 and February 1988 have 'disappeared'. The four persons concerned are: S.Varatharajah, aged 36, of Nallur arrested on 16 November 1987; M.Baburaj, aged 14, of Valvettiturai arrested on 16 November 1987; A.Thandauthapani, aged 40, of Vaddukoddai arrested on 8 January 1988; and N.Kirupakaran, aged 19, of Urelu arrested on 23 February 1988. In all these cases, the IPKF had confirmed the detention saying that they would be released after investigation. But the relatives have been unable to establish their fate or whereabouts, and it is feared that they might have died while in custody.

(A summarised review of 'Reports of Torture and Killings in Custody and Recent Allegations of 'Disappearances" by Amnesty International released on 21 June 1988 prepared by the HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (SCOT)

Amnesty's charges against IPKF baseless

From K. K. Katyal

NEW DELHI, June 20.

The Government today denied allegations of rape and brutality levelled by Amnesty International against the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka.

The charges were fabricated and unfair, a Foreign Office spokesman said when asked to comment on the Amnesty International report. 'Every specific complaint received from any source about the behaviour of IPKF troops has been investigated. Most of these charges have been found to be baseless. Wherever such charges have been proved, quick and salutary action has been taken against the guilty', he added.

The IPKF, according to him, operated in Sri Lanka with the utmost restraint, and used minimum force to avoid or reduce civilian casualties as far as possible. As a result, the IPKF took extraordinarily heavy casualties, a sacrifice which only a highly disciplined force was capable of.

'The Indian Army is a highly professional body of troops, and acts according to a professional code. There is no question of the Indian Army, or of the Government of India, tolerating any action by its soldiers which would violate the rights of the very people whom they have gone to Sri Lanka to protect', said the spokesman.

IPKF SOLDIER RELEASED

Lance Naik Dilip Bali Shagakar, a soldier belonging to the Indian Peace Keeping Force operating in Sri Lanka, was released by the LTTE on May 13.

The LTTE announced in Madras on May 11 that it was willing to release the Indian solider because of its 'love and respect for the people of India.' The 26-year-old Shagakar, of the Army Service Corps, was captured by the Tigers on March 6 at Nellukulam village in Vavuniya district during a clash between the IPKF and the LTTE.

A helicopter brought reporters from the airfield in Vavuniya town to the designated spot. Three tents had been pitched in the field for the use of the IPKF, the LTTE and the press corps. But there was hardly any use for them as the journalists fell to chatting with the IPKF officials.

Around 1.25 pm 'an advance party' of five Tiger representatives arrived at the pre-arranged location. They included, besides Castro, Dinesh, Inpan, Arjuna and Deepan. While Dinesh had a walkie-talkie, Inpan carried the red LTTE flag with the yellow Tiger emblem and Deepan and Arjuna were armed with AK-47 rifles. The IPKF officials offered them tea and biscuits, and there were discussions. After some time, Castro left for Sastrikoolankulam.

Around 2.05 pm, Shagakar came walking to the designated spot, accompanied by Castro, Visu and Nawaz of the LTTE. He was handed over to Col.P.S.Khanna of the IPKF. The journalists were given a couple of minutes to take photographs of Shagakar, dressed in a lungi and a white shirt. He carried a bag. The handing over was complete with Dinesh saying that the release marked the LTTE's 'love and respect for the people of India.'

T. S. Subramaniam

After the release of Lance Naik Dilip Bali Shagakar (in lungi), Dinesh of the LTTE shaking hands with an IPKF officer..... pointer of things to come?

THE TAMIL EELAM STRUGGLE IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

By Thirumalai Nathan

COMMENT

Strategic Implications

To view the Tamil national question as an internal issue in the island of Sri Lanka would be extremely myopic. The external impingements are too many. **Placed as we are on a sensitive sea route in the Indian Ocean, a sea route that has vast trade and strategic implications, in a seabed with potentially rich resources, in an area that is rapidly getting militarised, in a waterway that carries constant superpower naval movements, the Tamil Eelam struggle cannot be viewed anymore in isolation.** Our close physical proximity to India itself enmeshes us in that country's security concern; and India being a vast country surrounded by smaller nations, themselves increasingly alert to their own security interests and suspicious of every Big Power policy move, the Tamil question is fast becoming a focal and vital point of interest for the entire Indian Ocean region; and could indeed threaten to become a cockpit of international power intrigue. That is a danger one cannot be unaware of.

With Trincomalee, one of the finest natural harbours in the world and Admiral Mountbatten's main sea base in the anti-Japanese war, in the east, and with Katunayake, an international airport, in the west, the strategic vulnerability of Sri Lanka is accentuated. **The future of the Tamil people is therefore inextricably linked to the power-play in the region, and to that extent the political, economic, trade and military interests of not only the regional power, but even of the super-powers have a direct bearing on the final outcome of our struggle.**

US's Vested Interest

Although the present posturings by the Big Powers tend to underplay the value and significance of the Trincomalee harbour as a military base, it cannot be forgotten that as recently as mid-1986 there existed a draft agreement between the Sri Lankan and U.S governments, in respect of Trincomalee harbour. In fact, it is suggested that this was one of the major ingredients that contributed towards the Indian initiative in signing the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. **It has to be realised that U.S imperialism has a vested interest in the Indian Ocean region; has an eye on the potentially huge export and trade market in the area; has therefore a logical interest in preserving the freedom of the sea for its own navies; both commercial and military shipping; and in pursuance of all these objectives will want, without upsetting the present balance of power, an ultimate dominance in the region.**

Various visible preparatory moves in this direction have been already taken over the years. The U.S needs in the Gulf and West Asia are already met, through bases and facilities in Oman, Egypt, Somalia and Bahrain, and possibly through further facilities in Pakistan. The search for Air Force and Naval communication facilities in the Indian Ocean region is bound to be the next logical step in U.S. ambitions in the area. **The Voice of America station in Sri Lanka was the first intrusion.** Diego Garcia ceded to Britain and thereafter leased to the United States began as a communications facility, but is today enlarged into a major military base.

US Encirclement of India

It is also no secret that while the super-power presence in the Indian Ocean region is, in the absence of any direct conflict largely 'invisible', **a U.S. encirclement of India and the Indian Ocean region is being pursued with vigour, both by air and sea and undersea nuclear-powered submarines.** U.S. satellites are constantly monitoring, probing and recording all earth-based military installations in this part of the world. Backed up by the U.S. facilities in the Australian continent, both naval and air, and with Pakistani willingness to permit Karachi for use by the U.S. forces in an emergency, and with Diego Garcia a formidable base already, **it is obvious that Sri Lanka would have suited American interests admirably, in order to complete the triangle of U.S. encirclement, and become the pivotal centre and the strategic post of U.S. in the Indian Ocean, in the same way as Israel serves U.S. interests in the Middle East.**

US and British Policy

It would seem that the thrust of both U.S. and British policy would be to keep India perpetually on a state of self-defence by militarising the Indian neighbourhood, and in effect destabilising the whole region. As far as Sri Lanka was concerned, the island's history during these past ten years has been one of U.S. involvement, but by proxy - funding through international aid agencies and supply of arms and weapons through satellite countries like Israel, Pakistan and South Africa. In return, President Jayewardene's government was prepared to grant the powerful VOA base that could undermine the security interests of the entire South Asian region as well as exclusive operating rights in and around Trincomalee harbour including the use of tank farms through front companies. The rationale behind the U.S. and British designs was to weaken India's interests without seemingly appear-

YOU TOO INDIA?

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நடுநிசிப் பொழுதில்
பல முகங்கள் காணது போவதும்
விடிந்ததும் ஒருசில வீதியில் கிடப்பதும்
இன்னும் ஒருசில கடலில் மிதப்பதும்
எஞ்சிய மீதி
முகவரியின்றி தனித்து நிற்பதும்
ஆரம்பமான அன்றிலிருந்தே
இரவினை வெறுத்தோம்.

காலையே நீ வெற்றிகொள்
இரவின் கொடிய தனங்களும்
அந்நியக் கூச்சலும்
அழிந்துபோக
காலையே,
நீ இரவினை வெற்றிகொள்.







நானே.....!
நம்பிக்கையின்
கடைசித் துளியும் வடித்து
மரணத் தருகே.

சூழவும்
உடைபடும் கடைகளின் ஒலியும்,
வெறிக் கூச்சலும்,
வேற்று மொழியும்,
விண்ணுயர்ந்த தீச் சுவாலையும்.

ing to do so, and by giving no opportunity to India to interfere openly in that grand design. To that extent, the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement could be seen as a successful attempt on the part of India to checkmate U.S designs; and the Indian secret boast that it was a turning point in India's regional and international ambitions could be seen as justified. But the moral of all these is that **the Tamil Eelam question has to be resolved within this mesh of regional and super-power interests and their mutual clash of wills and antagonisms.**

Soviet Policy

The present Soviet policy in this region cannot be anything other than what it is today. **The Soviets would indeed have to ensure that the trade and shipping routes have to** be freed from U.S. control, the region safeguarded from U.S. hegemony; and towards this objective, will want to back all Indian initiatives in the region, while continuing to subscribe to the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty. In India, the major power in the region, she has an effective proxy, unlike the U.S. which has none. But this again has an unfortunate bearing on the Tamil Eelam question.

Indian Foreign Policy

Having achieved a formidable military strength, with the fourth largest army in the world, and a fast building up on naval strength, India will certainly want to hammer a foreign policy that would not only ensure its regional predominance but lift the country into an accepted status of a major power in the world. At the same time, as a founding father of the Non-aligned Movement, as a country with a history of opposition to colonialism and Western imperialism, as an opponent of racial discrimination and as a champion of oppressed peoples, India has to preserve her credibility in these areas, which credibility has brought her both respect and political benefits in the world comity of nations. While on the one hand forging a foreign policy that would ensure that the Indian Ocean region remains a zone of peace and that would insulate it from super-power presence, India would also like to project herself into a position where she would be accepted as a leader of the SAARC region, and as an umpire and mediator in problems arising within this region. **Although the basic thrust of Indian policy is to develop friendly links with neighbours in order to achieve this status, there have occurred many instances where that same policy had been handled with high-handedness - making the smaller neighbours to complain of an overbearing, Big Brotherly attitude, unethical dealings, postures of intimidation, underhand actions in the execution of policy, and show of military muscle. How India handled the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka and continues to handle it is one such example.**

Firstly, the Government of India exploited the Tamil freedom struggle in Sri Lanka to browbeat the Government of Sri Lanka. While extending support of various kinds including arms and training to Tamil militant groups, it brought pressure on the Jayewardene government. Thereafter it profited by the Sinhalese fear of an Indian invasion on behalf of the Tamils by selling out the interests of the Tamils in return for the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and the establishment of Indian hegemony over Sri Lanka. Having realised that objective the Indian policy makers were in a position to disregard the Tamil aspirations and their demand for power-sharing in their own country. Although President Jayewardene had to mortgage his country's sovereignty to India through the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, it is with the help of Indian military might that he is able to crush for the time being the Tamil Eelam struggle and the force that spearheads it - the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

US Blessings for the Accord

The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement received the blessings of the U.S. and British governments. If the U.S. government was prepared to give up its imperialist inroads into Sri Lanka as a result of the Agreement, it could have its own reasons for it:-

1. Since it recognised in the Agreement only a half-baked solution to the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka, the problem would continue to simmer; in consequence India will get bogged down with the problem for a foreseeable period of time.

2. The calculation that, in the long run, it would get its opportunity to intervene directly on behalf of either the Sinhalese or the Tamils.

3. To make India temporarily safe for its own vast market.

4. To make the vast market in India immediately safe for economic exploitation.

5. The belief that it could be still possible to negotiate for military facilities with the Jayewardene government by striking a deal with India; a hope that cannot be dismissed in the light of the recent visit of U.S. nuclear ships to Indian ports.

Since the Tamil freedom struggle involves among its external objectives, opposition to all forms of imperialism and neo-colonialism and the working towards a peace zone in the Indian Ocean, it is a distinct possibility that the U.S. government through its agencies could attempt to infiltrate some Tamil militant groups. Given the present situation where U.S. incursions into Sri Lanka have been temporarily eclipsed, but where Indian dominance over Sri Lanka has yet to become a fait accompli, it will serve Soviet interests as well to be seen bolstering the present situation.

After Disarming LTTE?

The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement has placed India in a position whereby she is called upon to underwrite the

Agreement as a guarantor. But although the foremost objective of the Agreement was to safeguard Indian interests in the region, finding a solution to the problems of the Tamils is another responsibility that India has undertaken. Since disarming of Tamil militants is a proviso in the Agreement, the Indian government has been engaging in a war with the Liberation Tigers in order to fulfil that objective. **But if once India succeeds in meeting that commitment under the Accord, and manages to crush Tamil resistance what rationale can India find; or, what excuse can she offer to enforce her will on the Sri Lanka government or keep her troops there in the event of the present Sri Lanka government or any succeeding government tearing up the Accord and ordering the Indian troops to withdraw ? Will she say that the Indian military presence will be required to ensure that the Tamils achieve their just demands ? What if it happens that the Tamils themselves declare that the oppressive presence of the Indian troops was no longer wanted by them ?**

Lebanon-type situation

In Tamil Nadu itself, there is popular resentment building up over the prolonged IPKF operations against their brethren in Tamil Eelam. The Centre is coming under severe criticism. It is only by putting a halt to the war against the Liberation Tigers and paving the way for the emergence of a Tamil homeland that India can restore its credibility as a champion of freedom struggles all over the world. **If the Indian Prime Minister keeps clinging to an Accord which is already proving self-destructive, for reasons of false personal prestige or for achieving objectives through the Accord which are inherently contradictory, he will be only paving the way for a Lebanon-type situation.**

India's Security Concern

It will be remembered that the General Officer Commanding of the IPKF, Major General Sardesh Pande himself declared that it was not necessary that India should have actual physical control of Trincomalee in order to safeguard the country's strategic interests. "We have better places in India from where we can protect our strategic interests" he said.

If Indian objectives are that her security interests in the region should be safeguarded, that U.S incursions should be prevented, that the policy of Non- Alignment should be maintained, well, these are aspirations that the people of Tamil Eelam will themselves endorse and support. That imperialist forces are at work in the Asian region is not a fact unknown to the vast majority of Tamils. But what do they do if India herself takes on the role of an assertive military power, and dons the mantle of imperialism to crush people's struggles and sit over smaller nations and aspiring small nations ? **While the smaller countries and the people in the region are prepared to recognise India's size, and strength, they certainly are not going to accommodate her Big Brotherly fixation. They will accept only the situation where there is equal security for all. Having lived through centuries of Western subjugation, and having emerged out of it into freedom, they cannot be expected to accept a new form of regional subjugation.**

India's Image

For a country that spearheaded the efforts of many Third World countries to extricate themselves from a process of bipolarisation and the tensions caused by the Cold War and in the process became a leader of the Non-Aligned assembly of nations, to involve itself in regional hegemonic desires and to suppress national freedom struggles, is an alarming prospect, and one that has already created warning bells in the entire SAARC region. **Doubts have arisen whether even those objectives that are sound and rational by themselves, such as the establishment of a Peace Zone and the founding of SAARC, are only devices that are meant to further India's hegemonic intentions. It is regrettable that Indian policy today has taken several regressive steps marking a departure from the image that this country enjoyed in the past. It would be foolish to ignore the process of history where all peoples hold it as a fundamental creed to oppose any attempts at overlordship, despotism. Liberation struggles are not new phenomena; they have the sanction and support of people themselves; and eventually it is the people's will that prevails.**

● Mankaanai near Valvettiturai in Jaffna District was searched by IPKF from 8.45 p.m. on 20.5.88 till 5.00 a.m. next day. Two youths in a house committed suicide to avoid arrest. The owner of house, Mrs. Kandasamy was arrested by IPKF. During the course of the same search, Mrs. Selvarani Sambasivam was injured by gunfire. Her husband who tried to remove her to hospital was assaulted by IPKF. Both husband and wife were removed to IPKF Camp at Udupiddy. Next morning, the husband was released in presence of the Assistant Government Agent of the area and the body of Mrs. Sambasivam was handed over to the husband.

● Mr. Kamalanathan, a teacher of St. John's College, Jaffna was arrested and detained by the IPKF. The Students and Teachers' Guild of St. John's threatened to take out a procession protesting against the arrest/detention. IPKF threatened to impose curfew if a procession was taken out. Later Mr. Kamalanathan was released after IPKF obtained statement that Kamalanathan was treated well. On being released Kamalanathan had to be taken to hospital as he could not even walk. Kamalanathan is still in hospital.

WHITE FLAG PROTEST

The call by Jaffna Municipal Commissioner, C.V.K.Sivagnanam, to fly white flags on June 15 as a demonstration to those who are presently engaged in armed hostilities has received widespread support in the north and east of Sri Lanka.

The main demands behind this white flag demonstration are: (a) an end to armed hostilities between the IPKF and the LTTE; (b) resumption of negotiations between the LTTE and India; and (c) restoration of peace.

In a statement issued, Mr.Sivagnanam said that the Tamil people have suffered enormously for a long time and they are yearning for peace and the whole country and the world should know this.

Mr.Sivagnanam said that the flying of the flag by the people would be a reminder to those who are presently engaged in hostilities to down arms and declare a ceasefire. It was not a 'hartal' or a protest action. It only meant peace and encouraging ways to achieve it. Transport, schools and work in government and private establishments would not be interrupted and would function normally. Shops would open. People would hoist white flags in their homes, on their vehicles and carry the flag wherever they moved, Mr.Sivagnanam added.

TIGERS BY THE TAIL

India's Quagmire In Sri Lanka

WILLIAM McGOWAN

COMMENT

Jaffna, Sri Lanka

From the rubble of the nearly 75,000 houses destroyed or damaged during its drive last October against Tamil Tiger militants, the Indian Peacekeeping Force has built a city of pillboxes and fortified bunkers inside this former rebel stronghold. Normalcy now prevails past the ends of machine guns bristling from sentry posts on every street corner. Yet the Indian troops deployed throughout northern and eastern Sri Lanka still find their quarry elusive. Given the opportunity, the Tigers can still paralyze civil administration and commercial life, kill political foes and collaborators and attack unprotected Sinhalese villages as well as Indian Army patrols before melting away uncaught.

Having given arms, training and sanctuary to Tamil separatists fighting the Sri Lankan military, India originally thought it could quickly tame them under the terms of last summer's Indo-Lankan Peace Accord. The accord was an attempt to resolve the longstanding conflict between the minority Tamils (18 percent of the population) and the majority Sinhalese Buddhists (74 percent of the country). The feud is rooted in the institutional discrimination Tamils say they have suffered since independence, in 1948, in education, employment, land settlement and language. But it dates further back, into colonial times and ancient antagonisms. Since 1983, when more than 1,000 Tamils were killed in Sinhalese pogroms, the nation had been in a state of civil war and de facto partition. Upwards of 7,000 civilians have perished.

India had supported the separatists because their cause was strong among 55 million ethnic brethren in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, and because the Western leanings of the Colombo government of President J.R. Jayewardene made it anxious. But when the trouble it was encouraging in Sri Lanka began to threaten India's own equilibrium, and Sri Lankan armed forces broke the struggle's long stalemate in a successful lunge against the militants in May 1987, India stepped in—at first with only a small force to back up what was intended to be primarily a diplomatic initiative. There was nominal peace for six weeks, but now, nearly a year after the signing of the accord in July 1987, the fighting continues; more civilians have been killed in the past year than in any previous year, most of them, ironically, by the Indian peacekeepers.

Any intervention into the miasma of Sri Lanka's ethnic troubles ran the risk of frustration. But India's presumptuous diplomacy and military miscalculations have turned its involvement into a daily $3 million quagmire for Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, with dark implications for his political future as well as for the domestic stability and international prestige of his country. Also on the line is the government of Jayewardene, co-signer of the accord, which has for months been under violent pressure from rabid Buddhist nationalists in the southern part of the island.

Delhi's first mistake was to overestimate its leverage on the two warring sides. The Indo-Lankan Peace Accord called for the rebels to lay down their arms in return for substantial political autonomy in their traditional areas and a guarantee that Sri Lankan armed forces—99 percent Sinhalese—would be confined to their barracks. Although the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or L.T.T.E., the dominant Tamil militant group, had gotten more than its fair share in the bargain, suspicions of the Colombo government built up over several decades were not easily dissipated. The language of the hastily prepared document left several substantive issues, like land colonization of Tamil areas, vague or unaddressed, and after provocation by Buddhist hard-liners within Jayewardene's own Cabinet, the Tigers resumed armed hostilities. At first the Indians did little to hold the Tigers back; in some cases, in fact, Indian soldiers from Tamil Nadu turned a blind eye while brethren Tamils burned Sinhalese out of their homes and shops. Before long, however, the Indians came down hard on their former charges, although for years they had warned Sri Lanka of the futility of a military solution.

The drive on the rebel capital of Jaffna was a military and intelligence debacle. The Indians basically dismissed the Tigers as low-caste youths who would never dare stand against the world's fourth-largest army—which after all had entered the conflict on their side. Having scoffed at Sri Lankan warnings, the Indians had little idea of Tiger manpower, firepower, intelligence and communications capabilities. Nor did they sense the fanatic motivation of the Tigers, symbolized by the cyanide capsule each cadre wears around his or her neck to swallow if captured. Most important, the Indians did not understand the lethal force of the Tigers' form of land-mine warfare—an innovation in guerrilla strategy. Losing face politically as casualties mounted daily, Delhi poured more troops into battle, often without proper rest, briefings, maps or equipment.

What should have taken the Indians three days took nearly three weeks, and during that time brutality against civilians—which India had originally intervened to stop—was ghastly. Here in Jaffna during the October drive, I saw random shelling of civilian areas and evidence that Indians had strafed civilians from helicopters and also shot them point-blank as they hid in their own homes for safety. In direct violation of the Geneva Accords, top Indian officers ordered the storming of the Jaffna Hospital, killing scores of doctors, nurses and patients. The Indians banned foreign journalists and the International Red Cross, making it difficult to verify or dismiss consistent reports of rape and other atrocities committed by Indian troops. Likewise, reports that the Tigers had used civilians as human shields.

William McGowan is completing a book on the war in Sri Lanka, to be published next year by Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Utter bedlam reigned during the battle as a half-million panic-stricken refugees sought safety and the Tigers continued to fight—killing many more Indians than military authorities admitted—before pulling out of Jaffna still largely intact as a fighting force. When it was over, with the peacekeepers claiming victory, there was "a city of corpses and rotting flesh," as one Indian brigadier general put it, with some estimates of civilian casualties running as high as 3,000. There was also a deep bitterness among the Tamil populace toward what had effectively become an army of occupation. Conservative estimates say India has 50,000 troops in Sri Lanka, but if higher figures given by Indian analysts and journalists are accurate, it may have up to 100,000 there—almost as many as the Russians had in Afghanistan.

Whenever they are asked about the current situation, Indian troops in the field, cued by public relations officers, no doubt, smile broadly and answer "picnic"—often the only English word they know. But a picnic it decidedly is not. Despite their overwhelming numbers, Indian forces are musclebound, their bureaucratically minded officers vulnerable to the Tigers' hit-and-run tactics; convoys still leave the main roads with trepidation. The Tigers continue to train new, ever younger cadres and say that even with weapons deliveries interdicted, they can hold out for five years more with the matériel that they currently have hidden. The Indians have been unable to protect informers or stop the Tigers from mounting boycotts, general strikes and shutdowns of important administrative services.

Most important, the same pattern of terror from previous years continues under the Indians' very noses. Armed bands of Tamils, Sinhalese and Moslems still massacre civilians of other groups. Sri Lankan police have broken out of their barracks to retaliate against Tamil civilians. In other cases, the Tigers have rampaged through Sinhalese settlements with impunity, intimidating government-funded colonizers. The Indian presence has made it worse for the Moslems, an important community in the Eastern Province's war of demographics. The rise of Islamic militias has been the result, with indications of Iranian and Libyan financial support, poisoning the ethnic brew even further.

Support for the Tigers among the Tamils had been waning until the harshness of the Indian occupation. Indian commanders talk of winning hearts and minds, but detentions of suspected militants and sympathizers are arbitrary, beatings are standard and the ethnic and caste complexion of the soldiers clashes with that of the population, leading to tension. The officer corps may be Sandhurst material, but the largely illiterate rank and file have treated civilians badly and are undisciplined. The simple presence of so many gunbearers who can't speak their language has the population on the edge of nervous breakdown and wishing, ironically, for the return of Sri Lankan troops, who had a harrowing record of human rights offenses.

The upshot is that despite their war-weariness and the hardship brought about by the Tigers' rejection of the peace accord, a majority of the Tamil population supports the guerrillas. And without the backing of the civilians, the Indians can do very little. The chemistry is by no means unalloyed. Tamils may fear the Tigers' authoritarianism and question their lower-caste background and their political inexperience, yet they are recognized as a historically necessary force asserting long-denied rights for national identity and liberation. Besides, there is simply no alternative moderate group.

In fact, the Indians may also feel that the Tigers are the only legitimate force; there are many indications that the military drive against them is more of a bid to discipline than to liquidate. The Indians have seemed reluctant to go for the Tigers' jugular: For example, reporters seeking interviews have sometimes had to wait for the militants to finish cricket games within half a mile of major Indian Army encampments, the Tigers keeping their AK-47s at the ready in bat bags. Such apparent laxity signals a fundamental contradiction in Indian policy, for as much as the Indians need to neutralize the Tigers militarily, they also need to preserve them politically, a balancing act requiring great delicacy and organization, which often elude them. For the accord to work, the Indians need some kind of guarantee of compliance from the increasingly disgruntled Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists in the south, which will be hard to secure without the prospect of a reactivated Tiger threat as leverage.

Gandhi's underestimation of resentment in the south and the effect that has on Jayewardene's ability to hold up his end of the bargain may prove the real undoing of the peace accord. The southern heartland, which prides itself as the land Buddha chose to preserve his doctrine of nonviolence and compassion, has become almost ungovernable under the emotional strains of the Indian intervention. Instead of seeing the accord as an opportunity to build bridges of trust between two warring communities, Sinhalese generally see the Indian presence on their soil as a violation of national

sovereignty as well as a threat to the existence of Buddhism, which they claim to practice in its most pristine form and to protect as part of their mythic charter. The Indian presence has been popularly depicted as a reincarnation of invasions from southern India that wiped out Sinhalese kingdoms centuries ago. Most of the Buddhist majority saw President Jayewardene's acceptance of India's "help"—Gandhi would have invaded otherwise—not as a shrewd calculation of geopolitical realities but as a selling out of national interests.

Broad popular resentment of the accord sparked other latent sources of disaffection against the ruling United National Party (U.N.P.) of J.R. (as the President is popularly known). Its Western-style economic policies, which have greatly widened the gap between rich and poor and led to official corruption on a vast scale, were attacked by the Sinhalese populace as inimical to Buddhist values. Also attacked were the regime's increasingly antidemocratic tendencies: the denial of elections for the past ten years, manipulation of parliamentary procedure and the official sanction given to political thuggery. The signing of the peace accord without popular ratification was taken as the final step in J.R.'s subversion of the democratic traditions that have been cherished since independence, even if observed more in form than in substance. The widespread feeling was that the old fox J.R. had tricked the young Mr. Gandhi into bailing him out in the north so he could better defend himself in the south, where his base of support had crumbled and a rebellion was only a matter of time.

A banned ultranationalistic political party called the People's Liberation Front (J.V.P.) has capitalized on the wave of discontent, focusing anger against the Indo-Lankan Peace Accord. Since September it has conducted a campaign of political killings and subversion that has taken the lives of almost 300 ruling-party officials, nearly brought the simple exercise of civil administration to a collapse and fed worry that the Sinhalese will repudiate their obligations toward India and the Tamils. In areas where the J.V.P. is strongest, police are reluctant to leave their stations after dark, and the public cowers behind shuttered doors. Where Buddha supposedly saw a flourishing *dharma*, the people see assassinations and assault. Most members of Parliament belonging to the U.N.P. are under threat of death and shun their home districts for the security of the capital. Provincial Council elections, which are crucial to the momentum of the peace process, were called off in over half the country due to the threat of violence. Politically moderate intellectuals who have backed the peace accord have been branded traitors to the motherland by the J.V.P. It is also likely that the J.V.P. has infiltrated cadres into the armed forces, raising the specter of unreliability and coup.

The J.V.P. taps into latent Sinhalese feelings of their special destiny, advancing a program that blends masochistic nationalism, apocalyptic rhetoric and the same chauvinistic cultural revivalism that also polarized Sinhalese-Tamil relations in the 1950s. Highly xenophobic, racist and romantic, the J.V.P. calls for a return to "indigenous" thought, values and economic development that predate European colonialism and contemporary Western influence.

The J.V.P. thrives in the economically depressed far south of the island. Most of its members—their numbers still unknown—are lower-caste youths in the universities or jobless graduates with few prospects in an economy still skewed to favor high-caste English-speakers, despite decades of lip service by successive governments to the "sons of the soil." There are also widening ranks of militant Buddhist monks in the party, who see their clerical role in political rather than spiritual terms and have defied superiors by calling for armed resistance in a Buddhist holy war. "We must weaponize," ranted one of them, clad in a brilliant saffron cloth, as a full moon bathed the sentinel face of a nearby stone Buddha. "We must weaponize to kill the traitor J.R. Jayewardene."

The armed subversion of the J.V.P. has justified the government's drift to authoritarianism in the name of preserving the only "five-star democracy" in Asia. The ruling party has armed a private militia, at least 20,000 strong, many of them recently paroled criminals. Fifty thousand troops hitherto fighting Tamil guerrillas have been redeployed in the south to quell the insurgents and their sympathizers. And the government is operating death squads, which are targeting J.V.P. suspects as well as legal political activists, opposition parties claim. Many innocents have been falsely accused and summarily punished in the bid to crush the J.V.P.—the very pattern that has fed militancy in the north among Tamils over the past five years. Police have been personally indemnified against civil actions, extending a carte blanche for abuse, and international human rights groups have been blocked from investigating.

The recent announcement of an agreement between the government and the J.V.P. to end the insurrection in return for the lifting of proscription was a promising sign—until it was discovered that the Minister of National Defense had been negotiating with hoaxers. But bringing the J.V.P. into the mainstream means little when the mainstream itself—including many of J.R.'s inner circle—mistrusts the accord. Parliamentary ratification of the peace agreements, despite a U.N.P. majority, could only be secured by strongarm methods. Having whipped up his hard-liners for years, even as he tried to negotiate a peace, J.R. found it very hard to contain them. Many right-wingers preferred an outright Indian invasion so they could reap windfalls of international sympathy for once.

Sinhalese government bureaucrats have shown their true colors by dragging their feet on the provisions of the accord that require them to grant equal rights to the Tamils. For example, very few of the relief supplies and funds that Western donors rushed to the country have made their way from government ministries in Colombo to war-ravaged Jaffna as was intended. Priority has been given to the plight of Sinhalese refugees instead, even though Tamils in need outnumber them tenfold. The government also refuses to discontinue its West Bank-style settlement program in the crucial Eastern Province, and has erected bureaucratic barriers to the repatriation of Tamil refugees who fled to India—100,000 of them. On a grimmer note, virtually none of the police or soldiers involved in any of the atrocities since India

June 25, 1988

stepped in have been disciplined, sending ominous signal that the security of Tamils is still not a state concern.

In essence, the Indian presence has not, as intended, provided an umbrella under which Tamils and Sinhalese can seek reconciliation. Instead it has made the scheming more byzantine and covert, with both sides jockeying around India for position. Sinhalese bloody-mindedness has made matters worse. As a recently returned Sri Lankan expatriate scholar said, "There is simply no sense of repentance on the part of the Sinhalese, no sense that they were in the wrong for many years and are now suffering for it, no sense that they brought the very intervention they feared on themselves. The reaction is just the opposite. They say they weren't tough enough. It's a very spooky psychology." Only now coming to recognize the extent of the alienation that persists between the two communities, all that Indian diplomats can say is, "Nation-building takes time."

The Indians are in a double bind. Even if they tame the Tigers, there is very little chance for lasting peace unless the Sinhalese south gives up deep-seated anxieties and accepts the legitimacy of Tamil autonomy without backsliding. Given the current mood in the south, that is unlikely to happen. Should antigovernment pressure build to a more dangerous level, or should the 82-year-old President die, the situation may become uncontrollable for the peacekeepers. The very point of India's involvement in Sri Lanka was to stabilize its own southern flank, but any direct movement of troops into the Sinhalese south could prompt a nationalistic backlash, uniting factions that are now hostile to each other. The ensuing bloodbath could further destabilize the situation and prompt a greater Indian intervention, which would be politically dangerous for Rajiv Gandhi, who already faces widespread public opposition over what many consider India's Vietnam.

Gandhi's Sri Lanka misadventure has emboldened his opponents. The unpopularity of the initiative among the 55 million Tamils in Tamil Nadu could hand his Congress Party an ill-affordable defeat in critical upcoming state elections. Bogged down by a few thousand guerrillas, the reputation of the Indian Army has been sullied under the watchful eyes of regional rivals Pakistan and China, as well as of armed separatists inside India. And its clumsy handling of ethnic factionalism bodes ill for India's role in refereeing power sharing in post-Soviet Afghanistan.

The situation in Sri Lanka may in fact have grown so poisonous that a cathartic bloodletting is inevitable. Militants on both sides—backed up by significant bodies of popular opinion—embrace the idea of a nationalistic *Götterdämmerung* much more readily than that of compromise. The psychological breach between the two communities may be much too profound for ready reconciliation, no matter what agreements are signed and what platitudes mouthed. Even if the flames are banked for a while, the fuel will ignite again. As the Indians navigating them know only too well, the currents on both sides of Sri Lanka's ethnic divide are vicious. Far from being the light at the end of the tunnel, India's involvement in Sri Lanka may well prove to be just a sidestep in a steady descent into darkness. □

CIVILIANS □ KILLED

K. Rathinam 8.6.88

Krishnanandamoorthy 24.6.88

Maria 3.7.88

Tharmarasa 17.6.88

Malathi 24.6.88

G. Vigneswari 3.7.88

S. Thedchanamoorthy 18.6.88

V. Nataraja 24.6.88

Malarvizhi 9.7.88

Selvaratnam 22.6.88

Johnson 28.6.88

N. Nithyanandan 9.7.88

P.A. Lincoln 23.6.88

S. Kaladeepan 28.6.88

K. Eswaran 10.7.88

Yasodharan 23.6.88

Krishnalingam 29.6.88

Ranjnidevi 10.7.88

CONFRONTATION

1

Colombo, June 1 (UNI): Two Indian soldiers and six Liberation Tigers (LTTE) men were wounded and more than 100 militants apprehended during IPKF operations in Sri Lanka's north and east during the last 24 hours, the Indian High Commission said today.

The two IPKF personnel were wounded in an exchange of fire with LTTE at a place north of Oddusuddan in the northern Vavuniya sector, where the 100 militants were captured and five LTTE men wounded, a High Commission official said.

The official said another LTTE member was shot at and injured by the IPKF at Kiran, in the eastern Batticaloa sector, while five others were apprehended at Batticaloa and Amparai.

A LTTE cadre Rajhavan came under IPKF sniping and died in Karuvelankandal at Mullaithivu.

2

Salam, a LTTE fighter consumed cyanide in an encounter with IPKF at Vembady, Valvettithurai. The IPKF along with the EPRLF boys came to Nallur in search of LTTE supporters and shot dead Senthanar, a businessman and his sister Bhagyam.

3

Six militants killed: At least six Tamil militants were killed and one committed suicide in the last 36 hours in the Eastern and Northern provinces as the IPKF continued operations against the rebels.

Official sources here said two IPKF personnel were also killed during the operations. The national news agency Lankapuvath, quoting official sources, said three LTTE militants were killed in two separate incidents in Oddusudden on Thursday. — PTI

4

Two LTTE leaders swallow cyanide: Two leaders of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) committed suicide by swallowing cyanide capsules and three others were taken into custody during IPKF operations in eastern Batticaola town during the last 24 hours, informed sources in Batticaola said today.

Magistrate shot dead: In the northern Vavuniya town, a local magistrate, Mr. R. Villavarajah, was shot dead by unidentified men at his house this morning, sources in Vavuniya said.

In Triyai at Trincomalee, some IPKF soldiers were killed by the LTTE landmine attacks. Many wounded.

6

COLOMBO, June 6.

Two Tamil militants gunned down a Roman Catholic priest in eastern Sri Lanka today in what appeared to be part of a feud between rival Tamil groups, residents and police said.

The gunmen, believed to be belonging to the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), shot Father Chandra Fernando, 46, killing him instantly in his parish house in Batticaloa town. No one has claimed responsibility for the killing observers said.

According to the residents, the victim had ignored TELO warnings to resign from the Citizens' Committee and keep away from the LTTE.—AFP

PTI reports:

According to Indian High Commission sources, the IPKF had apprehended 10 LTTE militants in the Jaffna sector and seven in Batticaloa sector, while two militants were wounded in an exchange of fire with the IPKF north-east of Oddusuddan in the Vavuniya sector.

Tamil civilians killed: Four Tamil civilians alleged to be traitors were killed by militants early on Sunday, according to the military said.

Officials of the Joint Operations Command said the authorities found the four victims near the bus in the northern Port City of Velvettiturai.

In Paranthan, Kilinochi Dt, a LTTE cadre Bhuvanesh was rounded up by ENDLF, and he consumed cyanide.

7

IPKF jawan killed: Hours before the pullout, an IPKF jawan was killed when a patrol jeep was mined by militants some 10 km south of Trincomalee. Four other soldiers were injured.

A spokesperson for the Indian High Commissioner said two IPKF men were killed when LTTE men fired at them at Alampil.

In Trincomalee dt. at Muthur 3 IPKF men were killed by the landmine attack by LTTE and in Kutchaveli 2 more soldiers died. Many wounded. In Batticoloa also, 7 IPKF soldiers ran into the landmines set by LTTE and were killed.

8

Trapped in a IPKF search and destroy mission, a LTTE cadre Thambu took cyanide at Puttur. As Thambu is so popular with them, the Puttur people mourned two days with blackflags. At Amparai in an ambush by LTTE, a Sri Lankan soldier was killed and many injured.

9

Punnalaikadduvan village at Jaffna was encircled in a search and destroyed mission by the IPKF. As left with no choice, the LTTE cadres Vinod and Kaliyugan consumed cyanide.

Indian army has ordered the closure of yet another Tamil daily "Nam Nadu". It is relevant to note that this publication had been reporting the details of harassment and atrocities, the people of Jaffna were being subjected to at the hands of IPKF. This paper was published by the citizens of Jaffna, and the closure would serve the Indian Government to keep the outside world in complete ignorance of the excesses committed by its forces against the Tamils. It should be remembered that the IPKF completely demolished two popular dailies "Eelamurasu" and "Murasoli" at the beginning of their military campaign in Jaffna.

IPKF MAJOR CAUGHT WITH GOLD !

A Major of the IPKF in Sri Lanka arriving on leave at Chandigarh airport in Punjab was nabbed by police. He was found to be carrying 100 sovereigns of gold in broken pieces of jewellery. His explanation was that he bought the jewellery. Police believe he snatched it from Sri Lankan Tamils. The Major had earlier flown from Lanka via Madras.

TEACHERS KIDNAPPED BY IPKF

Two teachers belonging to St.John's College were kidnapped by the IPKF on 17th May. The IPKF entered the college and forcibly removed the teachers Kamalanathan and Alphonsus and it is believed that they were taken to the Kankesanturai IPKF camp. Kamalanathan was later admitted to the Jaffna Hospital with severe injuries where his condition is said to be critical. The plight of Alphonsus is still not known.

DAMAGE TO JAFFNA UNIVERSITY QUANTIFIED

The damage to the University of Jaffna since the IPKF offensive has been estimated at Rs.52 million, the Vice-Chancellor of the University, Prof.S.Vithyananthan, confirmed in a media interview.

10

COLOMBO, June 10.

Two Sri Lankan policemen held captive in a LTTE camp in Batticaloa in east Sri Lanka escaped after killing their three captors, official sources here said today.

They said the policemen, held in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam camp for months, took advantage of an IPKF operation in the area on Saturday night and managed to escape.

They reached a Sri Lankan Army detachment yesterday, national news agency Lankapuvath said quoting official sources. The two told officers of the Army unit that there were about 60 militants in the camp situated in Pulipanjakal.

About 50 militants had gone into hiding following the Indian Peace Keeping Force operation leaving only a few guards at the camp. The policemen managed to grab their guns and fled after killing them, official sources said.

11

Colombo June 11: Five militants and two civilians were reportedly killed in separate incidents in the north and east of the island in the last 24 hours, according to security sources.

The body of a PLOT member was found in Batticaloa town on Saturday morning, allegdly killed by EPRLF member Sivasambo Sivakanth.

According to Indian High Commission sources, in an IPKF search operation in Jaffna two militants were killed and an Indian soldier was wounded.

Military sources also reported that a fibre glass dingy with 11 on board was taken into custody by Sri Lanka naval foroces two miles north-east off Mannar. The men includes six Indians, four Tamils and one Sinhalese.

Civilians killed: Official sources said, a civilian was shot dead by some unidentified persons in Kokuvil in Jaffna and another beheaded body was found in Kamparamalai also in the Jaffna sector on Friday.Liberation Tigers militants were suspected of being responsible for both the killings.

Cops kill abductors, escape: Two Sri Lankan policemen, kidnapped by the LTTE in Vallaichenai in the Batticaloa disstrict eight months ago, killed their captors and escaped on Wednesday night, according to police sources.

12

Express News Service

Colombo, June 12: Indian High Commission sources in Colombo today denied a Reuter report in the Colombo media that seven Indian soldiers were killed in a landmine explosion last Tuesday in Batticaloa.

The report had said the jeep in which the Indian soldiers were travelling was blown up with the soldiers; the incident occured at Panich Ankerni in Batticaloa district.

The LTTE statement to the news agency had also claimed that there were 1,30,000 Indian troops deployed in the north and east of the island.

13

Many IPKF soldiers were caught in the landmines set by LTTE in Samangulam, Tricomalee casualties not known. In a Grenade charge by LTTE on the checkpost of IPKF at Visuvamadu, a soldier was killed and one escaped with wounds.

LTTE cadres Paramanathan and Illango escaped from two various camps of IPKF at Vatakatchi and Navalkuli.

17

Meanwhile *The Sun* reported today that three civilians were injured in a crossfire between the IPKF and LTTE cadres in Urani in the Batticaloa district on Wednesday.

The report said that an IPKF jeep had been fired at and the IPKF had returned the fire in which the civilians were injured.

An intensified search operation in Batticaloa begun on Tuesday is said to be continuing. Indian sources reported a number of apprehensions and the killing of LTTE militant Arulapan and the injuring of another LTTE militant.

According to an unconfirmed LTTE source in Batticaloa 10 LTTE cadres taken into custody had taken cyanide during the current operation.

In a landmine blast the IPKF lost nine of their soldiers. Consequently they fired mortar shells at civilian colony at 3rd post. 3 people were killed and sveral wounded.

18

Colombo, June 18 (UNI): One Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) jawan was killed and another jawan and two civilians were seriously wounded when a civilian truck in which they were travelling ran into a landmine, planted by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), near Murukandy in Sri Lanka's North-

ern Killinochchi district yesterday, security sources said today.

Meanwhile, the office of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), in Northern, Vavuniya town was bombed by unidentified men last night, they said.

The IPKF encircled the villages Moothur, Sambur, Kaddaiparichan, Kiliveddi, Mallikaithivu, Manalsenai, L.V. 3 colony, all in Trincomalee dt., arrested more than 500 people and took them to their camp. They were lined up in the sun for the whole day and beaten up severely to tell he whereabouts of the LTTE.

20

MADRAS, June 20.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force apprehended a large number of hardcore Tamil militants on June 19 in Sri Lanka.

In Trincomalee district, a confirmed LTTE leader, Vijaya Raja, was nabbed in Toppur with a large amount of foreign currencies, including 19,000 francs, $925 and Rs. 33,150 collected as taxes, according to a Defence Ministry press release here.

In Batticaloa district, where the IPKF operations were particularly successful, Chinnathampy alias Raja, Nagaraja alias Kuttum and Ganesh Murthy were trapped at Vantaramulai. Sunder, an LTTE hardcore member, was killed, while Tyagu, Rajendran alias Nimal and Ramanathan alias Sinnakamal were captured. A number of other suspects had also been rounded up and were being questioned.

21

Six IPKF men hurt: Six IPKF personnel and six militants were wounded in two separate incidents in Sri Lanka's north and east as the IPKF launched a fresh operation to disarm the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). — UNI, PTI

23

COLOMBO, June 23.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) killed the Batticaloa leader of the LTTE, Arasan, and his deputy, Easwaran, in a gun battle in Eastern Sri Lanka today, officials said.

The Indian High Commission here confirmed the report, but said it had no details. Officials in the area contacted by telephone said soldiers seized two AK-47 assault rifles from the two LTTE men. Residents said the incident was the first face-to-face confrontation between troops and Tamil tigers in Batticaloa in recent months.

Indian soldiers launched a major search operation codenamed "checkmate" on Monday to hunt remaining the LTTE rebels in the island's troubled North and East, officials said.

25

MADRAS, June 25.

The Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) has launched several operations in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka, following complaints that the LTTE was trying to extort money from the local people.

A Defence Ministry press release here said that in Jaffna Peninsula three militants attempting to extort money were apprehended. In Mannar district eight militants, including Suji, Jose and Ceethan were rounded up and Rs.40,000 was found in their possession.

A number of cases of the LTTE forcibly recruiting school boys had been reported to the IPKF by the parents and the IPKF had assisted in securing these students to their parents.

Instances of the LTTE indulging in the killing of civilians in Vadamarachi area to terrorise locals as the civilians were not forthcoming to give money had been reported and LTTE intercepts have also acknowledged that 15 persons were killed.

The press release said that the current operations were highly successful and the IPKF had located a large group of militants in Alampil jungles in Vavuniya sector. In an operation to apprehend them more than 20 militants were killed and the IPKF suffered two casualties, including one officer.

In the Vishwamadu forest and the area around Pudukudiiruppu the militants who were in the process of setting up a camp were attacked and the camp was struck and destroyed. In Trincomalee district the IPKF was carrying out extensive operations in Nilaveli, Irakkandi and Sampaltivu and had apprehended a number of militants. In the Batticaloa sector eight militants were apprehended and in Tunukkai in Vavuniya sector the IPKF had killed 15 militants. The Operation Checkmate was continuing and the entire coastline from Point Pedro to Trincomalee remained sealed.

In Kumulamunai area, Mullaithivu the LTTE camp was under attack by IPKF helicopters (M-I-24). In the encounter one IPKF colonel was killed. No losses to the LTTE.

27

Seven IPKF soldiers were shot dead in an encounter with LTTE in Chettikulam, Vavuniya. 8 escaped with wounds.

28

COLOMBO, June 28.

At least 16 persons, including seven Indian soldiers, have died in fresh violence in Sri Lanka, officials said here on Tuesday.

Fighters of the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on Monday blew up an Indian truck killing four soldiers and wounding three in northern Cheddikulam village, the Indian High Commission here said.

Five soldiers were reported missing after the blast, a High Commission spokeswoman said, adding that a search for them had been launched.

The LTTE guerillas had also set off a powerful bomb in the northeastern port town of Trincomalee on Tuesday, the source said.

Six persons, including two women and three Sri Lankan policemen were wounded, the source said.

'VIRAT' AND 'CHECKMATE'

23 May, 1988 - 6,000 Indian troops converged on Alampil and surrounding villages of Semmalai, Nedunkerni, Kumulamunai, Mulliyavalai and Andankulam and attacked the LTTE bases in the jungles. Some residents fled from these areas and others were prevented from fleeing. **A convoy of 265 vehicles carrying reinforcements** were seen moving from Vavuniya towards Mullaitivu as the fighting progresses and soldiers are air-dropped from helicopters at Alampil, Semmalai, Kumulamunai, Tanniyuttu, Mulliyavalai, Murippu, Andankulam and Muthaiyankaddu.

24 May - Civilians from Puthukkudiyiruppu fled the strife-torn area towards Kilinochchi and residents from Alampil and Kumulamunai moved to Vavuniya to escape the hardship of continuous curfew and danger to their lives. More troops were brought into Vanni area and fierce fighting continued.

25 May - More than 15,000 troops were deployed over the entire Vanni area and search operations were carried out. During the search operation, troops harassed, humiliated and tortured the civilians and robbed them of their belongings. More than 100 civilians were arrested and detained. Petrol and diesel oil, from 30 bowsers brought in by troops, were sprayed over selected areas and set them alight. Parts of jungle were ablaze.

26 May - 4 Indian helicopter gunships strafed the area and several people were injured. Some were killed.

27 May - Indian troops stopped movement of people and effectively blocked information going out of the operation zone. Civilians were ordered to stay indoors.

28 May - Troops launched sporadic attacks on LTTE bases in the jungles. Civilians continued to stay indoors and were prevented from moving.

29 May - Search operations continued in Vanni area and many more were arrested, detained and tortured.

30 May - Four young girls were taken and raped by Indian soldiers at Muthaiyankaddu in the Mullaitivu district.

31 May - LTTE announced that they were abandoning one of their bases in the Mullaitivu perimeter. Fighting continued, and civilians were kept indoors.

1 June - Indian Military authorities confirmed that about 15,000 troops were deployed in the region and they were mounting a major offensive on LTTE.

2 June - All hospitals, schools, government offices, shops and markets remained closed in the Vanni area. Fighting continued and civilians were threatened not to leave their houses.

3 to 12 June- Fighting was reported in the villages of Alampil, Kumulamunai, Puthukkudiyiruppu, Kovil Puliyankulam, Nedunkerny, Oddisuddan and Andankulam. One civilian escaped from Alampil and reported that people were undergoing untold hardships without food and medical supplies; those who ventured out had been shot by the military, several women were raped and a few committed suicide, young men were disappearing every day and parents did not know what to do. One LTTE member Paramanathan escaped from Indian army camp at Vaddakkachchi in the Kilinochchi district.

13 to 15 June - Indian troops set up road blocks at Visvamadu in the Mullaitivu district. LTTE guerrillas launched a grenade attack on two soldiers at the road block. People from Mullaitivu defied military orders and staged protest campaign (wearing black badges) for three days against the Indian offensive on the LTTE and the Walioya Sinhala Colonisation Scheme in Mullaitivu district and called for the release of all political prisoners.

16 June - Indian troops set up more than 25 sentry posts between Kodikamam and Chavakachcheri, a distance of 5 miles apart, and people travelling between these two towns were harassed and humiliated. In Vavuniya 12 detainees were released by the Indian troops and more than 100 kept back in detention.

17 June - New weapons were used by Indian troops to attack the LTTE in Mullaitivu district. 9 Indian soldiers died in a landmine attack by LTTE when they were on their way to Skanthapuram from Kilinochchi on a search-and-destroy mission.

18 June - Tamil Welfare Societies of Vavuniya district held a mass demonstration demanding the Indian government to negotiate with the LTTE and to stop all colonisation efforts by the Sri Lankan government.

19 June - Fighting continued in Mullaitivu district. **Young women were taken naked along the streets to the army camps. Various parts of their bodies were subjected to 'cigarette burn' by the Indian soldiers.**

20 to 22 June - Intensive search operations were carried out throughout Vanni area by Indian troops and almost every male was taken to army camps.

23 June - Indian troops launched military operations code-named "Operation Checkmate" throughout the Northern and Eastern provinces. A massive aerial attack was launched in Mullaitivu district by the Indian military. Indian planes and military helicopters bombed and strafed the residential areas of Alampil, Naayaaru, Semmalai and Kumulamunai in the Mullaitivu district. Indian forces were reported to have used napalm and chemical bombs and 250-kilo bombs in the aerial attacks. Hundreds of houses, schools and government buildings were damaged. Civilian casualties feared high but no accurate figures were available.

24 June - More than 1000 people went on hunger strike from the villages of Thanneeroottu, Kumulamunai, Kallappaadu, Vattakandal and Mulliyavalai against the Indian military atrocities and demanded the Indian government to announce a ceasefire and to start negotiations with the LTTE.

25 June - Four Indian military helicopters 'MI.24' bombed and strafed an LTTE camp at Kumulamunai in Mullaitivu. Fierce fighting reported between LTTE and Indian troops. One Indian Colonel aboard a helicopter was killed. More than 1,000 Indian troops from Kilinochchi and Murukandy army camps surrounded the Kilinochchi area and carried out search-and-destroy operations. Several civilians were killed and injured, but details not available. Indian troops opened up two new camps at Akkaraayankulam and the Irrigation department building at Vannerikulam.

27 June - Seven Indian soldiers died and their weapons captured in an ambush by LTTE at Puliyankulam in Vavuniya district when the soldiers were on their way to Puliyankulam on a search-and-destroy mission.

28 June, 1988 - Indian troops surrounded the villages of Skanthapuram. Konavil and Anaivilunthan, and assaulted villagers and some were tortured. Many sustained injuries and were admitted to Kilinochchi hospital.

'Checkmate' puts LTTE under pressure

From Thomas Abraham

COLOMBO, June 26.

The current Indian Peace-Keeping Force operations in the Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka, codenamed "Checkmate," has sharply reduced the LTTE's effectiveness as a fighting force. The organisation could be on its last legs militarily, according to IPKF sources.

The assessment is confirmed by sources close to the LTTE who say their cadres have been cut off from their sources of supply, and are under intense military pressure.

"Operation Checkmate" has been described as the most intense operation conducted by the IPKF since the fight to gain control of Jaffna peninsula late last year. It is a culmination of the process which began with operations Virat and Trishul in March and April.

The earlier operations pushed the militants away from towns and built-up areas into the jungles around Vavuniya, Killinochi and Mullaitivu. The IPKF has now cast a wide dragnet, in an area bounded by Talaimannar in the West, Killinochi in the North and Vavuniya and Mullaitivu in the South. The IPKF sources said with the move away from built-up areas, the IPKF was able to use its firepower more freely. "The earlier operations winkled out the LTTE cadres from built-up areas into the jungles. Now we can operate with less civilian casualties," the IPKF source said. Mortars are being used, along with machine guns and occasionally helicopter gunships.

"The fighting is now extremely intense, but you don't hear much about it because there are no civilians involved," said an IPKF source.

A focus of the operations is to ferret out LTTE cadres from their strongholds in the Northern part of Trincomalee, around Verungal, north of Batticaloa, and around Akkaraipattu in Amparai. Lt. Gen. A. S. Kalkat, the General Officer Commanding of the IPKF Land Forces, has established a forward headquarters in Trincomalee and is supervising the operations.

Big setback: The sources said the recent operations at Alampai, where a major LTTE command centre was captured, was a big setback to the organisation. The IPKF has been trying to weaken the LTTE by denying its cadres access to bases and sources of supply and keeping them on the run. The Alampil operation, though small in terms of the amount of men and material captured, is regarded as having been extremely successful as it has denied the LTTE access to an important supply point and command centre. Wireless intercepts indicated that the LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabhakaran, had directed the fighting.

When asked to sum up the effect of IPKF operations since last March, IPKF sources say that the main change has been that the LTTE is no longer capable of offering organised military resistance. Their chain of command has been shattered, their supply lines broken and they can now only operate in isolated groups of two and three people. "Their movements have been restricted and their cadres immobilised," the sources said.

They felt that the LTTE was disintegrating as a military organisation and the leadership could no longer keep a tight hold over their cadres.

While the military operations have been described as successful, there has been no corresponding weakening of the LTTE's positions in its talks with Indian Government representatives. The military operation is one of the two tracks the Indian Government is following, the other being the negotiations in Madras. The broad strategy has been to apply military pressure in the LTTE and induce it to take more flexible positions in the negotiations.

Sticky point: According to informed sources, a broad agreement has been reached on the number of arms to be surrendered but the timing appears to be a sticky point. The LTTE is reportedly keen that a ceasefire is announced as a first step to any agreement while the Indian side wants a surrender of arms to precede any ceasefire. The LTTE has argued that its cadres and arms supplies are scattered and that it would take weeks for all the weapons to be gathered and surrendered. A ceasefire would allow the LTTE to collect its weapons, the organisation has argued. One compromise which is being worked on is the declaration of a ceasefire, followed by the surrender of a few arms, first and then by the handing over of the remaining weapons within a given time period.

The payment of money to the LTTE, dubbed as aid for the relief and rehabilitation of LTTE cadres, and for the reconstruction of the "industries" the LTTE ran in Jaffna, is another area of negotiation. The Government of India has taken the position that any money given for rehabilitations should go through Sri Lankan Government channels and not directly, as it happened last year after the accord was signed. India also wants relief to go to all the militant groups and not just the LTTE. As a compromise, a formula is being worked out under which each group will be compensated according to its number of cadres.

The Indian Government is also reportedly demanding a commitment from the LTTE that it will enter the democratic process and participate in the Provincial Council elections. The LTTE has raised several political preconditions for this, including an improvement of the devolution package, which is unrealistic at this point of time.

The Defence Minister, Mr. K. C. Pant, had publicly stated during his visit to Colombo last month that conditions for starting the election process could be ensured by the IPKF by July. With that deadline approaching, there is pressure on the Indian Government to reach an agreement with the LTTE quickly.

IPKF using napalm bombs: LTTE

Madras, June 25: The LTTE today accused the Indian peacekeeping force of using napalm bombs with the intent "to exterminate the Tamil race and the Tigers" and said several animals have perished in forest fires set off by the bombs.

The IPKF began napalm bombing on June 22 and were still continuing the assault on civilian places at Mullaitheevu and its surrounding areas, an LTTE statement in Madras said this evening. The information was based on a message received by the Tigers' propaganda office here early this morning, it said.

Besides destroying many houses, schools and office buildings, napalm bombs had resulted in several kilometres forests being set aflame, the LTTE alleged.

Even as the media speculations about talks between the Tigers and the Indian intelligence agency RAW abound, now this charge of India using napalm bombs to disarm the LTTE would constitute a serious setback to the peace process.

Some recent rumours have also said the Tigers were merely buying time by pretending to negotiate with India even while preparing for bigger warfare. A shipload of arms is on its way with an European supplier, reports have said. However the local LTTE office has denied this.

SINNAVAN PARREY, RAJAKERAMMAN, Karaveddi West, Karaveddi.

Miss. Sinnavan Thaivanai, age 29, is my only daughter.

It was army operation and shelling over Karaveddi West area, on 1.6.88.

She above said Miss. Sinnavan Thaivanai went to the market to sell and buy things.

On her return on 1.6.88, She sustained gun shot injury, and died at the spot.

Her body was cremated at Verenddai Cemetery.

My husband who was the father of the deceased was blind for the last five years.

My above said deceased daughter was the sole bread winner of my family of two members.

MISS KAMALESWARY RASARATNAM, Cemetery Lane, Ward-6, Myliddy.

The deceased Rasaratnam Pasunkili, aged 53 years was my mother.

My late mother was engaged in selling vegetables at Myliddy market since 1985 to look after the family as my father was old and feeble and is bed-ridden.

On 17.6.88 at 7.30 a.m. my mother left home for the market as usual.

At about 11.00 a.m. my younger sister Mrs. K. Rajeswary came home and informed me that my mother had been shot dead in the myliddy market when the IPKF opened fire during their search operations.

Immediately I rushed to the spot along with my brother Maheswaran and brought home the dead body.

The dead body bore bullet injury of her left chest.

The dead body was cremated the following day morning at Myliddy cemetery.

I have no means of living as the bread winner of the family is dead.

VAITILLINGAM SIVAPACKIYAM (63) Pillayar Kovil Veethy, Erlalai North, Erlalai.

The injured person Vaitilingam Raveendran alias Indran aged 30 years is my son.

He is deaf and dumb and a casual labourer.

On 27.6.88 at about 6.00 p.m. my son was seated at our gate.

An army patrol unit came that way fired at him.

As a result he sustained an injury on his left leg.

He was taken immediately by the army itself to the Punnalaikattuvan army camp.

I went to the camp at about 8.00 a.m. on the following day where I was told that my son is alive and well.

My son was not shown to me.

I returned to my home.

Later I heard that my son was admitted at the General Hospital, Jaffna.

I rushed there and found my son minus his left leg.

I learned that his left leg was amputated at thigh level in the army Hospital prior to his admission to the General Hospital.

At present he is being warded at the General Hospital, Jaffna.

AFFIDAVIT

CRP

IPKF OFFENSIVE IN MULLAITIVU :

The IPKF operation (VIRAT) which commenced during the last week of May continued into the first week of June. More troops had to be moved to the area. It was reported that a convoy of 265 vehicles carrying reinforcements was seen moving from Vavuniya towards Mullaitivu as the fighting progressed. LTTE Chief's Deputy, Mahathaya was reported encircled by the IPKF. Civilians from Pudukudierruppu fled the strife torn area towards Kilinochchi. Residents from Allampil and Kumulamunai moved to Vavuniya to escape the hardships of continuous curfew and risk to their lives consequent on the fighting. The Indian High Commssion press release said that 100 LTTE cadres were killed and 40 captured while admitting losing 30 of their men. The LTTE claimed to have killed 62 IPKF soldiers. The operation was intended to make an impact on the ongoing LTTE – India talks but the operation did not turn out to be decisive.

R. Rajkumar (16) arrested by the IPKF near his home at Navatkuly by the IPKF stationed at Navatkuly died in custody within 3 days of arrest. Body briefly shown to parents and disposed of by IPKF.

Perinpam Thiru of Akkaraipattu was kidnapped from his home on 10.06.88 by two youths who came on motor-cycle. Parents followed kidnappers to Tirukovil. Kidnappers promised release youth next day but early next morning, body butchered into pieces found on Pottuvil-Akkaraipattu main road.

IPKF men passing Polikandy village near Valvettiturai on 07.05.88 were annoyed with a young boy beating on a tin can. They assaulted the boy and his father severely. Father Arunasalam Sivalingam (48) was admitted to hospital and succumbed to his injuries on 05.06.88.

Attorney at Law Vilvarajah (58) of Vavuniya shot dead by unidentified men.

Subramaniam Keerthirajah, Colombo TELO leader shot dead in Colombo on 03.06.88.

A Tamil youth was shot dead near Kollupitiya lane, Colombo on 08.06.88.

Tamil detenus held at Boosa at present number 524. No further release states Attorney General. Meanwhile IPKF without any legal sanction held 194 youths at Vavuniya and about 1000 youths at Kankesanthurai and Palaly.

Cordon and search operation go on apace both in the North and East. At Batticaloa during search operation Velupillai Uthayashankar is shot dead. Sinnakutty Thavarasa of Valvettiturai takes cyanide during IPKF search operations. Urany near Batticaloa search by IPKF on 4th June Killikumar is shot dead.

Two IPKF soldiers leaving textile shop in Point Pedro are shot and killed and their arms removed. More IPKF men arrive on scene and attack civilians. Several hospitalised consequently.

IPKF OFFENSIVE CONTINUES

The IPKF operation VIRAT centred in the Mullaitivu District during the first three weeks of June has been enlarged to cover a wider area from 21.06.88 under operation code named 'CHECKMATE'. The extended area besides Mullaitivu includes Vavuniya and environs. More IPKF troops have been inducted into operation 'CHECKMATE' than in the earlier operation 'VIRAT'. The IPKF claim to have destroyed the LTTE hideouts at Visvamadu and Thunukai. Fifty youths were

30

COLOMBO. June 30.

One Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) jawan was killed and a few others were wounded in an ambush by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka's north-eastern Mullaitivu district on Wednesday. In the ensuing exchange of fire three militants were killed and two others were apprehended.

The IPKF men were returning from Oddusuddan to Mullaitivu when they were ambushed in a jungle area.

Meanwhile, two of the five IPKF men reported missing in Monday's ambush by the LTTE in the northern Vavuniya district were found by villagers in an unconscious state and handed over to the Sri Lankan troops, who in turn handed them over to the IPKF, the sources said.

Capal, a LTTE guerrilla was rounded up by IPKF para commandos. After throwing his grenade he took cyanide. Two soldiers were dead. Vadamarachi people mourned his death with homages. The enraged IPKF entered Valvettithurai, Point Pedro, Tikkam and Polikandy and severely assaulted whoever they caught.

In Pudukudiyirupu, between Mullaitheevu and Othiyamalai 6 IPKF soldiers were killed in an encounter with LTTE. An IPKF officer was killed.

In a landmine attack by LTTE, 4 IPKF men were killed.

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Two leading Tamils of Akkaraipattu, P. Kanapathipillai (59) and Kariyan Vadivel (60) kidnapped on 21.06.88, whereabouts still not known.

A teenaged student and a girl from Karaitivu kidnapped and killed.

A Muslim youth, Mohamed Nazeer (26) of Akkaraipattu was stabbed to death by another Muslim of the 'Three Stars' group.

Drop-outs from the various groups other than the LTTE are roaming the Batticaloa District robbing people, especially at Chenkalady, Kalmunai, Pandiruppu and Akkaraipattu.

IPKF have intensified their searches in Akkaraipattu.

EPRLF, TELO, and PLOTE have jointly opened an office at Tirukovil near the IPKF camp. Members of this joint office accompany the IPKF on their rounds. They also inquire into disputes. Attendance of the parties is ensured by threats.

DIES IN IPKF CUSTODY

A Batticaloa Citizens' Committee member said that on the 28th May, 1988, one Kanapathipillai Thiruchselvam, one of the eight persons taken into custody by the IPKF at Kirankulam, died hours later.

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arrested on 21.06.88 during search operations at Sastrikoolankulam and Thandikulam. Another 34 youths were arrested in the same locality on 25.06.88. Parents and spouses of arrested persons complained to the Government Agent on 23.06.88. An IPKF officer was killed in an encounter with the LTTE in Vavuniya. On 27.06.88 at Cheddikulam IPKF truck ambushed. 4 IPKF men killed, 5 missing and 3 injured. On 29.06.88 at Thaniyootu near Mullaitivu one IPKF soldier was killed. On 30.06.88, 3 IPKF men killed at Nedunkerny near Mullaitivu. On 30.06.88, 4 IPKF men killed in a landmine blast at Tiriyai near Trincomalee.

One IPKF soldier killed and another wounded at Murikandy on 16/6 as a result of a landmine blast.

TELO office at Vavuniya blasted on 17/6.

On 18/6 at Vavuniya there was a protest march parents and spouses of nearly 200 detenus held without charge by the IPKF. Protest march was organised by Citizens' Committee Vavuniya and led by the President Dr. Pararajasingham and other officials. There were nearly 5000 persons including school children. At the first check point the marches were stopped by the IPKF and armed youths believed to be TELO and EPRLF cadres. Dr. Pararajasingham had been threatened by the same groups. He has since relinquished office and left Vavuniya.

Kathankudi 21.06.88 – Kalideen arrested and released earlier by IPKF in connection with the killing of Mr. Ahamed Lebbe ex Chairman T.C. and respected member of area was shot dead. IPKF at Kathankudi is attacked with grenades. IPKF counter attack and kill two militants and arrest about 20 others. Shop and other buildings damaged.

On 21.06.88 about 25 members of 'Three Star' group cordon Iruthayapuram area in Batticaloa. Residents panic. Nesan of the LTTE trying to escape on bicycle is shot dead.

Two youths Kandiah Nesan and Pathinathar Babu taken off passenger bus from Colombo to Jaffna and killed by a group which alleged victims were PLOTE members.

Nagulan, LTTE leader killed in cordon and search operation. Hartal observed to commemorate him in his area – Chavakachcheri, Kodikamam and Pallai on 23.06.88.

Hartal in Atchuvely, Avarangal and Puttur on 23.06.88 to commemorate S. Rasavarajeeva LTTE leader of the area killed during first week of April.

On 23.06.88 Arasan and Eeswaran of the LTTE were killed at Mamangam near Batticaloa by the EPRLF.

At Trincomalee on 27th June, two P.Cs and three Sinhala civilians injured in grenade attack. In a second grenade attack, one sub–inspector and two P.Cs injured.

600 mothers march and hand over petition to IPKF. Demands – to dislodge colonists from Welioya former Manalaaru; to order cease fire and enter into talks with LTTE. Tamils had suffered and youths detained both under Sri Lankan Security Forces and later under IPKF. Demand also to free all detenus.

Mr. Veluatham and elderly businessman at Batticaloa was kidnapped on 28th June. The kidnappers are demanding a ransom of Rs. 2 lakhs. The kidnappers believed to be the 'Three Star' group have blamed it on LTTE.

விடுதலை வீரன்

அன்பே வடிவானவர்களுக்கு
மரணம் எப்போதும் நண்பன்
எனவே எனக்குப் பயமில்லை

'முதுகில் கனக்கும்
எந்திரத் துவக்குடன்
வனங்களில் அலைகிறேன்
காலடிகளில் பதிகின்றன
நம்பிக்கையின் சுவடுகள்

நான் நிழல்
எனது செயல்களே நிஜம்
கண்ணிவெடிகளின் முழக்கம்
படைத் தளபதியின்
உறக்கத்தைச் தெறடிக்கும்
நேற்றிருந்த ஒப்பாய்
இன்று இறந்திருப்பான்

எல்லோரும் தங்களை உலகுக்குக்
காட்டத் துடிக்கும் போது
நானோ உலகத்தின் கண்களிலிருந்து
மறைந்து நின்று போராடுகிறேன்
'எனது மக்களே எனது மலைகள்'
தங்கள் குகைகளில் என்னை
மறைத்து விடுவார்கள்.
என்றைக்காவது ஒரு நாள்
எதுவும் நிகழலாம்
இராணுவத்தால் அரவமில்லாமல்
பிடிக்கப்படலாம்.
யாரும் காணுமல் நதிக்கரையில்
பிணமாகக் கிடக்கலாம்.

அது நானல்ல. என் நிழல்
நிழலை மட்டும் தான்
அவர்களால் அழிக்க முடியும்

எந்தக் கவிஞனும்
என்னைப் பாடமாட்டான்
ஆனால் கிராம மக்கள்
என்னை மறக்க மாட்டார்கள்
துயரம் மௌனமாய் கவிய
நான் இல்லாமல் போனதெப்படியென
நண்பர்கள் நினைத்திருப்பார்கள்

எப்போதும் காணமுடியாதவாறு
எனது உடல் அழிக்கப்படலாம்

அலைகளோடு எழுந்து
இரவினில் வருவேன்
பனிப்படலமென இறங்கி
வனங்களில் மிதப்பேன்

தோழர்கள் தாகத்துடன்
குளங்களில் குனியும் போது
நீரலைகளில் நெளியும் என் வடிவம்
என்னையே அருந்தி
பயணத்தை தொடர்வார்கள்
போராட்டத்தை நோக்கி.

— முகம்மது ஜமால்

வீர வணக்கம்

'நகுதக் கனரே, நாடுமீக் கூறுநர்;
இளையவன் இவன் என உளையக் கூறிப்,
படுமணி இரட்டும் பாவடிப் பணைத்தாள்
நெடுநல் யானையும், தேரும், மாவும்,
படைஅமை மறவரும், உடையம் யாம்' என்று
உறுதுப்பு அஞ்சாது, உடல்சினம் செருக்கிச்
சிறுசொல் சொல்லிய சினங்கெழு வேந்தரை
அருஞ்சமஞ் சிதையத் தாக்கி, முரசமொடு
ஒருங்குஅகப் படேஎன் ஆயின் பொருந்திய
என்நிழல் வாழ்நர் சென்னிழல் காணுது....

தலையாலங்கானத்துச் செரு
வென்ற நெடுஞ்செழியன்.

Capt. Vadavooran 14.6.88

Yasodharan 12.6.88

Capt. Mahendi 31.6.88

Maria 3.7.88

Capt. Kasim

Subash 3.6.88

Udhayan 24.6.88

Lt. Nidhi 30.6.88

Dhamu 8.6.88

Kones 6.6.88

Capt. Vadavooran 14.6.88

Sam 2.6.88

Buvanesh 6..6.88

Vinod 9.6.88

Kaliyugan 9.6.88

Lt. Surdar 19.6.88

Nakulan 26.6.88

Sambal 30.6.88

June 88

Maj. Kala

Capt. Raghavan

Sabesan

Mano

Anex

Ramu

Harisada

Pirim

Thiyagu

Arasan

2nd. Lt. Ravi 3.7.88

Maria 3.7.88

Kandeeban 4.7.88

Capt. Kasim 16.7.88

Vaithi 17.7.88

Thadi 19.7.88

Hari 21.7.88

Raja 27.7.88

Edwin 29.7.88

Capt. Mahesh 30.7.88



Maj. Salam 2.6.88

Capt Mahendi

Capt. S. Krishnalingam 29.6.88

Subash 3.6.88

Gandhi 30.7.88

KILLING □ FIELD

88 June

claims	IPKF KILLED	IPKF WOUNDED	LTTE KILLED	LTTE WOUNDED	S.L. ARMY KILLED	S.L. ARMY WOUNDED	OTHER MILITANTS KILLED	OTHER MILITANTS WOUNDED	CIVILIANS KILLED	CIVILIANS WOUNDED
IPKF		2		106 C						
LTTE										
MEDIA							2 1 T	2		

2

		1						2	

3

2		9							
2				3		1 T			

4

		2						1	
								3	

5

3	2							4	

6

			C 10					5	
		1							

7

3	4								
12									
								1	1

8

			1						
		1		1	2			1	

9

		2							
								1	

10

		3*							
								11	

11

	1	2				1 P		2*	
7									
								1	

12

13

1	1								

15

								1	

16

1	1								

17

			1	1				3*	
9								3	

18

1	1							2	
								C 500	

19

			1						

20

			1	C 8					

21

	6		6						
			3	20				C 52	

22

						1 P		1	

23

		2							
1		3							

24

25

2		35	8 C					15	
1									
								1	C 34

26

		1							

27

7	8								
4	8							4	4

28

4	8				3				3
				3	2				3

29

1								3	

30

1		3	2 C						
13		1							
7									

TOTAL	IPKF KILLED	IPKF WOUNDED	LTTE KILLED	LTTE WOUNDED	S.L. ARMY KILLED	S.L. ARMY WOUNDED	OTHER MILITANTS KILLED	OTHER MILITANTS WOUNDED	CIVILIANS KILLED	CIVILIANS WOUNDED
	13	22	58	7C 134		3	1		23	8
	50	9	17	1					2	3C 500
	30	10	7	20	6	4	4	2	33	8C 86

* - Sri Lankan Information.c-captured. EP-EPRLF T-TELO, P:PLOTE, EN-ENDLF, E-EROS TNA-Tamil National Army CVF-Citizen s Voluntary Force

LTTE claims : June '88–10 LTTE killed.

CHAPTER 13

1988

the heinous crimes of indian peace keeping

July

1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28
29	30	31	

29 A year passed with no peace in sight. Curfew in Colombo and Jaffna. Strike in Tamil areas observed succesfully.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

Tamil Tragedy in Sri Lanka and Contradictory Strategy by India—I

V.R. Krishna Iyer

COMMENT

The Sri Lankan Constitution does not vest in the Indian prime minister the power to direct the Tamil citizens of Sri Lanka to accept the India-Sri Lanka accord and surrender arms or die. This is the concern of the government of Sri Lanka vis-a-vis *its citizens. By what magic of law can the Indian army become the Lankan civil authority and be bound by any accountability in that country?*

A DYNAMIC re-thinking of India's Sri Lanka policy is overdue because the rapid flow of forces affects political logic and parties which are committed to humanist dialectic must respond to new social realities. When the story of the bleeding peace-keeping in Sri Lanka by Rajiv Gandhi's government comes to be written the world will be shocked by the savage sins some jawans have committed against Tamil human rights. To wish away army crime, because *our* jawans have committed it, is not patriotism, as some bigoted chauvinists claim, but unconscionable nationalism, as Gandhiji would have declared. All of us are vicariously guilty, if the charges of torture and massacre and sex and theft, now coming to light, were even fractionally true. Lanka's Tamils expect much from India as their saviour. India too is concerned for justice to the Tamils. Some perverse moronism has stultified our massive effort. We must with nationalist impatience examine the whole development. That criticism is constructive duty.

I

Death Sentence by Colombo on Jaffna

First, the history of the brutal suppression and escalating alienation of the Tamils of the island by the Simhala regimes since independence culminating in the pogrom of 1983 and after by the Buddhist version of the Ku Klux Klan and the military of Jayewardene, alas, now taken over more bitterly, violently and professionally by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in the name of implementing the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA) and tracking down the Tamil Tigers.

Ceylon attained independence and became a republic in 1948. 72 per cent of the population are Simhalas, but the Tamils—a separate ethnic entity with a long history—are a significant presence, having made substantial developmental contribution to the island. There are other tiny yet distinctive groups. The island is multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and culturally plural. The Simhalas had a brutal bracket, from the beginning, hell-bent on the liquidation of the Tamils, the dominant demographic factor in the northern and the eastern sector. Electoral engineering, in this climate of communal hostility, preponderantly projected the Simhalas into state power, and over the decades, the Sri Lanka rulers, whoever formed the government, were abetted by the hard-core hoodlums and Buddhist monks to crush the Tamil ethnics. This meaningful minority had occupied high positions, key places, strategic roles and had contributed to the enrichment and building up of the national economy. With the divisive politics gripping Sri Lanka, Tamils were gradually flushed out, crushed down. It was not mere discrimination; discrimination is a very mild word to describe such a situation. In matters of employment, discrimination. In matters of education, discrimination. In matters of police and army posts, discrimination, until at last it reached a stage when armed violence was openly practised to inflict blood and death on masses of Tamil civilians to jettison them from the island, with no court to give justice, no right to share power in the executive or legislative branches. The Tamil people whose almost sole surrogates in parliament were the TULF members were *de facto* disfranchised by a constitutional device. The Supreme Court became helpless because the judges were rendered toothless by the Emergency and remained robed as boneless wonders in the face of constitutionalised authoritarianism. Human rights agencies found the administration grossly guilty. Indeed, the heartless approach to Jaffna Tamils reached the boiling point of betrayal when in 1986 the Indian government rightly felt so enraged that it took upon itself the responsibility of unusual measures of humanitarian intervention without the assent of the island government. The refugee deluge and Jaffna under siege are testimony of the oceanic violations by the Colombo throne.

Amnesty International, Law Asia, the International Commission of Jurists, independent media and other well known human rights organisations and champions all over the world expressed shock at the state-engineered macabre happenings. Progressive forces inside Sri Lanka, including some left elements, and the church, protested in vain. India's Tamil Nadu was in convulsive anger.

Simhala encroachment in the Tamil areas, breach of ethnic demography wherever the Tamils were a vast majority, state-sponsored colonisation in the Trincomalee district to break ethnic homogeneity, discriminatory demarcation of new rural councils, and like measures steadily accelerated and intimidated the Tamil minority with the dismantling of their integrity. The confidence of the community in state justice collapsed. The Tamils apprehended imminent extermination from their historic homeland. Nightmarish violence, which was simmering below the surface, was let loose after 1983 and people could not know whether they would survive for the morrow. Scenes of woe, the like of which only the Indian partition tragedy had witnessed, became common. Electoral rolls were used by racist street-roughs to identify the Tamils, even in the city of Colombo. You go to this house, this is a Tamil house; that shop, it is a Tamil shop. Therefore, kill the people there, destroy their belongings and, if it is a Simhala shop or house, leave it.

There are some crises of communal terror when a prison may be a sanctuary for the victims. But here the Tamils inside the Welikade prison were dragged out, killed and the blood of the prisoners was offered to the Buddha statue within the prison premises. Civilised law says that when a man is killed there will at least be a post-mortem. But a law was made by which the basic minimum of even a post-mortem on a person killed was said to be not necessary. And detentions galore and no court's writ could run. To make a long story short, there was state terrorism, not merely the fear of the Sinhalese sector going berserk. State terrorism practised at that time was so terrible that the president shamelessly declared: "I am waging war". Imagine a president of a country saying that he is waging war against a substantial minority in that country itself.

True, the LTTE, in raging reprisal and struggling for Tamil survival, hit back and innocent Simhalas perished. Brute force begets brute force and increases exponentially. To kill, by reckless bombs, Simhala civilians is savagery. Even so, for the state to starve and shoot and bomb out an ethnic minority with genocidal intent during times of peace is a crime against humanity.

The venerably gerontic president, Jayewardene, was an extremist in violence, yet a 'Buddhist' and 'Gandhian'. He could bomb and starve his own citizens and call them for conferences. Tamils knew his clever treachery, never trusted him and dreaded his killer ploys.

Unless we have a live historical memory, we oftentimes forget the present issues which are projected by the past. Terrorism is a false label for the struggle of a people in despair facing genocide by state massacre and communal terrorism. It was in this macabre background that the Tamils, with Indian government's empathy, fought back. There was an outcry then that this was terrorism. But at the same time, when the Sri Lankan army gunned down people all round, it was

called an innocent army operation. Inevitably, like a wounded tiger at bay, the Tamil militants struck back. Once we appreciate the gory, grim and ghastly scenes which had been spreading over the decades, from 1948 onwards, we will realise the dialectical forces at work. Tamils wanted a historic home and home rule *within* the republic, if possible, without the republic, if necessary.

Indira Gandhi, moved by the suppressive strategies of the JRJ regime, sent her emissaries to negotiate a national reconciliation with justice to the ethnic Tamils of the north and the east. When she fell victim to a dastardly assassin Rajiv Gandhi emerged as prime minister and brought to bear a fresh approach to the Sri Lanka issues. He too sent his representatives to Colombo, some of whom were misfits but others able hands. But president Jayewardene, a consummate artist of contradictions, of double-think, double-speak and new-speak, outwitted neophyte prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. He discussed proposals but simultaneously waged war. The tomfoolery was so baffling and the siege on Jaffna so heartless that Rajiv Gandhi, in rare a mood of humanity, rushed mercy ships of food and medicine to the north, and on the Lankan navy turning them back, the IAF blitzed into the island to drop compassionate supplies to the starving Tamils. This action transformed the situation and after some hectic activity there suddenly emerged, on July 29, 1986, the India-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA) which was hailed at first blush as a benign beginning of ethnic justice. The gestation and the midwifery of this agreement are a riddle wrapped in a mystery; the cumulative meaning of the ambivalent clauses of this hasty document is an arcane enigma; whom it benefits in the short and the long runs is as yet difficult to decode. The India-Lanka Accord must be tested by measuring its clauses, their viability and credibility with the triple imperatives of Tamil justice within the republic. With hindsight, we may apprehend that the accord is grinding to a halt unless courageous self-criticism and policy changes bail us out of the requiem situation.

II

India-Lanka Accord and IPKF Imbroglio

Since the Sri Lanka soldiery and the Simhala skinheads together menaced the Tamil future, the IPKF landing in Jaffna was welcomed as a propitious presence. Notwithstanding the fatal processual weaknesses of failure to consult Sri Lanka's Tamil groups or Simhala opposition or even the prime minister of the island or, for that matter, India's opposition parties; despite the poverty of devolution of provincial powers, the tricky triarchy whereby president and governor could, and would, cipherise the elected council and make a mockery of ministers; although the fusion of north and east is sought to be sabotaged by the referendum trap, some prospect of ceasefire, national reconciliation and ethnic justice through Indian guarantees was a note of hope. It must be assumed that prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's original intentions were to secure effective devolution and enduring linking of north and east, sans which the solemn agreement would be a *mareecha* instrument. For those with dialectical vigilance and political sense the ISLA project is counterfeit. Even so, giving a charitable meaning to the instrument, we still find gaping gaps which make the pact a defeat for the Tamils. Sad that some leftists blink at realities and support the accord.

Most favourably read, the anatomy of the accord consists of a luminous preamble, a string of resolutions, an annexure to the agreement and an integral exchange of letters of even date between the high signatories. The political essence of the Tamil position, abandoning the demand for 'eelam', is that in the setting of Lankan pluralism, ethnic, linguistic and religious, two fundamental demands must be granted with grace. Firstly, "that the northern and the eastern provinces have been areas of *historical habitation* of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have *at all times hitherto lived together in this territory* with the other ethnic groups". The second basic is the Tamil right to "live in *equality, safety* and *harmony,* and prosper and fulfil their *aspirations*". These aspirations are a Tamil homeland and home rule within the republic. Strong political structures, with Indian guarantees, are the desideratum, having regard to the dreadful discriminations, privations, and tortures of the past. Tamil mistrust of Colombo is natural. Clear and concrete clauses fleshing out the formula of inviolable autonomy and fusion of the historic home of north and east, guaranteed by India and agreed to by the broad Simhala community—not merely Jayewardene—is the sensible solution. Remember JRJ is a lame duck president and cannot constitutionally contest beyond his second term expiring within months, and the parliament itself is running out its term. And, what is worse, even his own prime minister as also the leading opposition, the SLFP, are open critics of vital aspects of the accord. Alas, our prime minister's dialectical literacy about Sri Lanka's historic realities and political prognosis does not measure up to the grave challenges and constitutional problems.

The agreement half-heartedly proceeds to implement the historical habitation thesis by promising a North-East Province (NEP). But the provision is precariously subject to a condition precedent of referendum for the east. We, in India, know the snares and snags of plebiscite in Kashmir. Sinister manipulations, false alarms may undo the link-up and frustrate this life-and-death demand for Tamil territorial integrity.

Be that as it may, during an interim period, the north and east, it is stated in the accord, would form one administrative unit, having one elected provincial council with one government, one chief minister and one board of ministers. Thus the immediate step was to initiate these processes. After the newborn NEP worked for some time, a referendum was provided for the east to express its wish to opt out of the NEP. There are many traps here to defeat the joinder. That apart, what is of critical importance is the immediate formation of the NEP as 'one administrative unit'. Assuming the accord to be inviolable, as obsessively and obdurately asserted by our prime minister, this condition remains a dead letter. Blaming the LTTE is poor alibi. Again, the elections to the north and the east assured within three months from the end of July 1987 (the date of the agreement) and "in any event before 31st December 1987" is a broken word. The "interim period", when the NEP experiment would be worked out and communities could make their choice in the light of that experience, has never materialised.

The next part of ISLA relates to normalisation processes relaxing the repressive regime. Constitutional terrorism flourished under the umbrella of the Emergency. To extinguish this suppressive situation, a condition precedent was prescribed that the "Emergency will be lifted in the Eastern and Northern Provinces by August 15, 1987", all arms with the militant groups were to be surrendered to designated authorities and the Sri Lankan Army was to be confined to the barracks. The deadly Emergency is disgracefully extant and Rajiv Gandhi is silent. Preventive detention and indiscriminate prosecutions had benumbed and killed all liberties. Therefore, as a step towards restoration of normalcy, the agreement mandated the president to grant "General Amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other Emergency Laws . . .as well as to those persons accused, charged and convicted under these laws". What a tragic truth that many still wallow in jails even today. There is a further clause that all residual matters—and they could be most critical, such as the constitutional amendments and legislative enactments to give full effect to the provisions of the accord—would be "resolved between India and Sri Lanka within a period of six weeks of signing this agreement" (i e, middle of August 1987). Audaciously, this clause was by-passed when the fraudulent amendment bills were moved and passed in the Lankan parliament with none in the South Block to protest.

Now we move on to the military mantle of India in the island—the peace-keeping outfit. When the government of Sri Lanka requests the government of India "to afford military assistance to implement these proposals", the latter will co-operate "as and when requested"·(clause 8). One is entitled to know what particular military assistance

has Sri Lanka demanded and what specific 'proposals' of the covenant are sought to be implemented by the Indian forces. Is it to enforce surrender of arms by militant groups, as stated in clause 8? "The law enforcment and maintenance of security in the northern and eastern provinces", stipulates clause 9, will be through "the same organisations and mechanisms" of Sri Lanka's government as are used for the rest of the island. Reading clauses 8 and 9 together, the Indian army has no peace-keeping or law and order business. There is no other indication anywhere in the agreement about the use of the Indian military for an offensive against any group, and certainly none to hound and hunt and shoot and kill the Tigers wherever they are. This is a self-imposed bleeding blunder or sabre-rattling mission beyond the accord orbit. The IPKF's terrible peace-keeping violence, spreading death, blood and tears, has no warrant in Sri Lankan law nor in the accord. It is outrageously *ultra vires*. In truth what is expected of India, according to clause 2.15 (c) (and the annexure), is to offer military *assistance* and *to co-operate with the Sri Lankan government by giving such assistance*. The principal role is thus of Sri Lanka and the co-operative or assistance role is that of India. Once these limitations are understood, the deadly distortions in the frenzied operations indulged in by the IPKF will become indefensible. Another co-operative venture indicated in 2.15 (e) also implies functional limitations. Sri Lanka and India, says the sub-clause, "will *co-operate* in ensuring the *physical security and safety of all communities*" inhabiting the northern and eastern provinces. The north is virtually Tamil and therefore India is expected to defend, not offend, to save, not slaughter, the Tamils there. What is being done, or has been done during these months, excels the Simhala genocidal chapter, if the reports related to me by those who had come fresh from Jaffna are true—a rabid reversal of physical security and safety of the Tamils. Even in the eastern province, a substantial number, speaking demographically, is Tamil, with a mentionable minority of Simhalas and Muslims. The IPKF has done nothing to defend the Simhalas and the Muslims. Tamil suspects and even innocents are anathema to them. Several hundreds or more of civilians have died under shocking conditions and the IPKF suffers from some kind of trigger-happy occupation-army syndrome. Why do I speak so harshly? Because I apprehend that the India of Gandhi and Nehru is involved abroad in lawless violence of diabolic dimensions. Let us scan the situation under the accord and Sri Lankan jurisprudence.

The functional relevance of the IPKF under the accord is (a) *co-operate and assist* the Sri Lankan government, (b) to *defend the Tamils* against aggressive Simhalas, and (c) *take into custody arms surrendered* by Tamil militants. To take into custody arms surrendered is a very limited operation, if words mean anything. Similarly, protecting the communities living in the north and the east, by no stretch of imagination, extends to killing Tamil civilians or suspected militants. Strangely enough the IPKF, obviously with South Block clearance, has taken upon itself the power to chase, liquidate and subjugate the LTTE—Operation Pawan. For this purpose, they make house-to-house searches, clamp down curfew, take into custody suspects, kill many, including humble civilians. Under what legal authority, and that in a foreign country? An accord is not law and approval of that instrument by parliament is not equal to legislation. My brief study of the constitution of Sri Lanka (as of 1978) with particular reference to Article 155 (Public Security) and Fundamental Rights (Chapter III) persuades me that the IPKF action is indefensible if that republic's constitution means anything beyond words. My hurried enquiry with a couple of well-informed Sri Lankan lawyers also is to be the same effect. If "amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent... in war and in peace", the IPKF is guilty of horrendous violations. Even in an Emergency, presidential regulations have to be made to suspend the provisions of any law. A proclamation and communication thereof to parliament are protections implanted by Article 154 of the constitution, so that rights of citizens, Tamil or Simhala, shall not be trampled over by executive fiat or by sten-gun writ. Inevitably, the question shoots up whether any proclamation and regulation, authorising foreign forces to shoot down Lankan citizens, or even to arrest them or make house searches has been promulgated. None, said the lawyers I consulted over the phone. It is significant that Article 11 forbids torture, cruel inhuman or degrading treatment of any person and Article 13 insists that no person shall be arrested except according to legal procedure. Other protections, as in the Indian constitution, are also fundamental rights in Sri Lanka, including freedom of residence and movement, of association and assembly, including the right not to be arrested except according to legally established procedure, to be informed of the grounds of arrest, to be produced before the nearest competent court and afforded a fair trial. To anticipate my charge against the IPKF, these basic rights have been crushed by the jawans as a body above the law, even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this background, foreign army invasion of the Citizens' Bill of Rights is brash unconstitutionality. If we believe in the rule of law, Indian soldiers have no business to get into Sri Lanka territory, search, seize, arrest, and shoot. They may assist Sri Lanka's civil authorities or afford defence (only) when Tamils are attacked. Is there—it would be extraordinary if there were—any legislative sanction empowering foreign soldiers by name or designation to search, seize, arrest, roam the streets with sten guns and fire upon anyone they fancy, with no inquest, no case registered, no magisterial enquiry, no answerability to Lankan legal authority? It is a shame for Lanka's parliament and people if the law is dead and police and administrative authority is usurped by alien forces invited by the president but acting under their own command.

The Sri Lankan constitution does not vest in the Indian prime minister the power to direct the Tamil citizens of Sri Lanka to accept the accord and surrender arms or die. This is the concern of the government of Sri Lanka *vis-a-vis* its citizens. India's writ is *ultra vires* unless there is validating legislation justifying one hundred thousand Indian soldiers hunting for Tamil militants. Their killings are mass murders unless legitimated by clear statutory empowerment which sets limitations on the exercise of such police powers. By what magic of law can the Indian military become the Lankan civil authority and be bound by any accountability in that country? Even president JRJ must rely upon some specific constitutional provision and subsidiary legislation if he is to deprive the Tamils of Jaffna and the east of their fundamental rights. This lawlessness par excellence is a matter of grave importance which deserves to be examined by constitutional lawyers and human rights watchdogs worldwide. From the angle of the Indian people, the IPKF operation has exceeded reasonable bounds and has been responsible for bitterness, butchery and loss of property, if the reports from the island are believed. By getting away with it *now* you cannot escape the verdict of history later. We are treated to disinformation and misinformation, making the LTTE the Ravana of the island and the IPKF the self-appointed Rama.

What most distresses the human rights sensitives is the savagery of some of the Indian soldiery. Maybe they were expecting a meek Tiger surrender but were surprised at the stiff resistance of the LTTE. But the LTTE had political reasons not to give up arms and would not take orders from India's chief executive. Their accountability is to their people. Under what law should they surrender? Even if provoked by the sophisticated fire power and the superior guerilla wits of the Tigers, how could a disciplined army run amok with their guns and do worse? Many cases of rape by jawans have been reported. In some instances, jawans have been caught red-handed and taken to court.

Tamil Tragedy in Sri Lanka and Contradictory Strategy by India—II

V R Krishna Iyer

Jaffna has been conquered, maybe. But the spirit of the people there will resist, long after their defeat. We are now disowned by the Simhalese and detested by the Tamils, thanks to our tragedy of strategy and hurry to win international glory. Let us look to the future and take measures of statesmanship. What are they?

III

Political Audit of The Accord

AN implementation audit of the Accord and a performance audit of the IPKF are important at this stage since president Jayewardene has broken the Accord and, if so, why does Rajiv Gandhi keep mum? Nearly a year after the signing of the ISLA, its imperatives remain in suspended animation. The lifting of the Emergency (Article 2.9), the general amnesty (Article 2.11), the disbanding of the Home Guards (an armed auxiliary force of non-Tamil civilians established by a directive of the president and functioning under the responsibility of the ministry of internal security) and the withdrawal of all paramilitary groups from the Northern and Eastern provinces (Annexure to Agreement, Article 3) are pledges betrayed. Similar is the fate of the interim administrative unit of North and East, of polls in three months (at least before December). Residual matters, left over by the pre-Accord negotiations, were to be resolved between India and Sri Lanka within six months of the agreement. Tragic but true, India was not even consulted, notwithstanding a Joint Committee overseeing the implementation. Nay, worse. The 13th Constitutional Amendment and concomitant legislation are a caricature of the requirements in the Accord, thus making the very conscience of the Agreement a casualty.

Is the LTTE right in vacillating about the Accord? It must accept the Accord if, at least in fair measure, the basic claims of (a) an unconditional fusion of the North and the East (home land) and (b) a viable provincial autonomy (home rule), are accomplished. If the ISLA is a *fraud on these demands* for which years of struggle have claimed thousands of martyrs, and the Bandaranayake-Chelvanayagam Pact of 1957 had laid the foundation, will any Tamil militant, save some Judas, agree to the Accord except under coercion? My brief discussion with various shades of Tamil militants from the LTTE to the TULF showed that all of them were disgruntled and, about the XIII Amendment, thoroughly disenchanted. They looked to India as saviour and now feel betrayed by their own trustee. The LTTE respects India's role. In a recent speech by Tilakar of the Central Committee of the LTTE at a London Conference, he voiced the view of the Tigers:

> The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord secures India's geo-political interests and strategic objectives. The LTTE is sincerely pleased that the government of India was able to put an end, through the Agreement, to the dangerous activities of the international subversive elements who operated in Sri Lanka as agents of imperialism. As a revolutionary movement committed to anti-imperialist policy we recognise India's security concerns in the region and support her cardinal foreign policy of making the Indian ocean as a zone of peace free from interference of extra-territorial powers. In this context, we wish to point out that it was the LTTE fighters who put up a heroic and relentless fight against foreign mercenaries. Our liberation movement is not opposed to India's interests. We have no objection whatsoever to India's strategic aspirations to establish her status as the regional superpower in South Asia. We always functioned and will continue to function as a friendly force to India. We would have extended our unconditional support to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord if the Agreement were only confined to Indo-Sri Lanka relations aimed to secure India's geo-political interests. But the Accord interferes in the Tamil issue, betrays the Tamil interests. It is here the contradiction of interests between the LTTE and India emerges.

The 13th Amendment to the constitution confers on the president abundant power to impose emergency. Even during non-emergency periods, the president can govern through the governor who will be the agent of the centre. Thus constitutional puppetry, with strings pulled from the presidential palace, sabotages provincial autonomy. Even otherwise, the governor has 'discretionary powers' emasculating the executive and legislative authority of the elected surrogates of the people. This *triarchy* is worse than the British dyarchy in India. Apart from these factors, the actual transfer of legislative powers is quantitatively and qualitatively chimerical. And proclamation of Emergency is a perpetual damocles' sword! Taking the ISLA as a *fait accompli* the Tigers who represent the large majority (Rajiv Gandhi says LTTE represents none but, says General Pande, hot from Jaffna, 90 per cent of Jaffna peninsula is pro-LTTE!) are agreeable for a solemn cease-fire, but not a total surrender of arms. Why? JRJ is on his way out, his second and final term running out. His successor and the majority in the next parliament are anybody's guess. The provincial elections, even when the leading opposition boycotts the polls, give him a negligible majority. What certainty is there that the ISLA would not be rejected, in the light of open UNP opposition to the North-East joinder? In that event, how will the Tamils, already wounded and weakened in their militant might, resist the next suppressive wave? And, more awesome to contemplate, the IPKF would be ordered to quit by JRJ or his rivals before the general and presidential elections, whether India likes it or not. The K C Pant palaver is a face-saving device for phasing the return. It is humiliating to think that after losing some thousands of jawans (the number 640 or so is an incredible underestimate) and spending well over Rs 1,500 crore or so and despatching around a hundred thousand military men, India should be asked to quit, politely of course, with none of the major clauses in the ISLA yet fulfilled by Colombo! But Simhala voice will rise against large foreign forces on their soil and India is not their favourite. For sheer survival, both UNP and SLFP will order India out. And if the IPKF is off, the Tamils are back to square one and must fight with their fists since all weapons are to be surrendered, according to Rajiv Gandhi. Please note, the most virulent, violent JVP is back in the open, with ban lifted and weapons not surrendered. Why is the LTTE denied what the more dangerous JVP *de facto* enjoys?

What most distresses the human rights sensitives is the savagery of some of the Indian soldiery. Maybe they were expecting a meek Tiger surrender but were surprised at the stiff resistance of the LTTE. But the LTTE had political reasons not to give up arms and would not take orders from India's chief executive. Their accountability is to their people. Under what law should they surrender? Even if provoked by the sophisticated fire power and the superior guerilla wits of the Tigers, how could a disciplined army run amok with their guns and do worse? Many cases of rape by jawans have been reported. In some instances, jawans have been caught red-handed and taken to court. Shock and

shame gush from our patriotic bosoms when we listen to the inhumanity of IPKF activity condemned by many at a recent London meeting as crimes against humanity. A P Venkateswaran, among others, was there and both of us turned pale at the tales of woe. IPKF today is an acronym for Innocent People Killing Force. The Tamils, of course, whispered this in private for fear. A recent paper I received says:

> The worst crime committed by the Indian troops was the rape of Tamil women. Hundreds of Tamil women were raped brutally and most of them were done to death after sexual violence. This brutality deeply wounded the sentiments of the people and the hate for the Indian army became widespread. (*Tamil Voice International*, March 15, 1988, p 12.)

Likewise is another excerpt:

> Among the most brutal massacres committed by the IPKF was the mass killing at the Jaffna General Hospital. The Indian troops stormed into the hospital and killed in cold blood over a hundred and injured scores of people. Four doctors were senselessly slaughtered and several nurses raped and murdered. In this ruthless military campaign, 1,400 innocent Tamil civilians were killed and several thousands injured. Colossal damage was done to Tamil property.
>
> • • •
>
> Even today, after three-and-a half months of the declaration of war, dusk-to-dawn curfew continues. (*Ibid*, p 12.)

News black-out notwithstanding, here is what Rev Fr M E Pius, director, Jaffna Diocesan Human Development Centre, states:

> IPKF moves into houses and institutions at any time under the pretext of search for the LTTE. Many people have been beaten beyond recognition after tip-offs due to past rivalry, enmity or jealousy between individuals, families or movements. Many parents spend sleepless nights to prevent the raping of their children—a fear not without firm foundation. Due to the war situation, more than 90 per cent of the people in the Jaffna Peninsula are without any source of income (*Ibid*, April 1, 1988, p 5).

If you have the heart, read another short extract:

> On 29th the curfew was lifted for four hours. We visited the hospital on 29th and 30th. Only on the 29th did we learn about the brutal killings of nearly 100 people including doctors and patients, nurses, attendants, etc. I had the chance to speak to some doctors and patients; and here is an account given by a doctor: 'On 21st, at about 4 pm some Sikh soldiers walked into the hospital shooting at random. I was trying to get into the doctors' lounge, but was thrown to the ground by the people who were running all over for safety. I remained there for quite a long time, as long as the shooting lasted. When everything was quiet I tried to crawl back to my room; and as I did so I realised that I was crawling over some dead bodies. I remained in the room till morning'.

The more horrifying scenario makes painful reading:

> When I heard that Dr Sivapathasundaram, consultant paediatrician, had come to the hospital I tried to come out of the room. Dr Sivapathasundaram and two nurses were walking with raised hands and shouting. "We are doctor and nurses, we are surrendering". They were shot at point blank range. I also learnt that my good friend and colleague, Dr Ganesh, had been shot dead the previous evening when he came out of the doctors' lounge. Later on we were called and asked to remove the dead bodies. Dr Parimelalahan was also among the dead. We were given three hours to dispose of the bodies. Dr Sivapathasundaram lives within a mile and we begged of the Indian officers to hand over the body to his wife, but they refused. We tried to get the identity of those killed by searching their pockets and cutting away pieces of clothing. It was humanly impossible as there was so much of mutilation, disfigurement, blood and smell.
>
> The official count of the dead is less than the number actually killed. According to official number, among the dead were three doctors, one matron, two nurses, eleven attendants, one driver. In all there were 62 bodies inside the hospital compound, and another 25 outside the hospital gate and along Stanley Road. All the bodies within the hospital compound were burned inside the premises (*Ibid*, April 1, 1988, p 16).

Torture and electrical shocks, burning of genitals and hanging upside down were devices employed on the arrestees. Looting and destroying of houses were also common. I was given in London many affidavits by simple folk narrating their terrible travails of killings and so on. I will refer only to portions from one of them—Nirmala Kumari, age 28, Valvettiturai:

> . . .the members of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) assumed control over our Valvettiturai area on 6.11.1987 without resistance and continued to be in peaceful possession. . .
>
> My husband Mr Mylhanam Aathinarayanapillai (31 years) was a fisherman by occupation. . .
>
> On that day (i e, 24.11.1987) the IPKF had a house to house search in our area. At about 12.00 noon five of them entered our house. One of them shouted at us to come out of the house. Then, I was in the kitchen which is located in the front compound of our house. My husband was having a sound sleep inside. . .
>
> My eldest son Sivachandran (5 years) also went with the army men and put his father up. While he was getting up one of them who is presumably a gurkha soldier fired a shot into my husband's mouth from a very close range and killed him then and there.
>
> . . .we all started raising hue and cry. All other IPKF men scolded the particular officer in some unknown language—probably in Hindi. He left the house with his head stooping down.
>
> . . .after almost 10 minutes about 10 other IPKF men visited the scene. The officer-in-charge repeated by tendering apology by telling 'very sorry', 'very sorry'.
>
> . . .then they insisted us to have the funeral without delay. Out of fear we had the funeral at 1.30 pm on the very day, without having magisterial inquest and post-mortem [Affidavit (1 to 8)].

There are hundreds of such instances. A doctor (Jaffna Tamil) narrated how one day a hospital was a scene of indiscriminate massacre. The IPKF, suspecting Tigers in hiding, rushed into a hospital. Three doctors and nurses were in attendance and over 50 patients. They pleaded there were no militants but the soldiers opend fire, killed all the patients and some medicos. One doctor who escaped told me the story in London. More pathetic is the tragedy of many women and young men being recklessly shot at point blank range, with no post-mortem nor inquest. Surprisingly, some Indian officers were gentle and consolatory but the savage terror and

mean treachery of our army will take Tamils generations to forget or forgive. Of Operation Pawan, as an Indian I can only borrow the words of Burke: "An event has happened upon which it is difficult to speak, and impossible to be silent". Indians, collectively, are answerable morally to history. Did not Gandhiji say: "All humanity is one undivided and indivisible family, and each of us is responsible for the misdeeds of all others. I cannot detach myself from the wickedest soul."

We must—our parliament must—demand of our prime minister to appoint a national commission of three Supreme Court Judges to inquire and report comprehensively on the legality, morality and criminality of the operations of our forces and publish it. That is courageous

patriotism. The political balance-sheet of the Accord can then be struck by our performance auditors. If the president (i e, prime minister) declines, a People's Commission of Human Rights activists and retired judges must set sail. Disinformation and misinformation by Colombo and Delhi have incarcerated all information. Are the Tamil Tigers truly or wholly responsible for IPKF's blood-stained record? True, the LTTE did exceed in their methods and used terrorist tactics against informers, spies, rivals and the aggressive and over-powering IPKF. They had a cause, a cause which would not die even if the last Tamil Tiger was killed. They were savage in reprisals because the IPKF allowed one of their leaders to die of Gandhian fasting, handed over for torture their several leaders who committed cyanide suicide to save themselves, the



jawans indulged in orgies of violence, even sex, on civilian brothers and sisters under guise of searching for terrorists and demanded surrender of arms with no evidence.that Colombo would implement the Accord. The Tigers have abundant *extenuation*, though not exculpation. In any case, that is no alibi for the IPKF turning blood-thirsty.

Jaffna has been conquered, maybe. But the spirit of the people there will resist, long after their defeat. We are now disowned by the Simhalas and detested by the Tamils; thanks to our tragedy of strategy and hurry to win international glory! Let us look to the future and take measures of statesmanship. What are they?

Let there be cease-fire right now. To kill is easy; to breathe life impossible. But no surrender of all weapons because no one knows what tomorrow (will it be like yesterday?) holds for the Tamils struggling against Simhala chauvinists. I feel that the LTTE will fully accept a gentleman's agreement on cease-fire. Another important understanding with the LTTE is that they cannot, shall not, exterminate by violence the other militant groups. Political monopoly? No. LTTE hegemony? Yes, if you earn it by convincing the people. Today, the reality is that the LTTE is overwhelmingly supported by the Tamils, as even TULF leaders agree. I told the LTTE activists at the London conference that a united front, with a socialist slant, of all Tamil militant groups under the powerful leadership of the LTTE must spearhead the movement. India must insist, not in secret whispers but peremptorily, that a North-East administration be immediately announced with LTTE as leader of a united front. Each group will choose its ministers, not Jayewardene. Then come a few crucial issues which may summon the creative courage of both sides to reopen and review the Agreement to assure ethnic and political justice to the island minorities. The vague and jejune aspects *vis-a-vis* devolution and North-East fusion, from the angle of a viable Tamil homeland-cum-home rule within the sovereign republic, abandoning the *eelam* demand, require serious and substantive attention. The IPKF need not—some say, must not—withdraw, lest history should repeat itself. Even pro-Tiger Tamils do not want the IPKF to leave now, but they must stop the *danse macabre*. K C Pant notwithstanding, the IPKF may be directed by JRJ to quit, to soothe Simhala militants, since elections are in the offing. Even Indians, considering the casualties and colossal funding, with only negative returns, may ask South Block to call them back. Already, the Indian army, bowing to the pressure of Simhala allergy, is forced to get out, by stages though, and none will shed a tear for them.

World opinion also may tell on India's dubious role. India has acceded to the International Convention on Political and Civil Rights (ICPCR), though not ratified the protocol. There is a broad accountability to the international community on its human rights performance. In Sri Lanka, Articles 3, 5, 8, 9 and 10 of the Universal Declaration and Articles 6, 9 and 10 of the ICPCR have suffered asphyxiation at the hands of the IPKF and JRJ. My casual conversations with Tigers persuade me that the LTTE still wants India to play a dynamic part. It can, it must. But that needs statesmanship. Where is that endangered species? Not Prabhakaran, but the cause he represents, is the end. And after all, for a real solution, Prabhakaran may well be the instrument.

Accord has failed to protect Tamils' interests: LTTE

MADRAS, July 29.

The Indo-Sri Lankan accord could succeed only if the Tamils' aspirations were recognised and the deep, complex and historical problems of the Tamils were solved to their satisfaction, the LTTE said

In a statement issued on the eve of the first anniversary of the accord, the Political Committee of the LTTE said: "The accord as a whole aids and abets Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism. In such a situation, it is unreasonable and unjust for the Indian forces to engage in a war with our organisation to disarm us."

It said that the Government of India should accept the fact that it was the Government of Sri Lanka which was the root cause for the failure to implement even a single provision of the accord fully since its signing. "While fighting a defensive war against severe odds, against extreme conditins, we are trying to impress upon the Government of India, the historic fact that no force on earth, however formidable it may be, can impose a solution on a people through genocide and oppression."

"The trust we have placed on the people of India, the necessity to avoid any conflict with the Government of India, the longstanding friendship the people of Tamil Eelam have with India, and apart from these, considering the circumstances in which a force beyond our power of influence has placed before us this accord, it is our position to extend our cooperation for the implementation of the accord if the Tamils' interests and aspirations are safeguarded," the LTTE said, adding that in accordance with this position, they handed over their weapons and agreed to give away the remaining weapons also.

After an year, has this accord safeguarded the interests and aspirations of the Tamil people? the LTTE asked, pointing out that an interim administration till the holding of the elections which should have been constituted in accordance with the accord, had been disregarded; the assurance of the Indian Prime Minister that autonomous provincial councils will be created with adequate measure of autonomy or powers enjoyed by the Indian States, has been abandoned; the Tamil language has not been given equal status; as stated by the Government of India, Indian forces have failed to protect the Tamil people; and the Tamils' homeland is being annexed through Sinhala colonisation.

A SRI LANKAN TAMIL VIEW

Encourage Democratic Forces in Island-State

V. RAMA KRISHNAN

COMMENT

It is eleven months since the Indian Peace Keeping Force arrived in Sri Lanka. Initially, the mission was for enforcing a ceasefire, as the condition essential to initiate the peace process. The transition to a peaceful state was to be in stages as envisaged in the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. The Sinhalese armed forces were to return to their barracks as the LTTE and other Tamil militant groups lay down their arms. The implementation of the other provisions were to follow thereafter. But this, however, did not work to plan and the force that went for peace is now at war.

What went wrong and where? These, however, do not seem crucial questions now, as the forces bent on sidetracking the core issues, strive hard to steer events in different directions. Their perceptions, tainted by the interests they uphold or serve, leads them to adopt postures that prevent understanding and adjustment. The outcome of it all is conflict on the ground and deadlock at the negotiating table, while the Tamil people lay sidelined and frustrated.

The first shot fired at the IPKF came from the Sinhalese side of the racial divide. This happened in Trincomalee, when the Tamil majority was celebrating the arrival of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. The Sinhalese Home Guards, hitherto given a free-hand in terrorising the Tamils, saw in the IPKF's presence a serious obstacle to their routine activities. In two seperate instances, the IPKF personnel were shot at ahd an Indian jawan was fatally wounded. The vehicles the Home Guards travelled in, when given chase, was seen entering the compound of the Sinhalese Regional Commander.

The behaviour of the Home Guards at Trincomalee was symbolic of the general frustration in the ranks of the Sri Lankan (Sinhalese) establishment. In the North and the East at least, the accord and the IPKF presence had put a stop to their regular activities.

Earlier, the governing circles, who had it their way in destroying the economic base of the Tamils in the South, carried the campaign right into the Tamil country, and all this, after obtaining Tamil help to be voted into power. Shocked into disbelief that the Tamils dared resist, the Government proceeded to arm the Sinhalese settlers. The Tamils were to be driven away from the rural regions of Trincomalee, Vavuniya and Amparai districts. Cabinet Ministers vied with another in settling armed Sinhalese in the regions cleared of the Tamils. The Tamil militants, in turn, picked on their spots to attack with equal ferocity. Then followed the Pakistani and Israeli trained Sinhalese Commandos. They were sqeezing in by land, air and sea when India intervened and sent the IPKF. This certainly was occassion for shock and frustration.

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The Sinhalese establishment, that relies on Tamil hatred for an added lease, feels the accord was imposed on them, at the stage when the Tamils were almost on their knees. To the contending caste-groups within the government and their leaders aspiring for the succession the aged President appears to have struck a deal, with the 'big brother'. This is true in a way. In the power equation that emerged, the President required Indian assistance to continue in office, for without power he is not assured of peace and, for that matter, personal safety too. This, the shrewd old man is fully aware. What was in fact the threat of intervention by India was skillfully transformed into an accord among equals. He conceded all India's demands related to her geo-political interests while the areas concerning the ethnic issue were left slippery to make escape routes a possibility.

The accord's emphasis on the 'unity, sovereignty and the territorial integrity' of Sri Lanka, often deliberately confused with a unitary Constitution, absolves the President of the sin of conceding to Tamil Seperatism. This gives him a free hand to deal with his Sinhala critics. Simultaneously criticism, both genuine and inspired, is presented to Indian authorities as 'compulsions' and therefore grounds to replace 'vague provisions' with 'firm assurances', for assurances of any kind mean plain nothing in Sri Lankan politics. As for Tamil militancy, the Indians were led into a situation of dealing with it with their arms, men and money. In turn, the strategy of saving the lives of Sinhalese soldiers becomes propaganda material to justify IPKF presence. He also asserts periodically that the IPKF is under his command.

President Jayawardene's diplomacy, which until recently linked him with forces hostile to India, now carries overtures of a different kind, acceptable to policy makers in Delhi. This apparent shift in direction and the arrest of some of the top leaders of the LTTE that led to their suicide, sees the begining of the Indian entanglement with the Tigers. Solving the Tamil problem attracts less attention now as the focus shifts on to hounding the Tigers out of their hideouts. In the meanwhile President Jayawardene strives hard to empty the accord of its contents vis-a-vis the Tamil demands.

The merger of the North and the East as a Tamil political unit with an interim administration preceding elections to the Provincial Council, now seems irrelevant to the normalisation process. 'Normalisation', in the President's strategy, means return to

the very political and administrative arrangement, resistance against which led to the liberal flow of Tamil blood.

President Jayawardene may have won a battle but not the war raging in his backyard. Ten years of unmitigated power with the attendant abuse of authority by a militarised administration has its limits to a people accustomed to regular change of government. The wave of sentiment, forcefully displayed when two millions filed past the body of the assasinated Vijaya Kumaranatunga, reveals the state of rage.

Vijaya it may be noted, had also espoused the cause of the Tamils. The immense popularity he enjoyed inspite of his pro-Tamils stand is Index to the shift of opinion among the Sinhalese. And yet, the state controlled media strains hard to present the unrest as opposition to the accord. True, the groups involved in the infighting within the Government are adopting anti-accord postures. But this is a stick aimed at the old man at the helm. They have their followers within the armed forces who pick on select targets as their victims. The problem of identifying the area where formal politics ends and the JVP underworld begins therefore becomes a very difficult exercise. The Mossad legacy just cannot be erased off, for the doors are yet kept open to foreign pressure'. Hence the distinction between popular upsurge and the fascist backlash, with President, Jayawardene sandwiched in between.

On the Tamil side, the polarisation of forces becomes more marked, except that the democratic majority is silenced into near submission by the LTTE. The Sri Lanka Governments' efforts to wriggle out of their commitments becomes favourable grounds for the Tigers to beat up all opposition. (The evidence available is inadequate to read an overall design in geo-political terms.) Nor is there an effort to reaffirm Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's post-accord declaration of a permanent majority for the Tamils in the North and the East with developed powers comparable to that exercised in the States of the Indian Union. This, at least, could have inspired the silent majority to speak out.

With a free flow of funds, sophisticated weapons and a mafia like organisation, the LTTE was able to decimate all other Liberation groups militarily. The elected representatives of the TULF too, were kept off the scene, with threats of death sentences hanging on some of them. The strategy was to assume the role of sole spokesman for the Tamils. The favoured treatment from the late MGR and their ability to win over the lesser mortals of Tamil Nadu, along with the initial boost given by the Indian Government, convinced them that they were entitled to assume this role.

What went wrong and where? Why did the LTTE reverse its stand agreed upon and confront the IPKF? Was it the arrest of their top commanders and the inability of the IPKF to prevent it? Did this make them suspicious of Indian intentions? Did Mahathya supply Syanide to his arrested comrades with instructions to consume them, when he visited them in detention? If so, were these men on a secret mission, whose purpose was not to become public knowledge? More importantly, was there instructions from a more powerful third party to scuttle the accord? These and several other questions remain theoretical now, for the fact is that the Peace Force and the LTTE are at war. But they remain relevant, for any effort at peace must not ignore commitments that constitute the background.

The IPKF began their operations with inadequate intelligence reports, in particular on the quality and quantity of arms in the LTTE's possession. They lost many of their men at the initial stages and this lent ferocity to the Indian retaliation. The outcome was disastrous for their public relations and the LTTE never hesitated to exploit it to their full advantage.

The scene of the IPKF's main operation has now shifted to the jungles of the main land in the North and the Batticaloa District in the East. With the Tiger's Communication network in disarray, their cadre has resorted to adventurist tatics. Other militants too have joined the fray. Add to this an enraged Catholic Church and the Muslim fundamentalists and the scene gets as complicated as it can be. It also becomes difficult to discover where the 'Liberation' struggle ends and brigandage begins.

The reaction in India appears equally discouraging. Many seem confused, and this legitimately so. News of destruction of LTTE hideouts and capture of arms is matched with information related to loss of the lives of Indian soldiers. It also involves a serious drain of resources. President Jayawardene's periodic claims to be in total command, makes people wonder whether his war is fought at Indian expense. Domestic Political rivalry besides prevents the emergence of a consensus on basics. Some demand the withdrawal of the IPKF, while some slogans, from questionable quarters, demand that it be displaced by a UN Peace Keeping Force.

The impending elections in Tamil Nadu threaten to make Sri Lanka an issue. The DMK and AIDMK of the two J's have come forward to express concern over the safety of Prabhakaran. Some analysts even predict that the Congress-(I) Government may, in the circumstances, strike a deal with the LTTE in the efforts to stage a come-back in Tamil Nadu. In fact the GOI's talks with the LTTE are understood to have reached a crucial phase. However, in the struggle for power, extremist postures are being adopted by assain contestants in Tamil Nadu and this certainly will not help ease tensions in Sri Lanka.

What really matters most are the developments in Sri Lanka itself. If the anti Indian JVP in the South and their LTTE blood cousins in the North were to emerge as sole spokesman, they may jointly demand the withdrawal of the IPKF. In this effort, they may not hesitate to appeal for powers hostile to India's interests in the region. The only option, in the circumstances, is for India to encourage democratic forces to emerge and play a more effective role. As it is, sensitive sections with commitments of friendship, are awaiting the right signals. They need to be identified and encourage, for this is the best gurantee of peace in India's southern border. □

July 2, 1988 — *a Sri Lankan Tamil Report*

THE NEW YORKER

A Reporter at Large

Excerpts :

Mary Anne Weaver

On October 9th, General K.Sundarji, India's Chief of Army Staff, flew to Colombo to consult with an outraged Jayewardene and with Sri Lankan government officials and members of the general staff. Mincing few words, Jayewardene demanded that India meet its obligations under the peace accord: it must disarm the Tigers; otherwise, he would be compelled to send the peace-keepers home. **Stung into action, Indian forces set out the following day upon Operation Pawan (the word means 'wind'), to destroy the Tamil Tigers as a guerrilla organisation, beginning with their stronghold in the city of Jaffna.**

It is impossible to say how many died in the battle that followed, but the number was at least two thousand people - between seven hundred and a thousand of them civilians. (The Catholic Church of Jaffna disputes the generally accepted civilian toll, claiming that between three thousand and four thousand civilians lost their lives). Of the Tamil Tigers, between three hundred and four hundred died in the battle for the city, and **Indian Army lost more than five hundred soldiers and twenty-five officers. (This is the figure the Indian defence officials concede privately). It was the highest death toll that the Indian Army had suffered since the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War -evidence of astonishing blunders and miscalculations on the part of the fourth largest army in the world.**

No longer a ragtag group of fishermen's sons, the Tamil Tigers had evolved into one of the most effective guerrilla forces in Asia. They had been trained, after all, by the Indian Army and India's RAW. Yet the Indians now fatally underestimated their former proteges dedication and strength, their fighting skill, their insane bravery, and their intimate knowledge of the local terrain.

In late October, the Indian Army duly claimed to be in control of Jaffna, but it proved a hollow victory. During the last days of the battle, Prabaharan and twelve hundred Tiger fighters slipped through the Indian net into the swamps and jungles; other guerrillas, many of them teenagers, remained behind. After coating their weapons with grease and wrapping them in plastic sheeting, they hid them, dropping them into the myriad lagoons and harbours of Jaffna, or burying them in the powdery red soil. Then they slipped quietly into the refugee camps dotting the north. A nameless, faceless army, unknown and unseen, had blended into the civilian population from which it came. One Sri Lankan Intelligence official concluded, two months after the battle began, that as a fighting force the Tamil Tigers had survived largely intact.....

However, the advantage is shifting to their side again, as a full-fledged guerrilla war takes its toll in the east and the north. Booby traps and mines set by the Tigers, often with the aid of civilians, have made the Indian troops jumpy and confused, and they patrol in a perpetual crouch to avoid sniper fire. The soldiers have shot and killed civilians - sometimes intentionally, sometimes not. **According to lawyers and human rights activists, there is strong evidence of widespread atrocities by the Indian troops in Jaffna and the east. They have reportedly raped women and pillaged homes and shops. (On December 15th, a Sri lankan court found six Indian soldiers guilty of raping Tamil women during house-to-house searches in the north).....**

Eight months after the Gandhi-Jayewardene accord, the agreement is in tatters, and in the east and north more than sixty thousand Indian 'peace keepers' are occupying a fourth of Sri Lanka's countryside. And in the face of a vengeful guerrilla army, an increasingly hostile civilian population, and a peace agreement that has brought none of its promised rewards, India's peace-keeping operation shows every sign of becoming a painful long term occupation - one that invites comparison not just with Ulster but with Vietnam and Afghanistan. **Indian forces are bogged down in a foreign country, fighting a counter insurgency war they cannot hope to win.**

For the Indian Peace Keeping Force (which is costing New Delhi more than three million dollars a day), it is a matter of face and honour that the provincial polls be held - after which, at least technically, some of the unhappy peacekeepers would be eligible to go home. But no one, including the Indians, is under any illusion about the difficulties of holding them. It will be impossible to have peaceful elections unless the Tamil Tigers and the JVP bless the polls, and a new wave of large-scale violence could be precipitated when a hundred and twenty-five thousand Tamil refugees in India are repatriated and find that Sinhalese are now occupying their former homes.....

The conflict in Sri Lanka - independent India's longest war - is rapidly becoming an embarrassment for Rajiv Gandhi. Indian flags now fly throughout the north and east, and those areas are blanketed with Indian Army checkpoints and small army camps, but thus far the Indians have been unable to intercept the vessels plying the east coast which ferry to the Tigers ammunition and weapons, now most often from Singapore.

Sinhalese friends have spoken to me proudly of how 'the lad' Velupillai Prabaharan kept the Indian army out of Jaffna for more than two weeks. Ironically, the rising tide of criticism of the tactics and behaviour of the Indian troops has at last brought Sinhalese and Tamils to a consensus -

the Indian 'peace- keepers' must go home. **The Sinhalese resentment of India has always been there, and what happened when the Indian troops arrived in the north was that the Indians saw Jaffna, and the people of Jaffna saw the Indians, and neither liked the other very much.**

There is now a realisation among the Tamils that they have to look south, to Colombo, instead of north, to India. Also, I think there is a realisation in the Sri Lankan government that the Tamil Tigers, defanged, would be a better bet to negotiate a political settlement with than any other group in the country, including the Indians. Two government ministers, Lalith Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake, the Minister of Lands, were attempting to initiate such talks. When I brought up the possibility of direct talks between the Tigers and the Sri Lankan government, Dixit said, "I am not certain these talks will take place. There is a firm understanding between my Prime Minister and President Jayewardene that no arrangements will be made without India's involvement and India's advice.....

In November, Mr.Jayewardene told a journalist from the 'Madras Hindu', "About Jaffna I must say that I am rather ignorant, although we have people coming and telling us about the situation".....

(When I met the President in the last week of February, I asked him if he was having second thoughts about the peace accord.) The anti-Indian feeling sweeping Sri Lanka is extremely high", I said. "My Sinhalese friends have expressed admiration for the Tamil Tigers for standing up to the Indian Peace Keeping Force, and my Tamil friends have told me that the Indian Army is ten times worse than the Sri Lankan Army was." " Well, yes", the President said. "On your second point, the Sri Lankan Army has behaved much better than the Indian Army".....

I asked Mr.Jayewardene what, after ten years in office, he considered his greatest achievement. He laughed, and said, "My greatest achievement is that I'm here."

"ACCORD, A CHARTER FOR SERVILITY"

The following is a text of a press statement dated 9 July issued by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam:

'During the 9 months war of attrition, being waged unjustly by the Indian army large number of civilians have been killed, women have been brutally raped, millions worth of property destroyed and the wild life and jungles were devastated.

'India is trying to teach democracy to the Tamil nation, that has suffered 40 years of oppression to the extent of genocide, by spending millions of rupees to bomb and burn Tamil areas.

'India's propaganda seems to be that once the North and Eastern provinces are merged together temporarily and an election is held the grievances of the Tamils would be over. It must be remembered that enormous sacrifices made by the Tamil people and martyrdom attained by thousands of Tamil youth was not to effect a temporary merger and elections for powerless provincial councils.

'What is described as North and East is the Motherland of Tamils and that is indivisble. The Sri Lankan government rejoiced, rather vainly after "Operation Liberation" in Vadamarachchy, that the liberation struggle of Tamils had been crushed. However with the suicide attack by Black Tiger Miller at Nelliyadi on July 5th 1987, the Sri Lankan government was stunned. The Sri Lankans and the whole world realised that the Tamil liberation struggle has not ended and the Liberation Tigers have not been subdued or liquidated.

'India which entered Sri Lanka under the pretext of protecting Tamils claims to have crushed their liberation struggle after committing greater atrocities than the Sri Lankans and also declares that elections could be held soon. India also seems to be exploring the possibilities if it could hold elections with the help of quislings. India mistakenly believes if they could hold a show election and install a puppet administration in the Tamil homeland which had been made a big garrison of Indian army, they could convince the world that democracy has revived in Tamil Eelam. Since it is obvious that Tigers will not accept any solution couched under the veil of peace, that does not afford genuine protection for the Tamils, India is hellbent on eliminating Tigers and liquidating its leaders.

'India is wrong if it believes that it could implement the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, a charter of servility for the Tamils, by destroying the LTTE and its leaders. If India continues to engage in its effort to eliminate Tigers and kill Tamils, it would become inevitable that the Tigers would withdraw from the farcial peace talks and prepare the Tamil Nation for a long and protracted struggle against foreign domination.

'In the military engagement, last month 80 Indian soldiers were killed and 15 were wounded. The number of Indian soldiers killed in various districts are as follows. Kilinochchi-26, Mannar-7, Jaffna-2, Trincomalee-16 and at Mullaitivu-15. On our side, Major Salam, Captains Ragavan and Sabesan and Mano, Alex, Thamu, Hari, Sutha, Prince, Thiyagu and Arasan attained martyrdom, to whom we pay homage.'

INDIA'S REACTION TO AMNESTY REPORT

The Government of India denied allegations of rape and brutality levelled by the Amnesty International against the IPKF in Sri Lanka. "The charges were fabricated and unfair", a foreign office spokesman said. He said every specific complaint received from any source about the behaviour of IPKF troops has been investigated. Most of these charges have been found to be baseless. Whenever such charges have been proved, quick and salutary action has been taken against the guilty. The IPKF operated in Sri Lanka with the utmost restraint, and used minimum force to avoid or reduce civilian casualties as far as possible. As a result, the IPKF took extra ordinarily heavy casualities, a sacrifice which only a highly disciplined force was capable of. The Indian army is a highly professional body of troops, and acts according to professional code. (Unfortunately, facts have proved otherwise and Rajiv Gandhi and the Indian forces stand indicted. Ed.)

INDIAN DEFENCE REVIEW

Lessons from Sri Lanka
A Subcontinental experiment in power projection

IDR RESEARCH TEAM

COMMENT

Introduction

As we go to press, Operation Pawan, one of the most significant politico-military experiments in power projection in recent times, is apparently in the process of being wound up. It is one of the longest wars fought by our armed forces. Though classically it may be called low-intensity conflict, its scope and scale have been that of a full-blooded conventional conflict. It has been a bitterly criticized and controversial venture. The media has been severely critical. Snide innuendoes have been passed on the so-called 'pacto-mania' current in our highest echelons. The armed forces are confused. For the first time they have had to wage a bitter campaign which did not have the unequivocal support of the entire nation. In its later stages it was blanked out of the media because of its impact on Tamil politics. Fighting troops thrive on recognition and glory. That denied, it becomes a cruel and thankless grind. Our erstwhile Army chief himself appealed for a national consensus on the issue before he laid down office. That by itself is a clear indication of the bitter divide it generated. As our legions return home, it is time for us to pause and take stock. It is still too early to come to definite conclusions for we are living too close to the events. However, enough has been published in the media for us to make a spot appraisal and check course.

The subcontinental Monroe Doctrine

Operation Pawan is the first real example of power projection in the subcontinent on the American RDF (Rapid Deployment Force) model – a model designed to enable a superpower or a regional power to project force in the defence of its perceived vital interests in other states. Bangladesh, our first real intervention, was a war in the classical Clausewitzian sense. The Sri Lanka operation fits the doctrines that have emerged in the post-Second-World-War phase. It is an extension of what may be called the 'South Asian Monroe Doctrine', that had been enunciated during Mrs Gandhi's regime to safeguard Indian interests in the South Asian region. Such an assertive diplomatic stance was a natural outgrowth of India's emergence as a pre-eminent regional power.

Today India has the fourth largest and amongst the world's best-equipped armies, the fifth largest air force with top-of-the-line aircraft like the Mirage 2000 and MIG-29s and above all the seventh largest blue water navy which can boast of two aircraft carriers and a nuclear submarine (with more to follow).

The unwritten South Asian Monroe Doctrine spells out India's determination to draw political mileage out of this military power. India is now a significant military power. Its growing naval strength ensures that even a superpower will now be forced to think twice before it intervenes physically in any conflict involving India in this region. It will have to be prepared to pay a heavy cost in capital ships and lives, should such physical intervention take place. It is a logical corollary to assume that the Indian ruling elite should try to convert this military capability to further national interests in this region.

Sri Lanka is the first concrete instance of India's willingness to use its military muscle in the pursuit of its regional interests. It is a crucial test of India's will to use its enhanced power to secure regional clout. It has set alarm bells clanging in Pakistan (who has hastened to call it India's Afghanistan). What is more important is the intense debate that it has stirred up in the country itself. In the long term the domestic fall-out will be far more important than the external dimensions of this campaign.

An analysis of options

Sri Lanka is a tear-drop-shaped island. The agony of its intra-national conflict between the Sinhalese and the Tamils is too well known to bear repetition. What happens to the Tamils in Sri Lanka has a material effect upon the Tamils of South India. India, therefore, cannot insulate itself from the fall-out of this intense ethnic conflict caused by the violent clash of Tamil and Sinhalese sub-nationalisms. So, when in 1987 the Sri Lankan authorities decided upon a 'final military solution', the impact was bound to be felt in India.

Computer war-gaming is an in-thing these days. Let us therefore replay the problem again and analyse the options of the Indian nation state in the face of the Sri Lankan crisis. These can be summed up in the following flow chart:



Let us now analyse these options in detail.

Non-intervention

The fierce media criticism of the operation seems to suggest that overt non-intervention was possibly the best course. Such a view is naive in the extreme. It is arrant nonsense to advocate that we should have sat back and watched the Sri Lankan crisis go into a violent tail spin; or that we should have turned a Nelson's eye to the creeping encroachment by foreign covert agencies (the Israeli Mossad and the British Keeny Meeny Services etc.). India has vital security stakes in Sri Lanka. These are:

(*a*) *Ethnic.* India has a large Tamil population in its southern region with close ethnic ties with the Sri Lankan Tamils. The emotive fall-out of a military solution designed to beat the Sri Lankan Tamils into submission could only be ignored at great political peril in India.

(*b*) *Geo-strategic location.* Sri Lanka lies at the tip of the Indian peninsula. It dominates all the important sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. Its ports of Colombo and Trincomalee assume great strategic significance. In the hands of an inimical naval power they can serve to cut off the Indian Eastern and Western fleets and seriously dislocate our maritime traffic.

(*c*) *Springboard for covert operation.* Separatist sentiment had been fairly strong in the Indian southern state of Tamil Nadu. Kerala was the first Indian state to turn communist by the electoral process. The death of MGR and the fall-out of the Sri Lankan crisis can lead to a highly volatile situation in this region. Already reports have surfaced of a Tamil extremist organization which has been behind a number of bomb blasts and train derailments in Tamil Nadu. Any hostile presence in Sri Lanka could serve as a springboard for covert intervention in the peninsula politics.

It is obvious therefore that no Indian government worth its name could have been oblivious to these vital security interests in its own geo-political backyard. *We had to intervene. The vital question was how?* One obvious answer was covert intervention. Apparently this had been the course pursued by Mrs Gandhi's regime. Covert support to the Tamil separatist guerillas could serve to raise the costs for the Sri Lankans. Severe attrition imposed on the Sri Lankan armed forces could perhaps wear down the 'military solution lobby' and lead to a resumption of political dialogue and mutual reconciliation between the two communities. It could equally have the opposite effect. A bitter, fratricidal conflict could breed permanent alienation and leave bitter scars on the collective psyches of the two communities. Ethnic conflicts tend to be brutal and bloody. The Harvest of Hate goes into the collective racial memories to breed permanent divides. That was how a bitter and unrelenting war started between the Sinhalese and Tamil sub-nationalities in Sri Lanka.

By early 1987 the position on the ground was that the LTTE-dominated Tamil militants had consolidated *de facto* control of the Northern Province of Jaffna. For two years they had held on to it in the face of concerted attacks by the Sri Lankan armed forces. The Sri Lankan authorities raised the ante by a ham-handed campaign that included economic blockade and aerial bombing of the Jaffna peninsula. In the Northern Province at least 'Tamil Eelam' was a physical and *de facto* reality.

The present Indian regime had now to grapple with the consequences of this bitter, fratricidal war. It had to decide whether it wanted an independent state of Tamil Eelam to come into being or not. It is apparent that it unequivocally seemed to have decided that such a result was not in its long-term interests. From the purely geo-political and military point of view this conclusion itself can be debated.

Invasion: The extreme option

If we question this basic end result it leads us to an examination of the second hypothetical option that the Indian state had: outright invasion a la Bangladesh to bring about the emergence of a Tamil Eelam state spanning the Eastern and Northern Provinces of Sri Lanka. Let us paint the hypothetical scenario a little more in detail and examine the advantages and disadvantages that could have accrued from such a course.

A HYPOTHETICAL INVASION

It is apparent that the Indian armed forces had been preparing for quite some time for such an eventuality. The high media profile exercise Tri Shakti that involved air and amphibious assault rehearsals in Goa had clearly driven home this message to all decision-makers in the subcontinent. Let us turn the clock back and wargame a hypothetical scenario. Let us go back to end June and early July 1987.

MILITARY COUP IN SRI LANKA

Prof. Girilal Jain had disclosed in an editorial in the *Times of India* that it was the threat of a coup by the Sri Lankan armed forces that forced President Jayawardene to execute a neat volte-face and sign the Indo-Sri Lankan accord. Let us assume that India had decided not to come to the rescue of President Jayawardene. The hypothetical scenario that could have emerged could be as under:

(*a*) *End July 1987.* Sri Lankan armed forces stage a coup and depose President Jayawardene. The new military regime vows to wipe out the Tamil Eelam militants and intensifies air, land and sea assaults on Jaffna. It uses Napalm on population centres.

(*b*) India warns the new military regime against escalating this conflict. It refuses to recognize this regime and pledges support to the democratic regime of the deposed civilian president.

(*c*) The military regime refuses to call off the offensive and appeals for support to USA, Pakistan and China. Pakistan promises support and recognizes the new regime. Embattled Tamil militants appeal to India to intercede.

(*d*) *13 August 1987.* Elements of India's 54 Air Assault Division and the Para Brigade land at Jaffna and Trincomalee. Air heads are secured with LTTE help at Pallaley and Trincomalee airfields. An air bridge is established and the ports are secured. Amphibious troops storm ashore a few hours later.

(*e*) *Jubiliation in South India and amongst Sri Lankan Tamils.* There is wild jubiliation all over South India. The Indian Prime Minister is hailed as an incarnation of "Shiva" – the saviour of the Tamil people.

(*f*) India inducts an armoured and a mechanized brigade with total air supremacy. Indian forces clear all Sri Lankan armed presence from the Northern and Eastern provinces. By end August 1987 both these provinces are fully secured.

(*g*) There is intense world-wide condemnation of the Indian invasion. Pakistan alerts its forces. The USA places its Central Command on full alert. The United Nations Security Council asks India to withdraw its forces. The Chinese condemn Indian hegemonism and warn of serious consequences.

(*h*) An LTTE-dominated government comes up in Jaffna. On 3 September 1987 it declares a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). The state of Tamil Eelam comes into being. Most of the countries in the UNO refuse to recognize it.

(*i*) Elements of the US Seventh Fleet commence an exercise off the Philippines. The Soviet Union pressurizes India to withdraw its forces from Sri Lanka. Troops withdrawals commence in end September 1987. There is a second coup in Sri Lanka and another General assumes charge in Colombo.

(*k*) The deposed president of Sri Lanka forms a government in exile in India. Tamil refugees return to the new state of Tamil Eelam. There is great tension on India's Northern and Western borders. India prepares for covert intervention to topple the military dictatorship in Colombo and restore democracy.

World media headlines accuse India of brinkmanship. Fights break out in Tamil Eelam between LTTE and other guerilla groups. The LTTE secures its hold after a virtual bloodbath.

(*l*) India goes in for a snap mid-term election in December 1987. The war euphoria causes a landslide victory for the Congress(I). Border incidents escalate on the Western border. The forecast is grim.

ANALYSIS OF THE INVASION OPTION

The above was a highly imaginative and rather optimistic account of what history could have been if India had decided not to go in for the accord but opted for an invasion. Let us dispassionately examine its pros and cons.

Advantages

(*a*) Such an easy 'win' could possibly have unleashed a lot of war euphoria and chauvinist sentiment and would have been very popular especially in the South. It may have been the Indian 'Grenada'. Its domestic effects would have been very positive indeed.

(*b*) Such a sharp, swift and decisive war could possibly have served to bridge the psychological divide, North and South of the Vindhyas. It would have given India a cheap military victory.

(*c*) The Tamil refugees would have been repatriated – a large-scale and long-term military presence could have been avoided in Sri Lanka. A long and costly counter-guerilla operation may have been obviated.

Disadvantages

(*a*) *International reaction.* Such a course, though domestically very popular, could have had disastrous repercussions internationally. India would have been totally isolated in all world forums.

(*b*) *The South Asian Lebanon.* A divided Sri Lanka would have become South Asia's Lebanon – perpetually unstable – a feuding ground for international intrigue and ceaseless strife.

(*c*) *Unrepresentative character of LTTE regime.* The LTTE has shown itself to be a brutal and fascist organization that is totally intolerant of dissent. It could never have provided a moderate and representative government to the Tamil people of Sri Lanka.

(*d*) *Fanning Tamil separatism.* Would the establishment of a Tamil Eelam state have fanned Tamil separatism in South India? There is a distinct likelihood of such a development though it is logically plausible to

propose that such a Tamil state could equally have sought a merger with India a la Sikkim.

The third option:
Intervention by invitation

Obviously the Indian nation state chose the middle course or the softer option of intervention by invitation. It responded to President Jayawardene's distress call and decided to underwrite the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka. Given the historical animosities between the two feuding communities it was bound to be a herculean task. Holding such a state together needs far more fusion energy than a cold-blooded attempt at dismemberment would take. By underwriting Sri Lanka's unity and integrity India has chosen to play the role of Syria in Lebanon. It has chosen to intervene on the side of order and oppose the entropic and centrifugal forces in the subcontinent. Given our commitments against China and Pakistan do we have the military wherewithal for such an awesome and long-term undertaking? Did we rush blindly into the accord without realizing the full long-term implications? These are moot questions and only time can give us the complete answers. We started by trying to safeguard Tamil interests in Sri Lanka. Events have led us to engage in a thankless counter-insurgency campaign against the LTTE, the chief Tamil militant organization which had more or less succeeded in carving out a Tamil Eelam in Jaffna. The chief criticisms of the accord option are:

(*a*) *Long-term nature of CI operations.* Counterinsurgency campaigns usually stretch out over a decade and more – can LTTE insurgency be tamed in a one or two years time frame?

(*b*) *What happens after IPKF withdrawal?* (i) Will the LTTE regain its erstwhile hold and lead to a new stand-off between Tamils and Sinhalese? Will things regress back to square one, once we leave? (ii) Will we have alienated ourselves both from the Sinhalese and Tamils of Sri Lanka? What about the long-term post-Jayawardene scenario?

(*c*) *What will be the repercussions in Tamil Nadu?* The demise of MGR has unleashed considerable uncertainty in the political situation. He was one of the key supporters of the accord. Will it lead to any long-term alienation of the Tamils? So far this has not happened and maybe the prophets of doom are wrong. We will have to wait and watch.

It is obvious that time alone can vindicate the accord option. It may turn out to be the only workable option that we may have had. *Though internationally applauded it has led to domestic confusion and sharp divergence of opinions. It has demonstrated the fact that it is essential, nay vital, to prepare domestic public opinion before we undertake large-scale operations at home or abroad.* A concerted media campaign to prepare the population and soldiery and sustain its enthusiasm is essential. A war that is relegated to the back pages and obscure corners of papers is not likely to be prosecuted with zeal for long.

Our strategic thought has of late been shaped to an acceptance of the use of 'Force without War'. Highly sophisticated doctrines of coercive diplomacy have been worked out in detail. However they appear simply too sophisticated to impress the common man or for that matter the common soldier. Before each of our past wars our propaganda organs had switched into the highest gear to psyche up our soldiery for conflict. The conspicuous absence of this media mobilization even by government organs is disconcerting. A quick campaign may have been better played up by the media to mobilize public support and raise and sustain the morale of the armed forces. The radio, television and press mediums had been mobilized to the highest pitch in our past wars. This has not happened in the Sri Lankan conflict and its absence has been keenly felt.

India: A status quo power?

In deciding against invasion and opting to underwrite the integrity of Sri Lanka, India has highlighted her credentials as a 'status quo power'. Any analysis designed to generate new options will need to address itself to the central question – Does the present status quo in the subcontinent suit us? We have lost most of the advantages we gained after our 1971 victory and a restructuring of our overall security environment may become inevitable in a few years time frame.

Most military observers are predicting Armageddon on the subcontinent well before this century is out. We need to psyche ourselves for the coming Apocalypse. We can therefore do without a lot of dovish cooing and crooning in the official media. We may have reasons to regret our peace paeans later. We cannot send our troops to war on slogans of peace. We are today a regional power. We need to inculcate the chauvinist attitudes that go with this power. The Hans are ultra-sensitive to the treatment given to the overseas Chinese in other countries. As a self-respecting nation we should acquire this sensitivity to the treatment other nations give to the overseas Indians. God willing in the years to come the growing power of our navy may just give us the means to make others conscious of our deep sensitivities even as far as Fiji. But before we adopt such a high-profile stance we need a major and concerted media blitz to psyche up our people and glorify our military traditions.

The confusing dichotomy of peaceful rhetoric and aggressive military postures will have to be resolved. Only a xenophobic, revivalist regime can sustain the mass mobilization required for distant foreign interventions or even bitter wars to the finish that may erupt in the subcontinent itself. Despite all this talk of

peace and Buddhism the world today is unfortunately headed for Armageddon. Students of military history will recall that the Second World War was preceded by a similar peace blitz. We have to see the writing on the wall. We have done well to modernize and streamline our armed forces. We need to prepare as a nation for more vicious times ahead. Sri Lanka may only be the tip of the violent iceberg.

An analysis of our performance

The intervention by invitation option was decidedly attractive. It was indeed a major diplomatic coup pulled off by our External Affairs Ministry. Dixit, as the Sri Lankans said, "Fixed it". And so we went in. Let us now leave aside all hypotheses and analyse our performance. Did we fix it or have we been fixed in the bargain? A great deal has been published in the media to enable any dispassionate military observer to piece together a fairly accurate picture of events on the island.

Phases of the Sri Lankan campaign

The campaign as such can be divided into four major phases:

(*a*) *Insertion* (End July–first week of August 1987). The fly-in of our RDF in terms of the 54 Air Assault Division and the initial surrender charade that lasted till October 1987.

(*b*) *Battle for Jaffna* 9 October–end November 1987.

(*c*) *LTTE: Eastern shift.*

(*d*) *The Eastern offensive.*

Let us now analyse each phase in greater detail to draw object lessons.

INSERTION

The accord was signed and on 29 July 1987 the Indian RDF comprising the 54 Air Assault Division was rapidly flown in. The Indian Air Force and civilian aviation assets seem to have been pressed in. India has clearly demonstrated its capability to airlift an entire division. The air bridge lasted some 7 to 10 days and despite poor airport facilities at Jaffna, seems to have been successful in inducting the entire RDF by the first week of August. There are press reports to indicate that the Indian armed forces seem to have been caught unawares by the sudden move. The general accord euphoria seemed to have spread to the troops. Early reactions were of bonhomie with the LTTE whom the soldiers felt they had been sent to assist. The LTTE went through the motions of a sham surrender. The accord soured rapidly. Intra-militant clashes broke out. The LTTE, a combat-hardened force of some of the most experienced guerillas in the world, had seen the Indian army come in sans its heavy weapons. Bristling as the militants were with some of the best automatic weapons and mortars from the Singapore arms bazaar, they soon lost their awe of the Indian army. This was a serious underestimation and belies a lack of maturity on the part of the LTTE leadership. By the end of August 1987 the accord seemed to be in a shambles.

The battle for Jaffna

Sun Tzu had said, 'The worst policy is to attack cities. Armies traditionally dread the concrete jungle and would avoid it like the plague. The best armies of the Second World War had met their Waterloo in the streets of Leningrad and Stalingrad. The city sucks in troops like a vacuum cleaner. The LTTE had made their stronghold in the concrete jungle of Jaffna. For two years it had become a *de facto* state of Tamil Eelam. They had held it successfully against the Sri Lankan Army in conventional combat. The motivation of the LTTE cadres (symbolized by the cult of the cyanide capsule) was amazingly high. The defences of Jaffna itself were organized in two concentric rings – one based on the city core and the other on its outskirts.

In retrospect this seems to be the phase of maximum confusion on the Indian side. The accord was tottering and the reactions had the tinge of panic. The LTTE had very deliberately set its course for collision. Another division (the 36th Infantry Division as per media reports) now seems to have been flown in – shipped in panic. Slightly confused and apparently disoriented troops were thrown into battle in what *India Today* has described as 'indecent haste'. In their terrible anxiety to get the IPKF to crack down on the LTTE the Indian decision-makers seemed to have lost all respect for organizational cohesiveness and formation boundaries. A desperate numbers game came into evidence as the IPKF went into high gear to do something it had not been structured or psyched up to do initially. The greatest fiasco was the commando raid on the LTTE HQ at the University of Jaffna at night on 12 October 1987. The para commandos landed slap in the middle of a football field (a traditional fly-in port for clandestine support to the LTTE) that was raked by heavy LTTE fire from all around. The heroism of the para commandos in this desperate situation was commendable. Equally tragic was the fate of a company of the Sikh Light Infantry sent in for link up (*India Today* has given a detailed account of this episode).

The creaky start of the Jaffna offensive launched in the most desperate and indecent haste left quite a few red faces all around. But the Indian army is a seasoned and historic army and soon got its act together. Five Indian Brigades began to squeeze in on Jaffna city centre along the five major roads. It was no CI campaign. It was regular war – brutal, bloody and desperately fought. The fanatic motivation of the LTTE and their amazingly skilful use of mines came as something of a shock. Lord

YOU TOO INDIA?

கை வேறு கால் வேறுக
சிதறிந்து கிடந்தவோ பறவைகள்



எனது கதவைத் தட்டிக்கேட்காதே எதுவும்
மரணத்தால் விறைத்திருக்கிறது என் வீடு

.....

இந்த நாட்கள்
காக்கி நிறப் பேய்களால் நிர்வகிக்கப்படுகின்றன.

இன்று
பூக்களும் பறவைகளும்
குழந்தைகளின் புன்னகைகளும்
பெண்களும் எரிந்து போயினர்
உறுப்புகள் வெட்டப்பட்டவர்களின் குரல்கள்
வெளிகளில் தடுமாறுகின்றன.

.....

மணலில் பதியும் ஒவ்வொரு சுவட்டிலும்
ரத்தமும் சீழும் படிகின்றன

சிலந்திகள் பின்னிய வலையில்
சரித்திரத்தின் ஆந்தைக் கண்கள்
வெறுமையாய் உறையும்.

எனது கதவைத் தட்டிக் கேட்காதே எதுவும்
இன்று
மனிதனாக இருப்பதே குற்றம்

Roberts' martial race theory went up in the dense smoke of Jaffna.

After a brutal slog, the outer perimeter of Jaffna defences seems to have been secured by the third week of October 1987. The painful slog for the core of Jaffna began thereafter. By now the IPKF had recovered its elan. The high ratio of officer to men casualties showed that the junior leadership had withstood the test of fire. (It also showed that the LTTE were specifically targetting them.) The Indian infantry, which is largely peasant-based, is one of the toughest and best infantries in the world. In the long run it was bound to prevail and it did.

By end November 1987 the IPKF had secured Jaffna completely. Flushing-out operations to mop up LTTE pockets in Vedamarachi and Kyats islands proved quite successful. From the military history point of view, the LTTE decision to resort to conventional combat in an urban setting, with a professional army, was flawed. Historically the only other precedent is the uprising of Polish Jews in the Warsaw Ghettos during the Second World War. The ratio of troops to space in a restricted urban area dictates that a guerilla outfit cannot hope to survive in a conventional war in such restricted geographic settings.

For the Indian army the chief lesson is epitomized by Mao's dictum, 'Do not fight an unprepared Battle.' Another Chinese dictum says, 'Four fast and one slow' – the one "slow" aspect is for preparation. Methodical and careful preparation goes a very long way in ensuring a smooth and rapid campaign and minimal casualties. Commanders owe it to their troops and must be able to stand up to the political leadership who may, for their own compulsions, be in a desperate hurry to show results. Montgomery in the Second World War and Sam Manekshaw in 1971 are excellent examples of military commanders who refused to be hustled into battles without full preparation.

LTTE: EASTERN SHIFT

The LTTE leadership seems to have realized that continued conventional combat in the restricted confines of the Jaffna peninsula was suicidal. It needed greater and more open spaces to melt away. To shift to the Eastern province was its most logical course. By end November 1987 it seems to have achieved this aim. A very large number of the LTTE cadres did manage to slip out to the Eastern provinces (whether over the narrow Elephant Pass isthmus or by sea or a combination is difficult to guess). Had the IPKF campaign not been launched in such a rush, perhaps a major portion of the LTTE could have been bottled up in Jaffna and destroyed. Media reports indicate that thereafter the 36th Infantry Division was switched to the Eastern province for more classical CI operations.

THE EASTERN OFFENSIVE

It was patently obvious to the Indian military planners that far greater force levels would be needed to cater for the greater geographical dispersion of the LTTE in the Eastern province. Jaffna also had to be held securely – for prestige reasons and to deny the LTTE its greatest source of finances. Classical CI operations need force ratios of 10:1 or more between security forces and insurgents/guerillas. The basic guerilla strategy is to extend the war in space and time, to survive and to wear down the will of the regular army by constant pinpricks. If that was so, we were in for a long and hopeless CI campaign that could last a decade or more. The Americans in Vietnam and very recently the Soviets in Afghanistan had failed to subdue guerillas in such long-drawn-out wars. Would we succeed? We seemed to be in a logical *cul-de-sac*. The only solution was to take advantage of the Himalayan winter, accept a risk and substantially raise force levels in Sri Lanka for a concerted knockout blow in a quick time frame. Provided we were able to mount sufficient pressure the LTTE could be induced to accept the accord and climb down from its inflexible 'Eelam-at-any-cost' stand.

The second phase of the induction of more troops now commenced. Two more divisions were now taken across the subcontinent. (*India Today* identified one of them as 57 Mountain Division that had years of experience in counter-insurgency operations in the North East.) Preparations were deliberate and methodical this time and the pay-offs have been highly visible in the operations that followed. *India Today* (15 June 1988 issue) gave out a total strength of the IPKF as 51,356 which appears reasonable. The earlier wild guess-estimate by Ravi Rikhye of over 100,000 troops seems far-fetched and implausible.

The LTTE had now concentrated in two major strongholds – one the urban setting of Batticaloa and the second in the Vavuniya-Maluitivu forested belt. To ensure successful operations it was essential that the LTTE cadres be prevented from slipping out by sea like slippery eels. A three-tier sealing of the coast was effected. The coastline itself was sealed by the Army; the Navy and the Air Force formed the second and third cordons respectively. After a methodical build-up and sealing the 57 Mountain Division launched the major cordon and search operations in Batticaloa in end March 1988. In a series of skilfully conducted search operations it combed Batticaloa and 30 villages in the adjoining jungles. This operation dealt a body blow to the LTTE in Batticaloa and led to the capture of a number of their top leaders and cadres.

The IPKF now turned its sights on the Vavuniya area. A chance encounter in June 1988 at Alampil led it to stumble on the largest insurgent hideout of the LTTE. Mahatya Sri, the intransigent leader of the military wing

of the LTTE (along with a number of other top military leaders), was holed up here. The IPKF had hit pay dirt at last. The whole area was a maze of fortified bunkers. Bitter fighting broke out in what could turn out to be the most decisive battle of this campaign. As we go to press media reports indicate that negotiations between the LTTE and RAW are in the final stages. If that is so, we can indeed claim victory. All is well that ends well. The hero of this long and bitter saga will then be the tough and stoic Indian jawan, the rugged peasant infantryman who has proved that he is still one of the best in the world.

In conclusion: Armageddon 1990

A perceptive student of military history will note a number of parallels between the situation in the subcontinent and its peripheral regions today, and the situation in Europe in the 1930s. To that extent Sri Lanka fits the analogy of the war in Spain that preceded the main conflict in Europe. Gorbachev and all the world leaders may be on a peace offensive today. Chamberlain and Stalin were also on a peace offensive in 1939 just before the Second World War. Chamberlain had returned triumphantly from Munich crowing 'peace in our times'. The words have a tragic tinge today in hindsight. One hopes one is wrong but the turbulence in Afghanistan, the spread of the Kalishnikov culture in Pakistan, China's perception of India as the main regional adversary, all seem to point to very turbulent times ahead. Spain had become a combat laboratory prior to the Second World War. Sri Lanka may well turn out to be the subcontinent's combat laboratory.

Maybe a few years later when the crunch comes Indian soldiers will fall upon their knees and thank Heaven for this God-sent intervention. Peace time 'squad-post' training breeds disaster in the early stages of any war. That is true of any army in the world. Dunkirk proved it in the Second World War. Fortunate is the army that gets a fore-taste of combat before the real crunch comes.

Alarmist? Insane? Ultra-hawkish? Call it what you will but today someone must ring the alarm bells. In the midst of all this dovish cooing – this cacophony of bland peace platitudes in our media – there is a need to strike an ultra-hawkish stance. *You just cannot send an army to war on slogans of peace.* The Indian peasant troops are simple, emotional and amazingly tough. They are simply the best fighting material anywhere in the world. We should stop confusing them in a difficult situation. The committal of 50,000 troops to combat calls in for a concerted media mobilization to raise and sustain high motivational levels. Soldiers do not fight for bonuses but for recognition and glory. This has been done before in each and every one of our post-independence wars. Today its absence is being keenly felt.

Prime lessons

We may just have pulled it off in Sri Lanka despite all odds. The peasant-based Indian infantry is tough. Unlike the American, Soviet or European infantry it has not gone soft and can combat the insurgent at his level of basic skills and hardihood. The prime lessons that emerge are:

(*a*) *Grenada not Afghanistan.* Sun Tzu said, 'No country ever profited from a long war.' A long-drawn-out campaign for which we have not prepared militarily or psychologically is best avoided. Short, sharp, swift and highly successful interventions, though unpopular internationally, are music to the domestic audience. If we are brash enough the world will lump it anyway! Any campaign has an external (or international) and a domestic dimension. Sri Lanka shows that the domestic angle can only be ignored at great peril. Long-term interventions that are likely to bog our troops down in counter-guerilla/insurgent roles are best avoided in the future. A model of long-term covert intervention on the American Green Berets pattern followed by a short, sharp and swift denouement is best. *When a nation state goes consciously into a long-term war it has to mobilize all its resources for a total effort in a very deliberate and conscious manner. A nation cannot go into war and forget to mobilize psychologically and materially.*

(*b*) *Methodical Preparation.* Methodical preparation and a deliberate and sustained build-up pay very handsome dividends in combat. Let us not go back to the Second World War for analogies. 1971 is the best example. Initially in Sri Lanka, we grossly violated this dictum.

(*c*) *Organizational cohesiveness.* Let us not tamper again with organizational cohesiveness of units and formations. We tried that in 1962 by putting together a disparate and rag-tag 4 Corps. I don't think very many of us will live to forget the disaster that followed. The initial mistakes in the Sri Lanka campaign (caused by what *India Today* has called 'indecent haste') were however duly corrected in the campaign itself.

(*d*) Grassroot lessons. It is for the units involved to draw grassroot lessons on basic fighting skills. Let us not be unduly alarmed. All peace time armies have found sudden transitions to actual combat very jarring. If the times ahead are dark and turbulent let us thank Him for this God-sent combat laboratory and make the most of it while it lasts.

INDIAN EXPRESS

28 July

One year of Lanka accord reviewed

By RITA SEBASTIAN

Colombo, July 20: "The maximum is on the table now on which the government of India and Sri Lanka are agreed, although the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) say that the devolution package is less than what they wanted Let further improvements come about through the institutions envisaged, not in terms of compartmentalised ethnic pleas but on the general political re-structuring of Sri Lankan society as it lends itself to the processes of decentralisation", said Indian High Commissioner J. N. Dixit on Tuesday. He was addressing the Foreign Correspondents Association of Sri Lanka.

Mr. Dixit, Lands and Mahaweli Development Minister Gamini Dissanayake, and Sri Lanka Freedom Party MP Anil Moonesinghe were panelists discussing an year of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord.

Mr. Dixit's comments came in his assessment of why the Indo-Sri Lanka accord came into being and what it has tried to achieve.

There was the presence of a large number of Tamil refugees in India after 1983, an upsurge of militant Tamil separatism in the north and Tamil militancy which posed a security problem. India's involvement, said Mr. Dixit, was not to foist a Tamil sovereignty on the island as India is accused of trying to do. If India did that she would be sowing the seeds of her own disintegration. India's intention was to interact with the government of Sri Lanka, overcome the gulf of suspicion and help restore normalcy to the island.

There was sufficient pressure of events and motives and a consciousness of the political realities that led the leadership of the two countries to evolve a situation that would satisfy both Sinhala and Tamil aspirations, he said. Contrary to what was being said, the accord had the close scrutiny of every single member of the cabinet and all the Tamil groups before it was signed, said Mr. Dixit. Referring to the demand of the militants for Eelam, India's answer was a categorical 'no', for accepting Eelam would be rejecting what India has always stood for, a united country in the framework of a multi-ethnic, multi-racial and multi-religious society.

Talks continuing: Mr. Dixit admitted that the time-frames envisaged in the agreement had not been met. A specific factor contributing to it was the difficulty the LTTE was finding in making the transition from a violent guerilla force to a political force. The talks with the LTTE had not stalled but were continuing.

Mr. Dixit charged that while at the highest level there was agreement there were still pockets in the LTTE side as well as the Sri Lanka side to pull back on certain issues which were further aggravating the situation

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Nikhil Chakravartty COMMENT

Facing a Fiasco

THIS week marks the completion of one year of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement signed by President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at Colombo on July 29, 1987. As the Agreement was widely hailed at that time as a great achievement by the Governments of the two countries — though there were warning notes as well, from many quarters including this journal — it will be useful and necessary to make an appraisal at this stage how far the expectations entertained at the time of the accord and the objectives held out in it, have been fulfilled. It is worth recalling that Rajiv Gandhi, at a public meeting in Madras four days after the signing of the accord, bombastically declared: "It is an Agreement without precedent in history. It is an Agreement, which does not have a parallel in the world. It is an Agreement, which puts into practice the ethical ideals of Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Indiraji."

Broadly speaking, the Agreement was meant to ensure the "nurturing, intensifying and strengthening the traditional friendship of India and Sri Lanka"; to acknowledge "the imperative need of resolving the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka and the consequent violence"; and to provide for the "safety, well-being and prosperity of people belonging to all communities in Sri Lanka" (quotations from the Text of the Agreement itself). It is necessary to evaluate how far these laudable objectives have been realised.

What was the scenario when the Agreement was signed? First, the massive military operation mounted by the Sri Lankan security forces against the Tamil northern province had failed. Secondly, the Jayewardene Administration had to face the attack of the Sinhala militant organisation, Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), and the very survival of his own regime was precarious, as even the capital, Colombo, was facing arson and disorder the very day the Agreement was signed. The very same night Jayewardene sought the help of the Indian troops to take over northern districts so that the Sinhala armed forces could be rushed to protect the capital, particularly the Presidential Palace. It was indeed a case of the Agreement virtually saving the Jayewardene regime, thereby making India appear as exclusively safeguarding the Government of one party in Sri Lanka. In fact, the Agreement was regarded by a large body of the Sri Lankan public as a commando operation to rescue President Jayewardene from political collapse. The wide base of goodwill that India always commanded even among the Sinhala public has shrunk in the course of this year as the traditional ally of India — Sirimavo Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), for instance — has turned from a position of neutrality in the crisis to one of antagonism.

This erosion in terms of political goodwill was, however, not compensated by the gains expected out of the Agreement itself. The direct Indian intervention in the island's affairs — militarily as well as politically — has earned for it the goodwill of neither the Tamils

available wisdom and should not be made a close preserve of the Prime Minister and his yes-men coterie.

The importance of political intervention as distinct from official negotiations lies in the fact that the party with which the talks have to be conducted is highly sensitive about its mass image. It could bend before political allies as an act of being persuaded by peers but would not like to appear as being conducted by officials, however seasoned or highly placed these might be. This mishandling of a delicate political question has persisted throughout in the dealing with the Tamil groups and the LTTE is not the only one to make such a complaint.

Even in the recent round of the Government's talks with the LTTE, the job has been entrusted to RAW, no doubt a competent intelligence agency but totally unsuited to pacify the ruffled feathers of the highly sensitive LTTE leaders, made more self-conscious after the military reverses they have had to suffer. If New Delhi's objective is to win over and not to humiliate the LTTE leaders, it has had no business to leave them to be handled exclusively by official agencies.

The mishandling by the Government of India has, therefore, much to do with the aggressive intransigence of the LTTE leadership today. In this context, if the responsibility for this sorry state of affairs has to be apportioned it would be incorrect to throw the blame on the obduracy of the LTTE leadership alone: it has to be shared in good measure by the Government of India the bankruptcy of whose policy is writ large in the terrible predicament into which our armed forces have been placed.

It has become fashionable for the Government to condemn any criticism of its involvement in a protracted military operation in Sri Lanka as casting an aspersion on our armed forces: obviously it is convenient for the Government to take cover behind such a cheap argument. The point to note is that the policy pursued by the Government — if there is a well-thought-out policy at all — is responsible for the mess in which our armed forces have been placed, and not the leadership of the armed forces.

For one thing, it is a misnomer to call the Indian Army now engaged in military operations as a Peace-Keeping Force. By no international norms an Army engaged in full-scale military combat can be called a Peace-Keeping Force. The fault certainly does not lie with our armed forces, which have a proud record of discipline and fighting mettle, but with the political leadership which seems to use the armed forces with cavalier irresponsibility.

It needs to be recalled that the Government, in the first flush of excitement after the Agreement, had given out that the operation, when launched against the LTTE, would not take more than two weeks to finish it off. Now it is engaged in the ninth month of its operation, in which more than 60 thousand armed personnel are engaged, involving all the three services. In the public eye, it hardly brings credit to the Indian Army that it could not overpower a small armed band of about two thousand, now might have been reduced to several hundred. Apart from the expenses involved — the amount of the drain scrupulously kept out of even Parliament's scrutiny — the fact that about 550 have been killed and over two thousand wounded hardly helps to enhance either the morale of the armed forces or mutual understanding between the public and the armed forces.

It is a grotesque situation that through the folly of the political leadership of the Government our armed forces today have to face the odium of being maligned in a country which at one time was friendly. If one were to ask as for whom the jawans had to give their lives in Sri Lanka, it can hardly be said that it was for the defence of the motherland, nor could it be for the upholding of democracy. One need not be a cynic to say that this was to prop up the tottering regime of Junius Jayewardene whose political credentials do not warrant him to be regarded as a close friend of ours in the arena of world affairs.

There are some who demand that the Indian Army must decimate the rump of the LTTE leadership now entrenched in the jungles of the north. These self-styled military strategists do not seem to realise that no insurgency in history has been wiped out by military means: the job is done by concerted political offensive. A desperate guerrilla band fighting on its own terrain dedicated to die for the land, can go on harrassing and unnerving the best army in the world. And the Indian Army leadership must never be blamed if they cannot exterminate Prabhakaran's intrepid Tigers.

The prospect today is that the Government, after having failed either to win over or overpower the LTTE leadership, seems to have resigned to the holding of the elections to the proposed provincial council of the north and the east. There is talk of inducting more reinforcements of the Indian Army to ensure the election. What is not being realised is that an election at gun point never succeeds nor can it help to set up a stable government. It needs to be noted that even staunch supporters of the Agreement like Minister Gamini Dissanayeke, are now having reservations about the efficacy of continued Indian military intervention.

No, the way out lies not through induction of more troops but by unleashing a full-scale political offensive — not for confrontation but reconciliation.

The Indian role in the Sri Lanka crisis today demands an all-out *national* endeavour embracing all parties. Let such an all-party team go, unarmed, to Jaffna and to the jungle hide-out of the LTTE leaders, talk to them and bring them round to the peace process. And then the same all-party team must proceed to Colombo and meet every party — even those who are critical of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement — and persuade them to regard the problem of reconciliation with the Tamils as a *national* problem — and not just a party problem. This way the climate will be created for internal reconciliation in Sri Lanka, and the need for Indian armed presence would be minimised. New Delhi's objective should be to facilitate the withdrawal of its armed forces from Sri Lanka. Apart from other considerations, let us not forget we have our own frontiers to guard.

In the true tradition of Mahatma Gandhi, such a sacred mission beckons all parties in India today. The crisis in the relationship between India and Sri Lanka can no longer be left to be mishandled as a private enterprise between Rajiv Gandhi and Junius Jayewardene.

N.C.

July 28

THE SUNDAY TIMES

88 July

INDIA'S EIGHT OPTIONS

By Qadri Ismail in 'The Sunday Times (Colombo) - July 14, 1988

COMMENT

"Better to let them do it imperfectly, than to do it perfectly yourself, for it is their country, their war, and your time is short."

The words are those of T.E.Lawrence, but they were probably similar to the thoughts of many Indian diplomats last week. Don't be mistaken; they are nowhere near conceding defeat. (In any case, they haven't been defeated.) Nevertheless, they are beginning to rethink. The first letters have been etched on a wall down Thurstan Road, though the full message will not be evident for many months: **No country, however large, can in the post-colonial era succeed in physically managing, over an extended period, the internal affairs of another.**

The U.S.A. in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan are only the high profile examples. The Vietnamese themselves were not successful in Kampuchea, the Israelis are not in Palastine, the Syrians are not in Lebanon, etc. Just as much we would not be in the mess we are in right now if our people and government had learned from the mistakes of others, India, too, wouldn't be in the mess it is beginning to realise it is in Sri Lanka today, if it had learned from the similar follies of the "super" powers.

It was way back in 1945 that K.M.Panikkar, the noted Indian foreign policy scholar, wrote, "while to other countries the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is the vital sea... Her future is dependent on the freedom of that vast water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless the Indian Ocean is free and her own shores fully protected. The Indian Ocean must, therefore, remain truly Indian." The implications of this statement for countries around India are not difficult to grasp.

Jawaharlal Nehru was, being a politician, a little more ambitious and a little less diplomatic. In 1954, he called India "the obvious fourth country in the world after the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R and China". Not foreseeing the rise of Japan and of a united (Western) Europe is forgivable. From a founder of Non- Alignment, his utterances on the relations between big powers and puny countries are not: "I can understand some of the similar countries of Europe or... of Asia being forced by circumstances to bow down before some of the greater Powers and becoming practically satellites of those Powers, because they cannot help it..."

There has been, from those days, a basic continuity in Indian foreign policy, a steady working towards the accomplishment of these goals. This is not the place to look at Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal, or Bangladesh. **Suffice to say that on July 29th 1987, slightly less than four years after Indira Gandhi walked through an ante-room in her office and told the various leaders of the Tamil militant organisations assembled there that she would look after them, Phase One of the recent Indian initiative on Sri Lanka was virtually over. The militants had been successfully used to gain the leverage India wanted over Colombo. All that remained was for them to be quietly neutralised. And all that stood in the way was one man, without even O levels, called Velupillai Prabhaharan.**

PRABAHARAN RESISTED ACCORD

He resisted the accord and was dragged kicking and screaming into "co-operating with its implementation" in August. He fought back "non-violently" and won virtual control over the north and east in September. Dissatisfied, he fought back violently in October. In February, he authorised his former Jaffna commander, Sathasivam Krishnakumar, to begin another round of peace negotiations. When these seemed close to fruition, he struck again.

The Tiger statement of July 9th is ominous. It is also the most noteworthy political event so far this year. The "enormous sacrifices made by the Tamil people and martyrdom attained by thousands of Tamil youth was", it states, "not to effect a temporary merger and elections for powerless Provincial Councils. What is described as north and east is the motherland of Tamils, and that is indivisible." After accusing the Indians of "committing greater atrocities than the Sri Lankans", it goes on, in the strongest language used by the Tigers to date, to call the accord nothing less than "a charter of servility for the Tamils." By those words, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam has categorically rejected the accord and lost the chance of entering the "main stream" of politics except on Indian terms.

The statement goes on to say that the Indians are wrong if they hope to implement the accord by destroying the Tigers and imposing a set of quislings on the Tamils. Then follows the threat, which the Tigers no doubt hoped would make the Indians tremble. "If India continues to engage in its efforts to eliminate Tigers and kill Tamils, it would withdraw from the farcical peace talks and prepare the Tamil nation for a long and protracted struggle against foreign domination."

Reacting to this, an important Sri Lankan official said, it has "frightful implications" and was worried that the Indians would now increase the heat on Colombo to immediately improve the devolution package. The Indian High Commission, however, reacted with equanimity. It regretted the LTTE's stance, "in the context of the very earnest endeavours made by the Government of India to invite the LTTE to the processes of democratic policies"; and added that India would "continue its various efforts at persuading them to give up violence."

WHAT INDIA CAN DO

Actually, there is very little new that India can do. On paper, it has the following options, presented in order of unlikelihood:

1.Withdraw the IPKF, say they made a mistake in getting involved in the first place and leave the Sinhalese and Tamils to sort things out;
2.Militarily destroy the LTTE;
3.Make the Sri Lankan government announce a permanent merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces and change the devolution package substantially;
4.Go through with elections in the north and east without LTTE participation- while the battle is still on - and claim that their obligations under the accord have been fulfilled;
5.Close down the LTTE office in Madras;
6.Arm more effectively and unleash groups like EPRLF, ENDLFand TELO on the Tigers;
7.Intensify rehabilitation and other efforts to drive a wedge between the Tamil population and the Tigers;
8.Continue doing what they are now.

To look at each option in turn. **Firstly,** the IPKF cannot withdraw. The Sri Lankan government will protest at India leaving without completing the job, and also leaving it to fight on two fronts at the same time. **More importantly from the Indian perspective, this would mean that all Indian regional ambitions, the main thrust of their foreign policy since 1948, would crumble.** (And the Pakistanis would celebrate Ramzan for the second time this year!) No, the Indians are still some years away from having to humble themselves before the world. Though, as with all "great" powers, their time, too, will come.

As for two; even if the Congress (I) forgets its ambitions in Tamil Nadu, **the IPKF cannot (attempt to) militarily defeat the Tigers because no army has, in the post-colonial age, vanquished a guerilla foe. Three;** the Indians can't put more pressure on Colombo and ask for permanent merger at this stage because it is politically impossible for the UNP to grant this (as long as an election is pending here); and now that India is actually in Phase Two of its Sri Lanka operation, **it is more important for it to "protect its investment in Colombo." In the words of one Indian diplomat, "We can't sacrifice Colombo for the Tigers."**

Four: elections cannot be held in the north and east as long as the LTTE and IPKF are fighting because, under the Provincial Councils Bill, the President cannot proclaim a merger of the Provinces until he is satisfied that there is a cessation of hostilities. (K.C.Pant's timetable gets added to the long list of irrelevant pronouncements on Sri Lanka.) It is possible for Mr.Jayewardene to amend this particular clause. Or he can say that he is satisfied that there has been a cessation of hostilities - if the Indians persuade him - even though slight fighting continues. But (again, as long as an election is pending) this is not likely.

Five: closing down the Madras Tiger office would be counter-productive as long as the Indians can hope that the "moderate" Kittu can in any way influence Tiger thinking. **Options six and seven will probably be employed to whatever extent possible. But what the Indians are most likely to do is continue to meander along as they have been doing since February "intensifying" military operations and praying like hell that the Tigers see reason.**

TIGERS HAVE 2000 WEAPONS

The Indians face many difficulties in moving for decisive victory against the Tigers. Sri Lankan intelligence estimates that the guerillas have 2,500 fighters, of whom only about half carry weapons all the time - for fear of getting caught at Indian check points. The Tigers are estimated to have around 2,200 weapons, including 80 to 100 heavy weapons. In certain areas, these sources say, like north of Vavuniya, Vantharumoolai and north of Mannar, no serious moves have been made against the Tigers. Which is where the bulk of them are meant to be found now. (The Tigers are also meant to be low on supplies; they do not engage the IPKF in direct confrontations, and no longer, always kill suspected informants with bullets, but were using knives etc.)

Currently, 15,000 troops are employed in some of these areas in "Operation Checkmate", which is described by the Indians as "just a name given to the checking of movements of men and materials into the Vavuniya sector." Soldiers of the 4th division, who specialise in "information and disinformation", are being used here. The specialist counter-insurgency division, the 57th, is currently deployed in Batticaloa. This has seen anti- guerilla activity in Mizoram and Nagaland. "But," said a senior Sri Lankan officer who had trained with the Indian Army in Mizoram, "the terrain is very different. Those areas are hilly, wet and with thick jungle. While Mullaitivu has the thickest forests in Sri Lanka, those are dry and scrub and in flat land.

"The current Indian strategy," he said, "has to be changed to one involving protracted missions into these forests. They must be prepared to stay there for long periods - and even then their chances of success are not certain. They have to improve their intelligence and hit selected targets, hard and fast. That is the only way." For a proper cordon and search operation in such terrain, a soldier is needed every five yards. No army has this kind of man-power. In Nagaland, the Indian Army used as much as 6,000 men to cover areas of 30 square miles - and still had not very impressive success.

The LTTE operates now in groups of five to eight, each group a minimum of five and a maximum of ten miles from the next. Young, "innocent looking" children perform sentry duties; most of them have radios, but close to a camp, exploding a granade alone would suffice as warning. With their superior knowledge of the terrain, the Tigers, who break into ones and twos when retreating, would find it easy to exfiltrate if attacked. "Besides", said the Sri Lankan officer, "the Indians are fighting with SLR's, which are not as effective in close combat as the AK-47. Like they did recently in the

Golden Temple, they should use AK's themselves."

FULL-THROATED PRESSURE

In time, the IPKF will no doubt sort these things out as much as they can. Now that the Tigers have effectively given up the negotiations option, the Indian Army will have to change from putting half-hearted to full throated military pressure on the guerillas. By failing to deliver the Tigers, it is RAW, which has been conducting the negotiations, that will find its credibility weakened. In contrast, Jotyindra Nath Dixit, who has been advocating a tougher line with the Tigers, was smiling this week.

RAW, badly needing to restore its image following the widely touted intelligence failures that led to major IPKF mistakes after October 10th, must have decided to make a deal with the LTTE at any cost. The cost of a short term triumph for RAW, of course, was long-term disaster for India. (Since the Tigers would have used the deal only as breathing space to be able once again to destabilise the situation.) RAW would have considered climbing this wall when they came to it.

Mr.Dixit would like to avoid it, he is careful. "They are not responding to political contacts, so military efforts will continue," reveals only the thin edge of the wedge. What that statement actually says is that no deal is possible with the LTTE and the political option has to be abandoned. With his friend Narasimha Rao back in the Ministry of External Affairs, and with circumstances proving him right, Mr.Dixit's clout with his Prime Minister can only increase.

"A DEMOLISHED SCHOOL IN JAFFNA"

The LTTE clearly fear this. Mr.Dixit's refusal to be alarmed about their July 9th statement must have led to the one four days later, where the Tiger threat of protracted war was changed into an almost desperate plea that one must be prevented. "Heroic freedom struggles of the oppressed people were never defeated in history," it concluded. Its author is right; but that fact does not mean that the LTTE has the ghost of a chance of winning, either - whether their goal is Eelam or anything else. The IPKF expects a long war of attrition, and this is what will happen, with the LTTE being steadily marginalised. (Though this does not rule out the occasional spectacular attack, say in Jaffna, for media purposes.) The only consolation for Mr.Prabaharan and his deputy will be that they will take the Indians down with them. Eventually.

From a country-wide perspective, what this means is continued instability. And, as long as conditions are unsettled in the north and east, it can be argued that national elections-whether General or Presidential - cannot be held. It will then be of little consolation to the SLFP, considering together all four electorates that voted on Thursday, they polled more votes than the UNP.

'BASIS OF ACCORD IS WRONG'

INTERVIEW

The President of the Ceylon Workers Congress and Minister of Rural Industries, Mr. S. Thondaman in a statement issued on the anniversary of the Indo Sri Lanka Accord said that India had acted in good faith in entering into the agreement with Sri Lanka. Though the IPKF actions had caused much hardship, one could not deny that the Tamil people wanted the Indian army to enter Sri Lanka. But the main reason for the lack of success of the agreement was its wrong basis, he added.

The following is the full text of Mr. Thondaman's statement:

'The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord came into existence because India wanted a peaceful solution to the Tamil demand for a separate state. Though India did not endorse the Tamil claim, it did recognise the fact that the Tamils were fighting for their legitimate rights. One cannot I think, doubt India's good intentions in conceiving the Accord and entering the island with substantial arms in the form of a Peace-Keeping Force.

'After India moved in, however, it found that it did not possess the resources to implement the Accord. And since it had signed an agreement with the Sri Lankan Government, it was anxious to honour the terms, and consequently began to resort to military measures.

'The main reason for this turn of events was the basis of the Accord. Rather than having the two principal protagonists sign the Agreement–that is, the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamils–with India underwriting it, the Accord was signed by the two governments, without involving the Tamils directly in the process.

'Though India negotiated with good faith in the interests of the Tamils, as it has demonstrated by its subsequent actions, India did not really understand the aspirations of the Tamil people. It felt that a minimun degree of devolution under the Accord would satisfy the Tamil people. But it did not. The Tamil demands at present centre on a merged North and East, substantial devolution of power and a halt to Sinhala settlements in the Eastern Province. The crux of the matter is that if the Tamils and the Government had been the main negotiators and India only a guarantor, this problem would not have arisen. India did not understand the true aspirations of the Tamils and found that it had to use the IPKF against the very people whose interests it came to protect.

'Though the IPKF actions have caused much hardship to the Tamil public, one cannot deny the fact that the Tamils, too wanted the Indian Army to enter Sri Lanka. The IPKF is here to fulfil a specific task – the implementation of the Accord.

'And since they have been called in by the Sri Lankan Head of State, who feels that is the best thing, there is nothing that can be done about it. The best solution to this problem would be for India to recognise and acknowledge the aspirations of the Tamil people, and draw up a satisfactory formula which would meet the just demands of the Tamils. This will lead to the gradual cessation of hostilities after which the IKPF will not have need to resort to militarism to control the Tamil people.'

EDITORIAL

A YEAR AFTER THE ACCORD

The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement signed on 29 July 1987 was intended to bring an end to the then raging ethnic conflict and violence that had rocked Sri Lanka for several years and inaugurate an era of peace and harmony among its people. A year has elapsed. But the violence and conflict continues unabated. Indeed the violence has spread to other parts of the country which had previously remained relatively unaffected.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force which arrived in the wake of the Agreement has failed to restore peace. On the contrary, it is engaged in a violent and tragic confrontation with the most dominant Tamil militant group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In this confrontation, many innocent Tamils have been killed, and many others subjected to untold hardship and suffering. In several instances, the personnel belonging to the IPKF have behaved as bad or even worse than the Sri Lankan security forces from whom they came ostensibly to protect the Tamil people.

'Operation Leap' and 'Operation Liberation' previously undertaken by the Sri Lankan security forces have been followed by 'Operation Pawan', 'Operation Virat', 'Operation Trisul' and now 'Operation Checkmate' launched by the IPKF. The successes claimed as a consequence of these operations have not brought peace, but death, destruction and misery to the people.

The basic cause of the continuing violence resulting from the confrontation between the IPKF and the LTTE is that the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement does not adequately provide for meeting the national aspirations of the Tamil people. With all its reservations, the LTTE is on record as having pledged to cooperate in the implementation of the Agreement. That being the case, it is hoped that the ongoing talks between India and the LTTE would lead to a resolution of the areas in dispute thus bringing peace to a long suffering people.

Ironically, the cause for the campaign of violence unleashed in the south of the island by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) with the tacit support of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) is that the same Agreement has granted too much to the Tamils and the limited devolution for which it provides is equated with the division of the country. These parties ought to realise that gross distortions of this type and the continued denial of the legitimate rights of the Tamil people resulted in the emergence of Tamil armed resistance. The cause of Indian intervention, to begin with indirectly and later directly, in Sri Lankan affairs has been the inability or rather the pig-headed unwillingness on the part of Sinhala political leaders to resolve a problem which was essentially an internal one.

If the SLFP or the JVP, or for that matter any other party or group, desires an early exit of the IPKF and to see an end to Indian meddling in Sri Lankan internal affairs, then they should come to terms with and recognise the legitimate aspirations and national rights of the Tamil people. The advance towards the realisation of those aspirations and rights have reached a point of no return. No amount of anti-Tamil propaganda based on misinterpretation of history or distortion of present day realities is going to prevent that advance.

Mass struggles against a government which subverts representative democracy by frequently monkeying with the Constitution, or extends the life of parliament by depriving the people of their right to periodic general elections, or suppresses political dissent and opposition by resorting to draconian, arbitrary or military means is one thing. But combining some elements of such a struggle with a campaign of individual terrorism which draws its inspiration and nourishment from an essentially chauvinist anti-Tamil stance is politically and morally wrong, counter-productive and reactionary and therefore should be resisted. For all the marxist rhetoric of the JVP, it has not only failed to recognise and understand the basic tenet that national minorities are the natural allies of all progressive forces, but has also ganged up with the most reactionary chauvinist and fascist elements in Sri Lankan society while engaging in a vicious and sustained campaign of individual terrorism.



"The Island" 7/7/88

INDIA'S FIRST YEAR IN LANKA

Mohan Ram writing in 'India Abroad' of July 29, 1988

COMMENT

India's military involvement in Sri Lanka is a year old. Though aimed at securing implementation of the July 29, 1987 agreement to solve the island republic's conflict, it has produced mixed results. The conflict remains.

The sharpest criticism of India's role came on the eve of the first anniversary of the agreement, described by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi as *the accord of the century*. It came from Gamini Dissanayake, a Sri Lankan minister who, unlike some of his cabinet colleagues, was known to be its supporter. Dissanayake said in Colombo on the eve of the anniversary that the Indian Peace Keeping Force (in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka for a year to demilitarise the conflict) had failed in its role. He also declared that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the most powerful of the secessionist groups, should be made either to accept the accord or be eliminated as a military factor. That perhaps sums up India's problem.

The biggest weakness of the accord, as the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) member of Parliament, Anil Moonasinghe, said, was that the majority of the Sinhalese and Tamil people did not agree with it.

Not Demilitarised

At the end of the first year, the balance sheet of the agreement is as follows: The conflict has not been demilitarised. The Indian Peace Keeping Force was sent to secure a disengagement between the Sinhalese forces and the Tamil secessionist guerrillas in the Tamil majority Northern and Eastern provinces. The Sinhalese forces were to be confined to their barracks. This was achieved. The next step was to get the Tamil guerrillas to lay down their arms. This was not done because the surrender of arms by the LTTE in early August 1987 was a token affair. It became a conflict between the IPKF and the LTTE beginning Oct.10, climaxed by the fall of Jaffna later that month. It is a continuing operation, laying India open to the Sinhalese charge that either it is incapable of liquidating the LTTE militarily or it is prolonging its operation deliberately to justify an indefinite stay of the IPKF. The IPKF could neither break nor bend the LTTE, which is holding out despite its heavy loss of manpower and arms and the Indian claim to have annihilated it militarily. **Politically, the provisions of the agreement, which provides for a measure of autonomy to the Tamil provinces through a devolution package, have not been realised.**

President Junius Jayewardene says he has delivered his part of the bargain having legislated for implementation of the devolution package. **Ironically the provincial councils, through which the devolution is to be effected, were constituted through elections in stages between April and June in the seven Sinhalese majority provinces that really did not want autonomy. The two Tamil provinces for which the devolution package was designed have not been able to hold elections.**

India has promised to create physical conditions for holding elections in the Tamil provinces by the end of July (that is, by the end of the first year of the agreement) but not the political participation.

The devolution package is inadequate even to the moderate Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), which welcomed the July 1987 agreement. India has been unable to revive the political processes in the Tamil provinces which in effect means getting the LTTE to participate in the political process, for without its participation no election would be legitimate. This leaves unrealised the essential component of the 1987 agreement - autonomy for the Tamil areas short of giving them a sovereign homeland. Strategically, India might have realised its objective of pre-empting the direct involvement of outside powers or a foreign naval base at Trincomalee.

Few Tamil Gains

While it might be a welcome respite for the Tamil provinces from the depredations of the Sinhalese forces, the Tamils have gained little since the political processes have not been revived in their areas.

But the 1987 agreement has helped polarise Sinhalese opinion on concessions to the Tamils and sharpened the opposition to Jayewardene and his United National Party (UNP) in the form of a nexus between Sirimavo Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the Sinhalese chauvinist militant youth organisation called the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). These two groups called for a boycott of the provincial council elections while the JVP tried to enforce it through terror tactics.

No Endorsement

Though the UNP could win all the provincial councils, the voting outcome is by no means an endorsement of the India-Sri Lanka agreement because the other contender, the United Socialist Alliance (USA), comprising the leftist parties, was not opposed to the accord either. The drop in voting in a country with a tradition of universal adult francise, dating back to1931 and known for a 70 per cent turnout at the polls, witnessed a sharp drop in voter participation at the council elections.

The 1987 agreement was between two governments, and the Tamils, who are its central concern, were not a party to it. Secondly, the Sri Lankan government that signed it lacked legitimacy because the 1977 parliament had prolonged itself through constitutional gerrymandering and the country had not had a national election since 1977. Jayewardene has placed the onus of securing the implementation of the agreeement - that is, getting the LTTE to accept it - on India, which is seen in a number of roles - a party to the agreement, its guarantor and its enforcer.

The Economist

COMMENT

Year of the mauling of the Tigers

A year after India sent its soldiers into Sri Lanka, that unfortunate country is still in the grip of civil war. For India's Prime Minister, Mr Gandhi, this is a disheartening comment on his long and patient pursuit of a peace plan based on a mixture of force and negotiation.

In early July it looked as if Mr Gandhi's strategy was going to succeed. Many of the Tigers' arms caches had been seized, the main channels through which they obtained weapons had been blocked, at least 200 of their best fighters had been killed or captured, and intercepted messages revealed low morale in their ranks.

Meanwhile, the negotiators in Madras were already discussing the duration of a ceasefire, the number of weapons the guerillas would hand over, and the deadline by which they would be handed over.

And on June 30 Sri Lanka's President Mr. Jayawardene had renewed his offer of an amnesty for Tigers who laid down their arms.

On July 10, however **the Sri Lankan Government issued a statement repeating that the proposed merger of the island's Northern and Eastern provinces would become permanent only if the people of Eastern Province, where Tamils are in a minority (by reason of colonisation) approved it in a referendum to be held not more than a year after the election of a joint council for the merged provinces.** This statement touched on the most sensitive element in the India-Sri Lanka agreement of July 29 last year.

Tamils in Sri Lanka had long demanded the creation of a single "Tamil homeland" comprising both provinces. Until last year the Government in Colombo had refused to consider the merger fearing that it would be a stepping stone to secession. When Mr Jayawardene accepted its inclusion in the July agreement, he insisted on making the permanence of the merger conditional on ratification by a referendum in Eastern Province. The Indian Government was not happy about this, but it hoped Mr Jayawardene would postpone the referendum and let the issue fade away.

But the Sri Lankan President was left with little room to manoeuvre when the Tamil guerillas proved intransigent and the Island's Sinhalese majority began to react angrily to the presence of the Indian troops.

The statement issued on July 10 was evidently meant to reassure the Sinhalese on the eve of four by-elections in which the ruling United National Party was to face a challenge from Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike's Freedom Party.

On July 13 the Tigers said they did not accept this condition for the merger of the two provinces. Officials in Delhi say the Madras talks have merely "hit a snag." However in talks with the Economist in Madras, the Tigers' spokesmen have made it clear that the merger issue is not the only one on which they want changes. They are unhappy about an amend ment to the Sri Lankan Constitution that was adopted in April. This 13th Amendment empowers the president to declare an emergency in any part of the country for a wide range of reasons. In the past, Mr Jayawardene has made much use of the emergency powers. The Tamils fear that the 13th Amendment will make Tamil autonomy permanently subject to Sinhalese vote.

They have made it clear that unless India puts pressure on Sri Lanka to reverse the 13th Amend ment, it would be suicidal for the Tigers to surrender their arms to the Indian Army.

Mr Gandhi faces a difficult choice. He can order an all out onslaught on the Tigers or he can concede the validity of their objections to the present scheme. He seems to have chosen the first course. Operation Checkmate, the latest of the assaults on guerilla bases in the north, has been inten sified and several Tiger commanders have been killed.

In the long run, however, a policy of bashing the guerrillas has its limitations. The Tigers voice is shared by many non-combatant Tamils in Sri Lanka. The more the Indian troops succeed in weakening the guerrillas, the more India will make itself morally responsible for the future welfare of Sri Lanka's Tamils. That could mean a long involvement in the island's affairs. The Indian government may find satisfaction in a great-power role; but not all Indians find the prospect attractive.

July 30, 1988

PEACE NO CLOSER ONE YEAR AFTER SRI LANKA ACCORD

One year on, the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement to Establish Peace and Normalcy in Sri Lanka can be seen to have singularly failed to achieve all of its main objectives.

Worse, an Indian Peace Keeping Force which has grown from 6,000 to 50,000 (Indian official figure) seems no nearer to subjugating Tamil militants fighting for a separate state in the north and east of Sri Lanka than when it first arrived 12 months ago.

Worse still, the IPKF is indefinitely locked into such a pursuit by the terms of the agreement, a task which has so far cost the lives of 500 Indian soldiers and seriously injured 1,500 others.

With months of talks in Madras between Indian and LTTE officials to try to achieve a negotiated settlement ending in stalemate in recent weeks, there is growing criticism coming from the Sri Lankan Government that the IPKF has failed in its task of forcing the Tigers to sue for peace.

A year on, that peace is no nearer, the possibility of valid elections in the north and east seems remote, and Tamils and Sinhalese alike are today hanging out black flags in protest at the accord.

NO PEACE IN SRI LANKA

It took a Sri Lankan army curfew in the south of the island yesterday to hold back protests of Sinhalese chauvinists; it took an Indian army curfew to restrain the Tamils in the north. Both communities were trying to mark the first anniversary of the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Both proposed a continuation of their campaigns of mayhem and murder.

When Mr Rajiv Gandhi put his signature to the accord last year he can scarcely have imagined the trouble that was in store. He signed for all the right reasons. By that stage there was no possibility that the Sri Lankan Government could reach an agreement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam on their own. The Tigers were sheltered in India and widely believed to be armed and trained there too. Sri Lanka with 30,000-man army simply did not have the power to crush them, though it was strong enough to cause vast suffering among the Tamils

The Sri Lankan Government, meanwhile, was also imprisoned by the strength of Sinhalese feeling against any settlement that would have been acceptable to the Tamils. Mr Gandhi felt able to lean on President Jayewardene to force one more concession after another out of him. In return Mr Gandhi could offer to cut off support to the Tigers.

Mr Jayewardene perhaps did see what he and Mr Gandhi were letting themselves in for. He asked Mr Gandhi for troops. They would free his troops to look after the Sinhalese extremists in the south, and they would be there if the accord should go sour and the Tigers should take up terrorism again.

Outside the Tamil areas the establishment of provincial councils has gone ahead, and elections have been held to them, despite the murderous efforts of the Sinhalese militants. In the north and east the Indians who are now 50,000 strong are still trying to hold the Tigers down.

The killing of more Sinhalese villagers to mark the anniversary showed that their control is far from complete, but the experience of Punjab shows that such complete control is simply not possible. In the meantime unofficial talks between Indian intelligence and Tigers are said to be nearing another agreement.

If there is another agreement the Indians must ensure that the Tigers are thoroughly disarmed this time. The Sinhalese should avoid stoking Tamil fears by renewed colonization. The Sri Lankan opposition should exercise restraint in opposing the settlement. The sad thing is that none of these things is likely to happen.

The Times (Editorial) - July 30, 1988

SRI LANKA LOSES FAITH IN ROLE OF INDIAN TROOPS

By Vijitha Yapa

The anniversary of the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan accord is being observed today with both the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils seemingly united in not wanting the Indian troops to remain in Sri Lanka.

Officially there are 52,000 Indian troops in the Northern and Eastern provinces, although Indian analysts say the number is double that.

One of their tasks was to disarm the Tamil guerillas fighting for a separate state. But, with nearly 600 soldiers dead, the Indians have found that having the fourth largest army in the world does not mean that the guerrillas, mainly of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), scare easily.

Even the most pro-Indian of the Cabinet Ministers and the architect of the accord, Mr.Gamini Dissanayake, says that the peace keeping force has not performed its functions well.

"One year after the accord, when the LTTE should be either conforming to the principles of the Accord or eliminated as a militant factor, they are still able to defy the Indian Army," he said. Sri Lanka is committed to holding elections in the North and East, but it is the responsibility of India to bring about the condition for this, he added.

The arrival of the Indian troops also gave an excuse for the extremist Sinhalese party, the People's Liberation Front, to whip up feelings. It has committed more than 200 murders, mainly of officials of the ruling United National Party and Government. They have called for a day of protest today and warned people to stay away from work.

The demands were sent through the postal system, which led the Government to take the unprecedented step of suspending the delivery of all letters for a week.

The Government also imposed a 24-hour curfew in two southern districts, Matara and Hambantota, to prevent violence after reports that the People's Liberation Front was planning demonstrations.

For President Jayewardene it is a decisive year. Presidential elections have to be held between December 15 and January 15, although general elections are not due until August next year.

Having won three of the four by-elections held this month, he is said to be keen to have the general election first. Observers feel that if his United National Party does not get an absolute majority at an early general election he will be able to manoeuvre the smaller parties into a coalition if he is still President.

But for him to contest a third term an amendment to the Constitution is necessary, which requires a two-thirds majority. So far, he has not revealed his plans.

The presence of the Indian troops will be a key factor in the elections and Mr.Jayewardene would have preferred to go to the people claiming that elections to provincial councils in the North and East had been held, the Tamil guerillas had been disarmed, and Indian troops had begun to go home.

But elections in the North and East seem a long way off. *(The Times - July 29, 1988)*

THE STATESMAN

BLUNDER IN LANKA

Issues beyond a flawed Accord

Swapan Dasgupta

COMMENT JULY 29, 1988

IF history is viewed as a compendium of ironies, it might be opportune to recall one of Jawaharlal Nehru's early speeches on the principles of Indian foreign policy. "India", he said, "wants to do away with the imperialist notion of capturing and exploiting another country. If Indians have any interest abroad, it should be based on the goodwill and cooperation of the people of that country".

On the first anniversary of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord—an agreement for which the present Prime Minister was hailed as the "ambassador of peace" and nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize—it may be slightly embarrassing to note that this speech was made to a mass meeting in Colombo in July 1939. However, it is unlikely that this revelation will cause any serious discomfiture to Mr Rajiv Gandhi and his close policy advisers who involved the country in a gigantic misadventure that is likely to have a debilitating effect on the future of our regional policy. Having raised chauvinistic feelings early last year to an all-time high with a brazen show of might against a smaller neighbour, Mr Gandhi undertook a gamble whose failure, in Mr J. N Dixit's words, "will set our foreign policy back by 30 years".

It is not that the July 29 accord has had no positive achievements. Within India, of the 39,960 destitute refugees accommodated in the camps, nearly 35,265 have returned to Sri Lanka (although 85 per cent of the one lakh or so self-supporting refugees have opted to stay on). More important, the serious law and order problem posed by pauperized militants equipped with sophisticated arms has eased in Tamil Nadu. And crucially, the unfortunate monetary nexus between the militant groups and local politicians has been broken.

DEVELOPMENTS

Within Sri Lanka, however, the post-accord developments have not been so encouraging. The passage of the 13th Constitutional amendment offered hopes that a measure of regulated federalism would find acceptance within Sinhalese and Tamil polity. But the generally indifferent response of voters to the provincial council elections suggests that it is only a matter of time before these bodies fall by the wayside, more so since the Tamils—for whose benefit they were established in the first place—are loath to participate in the venture.

Secondly, New Delhi's belief that the Tamil secessionist movement was a pliant instrument of the Indian intelligence services that sustained it with weapons and other resources for four years turned out to be completely misplaced at least in the case of the LTTE. Not only did Mr V. Pirabhakaran refused to sing Mr Rajiv Gandhi's tune, he had no inhibitions against training his guns on his former mentors. Perhaps this should have been obvious to New Delhi from the LTTE's conduct at the 1985 Thimphu talks and its subsequent sabotage of all peace initiatives, but it wished away these embarrassing details and focussed on playing its one-upmanship games against a vulnerable regime in Colombo.

Even after the recalcitrant Tigers bared their fangs in Jaffna and the Eastern Province in October last year and Mr Rajiv Gandhi publicly denounced them as a "small, unreliable and untrustworthy group", New Delhi insisted on perpetuating the fallacy that no peace was possible without the cooperation of the LTTE. In the process, Mr Pirabhakaran was encouraged to exploit the political uncertainty in Tamil Nadu following M. G. Ramachandran's death as a bargaining lever against decisive military action. The recent negotiations with the LTTE conducted by the Research and Analysis Wing—against the advice of the External Affairs Ministry—may have reinforced Mr Pirabhakaran's conviction that India is desperate to bury the hatchet in order to give the Congress(I) a fighting chance in the Tamil Nadu Assembly elections. The fact that strong domestic compulsions determine its attitude to foreign policy has hardly enhanced India's projected image as a regional power, especially when it is known that the Government in New Delhi is leading a precarious existence and unsure of its political future.

In a sense, New Delhi's tragic vulnerability is a consequence of a short-sighted policy of brinkmanship against its smaller neighbours. While there is no doubt that some pressure on Colombo was imperative after the 1983 riots and the failure of the all-party conference, Mr Rajiv Gandhi erred by not coupling his favourable equations with President Jayewardene with an understanding of majority sentiment within Sri Lanka. By issuing blanket endorsements of both real and imaginary Tamil grievances, particularly on the complex question of the Eastern Province, India enabled the sophisticated Eelam propaganda machine to capture the public imagination. Rather deftly, the LTTE and its associates managed to convey the popular impression that Indian interests and Tamil interests were very similar indeed. The profound ignorance of the Opposition parties to the Sri Lanka problem did not help matters either, and in their anxiety to score debating points over the Government they, in effect, pushed New Delhi towards a disastrous course.

But if the accord and subsequent events have exposed the limitations of India's regional clout, its effects on the politics of Sri Lanka have been catastrophic. Article 2(9) of the accord confining the Sri Lankan "army and other security personnel" to the barracks in the Northern and Eastern provinces and the concomitant article 2(16c) whereby the IPKF was called in to "underwrite and guarantee" the accord have been widely perceived as violations of national sovereignty. This is not an abstract and academic question as New Delhi often maintains, but an issue of immediate political significance that has delegitimized President Jayewardene's Government in the eyes of the majority of the Sinhalese.

The obvious manifestation of this is the alarming growth in numbers and influence of the

Janatha Vimukti Peramuna in the south of the island. While part of the reason for Mr Rohan Wijeweera's ability to win fresh adherents to his adventurist brand of chauvinistic politics is undoubtedly the economic dislocation of what is close to civil war, it would be short-sighted to deny that what really spurs on the JVP is simple patriotism. The presence of foreign troops —besides lending credence to the oft-repeated charge of Indian expansionism—violates one of the central tenets of Sinhala-Buddhist consciousness, its fierce and resurgent nationalism.

True, the JVP's adroit use of selective terror may have exaggerated the problem, but it is significant that President Jayewardene has failed to elicit any substantial public support against terrorism in the south. In short, the accord has created a new second front in Sri Lanka and in the process destroyed some of the more stable political institutions of the Sinhalese heartland.

For example, it is significant that while there has been no formal challenge to President Jayewardene's leadership, few the private armies of the UNP MPs; the three-star combine of PLOTE, EPRLF and TEL O, and the tough and restive soldiers of Sri Lanka's regular army The most recent addition is Al Jihad, a shadowy, Muslim militant group.

There are constant rumours of a deal being worked out between Colombo, New Delhi and the LTTE. The return of the moderate Tamil United Liberation Front leader Mr A. Amirthalingam, to the island after five years in Madras is indicative of some accommodation. But the tentative nature of each step recognizes that there can be no orderly elections without LTTE cooperation in the north and east. There were no nominations on an earlier occasion when the Government tried to bluster through Pradeshyan Sabha by-elections in the north-east. Now the speculation is that the LTTE is demanding a common slate of LTTE-approved candidates, with perhaps some TULF and EROS nominees thrown in.

But there are also complaints of being excluded from even tiny groups like the Tamil Congress. Nor are the more powerful contenders for power, EPRLF and PLOTE, likely to take kindly to exclusion from the democratic process. Progressive left groups which have just found their feet might also like to contest in alliance with moderate Tamils, while the UNP and SLFP, which have committed followers in the north and east, would like to make some sort of a showing.

WISDOM

Simple wisdom suggests that an LTTE-dominated Provincial Council is better than a violent and chaotic electoral free-for-all. But this begs the question of whether in fact the LTTE wants to play electoral games in accordance with the official timetable without first wresting fundamental concessions with regard to the content of the devolution package.

The progress of devolution in the north and east is vital to the south's continuing stability and to the success of the new decentralization efforts. The Sinhalese polity has temporarily suppressed its suspicions about the motives of Indians and of their own Government. The token IPKF withdrawals immediately after the elections sent the right signals. But any indefinite postponement of elections in the Northern Province, or further concessions to the LTTE would disturb the delicate balance of consensus that President Jayewardene has managed to maintain in the south. Any obstacles in the decentralization experiment would also renew fears of Colombo's collusion in Tamil ambitions of total independence, Indian hegemony and the island's disintegration.

Alternatively, if a Provincial Council is established in the north and east, the Indian presence could quickly be reduced so that the normalization process is further facilitated. However, a minimal presence seems inevitable to ensure the success of parliamentary politics, though the level of dependence remains to be seen

RELIEF WORK GRINDS TO A HALT IN TAMIL AREAS

by D.B.S. Jeyaraj

Refugee relief and rehabilitation work undertaken by religious and non-governmental organisations in the Northern and Eastern Provinces have ground to a halt.

The killing of the Catholic Priest Fr. Chandra Fernando in Batticaloa on June 6 and the abduction of a prominent social worker Mr S. Kandasamy by unknown persons on June 19 has led to this situation.

An office-bearer of the Tamil Refugee Rehabilitation Organisation (TRRO) said that most international agencies that were giving aid to the TRRO for refugee relief and rehabilitation work had expressed horror at the plight of Mr. Kandasamy. Several of these agencies particularly those from Scandinavian countries had already suspended financial aid following Mr. Kandasamy's abduction. In view of this situation the TRRO was constrained to suspend its refugee settlement programme including free-medical aid. Mr. Kandasamy was primarily instrumental in setting up the TRRO in 1977 after the August violence.

The TRRO had spread its activities throughout the North and East and since 1983 had been playing a prominent role in rehabilitation work. Mr Kandasamy went into self-exile in 1983 and thereafter was responsible for fund raising from western countries for the TRRO.

A west-European based representative of an aid-giving agency told The Island by telephone that the donor agencies were disappointed at the inertia of some TRRO officials, in matters concerning the release of Mr. Kandasamy. "We know personally that he is a man dedicated to upliftment of the Tamils and of unimpeachable integrity. If some harm has befallen him then we will have to reconsider the whole issue" the representative said.

A spokesman for the Catholic church told The Island that the church has suspended all its social work in the Eastern Province following the killing of Fr. Chandra Fernando who was also Chairman of the Batticaloa-Amparai Citizens' Committee.

The Batticaloa-Trincomalee Bishop Rev. Fr. Kingsley Swampillai had decided to suspend these activities as the role of the church was not being appreciated as indicated by the killing of Fr. Chandra Fernando. All Catholic priests had resigned from posts held in Citizens' Committees following the killing.

The Bishop of Jaffna Rev. Fr. Deogupillai has also advised the priests in his diocese to be 'careful' and 'go slow' in doing social work because of the political situation.

According to citizens from the North and East, the suspension of refugee work has hit the ordinary people very hard. More than half the population have been affected by the past violence.

The Indian Post

COMMENT

THE WAR ACCORDING TO DELHI AND COLOMBO

Why is there no first hand reporting of IPKF operations in Sri Lanka? Rita Manchanda on the war story the Indian press does not cover

ARE ANY of the men in the Indian Peace Keeping Force held prisoner by the Liberation Tigers? Probably not, but curiously enough it does not appear to have troubled anyone to ask the question. It is yet another disturbing reminder of how little we know or even care to know about this "war" on our very doorstep.

More than 53,000 Indian soldiers are in Sri Lanka involved in the country's longest military operation that this year has claimed 537 lives and left more than 14,000 wounded according to official figures. In its first phase "Operation Pawan" was the testing ground for many of the former Army Chief General K Sundarji's avant - garde strategies, the first occasion in which helicopter gun ships were used and the army had to fight in a built-up area. In its current phase, it is a classic counter-guerrilla insurgency operation, the stuff that commando lore is made of.

Yet press reportage has been largely limited to a perfunctionary single column statistical flash.

"Three IPKF personnel were killed and two seriously wounded when the militants attacked an IPKF convoy with rocket launchers and automatic rifles at Mankeni, 35 km from Batticaloa." Few of the papers will subsequently bother to pick up even the news agency follow up that "one LTTE subgroup leader was killed and four militants were wounded in the attack".

Whatever happened to the eye witness account at the unit level, of the blood, gore, ennui and demoralisation, the war diaries, the worm's eye reconstruction of battle, the discovery of the unsung heroes of unknown battles, the investigation of alleged atrocities and the lessons of war? A John Reed covering Mexico in flames, a James Fenton reporting on Vietnam and a Susard Kapuchinski on the battle front in Angola are the models on which impressionable young journalists are weaned. Then where are our own home grown war correspondents or even just mavericks? There was a Shyam Tekwani (photographer, *India Today)* and Sumir Lal (*The Telegraph*) who dared to go into the Liberation Tiger's den. But that was last November. We dream of travelling with the Afghan mujaheedin or envy the Soviet journalist who recently published an account of his days and nights with Afghan-Soviet troops. Then why not with the IPKF or LTTE in Jaffna?

But if we think to do it on the piggy back of government sponsored jamborees, then the standard five o'clock briefing in Colombo and Madras is what we deserve. The government, for quite understandable reasons, does not wish to dramatise the IPKF operation in Sri Lanka. There is to be no ceremonial gesture by the prime minister to be at the airport to receive the body of the commanding officer of the 4/5 Gurkha Battalion who dies in battle. Government officials bristle at the use of the word "war" to describe the military action in Jaffna and the eastern province. In a formal briefing on the IPKF on July 26, the spokesman in Madras was at pains to stress that "we have never been at war. The IPKF is at war against militarism and gun running." The IPKF forces are here at the invitation of the Jayewardene government under joint command. Unlike the earlier diplomatic gafes about who commands the forces, New Delhi has been circumspect about projecting that the decision making initiative comes from Sri Lanka. Therefore even the May visit to Colombo of the Defence Minister K C Pant was announced there and not in New Delhi. No longer are there simultaneous briefings on the Jaffna-Eastern province situation in New Delhi, Madras and Colombo. The government is anxious to play down the IPKF to counter propaganda of the hegemonistic thrust by big brother India into the affairs of its neighbours.

More important, given the special nature of a counter insurgency operation, the IPKF has to fight not only with its hands tied behind its back but a battle in which the enemy that he must kill is also the very man whom he must keep alive to transfer political power to. A viable political solution in the north and eastern provinces has to involve the LTTE and perhaps even the supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran. The battle for arms is much less important than the battle for minds. Here it is the anomaly that Thomas Hardy quipped about in *The Man He Killed,*

"Yes, quaint and curious war is!
You shoot a fellow down
You'd treat if met where any bar is,
Or help to half a crown".

And it is also having to perforce to turn a blind eye to the LTTE continuing to use India as not only a place of sanctuary but also spareparts for arms. For example closely monitored by defence military intelligence Prabhakaran from a hideout in Jaffna communicated with the LTTE leader "Kittu", under house arrest in Madras, by means of a radio transmitter, their urgent need for spare electronic switches used to detonate mines that were responsible for over 60 per cent of all IPKF casualties. The supplies arrived within a week, presumably through clandestine channels from India.

Since Operation Pawan last October, the IPKF has been on an intensive combing operation to flush out LTTE hideouts and ammunition caches. The number of weapons to be surrendered has become a bargaining exercise in the LTTE-IPKF dialogue. But strangely enough there has been little attempt to do an investigation of the quantity or quality of arms with the LTTE or a reconstruction of their supply lines. Much before the IPKF operation in May 1987 there were war analysts like Robert McDonald writing in *Jane's Defence Weekly* after a six week stint with the Tigers about their inadequate fire power and their home-made weapons. Four months later, it was a heavily armed LTTE that

took on the IPKF. Were these new weapons?

There were at that time stray press reports, "LTTE gets arms via Singapore" (*The Indian Post*, October 29) yet till today there has been no sophisticated reconstruction of the LTTE's supply lines. In its June 19 issue *The Week* does address itself to "arms and the LTTE" but goes no further than vaguely alluding to the still unnamed Singapore shipping company and a possible JVP supply nexus.

In war, Hemingway's phrase has now come to be accepted as a truism, the first casualty being truth. But in the Sri Lanka IPKF operation we have shown neither much effort nor interest to get at it. What is possible was ably demonstrated by *India Today* correspondent Shekhar Gupta's foray into Jaffna in December to reconstruct the tactical battle of Operation Pawan. Till then it was still believed that in that disastrous first commando operation on October 11 to capture the LTTE leadership, the brunt of the casualties was borne by the 10 para-commando battalion whereas it was the 30-strong platoon of the 13 Sikh Light Infantry that were all but wiped out. It was also Gupta who in his subsequent analysis pointed to serious flaws at the tactical level.

Are arms supplies still reaching the LTTE? Are they coming from India? It comes as a shock to read in a report from a Colombo based correspondent that the patrolling by Indian and the Sri Lankan navy does not seem to have made much difference to bringing in fresh arms, some of this still coming from India. Quoting rival Tamil militant groups, the report speaks of an undisturbed supply line. Back in November 1987 the LTTE Jaffna commander Mahattaya had admitted, "We are short of weapons though we have plenty of ammunition. But the IPKF is fooling itself if it thinks it has cut off our supply lines." Was Mahattaya right?

The current checkmate no doubt merits another such worm's eye reconstruction but how many editors would be willing to back the rare correspondent who has the expertise to undertake such a task? Many editors shy away from what they fear would dangerously veer towards commando comic type hype. As a last resort they say the government will not allow it. Yet time and again some correspondents have taken the risk and gone to Jaffna.

Which leaves us where we started with the official spokesman. And so we are surprised that the LTTE as a fighting force is far from finished although government sources have for weeks been stressing the success of the combing operations, the breakdown in LTTE channels of communication, the disintegration of the chain of command structure. Yet just last week the LTTE killed 21 Indian soldiers and wounded many more. This should however be balanced with the information that between July 16 to 25, 39 LTTE militants have been killed and 28 captured.

How little we still know about the LTTE becomes evident when we realise that it has taken nearly a year for the national dailies to carry reports about how the LTTE communicate with each other. It is only on July 28 that *The Hindu* carried a report about their communication network, although for months we have known that intelligence sources have been regularly intercepting their walkie-talkie exchanges.

Even this information about the "invisible enemy" is from IPKF sources. Do we have to read the reports of foreign correspondents to see the other face of the invisible enemy. For example in Trincomalee, a correspondent from *The Independent* let it be known that he wanted to meet the Tigers. He was duly contacted and taken to meet them. They were playing cricket not too far off from an IPKF post.

What about the reality of the IPKF soldier in Jaffna or Trinco? Amnesty International in its June 1988 report on Sri Lanka and a review of alleged human rights abuses says" ... IPKF were accused of raping Tamil women and of deliberately killing dozens of unarmed Tamil civilians among them elderly people women and children". It also adds that in January 1988... "four Indian soldiers were discharged and sentenced by an Indian court martial to one year's imprisonment for raping Tamil women". Does it not merit investigation or must it be left to Amnesty International?

CIVILIANS KILLED

Selvaratnam 12.7.88

T. Vallipuram 17.7.88

R.A. Ilamuqan 25.7.88

C. Kalamohini 13.7.88

Grace Nesamma 19.7.88

R. Lingeswari 25.7.88

Mrs. Sakuntaladevi 14.7.88

Balendran 21.7.88

T. Manadas 27.7.88

R. Sivakaran 15.7.88

K. Yuganathan 27.7.88

Jayaratnam 31.7.88

V. Ponnampalam 16.7.88

Pushpakaran 23.7.88

Paranitharan 25.8.88

Ponnudurai 17.7.88

Saradamani 24.7.88

C. Senthamaraiselvi 31.8.88

THE TAMIL NATIONAL QUESTION AND THE INDO-SRI LANKA PEACE ACCORD

(A message from Prof.C.Jeyaratnam Eliezer Ph.D.(Cantab), D.Sc.(London), President, Australian Federation of Tamil Associations and Patron, World Federation of Tamils)

OPINION

I would have urged a collective tribute to the many Tamils who have given their lives in our liberation struggle.

I do not believe in the use of war and violence as a means of settling disputes - political or otherwise. But I do believe that civilised people have a duty to defend their families, homes and their folk, when they are victims of arson and murder.

I am specially moved by the memory of those who defended the Jaffna Peninsula and the Jaffna city, first from the Sinhalese army and their mercenary bombing pilots, and later from the so called peace keeping forces.

In the nine months since the accord was signed, there is little to show of any rapprochement between the communities, which I regard as an essential prerequisite for any peace. I do not believe that the Tamil people will quickly forget their years of suffering and numerous pogroms and the cruelties they have endured under the Sri Lankan Government and its forces.

I understand that President Jayewardene is seeking re-election for a further term as President. I anticipate that in the next few months, he would woo Tamil votes with fanciful promises. People of Wellawatte would remember his past and all will remember his promises in 1977 when the UNP election manifesto spoke of Tamil grievances and disabilities and programs for rectification. I believe that before the Tamils are taken in by any promises, they should ensure them underwritten by Indian Authorities.

The unexpected deterioration of our relationship with India is hopefully a passing phase. India as the great power of the region has the right and indeed the responsibility to ensure stability and security. I do not believe that this is in anyway incompatible with the hopes and aspirations of the Tamil people. A statement of these had been agreed on by various sections and has been called the Thimpu Declaration.

By its actions, India has so put back the momentum of the Tamil movements that it should now take responsibility for the protection of the Tamil people and the implementation of the sentiments in the Thimpu Declaration. I believe the Tamil people certainly expect this of India. The judgement of the international community would also expect it - not to mention the judgement of history.

For all these reasons, I urge the hastening of Indian reconciliation with the Tamil people including the LTTE.

Until such time as the conditions are suitable for the restoration of democratic procedures, and the elections to be held, I believe quite strongly that Mr Velupillai Prabhakaran should be a principal spokesman for the Tamil people.

Before I conclude I would urge all concerned to take steps in the seemingly impossible task of bringing unity among the Tamil expatriate community. General De Gaulle once said "all Frenchmen hate each other, but they love France." In a similar vein one could say, all Tamils are wary of one another, but they love Tamil. By Tamil, I don't just mean the language but also its literature, its devotion, its land and its poetry. I mean all these. In our common love of all these, we ought at least to take united action on some urgent agreed objectives so that the expatriate Tamil voice may be heard and listened to at this moment of crisis and hope for the Tamil people.



INDIA USES NAPALM & CHEMICAL BOMBS

Indian forces, in their attempt to wipe out the LTTE, have carried out massive scale aerial bombardment in Mullaitivu district. Since 22nd June, Indian planes and military helicopters bombed and strafed the residential areas of Alambil, Naayaaru, Semmalai and Kumulamunai in the Mullaitivu district. Indian forces used internationally banned napalm and chemical bombs and 250 kilo bombs in these operations.

Hundreds of houses, schools and government buildings have been severely damaged. The civilian casualties are feared high but as Indian forces continue this operation, accurate figures are not immediately available.

Most of the jungle areas in Mullaitivu are on fire and the animals are badly affected, several of them dead. It is understood that **Rajiv is bent in destroying the Tamil Resistan Movement and enthroning his ally J.R. Jayewardene for the third term. Tamils believe that Rajiv will meet his Waterloo in Tamil Eelam if he does not mend his ways. A nation cannot be massacred however militarily powerful India may be.**

Hunger-strike protest in Mullaitivu

A mass hunger-strike protest rally was organised by the people of Mullaitivu on 24.6.88 against the Indian atrocities. Over 1,000 people from the villages of Thanneerootu, Kumulamunai, Kallappaadu, Vaddakkandal and Mulliyavalai participated in this protest and demanded the Indian government to

* announce a ceasefire and start negotiations with the LTTE;

* dismantle the Walioya Sinhala colonisation (a Tamil village called Manal Aru recently turned into Walioya Sinhala colony) and to release all the civilians who were arrested by the Indian and Sri Lankan forces.

PROTEST DEMONSTRATION AND RALLY

EELAM TAMILS CALL UPON PEOPLE WITH REASON AND CONSCIENCE TO JOIN THIS DEMONSTRATION AND RALLY TO BE HELD ON SUNDAY 31ST JULY, 1988

Starting from TYBURN WAY (Tube -Marble Arch) to TEMPLE PLACE. Assemble at 1-30 p.m.

IN REMEMBRANCE OF MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN KILLED IN COLD BLOOD IN THE STATE-SPONSORED TERROR CAMPAIGN OF JULY 1983 AND THEREAFTER IN TAMIL EELAM WHERE OVER 20,000 CIVILIANS HAVE BEEN KILLED

JOIN TO REGISTER YOUR PROTEST

Against Rajiv Gandhi's despicable expansionist military manoeuvres in Sri Lanka under the pretence of a Peace Accord which remains dishonoured.

At the continuing crimes against humanity by Indian troops against Tamil Eelam and its people. So far about 5,700 civilians had been killed, about 780 women had been raped and hundreds of young men and women had disappeared after the Indian invasion.

At the devastation and destruction caused by Indian troops by their use of high explosive, Napalm, chemical and other deadly bombs in Tamil residential areas.

Against India's persistent denial of access to International Red Cross, International media, humanitarian and aid agencies to resist and render assistance to the long suffering people of Tamil Eelam.

At the vulgarity of Rajiv's duplicity and treachery in gaining entry into Sri-Lanka claiming to bring peace and solution to the long standing national question and in fact trying to achieve self and geo-political interests.

At the blood thirsty attempts to search and eliminate Liberation Tigers and their leader V. Prabaharan who are authentic representatives of Tamils with the objective of destroying the national liberation struggle of Eelam Tamils.

MASS DEMONSTRATION AND PROTEST MEETING BY THE D.M.K.

The Working Committee of the D.M.K. have resolved to hold a mass rally and demonstration on July 29, 1988, condemning the false propaganda made by the Rajiv regime without agreeing for a ceasefire in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka, despite LTTE's appeals for cessation of hostilities and negotiations for a political solution.

THE HINDU

CRP

IPKF OPERATION CHECKMATE AND ITS CASUALTIES :

This IPKF operation begun on 21st of June is being continued. Area of operation is Kilinochchi, Vavuniya, Mullaitivu. There was a cordon and search operation in Pavatkulam near Vavuniya on 30th June and 1st July. N. Tharmarajah (28) father of one child R. Mohan (31) father of 3 children were beaten to death by IPKF. Gangatharanathan (61) priest of Hindu Temple. N. Nithiyananthan, President R.D. Society and S. Nadarajah (35) father of 3 children arrested and severely assaulted. Body of Nadarajah was found at Cheddikulam on 08.07.88. Dead body of Nithiyananthan was handed over to next of kin on 10.07.88. Whereabouts of Hindu Priest not known.

Cordon and search at Olumadu and Manaikulam near Mankulam by IPKF on 1st 2nd July: 34 persons assaulted and hospitalised at Jaffna. Vavuniya and Anuradhapura hospitals. Residents protest to Government Agent Vavuniya and demand inquiry.

03.07.88 – Visvamadhu near Mullaitivu, 3 IPKF soldiers killed: two LTTE militants killed: a woman and a child killed in crossfire. Same day at Vavuniya, two IPKF soldiers killed and 4 injured in a confrontation with LTTE. One LTTE killed and one arrested.

05.07.88 – at Poovarasankulam near Vavuniya ,during IPKF search operation eleven civilians injured and hospitalised. On 08.07.88 at Kilinochchi, 6 IPKF injured in a grenade attack. A civilian was killed and about 100 persons arrested following grenade attack. At Ramanathapuram near Kilinochchi, on 09.07.88, landmine explodes. IPKF fire indiscriminately. Shanmugam Ponniah (60) died and his son (12) grievously injured.

09.07.88 – about 20 IPKF men were riding in a passenger bus from Jaffna to Mullaitivu. Near Anandapuram the bus was attacked by unidentified gunmen. Three civilian passengers were killed. Ten civilian passengers and 5 IPKF riding in the bus were injured.

09.07.88 – Nachikuda near Punakary, coastal areas were bombed by planes. Several boats were destroyed.

12.07.88 – off the coast of Chemmalai near Mullaitivu, a boat conveying IPKF men was attacked. Two Officers killed and 16 injured. Three militants died in the ensuing cordon and search operation.

15.07.88 – IPKF sentry post in Paranthan near Kilinochchi was attacked. One IPKF soldier killed and another injured. IPKF fired indiscriminately. Six civilians were killed. Several injured. In ensuing search, several persons arrested. Shells were fired from IPKF camp at Thanimurippukulam, near Mullaitivu. Shells landed in surrounding villages of Kumulamunai. Alampil, Aandankulam and Kallikaadu. Indiscriminate aerial bombardment by IAF planes was reported over populated villages – Thanimurippu, Kumulamunai, Kalikadu and adjoining jungles in Mullaitivu District. The IAF used MI-24 helicopter gunships and bomber planes which dropped 250 kg bombs each capable of creating a 30 yards wide crater. Losses of life and property consequent on such bombings are not known owing to difficulties in communication.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT-REFUTATION OR ADMISSION BY INDIAN HIGH COMMISSION?

The recent Amnesty International report charged the IPKF with rape and other brutality The Indian High Commission denied the charges and said

LTTE must seek 'a democratic option'

MADRAS, July 26.

The Indian Peace-Keeping Force is conducting "a major operation" against the LTTE in the Nettikaikulam area of Mullaitivu district in Sri Lanka, according to an IPKF spokesman here. The operation covered a large jungle tract, where the LTTE had constructed 14 to 16 bunkers, some of them shell-proof. The bunkers could accommodate 50 to 60 persons and they had rations, explosives and even training manuals.

Briefing reporters here today, the IPKF spokesman said that "our forces hit upon this three days ago and our forces are still fighting there". Seven LTTE men were killed and 12 wounded on July 24 but "by now, it will be much higher". This was the headquarters of Balraj, the military commander of the LTTE for Mullaitivu district and he might have been wounded.

The spokesman said the "Operation Checkmate" was not confined to one area but covered all operations in the Northern and Eastern provinces including the districts of Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Jaffna peninsula. "The situation as of today is that the message must have gone home to all the groups and particularly the intransigent LTTE that the military option is not a viable one, that it will not work and they should seek a more sensible, democratic option, where everyone will have equal rights." The LTTE had been driven out of the population-centres in the Jaffna peninsula, Batticaloa, Kilinochchi etc., and they were now in the low-level population centres of Millaitivu, Vavuniya and Talaimannar. "We are operating against them and our plans and objectives are being met fully," he said.

"As far as operations are concerned, we are not at war. We have never been at war. The IPKF is at war against militarism and gun-ruling...."Our Government and the Prime Minister has said doors are open....These doors are doors of peace," he said.

Acts of sabotage: The IPKF's last major operation in Alampil in Mullaitivu and its simultaneous operations in other areas of the North and East brought down the cohesiveness of the LTTE as a military group and it had broken into small groups of three or four persons. Thereafter, the LTTE had done various acts of sabotage and terrorism. In Mullaitivu, the LTTE had disintegrated. In the last seven days in Batticaloa, seven LTTE men were captured. In Mannar, where the LTTE tried to become active, seven hardcore men were captured in the last 72 hours. In Karaitivu island in the Jaffna peninsula, the LTTE men, who were planning to carry out sabotage, were apprehended. The IPKF had also captured 15 PLOT militants in Vavuniya. The IPKF had defused hundreds of explosive

devices and booby-traps and saved countless lives, the IPKF spokesman said.

"Though the LTTE is a very important party in the Tamil politics of Sri Lanka, it is not the only party to the exclusion of other parties." If any party claimed it was the only party, there was always the ballot-box. "Apparently, they are shy of it", he added.

Replying to a question on the likelihood of a ceasefire, he said, "Personally, I have no knowledge. I don't deal with negotiations" The Government of India had said that the LTTE must lay down the arms and accept the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. On whether the situation warranted a ceasefire, he said the realities on the ground must be taken into account. When a two-day ceasefire was announced in last September, the LTTE bought time to acquire arms and explosives.

The IPKF spokesman maintained that no Sinhalese colonisation had taken place in the Tamil areas after the IPKF went there immediately after the Agreement was signed on July 29, 1987.

Answering a question on the TULF's memorandum to the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, that a massive Sinhalese colonisation had taken place in the East in the last few months under the Weli-Oya scheme, he said the "main colonisation" took place from 1983 to 1986. About 60,000 Sinhalese fled the East from October 1 to 5 last year. It has taken four to six months to ask them to get back and the Sinhalese had not returned fully. About 80 per cent of the shops were allotted to the Tamils in Trincomalee town recently. "Our people are there to see that no Tamil is denied his legitimate rights," he added.

Rehabilitation: On the process of rehabilitation of the Tamil refugees from Tamil Nadu, he said that as on July 25, 4,670 persons have returned to Jaffna, 15,323 to Mannar and Vavuniya districts and 1,536 to Trincomalee district. Within Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Jaffna peninsula, and Vavuniya and Mullaitivu districts, the number of persons rehabilitated were 1,87,667, 5,757, 38,123 and 33,185 respectively. There were no displaced Tamils in Jaffna but 60,000 displaced persons were there in Vavuniya sector, 11,800 inside Trincomalee sector and 11,025 outside. The total number of displaced persons who were rehabilitated was 2,82,263.

On the allegation that there was a lack of coordination between the IPKF, the Indian High Commission in Colombo, Research and Analysis Wing and the External Affairs Ministry, which reportedly led to the death of the LTTE emissary, Johnny, the spokesman said, "As far as the IPKF and the Indian High Commission is concerned, we have not only total rapport but we have day-to-day interface. At no stage, at no point of time has there ever been lack of coordination... As far as Johnny, we do not deal with negotiations. Kittu had sent Johnny. He was killed with others in Vavuniya. We really do not know who he was when the action was taken."

The withdrawal of the IPKF depended on the ground situation. The spokesman said it was not for him to decide when the provincial council elections should be held in the North and East. The IPKF had not been asked to supervise any elections anywhere. It only provided the security environment.

The IPKF was not specifically operating against one person (the LTTE leader, Mr. V. Prabakaran).

CRP

they were fabrications. Almost in the next sentence the High-Commission went on to state that where such charges had been proved, quick and salutary action had been taken against the guilty.

IN BRIEF

Two IPKF soldiers were killed in an attack at Chulipuram on 16.7.88. A LTTE militant was also killed in the counter attack. Civilians were subjected to inhuman assault.

Passengers in private buses robbed of their valuables & cash by armed youths at Iratperiyakulam in Vavuniya on the night of 16.7.88 and again on 18.7.88 at a point just quarter of a mile away from a Sri Lankan army camp.

Four IPKF personnel were killed in a landmine attack on 16.7.88 at Arugambay in Pottuvil. 2 farmers were shot dead in retaliation.

The Poster campaign of 17.7.88 organised by the Mothers Front of Trincomalee demanding a cease fire and early resolution of the problems of the Tamils through talks was stopped by the IPKF.

Six IPKF personnel were killed at Pesalai on 18.7.88 in a land mine attack. 70 LTTE suspects were arrested in searches.

Twentysix terrorist suspects were arrested by the IPKF at Araipattai in Batticaloa on 18.7.88.

Nalliah Vasikaran aged 19 years arrested by the IPKF on 16.1.88 at Kerudavil and held at Udupiddy and later at Valvettiturai is reported to have escaped on 18.7.88. The mother had visited the youth at both camps. The mother now complains to the IPKF and the Citizens Committee over the disappearance of her son.

A bomb blast in a hotel in Trincomalee on 21.7.88 claims the lives of four sinhalese and a Tamil. Four Tamils are killed in Retaliation and another is reported missing.

10 LTTE militants are killed by the IPKF on 21.7.88 in operations in the Eastern Province.

A time blasted off at a sentry post near the Jaffna Secretariat on 22.7.88. An IPKF soldier was killed. A curfew clamped in the municipal is now being enforced daily from 6 am the next day. The curfew is now being enforced daily from 6 pm till 6 am in the whole peninsula. The IPKF Town Commandant in a press release warns that he may not be able to restrain his men in the event of such acts being repeated.

Consequent on an attack in which 2 IPKF soldiers were killed at Point Pedro on 1.6.88, IPKF had gone on the rampage. 279 civilians who had suffered injuries in the reprisal have submitted a signed petition to the IPKF.

One IPKF soldier was killed in a land mine explosion at Pankulam in Trincomalee on 23.7.88.

At Nochchimunai in Batticaloa 5 militants were shot dead on 24.7.88.

A hartal was observed in the North & East on 25.7.88 on a call by the TELO in memory of 53 Tamil Political prisoners massacred at the Welikade prison five years ago.

2 Sri Lankan army personnel were killed at Dehiwatte on 27.7.88 in an attack by militants.

INDIAN EXPRESS

Sticking point in reaching accord with LTTE

REPORT

By NARENDRA REDDY
Express News Service

New Delhi, July 30: The differences between the LTTE and the Indian Government negotiators seem to be much deeper than what the officials are admitting. The LTTE is understood to be insisting that the Sri Lankan Government should have no representation on the proposed committee for the rehabilitation of the group's cadres.

The officials have been maintaining that only a minor hitch in the composition of the rehabilitation committee remains to be sorted out. But the LTTE's condition shows that despite months of fighting with the IPKF and having suffered heavy casualties, the group is not resiling from its principled stand.

The Indian Government apparently feels that the LTTE condition goes against the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement. Article 2-11 of the agreement is being cited in this context. Under the provision "the Government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate militant youths with a view to bringing them back to the mainstream of national life and India will co-operate in the process."

It is being interpreted that the rehabilitation of militant youths is the responsibility of the Sri Lankan Government and the Indian Government's role is only to assist the Sri Lankan Government. According to reliable information here, the LTTE condition is not acceptable to the Sri Lankan Government.

Attitude hardens: According to official understanding, the LTTE has been insisting on the condition in the hope that the Indian Government would give in being anxious for a settlement before elections to the Tamil Nadu Assembly. The representatives of the Indian intelligence wing negotiating with the LTTE has the definite impression that the impending elections in Tamil Nadu have hardened the attitude of the LTTE leaders.

The official sources maintain that an understanding has been reached with the LTTE on all other issues and it is not insisting on the devolution package being further improved at this stage. The LTTE is also stated to have agreed to surrender arms though no time-frame has yet been fixed for this.

The only sticking point is the composition of the rehabilitation committee, and the LTTE leaders seem to be insisting that the committee should have no representation of the Sri Lankan Government.

LTTE popular: While not agreeing to the LTTE condition, both the Indian and the Sri Lankan Governments at the same time are of the opinion that the LTTE still has popular backing and it will come to power if elections are held.

Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene, in a television interview last week, said that unlike in the southern provinces "people in the north and east are sympathetic to the terrorists".

The Indian Government also realises that the LTTE is still popular in the northern province and the situation there is worse than that in Punjab. While in Punjab the administration is functioning, in the northern province of Sri Lanka the LTTE, it is said, is in a position to bring the administration to a halt — if it so decides.

In such a situation it is unlikely that the IPKF will be able to extricate itself from the present entanglement soon as the Indian Government has been hoping.

The Indian Government had earlier, with the knowledge of the Sri Lankan Government, given financial assistance to the LTTE for the rehabilitation of its cadres as part of the settlement. But after receiving the money, according to the Indian Government, the LTTE leader, Mr. Prabhakaran, had gone back "on his assurances and commitments". It is the feeling now that the LTTE had used the money to buy more arms to resist the IPKF.

The Governments of India and Sri Lanka, therefore, want the task of rehabilitation to be entrusted to a committee, which includes representatives of the Sri Lankan Government. The LTTE has not so far agreed to the proposal. A fresh proposal is understood to have been sent to the LTTE. But there is no indication of a positive response from the LTTE.

WHOM ARE THEY FOOLING ?

The Government of India claims to have had negotiations with the LTTE and tries to fool the Tamil Nadu, or perhaps the international community, or else whom ? What understanding/accord has been reached several times with the LTTE? The LTTE denies having had any serious negotiations. TVI reliably understands that neither Mr.Rajiv nor Mr.Pant is prepared for negotiations of any sort until the LTTE surrenders their arms. **LTTE is willing to surrender the arms gradually and not all at the same time in view of the distrust created by the Government of India. They quote a number of incidents to prove their fear - e.g. Mr.Rajiv's OK for the removal of the 17 members of the LTTE to Colombo in Sept.1987 being the first betrayal and the murder of Lt. Col.Johnny the last. Mr.Rajiv is not only intransigent, but untrustworthy too!** ***We pity him, the grandson of the great Nehru, and, above all, the white hope of the great nation India.*** The Amnesty International exposes India's actions in its report issued on June 20.

The following is the text of the communique issued by the Presidential Secretariat on 30th June 1988:

'Following the Indian Defence Minister, Mr. K. C. Pant's visit to Colombo for discussions with the President between 30th May and 1st of June 1988, the operations of the IPKF have achieved further successes. There has been an exchange of communications between the President and the Prime Minister of India between the 24th and 27th of June 1988. The Prime Minister has informed the President that the LTTE has given indications of their willingness to lay down their arms and cooperate in the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement.

'Keeping in view the shared objectives of the Government of India and the Government of Sri Lanka to bring an end to violence and suffering of the people of Sri Lanka and to revive the political process by giving a free, fair and equal opportunity to all to participate in these processes, the Government of Sri Lanka reiterates its willingness to take the following steps:

'If the Tamil militants would lay down arms and support the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, the detenus will be released and all Tamil militant groups would be granted general amnesty and would be allowed to return to the mainstream of democratic process as envisaged in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and the latest amendments to the Sri Lankan Constitution.

'The LTTE, it is understood, is now willing to do so and if they agree to surrender all arms, explosives and communication equipment held by them, in accordance with a procedure agreed between the military authorities relating to quality, quantity, type and method, and the Government of India agrees to disarm totally the LTTE, the Government of Sri Lanka will issue instructions to the authorities and the Commissioner of Elections of Sri Lanka to call for elections to the Provincial Council of the North-Eastern province under Article 10(1) of the Provincial Council elections law and to take further action under that law, and the North-Eastern Provincial Council to be formed with one Government, one elected Chief Minister and four elected Ministers (vide S.37 of Act No. 2 of 1987).

'The question of the use of the 1982 election register by an amendment to Act No. 2 of 1988 S5(1) will be studied for its constitutionality and legislative appropriateness.

'The Government of Sri Lanka will also take immediate steps to appoint one High Court for the North-Eastern Province and pass the necessary legislation envisaged in the 13th amendment of the Sri Lankan Constitution to fulfil aspirations relating to Tamil, along with Sinhala, being made the official language of the Democratic Socialistic republic of Sri Lanka.

'If, in response to these assurances, the LTTE fulfils its stated commitment to lay down arms and fully cooperate in the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, the Government of Sri Lanka will initiate steps by the end of July for holding elections to the North-Eastern Provincial Council.'

EDITORIAL

A COUNTRY UNITED BY FEAR

The cynics could as well say: Sri Lanka is at last one united country, united by one common thread – fear!

Be it north or east, south or west, a fear psychosis is quietly gripping the whole island. There is no more, in terms of the mental state, a north-south divide. President Jayewardene who talked endlessly for the past ten years about 'Northern Terrorists' has now his hands full with 'Southern Terrorists'. The 'Northern Terrorists' anyway are no longer confined to the north – or east. Some of them have found safe living in the south as well. The AK-47 has now found a new brother in the south – the T-56!

The classic right-left divide in Sri Lankan politics is gradually getting effaced. Both rightists and leftists are together falling like nine pins under the assassins' bullets – united in death! Even the centre is unable to hold.

The liberals are under threat. Academics are leaving, both Sinhala and Tamil. Universities are closed. The Sinhala people who went along with their governments in trying to restrict higher education to the Tamils are now paying their price. There is hardly any room for the intelligensia anymore – either in the north or south. Those who remain must either lie low or serve some master. Every politician has to become a manipulator, or else end up as a lame duck, like the once powerful Finance Minister Ronnie De Mel.

The security forces themselves are not wholly secure. Desertions have become common and infiltrations a way of life. Looking at the lower ranks one cannot know whether he is soldier, sailor or subversive. Minister of National Security Lalith Athulathmudali is himself suffering from a feeling of insecurity. Everyone is killing everyone else, and no one is wiser at the end as to who is killing, whom? Thousands of people must surely be knowing who the killers are, but no one dares to give information. What does one make of a police who could be excused for failing to act when the identity of a killer is unknown, but shrug their shoulders and do nothing because they KNOW the identity of the killer?

There was a time, in the case of democratic societies' one spoke of 'Public Accountability'. The man at the top is always accountable to his people. But no one bothers about it any more, least of all the man at the top himself. As far as President Jayewardene is concerned, the level of turpitude into which Sri Lanka has descended during his eleven years of rule has nothing to do with him! It was due either to the 'Northern Terrorists' or the 'Southern Terrorists'. But who is there to question him? The superpowers congratulate him on his accord with the Indian establishment. The regional superpower is shoring him up, because there is no other way of achieving her own regional interests. The press, muzzled and threatened, has become a dull dog, no more a watch dog. The late Indian leader Rajagopalachari used to say that as long as the people are dumb, the rulers will be deaf. But where are the people? Their tongues are tied, their hands are manacled, and their minds are frozen. They move around like zombies talk in whispers while the country goes to rack and ruin. Is it that no one seems to care, or that no one dares to care?

Is the country once known as 'Paradise Isle' steadily moving towards anarchy? What portents do they offer for the immediate future? The real issues are not provincial councils, autonomy and merger, ceasefires and accords. The ones that really matter are much more malignant. There is a deeper human malaise, a total collapse of values.

The country, the rulers, the people are sitting on the top of a volcano. The erupting lava could envelope the whole country and could well make the preceding 11-year violence seem like schoolgirl picnics.

JULY 1988



PRABAHARAN HELD IN AWE AND ADMIRATION EVEN BY THE SINHALESE

I.Kumar, Manor Park, London

I wish to quote from a weekly column "Men and Matters" written by a Sinhalese journalist, *Kautilya* for *The Island (8.5.88)*, in which he refers to Mr.Velupillai Prabaharan, leader of the LTTE:-

On the run, his LTTE's military capability greatly reduced, Mr.Prabaharan remains nonetheless the central figure in a Sri Lankan conflict which even the most cussed Sri Lankan militarist was finally forced to accept as a politico- military struggle, with an important external aspect...

."... he is a born guerrilla, this man. Dislodged from his main base, the peninsula, and unaccustomed as he is to this new scrub-and-jungle terrain, he is prowling and probing the most sensitive 'border' areas (Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim), grasping instinctively the 'politics' of the current situation, and his own enhanced capacity for deadly mayhem and de-stabilisation.

"He is a strategist too. Militarily the LTTE is perhaps at its weakest since the early 80s ..... Yet, he knows weakness and strength are both relative to that of the opponent's, in this case, and right now, both the Indian and Sri Lankan governments.....".

As a Tamil, I am proud to read that appreciation coming from the pen of a Sinhalese journalist, who certainly has no love for Prabaharan. Kautilya would no doubt like to see Prabaharan captured, dead or alive, as would a few of our ex-battle-'scarred' (sorry, battle-'scared' would be more appropriate!) militant groups.

LETTER

I am sure that the awe and admiration with which Kautilya sees Prabaharan in his column is indicative of an unconscious yearning in his mind about the need to have a similar great leader for the Sinhalese people. May be it is true. Prabaharan is doing a far better job for the Tamils, being a fierce guardian of their rights even at the cost of his life, than what J.R is doing, or what Mrs.B could do, for the Sinhalese, or what Rajiv Gandhi himself is doing for India.

I am not, and I have never been, biassed towards Prabaharan, but my respect for him and his judgment in political matters has gone sky-high since the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Whereas, some other militant groups had rushed in to register themselves as political parties with the Elections Commissioner of Sri Lanka, and then gone on to join the United Socialist Alliance, Prabaharan and the LTTE have proved that it is not political power for themselves that they are seeking, but the genuine rights of the Tamils and Muslims of Eelam towards which they are prepared to continue sacrificing their lives. I am sure that very soon every Tamil, whichever part of the world he lives in, would realise this and throw his full weight behind Prabaharan and the LTTE.

WORLD OPINION MUST CONCERN ITSELF WITH THE CAUSE OF THE TAMIL PEOPLE

Political Committee of the LTTE.

In July 1987, the Indian Peace Keeping Force arrived in Sri Lanka ostentibly to protect the people of Tamil Eelam and to implement the Indo-Sri Lankan peace accord. In reality, however, the IPKF has violated the most important provisions of the peace accord. It has failed to prevent recurrent atrocities against the Tamil people by the Sri Lankan armed forces. It has taken no measures whatever to disarm the racist Sinhala homeguards and other Tamil traitor groups. In fact,it has given no protection to the Tamil people.

Instead, it has sought to disarm the LTTE to the core despite the fact that the LTTE had already surrendered large quantities of arms and ammunition to the IPKF. To cover up its atrocities against the Tamil people, the IPKF has destroyed the sole means of communication between the LTTE and the civilian population in the North and East by blowing up the printing presses producing the newspapers 'Murasoli' and 'Eelamurasu', as well as the TV station 'Nidharshanam'. **Having silenced the voice of Tamil resistance the IPKF has cynically substituted it with its own Goebbelsian propaganda machine with the aim of deceiving world opinion and justifying its criminally repressive policies.**

The Tamil people state, sincerely and unambiguously, that they desire peace. They want the cessation of all Indian military activities and they urge the Indian government to begin serious peace negotiations with the LTTE.

The people of Tamil Eelam, the international Tamil community and Indian public opinion are demanding an end to the Indian Government's military action; and yet the Indian government continues ruthlessly to pursue its military offensive in Tamil Eelam. Far from abandoning its military activities, the IPKF has intensified its operations and slammed the door shut to a negotiated peace. Worse still, they are co-ordinating their military activities with the murderous Sri Lankan army and are converting the Tamil homeland into a veritable killing-field for the armies of India and Sri Lanka. After ten months of uninterrupted war and repression against the Tamil people by the Indian army we demand that the Indian army cease all military operations and enter into peace talks with the LTTE without any preconditions.

INTERVIEW

TIGERS SET 3 CONDITIONS ON ARMS

"The Sri Lanka government as well as the government of India are now going back on all major points."

The talks between the government of India and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have reached a crucial stage, with the Tigers laying down three conditions for handing over their arms.

The three conditions are:

First, the Sri Lankan government and the government of India should provide **adequate financial compensation** to the Tamil people in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka for the property destroyed as well as the loss of life suffered during the action by the Sri Lankan and Indian armies.

Second, there must be **substantial devolution of power** to the proposed provincial council and **'not as envisaged in the recent 13th Amendment to the Sri Lanka Constitution'.** (The LTTE as well as all the opposition parties in Sri Lanka have rejected the 13th Amendment as *mere eyewash)*

Third, the proposed **interim government should be formed** along the lines agreed on Sept.28 between the Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, J.N.Dixit, and the LTTE. (That agreement envisages a dominant position for the Tigers in the proposed provincial government with the exclusion of all other Tamil militant groups).

A Political Affairs committee member and LTTE spokesman in Madras, S.Subramaniam, told *India Abroad* that **"lasting peace in Sri Lanka is possible only if these three basic conditions are met to our satisfaction."**

"The LTTE has always been willing to hand over arms", he said. "Handing over of arms has never been an issue with us as it is made out by New Delhi. But what must be clearly understood is that we will lay down arms only if the three basic conditions are met in full."

Subramaniam was highly critical of the 13th Amendment, saying, "The proposed provincial councils will have the same powers as a municipal corporation. This is what the 13th Amendment has done. We will not accept it under any circumstance.

"The Sri Lanka government as well as the government of India are now going back on all major points which were mutually agreed upon during negotiations on the eve of the accord last year. We sometimes feel we have been betrayed by both governments."

He was categorical in asserting that the LTTE **"will not lay down arms unless the conditions set by us are met."** While the LTTE wants peace to prevail, **"We will not compromise", he said. "If our demands are not met we will continue our struggle.** On our part, we are prepared for prolonged guerrilla warfare with both the Sri Lankan and the Indian armies."

Talks not progressing

Subramaniam said that while the talks between the LTTE and New Delhi are continuing, "I would not say they are progressing rapidly. We have made our proposals clear to the government of India. Now it is for them to act on it", he said.

Meanwhile, the former Jaffna commander of the Tigers, Kittu, continues to be under house arrest in Madras. Armed policemen stand guard outside his house in Indira Nagar, and no one is allowed to see him. He is even denied access to a telephone. - *India Abroad - May 27, 1988)*

INDIAN FORCES ATTACK CIVILIANS

Immediately after the death of two IPKF men in the hands of the Tigers in Pt.Pedro, the Indian soldiers took revenge on the civilian population mercilessly. They cordoned off the three-mile area surrounding the incident, attacked everyone irrespective of age and sex. Young boys were asked to lie down on the road and soldiers walked over them. They beat them with iron rods and belts and many sustained severe injuries. The headmaster of Katkovalam Junior School, Mr.Ammiahpillai Karunanithy, was admitted to the hospital with injuries in his left hand. Before they attacked Mr. Karunanithy they asked him, "Thumare naam kiyahai." When he said Karunanithy they beat him severely. Another person by the name of Arunachalam Sivalingam (48) succumbed to his injuries in the Manthikai Hospital. About 3,000 people were arrested in the Pt.Pedro area and were left on the beach, under guard, several hours without any food or drink by the IPKF after the killing of the two soldiers.

FISHERMEN DEMONSTRATE IN VADAMARADCHI

Fishermen's Association of Vadamaradchi in Jaffna peninsula organised a demonstration on 24th June demanding the withdrawal of the embargo on fishing and an immediate ceasefire between Indian army and LTTE. About 5000 people participated in the demonstration. The procession which started at Valvettithurai went through Polikandy and ended at Nediyakaadu with a mass meeting. A two-point petition was handed over at the IPKF camp at Polikandy. The IPKF did not allow any photographers throughout the procession and the meeting. TVI

WORLD THAMIL EELAM CONVENTION - IV CONTRADICTS PTI REPORTS

(A letter sent to the Press Trust of India by the Convenor and the Press Secretary, World Thamil Eelam Convention, held recently in New York, complaining of misreporting is reproduced below. A letter on similar lines, signed by twenty out of the twenty seven participants, has been addressed to the LTTE leader, Prabaharan.)

We were distressed to find that the Press Trust of India had misreported the proceedings of the Fourth World Thamil Convention held in Nanuet, New York, on the 2nd and 3rd July 1988.

The reports that have appeared in the Indian newspapers speak about 'A resolution calling for an investigation into allegations of human right violations in Sri Lanka by the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE and the IPKF' and about a 'Plea to make Mr.Prabaharan and the LTTE as the sole representatives of Tamils in Sri Lanka (that was) rejected'.

First of all, no resolution was passed at this convention either on the first day or the second. Secondly, no attempt was made to make Mr. Prabaharan or the LTTE as the 'sole' representative of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. It was generally accepted by all delegates present that the LTTE is the premier and dc force among the Tamil leadership, and as such there was no need to 'make attempts' to enhance their leadership position.

On the question of human rights violations, **all delegates understood that the IPKF were guilty of gross human rights violations, and that these should not be let go without inquiry.**

All delegates clamoured for an investigation into this by an impartial body such as the Amnesty International. The question of an 'Indian Tribunal' arose only when it was stated that the 'Indian government will never let a foreign organisation to investigate the actions of its army'. The delegates then agreed that they should, as a second choice, ask for a joint Indo-Sri Lankan Tribunal to investigate human rights violations by the IPKF.

The entire proceedings of the convention were recorded and we can make the recordings available to you if you need to verify what we have stated here.

Further, at the beginning of the convention it was announced that a competent authority had been appointed to issue press statements and that no one else was authorised to do so. We are enclosing herewith a copy of the official press communique that was issued at the end of the convention.

We hope that you would make the necessary corrections and give it equal publicity.

PRESS STATEMENT

The fourth World Thamil Eelam convention held in Nanuet, N.Y., on July 2nd and 3rd, attended by delegates and other Tamil organisations in North America and abroad decided on the following proposals:-

1. That the governments of Sri Lanka and India allow unrestricted access to the International Press, Amnesty International, ICRC to all parts of Sri Lanka, including prisons and detention camps, to monitor and report on alleged serious human rights violations.

2. If, for any reason, Amnesty International and other agencies mentioned above are unacceptable, then as an alternative, a respected Independent Indian Tribunal be admitted to study and report on the Human Rights concerns. This must be undertaken in the interests of the Indian image in the international community.

3. That the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka be repealed to enable all shades of political opinion to participate in the democratic process in the forthcoming elections.

4. That the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord be restructured to accommodate all of the concerns, grievances and the aspirations of the Tamil-speaking minority; and that in this spirit the 13th Amendment be replaced by one that gives effect to the revised accord.

5. That a United Tamil Front be formed by all the politico-military groups, with the LTTE as the dominant group; and that this United Tamil Front participate in the negotiations of the revised Accord.

Issued by the Press Committee of the Convention of July 3rd, 1988; and by Conference order, no other statements will be allowed by individuals or groups to speak on behalf of the Convention. If statements have been issued contrary to the above communique on any one of the above items, they are factually incorrect. (Edward Benedict, Press Secretary, Convention IV).

RAW ATTEMPTS TO BUY EXPATRIATE LEADERS

Indian Secret Service RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) is engaged in influencing the overseas Tamil organisations for its disinformation campaign. Reporting of the World Tamil Eelam Convention IV held in Nanuet in New York on 2nd and 3rd of July was deliberately doctored by the Press Trust of India. It is believed one or two of the Tamil expatriates were responsible for the false reporting.

PTI reported "a resolution calling for an investigation into allegations of human rights violations in Sri Lanka by the Sri Lankan Government, the LTTE and the IPKF", and had a "plea to make Mr Prabhaharan and the LTTE as the sole representatives of Tamils in Sri Lanka rejected." Press Secretary to the conference and the convenor, in their joint statement issued to the PTI, which appears elsewhere in this issue, and twenty out of the twenty seven delegates, have signed a letter addressed to Prabaharan, the LTTE leader, denying the news item. TVI

NEWS IN BRIEF

●EROS is continuing with its campaign of blocking roads in support of its demands for a ceasefire and talks between India and the LTTE. Roads were blocked at Vadamaradchi 16th June, Periyanilavanai near Kalmunai on 17th, Mutur 18th, Trincomalee 22nd, Eravur 23rd and Pothuvil 24th.

●All government offices, and commercial banks at Mannar closed from 15th June for 15 davs on orders of LTTE.

●One IPKF soldier killed and another wounded at Murikandy on 16/6 as a result of a landmine blast.

●TELO office at Vavuniya blasted on 17/6 by a rival Tamil group.

●On 18/6, at Vavuniya, there was a protest march by parents and spouses of nearly 200 detenus held without charge by the IPKF. Protest march was organised by Citizens' Committee Vavuniya and led by the President Dr.Pararajasingham and other officials. There were nearly 5000 persons including school children. At the first check point the marchers were stopped by the IPKF and armed youths believed to be TELO and EPRLF cadres. Dr.P ararajasingham had been threatened by the same groups. He has since relinquished office and left Vavuniya.

●Kathankudi 21.6.88 – Kalideen arrested and released earlier by IPKF in connection with the killing of Mr.Ahamed Lebbe ex Chairman T.C. and respected member of area was shot dead. IPKF at Kathankudi is attacked with grenades. IPKF counter attack and kill two militants and arrest about 20 others. Shops and other buildings damaged.

●On 21.6.88 about 25 members of 'Three Star' group cordon Iruthayapuram area in Batticaloa. Residents panic. Nesan of the LTTE trying to escape on bicycle was shot dead.

●Two youths Kandiah Nesan and Pathinathar Babu taken off passenger bus from Colombo to Jaffna and killed by a group which alleged that the victims were PLOTE members.

●Nagulan LTTE leader was killed in cordon and search operation. Hartal observed to commemorate him in his area – Chavakachcheri, Kodikamam and Pallai on 23.6.88.

●Hartal in Atchuvely, Avarangal and Puttur on 23.6.88 to commemorate S.Rasavarajeeva LTTE leader of the area killed during first week of April.

●On 23.6.88 Arasan and Eeswaran of the LTTE were killed at Mamangam near Batticaloa by the EPRLF.

●At Trincomalee on 27th June, two P.C.s and three Sinhala civilians injured in grenade attack. In a second grenade attack, one sub-inspector and two P.C.s injured.

●600 mothers march and hand over petition to IPKF. Demands – to dislodge colonists from Welioya former Manalaaru; to order a cease fire and enter into talks with LTTE.

●On 25.6.88 Vakisayah detenu shot dead by IPKF allegedly trying to escape.

●Refugees from Tamil Nadu arrived in Sri Lanka – 565 at Kankesanthurai on 18th June, and 508 at Talaimannar on 25th June.

●Two leading Tamils of Akkaraipattu, P.Kanapathipillai(59) and Kariyan Vadivel(60) kidnapped on 21.6.88, whereabouts still not known.

●A teenaged student and a girl from Karaitivu kidnapped and killed allegedly by a Tamil group.

●A Muslim youth, Mohamed Nazeer(26) of Akkaraipattu was stabbed to death by another Muslim of the 'Three Stars' group.

●Drop-outs from the various groups other than the LTTE are roaming the Batticaloa District robbing people, especially at Chenkalady, Kalmunai, Pandiruppu and Akkaraipattu.

●EPRLF, TELO, and PLOTE have jointly opened an office at Tirukovil near the IPKF Camp.

EPRLF IN FR.CHANDRA'S MURDER ?

Reports reaching from Batticaloa indicate that the Eelam Peoples' Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) was behind the killing of the outspoken voicé of Eastern Province, Fr.Chandra Fernando. They considered Fr.Chandra to be a supporter of the LTTE. Since the IPKF operation in Batticaloa, the EPRLF and other anti-social elements have taken the upper hand with the backing of the Indian forces. Killing of Fr.Chandra is an indication of the extent of support the EPRLF is getting from the IPKF.

IPKF SEARCH AND DESTROY IN JAFFNA

The Indian soldiers have stepped up their search-and-destroy operations in the Jaffna peninsula. A number of hit-and-run attacks on the IPKF posts by the LTTE is a major worry for the IPKF. The Tamil Tigers detonated a landmine under a lorry killing an Indian soldier and seriously injuring another in Kilinochchi. One Sri Lankan Army officer was injured in the Trincomalee sector when LTTE attacked a Sri Lankan logistics column using small arms. Heavy fighting is reported to have taken place in Vavuniya at the police post near Vavuniya G.A's residence.

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TELO OFFICE BOMBED

The office of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) in Vavuniya was destroyed in a blast by about midnight on Friday, 17th June. According to the security sources, the blast is believed to have been caused by a bomb set off by members of the rival group PLOTE. The office was on the top floor of a two-storeyed building in the Main Street of Vavuniya town. On the following day the body of a TELO supporter was found close to the Poonthoddam tank. It is suspected that he had been shot by the man who had set off the bomb. TVI

CURFEW RE-IMPOSED

A curfew has been clamped down in the Jaffna peninsula during the past few weeks and the unruly Indian forces have once again started their spree of harassment and humiliation. Under the notorious pretext of 'Search and Destroy' operation, the unbridled Indians continue to commit every manner of antisocial and inhuman crimes in the peninsula. On the 20th July, 1988, five innocent civilians were killed and 25 were injured at Chulipuram when the Indians fired some random shots from a mortar.

RESIDENTS OF VISUVAMADU RENDERED HOMELESS

As a result of the unrelenting onslaught on the Visuvamadu village, in Mullaitivu district, by the Indian forces, the activities of the residents of Visuvamadu have come to a standstill. It is reported that about 75 per cent of the residents have abandoned their homes and moved surreptitiously to other places of safety. The harassment by the Indian forces has reached such intolerable heights that even those who bore up the calamitous happenings with fortitude and remained in their village have now begun to desert their homes.

10 JAWANS KILLED IN MULLAITIVU

According to confirmed reports reaching our news desk, during an operation launched by the Indian forces pursuant to the widely publicised 'Operation Checkmate', ten Indians are reported to have lost their lives when the Tigers took them aback and drove the Indian forces away.

THREE INDIAN SOLDIERS KILLED NEAR JAFFNA KACHCHERI

Three Jawans of the Indian forces are reported to have been killed by the freedom fighters in Jaffna during a gun battle that ensued between the Tamil Tigers and the Indian Peace-Keeping Force.

675 INNOCENT TAMILS OF BATTICALOA TAKEN INTO CUSTODY

The Indian army carried out a 'search and destroy' operation on a large scale in the Batticaloa district. It is reported that the Indian army took many civilian Tamils to their camps and subjected them to torture and degrading treatment in order to extract confessions and information. It is reliably learnt that on the 16th July 1988, the Indian army which pounced on the village of Kiran, arrested more than 600 civilians and took them to Pulipaainthakal army camp. It is further reported that on the 17th July, the Indian army went on a rampage into Murathanai, Koraveli, Pondugalsenai, Morathan Senai, Kattaiyadimadu and took into custody more than 50 farmers.

INDIAN FORCES AND LTTE CLASH - 7 INDIAN SOLDIERS DIE

On the 22nd July 1988, the LTTE guerrillas launched a landmine attack near the 8th Canal in the Trincomalee district on an Indian convoy moving from Pankulam army camp on a search-and-destroy mission. As a result, a military truck of the Indian forces was completely destroyed and seven soldiers were killed on the spot.

DON'T HAVE DEALINGS WITH LTTE !

The IPKF has ordered the people of the Batticaloa and Amparai districts not to have any dealings with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. It has further warned them that if they have any kind of relationship with the Tamil Tigers in breach of their order, they would be rounded up and dealt with accordingly. It is said that this order by the IPKF is a 'reactionary' move of the Indian forces in response to an earlier order made by the LTTE requiring the people to refrain from having close dealings with the IPKF.

IPKF RUNS RIOT IN MANNAR

A dusk-to-dawn curfew has been imposed in the Pesalai area of Mannar in the Northern Province and the Indian soldiers under the guise of searching for militants are reported to be indulging in all kinds of revelry and orgies with impunity. According to very reliable sources more than thirty houses in the Pesalai area have been ransacked, looted and set on fire, while about 32 of the residents of the area have been bundled up in trucks for questioning.

FISHERMAN IN AMPARAI PUT TO DEATH

Reports coming from Amparai have confirmed that Samsudeen, a fisherman, and Jayaseelan, a bus passenger, have been shot dead by a jawan of the Indian army.

TELO KILLS TIGER SUPPORTER

According to reports reaching our news desk, a supporter of the LTTE, Ponnampalam, has been shot to death by a member of the TELO.

THREE TAMILS HACKED TO DEATH

"Unleashing of communal hatred and anti-Tamil terrorism and brutal violence on the hapless Tamils have become a regular feature in Trincomalee" says a newspaper report of 22nd July 1988. It is reported that the Sinhalese army on the 21st July 1988, joined hands with the Home Guards and the Sinhalese thugs of Trincomalee and went on a rampage in the heart of Trincomalee town, burning houses, looting shops and hacking Tamils. According to the news report, Sri Lankan government appears to be acting hand in glove with the Sri Lankan army and thugs.

LTTE SURROUNDS INDIAN ARMY CAMP

According to our correspondent in Tamil Eelam, the LTTE launched, on 14.7.88, a guerrilla attack on one of the Indian camps in Chunnakam which is notorious for molesting civilian Tamils. This attack by the LTTE has belied the claims of the IPKF that Jaffna is fully under the control of the IPKF. It is reliably learnt that the Indian forces have suffered severe casualties during the attack.

CHULIPURAM WITNESSES GUN-BATTLE

On the 16th July, the LTTE is reported to have engaged the IPKF in a gun battle. During the confrontation,

which was a shock and surprise to the IPKF, 3 Indian soldiers were killed and some Indian equipment captured by the LTTE. It is reported that during this confrontation Lt.Saleem of the LTTE was killed.

NEW ARMY CAMPS OPENED IN TAMIL AREAS

According to reports reaching the TVI from Batticaloa district, more Indian army camps are being opened in Iluppaichenai and Uppuveli villages in the Muthur district and in Ramanathapuram in the Kilinochchi district.

INDIAN ARMY'S MARCH HALTED !

Angered by the support given to the LTTE by the Tamils of Eelam in Pesalai village in the Mannar district, the Indian army has started to subject the Tamils of that area to untold hardships and iniquities. On the 18th July, upon seeing the Indian army heading to Talaimannar to massacre the Tamils, the LTTE commandos attacked the Indian soldiers with landmines. During the confrontation at a place called Kudiyiruppu twenty Indian soldiers were killed and many more wounded.

HEAVY SHELLING AT MURASUMODDAI

The village of Murasumoddai in the Kilinochchi district was subjected to heavy shelling by the Indian forces during the past weeks according to news reaching London. Though confirmed reports of the extent of damage to property and life are not available, it is reliably learnt that the Indian troops, on their way to their camp, have shot and killed a girl student and four other Tamil civilians.

ARMY TRUCKS BLASTED

The IPKF are reported to be continuing their operations against the LTTE in the Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi districts. A convoy of four army trucks carrying IPKF soldiers is said to have been mined by Tamil Tigers blasting one of the trucks and killing 20 soldiers.

HARTAL IN THE NORTH AND EAST

During a hartal observed by the people in the North and the East of Sri Lanka, on the 13th and 14th of July, there were no violent incidents reported except that a Sri Lanka Transport Board bus was intercepted by armed youths while plying between Trincomalee and Vavuniya, the passengers ordered to alight from the bus, and the bus set on fire. All shops and offices remained closed in Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Vavuniya, Mullaitivu , Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai.

OPERATION CHECKMATE

According to reports reaching from the Vanni district of Tamil Eelam, IPKF seems to have suffered more casualties than the LTTE during the military exercise code-named "Operation Checkmate" (interpreted as 'trapping the king' or, in effect, grabbing Prabaharan). West of Thirumurukandy, two soldiers were killed in an improvised explosives device; and at the 146th milepost on Jaffna-Vavuniya road, another Indian was killed while repairing railway lines. On the same day (16.7.88), four Indian soldiers were killed at Konari, about 52 miles south of Batticaloa on the Batticaloa-Pottuvil road, when their vehicle hit a landmine planted by the LTTE. It is also reported that another three IPKF soldiers were killed and four seriously injured in a separate incident in the Northern Province, on 15th July.

BLACK FLAG DAY ON JULY 29TH.

Jaffna District Social Development Society has appealed to all Tamils to declare 29th July as a 'Day of Betrayal', to wear black badges and to hoist black flags on all commercial and other establishments to mark the anniversary of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.

JAFFNA ST.JOHN'S SHELLED

"On the 10th day of the IPKF advance they shelled the school. Apparently they had information that Tigers were here. The same night they stormed the school and occupied it. About 30 shells fell in the compound of which 12 scored direct hits. The worst damage was to the Jubilee hall (two hits). Science Block (two hits) and a set of class- rooms opposite the office. Other buildings hit were the Principal's bungalow, library, Pooranampillai Block and the office. Our estimate of the damage to the buildings is about Rs.500,000. For furniture, fittings, laboratory equipment etc., the estimated cost of replacement is about Rs.750,000." *From a letter of Principal, Dr.Devasagayam, to an old boy in London*

FOUR IPKF MEN KILLED BY LANDMINE

Three soldiers and an officer of the Indian Peace Keeping Force were killed when the vehicle in which they were travelling hit a landmine on the Akkaraipattu road in Pottuvil on July 16, 1988. This brings to eight the number of Indian soldiers killed by the LTTE in the East within the past two days. Eight IPKF personnel were also injured in the past two days. The last 48 hours also saw two terrorists killed, three others injured and six civilians injured in the clash. On Friday an explosion in the west of Thirumurukandy killed two soldiers and wounded four. At Vavuniya one soldier and one terrorist were killed on the same day. *By courtesy - "The Sunday Times" - July 17, 1988*

WEATHERING THE STORM

ONE YEAR OF INDO-LANKA AGREEMENT

by JUSTICE SATCHI PONNAMBALAM COMMENT

(Being an address delivered at a Meeting on the occasion of the First Year of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement held on 30th July 1988 at Fairleigh Dickinson University, New Jersey)

One year ago, on 29 July 1987, the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement or the Gandhi-Jayewardene Accord was signed by these two men in Colombo. It was said to be an Agreement 'to establish peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka', and so the news media has christened it the 'Peace Accord'. The first year of its operation has brought neither peace or normalcy, but instead war by the Indian army on the innocent and defenceless Tamil civilians in their homes, towns and villages, all over North and East Sri Lanka.

Rajiv Gandhi and Jayewardene signed the Agreement, worked out in secret talks the weeks before in New Delhi and Colombo. Both the Sinhalese and the Tamil people and also the Sri Lankan and the Indian news media were kept in the dark- There was no mandate whatever by the Sinhalese or the Tamil people for the Agreement and the calling in of the Indian my into the country.In fact, the Tamil leader Prabhakaran was under guard in a New Delhi hotel after he had described the Agreement to the Indian authorities as a 'stab in the back'. In Colombo, there was rioting by angry Sinhalese mobs and over 70 people were killed as police and soldiers resorted to rifle fire to contain the rioting. All island curfew was declared and soldiers were mobilised to keep demonstrators from approaching President's residence, where the Agreement was signed. President Jayewardene's vacation home in the South called the 'Red Cliffs' was set on fire and burnt.

Avoids 'colonisation'

The Agreement states that the Tamils are an ethnic group and that the Northern and Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups. This is some new history that is being written. The Agreement does not say that the Tamils are a nation or that the North and the East are their traditional homelands or that they are entitled to self – determination. These are unacceptable, however true and real they may be, to the Sri Lanka Government, as it was to its delegation at Thimpu.

The Agreement also does not mention anything at all about the vexed question of state-sponsored and state-aided Sinhalese colonisation of the Tamil areas of the North and East. In fact, any mention of this is scrupulously avoided, for the clear intention, as seen from the provisions of the 13th Amendment is to continue the state – aided and state – sponsored colonisation of Tamil areas. And, we would say that any Agreement or Accord that does not put an end to this state-sponsored and state-aided colonisation of Tamil areas does not even touch the fringes of the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka. And so it is with the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement or the Rajiv Gandhi-Jayewardene Accord.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement provided for an interim government, merger first and later separation by referendum of the Northern and Eastern Provinces and Provincial Councils with a Govenor, a Chief Minister and a Board of Ministers. The Agreement provided for Tamil and English to be also official languages, along with Sinhala. The Sri Lanka Government has already gone back on this official language agreement in regard to English. The 13th Amendment to the Constitution, passed in November 1987, provided for Tamil also to be an official language, but in regard to English it said, 'English shall be the link language'. What that means is anybody's guess.

India underwrites

The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement provided that within 48 hours of the signing of the Agreement, a ceasefire will come into effect all over the island. All arms held by the militant groups will be surrendered to authorities to be designated by the Government of Sri Lanka. Consequent to the ceasefire and the surrender of arms by militant groups, the Sri Lanka army will be confined to barracks in camps.The process of surrendering of arms and the confining of army to barracks will be completed within 72 hours of the ceasefire coming into effect. Sri Lanka Government will give a general amnesty and free all political prisoners and combatants held in custody.

The Agreement contained that if the Government of Sri Lanka requests the Government of India to afford military assistance to implement these proposals, the Government of India will give such military assistance.

The Agreement also provided that the two Governments will ensure the physical security of all communities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

The Government of India agreed to underwrite and guarantee the resolutions, and cooperate in the implementation of the proposals of the Agreement.

In entering into this Agreement, it did not matter to Jayewardene that he was bringing in foreign military intervention, so long as he could achieve his objective of decimating the Tamil liberation struggle and putting the Eelam demand to rest. To achieve these, he had earlier obtained the assistance of the British ex-SAS and the Keenie Meanie Services (KMS) mercenaries, who were hired by Rhodesia's Ian Smith and South Africa. The Israeli involvment in Sri Lanka Government's brutal war with the Tamils started with the opening of the Israeli Interests Section in the US Embassy in Colombo. Then came the Israeli Mossads and the Shin Bet, the Israel's domestic Intelligence Agency. These were responsible for the atrocities of the Special Task Forces against the Tamils in the Eastern Province. When all these could not tame the Tigers, Jayewardene felt he had nowhere to turn except to India.

Rajiv's optimism

Rajiv Gandhi felt that the Agreement provided India with an opportunity to succeed in its peace-making mission and to bring to end the ethnic strife in neighbouring Sri Lanka. But he left the chances of success not to the written provisions in the Agreement but to the good intentions of President Jayewardene. Hence, his optimism was not well founded, although he articulated them with enthusiasm. On 31 July 1987, in the Indian Parliament, he said:

> 'This Agreement meets the basic aspirations which animated the Tamils' struggle, namely, the desire to be recognised as a distinct ethnic entity; political autonomy for managing their political future; and appropriate devolution of governmental power to meet this objective, the recognition of the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka as areas of historical habitation of the Tamils and the acknowledgement and designation of Tamil as an official language. . .'

At a public meeting in Madras, explaining the Agreement, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said:

> 'The Agreement secures everything that the Sri Lankan Tamils had demanded, short of breaking Sri Lanka's unity. In fact, it goes well beyond the initial demands of the Sri Lankan Tamils. Under the Agreement, approximately one-third of Sri Lankan territory will be made a single province, where the Tamils will have a clear majority. They will have regional autonomy, comparable to the State Governments in India.' (THE HINDU, I.E. 8/8/1987.)

It is on this view of the Agreement that the Government of India signed the Agreement without consulting the representatives of the Tamil people, who were protecting the Tamil people and fighting the Tamil cause. When it found that they were unwilling to accept the Agreement, then it forced them to accept, denying them the right to disagree. Then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi gave several assurances that the Agreement will be implemented safeguarding the interests of the Tamils. Because of these assurances, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) accepted the agreement (vide Prabhakaran's Interview, INDIA TODAY, 15/8/1987)

LTTE's unequivocal acceptance of the accord

At a public meeting in Jaffna, LTTE leader Prabhakaran said:

> 'Even though the Accord does not fulfil our demands, we hand over our arms in the presence of the IPKFs because we want to respect India, which we love and also show our regards to the assurances given by the Indian Prime Minister. But, at the same time, as we hand over our arms in the presence of the IPKFs, we hand over responsibility of protecting our people also, which we were doing all these days, to the IPKFs.'

The LTTE was the only liberation organisation to publicly hand over a substantial stock of its arms and ammunitions to the IPKF in terms of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. The LTTE had publicly committed itself to surrendering all its arms to the IPKFs. Its acceptance of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement had become unequivocal. However, before the hand over of all arms could be completed, there were armed attacks on LTTE cadres by other groups and by Sinhala Home Guards on the Tamil people. This derailed the surrender of arms, leading to conflicts over nomination to the interim administration and finally the peace process being overtaken by Thileepan's Fast Unto Death. Thileepan's death and the arrest, detention and death of two regional commanders and 10 senior members in the hands of IPKF brought about discord and estrangement between LTTE and India.

The interim government, in which the LTTE was assured a major role by India was not formed. The merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces into one administrative unit, envisaged by the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement did not take effect. The interim government was not put in place because the persons nominated by the LTTE from the Eastern Province were found unacceptable to President Jayewardene and he proceeded to nominate his persons to fill the LTTE names.

The Provincial Council constitutes the centre-piece of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement.

We do remember that in the past 35 year political history, the Tamil people and their political parties have earlier advocated and demanded a federal structure of government and later a separate state of Tamil Eelam. In the 'Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact' of 1957, as a compromise agreement, the Tamils accepted Regional Councils, with the widest powers of devolution and amalgamation.

There has never been any demand by any Tamil or for that matter by anyone in Sri Lanka, for Provincial Councils. Yet, in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, to Sri Lanka and Indian governments, Provincial Councils have been found to be the solution to put an end to the bloody war to create a separate state.

Perpetuates unitary system

The law to bring the Provincial Councils into effect has been enacted by the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, which came into force in November 1987. But no Provincial Council election has been held in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Hence, the Provincial Councils for the Tamil areas have not come into operation.

The present constitution of Sri Lanka, which was enacted by the Jayewardene Government in 1987, perpetuated the hitherto existing unitary system and introduced a highly centralised executive presidential government with a devalued parliamentary system. It is upon this constitution, which proclaims Sri Lanka a 'unitary state' and having a highly centralised and authoritarian presidential system that the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and the 13th Amendment engraft the Provincial Councils with devolved powers. On the face of it, one can only see mutually antagonistic and conflicting concepts and institutions brought together in a hotchpotch, for the sake of political expediency to end the stalemate than devising viable and durable institutions representing structures of compromise, recognising Tamil national identity so as to launch the united nation-state on a course of nation-building. In the scheme that is bound to emerge, the Provincial Councils, as presently devised will be stunted at birth, crippled in growth and deformed at old age.

The devolution of power to the Provincial Councils under the 13th Amendment, is the same for the Councils in the Sinhalese and Tamil areas. Therefore, it cannot be contended that any special dispensation or concession has been made to the Tamils. The devolution of power to the Provincial Councils is a very miniature form, in no way comparable to those of the States under the Constitution of India. The existing unitary system and centralised presidential government preclude a genuine devolution of power.

Although every legal provision effectuating this reform is textually based upon a comparable provision in the constitution of India, nevertheless subtle changes and departures have been incorporated in certain places which make the Sri Lankan provisions differ from their Indian counterparts. Most of such Sri Lankan mutations will go to further constrict and cripple the miniature devolution of power and prevent the Provincial Councils from growing and developing into genuine institutions of autonomy and internal self-government.

How much of a sham the devolution of power to the Provincial Councils can be seen from the sensitive subject of land. It is instructive to see how the subject of land has been dealt with in the constitution of India. Land is in the State List. It is stated as: 'Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization.'

The land question

Under the 13th Amendment, 9.1 of Provincial Council List states: 'Agriculture, including agricultural extention, promotion and education for provincial purposes and agricultural ser-

vices (other than inter-provincial irrigation and land settlement schemes, state lands and plantation agriculture). 18.1 of the Provincial Council List states: 'Land – Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenure, transfer and alienation of land, land use, land settlement and land improvement, to the extent set out in Appendix 11.'

Appendix 11 states: 'State land shall continue to vest in the Republic and may be disposed of in accordance with Article 33(d) and written law governing the matter.

Subject as aforesaid, land shall be a Provincial Council Subject, subject to the following special provisions:–

1. State land:–

1:1 State Land required for the purposes of the Government in a Province, in respect of a reserved or concurrent subject may be utilised by the government in accordance with the laws governing the matter. The Government shall consult the relevant Provincial Council with regard to the utilisation of such land in respect of such subject.

1:2 Government shall make available to every Provincial Council State land within the province required by such Council for Provincial Council subject. The Provincial Council shall administer, control and utilise such State land, in accordance with the laws and statutes governing the matter.

1:3 Alienation or disposition of the State land within a Province to any citizen or to any organisation shall be by the President, on the advice of the relevant Provincial Council, in accordance with the laws governing the matter.

2. Inter-Provincial Irrigation and Land Development Projects

2:1 Such projects would comprise irrigation and land development schemes:–

(a) within the Province initiated by the State and which utilise water from rivers flowing through more than one Province: a Provincial Council however, may also initiate irrigation and land development schemes within its province utilizing water from such rivers;

(b) within the Province which utilizes water through diversions from water systems from outside the Province; and

(c) all schemes where the command area falls within two or more Provinces such as the Mahaweli Development Project.

2:2 These projects will be the responsibility of the government of Sri Lanka.

In the Concurrent List are:

17. Irrigation

17:1 Water storage and management, drainage and embankments, flood protection, planning and water resources:
17:2 Services provided for inter-provincial land and irrigation schemes, such as those relating to rural development, health, education, vocational training, co-operatives and other facilities'.

From a consideration of the totality of the provisions concerning land, we can see that the nominal power over land given to the Provincial Councils by item 18:1 of the Provincial Council List is substantially circumscribed and limited by the introduction of the arbitrary concept of State Land and the so-called inter-provincial irrigation and land development projects. Land and land development is usually the first item to be devolved in any scheme of regional autonomy. But in the Sri Lanka's scheme of devolution, the distrust of the Provincial Council to be vested with power over its land is manifest. The reason is obvious. And that is colonisation. State-aided and state-sponsored Sinhalese colonisation of the Tamil areas by the Government of Sri Lanka will continue. That is just what is hiding behind the so-called State land and inter-provincial irrigation and land development projects.

No neutral machinery

Although the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was drafted and signed, no independent and neutral machinery was put in place to usher in the ceasefire, the surrender of arms by all fighting groups and set up the interim administration. All these were left to the existing lines of political command in Colombo and newly set up Indian military command in Jaffna. The peace Agreement was not negotiated by the combatants or by their representatives, but almost overnight they were required to restore status quo ante. This proved formidable and difficult in the circumstances. A number of initial minor problems were allowed to snowball into confrontation between the Indian Peace Keeping Force and the LTTE. The death of the two regional commanders and 10 senior members of the LTTE in the hands of the IPKF worsened the situation. With the confrontation fast escalating, the Indian Peace Keeping Force resorted to a military offensive in Jaffna from 10th October 1987 for six weeks. The deaths, destruction and devastation and the brutalities, indignities, sufferings and oppression suffered by the innocent and defenceless Tamil people – our fathers, our mothers, our brothers, our sisters, – as a result of the military offensive have been told and retold many times. I do not propose to recount them here.

For about a quarter century, the small Sri Lankan Tamil nation has been oppressed by its own State. The Tamils were deprived of their individual and collective fundamental rights to language, education, employment and finally even representation in Parliament. They were discriminated, terrorised and bullied by their own State. They were driven to fight for their survival. It is to the help of such a nation that the Indian forces went as peace-keepers. They were welcome as friends and saviours. History will never absolve the taking of arms against such a nation of people as the Tamils by the Indian peace-keepers. Such act, violated the trusted neutral role of peace-keeping in a foreign land. 'Peace-keepers have a place and a role in international law. That has been violated. I will leave the matter at that.

The events of last year have brought about many changes in the external character of the Tamil problem. The actors have changed. The Indian forces have taken the place of the Sri Lankan forces. The Tigers who are holding their ground openly have gone underground. The focus has changed. Earlier, it was confronting the Tigers indirectly and not openly. Now, it is finding the Tigers in their jungle hideouts and disarming them. All these changes do not add even a wee bit to solving the Tamil problem. Indeed, the problem remains totally untouched by all these changes. It is misplaced belief in the power of military might to solve the Tamil problem that has brought all these irrelevent changes to the forefront. The Tamil problem has not been and will not be solved by any superior armed military might. It is a problem of a nation created by the denial of equality, justice and dignity. What the Tamil people want is to live in equality, justice and dignity. Restoration of these to them do not need any armed military might.

The restoration of these in the various forms cannot be done in vacua. It must be done in consultation with and in agreement with the representatives of the Tamil people. Such a settlement will bring about a lasting and durable solution to the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka.

AFFIDAVIT

VIJAYALEGCHUMY, widow of Nithyanantharajah, 3rd lane, Arasady, Nallur, Jaffna.

My beloved husband Ratnam Nithiyanantharajah was the sole bread-winner of the family and the entire family depended on his income.

On 5.7.88 my husband Ratnam Nithyanantharajan aged 48 years, Mechanic was returning home from his place of work and unfortunately he got caught in between the cross firing and a shot having attacked him succumbed to his injuries.

There are four children in the family and myself and our children were depending on his earnings.

Since the death of my beloved husband the entire family is driven into utter starvation, without none to provide.

Name of the Deceased: RAYAPPAN JESURAJAH, son of S. RAYAPPEN, ALANKERNY, KINNIYA Husband of T. VIJAYASIRI, KOONITHIEVU Muthur of Trincomalee District.

Detail History: Arrested by IPKF on 11.7.88 at Soodaikudai which is 3 miles off Koonithievu and detailed at IPKF Camp.

On 16.7.88 he complained of fever, vomitting and passing dark coloured urine. Admitted to Camp medical centre and treated by Dr. Narang of the IPKF. He has diagnosed as 'Hepatitis' (Jaundice) and treated for it. He also advised the higher officers to evacuate him to Trincomalee hospital for further management. But they delayed it by giving reason as 'Transport difficulty'.

Under these circumstances he died there in 18.7.88 at 3.30 a.m. Magistrate along with doctor visited the scene on 19.7.88 at 8.30.a.m. They were surprised to see that the detention camp is a small corridor behind an unfinished house (around 12' x5'). No permanent roof, a small tent cloth was covering 2/3 of the roof. In this camp 6 males and one female were kept at that time.

After visiting the scene they visited the Muthur hospital mortuary to see the body. Magistrate requested the doctor to conduct the postmortem.

There were multiple abrasions and contusions present all over the body. There were laceration injuries present in the both buttocks due to dragging.

The body was deeply 'Icterus' - yellow in colour.

The important postmortem finding was there was big contusion injury measuring 4' x 3' present in the lower part of the right lobe of the liver. This injury is only causative factor for the jaundice. Parts of the Liver, Kidney & stomach along with blood sent to Govt. Analyst, Colombo for report.

During Magistrate inquiry father & wife of the deceased strongly mentioned that he died due to IPKF assault. They also mentioned that when he was taken into custody he was healthy & did not have any disease. Detention in charge officer IPKF Camp & IPKF doctor refused to give statement at the magistrate inquiry & walked out as requested by their higher authorities. The magistrate gave an open verdict and asked the police to investigate.

SUBRAMANIYAM SATTANATHAPILLAI (48)
Ward No. 5, Thiriyai Trincomalee

I was residing with my wife and two childern at the above address for the last four decades. In October 85 the whole village was attacked and burnt by the Sri Lankan Security Forces. All the residents left Thiriyai and went o Mullaitivu as refugees.

After the signing of the Indo Sri Lanka Agreement on 29th July 1987 I returned to my native village of Thiriyai with other families in October 1987.

On 30.6.1988 I heard an explosion which I came to know subsequently as a land mine in which a few Indian Soldiers lost their lives.

On 02.07.88, 10 Indian Soldiers came to my house at about 11 a.m. and took me to the Indian Army Camp at Thiriyai. Through fear I did not protest or ask the reason for such arrest. At about 5 p.m. on the same day, I was taken to a room and I was asked to raise my hands and I was assaulted with a batton on the hip and buttock. They asked me only one question. 'Did you supply food to 3 members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam?' I told them that I did not supply food. I was kept in the Indian Army Camp till 13.7.1988. I was assaulted by the Indian soldiers every evening. I was subjected to electric current treatment on six occasions. I was later asked to work in their camp as their labourer. There were nearly 12 detainees like me who underwent the same agony. I was released on 13.7.88.

MUTTAN SELLI (46) Puttur East, Puttur.

The deceased Muttan Kuganandamoorthy (27) was my son.

On 24.7.88 at about 10.00 a.m. during the IPKF search operations in Puttur my son M. Kuganandamoorthy who was at home was shot dead by IPKF personnel.

The dead body of my son was taken away by the IPKF to the Puttur camp.

The dead body of my son was collected from the IPKF camp at 3.00 p.m. and cremated on 25.7.88.

IPKF personnel who searched our house removed a bicycle and 2 wrist watches which have not been returned.

My son M. Kuganandamoorthy was not involved in any anti Government activities. He was a Farmer.

I am a widow and Kuganandamoorthy was only son. I have two daughters both unmarried aged 24 and 18.

Kuganandamoorthy was the only earning member in the family by whose death my two daughters and I have been made destitute.

MRS. KANTHAPPILLAI THANKAM, Navatkadu South, Atchuvely

I have two children and one of whom known as "KANESAMOORTHY" is my eldest son and the bread winner of my family was shot dead by the IPKF on 30.7.88.

My husband Mr. Kanthapillai is disabled and the deceased who was my son was shouldered with much responsibility to look after us as well as his unmarried sister.

His unfortunate death caused me to undergo untold hardship to keep my head above water.

CRP

4 Sinhalese colomists were killed at Welioya on 28.7.88 by persons suspected to be Tamil militants.

The SLFP is receiving American funds from big California businessmen. What tune they will call in return remains to be seen.

Sinnathamby Tharmalingam of Tellippallai detained under the PTA for the past 4 years and 5 months is sentenced to two weeks simple imprisonment on a charge of having failed to divulge information re some terrorists.

Several new Sinhala colonies are being set up in haste in the Trincomalee District. Incentives and army protection are being provided.

Mamaduwa a Sinhalese village in Vavuniya was attacked on 29.7.88. Two Sinhalese were killed. Several houses were damaged.

Ganesh of Atchuvely was arrested by the IPKF on 24.7.88. His father was informed on 31.7.88 that his son is dead. Some ash said to be the remains of his son are given to him.

அமைதி காத்தல்! 1987 ஐப்பசி

ஸ்வப்னா

எங்கள் வீதிகள் ஒழுங்கைகள் வழியே
எத்தனை காலம் அஞ்சி நடந்தோம்
எங்கள் வேலிகள் சுவர்களின் நடுவே
எத்தனை நாட்கள் பதுங்கி மறந்தோம்
எங்கள் வீட்டு இளைஞருக் காக
எத்தனை இரவுகள் நித்திரை மறந்தோம்
எங்கள் வாழ்வை எமக்கென மீட்க
எத்தனை ஆண்டுகள் கடுந்தவமிருந்தோம்.

வந்தது போரின் முடிவெனச் சொன்னார்
வந்தது நல்ல தீர்ப்பெனச் சொன்னார்
வந்தவர் அழையா விருந்தினரெனிலும்
வாசல்கள் யாவும் விரித்து திறந்தோம்
வந்தவர் நண்பர்கள் என்று நினைந்தோம்
வீதிகள் தோறும் தோரணம் இழைத்தோம்
வந்தனை செய்தோம் வாழ்த்தி மகிழ்ந்தோம்
வந்தது சூறையின் கண்ணிடை அமைதி.

கடற்கரை வயல்கள் வீதிகள் வெளிகள்
காணுந் திசைதொறுங் கவச ஊர்திகள்
இடியென விழுந்த பலபெரும் வெடிகள்
தொடரும் பறிமுதல் கொள்ளைகள் கொலைகள்
படைகளின் ஒதுங்கி நாடிய நிழல்கள்
பெருஞ்சிறை ஆயின ஆலய மதில்கள்
சுடலையின் மோனம் சூழ்ந்திட எங்கள்
அமைதியைக் காத்தன ஆயுதப் படைகள்.

இருளாய் விடிந்த பொழுதில் விழித்தோம்
கனவு கலைந்தோம் போரில் எழுந்தோம்
எங்கள் வாழ்வை எமக்கென மீட்க
எத்தனை ஆண்டும் போரிடத் துணிந்தோம்.

THE DAY OF BETRAYAL AND SERVILITY

LONDON: Britain's Tamils Decry the Accord

'Over 200 angry protesters greeted Sri Lankan Prime Minister Premadasa and his wife when they visited Springvale, Australia. The protesters members of the Ceylon Tamil Association gathered outside Springvale City Hall, on 30.7.88 waving placards and chanting slogans. Dr. Rajan Rasiah, Vice President of the Association said that the protest was organised to drive home to the P.M. their grievances with the Sri Lankan Government which had not treated the minority Tamils reasonably.

Demonstrations all over the world against the Accord

The Eelam Tamils living all over the world have, on the first anniversary of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 29th July 1987, successfully organized and launched protest marches and demonstrations condemning the ill fated Accord and highlighting the utter failure in its execution.

The International Tamil Community has driven home to the several non-governmental organisations that the Indian government which had firstly failed to recognize the basic principles of Tamil nationalism, Tamil homelands and the right to self determination of the Tamils in the Accord, has subsequently, through its unbridled and indisciplined army of illiterate and inhuman soldiers, killed and maimed thousands of innocent children, women, men and students besides having raped and indecently assaulted and outraged the modesty of many hundreds of Tamil women and girls of the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.

With a view to attracting the attention and focussing the concentration of the cilivized nations of the world many of which still appear to be labouring under the delusion that India, the land of the Mahatma "Can do no wrong", the internationally scattered Tamils have held Seminars, Discussions, Exhibitions, Demonstrations, Rallies and Protest Marches in many parts of the world.

Given below are brief accounts of the mournful anniversary activities:-

U.S.A.

The Tamils living in the USA with the support and guidance of Miss Karen Parker of the Association for Human Rights, Rev. Father Thomas Amalathas of the World Tamil Movement, Mr Veeramany, of the Dravida Kazhagam and Mr. Wakely Paul, constitational law expert and attorney-at-law, launched a protest march in Washington on the 29th of July 1988, condemning the shametul Accord of July 1987 and urging the American government to intervene to ameliorate the sufferings of the Tamils in Sri Lanka.

The protest-march which lasted for about three hours and covered a distance of two miles ended at Larbian Park in front of the White House. The protest march was followed by a meeting in the Park during which many speakers spoke. At the end of the meeting it was resolved to urge the American government to recognize the LTTE as sole representatives and leaders of the Tamils and to request the American Government to use its good offices to ask the Indian government to declare a cease fire forthwith.

CANADA

On the 29th of last month the Tamils of Canada organized an exhibition in Toronto, Canada commemorating the ignominious Accord of last year and highlighting the gap between the words and deeds of the Rajiv government. Many hundreds of photographs and sketches depicting the atrocities and iniquities and orgies perpetrated and indulged in by the Indian forces were displayed at the Exhibition.

The organizers of the Exhibition had also issued several thousands of pamphlets and leaflets in the English and French languages decrying the hollowness of the Accord.

AUSTRALIA

The Tamil residents of Melbourne and Canberra in Australia organized and participated in mammoth meetings condemning the Peace Accord of 1987 and demanding that the Accord should be annulled forthwith. On the 30th of July the Tamils of Sydney observed a day of fasting protesting against the Accord which has resulted in widening the discord between the Tamils and the Sinhalese.

FRANCE

The liberation organizations and the Social Service institutions of France together with the Tamils living in France staged a procession on the 29th July 1988, in remembrance of the signing of the Accord of July 1987 which has in its wake brought untold hardships and misery to the Tamils living in Sri Lanka.

WEST GERMANY

The Tamil residents of West Germany observed the 29th of July 1988 as a day of mourning, wearing black badges and bands. On the 30th, the Tamils living in the town of Dussel Dorf staged a protest march at Stausenplatz, passing through the streets wherein the embassies and High Commissions of Argentina, Denmark, Canada and Sweden and situated.

NETHERLANDS

On the first anniversary of the signing of the despicable Accord of 29th July 1987, the Tamils living in Netherlands organized a big rally to voice their dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Accord has been implemented during the last 12-months. A big crowd assembled before the Indian High Commission in the Netherlands and chanted slogans describing the inhuman and beastly behaviour of the Indian forces in Sri Lanka.

NORWAY

The Tamils living in the towns of Oslo, Bergen, Drammen, Romso and Arendal together with the various human rights organizations staged a protest rally at Oslo on the 29th. At the end of the rally, they handed over a Memo to the Indian High Commissioner to be given to the Prime Minister of India.

BRITAIN

In commemoration of the signing of the much criticized Accord of July 1987, the various Tamil Organisations of London staged a Protest Demonstration and March in London. The march which started at Tyburn Way near Oxford Street covered a distance of about 3 miles and ended at Temple Place near the Indian High Commission.

More than 10,000 pamphlets and notices exposing the hollowness of the Accord and the criminal intentions of Rajiv Gandhi were distributed to the various sections of the communities all over England.

CONFRONTATION



1

COLOMBO, July 1.

At least seven IPKF soldiers and two Tamil militants were killed in separate incidents of mine blast and exchange of fire in the North-Eastern Province during the last 36 hours.

Elsewhere in the Southern Province, the Chairman of a District Development Counil (DDC), said to be a Government supporter, and two policemen were killed in two separate incidents during the period.

At least four IPKF personnel were killed in mine blast and few others including a JCO were injured in the Eastern Province yesterday. In another incident of exchange of fire with the militants at Nedunkerni in Mullaitivu district yesterday, three IPKF soldiers and a militant were killed. Three militants were injured in the incident, a spokesperson of the Indian High Commission said here today.

The IPKF went on search operation through the villages Puliyalankulam, Nelukulam, Sharathipuram, Rajendrankulam, Chekkadipulavu, Iyankavur, Maniyankulam, Paratkulam, enquired about the tigers and assaulted them heavily till their innocence was proved. Two civilians, Bala and Dharmu were shot dead. Gripped with fear more than 400 families shifted to Vavuniya town as refugees.

2

5 IPKF personnel were killed in a ladmine attack by LTTE in Jaffna between Palai and Eluthumathuval.

3

MADRAS, July 3.

In the continuing Indian Peace Keeping Force operations in Sri Lanka, Selvam, a hardcore LTTE member, was killed and another, Raju Mahalingam, was apprehended in Palali area yesterday, according to an official press release. A shopkeeper and his wife, who harboured militants, were also apprehended and a gun and a few cyanide capsules were recovered from them, the release said.

In Batticaloa sector, searches yielded a cache of heavy arms which included SMC guns, 60 mm and 83 mm bombs besides spare parts.

LTTE commandos ambushed an army convoy in between Viswamadu and 11th post. 9 IPKF soldiers killed. A LTTE girl, Maria lost her life.

In retaliation the IPKF shot dead 3 civilians at Viswamadu and burnt down 15 houses.

In an another encounter at Thanneermurippu the IPKF suffered heavy casualties. Then IPKF madly shelled the populated areas of Thanneermarippu, Thakaravadi, Kumulamunai, Andankulam. Helicopters strafed and a plane raided with 250 kg bombs.

Mrs. Arumugam and her child were dead and several others wounded.

4

COLOMBO, July 4.

At least six IPKF jawans, three militants and two civilians were killed in different incidents of ambush laid by the LTTE on IPKF patrol in the Northern and Eastern provinces of the island during the last 36 hours.

Three jawans were killed and two others injured when an IPKF patrol was ambushed by the LTTE militants northeast of Nedunkerni in Vavuniya sector yesterday. One woman and a child were also killed in the incident as the militants had been firing "indiscriminately" a spokesperson of the Indian High Commission said here today. — PTI

5

In Pothukulam jungle area at Trincomalee 7 IPKF were killed in a LTTE landmine blast.

In consequence the IPKF shelled indiscriminately at Kudumimalai, Pulipainthakal, Miankulam, Aliaodai, Erulaikulam, Pluthumanodai, and caused extensive damages to the public offices, school and market. Most of the affected families went to Kiran Si'handi, Santhiveli as refugees.

6

COLOMBO, July 6.

One Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) jawan was killed and two were wounded in encounters with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka's North and East yesterday, a spokesperson for the Indian High Commission said today.

She said one jawan was killed in an encounter at Kuchchuveli in Trincomalee district while two others were wounded in exchange of fire with the LTTE at Puthur in the Jaffna sector and Eravur in Batticaloa.

She said a number of incidents had been reported where LTTE men had attacked IPKF patrols with guns and grenades but there were no other casualties on the IPKF side. — UNI

9

3 civilians and 4 IPKF men were killed in an encounter between LTTE and IPKF at Pudukudiyiruppu, when a bus carrying IPKF soldiers.

In a Claymore mine attack on IPKF at Kilinochi, LTTE killed 5 IPKF soldiers and wounded many.

3 IPKF men killed in a cylinder attack by LTTE in Mudur, Trincomalee.

The IPKF fired on civilians and killed S. Ponniah (60) and his son P. Sasikumar (12) and wounded many in Trincomalee Dt.

10

Two killed in ambush: Tamil rebels killed two passengers and wounded 15, including five Indian soldiers, in a bus ambush in northern Sri Lanka on Saturday, witnesses said.

They said LTTE guerrillas attacked the bus, carrying some 40 passengers from Jaffna peninsula to Mullaitivu in the north-east, at Anandapura.

The witnesses said the bus driver drove to the nearest hospital without stopping. There were 20 soldiers on the bus but they did not return fire.

12

COLOMBO July 12.

Three LTTE militants and two Indian Peace Keeping Force officials were killed and two IPKF jawans wounded in an exchange of fire at Chelai in Mullaitivu district yesterday, a spokesperson for the Indian High Commission said today.

She said the two officers were killed and the two jawans wounded when the LTTE militants fired at a boat in which they were travelling. Other IPKF men in the boat returned the fire, killing three militants.

She said one LTTE detenu, Vigneswaran, was shot dead by the IPKF when he tried to escape from a detention centre in the northern Vavuniya sector, while three others were apprehended in Batticaloa, Vantharamoolai and Dharmapuram. — UNI

13

The IPKF went on a search mission to Manthuvil village, razed down most of the huts and burnt it. People went to nearby villages and forest as refugees.

One IPKF soldiers was shot dead by LTTE near Vilavidai, Kilinochi dt.

14

20 IPKF personnel were killed in a landmine blast set by LTTE at 10th post, Akkarayankulam. The truck was smashed in to pieces. 6 IPKF men were killed in Kokavil by LTTE landmine attack.

In Jaffna, at Sunnagam many IPKF men were shot dead by LTTE. Many wounded.

15

The Indian soldiers fired indiscriminately in Murasumoddai village. Four civilians including a school girl were fired.

The IPKF encircled the villages Kaddaiparichen, Kadarkaraichenai, Sambur and arrested 20 civilians including four women. They were taken away. Till then nothing was heard about them.

3 IPKF soldiers at Paranthan junction and 4 soldiers at Mangulam were killed and many got injuries by LTTE attacks.

16

The IPKF shot dead Sumsudeen while he was fishing in the river. Another civilian, Jayaseelan was dragged out from bus and killed.

Kasim, a LTTE Lt. fought with IPKF bravely and died at Sulipuram.

3 IPKF men shot dead by LTTE at 60th post, near Pothuvil in an encounter. In Pulipainthakal 2 more IPKF lost lives and many injured.

17

PTI reports from Colombo:

Six IPKF soldiers and one Tamil militant were killed in different incidents of mine blast and exchange of fire between the IPKF and the LTTE in the north and eastern provinces during the last 36 hours.

A spokesperson of the Indian High Commission here today confirmed that four IPKF soldiers were killed when their vehicle was involved in a mine blast near Konari in Batticaloa sector yesterday morning.

She said in another incident of exchange of fire with the LTTE near Manipan in Jaffna, one militant was killed and seven IPKF soldiers were wounded. Two of the wounded soldiers later succumbed to injuries.

A militant was apprehended at Eranpettikulam, and over 30 kilos of explosives and an improvised explosive device (IED) was recovered by a police patrol from a place near Paranthan, in the Vavuniya sector.

At Trincomalee the IPKF recovered one IED, five hand-grenades, large quantity of ammunition and a generating set, she added.

At Uppuvil, Trincomallee dt, some civilians were arrested and taken away. In the IPKF camps they were tortured severely. Raghavan succumbed to his wounds in their custody.

Near Mallagam, LTTE charged with hand grenades on a IPKF truck. Damages not known.

The IPKF infantry caught in landmines set by LTTE In Alagulam, Mannar and lost 4 men, got many injured.

18

Two Indian soldiers killed: "Tamil militants killed two Indian soldiers and wounded five in an ambush in Sri Lanka's Northern province, officials of the Indian High Commission said today. They said one rebel was injured in the clash at Manipay on Sunday.

19

COLOMBO, July 19.

Five Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) personnel were killed and one was wounded when their vehicle was blown up yesterday after hitting a landmine planted by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) at Pesalai in Sri Lanka's North-Western Mannar district.

A spokesperson for the Indian High Commission, however, said they had no reports.

Travellers from the Northern Jaffna town said that the LTTE leadership had issued orders to their cadres at all levels to launch attacks on the IPKF men in their areas. They said the recent attacks, in which more than 15 IPKF men have reportedly been killed, was a sequel to the order.

The IPKF was in full control in the Jaffna peninsula, and the militants were not in a position to attack them. However, they were seeking to prevent the people, including grama sevakas (village headmen) and other Government employees, from having any contact with the IPKF, the travellers added. — UNI

YOUTH DIES UNDER IPKF CUSTODY

IPKF based in Navatkuli recently arrested a youth from the same area for interrogation. His body was later handed over to the Jaffna Hospital with severe wounds. The name of the victim is Rajkumar (16).

7 IPKF SOLDIERS KILLED

The LTTE, in a statement issued to Reuters on June 11, claimed that they had killed seven Indian soldiers and destroyed their jeep by one of their landmines in Panichankerni in the eastern province of Batticaloa. No one from the Indian High Commission was forthcoming to comment on this report. TVI







JEAN-PAUL WALRAVENS (PICHA)/*Belgium*

At Mangeni village LTTE guerrillas attacked IPKF truck by setting landmines and killed 11 soldiers and wounded 4. At Mudur near Kattaiparichan bridge, one soldier killed, two wounded in the same kind of attack by LTTE. In Trincomalee, Kutchaveli 2 IPKF men were caught in the mines and dead.

IPKF shot dead two Sinhala civilians, P.H. Sumantilaka (18), M.H. Austin Fernand (25) who ran out of fear.

20

Express News Service

Madras, July 20: In fighting between LTTE guerillas and IPKF soldiers in eastern Batticaloa district on Monday, 11 soldiers including an army major were killed, the Tigers said here on Wednesday.

The guerillas had an encounter with IPKF at Kirumichai when soldiers going from Madurankulam for search operations surprised them. In the ensuing fighting, a major and 10 soldiers were killed. Four soldiers were seriously injured, while a jeep and a truck were destroyed.

The Indian soldiers went on a search and destroy mission through the villages Thalvupadu, Erukalampiddy, Pesalai. They razed and burnt down some 75 houses. They took away 300 civilians to their camps and tortured them, enquiring about LTTE. In Eechangulam at Vavuniya a shop was looted by IPKF and the shop keeper's wife with 6 months baby were abducted along with 17 civilians to the camp. Their fate still not known.

4 civilians were abducted by IPKF at Sammanturai in Batticoloa. 3 were shot dead and 1 women wounded.

22

On the 22nd quisling group, who were protected by the Indian Army, killed Jyothi, a LTTE fulltime helper at Kanguveli in Muthur District.

23

Express News Service

Madras, July 23: Indian troops on Saturday smashed the LTTE-Mullaitivu base camp, three km south of Nittukaikulam in thick jungles, killing seven militants and losing three of its own men.

A defence spokesman said here that the camp, occupied by 30 men, had 12 bunkers and heavily booby trapped, captured by the IPKF after heavy fighting. A large cache of arms and explosives was seized from the camp.

At Sastrikulam, northwest of Vavuniya, five "hardcore" LTTE men, including Ravi and Mohan, were captured in an IPKF operation. LTTE men Vijay Kumar and Dayaparan were held in northern Batticaloa, while one militant, Vasant was captured in southern Batticaloa. Another man accompanying him was shot dead.

24

MADRAS, July 24.

The IPKF have captured another heavily booby trapped LTTE camp with ten bunkers during the follow-up operations in the Mullaitivu jungles, according to an IPKF press release. Two militants were killed in the operation.

The press release says "the captured documents revealed that this camp was the headquarters of Balraj, who is the military leader of Mullaitivu. The IPKF is combing the area for those who have fled into the jungle. It is not known if Balraj is wounded.' In Jaffna, one militant was shot dead and Ratna Singham and Ganesh of Nesam group were captured with a large amount of explosives. Two militants, Murthy and Poonathan, were captured in Kilinochchi area.

Seven LTTE militants and three IPKF soldiers were killed when the Indian Peace Keeping Force hit upon a major LTTE camp, three km south of Nittunkaikulam in the thick jungles of Mullaitivu district. Nine other LTTE militants were wounded.

According to a Defence Ministry press release, the camp contained 30 militants and had 12 bunkers and was heavily booby-trapped. This was being set up as a LTTE headquarters in Mullaitivu district. The camp was attacked and captured after heavy fighting. A large cache of explosives and ammunition had been captured.

In Shastrikullam, north west of Vavuniya, five LTTE hardcore militants, including Ravi and Mohan, were captured in a swift operation. In Northern Batticaloa, LTTE militants Vijay Kumar and Dayaparan have been captured in cordon and search operations. In Southern Batticaloa one LTTE militant was shot dead and another named Vasant captured. In Vavuniya 15 PLOT militants have been apprehended.

25

Seven IPKF men were killed in a landmine attack by LTTE in between Alangulam and Madu, Mannar Dt.

One of IPKF was killed in an ambush by LTTE at 7th Block.

In Direct confrontation with IPKF who were coming along Nedunkerni – Maruthoodi, the LTTE killed 4 soldiers and wounded 3.

26

Four thousand Tamils left their dwellings and escaped into the jungles of Mullaitivu, Vavuniya, and Kilinochchi due to IPKF blind attack with more than 400 shells in the villages of Mullaithivu dt. The casualties among the civilians in this intensive attack are not known.

The Indo-Sri Lankan accord saved this country, my government from more disasters. Indian soldiers have died and Indian money has been spent on our behalf. We should be grateful to them.
—J R Jayewardene

NO COURT ACTION AGAINST IPKF- DIXIT

Since the IPKF is a foreign force operating in Sri Lanka under the terms of the Indo-Lanka accord the question of local citizens filing habeas corpus applications against Indian Army officers does not arise according to Indian High Commissioner, J.N. Dixit.

The Indian High Commissioner was replying to a question as to whether Brigadier Manjid Singh of the IPKF intends to seek legal immunity in a case filed against him by Parameswaran Sumathy in the Court of Appeal.

In her habeas corpus application Mrs Sumathy of Cheddikulam states that her brother Parameswaran Kenga (22) was arrested by IPKF officers attached to the Vavuniya camp on April 5th.

She has cited Brigadier Manjid Singh and the Attorney General as respondents.

Brigadier Manjith Singh of the Vavuniya IPKF camp has been cited as a respondent in a Habeas Corpus Application field in the Court of Appeal registry challenging arrest of one Parameswaran Kenga (22). The application was filed by Attorney-at-Law Mr. A.Vinayagamoorthi on behalf of Kenga's daughter Sumathi, for her father to be produced before a Court of Law.

27

Rita Sebastian, Express News Service, reports: Four members of the LTTE were killed in three separate incidents in Jaffna yesterday, according to Indian High Commission sources.

In the Mullaitivu district, three bunkers and three trenches were reported destroyed.

The same sources reported that according to an LTTE intercept, five LTTE members were killed and three wounded on July 21.

In eastern Batticaloa district, 25 LTTE sympathisers were taken into custody by the IPKF yesterday and a large cache of arms and ammunition recovered in Akkaraipattu.

28

The Indian Peace Keeping Force has destroyed another fortified LTTE base in the jungles of Sri Lanka's Mullaitivu district. A Defence Ministry press release said the base had 12 bunkers with all administrative facilities for the militant leaders

During the last 48 hours, troops had raided two camps, one at Pankulam in the Trincomalee area in which a large quantity of medical stores including over 1,000 vials and 69 bottles of drugs were recovered.

The press release said that in search operations in various places during the last two days, as many as 12 LTTE hard core militants had been killed, six wounded and eight others captured alive. A militant leader of Jaffna, Nedunkuna Raj alias Kannan was among those killed. Among the captured, Ganeshmurthy, Theevan and Udaiyan were prominent in the Batticaloa area. The IPKF lost one soldier.

Colombo, July 28: Fourteen Sinbalese farmers were massacred on Thursday morning allegedly by the LTTE in Welioya' in Anuradhapura district. Two others were seriously injured.

29

Two IPKF men were killed and many wounded at 12th check post in Paranthan – Mullaitivu Road by LTTE attack. The villages at Killinochchi and Mullaithivu were under IPKF attacks, heavy artillery and helicopter gunships hae been used. Civilian casualties are not known.

Gandhi a LTTE cadre, was killed in an encounter between LTTE and Sri Lankan forces near Vilcumvikarai Camp.

30

Two militants killed: The IPKF operations continued unabated in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. In the Jaffna sector, eight hardcore militants were captured and two 60 mm mortars, recovered. The LTTE militants were also tracked down in the Vavuniya sector, where two were shot dead and another seven captured

A hide-out was raided in the Nedunkeni area and 200 kg. of ration items were recovered among other things. Raids in the Trincomalee sector recovered a walkie-talkie radio set, a 35 HP OBM and other explosive devices used by the militants, including claymore mines.

31

MADRAS, July 31.

The IPKF continued relentless operations against the LTTE and during the last 24 hours have captured ten hardcore militants in the Jaffna and Vavuniya sectors including Thurian, Ranjan, Theevaraja and Kumara Singam and have recovered two explosive devices, according to a IPKF release.

A militant camp was raided in Omantai area near Vavuniya and a militant was captured along with ammunition and warlike stores.

In the Batticaloa sector, IPKF patrols located a hideout and recovered a sniper rifle, a 12 bore rifle and some quantities of ammunition and equipment, the release said.

Over 500 jawans killed: The IPKF had so far lost 537 soldiers and 1,400 were wounded. According to the radio intercepts of the LTTE's conversation, the LTTE had lost more than 1,000 boys. "In fact, 1,500." About 1,120 LTTE militants were apprehended and 198 had voluntarily surrendered to the IPKF. From July 16 to 25 this year, 39 LTTE militants were killed and 28 captured. They included "Capt." Martin, "Lt." Kasim, Jayakody and Kabilavan.

After the IPKF had gone to Sri Lanka, it had totally protected the Tamils from any atrocity or physical damage from the Sri Lankan armed forces, police or paramilitary. The Sri Lankan armed forces had remained confined to the barracks. The other "belligerent" party viz the LTTE did not hand over the arms fully. When the IPKF went looking for those arms, its personnel were shot at. The IPKF had to defend itself and it resorted to the use of weapons with "no malice". After Jaffna was captured, the IPKF men took full part in relief work.

The LTTE made one demand after another to achieve its "diabolical purpose". What was at stake was the principle that no group, fighting for any rights, in whatever form, could think it could get away with force of arms. The common Tamils of Sri Lanka should not be "subjugated to a fascist kind of system where they are told what they should do at the point of a gun," the IPKF spokesman said

KILLING ☐ FIELD

88 July

claims	IPKF		LTTE		S.L. ARMY		OTHER MILITANTS		CIVILIANS	
	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED
IPKF	7		2	2	2				1	
LTTE									2	
MEDIA									2	

2

5									
1									34

3

		1	1 C						2 C
9		2							5 C
7	2	3	1					2	

4

6	3								2
	1								
						2 EP			

5

7									
									11

6

1	2								



8

6								1	100 C

9

12								2	
	5							4	11

10

	5							2	10

12

2		3							
2	16	3							

13

1									

14

26									

15

7								4	20 C
1	1							6	

16

5		1						2	
6		1						2	

17

6	5	1							
4		1							

18

2	5		1						
6			70 C						

19

5	1								
14	6	1						2	

20

11								3	321 C

21

		1							
		10						9	

22

1									

23

3		7	8 C						
1									

24

		5							

25

12	3								

27

		4	25 C						
		1							

28

		16	8* 12 C					14	2

29

2		1							
							2		

30

		2							
		1							

31

			11 C						

TOTAL

32	18 25 C	39	11 32 A	2				3	12 2 C
115	9	10						15	346 C
31	24	22	1 70 C			2		29	56 100 C

* - Sri Lankan Information.c-captured. EP-EPRLF T-TELO, P:PLOTE, EN-ENDLF, E-EROS TNA-Tamil National Army CVF-Citizen s Voluntary Force

புலிகளின் தாகம்
தமிழீழத் தாயகம்